NEUTRALIZATION AS AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC OPTION

SPECIAL REPORT

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
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SPECIAL REPORT

NEUTRALIZATION AS AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC OPTION

by

Elmer Plischke

15 May 1978

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FOREWORD

This special report is a survey focusing on the nature, advantages and disadvantages, and potentialities of neutralization as a policy alternative to formal and informal security commitments of the United States. Through the consideration of several forms of neutralization, the author analyzes their political, economic, and military purposes in six separate regions: Western Hemisphere, Europe and the Mediterranean, Africa, South Asia and the Indian Ocean area, Pacific region, and Polar regions.

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BIОGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

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SUMMARY

Diverse policy strategies may be devised to govern participation in international affairs and the pursuit of national security. Some are founded on negatory principles of noninvolvement which, if unilaterally determined and executed, may be characterized by such variations as noninterference, isolationism, neutralism, self-neutralization, self-demilitarization, and traditional neutrality in time of war. Bipartite and multipartite versions may entail nonaggression and anti-war pacts, multiple neutrality in time of hostilities, and collective neutralization.

Objectives of security by means of positive international participation, on the other hand, are achievable by an assortment of other processes. Aside from the devisement and implementation of unilateral national policy, these may be bilateral or multilateral, and may involve formal alliances, military assistance arrangements, bipartite and collective defense pacts, and institutionalized collective security systems, like the League of Nations and the United Nations. As political devices, these are not mutually exclusive, and in state practice some are overlayed or paralleled by others, so that an interrelated package may be fabricated for different geographic areas, groupings of states, and functional purposes.

Basic forms of commitment within the parameters of this spectrum range from complete and deliberate inaction to overt and automatic involvement. They embrace such mutations as commitments to abstain, to recognize or acknowledge a status or condition without an obligation for external action, to consult regarding joint or collective policy and action in the event of specified contingencies, to regard a threat or aggression to independence or territorial integrity as requiring an automatic response, and to assure or guarantee, in advance, mutual or collective assistance in response to such threat or aggression—either with or without joint or combined forces in being.

Some of these strategies have been highly developed in US policy and practice, as well as in literary analysis. Others are less well defined or understood. This survey focuses on the nature, advantages and disadvantages, and potentialities of neutralization as a possible optional strategy for certain territories and other phenomena.
Section 1. INTRODUCTION.

Background

The term "neutral" has various meanings and usages in international law and practice. They include: (1) "neutrality," (2) "neutral establishments," (3) "neutralization" of states, (4) "neutralization" of parts of states, canals, rivers, and the like, and (5) "autonomous" or "self-neutralization." Since World War II, especially in the 1960s, these were supplemented with the concept of "neutralism" or nonalignment. For purposes of this review, attention is paid to all but the first two, which apply during a formal state of war, and for which a substantial body of customary and conventional international law has been established. Four degrees of neutral status/neutralization are distinguishable and of importance to United States commitments policy: neutralism, self-neutralization, limited neutralization, and neutralization of states.

Neutralism

Since World War II, many states have adopted a neutralist policy—that is, self-generated noninvolvement or nonentanglement in military and other defense alliances and alignments, whether or not entailing participation in regional and global international relations and confederations dealing with general political as well as specialized functions. Neutralism generally has related to the Cold War and the Western and Communist blocs, although it presumably is also applicable to other than East-West relationships. Assuming that it would be regarded by the United States to be disadvantageous to have the country align itself with adversaries, the central policy issue for the United States is whether in each specific case it is preferable to have the country on our side or to have it be neutralist and uninvolved.

As former colonial territories gained independence and they joined the immediate post-World War II neutralist powers, and as the bloc of non-East-West states focused attention increasingly on economic issues and the anti-Western decolonization movement, they came to be converted into the Third World bloc. Currently, it consists of approximately 110 of the 157 existing states. In general, this bloc is neutralist with respect to East-West relations, but it is not solid, in that certain states are supported by or are otherwise affiliated with either the West or the Communist bloc. Thus, even though a developing state stands with the Third World on given issues in particular forums such as the United Nations, it may elect to lean toward the Western or Communist states for military support and contributions.

Self-Neutralization

The second category consists of self-neutralization, which is essentially a unilateral expression of self-abnegation or non-alignment. It constitutes a policy posture, nationally adopted, which may or may
not be explicitly recognized by other states and which, even though intended and propounded to be permanent, because it does not engender binding international commitments, can be unilaterally rescinded or changed by the self-neutralizing power. In some cases such neutralization is multilaterally recognized by joint convention, which constitutes an acknowledgement commitment but not a guarantee to preserve it.

Self-neutralization may be restricted simply to neutral status or noninvolvement in the event of crisis or hostile conflict, or it may be broadened to encompass nonparticipation in alliances and alignments. It is more concrete than neutralism, but it does not of itself create effective international law, and other states are not legally bound by it unless they acquiesce to it, tacitly or overtly, as in the cases of Switzerland and Austria, noted later, or if the neutralization is reduced to formal treaty commitments.

Twentieth century examples of general self-neutralization include Iceland, Spitsbergen, and two Baltic states. Iceland declared itself to be permanently neutral in 1918, but this was short-lived because it was occupied by United Nations forces during World War II and it became a member of the international community in 1944 and joined the United Nations two years later. In 1920 Norway undertook by treaty with eight other powers not to build a naval base in Spitsbergen or to use it for any military purposes, and although it belongs to a North Atlantic signatory and is covered by NATO guarantees, it remains unmilitarized.

In 1918 Estonia sought to establish its self-neutralization, which was recognized by the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Republic, but in joining the League of Nations, it made no request for special status under the Covenant, and its brief venture in self-neutralization lapsed. Apparently Latvia entertained a similar idea, but also abandoned the prospect when it joined the League.

Other examples, involving partial self-neutralization include Honduras and Japan. In the Central American Peace Treaty of 1907, Honduras adopted the status of self-neutralization by unilateral action, but it was functionally and areally restricted to military conflict between other Central American republics. Following World War II Japan adopted a new constitution in which it renounced the right to wage war—a form of partial self-neutralization—as noted in the following section.

Vatican City (or the Holy See) provides an additional example of self-neutralization—intended to be permanent, extant for nearly half a century, and generally observed without legal action or formal acknowledgment by others. The Lateran Treaty of 1929 between Italy and the Holy See established Vatican City as a separate political entity, and the Holy See unilaterally proclaimed its neutralization—that it will remain aloof from the temporal competition of states (presumably including alliances and alignments) and from congresses and conferences convoked to deal with such matters, except to the extent to which contending parties by common
consent might appeal to it for a mission of peace. Furthermore, in time of war Vatican City was to be neutral and inviolable. This position of neutral status was maintained during World War II and was respected by the belligerents. The neutralization of Vatican City has impeded its participation in international organizations. It refrained from joining both the League and the United Nations, and it has affiliated with only three of the specialized agencies—the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Telecommunication Union, and the Universal Postal Union.

Limited Neutralization

The third category is partial or limited neutralization, which may be established by neutralizing powers or self-imposed. It is genuine and is normally intended to be permanent neutralization, but is of territorially or functionally limited applicability—restricted to parts of states (like Spitsbergen), internationalized places, canals, rivers, and the like, or to issues of militarization. It has applied, for example, to Tangier and the Panama Canal. In the case of Tangier, the International Statute of 1923, establishing it as an internationalized community, provided that the Tangier zone was to be neutral in time of war. In 1940 Spain occupied the territory in violation of the statute, and five years later the major anti-Axis powers jointly called upon Spain to evacuate the zone. Tangier was formally ceded to Morocco in 1956, when the latter joined the community of nations as an independent state.

By treaty of 1901 (Hay–Pauncefote) with Great Britain, the United States agreed to the neutralization of the Panama Canal on the basis of the principles previously established by the Anglo-American Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 and as prescribed in the 1888 specifications for the Suez Canal. That is, the principles of neutralization were made identical with those that applied to the Suez Canal. During both World Wars belligerent warships passed freely through the Panama Canal while the United States remained neutral. In 1977 a new permanent neutralization treaty was signed by the United States and Panama, and in a Protocol to the Treaty Concerning Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, the signatories in Article I, "acknowledge the regime of permanent neutrality," in Article II, "agree to observe and respect the regime of permanent neutrality... in time of war as in time of peace and in Article III, undertook to open the protocol to accession "by all States of the world."

Partial or limited demilitarization falls within this category of neutralization—what has been called "disarmament by neutralization." It may be limited, incremental, or comprehensive in scope. Of classic significance for the United States is the historic Rush–Bagot agreement of 1817, limiting Anglo-American naval armaments on the Great Lakes. This was later extended to the neutralization/disarmament of the entire Canadian-American border.
More recently, in a sense it may be said that West Germany and Austria were neutralized with respect to nuclear and other specific types of weaponry in 1955. The Austrian State Treaty prohibits Austria from possessing, constructing, or experimenting with nuclear, gaseous, and biological weapons. The Brussels Pact, as amended, creating the Western European Union, established a commitment on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany "not to manufacture within its territory" any nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Of special importance to the consideration of possibilities, as noted more fully later, a general hemispheric treaty was signed in 1967, creating a "nuclear free zone" in Latin America.

Partial neutralization by means of self-demilitarization is illustrated by Japan's postwar constitutional system. Although a member of the United Nations and party to a bilateral security treaty with the United States, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution stipulates that the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation as well as the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes—reminiscent of the prescriptions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Japanese constitution also provides that in order to accomplish this, "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." Although the Japanese government has not regarded this restriction as a prohibition on maintaining a self-defense force equipped with "defensive" weapons, or from joining a collective security organization or becoming a party to a defense commitment with the United States, various aspects of its self-demilitarization have been politically and judicially contested and the precise nature of its partial self-neutralization is equivocal.

Neutralization of States

The most formal and comprehensive form of neutralization is that imposed by neutralizing powers on the neutralized state as a whole by means of a multipartite treaty. In this case, the independence and territorial and political integrity of the neutralized state may be "guaranteed perpetually by a collective agreement" which may either be mutually negotiated or be imposed by outside powers. It is subject to the condition that the state concerned "will never take up arms against another state—except to defend itself" and that it will "never enter into treaties of alliance" which may "compromise its impartiality or lead it into war." Its key characteristics, therefore, include a formal collective treaty commitment, permanency, and mutuality of protection of the neutralized state's security in return for nonmilitary involvement. Signatory powers may agree not only to respect, but also to maintain the permanent neutrality. However, unless specified in the treaty, this does not impose on them an obligation to guarantee the neutralized state's territory and integrity.

Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxembourg represent primary examples of such classic neutralization prior to World War II, and Austria constitutes a recent illustration of a more modified form.
Switzerland was neutralized in 1815, when the major European powers acknowledged the perpetual neutrality of the country and guaranteed the integrity and inviolability of its territory, which established its neutralization as a matter of international law. Swiss neutrality survived World Wars I and II, remains in effect, and constitutes a major impediment to membership in the United Nations. The neutral status of Belgium was inserted into three separate treaties concluded at London in April 1939. They provided for the dissolution of the union of the Netherlands and Belgium and declared that the latter was to constitute an independent and perpetually neutral state. Belgium's neutral status and independence, guaranteed by treaty, were violated by Germany during World War I, and following the Armistice the Belgian king declared the neutralization restrictions to be terminated. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was proclaimed a perpetually neutral state by an international act annexed to the April 1839 treaties, and was guaranteed by the major European powers. Although it decided to remain neutralized after World War I, it was invaded by Germany in 1940, and after World War II it joined the Western powers. Both Belgium and Luxembourg became original members of the United Nations, joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union, and were signatories to the European Defense Community Treaty.

Austria's neutralization differs from the traditional nineteenth century pattern. Following World War II Austria was neutralized by a combination of measures. These included self-neutralization by Constitutional Federal Statute in 1955, joint neutralization by Soviet-Austrian agreement, and formal recognition of neutralization by other powers, including the United States. An American note written at the request of the Austrian government specified "that the Government of the United States has taken cognizance of this constitutional law and recognizes the perpetual neutrality of Austria as defined therein." When the multiparty State Treaty of 1955 was signed, in order to implement the obligations of its agreement with the Soviet Union, Austria unilaterally and voluntarily legislated that it would be perpetually neutral, defend its neutrality, join no military alliances, and allow no foreign bases on its territory. Austria's neutralization remains in effect and Austria has joined no alliances or regional collective defense arrangements, but it did become a member of the United Nations in 1955. Austrian neutralization, involving multiparty recognition of its self-initiated though permanent neutral status, differs from that of Switzerland, in which case not only was neutralization multilaterally recognized but its territorial integrity and inviolability were also guaranteed.

Section II. Analysis.

Purposes

General motivations for neutralization may be political, economic, and humanitarian. The political purpose, focusing on the preservation
of security—of the neutralized state, territory, or some facility or phenomena directly involved—and of the outside neutralizing powers, is normally the more central and most prevalent objective. That is, the neutrality of the neutralized is intended to keep the state, territory, or facility or phenomenon from being attacked, invaded, occupied, or annexed, from joining or being used militarily by an adversary, or from being destroyed or contaminated.

Economic considerations may be important especially to the neutralized entity, to obviate the need to expend a substantial share of its resources on alliance arrangements, territorial security, and armaments. The neutralizing are concerned with the costs of extending their security systems and coverage, involving issues of military assistance, equipment, troops, and logistical support.

Humanitarian motivation also may be possible, especially on the part of the outside parties. Thus, neutralization may enable the neutralized entity to remain aloof from the politics and alliances of other powers and thereby free it from the necessity of joining them in warfare, crisis management, and peace-keeping, so as to concentrate on economic affairs and on internal problems and development. While humanitarian objectives are intellectually conceivable, they are likely to be overridden in practice by the exigencies of politics and national security.

From another perspective, more precisely, the purposes of neutralization are to keep the neutralized entity from arming and being used to affect the general international or regional security equilibrium, or from becoming a base of operations against or a threat to others. Neutralization does, however, enable the entity to be minimally armed—limiting military manpower and materiel to internal security purposes, or for conventional military engagement against invasion or action against possible aggressive military use of its domain and facilities by other powers. The validity of specific motivations depends upon the interrelations of the particular states concerned, the actual and potential volatility of the area in which they are located, and the development of circumstances. The nineteenth century neutralization of countries like Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland also produced a neutralized buffer zone between contending European powers.

Legal Patterns

Potential documentary and legal forms of neutralization include three basic types:

(1) a simple act of self-neutralization by the neutralized state without action on the part of others—such unilateral action may be consummated by proclamation, statute, constitutional prescription, or more informal stipulation of national policy, and, even though declared to be permanent, it is open to subsequent unilateral modification or reversal. Unless it is made the subject of a formal treaty, it entails no international commitments.
(2) An act of self-neutralization by the neutralized states supported by statements of acknowledgment or recognition, or by commitments of guarantee (or a combination of both) made by other (the neutralizing) nations—if such statements or commitments are made unilaterally, they reflect national policy positions that carry no binding international legal obligations.

(3) A collective treaty involving the neutralized state and the neutralizing powers which creates a formal international commitment that is binding until modified, rescinded, or superseded—if violated by an outside power (whether neutralizing or not), its usefulness will be vitiated, and either the violation will be redressed and neutralization restored, or the latter will need to be superseded or terminated.

Of importance to note is that an act recognizing neutralization may simply acknowledge, or it may go further and acquiesce to, a proclaimed state of affairs established by the self-neutralized state, or it may be conditioned on the acknowledgement of the neutralization by other, generally potential adversary powers. On the other hand, a guarantee of neutralization may be accorded, constituting either a promise not to attack, invade, or use the territory of the neutralized state or other entity for military purposes (tantamount to nonaggression and nonmilitarization), or a promise to assist the neutralized state against aggression upon or the military utilization of its territory by others. In the latter case, the guarantee would amount to a mutual security or joint defense commitment. The guarantee may specifically apply to the preservation of the neutralization, the independence, or the territorial integrity of the neutralized. In principle, such guarantee of assistance may not be given, on the assumption that it is either unnecessary under the circumstances or it is implied in the like restraining commitments of other (including adversary) guarantors.

Costs

Reduced to rudimentary considerations, the neutralized state may be able to minimize military expenditures if its security and its uninvolvement in the power struggle and armaments race are assured. In such case, it may be able to relieve itself of the burden of the arms proliferation spiral. On the other hand, the neutralized state will not be relieved entirely of this military cost if it decides or is expected to arm sufficiently to defend its neutrality (against invasion for the purpose of political domination or annexation or to employ its territory as a base of operations)—or at least to defend its integrity. Such expectation is normal if it joins a neutralization arrangement or affiliates with a confederation that establishes "collective security" commitments, as is the case with membership in the League and the United Nations.33

The cost to foreign, neutralizing states will increase or diminish in relation to the circumstances surrounding the neutralization, threats to the neutralized state's integrity and its neutral status, and relations with adversary powers in the area. Military weaponry, manpower, bases, logistical support, and even general financial support and economic
development, as well as direct and indirect costs in other territories as they relate to security and the power balance, may be involved.

Candidates for Neutralization

Distinctions may be drawn on the basis of the nature of the neutralized entity, its specific geographic location, its continentality/insularity, and its military salience or value. If the neutralized entity is an internationalized community (such as Tangier), a canal or other important maritime waterway, some other phenomena (such as uninhabited Antarctica, outer space and the celestial bodies, or the seabed), the nature, consumption, and implementation of neutralization may be relatively straightforward.

If the candidate is a national state, on the basis of past experience, neutralization is more likely either for a lesser continental power lying in a sensitive position between greater and usually adversary or at least competitive powers, or for a smaller insular state located at some distance between major adversary powers. As a matter of principle, neutralization appears to be most probable for territories that major powers wish to keep from assisting their adversaries; that major powers mutually wish to remove from their competing alliances and politics; that are of little concern to their security and other critical interests; or that are of no or lesser military significance to them and other powers at the time that neutralization is contemplated. Neutralization is most likely to be effective if the entity concerned is able to defend its neutral status, independence, and integrity; if other states jointly regard violation of its neutral status to be detrimental to their interests and they are able to do something about; or if, by reason of location, terrain, or lack of population and resources it is of little consequence to other states.

General Applicability

In addition to these broad considerations, additional factors of applicability of neutralization need to be examined. So far as geographic positioning is concerned, as a matter of ideology, power, and politics, major nations are more apt to oppose neutralization of states, islands, archipelagoes, canals, and the like immediately adjacent to their domains and, unless they can lure them into alliances, such powers will favor their neutralization when they lie some distance from themselves and are located in the vicinity of their adversaries which, for the same reason, are likely to oppose such neutralization. Inversely, neutralization is more feasible if the candidates lie either immediately between such adversaries (like Switzerland located in the midst of the nineteenth century major European powers, or Austria currently situated precariously between East and West) or they lie between but at some distance from them both. Nevertheless, simple geographic location may be overbalanced by other strategic imperatives depending on the competitive objectives and interests of the states concerned—both the potential neutralized and the neutralizing.

Geopolitically, neutralization may be most attractive to lesser territories in which greater powers and alliances are particularly interested
either in persuading them to become allies or to keep them from allying with adversaries. In the past, this has applied to a number of lesser European states and territories. At present, neutralization is theoretically feasible in general East-West, United States-Soviet, United States-Chinese, and Soviet-Chinese relations, or possibly in the juxtaposition of other powers in particular geographic regions, such as the Indian Ocean area (Iran, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia) or the Western Pacific.

Neutralization, geopolitically, is also applicable to a lesser continental power lying between greater powers that are potential or actual adversaries, or to lesser insular states located in an ocean, sea, or other body of water surrounded by competing great powers. Usually neutralization is possible, however, only if the greater powers involved are not interested in allying with the potential neutralizable territory, or in using it militarily, or if preclusively they wish to keep it from the power sphere of an adversary.

From the perspective of the neutralized state or territory, there are several basic functional aspects of neutralization applicability. Primary concern may be freedom from advance commitment to join sides, the necessity of assuming alliance and alignment guarantees, and from involvement in the international politics and the balance of power of other states. Second, concern may focus on immunity from attack, invasion, aggression, occupation, and threat of loss of independence and territorial integrity. Third, interest may center on establishing a low military profile, with force and materiel levels directed solely toward defense of neutralization and the country within its national domain, and with restrictions on the establishment of bases and the use of its territory for military purposes by other powers. Each of these aspects has been specified in neutralization arrangements in the past.

However, because subversion and terrorism, either from within or from outside, are not as common as overt military aggression from abroad, the nature of neutralization commitments and the role of the military may require reconsideration and refinement. In many countries there is little social stratification and structuring in the nation other than an organized military on which to found local political support for a policy or regime. Regardless of how rudimentary, the military establishment may be the inevitable base of political power in such countries and therefore obviate certain economic relief justifications for neutralization. The alternative is to develop optional indigenous bases of political power and stability, which takes time, may require substantial attitudinal changes, and tends to be resisted, especially by those holding political power.

The collective obligation of neutralizing states could theoretically be broadened to encompass guarantees of noninvolvement with or support of subversive, insurgent, and terrorist groups and forces in neutralized states, which would change markedly the nature of neutralization commitments. The result might be so nebulous and unenforceable, however, as to dissuade potential candidates from seeking or accepting neutralization as an alternative to military assistance and support from other states.
From the point of view of thy potential candidate for neutralization, this contingency conceivably weakens the attraction of, and the argument for, neutralized status. Moreover, if a neutralized country doesn't manufacture weapons or possess the resources to acquire them from others, whether it, or even the potential neutralizing powers, can, in effect, guarantee its neutralization is questionable.

From the perspective of the neutralizing power, an acknowledgement of neutralization depends on the credibility and reliability of other parties to the arrangement. By the very nature of contemporary international political maneuvering, subversion of governments, and clandestine support of revolutionists, insurgents, and terrorists, such credibility would in many cases be questionable if not moribund. Consequently, a guarantee commitment by neutralizing powers may be regarded as impractical, unreliable, or too costly, and flexibility of policy and action may be preferred. The result is that neutralization is not likely to be widely employed to counter subversion and terrorism, and alternative strategies will need to be formulated to cope with them.

Another distinction of functional application of neutralization relates to basic military force categories. Essentially, these include nuclear power, conventional forces, and various forms of logistical support. More precise distinctions may be made between ground, naval, and air forces, bases, depots, and similar support facilities, and refueling, repair, and other services. If neutralization is general and complete, it applies to all such factors, and traditionally this has been the case.

Nevertheless, partial restriction—whether technically regarded as neutralization or not—is a possibility. This may involve either self-abnegation or collective commitment, and may apply to only nuclear forces and weaponry (denuclearization), or to these and conventional forces, together with bases and logistical support (demilitarization). These variations are intellectually, and they may be pragmatically, distinguishable, but the most significant distinction is that which pertains to nuclear weaponry. Nuclear neutralization—that is, denuclearization of individual states or the establishment of nuclear free zones—may constitute a refinement of neutralization that could be central to future national commitments and could become widespread in contemporary international politics, as suggested below for specific territories and geographic areas.

Neutralization and United Nations Membership

Incompatibility exists in the relation of neutralization and the obligations of a member of an international institution possessing collective security obligations, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. When Switzerland joined the League, it was permitted to do so without assuming the normal commitments established by Article 16 of the Covenant, which provided for collective sanctions (including diplomatic, economic, and financial restrictions as well as military contribution to
protecting "the convenants of the League"). Article 16 supported Article 10, which specified that League members "undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League." By this process of special waiver Switzerland was able to bridge the inconsistency of involvement and nonalignment. It subscribed to the Kellogg-Briand anti-war pact and cooperated with and within the League short of the point at which its neutralization would have been undermined or abridged.34

The situation with respect to United Nations membership and neutralization is generally comparable, but differs materially in detail. Article 1 of the Charter specifies that members are "to take effective collective measures" to prevent and remove threats to peace and suppress aggression, and Article 2 requires members to assist in taking preventive and enforcement action against a state when this is decided upon by the United Nations. But it is in Chapter VII (Articles 39 to 51) that the commitments of members to collective cooperation against threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and the perpetration of aggression are prescribed, including the collective sanctions that may be imposed by the United Nations. Generally, this arrangement is regarded to be more demanding and more centralized than existing under the League Covenant, but it also differs in that the member state's commitment is not as automatic as it was in the League.

Many members of the United Nations are neutralist, and their posture poses no serious problem of commitment incongruity. Such states are subject to the requirements of the Charter although they remain unaligned with either the West or the Communist bloc. That is, they eschew participation in NATO, Warsaw, and other collective defense arrangements, but they do not remain aloof from political determinations within or outside the United Nations system. This characterizes the position of countries like Sweden, whose legal status is sometimes compared with that of Austria and Switzerland.35

Genuinely neutralized countries have a different relationship with the United Nations. By virtue of its nonparticipation in either the League or the United Nations, Vatican City poses no problem. The case of Switzerland is another matter. It has not joined the United Nations, although affiliation has been under serious consideration. The crux of the issue is whether Switzerland can expect and requires a special waiver by the United Nations like that accepted by the League. An ancillary though important issue is whether, if such a waiver is permitted to Switzerland, then why not for other permanently self-or collectively neutralized states as well?

This problem surfaced in connection with the admission of Austria to United Nations membership in 1955.36 Despite the joint Soviet-Austrian agreement that stipulated Austrian neutralization "according to the model of Switzerland," Austria expressed its willingness to accept the obligations of the Charter when it joined the United Nations and the latter, in turn, did not prohibit Austria's membership on the grounds of incompatibility with the country's neutralization, which, it has been contended, has become a matter of international law.37 Political considerations concerning the
State Treaty, Austria's security and potential alignment, and its admission to the United Nations appear to have overridden the technicalities involved in the juxtaposition of neutralization and membership.

Because United Nations collective sanctions are not automatic, whether special exemption for neutralized states may be accorded by implicit inaction as well as explicit resolution by the United Nations, is arguable. Determinations may be made piecemeal—per country or per case—or they may be generalized for given countries (like Austria) or for a group of states (including all permanently neutralized powers). If the latter, possibly neutralization and United States membership, though seemingly or technically inconsistent, may be politically accommodated as a matter of general principle. Alternatively, the issue may be obviated by permitting optional or voluntary participation in the sanctions. Such practice may be increasingly important if more and more states are neutralized. Election by individual states, like Switzerland, to join the United Nations would then become primarily a matter of national policy determination—balancing the sanctity and obligations of its neutralization against participation in collective cooperation short of political alignment and in collective United Nations action against states that are deemed to threaten the peace or to be engaged in aggression.

The basic issue is less a matter of whether such a neutralized state could refrain from joining with others in the application of sanctions and the use of collective force against aggression than it is a matter of overtly perpetrating action in contravention of a United Nations determination. Despite whatever arrangement may be devised for accommodating neutralized states in their quest for United Nations membership, the essence of incompatibility of obligation nevertheless remains, and the pragmatic test of coalescing neutralization and collective security in a critical case remains unresolved. In the long run, perhaps, resolution will be influenced more by the drive for universalization of United Nations membership than for the inclusive participation of members in the implementation of collective sanctions. Should this be the case, the problem of admitting Switzerland and newly emergent neutralized states to membership, and living with the neutralization of previously admitted members, like Austria, is moot and will evanesce.

Section III. POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES.

The following are possible fundamental advantages and disadvantages to the United States and other neutralizing powers and to the neutralized states, territories, and other phenomena. Some are more applicable to particular circumstances than are others. More specific advantages and disadvantages are definable for individual states, regions, and functional components—such as borderland demilitarization, ocean basin insular neutralization, and denuclearization—and they are treated later in the section on regional application.
United States And Other Neutralizing Powers

Advantages of neutralization.

a. Adversaries are committed (if party to the neutralization agreement) not to attack or invade the neutralized state or use its territory for military purposes against the neutralized state or the United States—such as passing troops through, establishing nuclear launching sites, bases, depots, and supply lines, or for refueling, repair, reprovisioning, and similar purposes.

b. Removal of state, territory, or other phenomena from certain aspects of the international politics of other (usually larger) powers, from the balance of power, and from military competition and the weapons spiral—therefore supports principles of nuclear nonproliferation, arms reduction, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

c. Reduced number of allies and therefore the number of participants in alliance with other forums and machinery used for policy development and alignment, in military planning, and in mechanisms for forces coordination.

d. Reduced United States military assistance expenditures, and if neutralized state resorts to minimal military establishments and thereby releases its funds and resources for other developmental purposes, United States general assistance requirements may be lessened or obviated.

Disadvantages of neutralization.

a. United States committed not to use the territory or facility militarily—to pass forces through; to occupy; establish bases, depots, repair and provisioning facilities, refueling and other services; and the like, including emplacement of launching sites.

b. Loss of actual or potential partner in alliances or collective defense system, which may have prestige, political, military, and other implications.

c. Possible reduced ability to influence the neutral entity's policy on international and other matters in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy (including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the Organization of American States, and similar agencies) which may apply in East-West, North-South, regional and sub-regional relations.

d. The necessity, difficulty, and cost of verifying that adversary states and the neutralized entity honor the neutralization.

Neutralized States and Other Entities

Advantages if neutralized.

a. Sense of freedom from commitment under exigencies of power politics, balance of power, and international stabilization.
b. Noninvolvement in and freedom from commitments under alliances, alignments, and mutual defense, and collective security arrangements.

c. Noninvolvement in war (declared) and other hostilities (undeclared), unless its territory is attacked or invaded.

d. Reduced military national establishments, involvement in arms proliferation and race, and absence of foreign bases, facilities, and troops within its domain.

e. Reduced national military expenditures, and consequent release of funds and other resources for nonmilitary purposes.

f. Reduced influence of policy and position of allies and other military powers in its foreign and domestic affairs.

In addition to these factors, if they are applicable, more specialized advantages may accrue to such international entities as canals and waterways, parts of states and internationalized communities, and phenomena like space and the seabed.

Disadvantages if neutralized.

a. Sense of inferiority as an independent and sovereign member of the international community—disaffection of national ego, pride, and prestige.

b. Reduced flexibility to influence policy and politics abroad respecting areal policy, crises, and stability in accordance with its national interests and objectives.

c. Because of reduced military capability, likely inability to defend its own neutralization, independence, and territorial integrity against foreign threat, attack, and invasion, particularly by greater powers.

d. Lack of ongoing outside military assistance—financial and materiel (direct) as well as facilities establishment and operation together with troop expenditures (indirect).

e. May become potential target of subversion and terrorism if unable to arm adequately or rely on outside military assistance.

Advantages if not neutralized.

a. Independent to pursue its own foreign policy, interests, and relations.

b. Free to join alliances, alignments, and collective defense and security arrangements, and gain their supportive guarantees.
c. May benefit from outside military assistance, including the
construction and maintenance of bases and other facilities, local employ-
ment, troop expenditures, and other outside direct and indirect economic
and financial support.

d. Sense of international importance.

Disadvantages if not neutralized.

a. May be pawn of international politics.

b. Lack of guarantee commitments whether in support of neutrali-
zation (if this is preferred) or of its independence and territorial integ-
rity unless it joins the United Nations and/or affiliates with alliances
and collective defense arrangements, and can rely on them.

Comment

In policy determination these and other, more precise advantages
and disadvantages need to be juxtaposed and assessed. Neutralization of
each specific nation, territory, or other phenomena may be individually
considered, and in many cases this is essential. In others, they may be
grouped, such as the lesser Antilles, Melanesia, or the islands in the
Indian Ocean basin or the Pacific, in which case options need to be assessed
as between advantages and disadvantages pertaining to individual territories,
on the one hand, and to the area as a whole, on the other. In still others,
such adjudgment must be made as between the areas involved and among the
various individual territories.

In this determination, aside from considering such obvious factors
as geopolitical position, need for bases and other facilities and services,
and preclusive elimination from involvement, the United States must assess
the factors of cost and feasibility. Assuming limits to financial commit-
ments for military support, priorities need to be determined as to neutrali-
ization vs. nonneutralization, and, with respect to nonneutralized terri-
tories, allocation of support among the various regions and sub-regions
and among the specific territories concerned. This consideration must be
balanced against the demands upon available funds, manpower, and materiel
for other security purposes, as well as the relevance of time, distance,
location, and likely consequences.

These and other more precise considerations are reviewed for specific
states, territories, oceanic basins, and other geographic phenomena in the
regional survey which follows.

Section IV. REGIONAL APPLICATION.

Western Hemisphere

Currently 23 of the 29 independent states of the Western Hemisphere
are members of either or both the Rio Pact (1947) and the North Atlantic
Treaty (1949), so that only 6 states and the remaining nonindependent territories of the hemisphere are likely candidates for neutralization. The unaffiliated states include the Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Surinam (Dutch Guiana)—all post World War II creations and all located in or around the Caribbean. The nonindependent territories, belonging primarily to Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States, which may be regarded as potential states range from Bermuda to the Lesser Antilles and include such continental territories as Belize (British Honduras) and French Guiana. Several of these are slated for early independence. All of them, together with the six independent states that are not members of the Rio Pact, are nevertheless covered by the collective defense commitments contained in that treaty. Although Cuba is a signatory to both the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Rio Pact, it was excluded from the deliberations of the inter-American system in 1962.

Partial neutralization of three types exist in the Western Hemisphere. The earliest is the demilitarization of the Canadian-American boundary, and the second pertains to the Panama Canal, both of which have been referred to earlier. The third—a portentous twentieth century innovation—was instituted by treaty, together with two protocols, negotiated in 1967, creating a Latin American "nuclear free zone." The treaty has been acceded to by all independent Latin American countries except Cuba and Guyana. Of the major nuclear powers, the Peoples Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States subscribed to its commitments, but not the Soviet Union. Britain extended the treaty's application to its Caribbean territories (but not Bermuda), and the Netherlands, which possesses Caribbean territory, is not a party to it, but neither is it a nuclear power.

The treaty proscribes Latin American signatories from producing, testing, possessing, or using nuclear weapons in their respective countries, and prohibits the receipt or installation of nuclear weapons. Article 4 specifies the area of applicability as a broad zone defined by lines of latitude and longitude south of the United States. The major powers committed themselves to apply and respect the treaty and to refrain from engaging in nuclear activity in the demilitarized zone. This arrangement could be broadened in application and participation, but this would introduce little fundamental change.

Commitment differentials exist among the nuclear and Latin American powers because, while Latin American non-signatories (such as Cuba) may not regard themselves as bound by the treaty's denuclearization restrictions, the major nuclear powers, except for the Soviet Union, are pledged to nuclear neutralization in a specified and inclusive zone within which all Latin American states are located. Furthermore, although a number of key Latin American states are not bound by the general Nuclear Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties (such as Argentina and Cuba) and others, including Brazil and Chile, have subscribed to the Test Ban but not the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they are all included within the aegis of the Latin American nuclear free zone.
Looking toward future possibilities, hypothetically it might seem desirable to promote some form of broader neutralization in the Caribbean area, which may be considered in its entirety, including both independent and non-independent territories, and both continental and insular domains. The rivalries of the Central American republics and of individual islands within insular groups, and especially the revolutionary posture of Cuba, the degree of subversion and terrorism prevalent in parts of Latin America, and the importance of the Panama Canal, render this potentially unlikely. In any case, were such action contemplated, a number of Central American and Caribbean republics that are signatories to the Rio Pact would need to trade existing collective defense guarantees for self-neutralization. Collective neutralization, on the other hand, would raise the question of the nature of the Rio Pact commitments of non-neutralized powers, and would involve more complicated United States relationships with leading Western European nations that have territories or traditional and current interests in the area, as well as with the major American powers, including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and others.

In terms of legal commitments and political advantage, there would be little gain for many of the Caribbean countries. The disadvantage as compared with the Rio Pact arrangement would be substantial. The advantage to those states that benefit from subversion and terrorism outside their own territories, on the other hand, might be substantial.

Possibilities of more restricted neutralization are conceivable with respect to the insular territory of the Caribbean, to which the preceding analysis also applies, or to insular territories of limited size and population, or simply to the microentities (under 300,000 in population) or the submicroentities (under 100,000). The economic advantages to the more diminutive territories—including future independent states, especially in the Lesser Antilles—might be important to them. Nevertheless, in view of the peculiar situation pertaining so far as the East-West relationship, the geopolitical and ideological position of Cuba, the automatic coverage of the Rio Pact, and the specialized security requirements of the Panama Canal including passage through the islands of the Caribbean are concerned, there seems to be little compulsion for the United States to promote neutralization of Caribbean insular territory.

However, should the Rio Pact be revised, significant changes could accrue. One modification, under negotiation, is to reduce the treaty's area of applicability from a hemispheric expanse—courts the mid-Atlantic and Pacific from pole to pole—to landed territory and adjacent maritime space out to 200 miles. A less likely but more drastic change would be to restrict the Pact's protection solely to signatories, which would modify the commitments of the United States materially. Then the United States would need to consider independently the options respecting each non-signatory territory, including persuasion to induce it to become a party to the Rio Pact, various types of United States territorial security support or guarantee without such adhesion, and possible neutralization. Off-hand, in such event neutralization would appear to be most applicable to the
smaller islands of the Lesser Antilles and possibly a few other insular territories (such as the Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Cayman Islands), but policymakers of the United States would need to balance its security needs, security potentials (including bases and command of lines of seagoing communication), preclusive probabilities, and cost of guaranteeing the integrity of such territories as either neutralized, allied, or automatically or explicitly protected domains. Because of the importance of Caribbean territories to United States and Panama Canal security, neutralization would be conceivable and advantageous only if no risk to the United States is perceived and if it determines to render them unavailable to potential adversaries.

On balance, under the circumstances it would seem that full neutralization of Caribbean island territory would be of little benefit to the United States, although it might be attractive to particular states and territories, especially minute Caribbean statelets, and the United States would need to review its policy should an individual entity initiate self-neutralization or actively seek collective neutralization. Within this framework, reflecting the earlier Honduran action, it is not inconceivable that an individual state may seek neutralization respecting strictly local relationships, which would not seriously affect United States interests except insofar as it might involve Western Hemisphere countries like Cuba or non-American adversaries.

As a consequence, aside from the demilitarization of the Canadian-American boundary, neutralization of the Panama Canal, and the denuclearization treaty, neutralization is unlikely in the Western Hemisphere at present. In the long run, however, should the status and policy of Cuba or commitments under the Rio Pact change, neutralization of some of the smaller independent islands and continental states of the Caribbean area cannot be ruled out.

Europe and the Mediterranean

At present most European countries are regarded as aligned either with the industrialized West (18 states) or the Communist bloc (9 states, plus Byelorussia and the Ukraine if separately counted). There are 13 European members of the North Atlantic Alliance (in addition to the United States and Canada), and 8 Communist powers (not counting Byelorussia and the Ukraine) are affiliated with the Warsaw Pact. Of the remainder, Austria, Switzerland, and Vatican City/Holy See are neutralized, as noted earlier, and several others, including Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Yugoslavia have established neutralist or noninvolvement postures of varying degrees. This leaves only Spain, which has bilateral mutual assistance relations and a bilateral treaty with the United States, and the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta. All European states, except Switzerland and Vatican City, are members of the United Nations.

In view of the East-West confrontation and the problem of geopolitical "stabilization" in Europe, additional formal neutralization is unlikely.
or, at most, is bound to be individualized and piecemeal. The time for establishing a general neutralization buffer belt between East and West Central Europe—involving Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and possibly Italy—has long since expired. Similarly, general nuclear neutralization on the continent involving NATO and Warsaw Pact powers is visionary.

Remaining for consideration, therefore, are the continental neutralist states and the islands of the Mediterranean. Unless it is self-initiated, formal neutralization of either Sweden or Yugoslavia is unlikely and, so far as the status of Finland and Ireland are concerned, while independence from the East-West relationship may produce some form of neutralism, these countries are not apt at this time to seek or welcome full neutralization. From the American point of view, policy and commitment flexibility—with the option of aligning them, together with Spain, more firmly in the Western camp, appears to be more attractive and realistic than neutralization.

Theoretically, the principal exceptions might be Finland and Yugoslavia. Because of its sensitive location, Finland could attempt to become self-neutralized, or even to buttress such status with broader collective neutralization acknowledgement or guarantee. Its neutralization acknowledgment or guarantee. Its neutralization involves critical issues of geography and diplomatic sensitivity. Generally deemed to be a democratic, free world power, often standing with the industrialized nations and friendly to the United States and other Western powers, there would seem to be little reason for the United States to seek Finland's neutralization unless Finland were threatened by engulfment by the Communist bloc. Because of its location and potential security problem, neutralization may be more appealing to Finland, however, and to the United States this would appear to be preferable to cooperation or formal affiliation with the Communist powers.

On the other hand, Yugoslavia is not likely to change from neutralism, with at least the possibility of Western military assistance arrangements, to self-neutralization, and the United States and the Soviet Union are unlikely to accept the responsibility of guaranteeing its collective neutralization. In any case, from the perspective of the United States, Yugoslavia's current status, unaligned with the Warsaw bloc, neutralist in terms of alliance policy, and not unfriendly to the United States and the Western bloc, may be the most favorable posture achievable at this time.

Turning to the independent islands in the Mediterranean—Cyprus and Malta—the possibilities are more varied. They may prefer the fluidity of their current status, as members of the United Nations while technically uncommitted under the North Atlantic Treaty, which leaves them somewhat flexible with respect to Europe's alliances and militarily uncommitted so far as central Europe is concerned, while enjoying a tacit protection of the Western alliance. Should these conditions change materially, the result for them is more likely to be neutralism than neutralization. Furthermore, they would seem to be disposed to prefer the constrictions of neutralization as they would relate to serious territorial issues in the Mediterranean.
Were additional islands to gain their independence in the Mediterranean (such as Corsica, Majorca, Minorca, Sardinia, and Sicily), a package neutralization is hypothetically possible. The advantage to the islands would depend, in part, on the sincerity and reliability of the continental powers (and the United States), and on whether their commitments simply accorded recognition or amounted to a guarantee. Without the latter, the need for and cost of self-defense might be greater than under existing arrangements. Central to United States interests would be maintaining Mediterranean shipping lanes, logistical support usage, and preclusion of availability to an adversary.

A more feasible possibility for neutralization may be Northern Ireland, should it gain independence. But neutralization in its case would be largely of local motivation and consequence, primarily involving Britain and Ireland. Neutralization of Northern Ireland would be of lesser significance to United States strategic policy, and is not apt to require specific American commitments, except in support of the United Kingdom and the North Atlantic Alliance. However, the protection and guaranteed use of adjacent sea lanes would need to be assured.

The major consideration for neutralization in this area involves the possibility and desirability of establishing a limited nuclear free zone. General denuclearization—as applied to fabricating or possessing nuclear weapons—in Europe, outside of the nuclear powers (Britain, France, the United States, and the USSR) supplementing the Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties, is a theoretical possibility. Except for Albania, France, and Vatican City, all European states are signatory to the Test Ban Treaty, and only Albania, France, Portugal, Spain, and the Soviet republics (Byelorussia and the Ukraine) have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A denuclearization arrangement similar to that establishing the Latin American free zone would constitute, not a major change, but a qualitative shift in the current nuclear balance. In view of the Test Ban and Nuclear Non-Proliferation commitments, the principal issue would be the location of the nuclear weaponry of the major European nuclear powers.

If the nuclear free zone obligations were restricted to strategic weapons, if East-West delivery systems are adequate so as to obviate the need for supportive facilities outside the territory of the four major nuclear powers, and if a substantial number of European states are committed to nonproliferation in the long as well as the short run, such a partial denuclearization arrangement ought to be hypothetically negotiable and could have certain advantages to both East and West, such as stabilizing their existing strategic nuclearization postures and paving the way for tangible nonproliferation for others.

Whether this is pragmatically negotiable, however, is less certain. Bargaining would be difficult at best. Both West and East would be suspicious of each other and both would seek advantage at the expense of the other. Furthermore, treatment of strategic nuclear weaponry involves the issue of tactical nuclear forces on which the NATO allies depend for their territorial defense and which have implications far exceeding the specific military purpose of the weapons themselves. Whatever may be achievable
in the matter of strategic denuclearization would, therefore, involve not only the problems of distinguishing strategic from tactical, and offensive from defensive weapons, but also the direct and indirect political and psychological risks of disaffecting existing United States-NATO allies and United States-Soviet relations.

Alternatively, a partial or selective denuclearization formula might be considered, applicable to the states lying outside the NATO and Warsaw blocs, or a lesser package of selected continental countries (such as Finland, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and Yugoslavia, in addition to the neutralized states), or simply the insular territory in the Mediterranean (either or both independent and nonindependent islands). The extent to which such territory is not critical to the nuclear policy and strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union, such limited denuclearization warrants serious contemplation and may offer reasonable potentiality. Among the advantages of such an arrangement might be the pragmatization of denuclearization beyond the Non-Proliferation Treaty for territory lying outside the needs of the major nuclear powers and the NATO and Warsaw alliances, which might serve to buttress the free zone in Latin America and as a precedent for other areas as well.

As a consequence, aside from the current status of neutralized and neutralist states in Europe, there is little prospect for neutralization with the possible exception of self-initiated neutralization of individual countries like Finland, local neutralization of places like Northern Ireland if it becomes independent, and limited or partial denuclearization. Major shifts in the current East-West balance and equilibrium, especially if it involves key states such as Germany, will affect these considerations materially.

Africa

In view of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, political competition within the Arab bloc, the Southern Africa problem, and unsettled conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa, including existing and future borderland, ideological, leadership, and other issues, major or broad-scale neutralization on the continent of Africa is not very likely. All independent African countries are members of the United Nations. The only exceptions are Transkei, which remains unrecognized by other states, and Rhodesia and Namibia (South West Africa), potential independent states, whose governance, diplomatic status, and United Nations membership remains unsettled.

It may be that, in the course of time, as local and regional relations stabilize in Africa, an isolated smaller country lying between or among relations stabilize in Africa, an isolated smaller country lying between or among larger competing or adversary powers could be neutralized, by unilateral or collective action. By and large, even if an Organization of African Unity recognition or guarantee is forthcoming, such neutralization is not apt to seriously affect US interests. Moreover, neither the
United States, the Soviet Union, nor the Peoples Republic of China is likely to become enmeshed in large-scale territorial neutralization ventures on the continent. Although some arrangement for East-West forestalling or amelioration of political and military competition between the major powers is not impossible, it is a tenuous probability.

Limited neutralization appears to have somewhat greater potential. Aside from the theoretical possibility of isolated, local neutralization referred to, one alternative pertains to individual or package neutralization of peripheral insular states, such as the Cape Verde Islands and Sao Tome and Principe in the Atlantic and, the Comoros, Mauritius, and the Seychelles in the Western Indian Ocean. The latter group might be dealt with as an Indian Ocean neutralization arrangement, as suggested in the following section. Other island states, should they become independent—such as Ascension, the Canary Islands, Madeira, and St. Helena in the Atlantic, and Socotra in the Indian Ocean—might be added to this consideration. In general, such neutralization would have minor impact on the policy of the United States and, subject to the delineation of exceptions, particularly as they relate to maritime shipping lanes and logistical support bases, a neutralization agreement respecting them would appear to be acceptable, provided it committed other major powers. Whatever may emerge, however, is less likely to be "African" than "Atlantic" and "Indian Ocean" in scope. So far as American naval interests in such insular territory are concerned, the freezing of current practice or the stabilization of limited military use might be negotiable with the Soviet government, provided shipping lanes remain unimpeded, and such negotiations are already underway for the Indian Ocean, as noted later.

The second possibility is the creation of an African continental nuclear free zone similar to that established in Latin America. The same analysis as that applied to Europe pertains. This could take various forms—denuclearization agreed to by the African area countries, by the major nuclear powers, or, as is the Western Hemisphere, by a combination of both. An African coalition arrangement is not realistic unless the Republic of South Africa, which is a party to the Test Ban but not to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, were committed to continental denuclearization. Some North African Arab countries might not be willing to accept denuclearization unless certain other Mideast powers, such as Iran, Turkey, and especially Israel, were similarly obligated. Moreover, a number of African countries—including Algeria and Saudi Arabia are not signatories of the Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties, while Egypt, Israel, and Turkey, though they have acceded to the Test Ban, are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a consequence, African denuclearization may need to be negotiated as two related packages—an Arab North Africa/Mideast segment (including Israel and the Arab countries east of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea) and a sub-Saharan African component. Nevertheless, even though African denuclearization did not include all North and Sub-Saharan African countries, considerable nuclear neutralization would be achieved simply by virtue of having the major nuclear powers committed to such an arrangement. This would have the advantage of excluding Africa from their nuclear politics and balance, and help to retard the expansion of the nuclear community.
A third alternative, which might parallel denuclearization, would be a wholesale agreement among outside powers to reduce or withdraw their military power from Africa, remove their military forces, missions, and bases, discontinue or moderate their military assistance programs and financial support for military developmental purposes, and curtail or eliminate the supplying of conventional weaponry and equipment. As in other areas, this would have the advantage of reducing the quantitative level of militarization, and the qualitative degree of weaponry sophistication, and therefore might lessen the level of military confrontation and conflict and foreign military involvement. Once the cohesive compulsion of decolonization diminishes or expires, and intra-African politics center more on internal, inter-neighbor, and regional issues, local conflict may very well accelerate, which could be moderated by the reduction of military power and potential. On the other hand, as long as competition among the major powers, the ideological conflict, and the presence of outside forces like the Soviet Union and Cubans in Africa continue, partial neutralization by means of demilitarization seems unlikely, and as long as outside adversary powers remain militarily involved, pursuing such a venture unilaterally would not be advantageous for the United States.

As noted, significant, if not always clear-cut, distinctions must be drawn between Arab North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. While some considerations, such as denuclearization might be viewed as continental matters—but even this might require dual packaging—others require subregional consideration and negotiation. As a consequence, certain aspects of the broad-scale neutralization possibilities mentioned require careful refinement. Both functionally and areally they may be dealt with on an itemized rather than a package basis, with respect to which priorities must be established and feasibilities defined. These will depend on both immediate and potential conditions. At present, with the Arab-Israeli and Southern problems, and other specific conflicts underway, certain theoretical potentialities are pragmatically unrealistic. Others, such as denuclearization, insular neutralization, and perhaps some aspects of conventional demilitarization may offer greater immediate promise.

South Asia and the Indian Ocean Area

Functionally, several layers of relationships need to be reviewed in considering this area. These include the East-West and Soviet-Chinese, the sub-continental, and the insular dimensions. All independent states in this region are members of the United Nations.

The possibility of East-West and Soviet-Chinese neutralization in this region may still be early enough to contemplate. United States-Soviet negotiations have been underway to produce an agreed, liveable military arrangement for the Indian Ocean. By agreement reached in 1977, the current military positions of the United States and the Soviet Union are to remain at existing levels, thus ostensibly stabilizing and managing military competition in the area, presumably as a first step toward reducing outside armed forces. The essence of the agreement allegedly
is to avoid forward deployment of forces, not to withdraw warships, submarines, and aircraft from the area at this time, nor to eliminate normal peacetime port calls, training cruises, and oceanographic research. This freezing of status and practice is regarded as a prelude to additional restrictions to incrementally produce a form of partial demilitarization, which other naval powers will be invited to join. Limited to outside naval powers, it does not directly affect the issue of neutralization of the sub-continent or the island territory in the Indian Ocean. This illustrates the possibilities of conditional restraint for geographically distant and perhaps less important security interests if dealt with before vested military interests and postures are firmly established, provided that the advantages are mutual, including the maintenance of a low profile of the adversary, and that the shipping lanes remain unimpeded.

The advantages of neutralization of the insular territory of the Indian Ocean would include removing this large maritime sphere from geopolitical competition and impulsion to achieve a favorable balance of power, and keep the Asian sub-continental and oceanic trading lanes open. This could be beneficial to the major East-West and Communist Chinese powers, as well as Japan and other shipping states. Such benefits would need to be balanced by the advantages and disadvantages, as well as costs, of maintaining a United States political and military presence in the area, both in the subcontinent and in the oceanic basin and its western and eastern approaches.

So far as subcontinental power relationships are concerned, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China have complicated, competing, and vacillating interests and relations with such important countries as India, Indonesia, Iran, and Pakistan, as well as lesser states, including Thailand, with which the United States has significant ties. India has been a leader of the neutralist movement in the sub-continent. In view of the direct and indirect involvement of these major Asian subcontinental powers in East-West and Soviet-Chinese relations and their specific military assistance relations with individual major powers, and in the face of their geographic positions and the Indo-Pakistani dispute, none of these countries appear to be clear-cut candidates for either self- or collective neutralization. The time for a great power imposition of such status, comparable to that of nineteenth century Europe, has passed. Certain lesser Asian nations, especially those lying between greater powers—such as Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal—may be more feasible prospects, and this possibility warrants exploratory consideration by the United States and other powers, weighing the status of existing commitments against responsibilities created by neutralization.

Under current circumstances, there is no compelling need for the United States to assume initiative in the matter, but contingency plans need to be developed to apply in the event that others assume that role. A critical issue is the extent to which serious future conflict between South Asian states may adversely affect United States relations with sub-continental nations and the political balance in the area.
The third category, the insular territory—both the independent (including the Comoro, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles island groups, and Sri Lanka) and the potentially independent (such as the Andaman and Nicobar, Cocos ((Keeling)), Lakshadweep, Socotra, and other lesser islands)—provides greater neutralization potentiality, which would have the advantage of removing this massive maritime sphere from the arena of competition, not only of the major global, but also the principal sub-continental, powers.

If Indian Ocean insular territory were neutralized as a package, this would involve local acquiescence, agreement by the larger peripheral Asian powers and Indonesia, and adherence by the United States, the Peoples Republic of China, and the Soviet Union, and perhaps other major countries (such as Britain, France, and Japan), or at least the paramount naval contenders—the United States and the Soviet Union. The package could be inclusive in coverage, or it might be selective. If the latter, the United States, in terms of its security and other commitments and interests in the area, may need to arrange reasonable tradeoffs with the Soviet Union and China. Even if the arrangement were selective, attention would need to be paid to the preclusive advantage of persuading other major powers to participate (such as Japan and the principal sub-continental powers that are or may be aligned with the West or the Communist bloc). If a package agreement cannot be negotiated, individual territories might be neutralized, self-initiated or collectively recognized or guaranteed. Possible candidates include each of the islands and archipelagoes listed earlier.

A final potentiality is partial military neutralization. So far as conventional military power is concerned, a number of alternatives are conceivable, including prohibitions on foreign ground forces, naval bases, airfields, logistical facilities and support, refueling assistance, and the like. These would need to be considered piecemeal as well as parts of a package. They would seem to be less likely possibilities for continental than for insular territory, although naval and air arrangements could apply to both. There may still be time for negotiating such functionally limited neutralization, as evidenced by the United States-Soviet negotiations for a naval freezing agreement, although the trend and attraction for the sub-continental nations seem to be in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, if the need and the desire of the great powers to extend and enlarge military commitments in the area, including the insular territory, should subside or be primarily preclusive, the benefits of neutralization, in the long run, may outweigh the immediate advantages of enjoying a presence and the disadvantages of costs and increasing commitments. A great power bargain to exempt the area from their political and military penetration, therefore, might be both mutually and generally beneficial.

Despite the fact that India has detonated a nuclear device and a number of other states in the region may be at the threshold of becoming nuclear powers, denuclearization remains an additional hypothetical possibility for partial neutralization. An agreement like that established for the Latin American denuclearization zone and suggested for other areas
is not inconceivable. It may be generally advantageous in reducing nuclear proliferation, and it might be more negotiable at present than it would be in the future. Much the same analysis as that related to Europe applies to the Indian Ocean area. The initiative might be taken locally or by the major nuclear powers, or it may originate in the United Nations, but it would be effective only if subscribed to universally, including the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, as well as the sub-continental and Indian Ocean nations.

The status of Asian nations under the Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties is mixed. Afghanistan, Iran, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore are bound by both. Aside from Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Peoples Republic of China, and Pakistan, which are party to neither, all other continental states are committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty except for Burma, India, and Indonesia. Of the insular states, the Maldives subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Sri Lanka is party to the Test Ban Treaty, and the Seychelles has signed neither. In view of the degree of non-commitment to these major nuclear restrictions, a treaty establishing a broad nuclear free zone would help to promote denuclearization, which, as suggested for Europe, could apply outside the territory of the current nuclear powers.

Although unlikely for individual larger sub-continental nations (Iran, India, and Pakistan), it is possible that individual smaller states may have an interest in nuclear self-neutralization, but that would not modify significantly the effect now possible by becoming a party to the Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties. The primary change that would be introduced into Afro-Eurasian relations by general denuclearization would be the creation of a general nuclear free zone in the area—from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and beyond—within which nuclear powers would refrain from locating their nuclear weaponry, and the Asian sub-continental and Indian Ocean insular states would prohibit their introduction and use.

The Pacific Region

In the Pacific region, the United States has alliance treaties with some 7 states (exclusive of Rio Pact commitments in the Eastern Pacific). These include the Anzus Pact and a number of bilateral joint defense or security agreements, as well as the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact) of 1955, to which France and the United Kingdom also are parties.43 Asian and Pacific allies include Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Nationalist China, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand. This embraces the major countries of the eastern Asian coastal region and the Western Pacific, except for Indonesia and the Communist powers—the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, and the states of Indo-China.

All independent states in this region, except for the Republic of China, the two Koreas, and the Pacific islands of Nauru and Tonga are
members of the United Nations. There are no neutralized territories, and neutralization status seems politically unlikely for virtually all of the continental nations mentioned. In theory, Korea may be an exception. Were the two Koreas to be amalgamated by negotiated reunification, which might be possible though not probable, so far as the major powers are concerned this would seem to be mutually acceptable only if it involved neutralization, but, as with Germany, the time for such resolution of the Korea question expired by the early 1950s. Without neutralization, reunification would be unacceptable to both Western and Communist powers except on their respective terms, which means that it is nonnegotiable.

Another possibility, also dubious, warrants consideration, however. Should the United States decide to terminate its commitments on the Asian mainland and withdraw completely from South Korea and at the same time endeavor to arrange for stabilization of the area, an undertaking for the negotiation of a collective neutralization of the two Koreas might be to the advantage of the United States. This might be of interest to either Communist China or the Soviet Union, or to both, but is bound to be unacceptable to North and South Korea. This solution appears to be implausible short of inducing the two Koreas to accept permanent division (perhaps by accepting the formula used by the two Germanies) and reduced military support by the United States and the Communist powers, coupled with a nonaggression and an arms reduction agreement. In any case, unless neutralization was linked with stringent and reliable demilitarization, it would be unacceptable to Japan as well as the United States.

Another exception might be Indonesia, which has adopted neutralism as its stance in East-West relations. If it remains unaligned, it could possibly seek self-neutralization or accept collective neutralization, provided that this commits the right major powers and they can be trusted. Geopolitically, its strategic location athwart the primary lines of transit and maritime communication, and its distance from the major Asian and Pacific powers may invite visions of obvious candidacy for neutralization.

However, Indonesia could scarcely entertain the prospect of neutralization if it did not enmesh arrangements for the Indian Ocean area with those for the Pacific, so that its advantages with respect to the latter would compensate for, if not overbalance the disadvantages attending any decline in its position in the Indian Ocean. In effect, neutralization, therefore, would need to constitute a package arrangement coalescing Asian subcontinental and major East-West powers as well as Indonesia. Other difficulties associated with such consideration include the territorial split of Malaysia and the independent states of Brunei and Papua New Guinea, and these, together with Singapore, in all probability, would need to be encompassed within any Indonesian neutralization package. Admittedly, this involves a great many contingencies, but the advantage envisioned in the Indian Ocean naval freeze might be extended to the Indonesian area and expanded to include other powers and aspects of demilitarization, which, in turn, might become the basis for further extension, ultimately amounting to virtual, if not actual neutralization.
A third possible exception is Nationalist China/Taiwan. Although both Chinas have refused to countenance the concept of two Chinas, the "Chinas question" might theoretically be resolved by establishing a neutralized, independent Taiwan. This would necessitate a major policy shift for the United States, the Peoples Republic of China, and other countries as well. This formula would eliminate the current United States commitment to, and military presence in, Nationalist China, but it would create a new commitment for the United States, Communist China, and other signatory powers at least to respect and, should it be agreed, to guarantee the neutralized status and possibly the inviolability of the island. The United States would continue to maintain a presence in the area without a collective defense and active military assistance commitment to Taiwan. The way would be paved for the United States and the Peoples Republic to negotiate full bilateral diplomatic relations and this might be embodied in a contemporary (perhaps companion) agreement. While not dependent on such neutralization, agreement to normalize Sino-American diplomatic relations would be facilitated by such arrangement, which also would set the stage for launching Taiwanese diplomatic relations with the United States and other countries, and for the admission of Taiwan into membership in the United Nations.

Other advantages would accrue to China, the United States, and Taiwan, as well as Japan, the Philippines, and other regional powers, not the least of which would be the removal of this issue as an impediment in the competitive politics of the Western Pacific. But Nationalist China would cease to exist, which naturally will be fought by the Nationalist government, and Communist China would have to accept the territorial loss of Taiwan. Such loss, in exchange for possible improvement in Sino-American relations and United States military withdrawal from Taiwan may hardly seem worth the price. The Soviet Union might oppose the resolution of one of the principal conflicts in Sino-American relations, thereby freeing China to turn its policy focus inland, but Moscow would scarcely be in a position to thwart the negotiation of collective neutralization of Taiwan by other powers. If this possibility were to be pursued by the United States, it might be less objectionable to others, however, if it were negotiated as a part of a general Western Pacific realignment package, as noted later.

The only other Asian territories that might be candidates for neutralization are Hong Kong and Macao, were they to become independent, or were this to be imposed upon them as self-neutralization respectively by the United Kingdom and Portugal. From the point of view of these Asian territories, or from that of the United States, however, their current and international status are not apt to be enhanced sufficiently to warrant a shift to formal neutralization unless a major, more favorable power alignment were established. Consequently, self-neutralization seems unlikely unless Macao and Hong Kong become independent, and collective neutralization, even if they are not independent members of the international community, is not impossible.
A fundamental aspect of these considerations is the feasibility and desirability of each individual neutralization possibility or, alternatively, of some package combination. In certain respects, acceptable arrangements might be more negotiable as separate issues. On the other hand, the acceptability to the United States and other powers of the disadvantages that would accrue may be greater if there are mutual tradeoffs respecting gains and losses—so that each principal participant could enjoy an overall sense of benefit. The achievement of this result would reflect a masterpiece of strategic realignment.

The potential neutralization components of the package embrace Korea (either two Koreas or a single, united nation), an independent Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and Indonesia (together with Brunei, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, and others), and possibly Laos and additional Southeast Asian countries. Except for Japan and the Philippines, this would be tantamount to an inclusive neutralization belt in the Western Pacific along the East Asian coastline, which would create a new power balance and relationship, and might provide greater geopolitical stabilization. If the major powers are willing to entertain a proposition for the mutual backing off by adversaries, they may be willing to accept the price that would need to be paid for such realignment.

While individual components of this formula may appear fanciful, if considered as a package, they may be more negotiable. In return for the loss of Taiwan, the Peoples Republic of China would benefit by the withdrawal of the United States from South Korea and Taiwan. The United States would be free to reduce its commitments in the area and withdraw to Micronesia, although it would retain its security obligations to Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Philippines. The latter countries might welcome the policy flexibility and mitigated military confrontation that would result from a neutralized buffer belt. Because the Peoples Republic of China would be free to focus its attention inland, the package arrangement would be most objectionable to the Soviet Union, and possibly India and Indo-China.

In the Pacific basin wholesale neutralization is not likely north of the Equator. The United States possesses most of the territory in the northeast quadrant (divided by the Equator and the 180th parallel). Neutralization is visionary for the Aleutians and Hawaii, and most likely also for Midway and Wake Island, unless they achieve independence. In the northwest quadrant—principally Micronesia (Trust Territory) and Guam—it is unlikely for both Guam, an "unincorporated territory," and the Marianas, which are about to become a United States commonwealth. This leaves the Carolines (to the south), the Marshalls (to the east), and lesser islands and archipelagoes—largely uninhabited Line Islands along the Equator, such as Christmas, Baker, Howland, Kingman, and Palmyra, together with the Johnston Atoll.

Should any of these Micronesian or Line Islands become independent states, neutralization may be attractive to them, and perhaps also to the
major powers concerned. Many of them will be wards of former colonial powers or the international community. The same may pertain to Nauru, Tonga, Western Samoa, and nonindependent insular territories in the Pacific south of the Equator (mostly British and French insular territory, such as the Gilbert and Ellice, New Caledonia, Solomon, Tokelau, and French Polynesian islands). Some of the latter territories are about to gain their independence, and in the next decades, assuming the drive for decolonization continues, others will follow.

As a consequence, the major powers—that is, those possessing island territory in the Pacific basin, principally Australia, Britain, France, Japan, New Zealand and the United States—could establish the collective neutralization of those Pacific islands that do not constitute integral components of their metropolitan territories, subject to specific exceptions (such, perhaps, as American Samoa and Guam). The advantage to the small island states would be considerable, but the prospect would be disadvantageous to the United States and other Western powers if the Soviet Union and Communist China were not also parties to such neutralization.

An areal neutralization arrangement would reduce United States flexibility in the region. Among the major difficulties for the United States are determining the exceptions to neutralization in advance, foreseeing the direction of future East-West relations in the Pacific (Soviet-American, Sino-American, and Sino-Soviet), and balancing present American commitments, costs, and risks against those that would result from neutralization, together with those that could result from non-neutralization. On balance, nevertheless, the potentiality of, and the consequences to, United States commitments, in relation to power politics and geopolitical stability, appear to offer significant opportunity for ameliorating potential military (especially naval and aerial) competition within an area in which the United States is paramount, provided the necessary exemptions are accommodated.

In addition, the possibilities of partial military neutralization need to be considered. On the one hand, this might be applied to a group of Asian continental states and off-shore Western Pacific islands. On the other hand, it may be considered for the insular territory of Oceania. Or it may be applied to both, as separate packages or as a joint venture. As with the contemplation of applicability in the Indian Ocean area, particular conventional forces and facilities might be restricted in the neutralized territories.

Of major importance, however, is the possibility of creating a general denuclearized zone within the Pacific basin. Minimally this might be delineated to apply to independent micro-islands. Or it might be broadened to include additional specified, non-strategically located islands. In both cases, neutralization could be imposed by the Western nuclear powers. Alternatively, it might be enlarged to embrace all of the micro-islands in the Pacific (under 300,000 in population), or all Pacific basin islands subject to selected exceptions (such as Guam and the Marianas). These denuclearization arrangements also could be
collectively established by the Western nuclear powers, plus Japan. To
the extent to which lesser islands adjacent to the Asian mainland were
included, Communist China and the Soviet Union would need to be party to
the process. The various optional possibilities may be analyzed in the
light of United States security needs, current and future relations with
allies and adversaries in the area, and the proliferation of independence
of Pacific insular territory and the termination of existing security
responsibilities of their colonial patrons (largely France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States). The potentiality of denuclearizing the
Pacific basin along the lines of the Latin American nuclear free zone
should not be negotiable, and the advantages to both the major nuclear
powers and the Pacific island territories would be substantial.

Polar Regions

Antarctica was neutralized by treaty signed in 1961. The treaty
specifies categorically that Antarctica "shall be used for peaceful pur-
poses only." Measures of a military nature, "such as the establishment
of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneu-
vers as well as the testing of any type of weapons" are prohibited. This
includes nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive material.
The area of applicability of this treaty is the landed territory and ice
shelves located south of 60° South latitude. The treaty is binding on
19 states.44 In addition to the Antarctic continent, the treaty applies
to the sub-Antarctic South Orkney and South Shetland Islands (both of
which belong to Britain). Sub-polar Bouvet (Norway), South Georgia
(Britain), and South Sandwich (Britain) islands in the South Atlantic,
and Crozet (France), Kerguelen (France), and Prince Edward (Britain)
islands south of Africa and the Indian Ocean, are not covered. All of
these are uninhabited or virtually unpopulated. The coverage of the
treaty could possibly be extended to these islands as well.

The situation in the Arctic is quite different. The polar basin
lies between the Western and Eastern hemispheres and is therefore of
utmost importance to the United States in the event of transpolar warfare
with the Soviet Union or Communist China. Western Hemisphere polar
and sub-polar areas are now encompassed by the Joint Canadian-American Defense
Board arrangement (1940 and 1947), the Rio Pact (1948, which applies to
the pole, but which does not entail a Canadian commitment), and the North
Atlantic Treaty (1949, involving Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, as
well as the United States). Western Arctic and sub-polar territory embraces
Alaska, the islands north of the Canadian mainland (Northwest Territory),
Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, and Spitsbergen (Norway). On the Eurasian
side all polar territory consists of islands and archipelagoes acknowledged
to belong to the Soviet Union. The most northerly territories are Ellesmere
Island (Canada), Greenland (Denmark), Spitsbergen (Norway), Franz Josef Land
(Soviet Union) and Severnaya Zemlya (Soviet Union). Finland was eliminated
from the Arctic by its treaty with the allied powers at the end of World
War II. The only Arctic territory currently under neutralization is
Spitsbergen, as noted earlier, and all of the states concerned are members
of the United Nations.
In view of East-West transpolar positions and existing alliance commitments, it is unlikely that additional landed territory will be neutralized unless there is a wholesale tradeoff, and this seems feasible only with respect to insular territory. Not all Arctic and sub-Arctic islands are dependencies of the major nuclear powers. Iceland is independent and Greenland has been incorporated as an integral part of Denmark. If these two territories were to be excepted, the bargain would hardly be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, if neutralization came to be seriously negotiated, these island territories would not be likely to pose any major difficulty.

Additional functional aspects of neutralization are conceivable. Agreement of the principal parties might be negotiable respecting sea/ice space, or airspace, for example. That is, non-landed terrain could be demilitarized, and this may be either comprehensive or delimited. Also, alternatively, both insular landed territory and sea/ice areas could be combined in an overall denuclearization zone comparable to that applicable in Latin America and the Antarctic. This would not affect the nuclear status within the continental territories of the nuclear powers, but would create a substantial denuclearized zone between them. In assessing its commitments, policymakers of the United States and other countries need to equate the advantages of continuing existing alliance responsibilities in the area, such as forward bases, mutuality of purpose, and military policy flexibility, against the benefits of wholesale neutralization and denuclearization.
NOTES

1. The Legal Adviser of the Department of State has distinguished the following:
   a. Neutrality——In time of war, the condition of state which is not at war with the belligerents and does not participate in the hostilities.
   b. Neutral Establishments——Special protection for the term of war, arranged in special conventions for certain establishments, such as Red Cross, hospitals, and the like.
   c. Neutralization or Neutralized State——A state whose independence and integrity are for all time guaranteed by an international convention of the powers, under the condition that such state binds itself never to take up arms against any other state except for defense against attack, and never to enter into such international obligations as could indirectly involve it in war.
   d. Neutralization of Parts of States, Canals, Rivers, and the like——Imposed neutralization upon an area by agreement of the powers with respect to a geographic area of mutual interest.
   e. Autonomous or Self-Neutralization——The unilateral declaration of a state that it will always remain neutral.

(Quoted in Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 1, p. 342.


3. Neutrality in the technical sense, together with neutral establishments, apply to nonbelligerent status assumed by states in time of formal international war——analysis lies beyond the scope of this review.

4. The neutralism of recent years may be distinguished from historic US isolationism——also a unilateral policy of nonentanglement in alliances and wars, but which was broader in scope, eschewing involvement in political affairs as well, including the joining of international confederations that deal with political issues and entail collective security commitments, such as those encompassed by the League of Nations Covenant.

5. For example, hypothetically Thailand could be neutralist in Sino-Indian relations and Iran could be neutralist in Ethiopian-Somali affairs.

6. For an unofficial listing of First World (industrialized), Second World (Communist) and Third/Fourth World (developing) states, see The Americana Annual, 1977, p. 586.

7. See Whiteman, Digest, p. 343.


10. The treaty specifies, in Article 3, that Honduras "declares" its absolute neutrality in the event of conflict between other Central American republics and they bind themselves to respect it and refrain from violating Honduran territory. See Whiteman, Digest, p. 347.


12. Such neutralization is intended to be permanent and may be imposed by other powers, agreed to in a multilateral treaty to which the neutralized territory is a party, or it may constitute self-neutralization.


15. This treaty was to take effect simultaneously with the New Panama Canal Treaty, and commits the United States and Panama to maintain a regime of permanent neutrality of the canal. The latter is to be open to merchant shipping and naval vessels of all nations at all times without discrimination as to charges or conditions of transit. The warships of the United States and Panama are authorized to transit the canal expeditiously in both peace and war, and without being subject to any restrictions as regards means of propulsion, armament, or cargo. Unlike the treaty governing canal operations, the neutralization treaty is of indefinite duration. See Department of State, "Statement: The New Panama Canal Agreement," release issued by Bureau of Public Affairs, August 17, 1977. For the text of the Panama Canal and Neutralization Treaties, see Department of State, Selected Documents, No. 6 (September 1977); the Neutralization Treaty appears at pp. 13-15. For commentary, see American Enterprise Institute, "A New Treaty for Panama," AEI Defense Review, No. 4 (1977).


18. Article 13, for treaty text, see Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955 (1957), Vol. 1, pp. 643-675.

19. In addition to West Germany, the parties to the Western European Union (WEU) include Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The Brussels Pact, signed in 1948, remains in effect for 50 years. See Department of State, London and Paris Agreements, September-October 1954, and American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Vol 1, pp. 972-989, especially Protocol III with Annexes.

20. Following World War II a similar constraint existed in West Germany's constitution (Grundgestetz), but this was modified by constitutional amendment and several treaties (European Defense Community Treaty which was not fully ratified, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Brussels Pact as amended to create the Western European Union).


22. Whiteman, Digest, p. 342. Also memorandum of Department of State Legal Adviser in ibid., pp. 343-345.

23. Other examples of neutralization include the Ionian Islands (1863-1864), the Congo basin (1885), the Aaland Islands (1922), and the Holy See/Vatican City (1929). For commentary, see Fenwick, International Law, 3rd ed. (1948), p. 108, and Hudson, Cases, p. 38. It is interesting to contemplate the possible perpetual neutralization of the Philippines by the United States, envisaged in the Congressional Act of 1934 establishing the Commonwealth of the Philippines; see Hudson, Cases, p. 76.

24. Act of Paris, November 20, 1815, endorsing the Declaration of Vienna of March 20 of that year. Signatories included Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. For summary statement, see Whiteman, Digest, p. 345. Most analysts regard Swiss neutralization as not only a guarantee commitment by treaty signatories (see Malbone W. Graham, "Neutralization as a Movement In International Law," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, January 1927, p. 89), but also as a generally accepted state of affairs under international law.

25. See section on neutralization and United Nations membership.

26. These treaties were signed by Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia, as well as Belgium and the Netherlands. See Whiteman, Digest, p. 346. Neutralization was provided originally in a treaty of 1831, reaffirmed in 1839, see Gordon E. Sherman, "The Permanent Neutrality Treaties," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 24 (January 1915), pp. 235-237.
27. The major powers included Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia. See Whiteman, Digest, p. 346.

28. Both Belgium and Luxembourg joined the Brussels Pact, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the Western European Union, as well as the European Communities.

29. Whiteman, Digest, p. 349; also see note 18 above. For Department of State Legal Adviser's analysis of the Austrian neutralization, see ibid, p. 344, and for additional commentary, see pp. 349-355. Also see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Vol. 1, pp. 687-688, and Vol. 2, pp. 1777-1778, 1859-1860, 1866. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles characterized the US commitment as a declaration of recognition, not a guarantee of the inviolability and integrity of Austrian territory; see ibid, Vol. 1, p. 688.

30. The parties include Australia, Austria, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, France, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. For the text, see 7 United States Treaties 803; TIAS 3560.


32. See discussion in section on neutralization and United Nations membership.

33. See comments on neutralization and United Nations membership.

34. See statement of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 1937, quoted in Whiteman, Digest, p. 345.

35. Sweden's status, nevertheless, differs in that Sweden does not have any constitutional commitment to neutralization and its neutral status is not guaranteed by other powers. See Whiteman, Digest, p. 354.


39. The treaty excludes applicability to the territory of the United States and its territorial waters.

40. Other Latin American states that are not signatory to these treaties include the Bahamas, Barbados, Colombia, Guyana, and Surinam, and several others have signed the Non-Proliferation but not the Test Ban Treaty.

41. In connection with German reunification potentialities in the late 1940s and early 1950s which, in view of the creation of the two Germanies, alliance with NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the permanent division of pre-war Germany, is no longer feasible or desirable.


43. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established to implement the Southeast Asia Treaty. On June 30, 1977, by agreement among the signatories, the organization (SEATO) was terminated, but the treaty remained in effect, so that United States commitments under this pact continue.

44. These include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Note that, of the nuclear powers, the People Republic of China and India, are not parties to the treaty. For its text, see 12 United States Treaties 794; TIAS 4780. Also see American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1961 (1965), pp. 452-458; and for commentary, see pp. 458-465; also US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and History of Negotiations, 1977 ed. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 18-26.
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Additional materials are to be found in general texts and casebooks in international law, encyclopedias, compilations of diplomatic correspondence such as Foreign Relations of the United States, and, for official documentation of the Department of State, in the following:


Foreign language materials, largely in French and German, dealing primarily with the neutralization of specific countries like Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, but also to some extent with permanent neutralization generally, may be found in the documentation contained in a number of the items cited above.
# Neutralization As An American Strategic Option

## Abstract
This report is a survey focusing on the nature, advantages and disadvantages, and potentialities of neutralization as a policy alternative to formal and informal US security commitments. By considering several forms of neutralization, the author analyzes their political, economic, and military purposes in six separate geographical regions: Western Hemisphere, Europe and the Mediterranean, Africa, South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, the Pacific region, and the polar regions.