HISPANICS IN ARMY ROTC:
PROBLEMS WITH RECRUITING AND COMMISSIONING

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Hispanics in Army ROTC: Problems with Recruiting and Commissioning

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This study attempts to determine why Hispanic cadets are not being commissioned in the same proportion as their enrollment in ROTC would suggest. Currently, Hispanics comprise four percent of the nation's ROTC cadets, yet only one percent of the Army's officers who received their commissions through ROTC. For background information, the revival of ROTC after its turbulent history during the Vietnam war years is examined. The study then focuses on Hispanic participation in ROTC, data for which was obtained from a survey of the 37 ROTC units.
Block 20. ABSTRACT continued.

Those Hispanic cadets comprise 90 percent of the nation's total. The investigation concludes with a case study of ROTC in Puerto Rico.

Research reveals that the two ROTC programs in Puerto Rico constitute the majority of the nation's Hispanic cadets. Further investigation discloses that high cadet admission standards have not been maintained in Puerto Rico in order to meet high ROTC enrollment objectives. Cultural and linguistic problems which affect Hispanic cadets to a lesser degree elsewhere in the United States thus are exaggerated in Puerto Rico. The subsequent high attrition and decreased competitiveness of Puerto Rican cadets have resulted in fewer qualified officers being commissioned. This, in turn, has decreased Hispanic officer production nation-wide.
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

HISPANICS IN ARMY ROTC: PROBLEMS IN RECRUITING AND COMMISSIONING,
by Major James H. Proctor, Jr., USA, 160 pages.

This study attempts to determine why Hispanic cadets are not being commissioned in the same proportion as their enrollment in ROTC would suggest. Currently, Hispanics comprise four percent of the nation's ROTC cadets, yet only one percent of the Army's officers who received their commissions through ROTC. For background information, the revival of ROTC after its turbulent history during the Vietnam war years is examined. The study then focuses on Hispanic participation in ROTC, data for which was obtained from a survey of the 37 ROTC units whose Hispanic cadets comprise 90 percent of the nation's total. The investigation concludes with a case study of ROTC in Puerto Rico.

Research reveals that the two ROTC programs in Puerto Rico constitute the majority of the nation's Hispanic cadets. Further investigation discloses that high cadet admission standards have not been maintained in Puerto Rico in order to meet high ROTC enrollment objectives. Cultural and linguistic problems which affect Hispanic cadets to a lesser degree elsewhere in the United States thus are exaggerated in Puerto Rico. The subsequent high attrition and decreased competitiveness of Puerto Rican cadets have resulted in fewer qualified officers being commissioned. This, in turn, has decreased Hispanic officer production nation-wide.
I wish to use this space to express my appreciation to the many persons who assisted me in preparing this thesis. To those who gave of their time, knowledge, expertise, and experience, go my heartfelt thanks.

The members of my research committee gave me invaluable encouragement and assistance. In addition to his continuous review of my on-going work, consulting faculty member Colonel Theodore Suranyi-Unger was especially helpful in providing the initial spark of encouragement which launched this project. Research advisor Major Mark F. Brennan, Jr. was steadfast in his support from a hectic beginning, spent many long hours meticulously reviewing and then discussing with me each page of text, and kept my efforts "on track" with his penetrating and enlightening comments. Graduate faculty members Lieutenant Colonels Tyrone P. Fletcher and John A. Kochenour contributed much by emphasizing minority perspectives throughout my research.

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CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

Problem Statement

The production of qualified officers to lead its soldiers is an important task for any army. In the U.S. Army additional emphasis has been directed recently toward the production of female and minority officers, resulting in the commissioning of increased numbers of women and blacks. All too often there is a tendency to think of this latter group as the only minority group in the Army. This project, therefore, focuses on a smaller, less-discussed minority group, Hispanic Americans. It will investigate the production of Hispanic officers by the Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program, discover possible problem areas, and present potential solutions.

Background

The U.S. Army relies primarily on three sources for its commissioned officers - ROTC, the United States Military Academy (USMA), and Officers Candidate School (OCS). Of these three sources, ROTC produces the majority of the officers commissioned in the Army, including the majority of Hispanic officers. At the beginning of academic year 1977-1978, 2,388 (four percent) of the nation's ROTC cadets and 89 (2.3 percent) of the cadets at West Point were classified as Hispanics. In the OCS class which began...
30 October 1977 at Fort Benning, Georgia only three (1.46 percent) of the 206 candidates were Hispanics.\(^3\) Because of the limited numbers of Hispanics involved in the latter two programs, this study excludes USMA and OCS in its examination of Hispanic officer production. Even though Hispanics have never comprised less than four percent of ROTC enrollment over the past five academic years, they account for only 1.09 percent of the officer corps whose source of commission was ROTC.\(^4\) In the grades of first and second lieutenant — precisely the ranks where recent ROTC graduates on active duty would be found — Hispanic ROTC graduates comprise 1.25 percent of the officers commissioned through the ROTC program.\(^5\) This reveals that, while the trend is improving, Hispanic cadets in the ROTC program are not getting commissioned in the same proportion as their enrollment would suggest. Why this is so and how it can be corrected are the main thrusts of this study.

**Assumptions**

One must assume that the Army desires to have the percentage of officers who are Hispanic closely reflect the portion of the nation's population who are Hispanic. The current Department of the Army Affirmative Actions Plan (AAP) identifies specific goals only for blacks, "other" minorities, and women. For example, the goals established by the AAP for male minority group enrollment in ROTC through 1985 are to increase black enrollment to 19 percent and "other" minority enrollment to six percent.\(^6\) Included in the "other" minority category are four Hispanic subgroups, American Indians, and eight other ethnic groups identified by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. While the AAP does not specifically state that the ultimate objective is to have the ethnic composition of the Army representative of that of the country, the goals established for Army ROTC enrollment appear to be to bring black and "other" minority officer production more in line with the minority content of the nation's population. By increasing the percentage of minority officers in the Army, there will be more such officers to whom minority soldiers can relate. As Reverend Thomas Skinner, the spiritual leader of the Washington Redskins and noted lecturer on human relations, has pointed out, to encourage positive aspirations by minorities it is important to have visible minority "symbols of success" with whom like minorities can identify. Presently, Hispanics comprise five percent of the nation's population, 3.45 percent of the soldiers in the Army, but only 0.98 percent of its officer corps. It is equally important for Hispanic soldiers to identify with, relate to, and aspire to succeed like Hispanic officers as it is for other minorities to seek these things in officers of their own ethnic group. Therefore, it is important to raise the percentage of Hispanic officers at least to something closer to the percentage of Hispanic soldiers in the Army.

Finally, it is assumed that, before the conclusion of this study, no drastic changes will occur either in Hispanic enrollment in ROTC or in the commissioning of Hispanic officers through ROTC.

Definitions and Limitations

In order to be consistent with current Army terminology,
"Hispanic" will refer to anyone of Mexican-American, Puerto Rican, Cuban-American, or Spanish (Hispanics presumably not in the first three categories) origin. This approach, of course, precludes the classification/identification of other specific Spanish minorities, such as those originating from Spain, countries in South and Central America, or the Caribbean. The Army's Information Data Base, however, is not further defined.

Even the collection of data based on the above categories may not be completely accurate because of differing collection techniques. Previously, the determination of an individual's ethnic group was done by the observation of a clerk or administrative noncommissioned officer. Not knowing the differences between the Hispanic subgroups, he or she may have identified all Hispanics as being of "Spanish" origin. Secondly, although the determination of one's ethnic group now is done by the individual, there have been instances of persons changing their own ethnic grouping from year to year. Both the above circumstances weaken the validity of statistical analysis.

To focus this study the author decided to limit discussion of the situation only to those ROTC programs having "significant" Hispanic enrollment. "Significant" is defined by the author as Hispanic enrollment in ROTC of four percent or greater or enrollment of at least ten Hispanic cadets at the beginning of academic year 1977-1978. Inclusion of this last group means that some ROTC units with enrollment of more than 250 cadets but having less than four percent Hispanic enrollment will be examined. In reality, it
means the addition of only three more institutions to the data base—Texas A & M University (3.79%), University of Texas at Arlington (3.48%), and Colorado School of Mines (1.89%)—for a total of 37 ROTC units with "significant" Hispanic enrollment.

The author desired to compare Hispanic ROTC enrollment with the ethnic composition of the colleges and universities hosting ROTC programs. However, this information proved to be unobtainable except for institutions in the western states, where a special survey was conducted in October 1977 for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Even these figures were incomplete, as several institutions, either partially or entirely, failed to provide complete ethnic breakouts of their student populations. The absence of this data limited a more comprehensive look at Hispanic enrollment patterns.

Another limitation to the study was the absence of information on the number of Hispanics commissioned each year by each of the 37 selected ROTC units. Without this information it is impossible to make an accurate comparison at each unit between the number of Hispanics enrolled in the program and those being commissioned. Likewise, it is difficult to assess how Hispanics compared to their peers in the type of commissions (Regular Army or Reserve, the latter either Active Duty or Active Duty for Training) they received without this data for each ROTC unit. Fortunately, this information is available for the one institution about which an in-depth examination will be made.
Design of the Study

The mission and organization of ROTC will be described, and the current status of ROTC will be discussed in light of events during the past decade. Also, the questions of what qualifications are expected of the ROTC graduate and what identifies one ROTC unit as more successful than another will be addressed.

Institutions having significant Hispanic enrollment in ROTC will be examined, and the special attributes and problem areas of these institutions will be identified insofar as practical. Areas to be investigated will be regional groupings, patterns of enrollment by Hispanic subgroups, and possible cultural and linguistic problem areas of Hispanic cadets. To obtain information on these subjects the Professor of Military Science at each of the 37 ROTC units with significant Hispanic enrollment was sent a questionnaire on Hispanic participation in ROTC. Response to this appeal for information was both rapid and 100% complete - testimony to the conscientiousness of these officers and an invaluable contribution to this project.

Because over half of the nation's Hispanic cadets are found on the island of Puerto Rico, a most important part of this project will be a case study of the ROTC program at the University of Puerto Rico. Finaliy, conclusions will be drawn from the investigated material and recommendations will be given on improvements which can be made in ROTC programs to improve the production of qualified Hispanic officers.
CHAPTER 1 NOTES

1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), unpublished figures on Hispanic cadet enrollment extracted from each TRADOC Form 479 (Senior ROTC Enrollment Report) submitted by ROTC units as their opening enrollment for Academic Year 1977-1978.


4. Figures from the Army Information Data Bank provided by the Pre-Commissioning Programs Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Department of the Army.

5. See Appendix A for a complete breakout of Hispanic officers by grade and source of commission.


9. Gomes, p. 32.

10. See Appendix A.

11. See Appendix F for the cover letter and Appendix G for the questionnaire sent to each PMS.

12. Contributing heavily to this portion of the study are the observations of and the data collected by the author over a span of almost three years residence in Puerto Rico. During this time he was an assistant professor of military science at Humacao University College, located on the eastern coast of Puerto Rico and one of several regional campuses in the UPR system.
CHAPTER 2

THE ROTC ENVIRONMENT

To insure that one has an understanding of the ROTC environment in which Hispanic participation will be examined one must be familiar with the mission and objectives of ROTC, the requirements for a successful ROTC unit, and ROTC's recent history.

The mission of the Army ROTC program as stated in Army Regulation No. 145-1 is "to obtain well-educated commissioned officers in sufficient numbers to meet Army requirements." Also set forth in the regulation are the objectives of the program:

... to attract, motivate, and prepare selected students with potential to serve as commissioned officers in the Regular Army or the U.S. Army Reserve; to provide an understanding of the fundamental concepts and principles of military art and science and to develop leadership and managerial potential, a basic understanding of associated professional knowledge, a strong sense of personal integrity, honor, and individual responsibility, and an appreciation of the requirements for national security.

Basically, the above objectives are those characteristics expected of all the Army's officers, but certain other requirements are also made of each ROTC unit.

To insure that ROTC programs produce officers in an economical manner, the Department of the Army (DA) has established specific minimum figures for enrollment and officer production. An ROTC unit falling below the enrollment minimum will be placed on
probation, and one failing to commission at least the required minimum number of officers each year is subject to withdrawal by DA. At institutions administering the 4-year, or a combination of 4-year and 2-year ROTC programs AR 145-1 specifies a minimum opening enrollment of 20 cadets in MS III and a minimum annual production of 15 officers. Additionally, the regulation stipulates that, to be retained at an institution, each ROTC unit "must produce ROTC graduates of the caliber to successfully function as commissioned officers."4

Within the above qualitative and quantitative parameters, for the past several years major attention has been placed on the latter aspect of the ROTC program. This emphasis has been generated at high Army levels and has been reinforced at the ROTC unit level through such measures as PMS (Professor of Military Science) Conferences, memorandums from higher headquarters, and personal counselling. While no document exists which singles out one area of the ROTC program as the most important, extensive conversations with numerous ROTC instructors over the past four years have detected an overwhelming consensus: the perception that high enrollment was the primary key to success in an ROTC unit.

The above situation can be more easily appreciated by a look at the recent history of ROTC. At the beginning of academic year 1977-1978, 59,677 students were enrolled in ROTC programs throughout the nation, an increase of 9.15 percent over academic year 1976-1977 and 23.3 percent over academic year 1973-1976.5 In 1978 the Army will commission about 6,500 cadets, the majority of whom
will serve on active duty. The remainder will serve in the Reserve Components, helping to fill critical requirements for junior officers in the Army Reserve and National Guard.

The above encouraging picture of Army ROTC, however, has not always been the case. During the past decade ROTC has undergone a period of significant turbulence and noticeable change. As the symbol of the draft and the United States presence in Vietnam, ROTC offered a convenient on-campus target for college and university opponents to the war in Southeast Asia. The ROTC programs of all three services received an unprecedented level of abuse - student protests, academic denunciation, removal of credit for courses, and expulsion of the program from many campuses. In more violent cases, fire bombings and riots resulted in property damage, physical injury, and even deaths. As the Vietnam War and protests continued, opening enrollment in Army ROTC across the nation plummeted from a high of 177,000 in 1967 to a low of 33,220 in 1973.

Because of the opposition to ROTC and the concurrent decline in enrollment, numerous studies were made to determine the causes of this situation and to develop possible solutions to the problems. At the height of this "period of unprecedented faculty and student opposition to ROTC on many campuses," the Department of Defense organized the Special Committee on ROTC, composed of prominent civilian educators and service representatives. In September 1969 the committee presented 21 specific recommendations on ROTC to the Secretary of Defense, most of which were concerned
with the relationship between ROTC and the host colleges and universities. In 1971, the Army tasked its contract advertising firm, N. H. Ayer and Son, with investigating attitudes towards ROTC among college and high school students.\(^6\) Commissioned by the Department of Defense in 1972, the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) studied enrollment-related factors when it investigated career potential among ROTC enrollees.\(^7\) Three years later HumRRO examined minority officer procurement in the Armed Forces and concluded that "ROTC plays a very important role in building minority officer strength in the Army."\(^8\)

The officer corps itself, of course, was fully aware of the ROTC predicament and contributed many studies of its own. Between 1966 and 1977 no less than 30 student monographs on the difficulties of ROTC were written at the Army's Command and General Staff College, the Army War College, and the Air War College. Finally, one could not fail to mention the dozens of articles that were written about ROTC in Army, Military Review, The Officer, The Review, and other professional journals, as well as national news magazines during this turbulent period.\(^9\)

To improve ROTC enrollment, the Army has taken several measures, many of which were recommendations of one or more of the aforementioned studies. It is difficult, however, to describe a particular measure as being directly attributable to a specific study as each has contributed knowledge in this area. Also, some of these actions taken were not new but extensions of measures previously instituted after passage of the ROTC Vitalization Act.
of 1964. Among the measures taken was the elimination of mandatory attendance during the first two years of ROTC at most colleges and universities — an issue primarily at land-grant institutions. Compulsory attendance in the Basic Course remains the prerogative of the state or institution, however, and 19 schools retain this requirement in some form. Changes in the ROTC curricula have resulted in the elimination of much repetitious-type training and its replacement by more demanding academic courses.

Upgrading the academic credentials of ROTC instructors was enhanced in 1970 by the introduction of the Advance Degree Program for ROTC Instructor Duty. In 1972 admission of women into the program began as a limited test at ten selected institutions. Changes in leadership laboratories, such as incorporating orienteering or Ranger-type training, have greatly improved the "drills" of previous years. Expansion of professional development and enrichment (PD&E) opportunities to include possible attendance at the ROTC Ranger Camp or participation in Airborne, Jungle Warfare, and other "adventure training" has presented added challenges to ROTC cadets. In 1970 emphasis was given to the procurement of minority officers, and ROTC recruiting was increased at minority colleges. Subsequently, minority recruiting has been expanded at non-minority colleges. Also, increases in the number of scholarships available (6,500) and the doubling of the monthly subsistence allowance to $100 have made ROTC more attractive.

Three measures were specifically initiated or expanded to
recruit those students who, for whatever reasons, had not joined ROTC during the first two years. One step was the "compression" of ROTC courses - participation in two ROTC courses concurrently, such as MS I and MS II or MS II and MS III, sometimes during the summer. Implementation of the "E" Curriculum has appealed to students whose heavy course loads would otherwise preclude their enrollment in ROTC by giving ROTC "credit" for designated university courses in lieu of attending regular ROTC courses, usually during the Basic Course. Finally, the Two-Year Program established by the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 has permitted non-veteran students to attend a six-week ROTC Basic Camp in lieu of taking the first two years of ROTC, while qualified veterans can enter directly into the ROTC Advanced Course.

Perhaps, more significant in halting the decline in ROTC enrollment were factors outside the Army's sphere of influence - the changing world and domestic situation in the early 1970's. The end of both the draft and United States involvement in Vietnam undoubtedly removed the major causes of anti-ROTC sentiment from the campuses. At the same time, the economic recession and even an upsurge of patriotic spirit during the bicentennial celebrations motivated students to join ROTC. For many reasons then, Army ROTC recently has experienced a tremendous revival in enrollment, increasing 80 percent in four years - from 33,220 in 1973 to 59,677 in 1977.

As part of an Army reorganization in 1973, responsibility for ROTC was given to the new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Under a major general Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC, the ROTC units were organized into four ROTC regions with a brigadier general commanding each region. Generally, the four ROTC regions are responsible for ROTC programs along the following geographical divisions within the United States: First Region, the East Coast; Second Region, the north Central states; Third Region, the south central states; and Fourth Region, the western states. First ROTC Region has responsibility for 105 ROTC units, Second ROTC Region has 67, Third ROTC Region has 62, and Fourth ROTC Region has 46. At the beginning of academic year 1977-1978, First ROTC Region also had the largest ROTC enrollment (23,638). Likewise, the rapid growth in ROTC enrollment has not been distributed evenly across the nation's 280 ROTC units. During the past four years First ROTC Region's cadet enrollment has climbed by 105.82%, while the other three ROTC regions have had increases ranging from 32.87% to 72.53%. Also, blacks and women have been enrolling in ROTC in record numbers across the nation. In the same four years that total ROTC enrollment has grown by 80%, black ROTC enrollment has grown by 127.46%, numbering 13,006 cadets (21.75% of the ROTC total) at the beginning of academic year 1977-1978. The admission of women into the ROTC program in school year 1972-1973 has brought about the most noticeable change in enrollment patterns. From that experimental program in which 212 women were the first of their sex admitted to Army ROTC, female ROTC enrollment climbed to 14,296 (23.96% of the ROTC total) at the beginning of the present academic year. ROTC has
become so popular among college women that the possibility exists that a limit may have to be imposed on female enrollment. Such is not the case with Hispanic enrollment in ROTC, however, as will be seen in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 2 NOTES


2. AR 145-1, para. 1-3.

3. AR 145-1, para. 2-6, 2-11, and 2-13.

4. AR 145-1, para. 2-11.


18. See the bibliography for an extensive listing of student monographs, dissertations, and articles on ROTC.


25. AR 145-1, Change 8, para. 5-83.

26. AR 145-1, Change 8, para. 5-29 and 5-81.


30. AR 145-1, para. 5-7.


33. Middleton, p. 17.


36. See Appendix B for the headquarters location of each ROTC region and their jurisdictions.

37. TRADOC, Directory of ROTC/NDCC Units, pp. 1-17.

38. TRADOC, Opening Enrollment Report, School Year 1977-1978, pp. 4-5.


41. TRADOC, unpublished fact sheet on black ROTC enrollment.


43. TRADOC, Opening Enrollment Report, School Year 1977-1978, p. 5.

44. Jim Tice, "ROTC Enrollment Expected to Hit 65,000," Army Times, 22 August 1977, p. 15.
CHAPTER 3

HISPANIC PARTICIPATION IN ROTC

According to the latest U.S. Bureau of the Census figures, Hispanic Americans are the second largest minority in the United States and constitute approximately five percent of the nation's population. Yet, it has been noted that Hispanics represent only one percent of the Army's officer corps and four percent of the cadets in ROTC, while 3.45 percent of the soldiers in the Army are Hispanic. While the number of blacks and women in ROTC has been climbing at record rates during the past four years, the growth of Hispanic ROTC enrollment has been less than the 80 percent overall growth rate for ROTC. At the beginning of academic year 1973-1974 Hispanic cadets numbered 1,407 but in four years had only increased 69.72 percent to 2,388. What appears to be a significant increase is actually a slight decline in the Hispanic portion of ROTC enrollment during this same period, from 4.24 to 4.00 percent. While ROTC enrollment has been increasing overall, Hispanic enrollment has been decreasing as a percentage of the total number.

Over 90 percent of the Hispanic cadets enrolled at the beginning of the current academic year were accounted for by only 37 of the 280 ROTC units across the nation. Contrary to the declining rate of growth for Hispanic enrollment overall, these units in-
cropped their Hispanic enrollment by 82.84 percent from 1973 to 1977. During the same period the total enrollment of these 37 ROTC units accounted for a fairly constant 15 percent of the nation's entire ROTC enrollment.\(^5\) While the situation varies from unit to unit, the above figures indicate that, increasingly, an even larger percentage of their cadets are Hispanics.

The large share of the Hispanic enrollment that these ROTC units have is related directly, of course, to Hispanic demographic patterns in the United States. As a result, the 37 ROTC units having significant Hispanic enrollment are located in areas having large Hispanic populations—generally, southwestern United States, southern Florida, the Chicago and New York City areas, and Puerto Rico.\(^6\)

Within this overall picture specific demographic patterns also can be found. Through academic year 1975-1976, the enrollment reports submitted to TRADOC by the ROTC units identified Hispanics by the four major subgroups previously mentioned. From these earlier reports one can see that Mexican Americans are the dominant Hispanic cadets in the southwestern part of the nation, Cuban Americans are the majority in southern Florida, while large numbers of Puerto Ricans are found in the Chicago and New York City areas and, of course, Puerto Rico.\(^7\) These are the latest official data available as the current (July 1976) ROTC enrollment report (TRADOC Form 479) does not distinguish between the Hispanic subgroups, but categorizes them all as Spanish-Americans.

To check this earlier information, a question on specific
Hispanic enrollment patterns was included in the questionnaire sent to the PMS of each of these 37 ROTC units. The predominant Hispanic subgroup was identified as being Mexican American by 30 respondents, Puerto Rican by seven respondents, and Cuban American by two respondents. One PMS reported that most of his Hispanic cadets were from other Hispanic groups, and two reported equal divisions between Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans or Puerto Ricans. The only geographic anomaly to emerge was in the New York City area, where Saint Peter's College in Jersey City reported that most of their Hispanic cadets were Cuban Americans instead of Puerto Ricans. This resulted from the strong support given ROTC by Cuban American faculty members who were "naturally good friends" of the PMS.

Each of the Hispanic subgroups has its own unique heritage, of course, but a common thread unites them all - the language - Spanish. It is the language spoken at home for over 7.6 million Hispanics in the United States. For many, especially first generation Hispanics, Spanish is the only language known and used in everyday affairs. Of the 37 ROTC units surveyed, ten indicated that Spanish was the "primary language" of most of their Hispanic cadets. This accounted for the majority of all Hispanic cadets because of the two Puerto Rico ROTC units in this group. All but one (who could not evaluate the Spanish proficiency of his cadets) of the remaining respondents judged their Hispanic cadets to have at least a "limited" (7 responses) or a "working" (19 responses) knowledge of Spanish.
Spanish is such a predominant factor in the lives of so many U.S. citizens that many bilingual programs abound. Most states with large Hispanic populations require some form of bilingual education in an attempt to meet the "special educational needs" of non-English-speaking children. Efforts in this direction were reinforced in 1974 by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Lau v. Nichols, in which the court ruled that public schools were required to take "positive action" to help children who do not speak English. Some areas of the country, such as Dade County in Florida, with its large population of Cuban Americans, also have ordinances requiring bilingual printing of public documents to meet the needs of their Hispanic populations. Puerto Rico, on the other hand, has an entirely different situation - the official language there is Spanish. Unique language difficulties still prevail on the island, however, as will be shown in the following chapter.

English is the language of instruction for all but a few colleges and universities in the United States, including those institutions located in areas with large Hispanic populations - Puerto Rico is the major exception. Of the 37 ROTC units canvassed, 33 indicated that English was the official language of the institution. One, Saint Peter's College, indicated that bilingual instruction became official this year, but that English was still predominant. Another, Texas A & I University, responded that instruction was completely bilingual. The remaining two were the ROTC units in Puerto Rico, where Spanish is the official or pre-
dominant language. Significantly, these last three units also have the highest percentages of Hispanic cadets, from 50 to 100 percent. Therefore, with the exception of Puerto Rico, most Hispanics entering higher education are bilingual or English-speaking.

The door to higher education at English-language institutions is not completely closed, however, to Hispanics less fluent in English. Many institutions, including most of those included in the author's survey, offer special courses in English for students for whom it is a second language. The desired product of these courses is a student who is sufficiently competent to handle other college-level courses in English. Once this point is reached, the student becomes part of the ROTC recruiting pool as does any other student.

Difficulties with English, however, appear to some degree in many Hispanic cadets. Fourteen of the polled ROTC units stated that "all" their Hispanic cadets were "completely fluent" in and had "no difficulty" with English, but these units accounted for less than ten percent of all Hispanic cadets. Furthermore, several of these respondents noted that the extremely high academic standards of their particular institutions virtually precluded the admission of students with deficiencies in English. The largest number (17) of the respondents indicated that "most" of their Hispanic cadets were "completely fluent" with only a "few" having "minor difficulties" with English. One respondent noted that, while "most" Hispanic cadets were "completely fluent" in English,
a few experienced "major difficulties." The remaining five respondents reported more widespread difficulties, with "many" Hispanic cadets having "minor" or "major" difficulties, with English. Primarily because of the two Puerto Rico ROTC units in this last group, this represents the picture of over 62 percent of the nation's Hispanic cadets.

The above difficulties with English, however, do not appear to have a significant impact on most institutions' Hispanic cadets during ROTC's two main summer training programs. A majority (23) of the ROTC units reported no English-related problems encountered by their Hispanic cadets at the ROTC Basic Camp, while four institutions reported a "few" cadets experienced difficulties. The remainder were not aware (9 respondents) of any difficulties encountered or had not sent cadets to the Basic Camp (1 respondent).

The situation at the ROTC Advanced Camp appears to be similar. Most (27) of the respondents reported no English-related problems, while such difficulties were experienced by a "few" cadets of five ROTC units and "some" cadets at one institution. The remaining four respondents were unaware of any difficulties encountered. Again, it was observed that the two ROTC units in Puerto Rico reported English-related difficulties experienced by their cadets at both summer camps.

In view of the above situations it is appropriate to examine the role of Spanish in the ROTC environment. A substantial majority (25) of the surveyed ROTC units reported that Spanish was "not used in any recruiting effort." The remaining 12 respondents
employed Spanish in varying amounts, from using Spanish-speaking cadets on the telephone, speaking in Spanish to parents of Hispanic, or addressing Hispanic organizations in Spanish, to using Spanish in every type of recruiting method. The ROTC units using Spanish in the largest number of recruiting techniques were the two in Puerto Rico.¹⁹

The use of Spanish appears to be even less in the areas of ROTC administration and instruction. Thirty of the units canvassed indicated that Spanish was not used at all in the daily administration of their ROTC program. In the area of ROTC instruction only four respondents reported the use of Spanish in the classroom. The extent of this use is difficult to measure, but three respondents indicated the use of Spanish was limited to informal exchanges or explanations when necessary. The most predominant use of Spanish in ROTC instruction and administration appears to be in the Puerto Rico ROTC units.²⁰

It is logical that the use of Spanish in ROTC recruiting, administration, and instruction is dependent upon the presence of Hispanic and/or bilingual officers and noncommissioned officers. In the 37 ROTC units surveyed there were 16 officers (including two professors of military science) and 27 NCOs identified as being Hispanic. Among the ROTC cadre at these institutions, 29 officers and 35 NCOs were indicated as being bilingual. Again, the two units in Puerto Rico accounted for a significant portion of these officers and NCOs, respectively, 75% and 44% of the Hispanics and 48% and 34% of the bilingual personnel. Of the 37
professors of military science, nine reported that they were bi-
lingual, and six noted that they had some knowledge of Spanish.
While neither PMS in Puerto Rico is Hispanic, both indicated them-
selves as being bilingual. 21

Examining the possible impact of cultural differences on
Hispanic cadets is another important aspect of this study. At
many colleges and universities the Hispanic culture is perpetuated
through informal social groups and Hispanic organizations. These
organizations are primarily focused on the preservation of a heri-
tage, and serving in ROTC is not viewed by most as being in con-
fusion with their goals. Only three respondents to the author's
survey indicated that any organized groups were obstacles to ROTC
recruitment and retention. One such organization was identified
as a militant Chicano group in one of the western states which
was described as being "against the Army, the establishment." 22
The other two instances of organized Hispanic opposition were
found in Puerto Rico, and these will be discussed in the following
chapter.

Four respondents, including the two in Puerto Rico, indicated
that other cultural factors also discouraged Hispanic enrollment
in ROTC. The principal opposition was reported as being directed
by parents and boy friends at female Hispanics because, by joining
ROTC, the latter are perceived as deviating from their traditional
Hispanic roles of wives and mothers. 23 For many non-Hispanic fe-
male cadets this may also be the case, but the Hispanic culture
overall — with many exceptions, of course — has held more conser-
Other cultural obstacles to ROTC are the close family and neighborhood ties which must be interrupted by subsequent service in the Army. Even the short six weeks trip to the ROTC Advanced Camp between the junior and senior years can be a traumatic experience for Hispanic cadets who have never ventured very far from their barrios (suburbs). The abrupt changes in language and food can be especially disturbing to a cadet who has spoken mostly Spanish and was raised on a diet different than that encountered at camp. Finally, some mention must be made of the mañana attitude of many Hispanic cadets noted by one of the respondents in Puerto Rico. In an organization, such as an ROTC and the Army, where initiative and rapid response to instructions are the expected norms, this “happy-go-lucky” approach can be a distinct hindrance to successful completion of the ROTC program and, especially, a career in the Army.

Since recruiting and retention of Hispanics appear not to be a major problem for most ROTC units, this leaves unanswered the question of flagging Hispanic officer production: How can Hispanics constitute four percent of ROTC enrollment and slightly more than one percent of the officers commissioned through ROTC? To determine precisely where the ROTC commissioning system is not functioning properly one must know the number of Hispanics commissioned each year by each ROTC unit and the type of commission received by each. Then an accurate comparison could be made at each ROTC unit between the number of Hispanics enrolled in the program and those being commissioned. As noted in Chapter 1, this infor-
tion is not readily available. While the TRADOC enrollment report annually identifies commissioned ROTC graduates at each unit as scholarship or non-scholarship and USAR, RA, or other, it does not identify the ethnic group of those commissioned, nor does it distinguish between Active Duty and Active Duty for Training recipients. To find out this information, one would have to identify each graduate of each ROTC unit, the type of commission received, and the minority group to which he or she belonged—clearly, a task which could be directed and accomplished only by TRADOC or higher headquarters.

Examination of the enrollment figures found in Appendix E, however, reveals an interesting phenomenon. For the current academic year, two of the 37 ROTC units with significant numbers of Hispanic cadets account for over half (57.92%) of all the Hispanic cadets in the entire nation. These two ROTC units are located at the University of Puerto Rico (UPR) campuses of Rio Piedras and Mayagüez and had opening enrollments of 906 and 477 cadets, respectively. For the past five years Hispanics have comprised the entire cadet enrollment at each UPR ROTC unit—the only ROTC units to be 100% Hispanic. As in the current school year, in each of the preceding four years these two units have accounted for the majority of the nation's Hispanic ROTC enrollment. Even assuming that all the Hispanic cadets are Puerto Rican in the five other ROTC units where they are reported to have the largest representation among Hispanics, over 90 percent of the total Puerto Rican ROTC enrollment in the nation comes from the two UPR pro-
program. This is true even though a small number of non-Puerto Rican Hispanics are enrolled in the ROTC programs at the two UPR campuses.

Since all the cadets in the UPR ROTC programs are Hispanic, all the commissioned graduates must also be Hispanic. These two ROTC units, therefore, offer the unique possibility of a direct comparison of Hispanic cadets enrolled and Hispanic officers produced. Although the campus environment at these two campuses appears to be the exception (as seen above) when compared to the 35 other ROTC units in Appendix E, the opposite is true when total Hispanic enrollment is considered.

If high enrollment is one measure of success, then it is highly relevant that one look at the ROTC programs in Puerto Rico to discover the reasons behind this apparent success. Particularly useful would be determining how the UPR ROTC programs solve any problem areas which might be encountered by other Hispanic cadets - cultural and linguistic difficulties for example. Finally, of course, the ultimate measure of success - the production of "sufficient numbers of well-educated, quality officers" - must be examined.
CHAPTER 3 NOTES


2. Information extracted from unpublished figures on minority ROTC enrollment maintained by Headquarters, TRADOC.

3. Ibid.

4. See Appendix E for complete enrollment figures for these ROTC units.


7. Information extracted from unpublished figures on minority ROTC enrollment maintained by Headquarters, TRADOC.

8. Data derived from 37 questionnaires (see Appendix G) returned in response to the author's survey of Hispanic participation in ROTC; see Appendix H for tabulated results.


10. Ibid., pp. 1-3.

11. Author's survey.


15. Author's survey.

16. Author's survey.

17. Author's survey.

25. Author's survey.

26. Author's survey.

27. Author's survey.

28. See TRADOC Form 479, "Senior ROTC Enrollment Report."

29. Appendix E.

30. Author's survey.
CHAPTER 4

ROTC, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO: A CASE STUDY

The only location outside the fifty states where senior ROTC is conducted is in Puerto Rico. With a total enrollment of 1,383 cadets at the beginning of the present academic year, the two ROTC programs at the UPR campuses of Rio Piedras and Mayagüez appear to be the embodiment of successful ROTC units. Furthermore, this high enrollment has been accomplished after the island's ROTC programs suffered through some of the worst anti-ROTC experiences of the nation in the early 1970's. Why these two ROTC units have met with such success in spite of such opposition is the main thrust of this chapter. Before addressing the subject of ROTC itself, however, one must have an understanding of the development of higher education in Puerto Rico and the island's political situation, as they relate directly to the ROTC experience.

Under almost 400 years of Spanish rule and 80 years of United States influence, Puerto Rico has had a complex history of cultural identity and higher education. Discovered by Columbus on 19 November 1493, Puerto Rico was not colonised until fifteen years later.¹ With little wealth on the island, Puerto Rico served mainly as a strategic outpost guarding the sea lane approaches to the richer Spanish colonies in Central and South America.² As a result, Puerto Rico was always at the periphery of
social development in the New World, and education was largely
neglected by Spanish authorities.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Spanish regime had
established only the bare rudiments of a public education system
on the island. Only a "small minority" of the population, "drawn
mainly from the elite," ever had an opportunity to receive any
formal education. As Gordon K. Lewis, the noted authority on
Puerto Rico, has written, the system itself

... was poisoned by the government suspicion that the
teaching force was always a potential source for hereti-
cal ideas; physical conditions were wretched and almost
totally neglected by a local administration whose sole
concern was that its statistical reports to Madrid
should merely indicate some increase in school popula-
tion; teaching even at secondary school level was based
upon the almost medieval assumptions of Spanish pedago-
gy; and whatever existed of professional education was
the result almost exclusively of private societies and
of sporadic efforts of the Church.

Thus, in 1898 over 77 percent of the children in the 5-18 age
group had not attended school, and estimates of illiteracy in
Puerto Rico varied from 80 to 85 percent.

In that year the Spanish-American War and the subsequent
occupation of the island by United States forces were to have a
profound impact on education in Puerto Rico. Among the changes
made in the educational system were banning religious instruction
in public schools, initiating public education for girls, coed
education, problem-solving and experimentation in lieu of rote
memorization, organized athletics, vocational training, and the
study of American history. Behind all the reforms was the Ameri-
can concept of widespread democratic education, as opposed to
Spanish elitism. As Theodore Roosevelt observed, the United States policy was to "Americanize Puerto Rico and thereby confer on her the greatest blessing, in our opinion, within our gift."7

One of the most disputed modifications of the education system involved the teaching of English. In less than two weeks after the August 1898 peace protocol terminated Spanish resistance in Puerto Rico, the first English language newspaper, The Porto Rico Mail of Ponce, was established, and the island's residents were displaying a "great interest in learning English."8 Shortly afterwards, the official language of instruction in the schools was changed from Spanish to English by the Military Governor, Major General Guy V. Henry.9 Following the end of U.S. military rule in 1900, the island's civilian Commissioners of Education (Presidential appointees) continued a policy of "Americanization, the extension of the school system, and the teaching of English."10 This policy went through several reversals and modifications until the distinguished Puerto Rican Luis Muñoz Marín became the first popularly elected Governor of the island in 1948.11 The following year his Commissioner of Education announced that Spanish would be the language of instruction through high school with English a required subject through the second year of college.12 For the most part, this is the system today, but the controversy over the role of English in the classroom continues unabated.

Less than fifty years after the discovery of the New World, Spain began to establish institutions of higher learning through-
out her new empire. In 1538 the first university in the Western Hemisphere, Santo Tomás de Aquino, was founded in Santo Domingo. Only thirteen years later the University of Mexico and the University of San Marcos in Lima, Peru were created. In less than two centuries twenty universities were located throughout Central America, South America, and the Spanish Caribbean, except in Puerto Rico. In fact, Spain "refused" to grant the Puerto Rican request for a university during the entire period of its rule over the island. Therefore, the Puerto Rican elite traveled abroad—usually to Spain, the United States, or Spanish universities around the Caribbean—in search of a higher education. Because of this isolation by Spain and the absence of her own university to help perpetuate the island’s cultural heritage, the inhabitants of Puerto Rico were viewed by many early American educators as being "passive and plastic" with ideals which were easily created and molded.

It was not until the advent of American domination that higher education was begun in Puerto Rico. In keeping with the United States concept of expanding education at the grass roots level, a Normal School was established in 1900 at Fajardo to prepare teachers for public schools. The following year it was moved to Rio Piedras, and two years later this institution formed the basis of the University of Puerto Rico, founded on 12 March 1903. Contrary to the desires of the Puerto Rican elite to pattern the university after existing Latin American universities with an emphasis on the arts and letters, the American educators stressed
teacher preparation, agriculture and mechanical training, and studies in the natural sciences and engineering. As a result, much of the Puerto Rican upper class boycotted the new university and continued to send their children abroad (ironically, often to the United States) for college studies. 

Today the Rio Piedras campus is the largest of several branches of the UPR system. In 1911 the College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts was established in Mayagüez, and in 1948 the Medical School opened as a separate campus in Rio Piedras. Two other four-year UPR campuses are Humacao University College (founded 1962) and Cayey University College (1966). Five two-year UPR campuses granting associate degrees are organized under the Regional Colleges Administration - Aguadilla, Arecibo, Bayamón, Carolina, and Ponce. In 1975 the total enrollment of all ten campuses was 47,981, with over half of the students enrolled at the Rio Piedras campus. Directing the entire UPR system is the Council of Higher Education (CHE), which appoints the chancellors of the subordinate campuses. One Commonwealth-controlled college which is not under the UPR system is the Conservatory of Music of Puerto Rico, established by the late Pablo Casals in 1959.

In 1912 the first of the private colleges and universities in Puerto Rico, Inter American University (IAU), was founded in San German. The largest independent university system in Puerto Rico, it has eight other branches across the island. The largest of these is the four-year Hato Rey campus (1962), whose enrollment now exceeds that of the original San German campus. The other
campuses were organized in 1969, offer only two-year associate
degree programs, and are located in Aguadilla, Arecibo, Barranqui-
tas, Bayamón, Fajardo, Guayama, and Ponce. As of 1976 eight other
accredited private colleges were located in Puerto Rico: Antillia-
ian College (1922) in Mayagüez, College of the Sacred Heart (1935)
in Santurce, Catholic University (1948) in Ponce, Puerto Rico
Junior College (1949) in Rio Piedras, Bayamón Central University
(1961) in Bayamón, World University (1965) in Hato Rey, Caribbean
Junior College (1969) in Bayamón, and San Juan Technological
Community College (1972) in Santurce. In 1976, Caribe Univer-
sity, a private medical school, began classes in Cayey, but still
lacked accreditation in 1977. In 1976, Caribe University,
Borinquen University, had planned to open in September 1977 but
encountered legal problems, and its present status is unknown.

With a total enrollment of over 92,000 students in twenty-
eight accredited (or, at least, "preaccredited") campuses, the
island suffers no lack of quantity in higher education. In
fact, education through university level is more available to
inhabitants of Puerto Rico than to those of any other Latin Ameri-
can country. It is interesting to note that Puerto Rico ranks
fifth worldwide (behind East Germany, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States) as having one (29.77%) of the world's highest per-
centages of population in the 20-24 age group attending universi-
ties. The enrollment ratio for college-age women only is even
more impressive — second only to the United States, 32.48% and
45.01%, respectively.
Actually, the effort over the years to extend educational opportunities to as many Puerto Ricans as possible has reduced illiteracy to almost ten percent. The huge Puerto Rican school system which has emerged in the process "employs more people and spends more money than any other sector of government." The standard educational complaints are heard on the island as often as elsewhere — overworked, underpaid teachers; overcrowded, inadequate facilities — but other problems abound which extend through the university level.

While quantity is not a problem with higher education in Puerto Rico, quality is another matter. Even qualified, competent instructors at the university level can do little with poorly prepared students graduating from high school and entering college. One reason may be the result of spending too little money per student in the lower grades as compared to the spending per student at college level. In 1974 Puerto Rico expended $483 per student in public elementary and secondary schools, while the U.S. average was almost three times as much — $1431. On the other hand, at the college level, the U.S. average of $3996 per student was less than 45 percent greater than the island's outlay of $2787. Later statistics were not available for higher education expenditures per student, but the 1975 statistics on elementary and secondary schools show an encouraging trend: Puerto Rican and U.S. expenditures per pupil were $593 and $1581, respectively, the latter being less than 2.7 times larger than the former. The result of such expenditure imbalances as the above is lower-


quality students all along the line.

Also contributing to the poor preparation for higher education in Puerto Rico is rampant absenteeism in the school system. Sadly, most students entering the first grade fail to finish high school. The author's experiences as a ROTC instructor are most revealing on this subject. At first, many students attended class whenever the mood struck them and were profoundly shocked when counseled on this matter. Those who did not attend regularly could not maintain the pace of the class and usually withdrew from the course. Discussions about this problem with the students who remained and performed admirably, indicated that absenteeism was widespread in many of their classes and had been a common practice since their earliest years in school.

Conversations with numerous older Puerto Ricans indicated that this situation did not exist when they were young. To them student absenteeism was an extension of a recent phenomenon — the development of an irresponsible and dependent mentality among younger Puerto Ricans as a direct result of more readily available welfare benefits. Such unsubstantiated statements, of course, need considerable research before being accepted as fact. However, a recent study of the labor situation in Puerto Rico by the management consultant firm of Clapp and Mayne lends support to these observations. The study concluded that while labor absenteeism was lower overall in Puerto Rico than in the United States, it was rising rapidly and is "considerably greater" for workers under 30.
Another serious problem in higher education in Puerto Rico is that of the "professional student." Because of failures and withdrawals from courses, many students repeat (often more than once) the same classes and thereby delay their graduation. To insure that a student is not overloaded and has sufficient time for all courses, a 15 credit hour limit per semester (exceptions are made for superior students) is maintained by the UPR system. This means that the poorer students take even longer to graduate.

Further adding to the ranks of "professional students" are those who change facultades (disciplines) two or three times, thus requiring additional courses and more time in school with each change. The author's students made him aware of another factor contributing to this phenomenon. Some students who transferred to Rio Piedras had to repeat courses taken elsewhere in the UPR system because their earned credits were not accepted by the Rio Piedras campus. The end result of all these delays is that many students need one or two additional semesters to graduate, and the "professional students" take six or more years to obtain their degree, when they do. These delayed graduations have a significant impact on ROTC, as will be discussed later.

No discussion of higher education in Puerto Rico would be complete without some notes on student activism. For all practical purposes, the private colleges and universities are free of militant student groups, so these remarks will deal primarily with the UPR system. In 1968 Arthur Liebman, the noted authority on Puerto Rican students, wrote that the UPR students were "... un-
like their peers in other developing societies . . . on the whole, neither radical or nationalistic despite the fact that Puerto Rico is not an independent country.  

One important reason for this apparently docile disposition was the long-standing ban on the use of the university for political purposes. This regulation was enforced because officials believed that such activities would create disturbances inconsistent with the Casa de Estudios (House of Studies) concept of the university espoused by its chancellor, Jaime Benítez. In 1966 Benítez was promoted to the CHE presidency, and the strict provisions were modified to permit on-campus political meetings. The result has been a sharp upswing in political activity and unrest, not unlike that of students elsewhere in Latin America. Accordingly, in 1972 Liebman revised his earlier statements by pointing out that "university students in Puerto Rico constitute one of the most significant bases of opposition to the government." 

The protagonist of most student disturbances has been the Federation of University Students for Independence (Federación de Universitarios Pro Independencia, or FUPI). Founded in 1956 to mobilize student support for Puerto Rico's independence, the FUPI was largely responsible for the student agitation for university reform that led to the 1966 changes in university law. Since that change, several confrontations (to be discussed in detail later) have taken place between the FUPI and ROTC cadets.

A most perplexing problem — especially where ROTC is concerned — is that of language training. With a system (already de-
scribed) by which English is a required second language through the second year of college for most, one would expect students to be fairly competent in using English. The author's three years of experience at Humacao University College proved this assumption to be completely false. Many students in their second year of college could not respond correctly to the simple question in English, "What is your name?" Any questions more complicated often would result in complete bewilderment on the part of the student. This was not true of all students, of course, but most sophomore students theoretically had completed 13 years of English instruction. The explanation for such dismal performance must lie in the quality of English instruction received during these years. Two of the author's former students were part-time elementary school English teachers, yet even they often had difficulty expressing themselves (orally and in writing) correctly in English. According to discussions with other students, the English proficiency of these two individuals was better than that of most other public school English teachers who had taught them during their primary and secondary school years.

While the problem of poor English performance appears commonplace among graduates of public high schools, it is seldom found in graduates of private high schools. For example, bilingual Colegio San Antonio de Abad, less than a mile from the Humacao campus, has the reputation of producing some of the highest-quality bilingual high school students on the island. Yet, according to school officials, the majority of its graduates attend college
in the United States, and most of the remainder go to UPR’s Rio Piedras Campus. English in public schools generally has been a facade. In one of many articles to appear on the subject in The San Juan Star, it was observed that "most public school students who have ostensibly been studying English for 10 years know no more of the language than beginners at a Berlitz course."  

Having recognized this deficiency for years, the present administration’s first Secretary of Education, Dr. Herman Sulsona (a strong supporter of ROTC), quickly outlined plans to improve English instruction in public schools. Sulsona, however, resigned in March 1977, and the improvement of English instruction in Puerto Rico suffered a temporary setback. His replacement, Carlos E. Chardon, Jr., quickly expressed his concern for English instruction on the island, but no information was available to the author on its direction or extent. In the meantime, dozens of advertisements in The San Juan Star for bilingual secretaries, receptionists, foremen, managers, and others continue to go unfilled because of the island’s inadequate English instruction.

The exact opposite obstacle awaits “Neoricans” (United States citizens of Puerto Rican birth or ancestry who have spent a large portion of their lives in the states, predominantly in New York) when they migrate back to Puerto Rico. Having been educated in an English environment most of their lives, younger Neoricans are then thrust into a totally new Spanish environment. The author has observed that if their Spanish language has been maintained by its use in the home or elsewhere, they usually do much better
than their peers - often being advanced a year or two in school because of a better academic background obtained on the mainland. If their Spanish is poor, their overall academic performance is usually poor as well - frequently resulting in the loss of a year or two of school. As many of the textbooks used in Puerto Rico are in English, much of the poor academic performance by Neoricans must be attributed to the "culture shock" of confronting a total Spanish environment. Although readily available, some students simply lose the will to make use of the material. The influx of returning Puerto Ricans during the recent recession who were incapable of handling instruction in Spanish created educational problems at all levels. Even students at bilingual IAU resorted to writing to The San Juan Star to request English-language instruction.\(^4^0\) The "Neorican situation" has a unique impact on ROTV, as will be explained later.

As the Neorican student struggles with Spanish, and the average Puerto Rican student labors through poor English instruction, both languages become distorted. Frequently the Puerto Rican student grows up with a poor command of his native tongue, speaking "Spanglish" instead of Spanish.\(^4^1\) This deficiency, of course, also affects his learning of other subjects in school, so the net effect is quite negative.\(^4^2\)

The role of language in education has become a political football whose direction changes each time a different political party gains possession of the government. Since it is inextricably linked with the Puerto Rico status question (statehood,
commonwealth, or independence?), the language dilemma will not be completely resolved until the island’s ultimate status is also decided. In the meantime, the ROTC programs in Puerto Rico continue to receive many cadets whose capabilities in English are questionable at best.

The irony of the lower quality education at the primary and secondary levels in public schools (compared to that of private schools) is that the public UPR system has a better reputation for quality university-level education than do the private colleges. The result is that more of the (better-qualified) graduates of private schools than the (less-qualified) graduates of public schools are accepted into the inexpensive UPR system. The latter students are usually from lower income families and, upon failing to enter the UPR, must usually attend one of the more expensive private colleges. For example, the tuition per semester at the UPR averages $175, while the IAU cost is $1,140, and World University charges $1,500. As most Puerto Rican students qualify (as being economically disadvantaged) for one or more educational grants or loans (usually federal), the immediate financial impact is usually not that great for the individuals concerned, but it is a lucrative opportunity for the private colleges and universities. This being so, there has been an expansion of these institutions in recent years.

The cycle observed by the author, therefore, was usually this: First, depending upon the discipline desired, a student applied for admission to the main UPR campus at Rio Piedras or to
the Mayagüez campus. Unable to be accepted at either of these, application was made to one of the outlying UPR campuses — usually one close to home. Failing that, application was made to one of the private colleges, often the IAU campus at Hato Rey. Finally, as a last resort, application was made to Puerto Rico Junior College, one of the IAU branch campuses, World University, or another private college. Of course, after one or more years of good performance at one of the second or third choice campuses one was in a much better position to be accepted at the UPR's Rio Piedras campus, and many students made such transfers. Thus, the impression received was that the quality of higher education in Puerto Rico appears to be inversely proportional to the tuition charged. Of interest to ROTC is that, by virtue of cross-enrollment programs, students at the private colleges and universities comprise over 27 percent of the total cadets in the two UPR ROTC units.

Specific examples of the problems encountered with many of these students in the ROTC program will be covered below.

To appreciate fully the nature of ROTC in Puerto Rico one also must be cognizant of the question of political status surrounding the island. In-depth coverage of this topic is beyond the scope of this study, however, sufficient information is given below, and numerous references are recommended to the reader in the bibliography. With the above discussion of higher education in Puerto Rico the reader is sufficiently prepared to focus on ROTC.

ROTC has been an integral part of the University of Puerto
Rico since the mid 1920's when military programs were established at both the Rio Piedras and Mayagüez campuses. In 1929 ROTC UPR commissioned its first officers – seven from Rio Piedras and nine from Mayagüez – and has commissioned over 2,400 officers since then. Until the mid 1960's ROTC at UPR was not unlike many ROTC programs at land grant institutions throughout the United States – a routine part of campus life with attendance mandatory for all male students during the program's first two years.

With the modification of university rules in 1966 permitting on-campus political meetings, the situation changed as FUPI agitation against ROTC began in earnest. Like many colleges and universities throughout the nation during the late 1960's, increased student militancy was linked to United States involvement in the Vietnam War. However, in addition to the more universal issues of the war's morality, legality, and purpose, student independentistas (advocates of independence for Puerto Rico) focused upon a unique Puerto Rican aspect – portrayal of the conflict as a "foreign" war having no significance for the island. Nevertheless, as U.S. citizens Puerto Ricans were drafted to fight in it without having the right to vote for the President or members of the U.S. Congress, and thereby possibly affecting the policy and legislation on the war. Therefore, to independentistas ROTC was the on-campus symbol of this "colonial" war, and the FUPI campaign for the abolition of ROTC from the UPR became the focal point for much of student political activity. These efforts led to a university decision to make the first two years of ROTC vol-
and after 1966 ROTC enrollment declined steadily for five years at Rio Piedras.

In 1969 the intensity and support for the FUPI campaign was increased by the sentencing on 26 September of a UPR student for draft evasion. This triggered a FUPI-led assault against the ROTC, which resulted in the ransacking and burning of its main building. The Rio Piedras chancellor, Abraham Díaz González, fearing an escalation of the incident, refused to call police onto university grounds. He did, however, temporarily suspend seven students, including the FUPI president, for inciting the attack on ROTC. Although tense, the situation remained stable for over a month.

The calm was broken, however, when the Rio Piedras Academic Senate voted on 5 November to phase out ROTC at the campus over a two year period. Incensed by this, the previous actions of the leftist students, and the lack of stronger action by Chancellor Díaz, a group of ROTC cadets, parents, friends, and others took to the streets in support of ROTC. Marching to the Rio Piedras campus, the chancellor and other faculty members dissuaded them from entering the campus itself. The angry mob moved instead to the nearby Pro-Independence Movement (Movimiento Pro Independencia, or MPI) headquarters, which they attacked with stones and Molotov cocktails.

In the wake of the anti-ROTC disturbance, demand increased for the dismissal of Chancellor Díaz. As the pro-commonwealth administration of the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular
Democrático, or PPD) had been replaced the preceding January by
the pro-statehood New Progressive Party (Partido Nuevo Progresista, or PNP), new appointments to CHE made it more conservative.
These new members proved decisive, and on 21 November CHE overruled the Academic Senate motion to oust ROTC. Barely a month later, on 22 December, CHE fired Chancellor Dias from his post.

With Jaime Benítes acting as the temporary Rio Piedras chancellor, the FUPI campaign against ROTC was renewed in 1970. On 7 March a violent confrontation between the riot police and opponents of ROTC resulted in one UPR student killed and several injured. Shortly afterwards, in a university-wide referendum a majority of the participating students (80% of those enrolled) voted to remove ROTC from the campus and to expand student power. Paradoxically, at the same time they also voted to retain Benítes as chancellor. The first two results were quite a testimony to the success of the FUPI efforts, as exactly five years earlier another referendum had drawn less than 25% of the student body, which voted by a two-to-one margin to restrict student power.

Still, with the pro-statehood party in power, ROTC remained on campus.

One year later the most serious disturbance in the history of the UPR occurred. On 11 March 1971 a fight in the Rio Piedras student center cafeteria between ROTC and FUPI members over the respective merits of Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazier quickly erupted into a riot. When campus police were unable to control the students, the new Rio Piedras chancellor, Pedro José Rivera, called
in the riot squad. By the end of the fighting, three persons (the riot squad commander, a riot squad member, and an ROTC cadet) had been killed by gunshots, over fifty people had been injured, and thousands of dollars of property including the ROTC building, had been burned by Molotov cocktails or destroyed by other lawless acts. After this episode, ROTC was moved off the main campus to its present location two blocks away.

A related casualty of this disastrous event — albeit delayed — was Jaime Benítez himself. After twenty-nine years as the head of the UPR, he was fired from CHE in October 1971. The reason for his dismissal was his refusal to replace a "moderate pro-independence advocate" as his nominee for the chancellorship of the Mayagüez campus. The underlying fear in this action, of course, was that disorders of the Rio Piedras type would spread to the heretofore quiet west coast campus.

The removal of ROTC from the Rio Piedras campus did not eliminate the opposition of FUPI and other independentista groups to the very existence of ROTC in Puerto Rico. Although the present ROTC building in Rio Piedras is under 24-hour police surveillance in an isolated compound surrounded by a ten-foot high fence, it still is not safe from physical attack. During the author's three years in Puerto Rico two unsuccessful bomb attacks were made against the building, the last one occurring in January 1977. At the other UPR campuses, FUPI efforts against the ROTC have been limited to denunciations in unauthorized wall paintings and in occasional newsletters.
Because of the riots in Rio Piedras and the calm in Mayagüez, the Army chose to separate officially the ROTC units at the two campuses — if the threatened program folded at the former campus, at least ROTC would survive in the latter. Therefore, since the beginning of the 1971-1972 academic year the two units have been independent of one another and are referred to by TRADOC as ROTC UPR-Rio Piedras Campus and ROTC UPR-Mayagüez Campus. Both ROTC instructor groups are part of First ROTC region’s Area VI, which also includes senior ROTC programs in Florida and Georgia. Henceforth, most comments will be concerned primarily with the ROTC program headquartered at Rio Piedras.

The experience of ROTC in Puerto Rico has made it difficult to obtain officers to serve as professors of military science. Several Puerto Ricans have told the author that Puerto Rican officers have avoided the PMS position because of possible disturbances and other problems. The situation is further complicated by the requirement to have a bilingual officer as PMS, presumably to converse with university officials. After the 1971 riots a new PMS was slated for Rio Piedras. Unfortunately, this officer was killed in an automobile accident enroute to his new assignment, and the next senior officer at Rio Piedras became the acting PMS. In 1972, however, the Army assigned a new PMS who is now completing his last year at Rio Piedras.

In the Army one measures success by accomplishment of the mission, and ROTC’s mission, as restated in the First ROTC Region ROTC Instructor Reference Guide, is “the preparation of sufficient
numbers of well-educated, quality officers" who will be the "fu-
ture leaders of tomorrow's Army." From all outward appearances, 
ROTC has accomplished this mission quite well at Rio Piedras. In 
1970 a 23-year low in officer production was reached when only 15 
were commissioned. In 1976, however, 62 officers were commission-
ed, an increase of over 300%. The lowest opening ROTC enroll-
ment in recent history was 331 in academic year 1971-1972. But, 
in four years this had soared 300% to a record high of 1,303 
cadets.

Enrollment and commissioning since have tapered off, but the 
reasons for this rapid growth deserve close attention. The same 
reasons for the increase in ROTC enrollment across the nation also 
apply in Puerto Rico, but the causes and effects are more exagger-
ated. The economic recession which produced unemployment rates 
near 10% on the mainland, for example, produced unemployment rates 
in Puerto Rico of over 20% officially, and as high as 40% unoffi-
cially. With the Army apparently offering guaranteed jobs via 
ROTC, it is not surprising that students flocked to the program. 
In fact, in last school year's survey of entering freshman cadets, 
42% of the 394 MS I respondents (slightly more than half of the 
total enrolled) indicated that the "career option" (i.e., employ-
ment) offered by ROTC was the main reason for their joining.

Illustrating this same motivation factor are the cadet re-
actions in Puerto Rico to a program recently offered by the Army 
in which ROTC graduates (other than scholarship cadets) can be 
guaranteed Active Duty for Training (ADT) upon commissioning. ADT
means that an individual receives a Reserve commission, comes on
active duty only for a few months to attend an Officer Basic
Course, returns to civilian life, and then serves the remainder
of his or her commitment to the Army in the Army Reserve or the
National Guard. This is a tremendous program for persons having
civilian careers they wish to pursue — assuming that civilian
employment is available in the first place. Given the job picture
in Puerto Rico, it is not surprising that when this new program
was first explained by the author and other MS III instructors to
the cadets in 1976, no one was interested in it.

Of course, Puerto Rican students are motivated to join ROTC
by other reasons as well. Independentistas notwithstanding, ser-
vice in the U.S. armed forces is considered a "family affair" by
many Puerto Ricans. The author encountered numerous cadets
whose fathers had been noncommissioned officers in one of the
service branches. These cadets not only desired to extend the
family tradition, but also sought upward social mobility by ob-
taining a commission through ROTC. Because of their exposure to
service life, these cadets usually had some understanding of the
military and a better command of English than their peers. Most
Noricans likewise possessed an excellent command of English, and
many also had a unique reason for joining ROTC. They had returned
to Puerto Rico only because their parents had brought them; thus,
by enrolling in ROTC, they could "escape" from the island and re-
turn to a preferred lifestyle on the mainland.

On the other hand, many cadets with a poor command of English
joined ROTC to practice the language. This is mute testimony to the failure of the Puerto Rican education system to produce students competent and confident in English. Ironically, in their quest to learn or improve their English, these cadets encountered obstacles in the form of Hispanic instructors teaching ROTC in Spanish, a practice which will be discussed in detail later.

Capitalising on these reasons for joining ROTC, both ROTC units in Puerto Rico expanded their "cross-enrollment" program. Cross-enrolled cadets now account for over 68 percent of the cadets enrolled in the Mayagües program and over 82 percent of those in the Rio Piedras unit. As a result, ROTC UPR-Rio Piedras effectively blankets the eastern half of Puerto Rico, and ROTC UPR-Mayagües covers the western half. ROTC instructor teams from the Rio Piedras instructor group now conduct classes at the UPR campuses of Humacao, Cayey, Bayamón, and Carolina. At all five locations students from the surrounding private colleges (primarily, Inter American University, Puerto Rico Junior College, Sacred Heart College, and World University) can cross-enroll in ROTC. But, as stated previously, the quality of students is usually lower in the regional campuses and private colleges.

To illustrate this point, the experiences of Army ROTC with students of two IAU branch campuses, Fajardo and Guayama, are pertinent. In the spring of 1975 first year military science (MS I) classes were begun at Fajardo and continued through the summer to allow the entire freshman year to be completed in time for the fall semester. When fall classes were begun in August,
34 students enrolled in the MS II course. Three months later only four of these students were even attending classes, the rest had dropped out or were carrying a failing grade with no apparent concern. However, pressure to maintain high enrollment figures caused the continuation of classes until a detailed memorandum on this situation was submitted by the author. Shortly thereafter, ROTC classes were withdrawn from Fajardo at the end of the semester. Unfortunately for the Army and the University of Puerto Rico, however, a contract never had been initiated with IAU at Fajardo prior to commencing ROTC classes, so no leverage existed to recover the hundreds of dollars of books and uniforms still in the possession of former Fajardo cadets. A similar situation involving poor quality students existed at the Guayama campus of IAU from the spring of 1975 until ROTC classes were terminated at the end of the first semester of school year 1976-1977.

Efforts to boost ROTC enrollment did not stop at overspending the cross-enrollment possibilities. Several questionable practices surfaced during ROTC orientation briefings given at local high schools to recruit potential cadets. At these briefings a member of the instructor group would speak in Spanish to the high school students about the advantages of ROTC, while one or two uniformed cadets would accompany him to complete the picture. As a result of these briefings many first-year cadets were falsely led to believe that they were entitled automatically to free tuition, a $100 per month stipend, exchange and commissary shopping privileges, and even medical care. These benefits, of
course, are part of the ROTC program, but they are only available to scholarship cadets, members of the Advanced Course, or while attending the Advanced Camp.

Another questionable practice was the improper administration of the RQ-8 and RQ-9 qualifying tests. Prior to the present academic year, qualifying scores on these tests, the College Entrance Examination Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), or the American College Test (ACT) were required for admission into the Advanced Course. These four tests were used to determine the academic potential of cadets with the RQ-8 and RQ-9 exams being used only if scores from the SAT or ACT were not available.71

Because of the importance of the RQ-8 and RQ-9 tests and the fact that they were locally administered and graded, procedures for their administration were specified in AR 145-1. One stated that cadets would be given only one form of the test and would "not be retested under any circumstances."72 In the UPR-Rio Piedras ROTC program, however, many cadets took the tests two or three times, often within a few weeks until the passing score was obtained.73

The minimum qualifying score itself was specified annually by TRADOC and was usually 50 out of a possible 120 points. Yet, in the UPR-Rio Piedras ROTC program, cadets without waivers were admitted into the Advanced Course with initial RQ scores as low as 9. Most cadets with extremely low scores (below 25) usually failed to complete the Advanced Course, but at least one cadet has been commissioned after having obtained only 20 points on the RQ
Another aberration in the administration of RQ exams was the amount of time given to take the tests. While not specified in AR 145-1, the time allowed on each portion of the exam was specified in the instruction booklet for administering the tests. Yet, in the UPR-Rio Piedras ROTC program additional time was routinely given to compensate for language difficulties experienced by the cadets.

To see if the above situation also was present at other institutions whose cadets might have language-related difficulties with the RQ exams, two questions on the author’s questionnaire concerned the RQ tests. A majority (20) of the respondents indicated that few to many Hispanic cadets had language-related difficulties with the RQ exams. Five respondents further noted that additional time, up to 15 minutes, had been allowed their Hispanic cadets on the RQ tests. Clearly, the above situation was not unique to the UPR-Rio Piedras ROTC program.

The author considered further investigation into this area appropriate and questioned numerous former ROTC instructors at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) about the administration of the RQ exams in their previous ROTC units. The majority of these officers stated unhesitatingly that additional time had been given on RQ tests to non-Hispanic cadets as well, especially to other minority cadets at predominantly minority institutions. Furthermore, these officers added that RQ exams had been administered more than once to cadets, that cadets had taken
RQ exams after failing either the SAT or ACT, and that RQ scores had been falsified to obtain passing scored for cadets. The unanimous consensus among these officers was that these measures were being taken because of pressure to report high enrollment. The UPR-Rio Piedras ROTC program certainly was far from alone in the area of improper administration of RQ tests.

It must be pointed out, however, that there was much disagreement over the validity of using the RQ tests for the selection of students applying for admission to the Advanced Course. A 1971 study "cast substantial doubt on the advisability of the use of the RQ" for its intended purposes. At any rate, the Army discontinued the use of the RQ exams on 15 October 1977 after the publication of Change 8 to AR 145-1. Now, if the SAT or ACT scores are not available, or if the cadet does not qualify on the SAT or ACT, scores for the Cadet Evaluation Battery (CEB) are used to determine academic potential of cadets prior to entrance into the Advanced Course. The CEB, however, is administered to all potential enrollees of the Advanced Course and is not a measure of scholastic aptitude, but a measure of managerial and leadership potential. What the Army has done, therefore, is to replace the RQ exams with no comparable measure of academic potential.

The absence of such an indicator must be based on the assumption that the cadet's college transcript is sufficient measurement. This may have some validity at colleges and universities with high standards; but such institutions most likely use the SAT or ACT for their own admission requirements, so scores from these
tests would be available. On the other hand, some institutions require only a high school diploma for admission. The fact that AR 145-1 states that the CEB can be administered in lieu of qualifying on the SAT or ACT further undermines the philosophy of using the CEB as a measure of scholastic aptitude. If a cadet fails to pass one standard, one may simply administer something entirely different.

In Puerto Rico the substitution of the CEB as a measure of academic potential is even more questionable. One of the desired learning outcomes expected from ROTC graduates is that they have the "ability to communicate effectively both orally and in writing." This means that, in the words of one PMS, "to be a successful officer the cadet must be able to communicate in the English language." Stated differently by another PMS, "the language of the U.S. Army is English." It has already been shown that successful passage through the Puerto Rican education system is not a guarantee of proficiency in English. Without the presence of some indicator of fluency in English, cadets deficient in this area can easily be admitted into the Advanced Course.

Assistance in learning English at this stage of a cadet's life requires considerable effort. As one of the previously-quoted respondents commented on his questionnaire, "College is already too late to try to teach a language plus all the technical data the cadet needs to graduate." In a totally Spanish environment such as is found in Puerto Rico, the absence of daily reinforcement needed for total fluency in English makes this ef-
fort monumental.

When reinforcement of English is greatly needed, it is, therefore, a questionable practice to allow ROTC instructors to conduct classes in Spanish. Although the language of instruction at the university is Spanish, the language of instruction in ROTC obviously must be English — to acquaint students with military terminology, to familiarize students with English in the midst of a Spanish environment, and, most importantly, to insure complete fluency in English prior to commissioning. Yet, because of laziness, the desire to give a compatriota (countryman) image, or submission to pressures for increased enrollment, Hispanic instructors (predominantly Puerto Ricans) often have conducted all or part of their classes in Spanish. While there may be some limited need for explanation in Spanish in the first semester of the first year, to do so any longer only encourages those less capable in English (the over-whelming majority of whom will not reach the required proficiency by graduation) to remain in the program. The above practice continues, however, in spite of the fact that "English language difficulty" was cited as the primary cause of losses from the program in last year's closing enrollment report.84 This situation continues because to conduct classes strictly in English would discourage students less proficient in the language from joining and remaining in the program, thereby causing a drop in reported enrollment.

This problem can be illustrated best by the author's experiences at Humacao University College. Upon his arrival in August
1974, 60 students were enrolled in MS II; however, 29 had withdrawn by the end of the semester. The majority (19) of these students had little comprehension of English, and this was, more often than not, coupled with severe motivational failure. These two factors had been enhanced by the practices of the previous ROTC instructor, a Puerto Rican officer who had conducted not only his classes, but also the monthly leadership laboratories in Spanish. Furthermore, his apparent failure to establish and maintain standards for his classes created expectations on the part of the students that this was the norm for ROTC. When this perception proved false with the arrival of the new instructor, the result was predictable — many students stopped attending classes and finally withdrew from the course. Pressure to retain these students, regardless of their lack of qualifications, was extremely high until a detailed memorandum was prepared analyzing the reasons for student withdrawal from the program.

One year later the above situation was repeated at Humacao with a slight variation. Originally, the ROTC program had been scheduled to expand, including MS IV as well as the first three years of instruction. Under this concept the senior APMS would teach the entire Basic Course instead of MS I only, and the author would teach the entire Advanced Course instead of MS II and MS III. Due to cadet transfers to Rio Piedras, enrollment failed to justify offering MS IV, and it was decided to revert to the prior practice outlined above. Because of two reasons this could not be accomplished completely: a scheduling conflict and the unpre-
paredness of many MS II cadets to take classes with a non-Hispanic instructor. It, therefore, became necessary to have two MS II courses, one taught by the senior APMS, a Puerto Rican officer, and one taught by the author. Most of the students in the former section were there because of difficulties with English, and this "special" section became known to the other cadets as the gallina or "chicken" section. This fear of practicing English apparently had been enhanced by their not having to do so to any large extent in their previous MS I instruction, which in turn led to false expectations of their MS II instruction.\textsuperscript{87} Even the separation of these students and supplementary MS II classes conducted for them in Spanish could not prepare them for the MS II course itself, the material for which had been prepared by the author. Understandably, none of the 28 students in the special section advanced to the second semester of MS II, while the majority of those in the author's two sections did advance. Again, the effect of this phenomenon on enrollment figures brought intense pressure to improve the enrollment picture. Once more it was necessary to provide a detailed memorandum on the situation to reduce the pressure.\textsuperscript{38}

The usual explanation of the evidence of English difficulties experienced by many Humacao cadets has been that the college is an isolated example because of its rural environment. To some extent this is true as outlined earlier in the chapter, but other factors have an equal if not greater impact on the situation. Certain campuses developed reputations for the lack of English fluency
among their cadets. Among cadets and ROTC personnel alike it was known that at these campuses Spanish was widely used in the classrooms by Hispanic instructors. One could actually stand outside various classrooms listening to classes being conducted in Spanish, yet when one entered the room the instructor would shift to English. When senior officers from First ROTC Region visited the campuses of the ROTC UPR program those Hispanic instructors who used Spanish in the classroom were particularly careful to present a different picture. Cadets fluent in English were introduced to important visitors and invited to parties in their honor. One was given the impression that English proficiency was not a problem at all. As one PMS so aptly remarked on his questionnaire: "Language becomes a problem only when standards are not clear or not enforced. It should be clearly stated that English will be used when the cadet enters the program."\textsuperscript{89}

Because of its metropolitan location one would expect the Rio Piedras campus to have cadets with a better command of the English language, but this was not entirely correct. As a substitute instructor for MS II classes, the author observed numerous cadets whose command of English was much less than that of most MS II cadets at Humacao. Upon questioning the cadets' usual instructor, it was learned that pressure to maintain high enrollment figures was dictating the retention of these cadets. Circumstances such as the above contributed far more to the lack of English proficiency among cadets than did the geographical location of the specific ROTC program. Yet, programs which encouraged
the enrollment of cadets without regard to their English proficiency usually had more cadets and were, therefore, in higher standing.

Another way in which high cadet enrollment was obtained at Rio Piedras was the recruitment of large numbers of females into the program. When ROTC first opened its doors to women in 1972, the UPR was not one of the ten test schools. At Rio Piedras, however, females were unofficially admitted into MS I and not recorded on the CONARC enrollment report.90 The following year 145 women were officially enrolled in MS I and 49 in MS II, some taking both courses simultaneously. Thus, in one year cadet enrollment at Rio Piedras increased by 54.59 percent with females representing 33.92 percent of the total.91 This figure is significant because in 1973 women comprised only 9.33 percent of the cadets nation-wide.92 Female enrollment continued to increase at Rio Piedras until a peak was reached in 1975. That year women comprised over half of the MS I cadets and 43.67 percent of all the cadets at Rio Piedras,93 but only 19.26 percent of all cadets across the country.94 One notes that this peaking of female enrollment also coincided with the highest ROTC enrollment in the history of Rio Piedras - 1,303 cadets.95 Although their numbers declined slightly in the next two years, women still comprised 35.32 percent of all the cadets at Rio Piedras at the beginning of the present academic year.96 At the same time female ROTC enrollment nationally represented 23.96 percent of the total.97 These statistics give one the impression that UPR-Rio Piedras leads the
way in female ROTC enrollment, rather than suffering from cultural obstacles, as was discussed in the previous chapter. This impression is correct only insofar as quantity is concerned, for close examination reveals a different picture in the area of retention and quality.

It is not unusual that women comprise the majority of the female MS I cadets in an ROTC unit, but it is significant when they constitute a high proportion of all cadets, and almost all fail to complete the program. Of the 49 women officially enrolled in MS II in academic year 1973-1974, only five successfully completed the ROTC course in 1976. Four were commissioned in 1976, and one received her commission in 1977. One was a truly outstanding cadet and received a Regular Army commission; the others received Reserve commissions, including one currently on an extended educational delay. This is an attrition rate of 89.80 percent, but it would be even higher if figures were available for those women unofficially enrolled in MS I in 1972-1973 and those who compressed MS I and MS II in 1973-1974.

Similar attrition rates have been observed in subsequent years. Of the 145 female MS I cadets enrolled in school year 1973-1974, only 12 successfully completed the ROTC program in 1977—an attrition rate of 91.72 percent. Only one (along with the first female graduate of the 2-year program) was commissioned in 1977, and eight were commissioned in early 1978. The remaining three will be commissioned later. Of the 318 women enrolled in MS I at the beginning of academic year 1974-1975, only 13 (and )
female cadets in the 2-year program) began MS IV in 1977 - a three-year attrition rate of 95.91 percent.\textsuperscript{102} It is not known how many of these 16 women will complete MS IV in 1978, but 9 (plus 2 female "holdovers" from last year's class) are tentatively scheduled to receive their commissions later in the year.\textsuperscript{103}

Finally, of the 362 female MS I cadets enrolled at the beginning of school year 1975-1976, only 10 began MS III in 1977 - an attrition rate of 97.24 percent in just two years.\textsuperscript{104} With increased numbers of women enrolling in ROTC at Rio Piedras, the problem of female attrition appears to be on the increase as well.

This situation has developed because of an emphasis on recruiting as many females as possible to obtain high ROTC enrollment, rather than seeking to enroll qualified women with the potential to complete the program and be commissioned. A glance at Annex 1 to Appendix M will reveal that female cadets, almost all highly unqualified, represented 65.52 percent of the students who withdrew from the author's MS 201 class in 1974. Although the student rosters mentioned in Appendix N have not been included for privacy reasons, the "special" section created for some poorly qualified MS 201 cadets in 1975 was comprised almost entirely of female cadets, none of whom continued in the program. Most of these women had enrolled in ROTC for anticipated social activities and a perceived easy grade, and, furthermore, many rarely came to class. Appendices M and N only address the conditions at Huaanao in 1974 and 1975, but the same situation regarding female enrollment was widespread throughout the ROTC programs of UPR-Rio.
Piedras. In fact, as suggested by the female attrition figures cited in the paragraph above, the situation was far more serious at campuses other than Humacao.\textsuperscript{105}

While some cultural opposition to women enrolling in ROTC existed at the Basic Course level, it intensified the closer female cadets approached the Advanced Course. This occurred, of course, because entry into and withdrawal from the Basic Course is unrestricted, while enrolling in the Advanced Course involves signing a contract with the Army for a commitment of six to eight years of military service.\textsuperscript{106} By that time, however, most of those women who had enrolled in ROTC for frivolous reasons had dropped out of the program, and the serious female cadets who remained were subjected to those cultural pressures. As a result, many qualified as well as unqualified women failed to continue the program beyond the Basic Course.

The above practices - and others not mentioned - have resulted in an "inflated" ROTC enrollment picture at the UPR-Rio Piedras. Technically, the figures do report those enrolled, but beyond that say nothing of the quality or physical presence of these students in the program. In fact, many high quality students are discouraged from entering or remaining in the program when they learn how it operates. All too often there is little resemblance to the "well-educated, quality" product called for in the ROTC mission. Many of these poor-quality students become "phantom" cadets - officially enrolled, but seldom, if ever, attending classes - who withdraw from the program at the end of each
semester, resulting in a large year-end attrition rate. For example, in academic year 1975-1976 the record-breaking ROTC enrollment reported by Rio Piedras at the beginning of the year had dropped by 44.97 percent at its end - only 717 cadets remained. Still, far too many cadets of dubious quality remain in the program, consuming a considerable amount of instructor time and costly supplies.

Even MS III cadets at UPR-Rio Piedras are given a special program at the end of the school year to prepare them for attendance at the summer Advanced Camp. During the author's three years in Puerto Rico this consisted of four to seven days intensive training at the National Guard's Camp Santiago training area. The focus of this training was on M16 familiarization firing and the duplication of anticipated Advanced Camp graded areas, such as orienteering, military stakes, physical fitness, and TAX (tactical application exercise). However, an equally important aspect of the exercise was the psychological preparation of UPR cadets to face the competition and stateside environment awaiting them at Fort Bragg. This additional training and the tremendous esprit Puerto Rican cadets bring with them undoubtedly enabled many - especially those whose English proficiency was lacking or whose previous ROTC instruction had been inadequate - to successfully complete the Advanced Camp. However, for those fluent in English and whose ROTC program had been rigorous, the special training was unnecessary. Even with these measures, some Puerto Rican cadets did not successfully complete camp or experienced
lesser degrees of difficulties, largely because of the failure to socialize with non-Hispanic cadets or the inability to communicate effectively in English.

The final obstacle to commissioning cadets at Rio Piedras is the problem of delayed graduations. This is easily illustrated by the 86 cadets who completed MS IV in 1977.¹¹⁰ Only 9 (along with 10 "holdovers" from previous MS IV classes) received their commissions at the end of classes in June and early July. Two others were commissioned in late July at the end of the ROTC Advanced Camp at Fort Bragg, and 8 (plus 7 holdovers) were commissioned in August at the end of summer classes. The largest number (33, plus 8 holdovers) were commissioned in early 1978.¹¹¹ This leaves a significant number for even later commissioning dates.

In 1977 there was even one holdover at Rio Piedras who had completed ROTC three years earlier but still had not obtained his bachelor's degree (his current status is unknown). The cost of delayed graduations to the Army is an inability to accurately predict officer production to meet requirements. The cost to the cadet is possible loss of a Regular Army or active duty Reserve commission, the desired branch or assignment, and placing oneself behind other members of his or her original ROTC class.

In spite of high attrition, and because of extraordinary efforts to carry marginal cadets through the ROTC program, many with severe English shortcomings are commissioned. While in Puerto Rico the author read Officer Basic Course performance reports in which the inability to communicate effectively in English was...
cited as the primary reason that some recent UPR-Rio Piedras graduates had finished at the bottom of their class. In more serious cases involving difficulties with English, UPR graduates have been boarded out or placed in similar courses for allied officers. Several Puerto Rican officers have explained to the author how unfavorable remarks on their efficiency reports about their lack of English proficiency had adversely affected their careers. Another Puerto Rican officer, also a graduate of UPR, told the author how painful and embarrassing it was to have to relieve a fellow Puerto Rican and graduate of UPR because of his inability to communicate effectively in English. An officer of the Puerto Rican National Guard recently disclosed to the author in an interview that many recent UPR ROTC graduates must receive additional instruction to raise their English proficiency to the fluency level required by the Guard. Several faculty members at the USACGSC related to the author a situation of two years earlier in which a Puerto Rican student had more problems with English than the allied officers. The fact is that Puerto Rican officers often are noted for their difficulties with English, and their careers sometimes suffer as a result.

A final observation by the author is that some Puerto Rican officers appear to be locked in a "cycle," spending longer and more frequent tours in Spanish-speaking areas, usually Puerto Rico and Panama. Whether this is in fact true, by design, desire, or accident, or detrimental to their careers is unknown and beyond the scope of this study. As we have seen, however, one reason for
the difficulties experienced by some Puerto Ricans is an inadequate selection and preparation of potential officers by the ROTC cadre at the UPR — certainly no fault of the Puerto Rican cadet.

Allocation of Regular Army (RA) and Reserve commissions, the latter for active duty (AD) or Active Duty for Training (ADT), is an important indication of how ROTC graduates compare with their peers. Basically, the best ROTC graduates first receive a limited number of RA commissions. In selecting the remaining officers for AD/ADT, the "basic principles used" are that "if there are too many volunteers for active duty, competitive selection is used; if there are too few volunteers, random selection is used to supplement the volunteers for active duty."113

For the past two years the first situation — too many requests for active duty — has prevailed nationally and in Puerto Rico. Therefore, the results of this selection process reveal much about the "competitive" qualities of Puerto Rican cadets. In 1977 only 10.59% (9 cadets) were selected for RA commissions, 30.59% (26) for AD, and 58.82% (50) for ADT.114 At the same time, the national statistics were almost the inverse: 30.27% RA, 54.50% AD, and 15.23% ADT.115 This year the initial selection results revealed a similar pattern. The figures for UPR-Rio Piedras were: 5.13% (4 cadets) RA, 33.33% (26) AD, and 61.54% (48) ADT.116 On the other hand, the same Department of the Army boards selected 22.25% RA, 49.18% AD, and 28.57% ADT nation-wide.117 The non-competitive nature of most cadets from UPR-Rio Piedras is readily apparent.
Within the above picture of graduates of the UPR-Rio Piedras ROTC program are wide variations between students, depending upon which campus they began and/or completed their ROTC studies. When the author arrived in Puerto Rico in 1974, one cross-enrolled campus had the worst reputation, especially in the area of English proficiency, of all the campuses — Humacao. Fate had its way, and Humacao was where he was assigned. As has already been discussed, the obstacles encountered were formidable, largely due to the absence of or ignored professional ROTC standards because of the pressure to obtain and retain high cadet enrollment.

The first order of business was to address the problem, rather than pretend it did not exist. This meant that standards had to be established and maintained in all areas — English proficiency, ROTC classes, and physical fitness, to name the three most important. Cadet opposition was strong to reforms instituted by the author — El Gringo to many students. These efforts, in fact, were perceived by many cadets as being anti-Puerto Rican. After the initial resistance had subsided, a growing number of cadets began to realize that the new ROTC instructor was working for them, not against them. Cooperation, rather than opposition, therefore, became the practice of more and more cadets.

The changes which resulted were remarkable. For most of the MS III cadets, however, their formative years in ROTC had completely distorted their perception of what was required of a professional Army officer. As a consequence, only one survived the rigors of his two remaining years in ROTC to be commissioned.
The MS II cadets fared much better. With only one year of bad habits and mistaken impressions to unlearn, they set new standards of excellence for Humacao. Most transferred to Rio Piedras after MS III; and when they advanced to MS IV in School Year 1976-1977, five were among the 16 UPR-Rio Piedras cadets selected as Distinguished Military Students (DMS), and one became the Brigade Commander of the Cadet Corps. When the RA/AD/ADT selection roster for UPR-Rio Piedras was released in the spring of 1977, Humacao cadets received 3 of the 9 RA, 5 of 26 AD Reserve, and 3 of 50 ADT Reserve commissions. This selection rate of 27.27% RA, 45.46% AD, and 27.27% ADT compared favorably with the national average of 1977 and completely outshined that of the rest of UPR-Rio Piedras.

The Humacao cadets who have performed the best, however, were MS I cadets in 1974, and most are being commissioned this year. When they became MS IV cadets in 1977, seven were among the 15 UPR-Rio Piedras cadets designated as DMS, and once again one was selected as Brigade Commander. In this spring's RA/AD/ADT selection by the Army, Humacao cadets received 3 of the 4 RA, 4 of the 26 AD Reserve, and none of the ADT Reserve commissions. Several other Humacao cadets have delayed graduations and will receive their commissions with next year's graduates, but it is anticipated that at least two (who were designated DMS) will receive RA commissions. The above record of 42.86% RA and 57.14% AD surpasses the national percentages considerably, not to mention those of UPR-Rio Piedras. One also notices the fact that Humacao cadets
comprised 75 percent of the UPR-Rio Piedras RA commissions.

The most significant factor about the above accomplishments by Humacao cadets is that they were achieved by cadets whose campus accounts for less than 10 percent of the total UPR-Rio Piedras ROTC enrollment. Similar successes in most other competitive areas—such as orienteering meets, pre-Advanced Camp training, and selection for Airborne training—were and continue to be attained by Humacao cadets. It is not, however, the author's purpose to praise these achievements, as they speak for themselves. Rather, the lesson to be drawn here is that high standards, set and maintained in a positive, supportive atmosphere by non-Hispanic personnel in a completely Spanish environment have no limits to success in terms of producing "sufficient numbers of well-educated, quality officers" as the "future leaders of tomorrow's Army." Without the continuation of these high standards under strong leadership, however, conditions can easily revert to those of earlier years.
CHAPTER 4 NOTES


17. Wagenheim, p. 204.


19. HEW, Education Directory, pp. 412-414; see Appendix J for a listing of these institutions and associated information.


22. See Appendix J for the fall 1975 enrollment figures of the colleges and universities of Puerto Rico.


24. Wagenheim, p. 199.


34. A more detailed examination of the language problem in ROTC in Puerto Rico will be conducted later in the chapter.


40. "IAU Students Want Classes in English," The San Juan Star, 16 May 1977, p. 11.

41. The author first became aware of this phenomenon at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. When he told the Spanish instructors (who came from all parts of Latin America) that he would be going to Puerto Rico for his utilization tour, the almost universal response was, "They don't speak Spanish there, they speak 'Spanglish'."


43. HEW, Education Directory, pp. 412-414

44. TRADOC, Opening Enrollment Report, School Year 1977-1978, p. 117.

45. U.S. Army ROTC Instructor Group, University of Puerto Rico (UPR)-Rio Piedras, "Record of Officers Commissioned: 1929-Present."


50. Wagenheim, pp. 88-90.

51. Maldonado-Denis, p. 287.


59. See Appendix K for annual ROTC production at the University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras since 1929.


65. Conversations of the author with numerous Puerto Rican cadets.


67. To maximize the cost-effectiveness of its ROTC instructor groups, the Army "cross-enrolls" in the ROTC program of one college or university students from nearby institutions which cannot support ROTC units of their own.


69. See Appendix L for the complete memorandum.

70. Conversations between the author, other instructors and several cadets who participated in these high school briefings.

71. AR 145-1, para. 3-17c(1) [before Change 8].

72. AR 145-1, para. 3-17c(3)(c) [before Change 8].

73. Record of RQ scores administered at Rio Piedras in the spring of 1975, in the possession of the author.

74. Results of RQ tests administered by the author at Humacao in the spring of 1975, in the possession of the author.

75. RQ examinations administered by the PMS at Humacao in the spring of 1977 in the presence of the author.

76. See Appendix G.

77. Author's survey.


79. AR 145-1, para. 3-17c(1).

80. AR 145-1, para. 5-2b(5); also, CONARC, *Army ROTC Senior Division Program of Instruction*, p. 2.

81. Author's survey.
82. Author’s survey.

83. Author’s survey.


85. Conversations of the author with numerous cadets and several ROTC cadre members who had spent one or more years in the UPR-Rio Piedras ROTC unit prior to the author’s arrival.

86. See Appendix M for the complete memorandum.

87. Conversations of the author with numerous cadets as well as his own observations.

88. See Appendix N for the complete memorandum.

89. Author’s survey.

90. CONARC, Opening Enrollment Report, School Year 1972-1973, p. 5; also, interview with one of these female cadets.

91. TRADOC, Opening Enrollment Report, School Year 1973-1974, p. 8; also, interview with one of these female cadets.

92. Appendix D.


94. Appendix D.

95. Appendix E.


97. Appendix D.


101. U.S. Army ROTC Instructor Group, UPR-Rio Piedras, "Record of Officers Commissioned: 1929-Present."


105. Conversations of the author with instructors and numerous cadets from other campuses.

106. AR 145-1, Change 8, para. 3-67b(1) and (6).


108. See Appendix O for further discussion.


111. U.S. Army ROTC Instructor Group, UPR-Rio Piedras, "Record of Officers Commissioned: 1929-Present.'

112. Conversations of the author with numerous Puerto Rican officers.


122. TRADOC, Opening Enrollment Report, School Year 1977-1978, p. 117.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the preceding text, many of which not only concern Hispanic participation in ROTC but apply to the whole Army ROTC program. The most obvious of these is the common thread which runs through the entire study—the over-emphasis on quantity at the expense of quality in ROTC programs. The Army appears to be concerned more with "sufficient numbers" of students enrolled in ROTC—not unlike the Vietnam "body count" syndrome—than it is with producing "well-educated, quality officers."

This emphasis on quantity vs. quality arose from a genuine need to counter the threats facing ROTC in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Much needed internal reform resulted from this turbulent period and, in conjunction with changing external conditions, turned the tide in favor of ROTC. One factor, however, has remained—the absence of a common set of concrete standards against which one can measure students to determine their eligibility for admission into ROTC (especially the Advanced Course) and ROTC graduates to determine the extent of the qualities and skills desired in them. This has led to "situational ethics" where each ROTC unit develops standards and practices of its own which may or may not meet those expected of commissioned officers.
This situation was found to be noticeably evident in Puerto Rico, where over half of the nation's Hispanic cadets are located, and where one learns important reasons behind the inability of four percent Hispanic ROTC enrollment to produce a corresponding proportion among ROTC graduates in the Army's officer corps. Paraphrasing an earlier quotation, the impression is that the UPR-Rio Piedras ROTC program's "sole concern was that its statistical reports to [TRADOC] should merely indicate some increase" in cadet strength. Thus, in recent years the opening ROTC enrollment figures reported by Rio Piedras have been among the highest in the nation. They are, however, only superficially impressive because of equally high attrition, especially among female cadets.

Investigation determined several reasons behind these high attrition rates. While some cultural and linguistic obstacles were important factors, the primary cause was found to be the unrestricted recruitment of lower-quality students in order to meet high enrollment objectives. In spite of extraordinary effort to retain these substandard cadets, most withdraw from the program within a year. Because the UPR-Rio Piedras cadets comprise over a third of all Hispanic cadets in the nation, the unit's subsequent high attrition rate has a profound impact on the overall production of Hispanic officers.

Furthermore, it was learned that, contrary to the national experience, only a minority of those commissioned through ROTC at Rio Piedras enter active duty, further decreasing Hispanic officer
representation in the Army. This occurs because lowered standards within the Rio Piedras ROTC program lead to the commissioning of less-competitive cadets. An additional consequence is the exaggeration among many of these graduates of the most common shortcoming found to a lesser degree among Hispanic cadets elsewhere in the Nation—difficulty with English.

To continue to enroll cadets and subsequently commission officers who do not meet the standards—be it English proficiency or others—required for the performance of their duties does a disservice to many. It is unfair to the cadets because they, of course, feel that their preparation has been adequate, and that they are qualified officers. When they begin to compete on an equal basis with their peers, however, they will learn to their dismay that they have been cheated. It is an injustice to the future subordinates of these ill-prepared officers who must accept them as their leaders. It penalizes the future superiors of these officers who will rely upon them as capable subordinates when they are not. It impedes minority recognition based upon merit because a few poorly qualified minority officers often can develop a reputation which is attributed to other officers of the same minority group. In the area of English proficiency this is especially true of Puerto Ricans specifically, and Hispanics in general. Finally, it does a great disservice to the Army and the nation because of the weakening of national security due to less-qualified officers in the military.

From the foregoing investigation of conditions extant in
Puerto Rico and its ROTC programs, one also could conclude that the latter should be withdrawn from the island. The author, however, disagrees with this conclusion for several reasons. First, Puerto Rico is capable of producing highly-qualified officers, as seen in those receiving Regular Army commissions as well as many of those receiving Reserve commissions and entering on active duty. The number of these officers may not be as large as many would like to believe, but it certainly exceeds the number required to maintain an ROTC program. Second, to deny interested and qualified college students the opportunity obtain a commission through a reputable ROTC program (when one can be supported by qualified enrollment) not only would be unfair to the individuals concerned, but to all Puerto Ricans, especially those soldiers serving in the Army who would be denied visible "success symbols." Finally, in the event that Puerto Ricans choose independence as the ultimate solution to their status debate, it is conceivable that many Puerto Rican officers would elect to serve their island in its new status. A viable self-defense force would be a necessity, and highly-qualified ROTC graduates would be invaluable in this regard, while at the same time maintaining close relations with the United States.

A most disturbing conclusion is that undesirable traits such as "situational ethics" are being inculcated in ROTC cadets. These men and women are not oblivious to the questionable techniques used to make one ROTC unit appear to be better than another. They interpret these methods as acceptable means to "success"
in the Army rather than deviations from the established principles of leadership. Yet, by emphasizing what appears to be a "numbers game," the Army contributes to the development of these undesirable traits in its future officers.

Fortunately, this study produced some encouraging areas as well. Most importantly, it was found that, in spite of cultural and linguistic obstacles, as well as unrealistic enrollment pressures, an ROTC program can be operated in a totally Spanish environment and produce sufficient numbers of highly qualified officers in a cost-efficient manner. The success of such a program is dependent upon strong, competent, and honest leadership which addresses the situation rather than disguising it, establishes high standards rather than removing or ignoring them, and challenges the cadets rather than catering to them.

Recommendations arising from this project are many. First, inordinate emphasis on ROTC recruiting, to the extent that "phantom" and marginal or even less-qualified cadets are enrolled to meet enrollment projections, must be eliminated. This requires an equal emphasis on closing as well as opening enrollment figures. The tools for measuring attrition are presently available, but they must be used to be effective in determining those institutions which are squandering their officer and material resources. It is most important that the Army establish universal standards by which ROTC cadets are admitted and ROTC graduates are independently evaluated before being commissioned. These standards cannot be so nebulous as the CEB, to be applied when convenient.
Certainly, additional research can be made in the area of Hispanic participation in ROTC. The role of Hispanic women in ROTC has just been touched. Further studies are needed of the attrition of Hispanics at each level of ROTC. Comparison of attrition rates in the 4-year and 2-year ROTC programs should be made. And, more data must be gathered on the performance of Hispanics by institution in the Officer Basic Courses. TRADOC should support such efforts by making the data recoverable. This can only be accomplished by having its enrollment report conform to the Army's data base - which it presently does not. In order to follow the production of minority officers other than blacks, similar information must be maintained, or at least be recoverable, to include the RA/AD/ADT data by ethnic group and institution.

Concerning Hispanic cadets in general and the University of Puerto Rico in particular, language problems should be eliminated prior to entry into the Basic Course, but must be eliminated prior to entry into the Advanced Course. The unique environment of Puerto Rico must not be allowed to affect the standards which are expected of her officers. This is particularly applicable to well-meaning but misguided Hispanic officers who may be tempted to "facilitate" ROTC instruction by using Spanish is the classroom. It has been demonstrated that high-quality officers can be commissioned on the island, and it is these officers that the Army, the Army Reserve, and the National Guard look for to lead their soldiers. By reducing ROTC enrollment by 25%-50% in Puerto
Rico and concentrating instructor efforts on producing better officers, not only will quality increase, but quantity may as well. Only by demanding an ROTC program with less show and more substance can Puerto Rican sons and daughters receive meaningful preparation in pursuit of an honored career, providing service to their people, their island, and their country.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A - Active Army Hispanic Officer Content by Source of Commission, April 1978

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<td>150</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Percent Hispanic</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Total U.S. Army</td>
<td>4581</td>
<td>11194</td>
<td>16330</td>
<td>28749</td>
<td>10019</td>
<td>11302</td>
<td>92433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pre-Commissioning Programs Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army.
APPENDIX B - ROTC Regions: Headquarters and Jurisdictions

1. First ROTC Region - Fort Bragg, North Carolina
   a. Connecticut  
   b. Delaware  
   c. District of Columbia  
   d. Florida  
   e. Georgia  
   f. Maine  
   g. Maryland  
   h. Massachusetts  
   i. New Hampshire  
   j. New Jersey  
   k. New York  
   l. North Carolina  
   m. Pennsylvania  
   n. Puerto Rico  
   o. Rhode Island  
   p. South Carolina  
   q. Vermont  
   r. Virginia  
   s. West Virginia

2. Second ROTC Region - Fort Knox, Kentucky
   a. Illinois  
   b. Indiana  
   c. Kentucky  
   d. Michigan  
   e. Missouri  
   f. Ohio  
   g. Tennessee  
   h. Wisconsin

3. Third ROTC Region - Fort Riley, Kansas
   a. Alabama  
   b. Arkansas  
   c. Kansas  
   d. Louisiana  
   e. Mississippi  
   f. New Mexico  
   g. Oklahoma  
   h. Texas

4. Fourth ROTC Region - Fort Lewis, Washington
   a. Alaska  
   b. Arizona  
   c. California  
   d. Colorado  
   e. Hawaii  
   f. Idaho  
   g. Iowa  
   h. Minnesota  
   i. Montana  
   j. Nebraska  
   k. Nevada  
   l. North Dakota  
   m. Oregon  
   n. South Dakota  
   o. Utah  
   p. Washington  
   q. Wyoming

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Organization, Administration, and Training, Army Regulation 145-1.
APPENDIX C - Opening Academic Year ROTC Enrollment by ROTC Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Fourth</th>
<th>Total ROTC Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>23,638</td>
<td>13,592</td>
<td>15,733</td>
<td>6,714</td>
<td>59,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>21,376</td>
<td>13,095</td>
<td>13,649</td>
<td>6,511</td>
<td>54,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>17,771</td>
<td>11,831</td>
<td>12,005</td>
<td>6,793</td>
<td>48,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>13,764</td>
<td>9,552</td>
<td>9,338</td>
<td>6,192</td>
<td>39,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1974</td>
<td>11,485</td>
<td>7,878</td>
<td>8,804</td>
<td>5,053</td>
<td>33,220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX D - Opening Academic Year ROTC Enrollment for Blacks and Females

ROTC Enrollment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic year</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>13,006 (21.7%)</td>
<td>14,296 (23.9%)</td>
<td>59,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>12,109 (22.1%)</td>
<td>11,838 (21.6%)</td>
<td>54,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>9,876 (20.4%)</td>
<td>9,324 (19.2%)</td>
<td>48,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>7,156 (18.1%)</td>
<td>6,354 (16.1%)</td>
<td>39,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1974</td>
<td>5,718 (17.2%)</td>
<td>3,098 (9.3%)</td>
<td>33,220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year/Opening ROTC Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. FIRST ROTC REGION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Stetson Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Univ of Miami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Univ of Tampa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Peters College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Fordham Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Polytechnic Inst of NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Saint Johns Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Puerto Rico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) UPR, Mayaguez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) UPR, Rio Piedras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SECOND ROTC REGION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Loyola U of Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) U of Ill-Chicago Circle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ of Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Missouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemper Mill School &amp; College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ of Wis-Madison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. THIRD ROTC REGION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. New Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Eastern New Mexico Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) New Mexico Mil Inst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) New Mexico State Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) St. Mary's U of San Antonio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Sam Houston State Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Texas A &amp; I Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Texas A &amp; M Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Trinity Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Univ of Houston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Univ of Texas-Arlington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Univ of Texas-Austin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Univ of Texas-El Paso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) West Texas State Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. FOURTH ROTC REGION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Arizona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Arizona State Univ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Univ of Arizona</td>
</tr>
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</table>


### Academic Year/Opening ROTC Enrollment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<td></td>
<td>Total Sp-Am</td>
<td>Total Sp-Am</td>
<td>Total Sp-Am</td>
<td>Total Sp-Am</td>
<td>Total Sp-Am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b. California</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) San Jose State Univ</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>97</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Univ of Cal-Berkeley</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Univ of Cal-Davis</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>268</td>
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<td>(4) Univ of Cal-Santa Barbara</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5) Univ of San Francisco</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c. Colorado</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Colorado School of Mines</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Univ of Southern Colorado</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>d. Utah</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weber State College</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. ABOVE INSTITUTIONS
a. ROTC Enrollment
   5,071 1,183  6,216 1,796  7,492 2,306  8,134 1,991  8,679 2,163
b. Percentage of ROTC Total
   15.26  82.08  15.80  85.04  15.48  86.27  14.88  89.97  14.54  90.58

6. TOTAL ROTC ENROLLMENT
   33,220 1,407  39,346 2,112  48,400 2,675  54,671 2,213  59,677 2,388

- Estimated figures based on preceding and following years
- Figures believed to be incorrect based on preceding and following years

1. As part of the academic program at the Command and General Staff College I am conducting a student research project on Hispanic Americans in the Army ROTC program. The completed study will be forwarded to the depository of research data at the Defense Documentation Center, Alexandria, Virginia.

2. One of the objectives of this study is to determine if language and cultural differences cause difficulties to Hispanic cadets in the Army ROTC program. If difficulties do arise, the study seeks to determine what efforts are taken by successful ROTC programs to recruit, retain, and commission Hispanics.

3. According to opening enrollment figures for Academic Year 1977-1978, your ROTC program is one of 37 throughout the United States and Puerto Rico which has significant enrollment of Hispanic cadets. ("Significant" is defined as Hispanic enrollment of at least 10 cadets or comprising at least four percent of the total number of cadets.) The experiences of your ROTC program, therefore, are invaluable to the conduct of this study.

4. To obtain data in the areas mentioned above, I have devised a short questionnaire which will take only a few minutes of your time to complete. As the demographic dispersion of Hispanics tend to follow distinct regional patterns, to correlate the ROTC experience with national patterns it would be extremely helpful if your college or university was identified. This, however, is optional on your part.
5. It is requested that you complete the questionnaire and return it in the enclosed envelope. Thank you for your cooperation in this important study.

JAMES H. PROCTOR, JR.
MAJ, IN
APPENDIX G

HISPANIC PARTICIPATION IN ROTC

1. Name of institution ________________________________

2. What is the official language of your institution? (Circle one)
   a. English.
   b. Spanish.
   c. Bilingual (Spanish/English).
   d. Officially bilingual, but predominantly English.
   e. Officially bilingual, but predominantly Spanish.

3. Which Hispanic subgroup has the largest representation among Hispanic cadets in your ROTC program? (Circle one)
   a. Cuban American.
   b. Mexican American.
   c. Puerto Rican.
   d. Other Hispanic.
   e. Evenly divided between ___________ and ___________.

4. How many Hispanic officers and NCOs are in your ROTC detachment?
   a. Officers ___________.  b. NCOs ___________.

5. Are you bilingual (Spanish/English)?
   a. Yes.
   b. No.
   c. No, but have some knowledge of Spanish.

6. How many officers and NCOs on your staff are bilingual (Spanish/English)?
   a. Officers ___________.  b. NCOs ___________.

7. In which of the following recruiting techniques has Spanish been used to attract potential Hispanic cadets?
   a. Spanish is not used in any recruiting effort.
   b. High school briefings.
   c. Freshman orientations.
   d. TV spots.
   e. Radio spots.
   f. Newspaper advertisements.
   g. Brochures/handouts on ROTC.
   h. Letters to potential cadets.
   i. Direct interviews.
   j. Other. (Explain)
8. How would you characterize the approach taken to enrolling Hispanic students in ROTC who have difficulties communicating in English? (Circle all the appropriate responses)
   a. Such a situation has not arisen at this institution.
   b. Such students are discouraged from enrolling in ROTC.
   c. Such students may enroll only in the Basic course.
   d. Such students may enroll, but are encouraged to take courses/step to improve their English.
   e. Other. (Explain)

9. How would you characterize the Spanish proficiency of your Hispanic cadets? (Circle one)
   a. Most are completely fluent, and Spanish is their primary language.
   b. Most have a working knowledge of the language.
   c. Most have a limited knowledge of the language.
   d. Most have little knowledge of the language.
   e. Most have no knowledge of the language.
   f. Other. (Explain)

10. How would you characterize the English proficiency of your Hispanic cadets? (Circle one)
    a. All are completely fluent, having no difficulty expressing themselves in or understanding the language.
    b. Most are completely fluent; however, a few have minor difficulties with the language.
    c. Most are completely fluent; however, a few have major difficulties with the language.
    d. Most are fluent; however, many have minor difficulties with the language.
    e. Most are fluent; however, many have major difficulties with the language.
    f. Other. (Explain)
11. What assistance is available to Hispanic cadets who have difficulty communicating in English? (Circle all the appropriate responses)
   a. No assistance is needed as all cadets are completely fluent in English.
   b. English classes conducted by the institution.
   c. English classes conducted by ROTC instructors.
   d. English classes conducted by ROTC cadets.
   e. Other. (Explain)

12. To what extent is Spanish used in ROTC classes to insure understanding by Hispanic cadets? (Circle one)
   a. Spanish is not used in any ROTC instruction.
   b. Spanish is used in MS I only.
   c. Spanish is used in MS I and MS II only.
   d. Spanish is used in MS I, MS II, and MS III only.
   e. Spanish is used in all four years of ROTC instruction.
   f. Other. (Explain)

13. To what extent is Spanish used in the daily ROTC administration to insure understanding by Hispanic cadets? (Circle one)
   a. Spanish is used regularly and frequently.
   b. Spanish is used occasionally, but irregularly.
   c. Spanish is used infrequently, and only to explain points of difficulty.
   d. Spanish is not used at all.
   e. Other. (Explain)
14. Have Hispanic cadets had difficulty with the English portion of the RQ-8/RQ-9 examination? (Circle one)
   a. No.
   b. Yes, but only a few.
   c. Yes, some.
   d. Yes, many.
   e. Other. (Explain)

15. Has it been necessary to allow Hispanic cadets additional time to take the RQ-8/RQ-9 tests because of language difficulties? (Circle one)
   a. No.
   b. Yes, an extra _____ minutes are allowed for each test.

16. To what extent do your Hispanic cadets encounter difficulties at the ROTC Basic Camp because of difficulties with the English language? (Circle one)
   a. No difficulties encountered.
   b. A few cadets encounter difficulties.
   c. Some cadets encounter difficulties.
   d. Many cadets encounter difficulties.
   e. The extent of difficulties encountered is unknown.
   f. Other. (Explain)

17. To what extent do your Hispanic cadets encounter difficulties at the ROTC Advanced Camp because of difficulties with the English language? (Circle one)
   a. No difficulties encountered.
   b. A few cadets encounter difficulties.
   c. Some cadets encounter difficulties.
   d. Many cadets encounter difficulties.
   e. The extent of difficulties encountered is unknown.
   f. Other. (Explain)
18. Are there any Hispanic student groups which specifically oppose or discourage Hispanic enrollment in ROTC?
   a. No.
   b. Yes.

19. Are there any cultural factors other than Hispanic student groups which specifically discourage Hispanic enrollment in ROTC?
   a. No.
   b. Yes. (Explain)

20. If the answer to the above question was "yes", please, explain how your ROTC program has overcome these obstacles to Hispanic enrollment in ROTC.

Since the small number of questions above cannot possibly address all the aspects of Hispanic participation in ROTC, please, write any additional comments, observations, or suggestions on this subject in the space above or on the back of this page. Thank you again for your cooperation in this study.
APPENDIX H - Results of Survey on Hispanic Participation in ROTC

1. Institutions participating in survey: 37 (100% of those canvassed).

2. Official languages of the institutions.
   a. English: 33
   b. Spanish: 1
   c. Bilingual (Spanish/English): 1
   d. Officially bilingual, but predominantly English: 1
   e. Officially bilingual, but predominantly Spanish: 1

3. Hispanic subgroups having the largest representation among Hispanic cadets in the ROTC programs.
   a. Cuban American: 2
   b. Mexican American: 25
   c. Puerto Rican: 7
   d. Other Hispanic: 1
   e. Evenly divided between Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans: 1
   f. Evenly divided between Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans: 1

4. Hispanic officers and NCOs in the ROTC detachments.
   a. Officers: 16
   b. NCOs: 27

5. Spanish proficiency of professors of military science.
   a. Bilingual: 9
   b. Not bilingual: 21
   c. Not bilingual, but have some knowledge of Spanish: 7

6. Bilingual officers and NCOs in the ROTC detachments.
   a. Officers: 29
   b. NCOs: 35

7. Recruiting techniques in which Spanish has been used to attract potential Hispanic cadets.
   a. Spanish is not used in any recruiting effort: 25
   b. High school briefings: 3
   c. Freshman orientations: 3
   d. TV spots: 5
   e. Radio spots: 5
   f. Newspaper advertisements: 5
   g. Brochures/handouts on ROTC: 5
   h. Letters to potential cadets: 5
   i. Direct interviews: 5
   j. Other: 2 (Telephone calls, speaking to Hispanic groups)
8. Approach taken to enrolling Hispanic students in ROTC who have difficulties communicating in English. (All appropriate responses)
   a. Such a situation has not arisen at this institution: 17
   b. Such students are discouraged from enrolling in ROTC: none
   c. Such students may enroll only in the Basic course: 1
   d. Such students may enroll, but are encouraged to take courses/steps to improve their English: 19
   e. Other: 4
      (1) Cadets must be able to communicate in English.
      (2) Cadets assisted by bilingual personnel.
      (3) Cadets assisted by English language module conducted on ROTC time.
      (4) If situation existed, cadets would be encouraged to take courses/steps to improve their English.

   a. Most are completely fluent, and Spanish is their primary language: 10
   b. Most have a working knowledge of the language: 19
   c. Most have a limited knowledge of the language: 7
   d. Most have little knowledge of the language: none
   e. Most have no knowledge of the language: none
   f. Other: 1 (Unknown - unable to evaluate)

10. English proficiency of Hispanic cadets.
    a. All are completely fluent, having no difficulty expressing themselves in or understanding the language: 19
    b. Most are completely fluent; however, a few have minor difficulties with the language: 17
    c. Most are completely fluent; however, a few have major difficulties with the language: 1
    d. Most are fluent; however, many have minor difficulties with the language: 3
    e. Most are fluent; however, many have major difficulties with the language: 1
    f. Other: 1
       (1) Basic Course cadets: most are fluent; however, many have major difficulties with the language.
       (2) Advanced Course cadets: most are fluent; however, many have minor difficulties with the language.

11. Assistance available to Hispanic cadets who have difficulties communicating in English. (All appropriate responses)
    a. No assistance is needed as all cadets are completely fluent in English: 9
    b. English classes conducted by the institution: 26
    c. English classes conducted by ROTC instructors: 2
    d. English classes conducted by ROTC cadets: 2
12. Extent to which Spanish is used in ROTC classes to insure understanding by Hispanic cadets.
   a. Spanish is not used in any ROTC instruction: 33
   b. Spanish is used in MS I only: 1
   c. Spanish is used in MS I and MS II only: none
   d. Spanish is used in MS I, MS II, and MS III only: none
   e. Spanish is used in all four years of ROTC instruction: none
   f. Other: 3
      (1) Spanish used as necessary in classroom explanations and in after-class instruction: 2
      (2) Spanish used on an informal basis in classroom: 1

13. Extent to which Spanish is used in the daily ROTC administration to insure understanding by Hispanic cadets.
   a. Spanish is used regularly and frequently: none
   b. Spanish is used occasionally, but irregularly: none
   c. Spanish is used infrequently, and only to explain points of difficulty: 7
   d. Spanish is not used at all: 30
   e. Other: none

14. Extent to which Hispanic cadets had difficulty with the English portion of the RQ-8/RQ-9 examination.
   a. None: 15
   b. Yes, but only a few: 11
   c. Yes, some: 5
   d. Yes, many: 3
   e. Other: 3
      (1) RQ-8/RQ-9 no longer used: 2
      (2) Cadets completing 2 years of ROTC had no difficulty, however, students trying to enroll in the 2-year program occasionally had difficulty: 1

15. Allowance of additional time to Hispanic cadets to take the RQ-8/RQ-9 tests because of language difficulties.
   a. No additional time allowed: 32
   b. Additional time (1-15 minutes) allowed: 5
16. Extent to which Hispanic cadets encounter difficulties at the ROTC Basic Camp because of difficulties with the English language.
   a. No difficulties encountered: 23
   b. A few cadets encounter difficulties: 4
   c. Some cadets encounter difficulties: none
   d. Many cadets encounter difficulties: none
   e. The extent of difficulties encountered is unknown: 9
   f. Other: 1 (No cadets sent to Basic Camp)

17. Extent to which Hispanic cadets encounter difficulties at the ROTC Advanced Camp because of difficulties with the English language.
   a. No difficulties encountered: 27
   b. A few cadets encounter difficulties: 5
   c. Some cadets encounter difficulties: 1
   d. Many cadets encounter difficulties: none
   e. The extent of difficulties encountered is unknown: 4
   f. Other: none

18. Presence of Hispanic student groups which specifically oppose or discourage Hispanic enrollment in ROTC.
   a. None: 34
   b. Yes: 3

19. Presence of cultural factors other than Hispanic student groups which specifically discourage Hispanic enrollment in ROTC.
   a. None: 33
   b. Yes: 4
      (1) Hostile parents, boyfriends to female enrollment in ROTC: 2
      (2) Close family, neighborhood ties: 2
      (3) Spanish language, food, mañana attitude: 1
APPENDIX I

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U. S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

12 May 1978

SUBJECT: Hispanic Participation in ROTC

Professor of Military Science
U.S. Army ROTC Instructor Group

1. I would like to take this opportunity to express my apprecia-
tion for your cooperation in completing the questionnaire on
Hispanic participation in ROTC. The overall response to my re-
quest for information was rapid and truly remarkable – 100% coop-
eration as of today.

2. In order that participating ROTC units may share in the bene-
fits of the data which they have provided, each will be sent a
copy of my completed study. Because of printing and assembling
time, the expected delivery date is not until mid-September. To
preclude additional delays caused by the rotation or retirement
of personnel, each copy will be addressed to the position of PMS
at each unit rather than to individual officers.

3. Once again, my sincerest thanks for your assistance in this
project.

JAMES H. PROCTOR, JR.
MAJ, IN
APPENDIX J - Colleges and Universities in Puerto Rico

INSTITUTION (location), control, level of studies (program),
student body (fall '75)

ANTILLIAN COLLEGE (Mayaguez), 7th Day Adventist, 4-5 yr baccalaureate (liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory, professional), coed (716)

BAYAMON CENTRAL UNIVERSITY (Bayamon), Roman Catholic, 4-5 yr baccalaureate (liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory), coed (1,534)

CARIBBEAN JUNIOR COLLEGE (Bayamon), independent non-profit, 2 but less than 4 yrs (terminal occupational below bachelor's, 2 yrs bachelor's creditable), coed (551)

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO (Ponce), Roman Catholic, master's (liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory, professional), coed (7,463)

COLLEGE OF SACRED HEART (Santurce), Roman Catholic, 4-5 yr baccalaureate (terminal occupational below bachelor's, liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory), coed (3,351)

CONSERVATORY OF MUSIC OF PUERTO RICO (San Juan), Commonwealth government, 4-5 yr baccalaureate (professional), coed (277)

INTER-AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO (Central offices in San Juan), independent non-profit; branches are:

SAN GERMAN, master's (liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory), coed (4,509)

HATO REY, master's (liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory professional), coed (5,716)

AGUADILLA, 2 but less than 4 yrs (terminal occupational below bachelor's 2 yrs bachelor's creditable), coed (1,730)

ARECIBO, 2 but less than 4 yrs (terminal occupational below bachelor's 2 yrs bachelor's creditable), coed (1,823)

BARRANQUITAS, 2 but less than 4 yrs (terminal occupational below bachelor's 2 yrs bachelor's creditable), coed (900)

BAYAMON, 2 but less than 4 yrs (terminal occupational below bachelor's 2 yrs bachelor's creditable), coed (2,733)
FAJARDO, 2 but less than 4 yrs (2 yrs bachelor's creditable), coed (1,167)

GUAYAMA, 2 but less than 4 yrs (2 yrs bachelor's creditable), coed (1,037)

PONCE, 2 but less than 4 yrs (terminal occupational below bachelor's, 2 yrs bachelor's creditable), coed (1,357)

PUERTO RICO JUNIOR COLLEGE (Rio Piedras), independent non-profit, 2 but less than 4 yrs (terminal occupational below bachelor's, 2 yrs bachelor's creditable), coed (5,691)

SAN JUAN TECHNOLOGICAL COMMUNITY COLLEGE (Santurce), local, 2 but less than 4 yrs (terminal occupational below bachelor's), coed (580)

UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO (Central offices at Rio Piedras), Commonwealth government; branches are:

RIO PIEDRAS, doctorate (terminal occupational below bachelor's, liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory, professional), coed (25,719)

MAYAGUEZ, master's (terminal occupational below bachelor's, liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory, professional), coed (9,334)

MEDICAL SCIENCES (Rio Piedras), doctorate (terminal occupational below bachelor's, professional - medical sciences), coed (2,086)

HUMACAO UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, 4-5 yr baccalaureate (liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory), coed (2,903)

CAYEY UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, 4-5 yr baccalaureate (liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory), coed (2,372)

REGIONAL COLLEGES ADMINISTRATION (Rio Piedras) (includes campuses of AGUADILLA, ARECIBO, BAYAMON, CAROLINA, and PONCE), 2 but less than 4 yrs (terminal occupational below bachelor's, 2 yrs bachelor's creditable), coed (5,567)

WORLD UNIVERSITY (Nato Rey), independent non-profit, master's (terminal occupational below bachelor's, liberal arts & general, teacher preparatory, professional), coed (3,515)

## Appendix K - Officer Production, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, 1929-1978

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<td>1962</td>
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* Figures in parenthesis are those commissioned from the Mayaguez campus before it became a separate ROTC unit but are not included in the figures without parenthesis.

** Includes only those commissioned through April 1978.

Source: U.S. Army ROTC Instructor Group, UPR-Rio Piedras, "Record of Officers Commissioned: 1929-Present."
MEMORANDUM FOR:  SENIOR ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE

SUBJECT:  Status of MS 201 Enrollment at the Fajardo Campus of Inter American University

1. Of the 34 students originally enrolled in MS 201 at the Fajardo Campus of Inter American University at the beginning of the first semester, SY 75-76, 15 presently remain on the rolls. Even this figure does not give an actual picture of MS 201 enrollment in Fajardo. As of this date, only four students are attending class and can, therefore, be classified as bona fide MS 201 students.

2. This high attrition rate can be explained easily by examining several areas. These are the initial recruiting of students to ROTC, the nature of the students at IAU-Fajardo, previous ROTC instruction at Fajardo, and IAU's support of ROTC at Fajardo. The following paragraphs discuss each of these areas in detail.

3. The source of most of the problems at Fajardo can be directly traced to a ROTC recruiting program that borders on the dishonest.

   a. Last spring I was personally assured by the individual responsible for the majority of the ROTC recruiting in Fajardo that he had recruited "high-caliber students" who spoke "excellent English." This proved to be completely false by any stretch of the imagination.

   b. The first indication that all might not be as claimed came during the ROTC camp held at Camp Garcia on Vieques, 11-14 April 1975. The MS 101 students from Fajardo who joined the Humacao cadets on this weekend camp proved - for the most part - to be a gross disappointment. The vast majority spoke little or no English, were only interested in partying the entire period of the camp, and showed little inclination in participating in most of the military training conducted.
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c. The first weeks of class reinforced the feeling that extremely poor quality students had been recruited into the ROTC program. Exactly half of the MS 201 students showed up for the first day of class on 15 August, and two of these never returned. The next week 21 students came for class, but the number decreased with each succeeding week with the exception of one - when 23 students took the first exam on 12 September. In fact, eight students attended only one or no classes at all - five of these are still registered in the course. With the exception of nine students, the English capability of those IAU-Fajardo students who attended MS 201 classes was extremely deficient - to the point of not even being able to handle the most basic of conversations in English.

d. Not only was the English of most extremely poor, worse yet was the motivation of even more students. Students attended class when they felt like it, offered no excuses for their absences, and then expected to take the missed quizzes and exams at their leisure. The fact that each class session missed was two hours long - an entire week of two normal 50 minutes classes - further compounded the problem of student absenteeism. Since the instructor team journeyed to Fajardo just once a week, unless the student went to Humacao (this happened only once) it was extremely difficult to catch up on the missed material. Most never made even an attempt to do so. Attendance at drill was even worse, with the Fajardo "company" progressively shrinking to a reinforced squad.

e. The main interest of most of the MS 201 students at Fajardo was constantly on the "next party" or the "next camp", not on applying themselves to their required studies. Once several students actually missed class only to show up hours later at a "surprise birthday party" for one of the ROTC instructors.

f. It is incomprehensible to assume that some indication of these glaring student deficiencies - especially the poor or nonexistent English capability - failed to appear when these students were initially recruited. When used correctly, adequate tools exist for determining the potential of prospective ROTC enrollees. Unless a more professional - and honest - approach to recruiting is taken in Fajardo, the same type of substandard students will continue to enter the ROTC program. This is grossly nonproductive.

4. Even before initial recruiting of ROTC students is begun in Fajardo, one must be aware of the nature of the average IAU student in that locale.

a. Generally speaking, the student who attends IAU is less qualified academically than the one who attends UPR and its various campuses. Unless the student has difficulty with Spanish, he first attempts to enter the Rio Piedras campus of UPR. Failing to
qualify for admission there, he then applies to one of the other UPR campuses. If admission is still not obtained, the student pays considerably more tuition and attends one of the IAU branches.

b. The above is not true of all students, of course, but two comparisons will bear out its validity. AQ-9 scores of comparable year-group students reveal a wide difference between those at IAU-Fajardo and those at UPR campuses. In the identical MS 201 course, the averages (99.19 to 91.58) of the top four students at Humacao are 25 points higher than the averages (76.96 to 70.05) of the top four students at Fajardo. (All the other students at Fajardo except one were failing before they stopped coming to class or dropped the course.)

c. Clearly, unless one is extremely selective in recruiting, a definitely lower quality student will be obtained from those at IAU-Fajardo.

5. The nature of previous ROTC instruction experienced by the MS 201 students at Fajardo has a lot to do with the dismal results experienced with this group.

a. Several students have volunteered to me that most previous ROTC instructors taught most of the classes in Spanish and seemed more interested in keeping students happy and advancing them to MS II than in developing correct study habits or conducting a challenging course. This was especially true this past summer when several different instructors taught MS 102 at Fajardo.

b. Such practices do a gross disservice to both the student and the ROTC program. By failing to expose the student to the proper academic standards required of all ROTC cadets, he rightfully expects all ROTC instruction to be equally lax in succeeding courses. When confronted with more realistic standards, the student is woefully ill-prepared to meet them. At the same time this “fun-and-games” approach to ROTC instruction creates a negative image of the course which, in turn, continues to attract the wrong type of student.

6. Finally, the lack of support from IAU-Fajardo has had a distinctly negative influence on not only MS 201 but all ROTC enrollment.

a. IAU-Fajardo has failed to provide any facility suitable for conducting classes. Only as a result of the efforts of NAJ Ortiz were two rooms of the Fajardo Cultural Center obtained for classes. Even this is inadequate. Projection screens, chalkboards, and other basic training aids must be brought each week for class. There are not enough tables or school-type chairs
For students to work on during class. Worse yet, the ceiling leaks profusely when it rains heavily, turning the "classrooms" into swamps. With this type of facility being used for instruction, it is very difficult to create an atmosphere conducive to learning.

b. More damaging is IAU's apparent failure to grant appropriate credit for ROTC courses taken at Fajardo. IAU's catalog clearly states that taking ROTC courses exempts one from required physical education courses. However, since neither grades nor credits have yet been given for any ROTC course taken at Fajardo, students have been told by their counselors that they must now make-up all missed PE courses. For some this means remaining an additional year at IAU to complete their studies. Quite logically, students ask themselves why they continue taking ROTC, and most simply stop attending class. This is also true of the MS I students.

c. If this lack of support continues it will be no surprise if even the small number of students now remaining fail to return for any additional ROTC courses.

7. The above discussion explains the reasons behind the extremely poor enrollment picture at Fajardo. In spite of all the problems encountered, great pains have been taken to provide the best instruction to the MS 201 cadets at Fajardo. This has consumed far more time and effort than is justified by the results.

8. Unless substantial improvements are made in the areas mentioned above ROTC courses should not be offered in the future at IAU-Fajardo. Until such action is taken, any serious student interested in taking ROTC courses should be encouraged to cross-enroll at Humacao University College or one of the other branches of UPR.

JAMES H. PROCTOR, JR.
CPT, INF
APMS
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Analysis of Student Withdrawal from MS 201, First Semester, SY 74-75, Humacao Regional College, Puerto Rico

1. Of 60 students originally enrolled in MS 201 at the beginning of the semester, only 31 remained on the rolls at its end, representing a loss of 48.33%.

2. At first glance this loss rate appears inordinately large and reflects a reversal of steadily increasing numbers of apparently bona fide students enrolled in the ROTC program at Humacao Regional College.

3. Closer examination of student withdrawals, however, reveals a more accurate picture of the actual situation existing presently and previously within the ROTC program at Humacao Regional College.

4. In Annex 1 are found instructor observations of each student who withdrew from the MS 201 course of instruction. In Annex 2 these student withdrawals are grouped into the distinctive patterns that emerge - those that made little or no initial effort, those who left because of extra-ROTC reasons, and those who made at least some effort beyond the initial six weeks of the course.

a. Those who made little or no initial effort totaled 17 or 28.33% of the original 60 students.

   (1) This group of students included three who never attended class and whose English capabilities could not be observed. However, all but one of the remaining 14 students had extremely poor capabilities in English not even able to hold a basic, simple conversation in the language, let alone absorb second year college instruction in English.

   (2) Subtraction of this group of students from the original figure leaves a much more realistic number of bona fide beginning students - 43. Against this total, the number of withdrawals...
(12) is less than half the previous number and reflects a loss rate of 27.90%, almost half the original percentage.

b. Those who withdrew from ROTC for reasons completely unrelated to the program numbered only three or 5% of the original students.

(1) Unfortunately, this little group of students spoke good English and had grades higher than most of their contemporaries. All of them, likewise, had a genuine desire to participate in the ROTC program, and most certainly would have obtained grades much above average had not extra-ROTC considerations compelled them to withdraw.

(2) Subtraction of this group of students from the original total leaves only 40 who began as bona fide students and who did not withdraw because of a lack of initial motivation. Against this figure, the nine remaining withdrawals reflect a 77% retention rate. This compares most favorably with HEW data (1957-1967) which show that nationally only 50% of all entering freshmen ever receive degrees four years after beginning in a college or university. While such a comparison is akin to comparing apples and oranges, appropriate data on retention in Puerto Rican institutions of higher learning are not readily available at this time.

c. The remaining category of withdrawals contain those who made at least some effort beyond the initial examination to remain in the course, and who comprised 13% of the original 60 students.

(1) Some of these students only made cursory attempts at passing the course, while others apparently worked more seriously.

(2) A wide spectrum of English capabilities, from extremely poor to good, was observed among this group.

(3) These failures, then, covered both motivational and ability failures, with the only real ability failure being a poor command of English. This deficiency, however, did not deter other students with the same problem from continuing in the course, applying themselves, and obtaining higher than average grades. The final analysis, therefore, must lean heavily towards motivational, rather than ability, failures as being the cause of this last group's withdrawals from the course.

5. The main thrust of these observations, then indicates a large degree of motivational failure coupled with severe problems with the English language. Both of these areas were investigated by the instructor with important results.
a. From interviews with numerous MS 201, MS 301, and MS 401 (at the Rio Piedras Campus) students, it was learned that the previous instructor, at least in the preceding year, had taught the vast majority of his classes in Spanish. This violation of the basic tenets of the ROTC program denied the students the opportunity of speaking and listening to English, as well as lulling them into a false sense of security by not having to use English.

b. These and other interviews with the same students revealed that many of the student learning outcomes stated in the CONARC Pamphlets 145-11 and 145-12 were not obtained the previous year because of a lack of or inadequate instruction in those areas. These deficiencies were so acute that some MS 301 students attended the MS 201 Military Geography subcourse and the remainder asked that they be given this subcourse by the instructor. (It was decided that they would attend this MS 201 subcourse when taught by their instructor the second semester.)

c. Additional interviews revealed that during the previous year the course was taken so lightly that little or no studying or even passing grades on exams was required to obtain satisfactory or higher grades at the end of the course. Students told the instructor that although they had failed most graded exercises they received an "A" or "B" in the course for merely attending class and the drill periods.

6. All of these approaches to the ROTC program made it, indeed, very attractive to a large number of students, but only for very superficial reasons. As a result they were ill-prepared to handle an honest workload and instruction taught in English when the former instructor left after a normal tour and was replaced by the present one. Most, as has been shown, simply gave up in the initial few weeks of the course.

7. Another possible reason for so many motivational failures could have been attributed to unnecessary or overly severe demands on the part of the present instructor. This, too, was investigated with equal openness by the instructor.

a. Conversations with students revealed that while his course was demanding, it was not overly so when appraised objectively. Students felt that the instruction was straightforward and covered all information later tested. The exams themselves, while difficult, contained no surprises and fairly tested the material previously covered.

b. A student rating of the instructor was initiated and conducted by the students themselves in late November. The result of these standardized forms was that, in the words of the student
representative conducting the rating, the instructor was "excellent" and had "nothing wrong" with him.

8. The results of these investigations revealed no serious instructor shortcomings that might have contributed to the higher that anticipated attrition rate of MS 201 students. Certain individuals, however, may not have liked their shortcomings pointed out to them in formal counselling sessions, but that does not change the veracity of the facts covered in such sessions. These students can usually be identified by longer than normal individual observations in Annex 1.

9. It can be seen from the above that a number of factors figured in the large number of withdrawals from the MS 201 course. Prominent among these was the lack of sufficient student motivation because of 1) a decidedly poor command of the English language and 2) the sudden shock of genuine academic work required of them. Both of these problems can be traced to a previous policy which coveted numbers of bodies rather than a number of students seriously interested in a career as an officer in the U.S. Army as a possible second career option. While increasing ROTC enrollment in the short run, this policy not only short-changed the program in the long run, but seriously handicapped those students currently enrolled and genuinely interested in the serious aspects of the program.

10. It was further observed that the initial apparent attrition rate of 48.3% was more like a retention rate of 77.3% when viewed realistically.

11. The above comments are not based on an exhaustive inquiry or scientific surveying techniques, but only conclusions drawn from many observations made over the preceding four months. Nor are they an attempt to place blame on any previous policy or instructor, but solely an attempt to cover all possible underlying reasons for most student withdrawals from the ROTC program.

12. This only scratches the surface of a vibrant and professional ROTC program at Humacao Regional College. With the enthusiasm felt by most of the cadets in the program and appropriate guidance from their instructors, the program can continue its forward progress and attract quality students.

James M. Proctor, Jr.
Captain, Infantry
Assistant FMS

2 incl
Annex I to APPENDIX M — Instructor Observations of Students Who Withdrew from MS 201

1. (MALE CADET). Extremely poor English [unable to hold a basic conversation without the aid of a translator]; attended 12 classes, 1 drill; wore a goatee until the first drill; 30(F)/69(D) — 1st EXAM [scored 30(F) on original exam and 69(D) on the re-examination of the same material two classes later]; did not show up on the day of the first quiz and never returned thereafter; failed to respond to ROTC letter; withdrew 22 Nov.

2. (FEMALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 18 classes, 1 drill; 10(F)/45(F) — 1st EXAM; 15(C) — 1st QUIZ; 46(F) — 2d EXAM; obviously cheated on 2d EXAM (first page of her test paper was an exact duplication — including all errors, but having no visible work or computations — of the first page of the test of the student who sat next to her during the exam) but denied having done so to her instructor and later to him and the senior instructor together (it remained their consensus, however, that she had cheated); returned to class only two more times after the cheating incident; withdrew 20 Nov.

3. (MALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 8 classes, no drills; wore hair close to shoulder length; 0(F) — 1st EXAM (did not attend the re-examination); attended 1 class after 1st EXAM, found out grade, and never returned; failed to respond to ROTC letter; withdrew from college 27 Nov.

4. (FEMALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 6 classes, dropped prior to first drill; had arm in a cast at beginning of semester; class conflict prevented attendance at entire class; extra help offered but never accepted; missed 1st EXAM and never returned; withdrew 24 Sep.

5. (MALE CADET). Poor English; attended 17 classes, 2 drills; 26(F)/61(F) — 1st EXAM; 14(C) — 1st QUIZ; 70(C) — 2d EXAM; 9(F) — 2d QUIZ; had some potential, was offered extra assistance, but allowed deficiency in English to overcome his own efforts; withdrew 22 Nov; expressed the desire to try anew next semester.

6. (FEMALE CADET). Poor English; attended 16 classes, 2 drills; 49(F)/61(D) — 1st EXAM; 12(D) — 1st QUIZ; 58(F) — 2d EXAM; had more potential than most but deficiency in English prompted her to quit despite instructor encouragement; withdrew 18 Nov; expressed the desire to try anew next semester.

7. (FEMALE CADET). Good English; attended 13 classes, 1 drill; 47(F)/83(B) — 1st EXAM; excellent potential but was convinced by younger sister to seek happiness in the U.S. and left the island; withdrew 15 Oct.
8. (FEMALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 3 classes and never returned; responded to ROTC letter by withdrawing 21 Oct.

9. (FEMALE CADET). Poor English; attended 8 classes, 2 drills; missed 1st EXAM and re-examination; special arrangements made for makeup, but student never showed and never returned to class; withdrew 22 Nov.

10. (MALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 12 classes, 1 drill; 10(F)/33(F) - 1st EXAM; prior to class on the day of the first quiz, in a conversation with the instructor, student demanded in an arrogant and completely discourteous manner that the instructor speak to him in Spanish; the instructor then called him into his office, explained to him why English was the language of instruction in ROTC, and counseled him on his rudeness; the student then replied that this was Puerto Rico where Spanish was the language, that he would only speak and be spoken to in Spanish, and would, therefore, drop the course; withdrew 21 Nov.

11. (FEMALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 5 classes, 1 drill; missed the 1st EXAM and re-examination; was counseled on her absenteeism and special arrangements made for makeup, but student attended only one class afterwards and subsequently never returned; withdrew 21 Nov.

12. (FEMALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 4 classes, no drills; 10(F) - 1st EXAM (did not attend re-examination); never returned after 1st EXAM; responded to ROTC letter by withdrawing 1 Oct.

13. (MALE CADET). Good English; attended 5 classes, no drills; 32(F)/70(C) - 1st EXAM; much potential, but decided to go to the U.S.; withdrew 15 Oct.

14. (MALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 6 classes, no drills; 39(F)/46(F) - 1st EXAM; after badly failing both tests, did not return to class; failed to respond to ROTC letter; withdrew from college 4 Dec.

15. (FEMALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 17 classes, 3 drills; 9(F)/34(F) - 1st EXAM; 14(C) - 1st QUIZ; 11(F) - 2d EXAM; had some potential but handicapped by her extremely poor English, genuine emotional problems, lack of effort, and "silly" approach to life's obligations in general; despite much personal help by her instructor, she attended only 1 more class after the 2d EXAM and 1 drill after withdrawing on 21 Nov; expressed the desire to try anew next semester.

16. (FEMALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 3 classes and never returned; withdrew 17 Sep.
17. (FEMALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 6 classes, no drills; missed the 1st EXAM and re-examination; attended 1 class after these exams and never returned; responded to ROTC letter by withdrawing on 22 Oct.

18. (FEMALE CADET). Fair English; attended 25 classes, 2 drills; 27(F)/49(F) - 1st EXAM; 12(C) - 1st QUIZ; 59(F) - 2d EXAM; 8(F) - 2d QUIZ; 12(C) - 3d QUIZ; 65(D) - 3d EXAM; excellent potential but, despite offers of assistance from the instructor and because of the lack of a guarantee from him that she would receive a "B" for the course, withdrew 21 Nov.

19. (FEMALE CADET). Never attended class; failed to respond to ROTC letter; withdrew 14 Nov.

20. (FEMALE CADET). Fair English; attended 13 classes, no drills; 21(F)/40(F) - 1st EXAM; took (and failed) half of 1st QUIZ, special arrangements were made to take the remaining half, but she failed to show up and never attended class again; withdrew 20 Nov.

21. (MALE CADET). Extremely poor English; attended 10 classes, 1 drill; 40(F)/70(C) - 1st EXAM; never returned to class; failed to respond to ROTC letter; withdrew 20 Nov.

22. (MALE CADET). Fair English; attended 18 classes, 1 drill; 10(F)/54(F) - 1st EXAM; 4(F) - 1st QUIZ; 53(F) - 2d EXAM; much potential but, despite encouragement and offers of assistance from instructor, completely gave up; withdrew 21 Nov; expressed the desire to try anew next semester.

23. (FEMALE CADET). Extremely poor English; registered late; attended 2 classes, no drills, no exams, and never returned; responded to ROTC letter by withdrawing on 2 Oct.

24. (FEMALE CADET). Poor English; attended 14 classes, 1 drill; 38(F)/51(F) - 1st EXAM; 17(B) - 1st QUIZ; missed 2d EXAM; refused to set date to take makeup exam; given more personalized assistance than any other student but suffered from emotional instability and problems at home; never returned to class after missing exam; withdrew 14 Nov.

25. (FEMALE CADET). Never attended class; failed to respond to ROTC letter; withdrew 21 Nov.

26. (FEMALE CADET). Good English; attended 23 classes, 2 drills; 51(F)/89(B) - 1st EXAM; 14(C) - 1st QUIZ; 43(F) - 2d EXAM; 14(C) - 2d QUIZ; 17(B) - 3d QUIZ; 60(D) - 3d EXAM; excellent potential but, because of serious medical reasons, withdrew 20 Nov.

27. (FEMALE CADET). Never attended class; failed to respond to ROTC letter; withdrew 22 Nov.
28. (MALE CADET). Good English; attended 22 classes, 2 drills; 53(F)/68(D) - 1st EXAM; 12(D) - 1st QUIZ; 60(D) - 2d EXAM; 9(F) - 2d QUIZ; 12(D) - 3d QUIZ; 32(F) - 3d EXAM; had some potential but was having difficulty in all subjects; although encouraged by the instructor, he stated he would drop out of school the 1st semester and start anew (including ROTC) the 2d semester; however, to the surprise of all, he stated his intention of joining the Navy when he withdrew from college on 9 Dec.

29. (MALE CADET). Poor English; attended 19 classes, 2 drills; missed 1st EXAM, 30(F) on re-exam; 14(C) - 1st QUIZ; 47(F) - 2d EXAM; 7(F) - 2d QUIZ; constantly late or absent and generally completely lacking in any sense of responsibility despite continuous counseling by the instructor; never made any effort to improve his grade and finally withdrew on 21 Nov; expressed the desire to start anew next semester.
Annex 2 to APPENDIX M - Statistical Groupings of Students Who Withdrew from MS 201

1. Original students - 60

2. Withdrawals - 29

a. Students making little or no initial effort

   (1) 3 - never attended class (numbers 19, 25, & 27).

   (2) 8 - attended 6 or less classes and/or never took first examination (numbers 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 17, & 23).

   (3) 6 - attended between 6 and 13 classes, but received very low/failing scores on the first examination/re-examination and never returned afterwards (numbers 1, 3, 10, 14, 20, & 21).

b. Students who withdrew for extra-ROTC reasons

   (1) 2 - Departed Puerto Rico for the U.S. (numbers 7 & 13).

   (2) 1 - Withdrew because of medical reasons (number 26).

c. Students making more than just initial effort

   (1) 3 - attended beyond the first examination, but made little or no observed effort at self-improvement despite counselling by the instructor (numbers 2, 24, & 29).

   (2) 6 - attended beyond the first examination, made some apparent effort at self-improvement, had some potential, but ultimately gave up and withdrew (numbers 5, 6, 15, 18, 22, & 28).

3. Students still enrolled - 31
MEMORANDUM FOR: SENIOR ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE

SUBJECT: Status of MS 201 Enrollment at Humacao University

1. Of the 62 students originally enrolled in MS 201 at the beginning of the first semester, SY 75-76, 49 presently remain on the rolls.

2. At first glance this appears to be a considerable (63.33%) improvement over enrollment figures for MS 201 at this time last year. This total, however, in no way reflects the actual enrollment of bona fide MS 201 students at this campus. Closer examination of the attendance and grade patterns, English proficiency, and motivation of the students enrolled in MS 201 reveals a markedly different picture of enrollment. Disturbingly, this reflects a continuation of earlier practices designed solely to produce the high enrollment figures required by Rio Piedras. The pattern which emerges closely parallels the division of students between the two officers instructing the course.

3. At the beginning of the semester it was decided that the MS 201 course would be taught by two instructors, MAJ _____ and CPT Proctor. This occurred because of two reasons: a schedule conflict and the need to have a special section for those not desiring to take the course with CPT Proctor.

   a. When it was originally planned to offer MS I through MS IV at Humacao this semester, MAJ _____ was scheduled to teach the Basic Course classes, and CPT Proctor the Advanced Course. When enrollment did not justify the offering of MS IV, the schedule had to be readjusted. In order to fairly distribute platform hours, MAJ _____ would teach MS 101, and CPT Proctor MS 201 and MS 301. A problem arose, however, when the scheduled MS 301 class conflicted with one of the MS 201 classes. All of the 13 students in the MS 301 class could not attend an hour earlier, and 17 of the 21 students registered in the conflicting MS 201 section (L111) did not desire to or could not change sections. It was, therefore, decided that MAJ _____ would teach this section.
b. Since MAJ__ had been the instructor originally scheduled to teach MS 201, his teaching of Sec Lill opened the avenue for the retention of all students who had registered expecting to take class with him for an additional year. As a result, 14 students from the other two sections indicated their desire to attend Sec Lill, and three other students who were not registered in any ROTC course also decided to attend this section (to be awarded a grade at a later date). These 17 students are so indicated on the inclosed roster of MS 201 students.

c. Some of these 17 students would have remained in ROTC if CPT Proctor was the only MS 201 instructor. For the majority, however, the differences in instructor techniques would be too much of a shock. They would have dropped the course and lowered MS 201 enrollment by 20 to 25 students. On the other hand, four of the better students (also indicated on the inclosed roster) in Sec Lill, knowing the requirements in CPT Proctor's sections, chose to take class with him.

4. The differences in performance between the students taught by MAJ__ and those taught by CPT Proctor are readily apparent.

a. As can be seen on the inclosed MS 201 roster, as of 5 November 73% of Sec Lill was failing. The chances that most of these failing students have of passing the course are extremely remote as their averages on that date ranged from 0.00 to 49.28. All the remaining seven students had "D" grades, the highest having an average of 69.57.

b. On the other hand, only 14.29% of the 21 MS 201 students taught by CPT Proctor at Humacao were failing. These three failing students had averages ranging from 45.33 to 59.44 on 5 November and can still bring them up to passing grades. (In fact, as of this writing, one of these students is now passing with a 60.21 average.) The other 18 students had averages ranging from 66.67 to 98.13 and have continued to improve. (All except one now have "C" or higher averages, the lowest having an average of 68.42.)

c. The reasons for this wide difference in performance are easily determined when one examines in detail certain areas mentioned above. The following paragraphs provide just such an examination, discussing the English proficiency of the students, their absenteeism, their motivation, and another practice followed in the name of maintaining high enrollment.

5. The most serious problem experienced by the majority of the students in Sec Lill is a gross deficiency in handling English in any manner.
a. Fully half of these students cannot handle the simplest of conversations in English. Some cannot even tell you their names if the question is asked in English. Some cannot answer questions on quizzes or exams unless they do so in Spanish. A distressing number must have some questions on quizzes and exams translated into Spanish before they even know what is being asked.

b. The problem is so extensive that — in order to keep these students in the program and enrollment high — the instructor conducts the majority of the class in Spanish. Everything that is said in English is translated into and further explained in Spanish. This means, of course, that it takes almost twice the time to cover the same material that is being covered in the other sections. As a result, Sec L111 is more than a week behind the published training schedule. To try to correct this situation the instructor conducts additional classes in Spanish at night during the week. Not all students attend these sessions, of course, and, therefore, remain even further behind than their classmates in Sec L111.

c. All of these students have had at least 12 years of English instruction before entering college. This, however, does not change the fact that many lack the absolute minimum proficiency in English required of students taking any ROTC course. The deficiency in English of these students is so great that it is not worth the enormous man hours which would be involved in trying to bring them up to the minimum level of proficiency. This does not even consider other problem areas which are discussed below.

6. The amount of absenteeism among many of the students of Sec L111 is exorbitant.

a. As of 5 November, only 11 of the 28 remaining students in Sec L111 had attended at least 75% of the required MS 201 class and drill periods. Absenteeism in Sec L111 is even worse when one considers only those periods in which grades are given — quizzes, exams, and drills. Of 336 total possible grades (12 for each of the 28 students) as of 5 November, the students of Sec L111 had missed and/or made-up fully 39.58% (133) of these. Only in 22 instances had any attempt been made to make-up the missed graded exercises. Only four students in Sec L111 have taken all the required quizzes and exams, the rest having received zeros for these missed grades.

b. Contrary to this pattern, all the 21 students of the other two MS 201 sections have attended at least 75% of the required classes and drills. Furthermore, only 9.18% (28) of their total possible grades (305) had been missed and made-up. (One notes that every absence from a graded exercise in section L121 and K101 has been made-up.) The reasons for this are that the
students in those two sections know that unexplained or unexcused absences are simply not permitted, and that all missed quizzes and exams must be promptly made-up.

c. As instructors and career officers in the U.S. Army, we have the professional obligation of instilling in our students a high sense of duty, responsibility, and discipline essential to the profession of arms. To tolerate such gross absenteeism—in the name of maintaining high enrollment—is to do the exact opposite.

7. The reason for much of the two problems discussed above is student motivation—either a complete lack of this ingredient or a misguided sense of it.

a. When students are attracted to ROTC because they think that they can obtain a good grade and college credits with little effort or without even coming to class or drill, then we are attracting the wrong persons. To encourage the entry of such students into the ROTC program is an affront to the many otherwise motivated and responsible students taking or considering this training. Worse yet, it undermines the very essence of our officer corps. Finally, it is dishonest in that we are deceiving the unsuspecting student into believing something which cannot possibly be true—that the road to becoming a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army is a less-than-serious affair.

b. From the very onset of classes this semester the MS 201 students of sections L121 and X100 have known the standards required of them to obtain good grades. They have known that they must attend all classes, must promptly make-up all missed graded exercises, must attend and maintain acceptable standards at drill and must take and be graded on a physical fitness test. Above all, they have known that they would be taking a challenging, college-level course which demands that they think and apply that which they have learned on frequent quizzes and periodic exams.

c. These course requirements have been practiced in all MS 201 sections taught by CPT Proctor since his arrival in August 1974. Having been exposed to less-demanding instructor practices previously, the students at first are shocked by the change. Later, however, they almost universally appreciate the challenge that they have been given and strive to meet the occasion. The wisdom of following these procedures is demonstrated by the fact that of seven former Humacao students now taking MS 301 at Rio Piedras, six were invited to join Scabbard and Blade, the national honor society of ROTC.

8. To maintain high enrollment, students having serious physical problems have been allowed into the program.
a. Even voluntary elective courses have prerequisites, and ROTC is no exception. In addition to a minimum command of the English language, students enrolling in either the Basic or Advanced ROTC courses are expected to be physically fit enough to engage in the physical activities conducted during drill. This prerequisite is underscored by the fact that the entrance physical given a beginning student specifies whether or not the student is qualified to take physical education or ROTC courses.

b. In Sec LIII there are presently at least two students who are physically incapable (as stated in Doctors' excuses) of taking any physical fitness test or engaging in any other physical activity. To allow any student to enroll without ensuring that he or she understands completely what will be required in the course is unfair to the student and weakens the program.

9. Most of what has been discussed above has been said on one or more occasions during the past year—most recently on 10 November in a conversation with the PMS and MAJ ______. On 19 December 1974 a memorandum for record was written covering essentially the same problems encountered in MS 201 last year. Basically, these problems are self-inflicted wounds—methods of maintaining high enrollment which later come home to roost.

a. Last year a Humacao it was a particularly painful experience trying to undo the in-house problems created by the enrollment-enlarging practices of the previous AFMS. For the most part, these efforts were successful in MS II. On the other hand, they were less so in MS III because the students had been exposed for an additional year to the practices mentioned in the cited MFR.

b. The continuation of these practices to maintain the high enrollment required by Pu Piedras causes enormous problems which simply need not exist. If the time spent on trying to correct these problems was instead spent on providing quality instruction and more personal attention to cadets, an increase in quality enrollment could result.

10. The enrollment at Humacao University College is not large enough to support an ROTC enrollment of much over 100 qualified, bona fide students. From a base of 25 to 35 MS II students, it is possible to produce annually around 10 to 15 Advance Course cadets who have the potential of becoming officers. To produce more—to the extent that we violate the very principles of "Duty, Honor, Country" that we have sworn to uphold—is not in the best interests of the ROTC program, the officer corps, or the U.S. Army.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE

SUBJECT: Curriculum Development

1. In accordance with your letter of 24 October and the 17 October letter of the Area VI Commander, the following views on ROTC curriculum development are submitted:

   a. The unique problems associated with operating ROTC within Puerto Rico offer no large obstacles towards the goal of reducing the number of contact hours with the serious ROTC student.

   b. With strict adherence to existing Army ROTC admission standards, the University of Puerto Rico ROTC program can produce sufficient numbers of "well-educated individuals" who have "exhibited the potential for further professional development." This can be accomplished with the added bonus of improved quality at lower cost per student.

2. The existing recruiting and instruction policy of the ROTC at the University of Puerto Rico places excessive emphasis on the attainment of high numbers of cadets with very little emphasis on the minimum qualifications of those enrolled.

   a. One result is that large amounts of resources are involved with supporting large numbers of students who do not belong in the ROTC program. At Humacao University College fully 50 percent of the MS II students do not meet the minimum standards of the course. However, they continue to be carried as students for the sake of maintaining high enrollment. At the Fajardo Branch of Inter American University this figure is at least 75 percent. The vast majority of these students will fail to successfully complete the course and advance to MS III. In the meantime, a considerable amount of instructor time and costly supplies have been expended on these individuals.

   b. The large number of unqualified students in the classroom requires more time for instruction on even the most basic of material, hampering the desired pace of instruction, and greatly dis-
encouraging those well-qualified students who might be present. lax treatment of excessive and unauthorized absences and low academic requirements soon build a reputation that drives away the very students we seek to attract.

c. With increased input of less-than-marginal students into the ROTC program we are seriously undermining the very foundation of the program and ultimately the officer corps as well.

3. ROTC at the University of Puerto Rico is indeed in an environment different from that at stateside institutions.

a. The same high standards must be maintained, however, if we are to honestly fulfill our mission of providing "well-educated individuals" who have the "potential for further professional development."

b. No unilateral shortcuts, exceptions to, or deviations from specific Army ROTC entrance standards, tests, or requirements can be allowed. If the problems of ROTC at the University of Puerto Rico are so unique as to warrant such changes in procedures, then these changes should be authorized in writing by Headquarters, TRADOC.

c. To do otherwise not only flagrantly disregards stated Army regulations and policies, but brings into the ROTC program numerous students who do not meet the minimum standards. The problems associated with such students have already been covered above.

4. The above paragraphs are directly related to curriculum development.

a. Much ROTC instruction time is lost due to the presence of large numbers of unqualified students in the classroom. The same amount of MS II instruction, for instance, could be given in one-half the time if two requisites were followed. First, the MS II course should be challenging enough to prepare students for the MS III course. Secondly, strict adherence to the entrance standards mentioned above should be followed to preclude the entrance of substandard students.

b. Additional time spent instructing MS III students could be saved by eliminating or substantially reducing the present U.S. Defense Establishment subcourse covered in the second semester of MS II. This subcourse is dry, uninteresting, and a great letdown to student and instructor alike after a fast-paced first semester. This time would be more beneficially spent if the existing MS III subcourse on Methods of Instruction were transferred to the second semester of MS II. This would not only expose the student early to this important subject, but would reduce contact time in the first semester of MS III.
c. With added emphasis on recruitment of quality students, the contact time in MS III could be reduced further by halving the tactics subcourse in the second semester.

5. Two practices, therefore, are the biggest deterrents to reducing instructor contact time. One is the continuing admission to and retention of unqualified students in the ROTC program. The other is the subsequent lack of professionalism in handling and conducting classes to the extent that good students are less likely to be attracted to the program. With substantial improvements in these areas and adoption of certain changes in the MS II and MS III curriculum mentioned above, contact time can be substantially reduced. Furthermore, a corresponding increase in student quality will result, with the University of Puerto Rico ROTC program producing sufficient numbers of qualified officers prepared for subsequent military training and instruction.

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