A NATIONAL SERVICE DRAFT

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I. INTRODUCTION

The choice of a military manpower procurement policy has traditionally been among the more important decisions that a nation must make. Besides its effects on defense capabilities and costs, manpower procurement policy has much broader economic and social implications. This is especially so for compulsory national service, a policy option that has recently begun to receive considerable public attention.

It is within the context of these defense, economic, and social considerations that the purpose of this paper is to sketch out a general approach for evaluating the efficacy of a national service draft, including some of the possible consequences that such a policy would entail.

Of particular importance to this evaluation is a careful consideration of the progress and prospects for the All-Volunteer Force. That is, compulsory national service should not be viewed in isolation from military manpower procurement since the military is one of the largest claimants of the nation's youth. Consideration of compulsory national service in the context of the AVF is further motivated by the

*This paper is based largely on material presented in a forthcoming book by the author, Defense Without the Draft.
fact that much of the support for a national service draft seems to
derive at least in part from concerns about the future of the volunteer
force. Thus, to the extent that these concerns are misplaced, the
rationale for a national service draft is correspondingly lessened.

To put the issue of compulsory national service in the perspective
of military manpower procurement, Section II of this paper begins by
outlining the major manpower procurement policy options and focuses
particularly on the reasons underlying the termination of the postwar
draft. The early experience with the volunteer force is then examined
in Section III. Given this background, Section IV turns to consider
compulsory national service, including the possible benefits and
problems of such a policy. Conclusions are then presented in Section V.
II. MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT

Because of the unique relationship between military manpower procurement policy and other policies affecting the nation's youth, the issue of compulsory national service should be addressed in the context of military manpower procurement options. Accordingly, the discussion below first examines what the major options are and, second, why the postwar selective service draft was terminated.

Policy Options

Although it is often convenient to dichotomize military manpower procurement policy into the two extremes—voluntary recruitment and conscription—there are in fact many different forms of conscription. These include selective service, universal military training, universal military service, and, particularly germane to this paper, compulsory national service.[1]

Under a compulsory national service policy, all young men (and on occasion, all young women) are viewed as having an obligation to serve their country. Such service is usually designed to benefit the national purpose and can include, for instance, helping the disadvantaged members of society (e.g., working in hospitals or programs such as VISTA), forestry and park services, and, of course, military service.

Under a policy of universal military service, all of the nation's young men are viewed as having a specific obligation to serve in their country's military forces. Such a policy therefore differs from one of compulsory national service in that nonmilitary service does not fulfill an individual's obligation. Although universal military training

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[1] There are, of course, other military manpower procurement policies such as a reserve-only draft.
is similar to universal military service in that all young men receive military training, all will not actually serve in the standing forces. The remainder are instead usually assigned to reserve or militia units.

The common element of these three forms of conscription is that all young men (and, in some cases, all young women) are required to fulfill their service obligation, whether that service consists of military service, some other national service, or just military training.

A selective service conscription policy, on the other hand, differs from these forms in that not all young men must serve or even receive training. Instead, although all are usually subject to the possibility of being conscripted, only some will actually serve—a result of the fact that present military strength requirements are too small to absorb all who are eligible. There are many different forms of selective service conscription, but these alternatives differ in the method of selection, not in concept.

As a practical matter, force readiness requirements and force size constraints preclude the viability of universal military service and universal military training policies for the United States. Specifically, force readiness requirements argue against reducing the length of the conscription tour below two years. Given a minimum conscription tour of two years, then, the size of the military aged male population means that universal military service would thus result in a force size of between four to five million uniformed members—that is, two to two-and-a-half times larger than current force size requirements.

The major military manpower procurement options therefore reduce down to a selective service draft, a national service draft, and voluntary military recruitment.
The Decision to End the Draft

Although the volunteer force is frequently viewed as an outgrowth of the Vietnam War, the move to end the draft was actually a result of far more fundamental concerns. In this regard, the basic policy problem of the sixties can be traced to the growing inequities of the selective service draft—inequities created by the selective way the burden of military service was applied to young men of military age.

This selectivity came as a result of some simple demographic trends: specifically, increasing numbers of young men reaching military age each year and constant (or decreasing) force sizes meant that a smaller proportion of the military aged cohort would actually serve. In fact, by the mid 1970s only one out of every five men would ever serve in the military. Coupled with the pay discrimination toward junior military personnel that characterized the postwar draft—often called the "conscription tax"—this meant that increasingly fewer would have to bear an increasingly large burden.

The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force—the so-called Gates Commission—concluded that, by simply raising recruit pay to the level earned by comparably aged and educated civilian workers, the military would no longer need a draft. In other words, an all-volunteer military would not require any extraordinary measures; it basically meant the payment of a "market wage" to new recruits.

The importance of these findings for the issue at hand—namely, compulsory national service and the All-Volunteer Force—is that a selective service military draft probably does not present a socially viable alternative for military manpower procurement under projected
defense needs and objectives. That is, because there is in fact no way of distributing the burden of selective service "fairly" after the fact, a return to selective service conscription would only reintroduce the inequities eliminated by the volunteer force.
III. THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Because of the important link between the future of the volunteer force and the advisability of compulsory national service, it is useful to examine the evidence from the first few years without the draft. In this regard, the emerging debate about the volunteer force provides a convenient tool for structuring an analysis of the early AVF experience.

The post-draft debate has raised a number of specific issues about the AVF, but four in particular stand out. These include whether the military services can attract a sufficient number of volunteers in the absence of a draft; whether they can attract a sufficient quality of new recruits; whether the AVF has resulted in a force that is no longer representative of the American people; and to what extent the enormous growth in manpower costs is attributable to the volunteer force.

Enlistment Supply and Demand

In the case of enlistment supply, concern has centered first on the recruiting shortfalls that characterized much of the first year without the draft (and that surfaced again during the summer of 1976); second, whether continued success of the volunteer force depends on continued high unemployment rates; and third, on what the decreasing number of young men reaching military age that begins to take place about 1980 means for the future of the volunteer force. Interestingly, most of the attention has focused on the supply side of this problem, leaving the demand for new recruits virtually unquestioned. Yet, enlistment demand is probably the single key AVF issue.

The evidence shows that there is a more than adequate supply of manpower for the enlisted forces, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Specifically, actual supply under the AVF closely matches the original Gates projections. In other words, one of the key assumptions initially used to judge the viability of a volunteer military has in fact proved to be correct.

In addition, although there were some recruiting problems during the first year without the draft, these were not the result of the AVF itself, but rather with the way it was initially managed. For example, the Army had about 1,000 fewer recruiters in the field during the summer of 1973 than it did during the last year of the draft, while simultaneously raising its quality standards. In other words, the first-year recruiting shortfalls do not seem to be indicative of longer run recruiting problems, though they do show that future recruiting problems can occur if the force is not properly managed.

Finally, high unemployment rates, though certainly aiding the recruiting effort, are not responsible for the success of the volunteer force. Since a 10 percent increase in the unemployment rate for young males results in only a 2 or 3 percent increase in the number of enlistments,[1] the future of the AVF does not depend on continued high unemployment. Rather, the recent economic recession has enabled the military services to achieve unusually high quality standards—higher than at any time during the draft—so that concern should instead be focused on whether the Services will unrealistically base future quality standards on what has been achievable during the recession, instead of on what is required.

The key AVF issue is therefore not enlistment supply—it is the demand for enlisted accessions. As a result of deliberate Service policies such as limiting the number of reenlistments (which is partly

[1]See, for example, Cooper, Defense Without the Draft, op. cit.
due to Congressional limitations placed on the numbers of personnel in the senior pay grades), the Services actually have larger accession requirements relative to force sizes under the volunteer force than they did under the draft. But, it is important to recognize that this increased demand for accessions is largely policy driven—not a result of the volunteer force.

On the face of it, the supply and demand projections shown in Figure 1 seem to support the Defense Manpower Commission's conclusion that the Services will weather the population decline in the 1980s only if there is continued high unemployment. However, these are based on the Services' own stated accession requirements.

If the Services' male enlisted accession requirements are instead reduced in accordance with the Gates Commission recommendations (by increasing the numbers of reenlistments and allowing more women to join) Figure 1 shows that there is a more than sufficient manpower supply throughout the 1980s—even under the most robust economic picture.

The sufficiency of enlisted manpower supply could be further enhanced by a relaxation of the physical (i.e., medical) standards used to screen Service applicants, since analysis shows that a modest relaxation in these standards could yield a 5 to 10 percent increase in supply with no adverse effect on force capability.[1]

**Quality**

The second major issue to emerge from the post-draft debate concerns the "quality" of the force. Although quality is a difficult concept to either define or measure, there are some proxy measures we

Figure 1

NON-PRIOR SERVICE MALE ENLISTMENT SUPPLY
AND DEMAND PROJECTIONS

SUPPLY (HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT)
DEMAND (SERVICE PROJECTIONS)

SUPPLY (LOW UNEMPLOYMENT)
SUPPLY (AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT)
DEMAND (ALTERNATIVE APPROACH)

THOUSANDS
400
300
200

YEAR
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

can use to gauge the quality of the force—perhaps the most common of which are the mental aptitude and educational attainment of those entering the force. No matter how we look at it, though, quality has changed very little since the removal of the draft. If anything, it has actually increased, especially during the recession.

For example, Figure 2 shows that the percentage of enlisted accessions that are non-high school graduates has remained at roughly the historic average. On the other hand, the percentage of accessions falling in Mental Category IV—that is, those in the below average portion of the mental aptitude spectrum—has been cut by more than half since the removal of the draft, from an average of 19 percent during the last years of the draft to less than 8 percent under the volunteer force.

Thus, the real issues seem to be, first, whether the Services are setting quality standards that are too restrictive (rather than too lenient) and, second, whether they have maintained the right balance among the various types of screening criteria such as mental aptitude and educational attainment.

Specifically, although the military services have emphasized the reduction in their Category IV intake—this has come at the expense of a moderate increase in the numbers of non-high school graduates accessed. Most analyses, however, suggest that Category IV high school graduates are more productive on the job, pose fewer disciplinary problems, and have lower attrition rates than their Category I-III non-high school graduate counterparts.

Social Representation

It is ironic that one of the key issues to emerge out of the volunteer experience has been whether the AVF would lead to a military
Figure 2

MENTAL APTITUDE AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF MALE ENLISTED ACCESSIONS

- MENTAL CATEGORY IV (BELOW AVERAGE)
- NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

PERCENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tr>
<td>FY60-64</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY65-69</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY70-72</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY73-76</td>
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</tbody>
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SOURCE: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).
composed mainly of the poor and of the black, and more generally, whether a volunteer military would be socially representative of the mainstream of American society. The irony is of course that the historically unrepresentative nature of conscription was one of the principal reasons for terminating the postwar draft. Whether due to explicit policy decisions such as those characterizing the 1918 draft selection process—where individuals were drafted in ascending order according to their "value to society"—or more subtle forms of discrimination such as those represented by post-World War II selective deferment policy, it has been generally well recognized that the draft placed a disproportionate burden on the poor and others less able to find ways of avoiding induction.

Although black participation in the armed forces has in fact risen significantly during the past 15 years (see Table 1), this increase is not the result of the volunteer force. It is instead due mainly to the increasing numbers of blacks found eligible for service. Specifically, although blacks continue to score less well on mental aptitude screening tests than whites, the proportion of blacks failing to qualify for military service has decreased significantly over the past 20 years. Because of this, Table 1 shows that the black proportion of the "prime" manpower pool—i.e., Mental Categories I-III—has increased from a little under 3 percent in 1960 to more than 7 percent today. This is an increase of almost two-and-a-half times.

In fact, the ratio of the black percentage of Category I-III male enlisted accessions to the black percentage of the 18-year old Category I-III male population has remained between 1.6 and 2.6 for the past 15 years. Moreover, not only is there no clear trend in this ratio, but what variations there are can be mostly explained by the unusually
Table 1

Determinants of Racial Composition of Enlisted Accessions

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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Enlisted Accessions: Percent Black</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Cat. I-III Accessions: Percent Black</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) 18 Year-Old Category</td>
<td>I-III Male Population: Percent Black</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Ratio of Row (2) to Row (3)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 18 to 19 Year-Old Male Unemployment Rates: Difference Between Black &amp; White (percent)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

large unemployment rates experienced by black youth (relative to white) during the 1970s. That is, whereas unemployment rates for black youth have historically averaged about 10 percentage points above those for white youth, Table 1 shows that this difference jumped to 18 percentage points in 1974. Thus, the changing racial composition of the enlisted force is not a result of the volunteer force, but rather to changing demographic and economic variables.

The AVF debate has also failed to recognize the major strides that the military services have made with respect to increasing black participation in the officer corps. Whereas only about 1 percent of all officers were black in 1960, about 7 percent of those entering today are black--about the same percentage as the black share of 22 to 24 year-old college graduates. This is a direct result of such programs as establishing ROTC detachments at predominantly black colleges in the South.

Although some have generalized the changing racial composition of the force to mean further that the military has come to rely more heavily on the poor since the end of the draft, there is remarkably little difference in the types of individuals entering the Service according to their families' income. For example, Table 2 shows that those Zip Codes representing the top 5 percent of all Zip Codes in terms of average family income account for approximately the same percentage of enlisted accessions under the AVF as they did under the lottery draft--presumably the most socially representative period of conscription. We similarly find that medium and low income areas are also contributing approximately the same percentages as they did under the draft.
### Table 2

Distribution of Enlisted Accessions According to the Average Family Income of Their Home Address Zip Codes (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>All Accessions</th>
<th>White Accessions</th>
<th>Black Accessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draft AVF</td>
<td>Draft AVF</td>
<td>Draft AVF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Income (Top 5%)</td>
<td>3.2 3.0</td>
<td>3.7 3.6</td>
<td>0.9 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income (75% - 95%)</td>
<td>24.4 23.9</td>
<td>27.6 27.8</td>
<td>9.0 9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Income (25% - 75%)</td>
<td>55.0 54.9</td>
<td>56.1 56.1</td>
<td>50.0 50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Income (5% - 25%)</td>
<td>16.1 17.0</td>
<td>10.3 10.3</td>
<td>34.3 32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest Income (Bottom 5%)</td>
<td>1.2 1.2</td>
<td>1.3 1.3</td>
<td>0.7 0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Richard V.L. Cooper, Defense Without the Draft, forthcoming.
Moreover, whatever little change that has occurred since the removal of the draft is entirely explained by the changing racial composition of the force, since blacks tend to recede in lower income areas than whites. In fact, Table 2 shows that whites and blacks individually each seem to be coming in the same or slightly larger numbers from high income areas under the AVF than they did under the draft.

**AVF Costs**

With the dramatic growth in defense manpower costs over the past 10 to 15 years, it is easy to see why manpower costs in general and the presumed cost of the volunteer force have become so important. Manpower costs increased from about $22 billion in 1964 to more than $50 billion in 1976. Furthermore, this increase has come at the expense of other defense items such as force modernization, since the manpower share of the defense budget over the same period increased from about 45 percent to about 56 percent.

Attribution of this enormous cost growth to the volunteer force is, however, plainly incorrect. Focusing on the amount that is paid to defense personnel, Figure 3 shows that the factors leading to the considerable growth in manpower costs can instead be traced to the events that began nearly three decades ago. For example, whereas the military had historically relied on a 30-year career, the immediate post-World War II period saw the first widespread implementation and use of the 20-year military career—a policy that would come to have a dramatic effect on defense manpower costs about 25 years later.

The sixties marked the implementation of the comparability pay principle for civilian employees of the Federal Government—about one million of whom work for the DoD—and the beginning of annual pay increases for military personnel.
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING PAY AND RETIREMENT

1946-48: 20-YEAR MILITARY RETIREMENTS
1962: "COMPARABLE" PAY FOR GS CIVILIANS
1963: BEGINNING OF ANNUAL PAY INCREASES FOR CAREER MILITARY
1965: COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTS FOR MILITARY RETIRED PAY
1966: BEGINNING OF ANNUAL PAY INCREASES FOR JUNIOR MILITARY
1967: "RIVERS AMENDMENT:" COMPARABLE PAY INCREASES FOR MILITARY
1967-69: "CATCH-UP" PAY RAISES FOR CAREER MILITARY
1969: "1% KICKEER" INTRODUCED FOR RETIRED PAY
1970: INTRODUCTION OF "AUTOMATIC" ANNUAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PAY INCREASES
1971: AVF PAY INCREASE FOR JUNIOR MILITARY
1971: SUBSTANTIAL PAY INCREASE FOR CAREER MILITARY
In addition, the period 1967 to 1969 also saw the so-called "catch-up" pay raises for career military personnel--to bring their pay in line with the private sector. Implementation of the "one percent kicker" for adjusting Federal military and civilian retired pay in 1969 meant that for every 3 percent increase in the cost of living, there would be a 4 percent increase in retired pay, thus increasing retirement costs substantially.

In fact, the only increases in manpower costs that can even be remotely related to the AVF are the large pay increase for first-term military personnel implemented in 1971 and the increased recruiting and bonus costs for these individuals. Even the pay increase should not really be viewed as an AVF cost, since the Gates Commission argued vigorously that pay discrimination against junior military personnel ought to be eliminated for equity reasons alone—whether or not the draft was to be ended.

The end result is that the volunteer force has added less than $300 million to the cost of defense manpower—about two-tenths of one percent of the defense budget. The reason why such a small proportion of manpower cost growth can be attributed to the AVF is that the draft provides little leverage over total manpower costs. That is, whereas the basic effect of the draft is to reduce the budget outlays for those in their first two years of service, the total cost of these personnel amounts to only about $6 billion—just a little over 10 percent of all defense manpower outlays.

**Future of the AVF**

To summarize, most of the concerns raised thus far during the post-draft debate are either unfounded or misplaced. In many instances
the debate has been factually incorrect; there has been a tendency to take issues and statistics out of context; and there has been a failure to distinguish what might be termed as general manpower problems from those specifically related to the volunteer force. The importance of this finding is twofold. First, the early experience with the volunteer force has generally been a success. In fact, considering the magnitude of the undertaking, it is perhaps surprising that more problems have not been encountered. Second, however, continued success depends on the Services making some fundamental adjustments in ways that they use, manage, and compensate their personnel.

Viewed narrowly, this means, for instance, that the Services ought to reduce personnel turnover rates, access more women, relax some of the medical criteria used to screen applicants for enlistment, and accept more Category IV high school graduates. In a broader sense, fundamental revisions in manpower utilization, career management, and compensation are required.

The AVF can be made to fail. But it can also be made to work, and perhaps much better than its draft-dependent predecessor.
IV. COMPULSORY NATIONAL SERVICE

As described in Section II, a national service draft would serve two principal purposes. It would help to supply the manpower required to staff the nation's armed forces; and it would provide a means for utilizing the remainder of young men (and possibly young women) in nonmilitary functions designed to benefit the national purpose. Because of the enormous impact that a compulsory national service policy would thus have on defense in particular and society in general, the discussion below briefly addresses some of the benefits and problems that might result if such a policy were implemented.

Benefits of Compulsory National Service

Support for a compulsory national service program is both philosophical and practical in nature. On the philosophical side, national service is seen by some as a vehicle for encouraging a new "sense of commitment" to the country—a hoped-for result of the direct labor contribution that each young national service participant would make. In other words, some view compulsory national service as a vehicle for combating the erosion of "national purpose" that has supposedly taken place during the past 10 to 15 years. Ideally, this would be accomplished in part through the "meaningful" activities that would comprise a national service program. Youth would be more effectively brought into the mainstream of American society; and society in general would become better acquainted with the aspirations, needs, and ideas of youth. National service is also seen as a means for encouraging a certain "socialization" process among the nation's youth—specifically, a mixing of individuals from different backgrounds and with different
interests that might not otherwise take place under a strictly market economy.

Proponents of national service, of course, do not expect these things to happen overnight or that national service would be the sole means for achieving these objectives. Rather, national service is seen as the beginning of a long evolution toward a more effective interaction between the individual and society.

In addition to the philosophical base of the argument, there is a more practical side to the case for national service. Specifically, one only has to look at the very high youth unemployment rates—approaching 30 percent or more for certain minority groups—to see the economic rationale for compulsory national service. Not only would a national service draft reduce youth unemployment rates directly, but a possible side benefit would be decreased future unemployment rates for national service participants—a result of the skills and maturity presumably gained during their period of service. Thus, compulsory national service is seen as a tool for making youth more "employable."

Although the above objectives are clearly laudable, it is important to recognize that they are a possible outcome of compulsory national service, not a certainty. Indeed, a national service draft could do far worse than the current system in achieving these objectives. For example, resentment among those subject to a national service draft might reduce rather than increase the "sense of commitment" to the country. Alternatively, a national service program may have little or no downstream effect on unemployment rates.

**Problems with Compulsory National Service**

In addition to the uncertainty regarding the benefits to be derived from compulsory national service, implementation of such a policy also
raises some possibly severe problems as well. First, there is the equity question concerning how national service workers would be distributed among the various national service jobs—especially between military and nonmilitary assignments—given that the distribution of individual preferences would be unlikely to match the distribution of jobs. For example, it is hard to argue that cutting down a tree in Wyoming as part of the forestry service is equivalent to cutting down a tree on the border between North and South Korea in the military. In general, then, an excess supply of applicants for nonmilitary assignments would be expected.

This problem could be solved by a random selection process, though history tells us that the better qualified would stand a better chance of their preferred choices. Alternatively, a pay or period-of-service differential could be introduced. Military pay might be set at a level higher than for other national service jobs, or other jobs might have a three-year commitment as opposed to two years of military duty. In any case, it is clear that without some such differential, compulsory national service once again introduces the equity problem that was inherent under the selective service draft, but eliminated by the AUP.

Second, a national service draft would be enormously expensive. Total program cost would depend on a number of factors, including the number of young Americans serving in the program (which in turn depends

[1] President John F. Kennedy, for example, proposed that a three-year period of service in the Peace Corps might serve as an exemption from the two-year minimum military service. Although this proposal was never implemented, it is illustrative of how a period-of-service differential might be applied.
on disqualification rates and the extent to which young women would participate, the length of the service commitment, the pay for national service, the costs of accession and training, and the costs of administering the program.

Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact costs of a national service draft, Table 3 illustrates some of the potential magnitudes. For example, assuming that about 2 million young men become 18 years old every year, that between 75 and 90 percent of all those coming of age would be found eligible for national service,[1] and that military force readiness requirements dictate two years as the minimum length of service, the numbers of young men in national service at any point in time would be between 3 and 3.5 million. Thus, depending on how many women would participate, the total number of national service members would be between 3 and 7 million. Assuming further that the pay for national service would be in the neighborhood of between $2.30 and $2.50 per hour,[2] the total salary cost for a "men only" national service program would be between $14 billion and $20 billion, as shown in Table 3.

The second cost element, accession and separation, would probably amount to between $1.5 and $3.5 billion per year, assuming that the

[1] It is unlikely that the disqualification rate for a national service program would be below those rates experienced during the selective service draft, since the same rationale (e.g., force readiness, etc.) could not be used to exclude the large numbers of individuals that were in fact disqualified for physical or mental reasons during the draft. Moreover, viewed as a social policy, national service might have its greatest positive impact on those that would have been disqualified under a selective service draft.

[2] It is interesting to note that even if the 1971 first-term pay increase had not been implemented, existing Federal law would have resulted in regular military compensation of about $4,960 per year for the first two years of military service in fiscal 1976 -- about $2.38 an hour. To expect that pay could be reduced much below this level, which was viewed as a poverty wage during the 1971 AVF debate, is at best unrealistic.
Table 3

Cost of Compulsory National Service: Men Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Element</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Average</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(000s)</td>
<td>Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary*</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>$4,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accession/Separation</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration-b</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Annual salary minimum based on minimum wage of $2.30 per hour; maximum based on wage of $2.50 per hour. Number based on cohort of two million young men; minimum number based on disqualification rate of 25 percent and two-year service tour; maximum number based on disqualification rate of 10 percent and two-year service tour.

bMinimum based on one administrator (supervisors, clerical, etc.) per 20 service members; maximum based on one administrator per five service members.
sum of accession and separation costs (e.g., travel, processing, etc.) average between $1,000 and $2,000 per individual. Depending on how much training would be supplied[1], total training costs exclusive of national service members' own salaries would probably amount to somewhere between $2 billion and $5 billion per year.

Perhaps most difficult to estimate are the costs of administration. If only one administrator (e.g., supervisors, clerical support, etc.) is needed per 20 service members, administration costs could run less than $2 billion per year[2]. Alternatively, these costs might run more than $10 billion per year, assuming one administrator per five service members.

Together, the total cost of a "men only" national service draft would seem to be somewhere between $20 billion and $40 billion per year, with the "best guess" probably being in the neighborhood of $30 billion per year. Netting out the $5 to $6 billion per year associated with those currently serving in their first two years of military service, a national service draft would thus add about $25 billion to the Federal budget, assuming that women were not allowed to serve (an unlikely event), that there were no pay or period-of-service differentials, and that the minimum period of service was two years. Relaxing these conservative assumptions so that women would be eligible but not required to serve and

[1] Although King estimates that national service training might be held to $600 per service member, past experience in the military shows that $600 buys little in the way of actual training. Thus, if national service is to provide much in the way of job training, it is clear that much more than $600 per participant would be required. Alternatively, if only a small amount is spent on training, the downstream reduction in unemployment that is desired from a national service program would be difficult to realize. In other words, you get what you pay for.

See William R. King, "Achieving America's Goals: All Volunteer Force or National Service?"

[2] Note that the number of administrative personnel required might be reduced by using some national service members for administrative support.
that there would be some modest pay or service commitment differential would probably drive the total program cost up to at least $50 billion dollars per year—half the size of the entire fiscal 1976 defense budget.

Third, a national service draft would be likely to displace some currently employed workers. Moreover, because national service workers would tend to be less educated, less trained, and less experienced, the individuals most likely to be displaced from their current employment would be the black, the poor, and the undereducated—those with the most difficulty in finding alternative employment offers. Thus, a national service program might reduce unemployment among the nation’s youth, but it might increase unemployment among other hard-to-employ segments of society.

Fourth, the removal of 1 1/2 to 3 million young men and women from the workforce and/or student rolls for two or more years each could cause possibly severe economic dislocations. For example, since 1.0 to 1.5 million graduating high school seniors go on to college each year, compulsory national service would create difficult transition problems for the nation’s colleges, universities, and trade schools. In addition, the high youth unemployment rates during the 1970s are clearly cause for concern, but the fact that 80 percent or more of those in the youth workforce find employment means that a national service draft would deprive the economy of many productive workers.

Besides the economic and equity problems, there is some question about how well a national service program would work since the "need" for this type of conscription is not certain to be well recognized by those forced to bear the burden. One only has to look back to the Vietnam War to see the effects of an "unpopular" war or the lack of a national commitment on the ability to successfully maintain conscrip-
tion. Thus, whereas the importance of defense may be well recognized by the American population—thus providing a certain credibility for a military draft when needed—drafting for "non-essential" purposes might seriously dilute support for a nonmilitary draft. In other words, the same arguments used to support a military draft—e.g., a youthful fighting force and the necessity of defense—cannot be used to justify conscripting young men and women for nonmilitary purposes.

The use of compulsory national service also raises a number of philosophical and legal problems, including the problems resulting from the use of coercion to allocate labor resources in a free society. In this regard, a Senate speech by Robert Taft of Ohio just before World War II is particularly relevant:

"The principle of a compulsory draft is basically wrong. If we must use compulsion to get an Army, why not use compulsion to get men for other essential tasks? Why not draft labor for [essential] occupations at wages lower than the standard? . . . In short, the logic of the bill requires a complete regimentation of most labor and the assignment of jobs to every man. This is actually done in the communist and fascist states which we are now apparently seeking to emulate."

In other words, the imposition of compulsory national service would seem to directly contradict the long-held principle of individual freedom. Indeed, for this reason, it is not clear whether a nonmilitary draft is even constitutional.
V. CONCLUSIONS

The preceding discussion has made two major points. First, the volunteer force has worked and, with continued top level management attention, it can probably continue to work for the remainder of this century. Thus, a draft—whether compulsory national service or otherwise—is not needed to staff the Armed Forces. Second, although the objectives of compulsory national service are in many ways desirable, the uncertainties regarding whether these objectives could be achieved through a national service draft and the very real problems associated with such a policy probably preclude its usefulness for achieving U.S. military, social, and economic objectives—especially given the success of the All-Volunteer Force.

Compulsory national service is therefore not needed to support U.S. military forces and, despite the other possible benefits from compulsory national service, there are probably far better means for dealing with the issues and problems that have been raised during the debate about national service.