| Alignment and Neutrality: Europe's Future (U) 

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by

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FOREWORD

This memorandum offers a reappraisal of prospects for the Atlantic Alliance with respect to such problems as the unique role of Germany in the Alliance, the military balance, and instability within the southern tier of NATO states. The author sees the need to master some basic problems such as healing the rift between Greece and Turkey, bringing France closer to the Alliance, and dealing with Eurocommunism in France and Italy. He also asserts that, if circumstances should permit, a protective umbrella should also be extended over the neutral border states in east central Europe, which may at some point be in danger of Finlandization or worse. He concludes that probabilities for the maintenance, buttressing, or disruption of current patterns of alignment demand attention.

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Major General, USA
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

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In the years since its inception, fluctuations have been numerous in the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance. The pursuit of Western security has seen periods of establishment, expansion, and contraction as well as phases of harmony and disarray. The Alliance has gained or lost in coherence, moved closer to or farther from the various neutral states, and has perceived the future in a variety of colors.

At a time in which external aspects, if not necessarily the substance, of US policy are undergoing striking changes, the course it is taking is giving rise to new uncertainties and concerns. Questions on such critical issues as the future of detente, the military balance, the instability of the states comprising NATO’s southern tier, developments in the Middle East, and the fate of post-Tito Yugoslavia are accentuated in one way or another. The basic significance of alignment and neutrality among states sharing equally in Western heritages seems to demand reexamination.

None of these states can greatly doubt that, for good or ill, it must perforce share the fortunes of the North Atlantic area generally. Yet the history of the world since World War II repeatedly demonstrated how this perception must compete with others that influence the form and extent of commitment of individual states to a common defensive
system. The outlook on such contending influences and perceptions provides the subject of this essay. The survey is best undertaken against a backdrop of historical factors that have helped determine alignment and neutrality in the past.

THE EURO-ATLANTIC SCENE, 1945-78

Alignment and Neutrality in History. Concepts and forms of alignment and neutrality have usually been as varied and complex as have been those associated with degrees of belligerency. The two terms have ever been relative in character and the dividing line between them has often been an exceedingly dim one. The basic determinants have varied little and have represented very elementary interests and goals. Neutrality is generally more complicated for decisionmakers, if only because it depends on the volition and restraints of at least three parties: the would-be neutral and one or more of the belligerents on each contending side. The resolve of any one of them may lead to its termination.

The factors determining neutrality or involvement are as multifarious as the motivations or compulsions which influence decisionmaking of governments in international relations. It is frequently interpreted as a sign of weakness, a token of resignation denoting impotence or lack of confidence in playing the power game vigorously. At times it is clearly an interim stage, the neutral holding off until he has improved his bargaining position due to the increasing desperation of the belligerents, or until the investment of his resources promises to be less than earlier. Occasionally there have been what could be called “leagues of neutrals,” formed to encourage and support one another against the interference or domination of the big players. A peacetime example of this in the late fifties, at a time of great pressures for alignment, was the relationship between Tito’s Yugoslavia, Nasser’s Egypt, Nehru’s India, and the Indonesia of Sukarno.

There is a neutrality of expediency in which a state does not feel sufficiently concerned to take a hand in the game or finds it opportune to stand by while rival states engage in a contest of mutual exhaustion. The latter role was that of the Soviet Union in the first two years of World War II, and would certainly have been the preferred course for France and Britain if they could have stood off while Hitler and Stalin were cutting each other down to size.

Least common in a century of ideological confrontations and
shrinking globe is the traditional posture of the disinterested, impartial neutral whose status was the main target of codification by the Hague Convention of 1907. The last representative of a major power to make some gesture in this direction was Woodrow Wilson in 1914, in making his celebrated appeal to the American people to be “neutral in thought as well as in deed.” However sincere this plea may have been at the time he voiced it, it did not take the President long to succumb to pressures to tilt American policy ever farther in the direction of one group of belligerents.

No hesitation such as Wilson’s beset the leaders who controlled the destinies of the larger bystanders when war came again in 1939. The international scene was now more complex, the world had shrunk further, and the pull toward the vortex of contention was so much more compelling. Those still uncommitted when the first shots were fired were soon absorbed in manipulating their “neutrality” in favor of one side or the other. Mussolini, Franco, Stalin, Roosevelt, and the men who dominated affairs in Tokyo soon left no doubt as to their preferences; the first-named was the one who coined the “non-belligerency” term which henceforth betokened more than the traditional equivalent of neutrality and, in fact, constituted a long step toward involvement.

The fate of many of the weaker nations which would have preferred to maintain neutrality between 1939 and 1945 legitimizes the query whether, in a period of sufficient international tension, it can be regarded as a realistic aim. Be this as it may, the fact that five of these states (Sweden, Switzerland, Eire, Spain, and Portugal) managed somehow to maintain a precarious neutral status for 6 years and the presumption that a World War III would perforce be a short one allow room for such a hope. Also, whatever the outlook once major forces are engaged, there are obvious benefits for those who are able to persist in nonalignment under peacetime conditions.

Alignments and Neutrality Since 1945. Late war and early postwar anticipations concerning the world of the future involved few thoughts of a world scene that would be dominated by confrontation between hostile alliance systems. It is true that Western statesmen, mindful of the contrast between President Wilson’s optimistic label of the war as one which would “end war,” and the stark post-1918 realities, avoided euphoric slogans on what victory over the Axis would accomplish. Yet survival in face of so titanic a threat as the expansive drives of Germany, Italy, and Japan made the thought of similar dangers in the
future too painful to contemplate. Here and there such alarming symptoms as Soviet steps in Poland caused anxiety, but in general expectations persisted that the superpowers would work out a tolerable if not entirely harmonious relationship. In any event, the establishment of the United Nations, in which Western states appeared assured of a built-in majority, gave hopes of an international order in which there would be some restraint of disturbers.

Much as in World War I, most Americans had looked on their second great intervention in Europe as another one-shot proposition after which they could go home to tend to their own affairs. President Roosevelt’s remark to Stalin that he expected American troops to be home within a year and a half after peace is illustrative of this view. The story of the disillusionments of the next 3 years is too sadly familiar to require review.

On the European side of the North Atlantic, there had been a growing realization, notably within the resistance movements, that a radically new kind of European order would be imperative. It did not take long, however, to appreciate that a purely European security system, notably one that excluded Germany, would not for a long time be a viable concept. By 1948 the idea was finding acceptance on both sides of the water that the only realistic approach would be one firmly set on Atlantic foundations. Once this viewpoint gained wide recognition, the primary issue revolved around the question of which states west of the Soviet-dominated sphere should be or might be willing to be included. In connection with this problem, it was obvious that the Alliance would have scant meaning if it depended indefinitely on the American nuclear umbrella alone. In that event, the Europeans really would have nothing to contribute to the common defense. Even an American force stationed on the continent would then constitute nothing but a tripwire whose violation by the Soviets would invite massive retaliation. The crux of the problem of forming a mutually supportive association thus centered on the inclusion of West Germany, without which any defense by conventional forces was recognized as an absurdity.

More questionable has been the necessity, or even the importance, of including some of the other states. One can argue persuasively that what eventually became the Atlantic Alliance was comprised, on the European side, of exactly those countries whose membership was imperative or nearly so. The vital role of Britain and France requires no stress. The Benelux countries were essential to an unchallenged grip on
the Channel and as the core of a logistical and communications network. The accession of Italy, Greece, and Turkey guaranteed for many years, though, as events have shown, not in perpetuity, the mastery of the Mediterranean. Norway and Denmark linked up to secure the entry to the Baltic and a grip on the North Sea.

For several of the countries which remained outside, one can make a strong case that their neutrality benefits not only the lands in question but the Alliance itself. Switzerland, the classic neutral, had much to offer the belligerents of both World Wars. All Europe benefited by the preservation of a haven of peace and decency, the headquarters of many a humanitarian or cultural organization. Preserving something like “normal” living conditions in this center was a boon for which all humanity could well be grateful. It was a country which, if it did not exist, deserved to be invented.

Sweden was a second land which, given its geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, could cogently argue that its neutral status benefited the West more than it did the neighboring superpower. This assumption might well need revision if the military posture of the West in Europe were other than purely defensive. If this were different, Sweden might well be claimed to constitute a useful sword pointed at one of the vital centers of the Soviet Union. Another standpoint: the country constitutes a buffer zone which the Soviets may well hesitate to penetrate, thus easing pressures on Norway and Denmark. As with the Swiss, the Swedes appreciate that the head of a neutral state situated at a point of strategic importance can never rest easily. Such a situation demands greater sacrifices for defense than is the case of a state aligned with and supported by powerful allies. Sweden has a defense establishment of sufficient consequence to force a potential invader to think twice and balance his costs and prospective gains very carefully. There is something also to an argument frequently advanced in Stockholm, that Sweden’s buffer status limits in that degree the direct military confrontation of the two blocs with a proportionate decrease of world tensions and danger of a clash in crisis situations. For the same reason, it is argued, the Russians are less inclined to take over Finland or at any rate to oblige the Finns to grant base or occupation rights.

Both for Austria and the West, the neutralizing treaty of 1955 is a mixed blessing. It was worth a substantial price to get the Soviets out of the country with no more than this major string and one or two economic ones attached. But militarily NATO was much handicapped. The extension of the neutral zone eastward from Switzerland, to be
supplemented later by a less definitive but even more crippling Western extension through the departure of France from the organization, threw a barrier between the northern and southern tiers of the Alliance. Austria, a probable member under conditions of no restriction, imposes through its neutrality an impediment to the full integration of the Western defense system. It is also a military soft spot in the heart of central Europe; no one believes that the Soviets would respect its status if it were inconvenient to do so. How little security the Austrians themselves perceive in their situation is evidenced by their near panic when Soviet bloc forces entered Czechoslovakia in 1968. For that matter, the West did not show too much respect for its neutrality when the British violated Austrian air space when they wanted to dispatch planes to Aden.

Of the two remaining neutrals, Eire and Spain, the absence of the former has mainly psychological significance and not too much of that. Militarily, Eire no longer presents so serious a gap as it did for the Anglo-Americans in World War II, when exclusion from its ports was a severe handicap during the Battle of the Atlantic. It scarcely appears probable, in another world conflict, that a contest at sea would be sufficiently intense and protracted to make Irish participation a vital factor.

As for Spain, it stands out on the map as a highly visible gap in the NATO lineup, obstructing a solid array of member states on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. This stood out more when France was still a full-fledged member of the organization. In actuality, the special treaty relationship between Spain and the United States has largely compensated for this. Debates within the Alliance on including Spain have at times had a certain acrimony. Aside from Austria, Spain has been the sole instance where the neutrality of a West European state has created real problems for the security system, an apparently missing link in the southern chain. It is the more welcome that, at a time of so many doubts about the states forming the eastward extension of this chain, there are at least prospects of this link being forged.

It should be noted that, to all intents and purposes, the Western security zone comprises almost equally the fully committed and the formally neutral. Of this fact all parties, though not always sufficiently, are basically aware. It should probably be driven home more forcefully, perhaps through an eloquent statement by an American President. Such neutrals as Eire, Switzerland, and Spain lie well behind the Western
defense perimeter as does partially committed France. The neutral within the front lines (Austria) and the one lying just beyond (Sweden) are largely sheltered under the same umbrella. This also is true to a more limited extent for Finland. NATO thus, whether enthusiastically or not, emerges as the thoroughly trapped guarantor of all the neutrals. The sometimes disparaged but really irrevocable doctrine of containment guards them as surely as it does those who contribute to Western defense more directly.

_Vulnerabilities in the Alliance._ Over the years weak spots have appeared in the Alliance. Their causes have usually not been difficult to identify. Among the most pervasive is what is often described as NATO being “the victim of its own success.” It has gotten on well with what it has, so that there has been no crying need for rehabilitation not to speak of radical reform. Though it is too absurd to fully formulate, there is some vague, ill-defined feeling that, as there has been no Soviet attack, all that has been done has been unnecessary—has really been wasted—that the cold war need not have been fought, and that the blocs are impediments to peace which should be dismantled. In every Western nation there are more or less significant elements which are drawn to such a line of reasoning. They perceive therein an escape from burdens of which they have grown weary and an excuse for turning a deaf ear to verities which, however much they remain valid, have lost appeal or become boresome. It can cause no wonder that the most responsive to this approach is a rising generation devoid of memories of the years when it was touch-and-go, the terrors of which were only mastered by what some now label superfluous.

Such sentiments found their most vigorous expression in protests against the involvement in Vietnam. A more pervasive, though far less intense, manifestation lay in the excessive euphoria about detente, which afforded an alibi for relaxing or falling short of fulfilling commitments, or being lackadaisical about reforms.

The end of the US entanglement in Southeast Asia and more mature judgments about what detente, assuming it persists, can be expected to accomplish has furnished some remedy. It is impossible to hide, however, that the current state of affairs remains far removed from the burst of drive and elan which are needed to master some of the more serious problems of the Alliance.

Inevitably there are tensions within NATO whenever situations arise that are alien to Western defense in Europe and on which there is some clash of interest or viewpoint. Most often and most emphatically, such
Divergencies have arisen between the United States and its European associates rather than among the latter themselves. Since the dismantlement of Europe's overseas empires, there has been comparative uniformity in the outlook of West Europeans toward the non-European world, the principal exception being French policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States, as the only Alliance member with sufficient means to intervene anywhere in the world when it is prepared to pay the price, has had small choice about giving some attention to critical situations on other continents. The Europeans, their own gaze now turned inward, have not always shown understanding or sympathy. All too often they are inclined to criticize what are obvious distractions from the attention they feel should be accorded to Atlantic problems. Americans, in turn, at times sense lack of appreciation for their enormous investment in the common defense, which they all too often misleadingly call “defending Europe.” In return, they think it reasonable to expect a certain measure of European support for American ventures elsewhere, however little these may be covered by formal Alliance obligations. They forget too easily how Washington repudiated this very viewpoint when the shoe was on the other foot; to wit, when the Anglo-French, with little or no consultation, sent an expedition to the Suez area in 1956.

Actually the record is mixed. In Korea, there was more than negligible support from Alliance members and some feeble aid in Vietnam. The United States, on its part, supported French efforts to retain a hold in Indo-China. It is the Middle East which has and may continue to offer the severest tests of Western solidarity. The Americans, too mindful of their own hurts in 1973, seemed to their Allies to show scant consideration for their more painful ones. Nor did the Europeans demonstrate excessive solicitude for each other in dealing with their energy problems. The major clash in conceptions on the two sides of the Atlantic, however, did not derive from mere national egotism. It is a firm conviction of many Europeans that US policy in the Middle East is as contrary to its own interests as it is to theirs, being dictated largely by domestic political considerations.

There is no need to review the painful traumas suffered by the Alliance organization with the departure of France. The Western security system was dealt a devastating blow from which complete recovery is possible only in terms of complete reversal of the process of separation. With no more than one or two exceptions, this problem confronts Western statesmen with their severest long-term challenge.
One of these exceptions is that of dealing with the issues raised by the status of Germany. "The German problem" of this century has been of a simplicity which at times seems more confounding than if it were a situation of greater complication. It lies in the bare fact that in the strategic and industrial heart of Europe live a people who have been from one and one-half to twice as numerous as any other west of Russia. Militarily, they have ceased to have offensive potential, at least no longer on a continental plane. But German forces added to or subtracted from those of their Western partners spell the difference between a strategy confined to massive retaliation and one capable of some degree of flexible response. This gives to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) a military weight close to that of the United States at the core of Western defense and one that grows in reverse proportion to the decline in the credibility of the nuclear option. In purely conventional terms, German forces are even more indispensable than those of the United States in European defense. Without German participation, defense against ground attack in central Europe is unthinkable. On the other hand, in the absence of an American presence, there remains a single viable option: a fully integrated European defense system which, if developed to maximum capacity, should be able to make as good or better showing as the current lineup.

This lopsided German contribution to NATO increases in exact proportion to every shortfall in the commitments of one or another European ally, notably since recessionary trends accentuated in the world economy in 1973. Of the Alliance members of more than ten million population, the Germans alone have escaped many of these tribulations. Small wonder that there should be a feeling of increasing unease, as awareness grows that substantial adjustments in the FRG position in the Alliance must be attempted. The military problem, of course, is only part of a larger one on the role of the FRG in Atlantic and European partnerships generally. It is a rare Western association in which the FRG is not in one way or another obliged to pull rather more than its share. Yet the memories and carryovers of the past dictate every caution in promoting the Germans to more significant positions of leadership.

As with so many of the world's troubles, there seems no adequate solution within the existing framework. In international relations one has a choice only between learning how best to live with one's problems or to eliminate them by kill-or-cure methods. In the case of Germany—West and eventually also East—the latter course means
submergence in a European union so complete as to ban national volition. As that day is perforce a distant one, there is nothing for it but to live with the problem, even though one will probably be confined to palliatives in dealing with it. In that way, one has at least the hope that tensions and complications inherent in the character of the relationship are held to a minimum.

There is a silver lining to this cloud on the Western horizon. This is that, after the Soviet Union, the FRG has been the great cementer of the Atlantic Alliance. The meaning of this somewhat paradoxical statement lies in the fact that, the cement of the Alliance—past, current, and future—being fear, that of a revival of German power independent of Western controls has been a powerful factor in inducing the FRG’s neighbors to club together in the first instance and to stay put thereafter. If detente should revive to the point where fear of the Soviet Union is again diminished, it can safely be assumed that the “German cement” will gain proportionately in importance.

Here is one illustration of how detente, whatever its benefits, is also a soft spot in the armor of the West. It distracts attention from major to minor concerns. Whereas the Soviet Union since 1968 has had much success in stabilizing its camp, the Western story offers a grim contrast. It is true that most of NATO’s current troubles—the advance of Eurocommunism, the sequelae of the Portuguese revolution, and the Greco-Turkish imbroglio—have little to do with excessive detente euphoria. It is more in the northern tier that it at times has resembled a siren song to lull anxieties and encourage lassitude in fulfilling Alliance obligations.

The more clear-headed about detente found discouragement in the auspices under which it was launched. The United States, entangled in Southeast Asia and fearful that the national will lacked stamina to maintain a full presence in Europe, seemed to them to be leading from weakness. Detente as a minimum proclaimed some confidence in Moscow’s good faith and intentions. This served to make the Communist Parties of the West politically more respectable, gave them more elbow room, and at least partially legitimized them.

Did Moscow count on a wave of neutralism to accompany such developments in the West? There are reasons to believe that the Soviets expected evidence of such trends at the Helsinki preparatory discussion for a Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CESC) and were somewhat taken aback that so much Western solidarity was demonstrated on this occasion.
Neutralism and Proposals for Neutralization. Over the years most talk about dissolving or deemphasizing the blocs was sparked by neutralist propaganda as well as by proposals to neutralize specific areas. Such overtures always originated in the East and were echoed by East Bloc agents or sympathizers in the West. In the 1950’s, far and away the principal aim was to forestall or impose limitations on the rearment of West Germany and its entry into NATO. A chief allurement held out to the Germans was a nebulous prospect of reunification. The principal campaigns centered about the Rapacki Plan and its various extensions. Poland’s foreign minister, Rapacki, began by urging the neutralization of the two Germanies and added one by one such states as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Denmark. There was also talk about bringing in Italy and the rest of Scandinavia. The proposals again came up in the sixties and it would be strange if something of the kind were not mooted in the future, particularly if there are opportunities to exploit weak moments in NATO.

In principal such a plan would be heaven-sent for the West, solving innumerable problems and offering release from many a dilemma. It would be even better if it could be extended to all Europe west of the Soviet Union, as well as to other parts of the world where there are aspects of US-USSR confrontation. The argument rests on the thesis that Europe has nothing substantial to contribute to the Alliance except to defend itself. Western Europe is vital to the United States as a shield and as an area which, in the hands of an enemy, would fatally turn the world balance. America thus has no choice but to pledge every resource at its disposal to guard what is best labeled “the Western frontier in Europe.” This oppressive burden could be removed from its shoulders and its defense confined to its own shores if only it could be assured that European neutrality was in fact inviolable.

This, of course, is exactly what it is impossible to assume. Such proposals are clearly designed to create confusion and dissension in Western camps, notably in Germany, where opposition to rearment was for a time formidable. If something like the Rapacki Plan were to be taken seriously and put into operation, central Europe and, to all intents and purposes, the entire Western continent would be defenseless and vulnerable to whatever form of domination the Soviets chose to impose. This does not mean that it was tactically well-advised to treat such proposals with the contempt they may well deserve and to reject all negotiations with reference to them. At some future date it may prove wiser to follow a somewhat different course.
Strains Within the Alliance. A defensive league of 15 states stretching from the Elbe and the Bosphorous to the eastern shores of the Pacific comprises too many divergencies to assure uninterrupted harmony. Inevitably, from time to time, local priorities will take precedence, and perhaps prevail, over the wider concerns that form the basis of the association. The problem made itself amply evident during the period of establishment. It required years to summon the resolution to even try to win acceptance for the rearmament and inclusion of a Germany which had inflicted many wounds that were still far from healed. Looking back, it is rather astonishing that, at least in principle, Germany’s neighbors were prepared to go so far as to support reunification.

Eire refused to join NATO in protest against the prolongation of British rule in Northern Ireland. Greece and Turkey gagged at coming together in the same association. Spain was excluded for ideological reasons and because of the close links it had maintained with the Axis in World War II.

From the start there were muted questionings on just how the United States could be expected to conduct itself in what, for a time at least, could not fail to be something of a hegemonial role. One could hardly foretell then what was to be the verdict of history as well as the virtually unanimous voice of the people of the affected nations: that in dealing with its Allies the United States conducted itself with a tact, restraint, and forebearance rare, if not unique, in such relationships. Circumstances, however, could not dictate otherwise than that the Americans should perforce exercise certain preeminent leadership functions, such as the supreme command of NATO forces and the special role of the President. With the single exception of deGaulle’s France, whose posture was largely determined by the humiliations of World War II, these were accepted in good grace. It should be noted, also, that deGaulle’s decision to withdraw was firmly, though not publicly, determined when he regained power in 1958. In no way can it be ascribed to American deportment or performance in the years which intervened between then and almost a decade later when the actual steps were taken.

The current state and outlook on a number of particularly painful issues, which threaten the solidarity and actual scope of the Alliance, are best discussed in conjunction with future probabilities and possibilities. The course of Eurocommunism and the questions raised by that phenomenon plus the threat to the solidarity of the southeastern flank of NATO, because of the quarrels between Greece
and Turkey, are in this category. The interrelationship between Atlantic-wide and more exclusively European associations and ties involve fewer strains than this and higher hopes of betterment. The problems derived therefrom and prospects for the future are also best considered in conjunction.

ISSUES AND OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

In international as in all human affairs, short- and long-range problems frequently fail to dovetail. Pressing current issues that demand and receive immediate attention may for that very reason pass from the scene rather rapidly. On questions of far more vital long-range impact, it may be possible, though often not advisable, to drift for a span of years. At times there is little choice but to wait until basic changes have taken place in the world constellation and cleared the way for constructive action.

The Atlantic Alliance faces the future with a burden of problems that have every imaginable degree of urgency and consequence. Sentiments vary greatly from country to country, but everywhere there is a majority which accepts with little argument that NATO continues to serve the same purposes as those for which it was established. Generally, this acceptance lacks the wholeheartedness and enthusiasm which characterized earlier years, but nowhere is it regarded as nothing but a necessary evil. Compared to the fading confidence of the late sixties, the portents are encouraging. Notably, the widespread fears of a new American isolationism and retreatist wave have been considerably allayed. It is in this somewhat auspicious climate that NATO must deal with a string of critical issues affecting its southern tier that appear fated to come to a head within something like the next 2 years.

The Shaky Southern Tier. Currently, and probably for years to come, the most compelling problems faced by the Alliance are mainly political and deal with states of the southern tier or situations in the Middle East. These issues are political in a dual sense. It is statesmen and diplomats rather than soldiers who must make the diagnosis and work out the prescriptions. Secondly, the troubles arise mainly out of domestic politics. In recent years, in Western Europe generally, these have been taking increasing precedence over fears of the Soviet Union; in the Mediterranean area this tendency has been even more pronounced. In the confrontation between Greece and Turkey, the resulting jumble is worsened by diversion of security worries from the neighboring superpower to one another.
The wrangles of Greeks and Turks are a classic example of how grievances between individual members of an alliance may take priority over central loyalties and obligations. They also confirm again, for the leading power in an association, that the onus for much that goes wrong almost automatically falls on its head.

What might have been done by Washington to forestall or alleviate the Greco-Turkish collision over developments in Cyprus is a puzzle that may largely be left to historians. The problem remains in a stage where there is little chance for an outsider to adjust the disputes without grave offense to one and most probably to both parties. There appears no alternative to continuing with caution, ever ready to assume any mediatory role for which opportunity may offer itself.

Among the sadder aspects of the situation which the United States must face in this prime test of statesmanship is dissipation of much of the reservoir of good will it once enjoyed in both countries. Depending upon the viewpoint, this was clumsily squandered or resulted from circumstances largely beyond American control. No matter which, it is a fact that carries with it the most serious consequences. Greek liberal and moderate elements, which once could be counted upon to sympathize strongly with the great Western democracy, and what it was believed to stand for, are among those most alienated. Whatever the facts, the conviction or, at least, the suspicion is widespread, that American agencies had much to do with helping to, and sustaining in, power the military junta whose rule became so hated.

The forfeiture of Turkish sympathies, for reasons which require no elucidation, goes deeper and is likely to prove more irremediable. It would be a remarkable achievement of American statesmanship if this loss could be recovered during the present generation.

Whatever the considerations guiding US peacemaking endeavors, there should be no deception on the stakes involved. One of the most serious errors would be an easy assumption that neither of the two states involved really has anywhere to go if it left NATO. Calculations of this sort have misled all too many modern statesmen, notably during the present century. Moreover, one or both countries might decide to go nowhere else, but to sink into a sullen neutrality. Both already have gone more than far enough in this regard. Surprises from Moscow, also, should not be ruled out, considering all the Kremlin stands to gain in altering the political climate of the Mediterranean. There could, for example, be a self-denying ordinance of guarantees to Turkey. This could, if expediency demanded, always be amended or abrogated.
any event, it would cost Moscow no greater restraint than that imposed
to date by the protection extended to Turkey by the United States.

It is too well known to require comment that the most fateful items
in the American peacemaking kit are domestic political impediments to
assessing objectively the factors involved in the problem and then acting
as judgment may dictate. Inevitably there is a hesitation to come to
grips with the basic issues and a kind of hope that “solutions” will
suggest themselves. Fact-finding and exploratory missions count only as
stepping stones to more persistent attacks on the basic differences
between states. Unless this is attempted in the face of all handicaps,
internal and external, the United States could eventually have to make
a choice in order to save for NATO at least one of the contending
parties. Clearly this would be a last resort.

The dilemmas the United States faces in the Middle East are in some
ways frighteningly similar. Here, too, American policy, though at times
with a certain diplomatic brilliance, seemed for a time confined to
backing and filling. Knowing that it could not hope to satisfy both
parties, American diplomacy tended to concentrate on day-to-day
problems and to shrink from efforts to achieve a definitive settlement.
Though there was criticism of the outward nonchalance in President
Carter’s early pronouncements on the Middle East, he went farther in a
few weeks than his predecessors did in 4 years in defining some of the
essentials of a reasonable convenant. History may yet judge that,
whatever the eventual result, it was this American readiness to address
fundamental aspects of the Middle East problems which provided the
basis for the dialogue which opened late in 1977 between Israel and
Egypt.

However weighty the stakes in the continued full adherence of
Greece and Turkey to NATO, they fade in comparison to those facing
the Alliance in the Middle East. Another crisis there in which the
United States and its Allies were much at loggerheads could imperil
NATO’s existence. A favorable portent may be that all parties have
undergone chastening experiences. Many Europeans appreciate that
they showed little more teamwork among themselves in 1973 than was
evident on the Atlantic plane. As a result, they may be more inclined to
follow an American lead if it seems at all to conform to the common
interest. They look for assurance that this consideration will prevail
over internal American pressures. The form taken by US energy policy
may be seen as in indicator of American readiness to regard the
problem broadly from the standpoint of the West.
Latin Europe presents a congeries of problems that, in one way or another, are linked to the health of democratic institutions in the Western world. Both in looking at current situations and to the future, most light may be gained by looking at these issues from the viewpoint of Moscow. Central to the picture is the rapid advance into the limelight of Eurocommunism in Europe’s Latin nations: France, Italy, and prospectively, Spain and Portugal. Few would doubt that for the Kremlin this is a somewhat mixed blessing. It cannot but gloat over the instabilities and distempers which plague the West and foster there a gnawing sense of insecurity. Almost equally, it must be disturbed by the spread of divergencies in the Communist movements that endanger their solidarity and the primacy of the USSR among Socialist societies everywhere. The experience with the great Peking and Yugoslav heresies are enough to give Moscow pause.

On balance, it is difficult to believe that the USSR, however much it dislikes some of the concomitants, does not count itself hugely the gainer. There are tempting prospects for the disruption of NATO to the point that it might be rolled back to its northern tier. Up to now, revisionism has not reached a stage where Communist parties are ready to repudiate basic doctrines per se. In effect, these have only been declared temporarily inoperative for tactical reasons. It would be like renouncing their birthright if they were really prepared to relax contentedly on the doorsteps to total power. It must still be assumed that the predominant impulse will be to keep up the climb toward fixed goals, utilizing every foothold that becomes available on the way.

This is not to ignore that there are factors which cannot fail to exercise moderating influences. The responsibilities and satisfactions of governing have often enough had a politically enervating effect on radical movements. An already somewhat mellowed fanaticism is likely to undergo further erosion. The need of holding on to and expanding a following, much of which is predicated on continued gestures of moderation and observance of democratic routines, dictates caution.

There are also “safeguards” which democratic parties can work out and perhaps even build-in against any coalition government drifting toward Communist takeover. Portfolios of power-sensitive departments, such as foreign affairs, defense, or interior (police), can be withheld from Communist Party representatives. Special legislation and political pacts can provide barriers to restrain activities about which there is apprehension. Such cautions should obviously be observed with great care if, in one country or another, there is no visible alternative to
constituting a coalition government. It should not be forgotten, however, that not a single one of them gives assurance of being effective. Consequently, all available means that are not likely to be counterproductive should be employed to forestall coalition regimes. A second criterion should be that this is not driven to a point where, in the event of failure to avert such a regime, these measures have been carried so far as to make “normal” communication with the new government impossible.

A further point: there are reasons to put off to the last possible moment the conclusion that a coalition government is unavoidable. The political pendulum swings strangely and sometimes crazily. The prevailing drift toward popular front political combinations, for example, may at some point exhaust itself, either broadly in Europe or in particular countries. Also, such matters as the death of a leader, a partial or definitive break between Communists and Socialists, or an economic upturn can reverse an apparently fixed course of affairs.

In the event of some such last minute reprieve, other troublesome complications may eventuate. In a country like Italy, the Communist Party, which has been cautiously feeling its way toward power, has frequently cooperated constructively with the Christian Democrats in legislative and economic matters. If it feels “cheated” of power, it could reverse gears, plunge the country into political and economic chaos, and conceivably strike for power. To deal with such a crisis, it would behoove the United States to make plain that it feels morally committed to the internal as well as the external security of the nations of the Alliance. The pronouncement should make clear that violence and other unconstitutional means of subverting a legitimate government would not be tolerated. If this could be made a joint act of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or of as many of its members as were prepared to go along, it would obviously be advantageous.

In looking at future dealings with Eurocommunism, the most vital point in determining policy and the cost of implementing it is that, in a country in which it is heavily represented in a coalition regime, the chance of continuing in the NATO framework is minimal. In the short-range, it is possible to make adjustments and coast along for a time. Also, the Communists in such a government are likely to be on their good behavior and avoid pressing too eagerly for a change in commitments to “Europe and the West.” For the longer pull, especially if Communist influence in a coalition continues to grow, it seems all but certain that the country must be written off for the time being as a NATO member.
A word needs to be said about Spain before leaving this review of matters affecting the southern tier. Admission of this country to NATO would appear to be a solid plus all around. Yet it would be a disservice to both Spain and the Alliance if the destabilizing trend in that country were driven so far that its internal situation would soon resemble that now faced in Italy.

*Issues of Neutrality, Neutralism, or Neutralization.* Looking northward and eastward, the lineup of established neutral states is virtually certain to remain intact. Only drastic changes in the world picture are likely to change this. It would be hard to discover reasons for Sweden and Switzerland to become involved in NATO, or for the United States to wish them to do so. Austria would regain freedom of action only if Soviet power faded beyond the eastern horizon, in which case an Atlantic Alliance would lose meaning in terms of defense.

By incorporation in the European Economic Community, Eire has moved closer to the Western security system. If the problem of Northern Ireland were settled satisfactorily, there would be no psychological impediment against joining. Yet, at this late date, there would also be small motivation for doing so. As for broader Western preferences, it requires no more than a modest stretch of the imagination to see Eire’s status becoming a lively issue if naval developments in the Atlantic continue on their present course. With the Soviets extending their naval defense perimeter to the Faroes and possibly to Iceland, this could occur sooner than expected.

The alignment of the states in NATO’s northern tier has varied in firmness only slightly over the years. There is little likelihood of it softening in the future, given no developments to loosen the bonds of the Alliance as a whole. Three states, in somewhat different ways, at present carry less than their originally established military share. Britain’s economic distresses have forced it to reduce its military presence everywhere except in the critical NATO sector on the continent. There is no more “fat” to be sliced away; yet the pressures continue to mount. The Netherlands have permitted some deterioration of their forces, which reduces the value of their contribution. Denmark is one country whose solidarity with the Western security system has at times appeared less positively influenced by fear of a Soviet threat or the advisability of dealing with it militarily than by the restraints it applies to Germany.

Norway, as the latest polls again show, is one of the brighter spots in the Alliance picture. This affords some contrast to 10 years ago, when
there were acrimonious debates on how the country got into NATO in the first place. The metamorphosis of the Soviet’s Kola Peninsula into one of the world’s most bristling armed camps, an uneasy feeling about future troubles with Moscow over Spitzbergen, and growing awareness of the security hazards of a country that has suddenly fallen into a good thing in the way of oil in a world of energy stresses—these combine to make the NATO umbrella more attractive. As long as confidence in the strength of the Alliance stands at a level of some assurance, the wholehearted adherence of Norway makes sense.

There is no significant neutralist trend in the current scene in northern Europe, and proposals for neutralizing specific areas promise to receive short diplomatic shift. This contrasts with a few years ago, when acute fears of a massive American withdrawal dovetailed with detente euphoria and Soviet blandishments about the prospects for CESC and of drastic reductions in the forces confronting one another in central Europe. The reduction of both hopes and anxieties has resulted in a more realistic assessment of the outlook for the future.

Such more sober appraisals should be joined with appreciation of how much rebuilding is needed in the years ahead if the Atlantic Alliance is to be made less vulnerable to such tensions as plagued it in the late sixties and early seventies. Fundamental apprehensions that have revived time after time can be laid to rest if understanding can be reached on a few particularly difficult issues. Heading the list of these is the recurring crisis of confidence in an unfailing American presence. Except in the unlikely event of a truly reassuring agreement on mutual and thoroughly balanced force reductions in central Europe, in nothing less than its existing form, it is important to fix the US presence for whatever time it is needed. With the tacit concurrence of the Congress, the present Administration has gone farther on reaffirming American commitments than has been the case since the mid-sixties. Both President Carter and Vice President Mondale have made ringing pronouncements at Brussels. For the first time in many years, American forces in central Europe have actually been increased. Mondale pledged that there would be no unilateral withdrawals in the future, one of the most far-reaching official statements during the third of a century of American presence. Further undergirding of this line of policy is the best guarantee against the revival of neutralist trends and of vulnerability to neutralization proposals. It is well to recall that the Rapacki Plan found its widest audience in the late fifties when the level of American ground forces in Europe and elsewhere had sunk to a very low point.
Much, also, will depend on progress that can be made to find more appropriate places for France and Germany in the NATO scheme of things.

France and Germany in the Future of Western Defense. Since the departure from power of Charles deGaulle, NATO adherents everywhere have looked longingly for signs that France was considering retracing at least some of the steps that had carried it out of the organization. Under President Giscard d’Estaing there at last surfaced some indications of such an impulse. Most significant to close observers have been little noted but fundamental changes in French strategic doctrine. These do not yet portend a return full circle to what prevailed before the declaration with much fanfare in the mid-sixties of a “defense in all directions,” which seemed to set no higher priority on a defensive posture opposed to the Soviet Union than to any other power. The new watchword was pronounced by General Guy Mery in a remarkable speech of March 15, 1976. Present emphasis is once more on a major deployment in Germany, a conception which appears to move French planning and preparations a large step closer to conceivable reintegration in the NATO defense structure.

Unfortunately, this brighter side of things military is more than outweighed by political trends which darken the outlook. There is much to support the guess that Giscard would have moved faster and farther if he had not been intimidated by the predominant Gaullist component of his supporting parliamentary coalition. Previous to the election of March 1978, this grouping seemed to be gaining political weight as against Giscard’s own party. A similar negative influence was represented by what, for a period, appeared to be the onrushing fortunes of the Left, with the Communist Party playing the more driving role. As bitter opponents to closer ties with NATO they outrank the Gaullists. The more long-range results of the election must reveal themselves before one can gauge with any confidence its influence, if any, on Giscard’s political inhibitions concerning steps which bear any stamp of closer association with the Western Alliance.

The problems raised by the proportional increase of the FRG’s military contribution to NATO are among those with which the Alliance long felt it difficult to deal. They are so complex and have so many facets and side issues that, for the time being, nothing much can be done about them. Nor are the Germans as yet greatly exercised regarding the growing contrast between their performance and recognition. Least of all have they wished anything to be done for them.
which would appear to diminish the stature of other members, notably the British. Thus there was no indication of a wish to have a German replace the British deputy to the Supreme Commander. What some of them would most have appreciated would have been the naming of one of them as Chief of Staff, a post of less prestige but considerable substance. The appointment would have honored their staff tradition without doing too much to build up their image in the NATO command, a development they are wise enough to shun. The creation of a second deputy command to be occupied by a German was an expedient that should accomplish much the same result.

The Atlantic Alliance and “Europe.” The role of France and Germany in Western defense, whether through the absence of the one or the overwhelming presence of the other, has been crucial in many of the affairs of the Alliance. They will loom even more in the foreground if, at some future date, they are called upon to be the kingpins in a European defense system. Such a development alone could save Europe from Finlandization if it ever came to a drastic diminution of the American presence. It is also the sole way in which the European component of NATO can approximate something like its military potential in Western defense. It has been estimated that the military weight of Western Europe can be multiplied by a factor of five by following this road and without increasing the investment it now makes for defense purposes. If there were no other reason, waste on so vast a scale of Western resources should be enough to prevail on the United States to continue its policy of promoting European union with all the means and influence at its disposal.
ENDNOTES

1. The writer's experience with hundreds of European audiences, including such in France both before and after deGaulle took the country out of NATO, strongly affirms this conclusion.
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ALIGNMENT AND NEUTRALITY: EUROPE'S FUTURE

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Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

5 May 1978

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NATO; Atlantic Alliance; European neutrals, neutralism; neutralization; Eurocommunism; southern tier of NATO; Greek-Turkish quarrel; France and NATO; Germany in NATO; NATO and "Europe."

Neutrality, neutralism, neutralization, and alignment have taken various forms in Europe since World War II. Finland and Austria are neutrals of necessity, Sweden, Switzerland, and Eire by choice. Yugoslavia occupies a unique position between the blocs. Spain is linked separately with the United States. Neutralist trends have at times manifested themselves within NATO itself. There has also been talk about but little disposition to building a purely European defense system. Most immediately actual among Western problems are Spain's future relationship to NATO, the prospect of coalition governments...
including Communists, and the weakening of ties with Greece and Turkey. Tito's departure could thrust the Yugoslav problem onto the center of the international stage. The role of Germany within the Alliance has grown in importance during the last decade, notably since 1973. It may yet force a number of adjustments in the Western defense structure.
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