Study on the Apprehension of Military Deserter's Durind Peace II

by

Gary R. Greenfield

by

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U.S. ARMY ADMINISTRATION CENTER

HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISATION

Combat Developments Directorate

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STUDY ON THE APPREHENSION OF MILITARY DESERTERS DURING PEACETIME IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

FINAL REPORT

DECEMBER, 1977

(PHASE I)

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**ABSTRACT** (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

A requirement existed to examine current Army policy on handling of deserters during peacetime in an all-volunteer force. USA ADMINCEN, under the sponsorship of HQDA, ODCSPER, studied current policy and alternative methods of handling deserters. Based on study results no change was made in policy on apprehension of deserters. Recommendation made to examine the sample of military personnel displaying characteristics associated with deserters—but who have not deserted, to establish validity of deserter predictors, to determine
whether they would be useful in a preventative sense. Study is being forwarded to Congress to justify current policy in opposition to GAO recommendation to discharge military deserters in absentia.
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STUDY ON THE APPREHENSION OF MILITARY DESERTERS DURING PEACETIME IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION. This study was prompted by a Government Accounting Office (GAO) Report, "Millions Being Spent to Apprehend Deserters Most of Whom are Discharged as Unqualified for Retention." In that report, the GAO recommended that the Army: (a) stop "apprehension of deserters except when the individual is wanted...for another crime or security matter and discharge them in absentia after they have been absent for a stipulated period"; or (2) not routinely undertake aggressive apprehension efforts until an individual has been gone long enough to indicate that a voluntary return is improbable." The intent of the study was to: (a) determine true desertion rates and true costs of desertion to the Army; (b) determine whether apprehension of deserters under current Army policy is a deterrent for an identifiable population of potential deserters; (c) determine the feasibility and applicability of differing methods of disposition of absentee cases based upon varying degrees of U.S. military involvement in international affairs and civil disturbances; (d) determine whether in absentia discharges are feasible; and (e) make recommendations on current Army policy on discharges in absentia and effects of changes in policy on desertion as suggested by GAO. In conducting this study, the authors reviewed detailed cost figures supplied by HQDA, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, Enlisted Records Center, Personnel Control Facilities (PCF), and the U.S. Army Retraining Brigade. Desertion rates were based upon Enlisted Master File data. Further, a longitudinal survey of trainee (BCT) attitudes and perceptions of AWOL and desertion and changes to present policy was conducted to determine the potential magnitude of desertion under in absentia discharge situations. Various recommended alternatives, proposed by Army agencies, were examined as well as those suggested by the GAO. Finally, legal precedent and literature was reviewed and analyzed to assess the legal consequences of establishing in absentia discharges that could constitute adverse separations from service.

2. STUDY FINDINGS. The following general findings were obtained from conducting this study:

a. The desertion rates are at present the lowest since the end of the Viet Nam conflict. There were 9,862 desertions during FY 77 and of that total there were 9,172 actual deserters. This represents an average 13 deserters per thousand enlisted force and is down from 17.7
Findings from the survey research section of this study indicate that in this sample there exists a potential pool of deserters—i.e., with characteristics like those of actual deserters. Under in absentia discharge conditions, desertions would increase to approximately 18 thousand per year, or about equal to desertions during the period immediately following Viet Nam. Most soldiers surveyed in Basic Training indicated that the present policy provides a vague but measurable deterrent to desertion. They also indicated that desertions are most frequently stimulated by family and financial crises, situations where Army helping services could alleviate part of the potential problems. In conducting the survey at BCT installations, however, there was an observable lack of links between training units and installation helping services. This was mainly due to the tight training schedules and lack of knowledge by the training cadres of installation human services support activities. It was also found that profile deserters, not actual deserters, would require vigorous apprehension efforts to invoke their return to military control. Thus either the in absentia efforts would have to be instituted or the present system would have to be maintained. Since the cost of in absentia discharges would exceed present costs and since there would be no remaining deterrent effect by changing present policy to in absentia, the survey data suggest that the GAO proposal is impractical as well.

c. After reviewing literature on desertion policy and examining policy made by other English-speaking armies, the authors concluded that it is impossible to distinguish among the variety of war and peace situations and emergencies which could arise. It was found that such distinctions are confusing and possibly legally unsupportable.

d. In Absentia discharges were determined to be feasible, but too costly to the Army in dollars, manpower losses and potential deterioration of troop morale.
e. After an examination of several alternative methods of disposition of deserters, the authors concluded that if the PCFs are disbanded, then either the Army should increase the retraining role of the Retraining Brigade, with accessions to it by courts martial or by accessions under administrative orders for nonconfined retraining status. Other alternative recommendations examined do not show clearly that retraining will be successful. The resistance of unit commanders and senior non-commissioned officers to deserters would probably make ineffective these alternatives, which return deserters to original units. Finally, research in military sociology suggests that destroying group bonds formed during BCT and AIT can contribute to desertions during training and during first tour of duty.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. The GAO in absentia recommendation is impractical, costs more and could severely aggravate desertion rates and adversely effect troop morale.

b. There is a steady accession of new recruits with personal and financial problems. This should be recognized as a constant in recruitments. It means that additional study should be made on improving the manpower conservation aspects of recruit development and on improving the accessibility of installation helping services. It is further recommended that additional studies be made on keeping training units in tact from BCT through first tour of duty. This could reinforce group bonds formed during training and possibly minimize desertions.

c. The present policy should not be altered to reflect different policies for war and peace. No clear distinctions can be made. Further, enlistment contracts should be re-examined to see whether reasons for separation from service should be stated clearly. For legal reasons, it also recommended that desertion should be re-examined for possible alternative words and phrases which are legally definable and which do not require excessive legal proof in criminal proceedings.

d. It is recommended that if the present PCF system is disbanded, then the retraining role of the U.S. Army Retraining Brigade be expanded to include all deserter personnel. In this regard, however, policy makers and legal experts will have to determine the best method of sending deserters to the USARB--either in confined status or
nonconfined status. To make certain that either of these options are not too costly, financial review by appropriate experts will have to be made to keep costs as low or lower than the present PCF system.

e. Finally, it is recommended that the longitudinal study conducted for the present project be continued and that the sample observed through BCT be followed into first tour of duty. This will help refine conclusions of this study and assist the Army in improving methods of conserving manpower and diminishing losses of personnel.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Section 1 - Background

1-1. PROBLEM STATEMENT.

a. The GAO Final Report, 31 Jan 77, "Millions Being Spent to Apprehend Deserters Most of Whom are Discharged as Unqualified for Retention," stated that current Army policies and procedures for deterring, apprehending and reintegrating deserters were not cost effective. Finding no empirical evidence that soldiers who do not desert are deterred by existing policies or by fear of criminal prosecution, the GAO recommended that the military could: (1) stop "apprehension of deserters except when the individual is wanted ... for another crime or security matter and discharge them in absentia after they have been absent for a stipulated period"; or (2) "not routinely undertake aggressive apprehension efforts until an individual has been gone long enough to indicate that voluntary return is improbable." The kind of discharge recommended in these situations was an in absentia discharge that was less than honorable.

b. Following this report, Headquarters, Department of the Army tasked CDR, ADMINCEN to provide a study of problems posed by the GAO report. Broadly stated, the problem is as follows:

(1) Determine whether current Army policies on apprehension of deserters are cost effective and a deterrent to desertion in an all-volunteer force during peacetime.

(2) Ascertain and recommend changes to current policy, if necessary, which would reduce costs, provide an effective deterrent to desertion and a better method of apprehending, retraining or making disposition of deserters.

1-2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE. To respond to the problems raised by GAO, the ODCSPER AD HOC Study Group agreed upon the following tasks or goals of this study:

a. Determine the magnitude of the Army's desertion problem.

b. Determine whether apprehension of deserters under current Army policy is a deterrent to desertion for an identifiable population of potential deserters.
c. Determine the feasibility and applicability of differing methods of disposition of absentee cases based upon the varying degrees of U.S. military involvement in international affairs and civil disturbances.

d. Determine whether administrative discharges in absentia are feasible.

e. Provide recommendations on current Army policy on discharges in absentia and effects of changes in policy on desertion as suggested by GAO.

Section II - Review of Literature

1-3. GENERAL. To obtain an understanding of the impact of current Army policies, the authors reviewed current and superseded Army and Department of Defense policies and regulations on desertion and separations from service. Secondly, the authors reviewed existing military and civilian literature, focusing on materials in the Twentieth Century, in order to obtain information on the following topics: (a) demographic characteristics of deserters; (b) biomedical and psychosocial aspects of desertion; (c) availability and effectiveness of human services, retraining efforts and chain-of-command effectiveness; and (d) deterrent effects of existing policies and the formal military organization. At present, there is a small body of literature dealing with desertion during peacetime; most of the information was developed with Viet Nam era deserters or with subjects during the Second World War and the Korean War. There are many military papers dealing with desertion; however, few of these are empirical studies, and the remainder are either speculative or polemical.

1-4. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DESERTERS.

a. Who Is Most Likely to Desert? The Army Research Institute (Bell and Houston, 1976; Bell and Bell, 1977) found personnel most likely to desert were: high school drop-outs; whites; personnel with lower mental ability (below mean scores on AFQT); personnel who are 17 or 18; volunteers; men in their first tour of duty; men in transit from one assignment to another; men at the end of Basic Combat Training (BCT) or Advanced Individual Training (AIT); men from the South; men in confinement (or under criminal or disciplinary charges); men classified as duty soldiers; men in lower skilled MOS; and men with previous disciplinary or criminal offenses. There is little literature to suggest that women present a problem as deserters or potential
deserters; however, this may change with increasing enlistments of
women into the Army. Air Force studies on personnel most likely to
encounter disciplinary problems (not limited to AWOL and desertions)
state that personnel most likely to have problems are those in first
or original tour of duty; less than four years of service; most
heavily concentrated in grades E1 to E3; and age 19 or less (See
Beusse, 1977). Navy research (Bradshaw, 1975) for deserters during
the period 1963-73 found demographic characteristics similar to those
in the Army and Air Force studies. A recent Washington Post article
(27 Oct 77) stated that Navy desertions during peacetime have risen to
31.7 personnel per 1,000 and that most of these desertions occur
during first-term enlistment and especially during or immediately
after sea duty. The article quoted the Navy as saying that personnel
most likely to desert also were ages 17 or 18 who had scored lower
than most naval enlisted personnel on AFQT tests.

b. When is Desertion Highest, and Where do Desertions Most
Frequently Occur? Desertions increase during war, decrease during
peacetime, and in either case most desertions occur within the
continental United States. This observation is fairly well supported
in the literature from 1945 to the present. (See Hartnagel, 1974;
Shils, 1977; Bell and Houston, 1976; Bell and Bell, 1977.)

1-5. BIOMEDICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF DESERTION.

a. Why Do Personnel Desert? The most frequent reasons given
for desertion are personal, family and financial (Bell and Houston,
1976; Hartnagel, 1974; Bradshaw, 1975). Failure to adjust to military
life is also given as a reason for desertion. In studies of Viet Nam
era deserters, researchers did not find that opposition to the war or
taxi the military's ethics or morality were major reasons for desertion.
In examining Bell's recent work, Shils (1977) stated that the primary
reasons for desertion were consistent and comparable among deserters
from the Second World War through Viet Nam. Other researchers suggest
that organizational issues and the destruction of primary group bonds
formed during initial training are perhaps more important reasons for
desertion. Littlepage and Rappoport (1977) argue that organizational
and troop environment factors combine to produce individual deser-
tions. There is also a large body of research, dating from 1945, sug-
gest that the disintegration of primary groups formed during BCT
and AIT and which are later destroyed, by sending individual soldiers
to a variety of assignments, are part of the reason for the high fre-
quency of desertions during first term - first tour of duty. (See
George, 1971; Janowitz, 1964; Homans, 1946; Shils and Janowitz, 1948;
Stouffer, 1949.)
b. Desertions as Maladjustment or Social Deviance. Various studies have focused on deviance, delinquency and maladjustment of deserters. Hartnagel (1974) examined the phenomenon of desertion as deviant behavior, defined by Merton and others. Hartnagel found little evidence to suggest that deserters were rebelling--one of Merton's deviance categories. Instead, Hartnagel found evidence of innovative deviance: That is, individuals were using illegitimate means to either solve their problems (family or financial) or to get out of the Army. This finding is indirectly supported in Bell and Houston's research and in the Medical After Action Report from the Presidential Clemency Processing Program. (See Hillenbrand and Peacock, 1975.) Drucker and Schwartz (1973) found that AWOL soldiers differed from non-AWOL soldiers in personality, education, intelligence, aptitude and military component. Since the Second World War, researchers have also found evidence of maladjustment, variably defined in results of psychometric tests as neuroses, psychopathy, hysteria and hypochondriasis. (See Feldman and Maleski, 1948; Fodor, 1947; Montgomery and Stephens, 1972; Russell, et al., 1971.)

c. Labelling Effects and Desertion. There is also an intriguing set of findings and questions about the phenomenon of "labelling effect." That is, if Major Jones tells Captain Smith that half his company are "misfits" and that the other half are good soldiers (even though the good are the real misfits), the identified "misfit" group will encounter more frequent disciplinary actions. The "good soldier" group will encounter less disciplinary actions. (see also Bell, et al., 1973; Bell, et al., 1974.) Hartnagel states the labelling effect problem as follows:

These findings suggest that the family problem-solver may define his initial AWOL as a one time only occurrence to deal with some felt need or perceived problem toward which the Army is insensitive. However, when this soldier returns to military control and experiences the negative reactions of the Army... he may decide that he doesn't really want to stay in the Army after all. The official reaction to an initial AWOL which was motivated by extra-military concerns may set in motion the "self-fulfilling prophecy" mechanism. (Hartnagel, 1974, p. 217)
1-6. EFFECTIVENESS OF HUMAN SERVICES AND RETRAINING.

a. Although not conclusively, several writers suggest that availability and visibility of human services are not a deterrent to desertion and do not provide the potential deserter an effective way to solve problems. The issue is far more complex; indeed, these writers are talking about human services activities and retraining efforts as they exist, not as they could exist and function. Further, there are differences among researchers as to the placement of blame for the soldier's inability to use human services activities or to respond successfully to retraining. In studies of Correctional Training Facilities (CTF), Littlepage and Fox (1972) found that deserters believed they could only solve their problems outside the service. In cases where the Army might provide help, but the help wasn't sought, McCubbin et al., 1971, Blackman et al., 1966 and Bell and Houston, 1976 found that deserters had sought help outside the chain of command, but that lack of involvement by chain of command had been a primary reason for short-circuited helping services. Thus there is the problem of deciding whether to improve human services activities, to improve the chain of command awareness of helping services or to improve both.

b. CTF studies of rehabilitative effectiveness are, at best, misleading when discussing how many apprehended soldiers can be re-integrated into the Army. A 1970 CTF study showed 63.4% of graduates serving honorably or discharged honorably. A second CTF study (CTF, 1970a) showed the figure 56.7% successful graduates. A 1971 CTF follow-up study, however, revealed that 37% of apprehended AWOL/deserters had been successfully restored to duty or discharged honorably. In their review of these studies, Bell (1976) found no satisfactory explanation for the variability in the percentages (e.g., was the variability in the percentages due to something being wrong with the CTF program? With the deserter populations at different times? With the aggregation of success categories at different times, dropping out one or more categories at other times?)

c. Hartnagel (1974) provides another dimension to the problem of rehabilitation or assistance through visible human services programs. He suggests that most likely deserters are characterized by previous histories in high turnover jobs (prior to military service) and by variable or poor work habits. Hartnagel goes on to say that some AWOL soldiers may already be accustomed to moving from job to job, and that frequent absenteeism from military duty is already
acceptable behavior to this group. Further, he argues that these personnel may have never trusted any institution to assist them in solving problems.

1-7. DETERRENT EFFECTS

a. The recent literature provides little evidence of deterrent effects of Army AWOL policy and apprehension procedures. Hartnagel's sample of AWOL soldiers, on the average, said that neither a dishonorable discharge nor criminal record would have much effect on their future civilian lives. Bell (1976) stated that most first time deserters do not feel compelled by either policy or criminal penalty consequences to remain in service and solve their problems. Bradshaw (1975) supports this argument in his study of Navy deserters. Recently, a short survey of first tour personnel at Ft Riley by US Army Retraining Brigade personnel indicated that about 10% of surveyed personnel said that less than honorable discharges would have little effect on their personal lives and that they would desert and accept an in absentia discharge that was less than honorable. (USARB, 1977) Except for the USARB study, none of the above studies deals with subjects who have not deserted. Specifically, no study has identified a population of soldiers with characteristics of deserters who are in fact deterred by present Army policies.

b. The literature also suggests that AWOL soldiers use Army policy and criminal penalties as a means, although illegitimate, to a desired end--to get out of the Army. Bell and Houston (1976) found that the myth of the "hunted federal fugitive" was not supported in their research. Many deserters being sought for criminal prosecution led "normal" lives, held good-salaried jobs and behaved, while in flight from prosecution, as good citizens.

1-8. SUMMARY. The above review of literature tells the reader much about the typical deserter: Where he comes from; why he deserts; why he doesn't feel deterred by criminal charges. The literature does not tell the reader precisely whether the current practices of apprehension and current policy on desertion are cost effective. Further, one does not know the consequences of making in absentia discharges or of waiting a stipulated time to invoke apprehension for criminal prosecution. Would the in absentia discharge make desertion more attractive to a larger number of soldiers? These unanswered questions, indeed many raised by the GAO report as well, are the subject of this paper.
Section III - METHODOLOGY

1-9. DETERMINING CURRENT DESERTION RATES AND TRUE COSTS.

a. Any desertion rate is subject to question as are most rates typically used in the social sciences. For example, one can "rate" deserters or desertions and derive different figures due to the problem of repeat offenders. Many other problems are equally involved in the question of deserter rate accuracy (Bell and Bell, 1977). With the above problems in mind, and a healthy skepticism, the existing data on desertion were reviewed.

b. The main source of data was the Enlisted Records Center (EREC) at Ft Benjamin Harrison, IN. In reviewing these data, the authors examined the incidence of desertions, number of deserters, their grade at time of desertion, the military post from which they deserted and the length of time of individual desertions.

c. Costs were equally frustrating to compute as true costs tend to be elusive. Depending upon the perspective of the organization or office citing the figures, the costs can appear different. This study began with the GAO Report figures. The authors reviewed the report's cost figures and sought consultation on their accuracy from several sources: from the office of the Comptroller of the Army, DACA - CAF; from HQ FORSCOM, APFR - LEO; and from HQDA, DAPA-HRL and DAPE-HRE. This examination thus questioned the cost figures supplied by GAO in light of expert recommendations from the following viewpoints: (1) Do the GAO figures reflect the true picture? If they do not, then what readjustments to costs need to be made? (2) If the GAO figures, once adjusted, exceed the Army's current operating costs for AWOL/desertion command and control or its minimum recommended operating costs, then the GAO figures must be rejected as less cost effective.

1-10. THE AWOL AND DETERRENT EFFECTS PERCEPTION STUDY.

a. Consistent with the requirements of the second tasking (Determine whether apprehension of deserters under current policy is a deterrent to desertion for an identifiable population of potential deserters.), the research design described below was initiated. Our population was defined as all troops in Basic Combat Training (On an average, there are approximately 32,000 trainees at a given point in time throughout the TRADOC system.) Five BCT sites (Forts Dix, Jackson, Sill, McClellan and Leonard Wood) were chosen as data collection centers on the basis of geographical stratification and some variation in the kind of training and assignment the troops would
eventually have (e.g., infantry, engineers, military police, etc.). While it is recognized that this was not entirely a randomized selection process, it was felt that it offered an adequate mix of the current BCT population.

b. Our sample included approximately 1000 trainees (933 were actually obtained). At each site, one company of trainees in their first week at the BCT site was randomly selected for inclusion in the study. Additionally, control subjects were also selected at Forts Sill, McClellan and Leonard Wood. In Fig. 1-1 the population and sample are diagrammed:

**FIGURE 1-1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>EXPLANATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>(all BCT trainees in first week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample sites</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(Forts Dix, Jackson, Sill, McClellan and Leonard Wood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>(200 per site)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample obtained</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>(93%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. A longitudinal study with post test-only control groups was utilized. This design incorporated a short longitudinal study to measure not only the perceptions and knowledge base concerning AWOL and desertion, but also possible changes in perceptions over time. Thus all subjects were measured at two points in time (at the beginning of BCT--T1--and at the end--T2). Additionally, to control for the possible effects of experimenter and test bias, three control groups (N=400) were administered the survey at T2 only. These data were then compared to those of the original sample (at T2 only) for any possible differences. Any significant differences might indicate biases which could limit the generalizability of the study.
d. Two parallel survey forms were developed using current acceptable techniques as described in the psychological and sociological literature (See Goode and Hatt, 1952; Oppenheim, 1966; Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Payne, 1951; Festinger and Katz, 1966; and Sellitz, et al., 1962.). Consideration was given to question sequencing, wording, length, threat potential, confidentiality, and validity (face, content, and construct). Survey questions were designed to tap the trainees' knowledge base (e.g., content of the policy, procedures and consequences of AWOL and desertion), and his beliefs and perceptions concerning deterrence and effects of current policy and in absentia changes to the policy.

e. In developing the surveys, pilot testing was conducted at Fort Knox, KY with approximately 400 trainees in BCT. This data analysis was used to reject non-workable questions, determine construct validity of the surveys, compare the parallel forms and to test strength of responses based on a survey written in the first person ("I would....") or third person impersonal ("A soldier would....").

f. A note on the generalizability of the sample: It is felt that these data results can be generalized to at least the approximate 4,600 who began BCT in the second week of August, 1977. These findings are probably appropriately generalized to all BCT groups (about 32,000) but because of possible biasing factors such as: (1) a higher percentage of black soldiers, and (2) a higher percentage of high school graduates than normally expected, care should be exercised in any interpretation. The higher percentage of high school graduates was anticipated due to the season in which the data was collected. Nothing, however, could be done to rectify this situation because of time constraints under which the study was conducted. The higher percentage of blacks in the sample is viewed as a product of chance and, hopefully, did not bias these findings.

1-11. DETERMINING DIFFERING METHODS OF DISPOSITION OF DESERTERS UNDER A VARIETY OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN WAR AND PEACE.

a. The sources of information for this determination and subsequent recommendations were:

(1) U. S. Army Retraining Brigade, Ft Riley, KS.

(2) MILPERCENT data and recommendations on Personnel Control Facilities (PCF).
(3) Survey data in this study.
(4) Findings from an extensive review of literature.

b. In making this determination, the authors proposed the following options for discussion and analysis:

(1) Maintain the present system.
(2) Return deserters to original unit, then some to USARB.
(3) Return deserters to replacement detachments.
(4) Establish a central PCF.
(5) Send deserters to nonconfined retraining at USARB.
(6) Accept the GAO in absentia recommendation.

These options were critically examined and considered by presenting the various assumptions, advantages and disadvantages of each system.

1-12. DETERMINING THE FEASIBILITY OF IN ABSENTIA DISCHARGES.

a. In deriving recommendations on this politically sensitive question, the authors reviewed modern US military history on in absentia discharges. Also, information was obtained from other English-speaking Armies--British, Canadian and Australian--to learn whether similar problems had arisen and, if so, what resulting policy formulations had been made. Consultation was also obtained from the resources of the Judge Advocate General, specifically from the criminal law and administrative law experts. The authors also examined leading case law and papers concerning due process, in absentia versus in personam adverse personnel separations, legal problems with the definition of desertion and the definitions of war, peace and emergency situations. Of secondary interest was the contract nature of enlistments.

b. In this section, the authors also related survey findings to the feasibility of in absentia discharges--first by identifying a pool of personnel with characteristics similar to typical deserters. Next, a per cent estimate was made, giving the estimated number of
personnel within this pool who would desert under in absentia discharge situations. Finally, this estimated number was multiplied by individual dollar losses in recruitment and training and by total manpower figures, yielding a total estimated loss for an in absentia discharge policy.
CHAPTER 2

STUDY FINDINGS

Section I - Desertion Incidents FY 77

2-1. THE ARMY'S CURRENT DESERTION RATES.

a. In an unpublished paper, Bell and Bell (1977) argue for a better method of computing desertion rates. Concerning a new procedure for computing desertions, Bell and Bell state:

This assessment should deal with individual deserters both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of those serving during the period. It should also reflect outcomes and costs. To divide the deserters by the number who served, and in some way take account of the length of absences, the apprehension and rehabilitation costs, the service rendered by the deserters before and after their return.

With the above recommendations in mind, the authors reviewed desertion figures and cost data. In compiling desertions, the authors developed numbers of deserters for FY 77 by month. Figure 2-1 (page 2-2) presents these data.

b. For the entire FY there were 9862 desertions. This figure does not take into account multiple offenders, persons going AWOL more than once. Bell and Bell (1977) suggest that between 7% and 14% of a given number of desertions represent repeat offenders. To compute the estimated actual deserters, the authors chose the lower limit (7%) of the Bell figures and subtracted that number from total desertions. The resulting estimated deserters is determined by subtracting (.07) of the total number of desertions from the total. (See Figure 2-2 below.)

FIGURE 2-2

ESTIMATED DESERTERS FY 77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Desertions</th>
<th>(minus)</th>
<th>(.07)(Total)</th>
<th>= Total Deserters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9862</td>
<td>690</td>
<td></td>
<td>9172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2-1 MIL DESERTER
## FIGURE 2-1
DESECTIONS DURING FISCAL YEAR 77
Source: ODCSPER 46*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NUMBER OF DESERTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCT 76</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOV 76</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC 76</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 77</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB 77</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR 77</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR 77</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 77</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 77</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 77</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG 77</td>
<td>1166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP 77</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Desertions FY 77 9862

*Enlisted Master file
c. The desertion rate given in this section is an estimation, since actual strengths are classified. Figure 2-3 below presents percent desertions per 1000 enlisted force.*

**FIGURE 2-3**

DESERTION RATE PER 1000 ENLISTED PERSONNEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desertions</th>
<th>Total EM Strength X 1000 = Rate per 1000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9862</td>
<td>700,000 = (x)(1000) = 14 per 1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast, Figure 2-4 below recomputes this figure, calculating deserters per 1000 enlisted force.

**FIGURE 2-4**

DESERTERS PER 1000 ENLISTED PERSONNEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deserters</th>
<th>Total EM Strength X 1000 = Deserters per 1000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9172</td>
<td>7000,000 = (x)(1000) = 13 per 1000 per year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These rates are the lowest since the end of the Viet Nam war. A recent Washington Post article on desertions in the military quotes DOD figures for the Army during FY 76 as being 17.7 desertions per thousand enlisted force. It should be remembered, however, that these figures are based upon total enlisted strength and that this study's data and other studies show that most desertions occur within the lower enlisted grades (E-1 through E-5). Thus rates are not uniform across categories of rank. If that figure were computed in the equation, then there would be a higher desertion rate and deserters per 1000 E-1 through E-5 personnel.

*The 700,000 estimated figure was obtained by subtracting just over 10% of estimated total strength presented in John P. White, "The All Volunteer Force Reassessed," Commander's Digest, 20 (September 1, 1977), p. 4.
d. Length of desertions also provides some idea of how long the average deserter returns, either voluntarily or by apprehension. Two one-month records checks of returned deserter files in the Enlisted Records Center revealed that approximately 50% of deserters returned voluntarily and 50% were apprehended. Here, care must be taken in equating "apprehension" to actual procedures: in many cases, not the full set of military and civilian procedures were used--e.g., FBI, civil arrest, etc.--and "apprehension" meant return to military control by military authorities. Figure 2-5 below contains a summary of a random sampling of the record check data.

FIGURE 2-5
LENGTH OF DESERTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAMPLE</th>
<th>DAYS ABSENT (AVERAGE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 - 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month One</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprehended</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month Two</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprehended</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notifications or other apprehension efforts often begin at the 60-day point following an AWOL. This tends to push the voluntary return time out another 30 days past notification of family. It appears that timely notification of AWOLs could make a difference in shortening average time on AWOL. Various recommendations have been previously offered about the actual time to take aggressive apprehension efforts. The GAO, for example, recommended that the Army not begin such efforts until a "stipulated period." Some errors have been made previously in looking at the average date of most AWOL voluntary returns, usually at the 60-day point, and then concluding that notification efforts should begin at that point. The effect of doing this is to extend the voluntary return times out to 90 days. It is probably better to maintain a 30-day DFR policy and to make initial notifications to family and to police at that time.

2-2. WHO DESERTED? Generally, deserters during FY 77 fit the profile of the typical deserter found in the literature and studies for deserters during wartime. Using the total desertion figures for
FY 77, these data are given in Figure 2-6 (page 2-6)*. To summarize the previous deserter groups according to age, geographic region (home of record), rank, and ethnic background.

2-3. WHEN DID DESERTIONS OCCUR? Most first term of enlistment desertions for FY 77 occurred at three points: (a) during BCT (22%); (b) during AIT (27%); or (c) during first tour of duty (51%). An analysis of literature in military sociology dealing with primary groups provides some reasonable speculations about why desertions are highest at these points. Further, observations made during the conduct of research in this study shed additional light on the problem.

a. Research on military sociology presents the following argument on destruction of primary group bonds and its impact on desertion. First, most young men often have never experienced group support systems or found a common bond or felt pressures of groups. (Perhaps only briefly in clubs, scouting, sports, etc.) The BCT cycle subjects these men to intense indoctrination and group training experiences during seven to eight weeks of Basic Training. During this time primary group systems are formed. Most of the desertions in BCT occur within the first few weeks of training, before these primary group bonds can take effect. This finding was not systematically examined, but was readily apparent to the researchers after many hours of record checks. Then, unless the BCT cycle merges with an AIT cycle in one station unit training, these support systems are disestablished, sending individuals to various AIT locations. Again, most AIT desertions occur during the first weeks of training, where the situation and surroundings are initially unfamiliar and threatening and where primary group bonds have yet to take effect. At the end of AIT, these new group bonds are disestablished for a second time, and individuals are sent to their first tour of duty. Having had two primary systems of support dismantled in a short period of time, the young soldier may again opt for desertion during the first tour of duty. While this discussion is speculative, it could provide an interesting argument for either total one-station unit training, or for assignment of "deserter profile" personnel together from BCT through first tour of duty, or for assignment for first tour of duty of units intact from AIT. That these first tour desertions indicate group bond dysfunction is only speculative. It could be that merely the opportunity to desert stimulates the desertion.

*United States Deserter Information Point (USADIP) provided figures for this section.
FIGURE 2-6
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DESERTERS FY 77*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE (%)</th>
<th>RAW</th>
<th>GROUP (%)</th>
<th>RAW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Oriental</td>
<td>.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8416</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOME OF RECORD (%)</th>
<th>RAW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Central</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Terr.</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK (%)</th>
<th>RAW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-1</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*mental Categories were not available for examination. Less than 1% of deserters were women. Source: Enlisted Records Center. The total raw number--8416--differs from the official numbers presented in Figure 2-1 (page 2-2). This is due to recording differences.
b. Observations made during conduct of this study indicated that many training cadre personnel and unit commanders were in favor of one-station unit training. Also, strains on the recruit and on the cadre were evident at several sites. Some of the strains observed were: (1) shortened training cycle makes it impossible to deal with human problems and get training done simultaneously; (2) training cadre sees the same problems again and again, but never solves them because graduates move out in a short time; (3) long hours are spent in "cramming" a voluminous amount of training into seven to eight weeks in BCT; (4) training cadre has little knowledge of human services on the installation and does not know how to make referrals to these services once chain of command help has been sought; (5) few training schedules have allotted time for useful briefings about human services on the installation. Thus constraints of time, lack of knowledge about helping services and the inability to keep the young soldier in one place long enough to help him are all potential contributors to the desertion problem in BCT and AIT.

c. In discussions with PCF personnel, the authors found that reasons given for desertion are consistent during peacetime with reasons provided in previous studies of wartime deserters. Indeed survey data from this study indicate that respondents with characteristics similar to actual deserters stated compelling reasons for desertion were family and financial. Most PCF personnel interviewed said that deserters confined in PCFs gave similar reasons for desertion.

Section II - The AWOL and Deterrent Effect Perceptions Study

2-4. DATA RESULTS FOR TIME ONE (T1).

a. Before analyzing the data, the authors proposed two hypothetical groups, shown below in Figure 2-7:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP ONE (I)</th>
<th>GROUP TWO (II)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers who are:</td>
<td>Soldiers who are:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 17 or 18</td>
<td>All other possible combinations than those reflected in Group I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No High School Diploma</td>
<td>Mental Category IIIB or below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or GED</td>
<td>lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Category IIIB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income Level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>below $6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aim in establishing these two groups was to see whether they would make differing responses to key questions about reasons for deserting, about attempts to seek help through Army helping agencies and about conditions which could cause them to return voluntarily. In analyzing the Ft. Knox pilot data, the authors learned that two factors—age 17 or 18 versus 19 or older and Mental Category IIIB or below versus IIIA or higher accounted for over 70% of the variance in responses made by the two groups to key survey questions.

Having concluded the validation of the pilot tests, the authors conducted the Time One (T1) Survey at the five BCT sites previously mentioned. At each site, test conditions were approximately the same, and the surveyors assured that the test was given in the same manner at each site.

b. Description of the Time One (T1) Sample (N = 933).
FIGURE 2-8

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR TIME ONE SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. AGE</th>
<th>No. of Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21+</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. ETHNIC GROUP</th>
<th>No. of Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. RESIDENCE</th>
<th>No. of Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Territories</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D. MARITAL STATUS</th>
<th>No. of Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single, never married</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E. EDUCATION LEVEL</th>
<th>No. of Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No High School or GED</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Diploma or GED</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Work</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree (4 years)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree plus</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Figure 2-8 (Cont.)

#### F. ARREST HISTORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Been Arrested</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Arrested</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### G. INCOME LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>No. of Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $6,000</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6001 - $10000</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10001 - $15000</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15001 - $20000</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20001 or higher</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### H. WORK HISTORY: Most respondents indicated they had held jobs for ten months or longer. The authors consider this questionable.

#### I. MENTAL CATEGORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mental Category</th>
<th>No. of Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAT I</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT II</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT IIIA</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT IIIIB</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT IVA</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT IVB</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### J. All soldiers surveyed were males.
2-5. SUMMARY OF TIME ONE (T1) DATA ANALYSIS.

a. Questions concerning why a soldier would desert, his knowledge base on desertion and under what circumstances soldiers would return voluntarily following desertion provided significantly different responses between the two proposition (hypothetical) groups on several items and marginally differing responses on others. It appears that the individuals in Group I do in fact respond differently on the majority of questionnaire items. Figure 2-9 (page 2-12, 2-13) contains the report of initial data analyzed. These results are quite similar to those found during the pre-test phase at Fort Knox. A copy of the T1 survey is found in Appendix A along with its Spanish translation.

b. Concerning the factor--possession of high school diploma or GED--as a potential predictor of military success, some observations are appropriate. This factor accounted for little of the variance. The authors noted in records reviews that many of the high school graduates and those with a GED had Mental Category scores of IIIB or lower. Further, it was noted in the pilot survey at Ft. Knox that reading the questions aloud to the group was better than having the group read silently and answer the questions. These observations may have a great deal to say about using high school diploma possession as a predictor of military success. Indeed, even as the surveyors read the questions, worded simply, they sometimes had to assist individuals in answering the questions. The inference here is that the Army may be experiencing what so many critics of education are talking about: that education in our schools is getting worse and that graduating students are not acquiring the basic communications skills of reading and writing. On the other hand, the darker interpretation could be that the Army is simply not attracting the higher-skilled high school graduate under the current all-volunteer Army. It would be advisable to examine the relationship, in future studies, between reading level and mental categories, AFQT scores.

2-6. SUMMARY OF TIME TWO DATA ANALYSIS.

a. Of the 933 sample subjects surveyed at Time One, 788 (84.4%) were successfully surveyed at Time Two (T2). Losses at T2 were due to several factors: sick and temporarily infirmed; attrition from units (There was one desertion from one unit surveyed, and, interestingly, this individual fit in the Group I category.); or special duty. Most losses, however, were due to illness and special details which
FIGURE 2-9

Probable Discriminators Between Group I and Group II Responses

Questionnaire Item

Today a person is likely to change jobs often instead of working at one job. * *

Quitting a job for personal reasons is all right. * *

Leaving the Army for personal reasons before end of enlistment is all right.

Desertion is all right during peacetime. * *

Desertion is a Federal crime. *

Punishment for deserting the Army can be a jail sentence. * *

If a soldier has a good reason, desertion is all right.

A money problem could make a soldier desert.

A family problem could make a soldier desert.

If a soldier couldn't get used to the Army, the soldier would desert. * *

If a soldier had a money or family problem, the soldier would ask chain of command for help.

If a soldier knew he could be discharged for desertion, while AWOL, he would desert.

To solve a family or money problem, a soldier would ask someone other than in the chain of command for help. *

If a soldier deserted, the soldier would return voluntarily if the Army wrote and asked.

If a soldier deserted, the soldier would stay away from the Army unless caught. *
FIGURE 2-9 (cont.)

Questionnaire Item

| If a soldier deserted, he would return voluntarily if the police told the soldier's family. | * |
| If a soldier understood he could be arrested and sent to jail for deserting, he would still desert. | ** |
| It would be all right for a soldier to desert, not return, and get a discharge that was less than honorable. | * |

NOTE:

**Indicates p_.05, a statistically significant discrimination
*Indicates p_.20, a marginally meaningful discrimination
unfortunately kept these trainees from our T2 group. Even though 84% is generally considered to be a successful follow-up, the authors asked the question: Did these losses represent a subgroup of our sample who would have answered the items differently and thus bias the findings? The only way to be completely certain of how these individuals would have responded would, of course, have been to search them out and administer the survey. This was not done due to time constraints; however, other checks on this possible source of bias were accomplished. The authors systematically compared the demographics of those who took the survey with those who did not and found no significant differences in demographics. Additionally, the "lost sheep" responses at T1 were compared to remainder of T1 sample for any response differences. No statistically significant differences were noted here either. It was concluded, therefore, that these losses were not interfering with or biasing the survey results in any meaningful way.

b. At Time Two (T2) the findings tend to be the same or similar to those of Time One. However, statistically (p. < .05) significant response changes were generated at T2 and are discussed. While most respondents at T1 agree that people are likely to change jobs often today, the feeling is more strongly held at T2. Conversely, at T2 most of the sample held that quitting a job for personal reasons was all right, and at T2 this perception is less strongly held. The item, "A money problem could make a soldier desert," yielded no clear trend one way or the other, as the mean, median and mode all fell at the "I don't know" response. At T2, however, this perception changed to a "partial" agreement that this problem could make a soldier desert. At T1 the sample reported strong agreement with the contention that a family problem could make a soldier desert. While this perception was still true at T2, it was less strongly held. For the item, "If a soldier couldn't get used to the Army, the soldier would desert," agreement was stated at T1 which was lost at T2. The mean score here clearly shifted to an "I don't know" response. On the issue of utilizing the chain of command for help with family or financial problems, the sample at T1 clearly felt they would use it and continued this belief even more strongly at T2. Alternatively, at T1 most respondents reported that they would seek help from outside the chain of command, and this was also more strongly held at T2. Interestingly, this sample reported at T1 that deserters would stay away from the Army unless caught. At T2, however, they were decidedly less certain of this. Somewhat paradoxically, a soldier would still desert even though he understood that arrest and confinement were possible consequences of desertion. This finding was more strongly felt at the completion of BCT than at the beginning.
c. While the above reported differences in perceptions were found between T1 and T2, generally the survey findings indicate that the results reported from the first survey are, for the most part, reliable. Further, the BCT experience had not altered radically the soldiers' perceptions concerning AWOL, desertion and existing deterrent effects. A copy of the survey used at T2 is found in Appendix B.

2-7. SUMMARY OF TIME TWO AND CONTROL GROUP COMPARISONS.

a. Of the 30 variable questions, 6 reveal statistically significant differences between the longitudinal group (T1,2) and the controls. As these 6 questions represent 20% of the survey items, this could indicate that bias had been introduced to the T2 groups by the survey, the experimental/measurement process itself, or the physical presence of the surveyors at the BCT sites. In the discussion below, however, the authors provide explanation for why these statistically significant differences were not felt to be meaningful. Generally, the controls responded the same as the T1,2 groups with the exception of the following six items:

(1) If a soldier has a good reason, desertion is all right. Neither group reports that it is all right; however, the T1,2 groups are significantly less sure of what they would do. They report being unsure or would partially disagree with the item. Additionally, the control group clearly prefers to say that they partially disagree with the item.

(2) Private Smith came from a farm in West Virginia. He finds out that his father is sick and can't harvest the crops. Private Smith should desert to solve this problem. Here, the control group is more likely to say they disagree, than did the T1,2 groups.

(3) If a soldier had a family problem or a money problem, the soldier would ask the chain of command for help. Controls are more likely to ask the chain of command for help.

(4) To solve a family problem or money problem, a soldier would ask someone other than in the chain of command for help. Neither group is committed to any one answer. Both partially agree with the item. Controls are significantly less certain whether they would do this.
If a soldier deserted, the soldier would return voluntarily if the Army wrote and asked. Both groups are uncertain and report mean score "I don't knows." Controls are significantly more likely to partially disagree. Reasons for the differences are unclear.

If a soldier deserted, the soldier would stay away unless caught. Both groups are uncertain of their responses and report mean score "I don't knows." Controls are significantly more likely to agree with the item. The reason for this difference is unclear.

b. Although these six items are different, their statistical significance is probably due to this survey's large sample size and therefore care must be taken in attaching meaning to these differences. Secondly, in each of the six cases, the standard error is sufficiently large as to alter and possibly neutralize most of the significant differences. This means that if one replicates the study with different subjects, one can expect the mean scores from this survey to differ in one direction (positive) or another direction (negative) by the value of the standard error. Thus, in this survey there is a significant difference between the T1,2 and control groups on six items; however, the next time the survey is conducted the differences might be less and change the p value. The authors believe therefore that one can reasonably conclude that there is little meaningful difference between responses given by T1,2 and control groups.

2-8. SUMMARY: DESERTIONS UNDER IN ABSENTIA POLICY. The following question was taken from the USARB Questionnaire. Assume a new Army Regulation says: "For all enlisted personnel listed as dropped from rolls (DFR) for AWOL in excess of 90 days, an administrative discharge under other than honorable conditions will be mailed to the individual's home of record. In addition, the Army will not try to apprehend the AWOL soldier." If this statement had been official when you joined the Army, would you have gone AWOL by the time? This question was asked again, both to the T2 group and to Ft. Ord first tour soldiers, grades E-1 - E-4. Figure 2-10 (page 2-19) compares respondents' answers. It is evident that findings in the Ft. Ord sample and the T2 sample are consistent but represent approximately half of the percentages from Ft. Riley (USARB). It should be noted that the USARB study method allowed for confidentiality and anonymous responding. This could account for the differences among the studies. Nevertheless, three different studies support the contention that under an in absentia discharge policy the frequencies of AWOLs will increase over the present rates. It is recognized, however, that intentions as
reported do not necessarily equal actual behavior. Thus, instead of increasing the present desertion rates five times as the data dictate, a conservative approach is to accept about one quarter of the reported increase, moving desertion rates from 1% to 2%. This change in rates will be important in determining true costs of desertion.

FIGURE 2-10
PER CENT SAYING DESERT UNDER AN IN ABSENTIA POLICY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ft. Riley (USARB)</th>
<th>Ft. Ord Replication</th>
<th>ADMINCEN AWOL Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section III - Cost Analysis of Desertion

2-9. GENERAL. The intent of this section is to analyze the cost figures supplied in the GAO Report, first by estimating the costs of recruitment and training losses (omitted in GAO figures) and second by estimating the apprehension and rehabilitation costs for dealing with FY 77 deserters. For this latter purpose, the FY 77 deserter figure is 9,572. The GAO recommended that in absentia discharge programs would cost the Army approximately $180K. But as noted above, this figure omits losses from recruitment and training expenses. Obviously the $180K would have to be readjusted to include these losses.

a. There is also the problem of whether to deduct current Army costs of apprehension from this readjusted total. The authors believe these apprehension costs should not be deducted based on the assumption that the GAO $180K mechanism will not entirely "replace" the present PCF apprehension mechanism. That is to say that there will be no real "replacement" by using the GAO proposal. It is our belief that the monies, personnel and resources will remain, although in different accounts. US Army Military Personnel Center, controlling the apprehension mechanism (PCF's), has indicated that these spaces, monies and resources will be committed in similar efforts.* Therefore deducting these apprehension costs is probably inappropriate. However in the interest of conservation these costs will be deducted in section 2-10.

*US Army MILPERCENT has temporarily frozen all these personnel resources prior to deciding their placements.
b. Several alternative operating costs of suggested programs have been suggested by various Army agencies. The lowest cost of these is about $16.9M per annum. In comparing the readjusted GAO figures, the authors will examine whether the readjusted GAO figures will exceed the lowest Army proposed system or the existing system. If the GAO figures exceed either of these costs, then their recommendations will be rejected on the basis of higher cost to the Army.

2-1u. AVERAGE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING COST LOSSES. The authors based computations on 9172 actual deserters for FY 77. Also included were figures from the GAO Report and the US Army Retraining Brigade Study: "Cost Effective Alternatives to Personnel Control Facilities." Of disposition of all cases of desertion, the 18.3% returned to units figure was offered, rechecked and confirmed. To find the actual number returned to units we use the following formula:

\[
\text{RETURNED TO UNITS OF 9172 DESERTERS:} \quad \frac{(.183) \times 9172}{1} = 1,678 \text{ returned to units}
\]

**USABLE SERVICE** was computed using the formula in Alternative I of the USARB Study (using the current system of six PCFs):

Thus, if 50% are effectively reassigned--

\[
\frac{(.50) \times 1,678}{1} = 839 \text{ soldiers (hypothetically)}
\]

Then replacement savings in dollars are:

\[
\frac{839 \text{ soldiers} \times 23 \text{ months usable service}}{30 \text{ months total service}} = 643 \text{ soldiers}
\]

Using average replacement savings for recruitment and training:

\[
\text{($5,700 per person) (643 soldiers)} = \$3,665,100 \text{ savings.}
\]

Using adjusted replacement recruitment and training cost for lower skilled MOS (average):

\[
\text{($4,300 per person) (643 soldiers)} = \$2,764,900 \text{ savings.}
\]

2-18 MIL DESERTER
This latter figure would be the realistic replacement savings cost obtained by operating the PCFs as presently staffed. But now recall that 9,023 soldiers are not restored to duty. The loss of these personnel in terms of recruitment and training cost losses is:

\[(9,023 \text{ soldiers}) \times ($5700) = $51,431,100 \text{ lost}\]

But given that most deserters are in the lower skilled MOS, the realistic loss in recruitment and training dollars is:

\[(9,023 \text{ soldiers}) \times ($4300) = $38,798,000 \text{ lost}\]

Finally, one further adjustment is required to account for the 22%* of trainees not completing AIT. Thus the final recruitment and training loss in dollars becomes:

\[
\frac{$38,798,000 \text{ minus } $8,535,758 \text{ (22%)}}{22\%} = $30,263,142 \text{ lost.}
\]

Returning to the original GAO figure—$180K—one must estimate the probable attrition under the GAO recommended plan. The survey data indicate that approximately 20% of the sample have characteristics of deserters. This does not mean they all would desert under in absentia situations. But assuming only an increase of from 12 to 24 per 1000 (approximately 10% of deserter pool), but only an overall increase from between 1% to just over 2% of enlisted forces, the authors estimate that the in absentia discharge program would return desertion figures to immediate post-Viet Nam era figures, or approximately 18,350 desertions per fiscal year. Since under an in absentia policy there would be no multiple offenders, there is obviously no need to adjust the GAO figures on this basis. Then multiplying this figure by the lowest average recruitment and training cost yields:

\[(18,350 \text{ desert under in absentia}) \times ($4,300) = $78,905,000 \text{ lost}.
\]

recruitment and training costs lost to the Army.

*United States Deserter Information Point (USADIP) figure.
If one believes that under a program of in absentia our present costs for apprehension (i.e., our present PCF system) will be less and perhaps minimal, then most of the PCF costs should be deducted here also. Except for manpower costs (see footnote page 2-21), monies attributed to position, returnee pay and allowances, viable and fixed OMA, apprehension and travel can also be deducted. Thus:

\[
\text{\$78,905,000 minus \$22,798,191 (Apprehension savings) = \$56,106,809,}
\]

the adjusted recruitment and training costs. This figure is then added to the GAO estimated cost of maintaining an in absentia discharge program to yield a total cost to the Army of:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{GAO Cost} & \quad + \quad \text{Recruit & Tng Losses} = \text{Cost of GAO Proposal} \\
\text{\$180,000} & \quad + \quad \text{\$56,106,809} = \text{\$56,286,809}
\end{align*}
\]

This adjusted GAO figure must not be compared to the apprehension and rehabilitation costs only. These latter figures must be adjusted as well by adding the recruitment and training costs lost.

2-11. APPREHENSION AND REHABILITATION COSTS.

a. Costs of Operating the Present PCF System. In developing cost data for apprehension and rehabilitation for the present PCF system, the authors recomputed the existing figures supplied in Alternative I of the USARB Study. To do this, the obtained 1,678 returned to unit figure was used, representing 18.3% of total deserters during FY 77. VARIABLE and FIXED OMA costs were not recomputed, but left as stated in the USARB Study. Figure 2-11 below contains recomputed figures for the present PCF System.

**FIGURE 2-11**

**COST OF THE CURRENT PCF SYSTEM (N = 1678)**

1. Manpower Costs (Total with 457 persons) $4,858,000
2. Returnee Pay and Allowances $13,001,144
3. Travel (For PCF dispositions returned to duty) $131,303
4. Variable OMA $5,370,000

5. Fixed Unit OMA $150,000

6. Apprehension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBI:</td>
<td>$150/man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil:</td>
<td>$17/man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Tvl:</td>
<td>$54/man = $452/man x 9172 desertions= $4,145,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Escort:</td>
<td>$200/man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>$21/man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total PCF Costs $27,656,191

Thus under the current PCF system, the Army is spending in rehabilitation and apprehension costs $27,656,191 for FY 77 (estimate) to realize a total replacement savings of $2,764,900, yielding a net cost figure of $24,891,291 to operate the present system. Once the adjusted average losses in recruitment and training are added to this net cost, the total cost to the Army of the present system is:

$24,891,291 Present PCF Costs

+ $30,263,142 Losses in Recruitment & Tng

$55,154,433

Recalling that the total adjusted cost of the GAO proposal is $56,286,809, the cost of maintaining the present apprehension system, adjusted for unrecoverable losses, is $1,132,376 cheaper than the GAO proposal. It is clear, therefore, that the GAO proposal is not as cost effective as the Army's present system. This difference is due to the absence of figures in the GAO estimate concerning unrecoverable recruitment and training costs.

b. Estimated Costs of Operating Proposed Alternatives to the Present System. Substantive advantages of these alternatives will be discussed in Section IV of this Chapter.

(1) Alternative II - Centralized PCF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Component</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Cost to Army</td>
<td>$18,782,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit &amp; Tng Losses</td>
<td>$30,263,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$49,045,142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2-21  MIL DESERTER
(2) Alternative III - Elimination of PCFs, Deserters to Replacement Detachments

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Cost to Army</td>
<td>$19,695,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit &amp; Tng Losses</td>
<td>$30,263,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$49,958,142</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Alternative IV - Elimination of PCFs, Deserters Returned to previous units with courts martial to USARB

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Cost to Army</td>
<td>$16,917,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit &amp; Tng Losses</td>
<td>$30,263,142*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$47,180,142</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Alternative V - In Absentia Discharges

(Previously stated to cost the Army $56,286,809 per annum.)

The GAO figures also exceed the alternate Army proposals: the GAO figures $9,106,667 more expensive than the Army's least costly proposal.

2-12. SUMMARY. The GAO recommendation raises the fundamental question: Is what the Army spends on apprehension and desertion a reasonable cost in order to maintain an effective deterrent and a cost effective method of processing deserters? Part of GAO's hypothesis is that no empirical data exists to support the contention that there is a deterrent under the present system. This study shows such a deterrent, however vaguely perceived by the individual soldier. Further, the study projects conservatively that an increase from about 1% to 2% per thousand enlisted personnel would cost the Army in excess of the present system while simultaneously removing any deterrent that now exists.

*The dollar cost of recruitment and training is left constant. It is recognized that there could be fluctuations in recruitment and training losses; but these cannot be estimated and thus the figure is held constant.
Section IV - Alternative Methods for Disposition of Deserters

2-13. GENERAL. Part of the reason the GAO recommended that the military consider in absentia discharges for deserters was that the nation is at peace. But it is hard to envision precisely defined points in time when this Nation is at war or at peace. Short of a declaration of war, the variety of civil and international emergencies, mobilizations and alerts makes impractical distinguishing between peacetime and wartime situations. Further, it would be sociologically difficult to promulgate one set of norms and yet maintain another set which would take effect without warning. Other English-speaking armies—British, Canadians, and Australians—have all, at one time or other, considered in absentia discharges. But these were intended only for those missing in action or missing and presumed dead, primarily to determine survivor benefits. These armies' policies strongly advocate maintaining penalties to insure individual commitment, and none of them has attempted distinctive desertion policies for war and peace. Also, this survey's data indicate that soldiers perceive, however vaguely, that desertion is a crime, is punishable and is a deterrent to protracted absence. Finally, in reviewing possible ways to deal with deserters, the authors considered six alternatives proposed by HQDA, U.S. Army Retraining Brigade, by various BCT commanders and training cadre and by these authors.

2-14. ALTERNATIVE I - MAINTAIN THE PRESENT PCF SYSTEM. The present PCF system may be disbanded due to decreasing utilization. The U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) is currently examining the closing of the remaining centers and moving their personnel assets elsewhere. (Even closing the centers does not reduce all administrative aspects of processing deserters.) It has already been shown in Section III of this Chapter that this system is cheaper than the GAO recommendation.

a. Advantages. The present system costs less than the GAO report proposal. Personnel are already in place and have acquired some expertise in their jobs. Regional PCFs can keep down unnecessary travel costs of deserter personnel. Problem soldiers can be isolated from unit commanders and their performance of main missions.

b. Disadvantages. Desertions are decreasing each year and are low enough to warrant adopting less costly or other more effective alternatives. The quality of staff may vary from PCF to PCF if there is the mission of rehabilitation as well as control. Replacement savings are low for $27M costs expended and personnel resources (457) committed.
2-15. ALTERNATIVE II - ESTABLISH A CENTRALIZED PCF.

a. Advantages. Processing and control of deserters in one place without as large a commitment of resources would save about $6M and 300 spaces. Uniform procedures could be more easily insured.

b. Disadvantages. It is not known whether this system would increase replacement savings above the present system. It should be studied beyond the scope of this study. Travel costs of sending deserters to a central PCF could exceed or easily equal those of regional PCFs. Finally, neither appropriate locations for a central unit nor construction and/or refurbishing costs are known.

2-16. ALTERNATIVE III - DISBAND PCFS, SENDING DESERTERS TO REPLACEMENT DETACHMENTS FOR DISPOSITION.

a. Advantages. This system saves 200 personnel over the present system. No fixed costs are accrued additionally, except for those detachments where units increase greatly in size. Also troubled soldiers are not returned to unit commanders who would resist their return.

b. Disadvantages. It is not known whether replacement savings would actually increase with this alternative. Control aspects of replacement detachments would be a significant problem. Combining replacement soldiers with deserters could adversely effect troop morale.

2-17. ALTERNATIVE IV - DISBAND PCFS AND RETURN DESERTERS TO FORMER UNITS.

a. Advantages. Operating costs would be about 8 million dollars cheaper than the present system. It is assumed rehabilitation would best take place in the original unit, where the commander knows (possibly) the problems of the deserter. No PCF facilities would be required. For those deserters court martialed, there is the possibility of retraining success by the Retraining Brigade, which could take an increase of from 500 to 800 confined personnel.

b. Disadvantages. The assumption that control, punishment and rehabilitation are best achieved in the deserter’s original unit is easily overstated. Assumptions made for the drug and alcohol program rehabilitation system, for example, have never been demonstrated to work in the unit setting. Indeed successes could not be generalized to all unit settings. All accessions to USARO would have to be made.
by courts martial so that personnel could be confined legally. Courts martial can take time, can increase costs and can tie up JAG resources unnecessarily. Resources required to support rehabilitation workloads would have to be of high quality. Commanders also would surely resist the return of deserters to units prior to courts martial proceedings, perhaps setting in motion increased administrative discharges and/or increased confinement requirements.

2-18. ALTERNATIVE V - DISBAND PCFs, RETURN DESERTERS TO UNITS AND ADMINISTRATIVELY ORDER DESERTERS TO NONCONFINED RETRAINING AT USARB.

a. Advantages. This alternative eliminates the need for 457 PCF spaces. Nonconfined retraining could work effectively with proper staff and administrative controls of deserters' time. Administratively ordering deserters to nonconfined retraining would avoid legal workload.

b. Disadvantages. The costs of increasing USARB resources and facilities increases without knowing effectiveness of retraining. A non-confined, non-punitive retraining situation could reduce established deterrent effect of present policy. The procedure for ordering deserters to non-confined retraining still raises legal issues concerning intent to restrict freedom of motion, intent to restrain, etc. It is also possible that the cost of training new replacements in lower skilled MOS would be lower than retraining deserters.

2-19. ALTERNATIVE VI - DISCHARGE DESERTERS IN ABSENTIA WHEN THEY ARE ABSENT FOR A STIPULATED PERIOD AND NOT WANTED FOR ANOTHER CRIME.

a. Advantages. Costs of Army resources committed to administering command and control of deserters are substantially reduced. Army personnel become available for other functions.

b. Disadvantages. The in absentia alternative is less cost effective than all Army proposals. While personnel would be freed to work on other projects, there would still remain a requirement to commit some resources to monitoring and administering deserter processing. In absentia conditions would tend to return Army desertions to immediate post-Viet Nam era figures and could remove any measured deterrent effects of present policy.

2-20. SUMMARY. Most of the alternatives presented have some serious disadvantages or unknowns which require further study before implementation. It may be that the present expense of the PCF system is a reasonable cost to the Army, considering that the DOD budget is $115
billion. Other than keeping the present system, the most attractive alternatives are IV and V which increase the retraining load at USARB. In this regard, confinement, under alternative IV, is preferable since it maintains punitive deterrents. In any case, in absentia discharges are not better than the status quo.

Section V - Feasibility of In Absentia Discharges

2-21. GENERAL. The feasibility of the in absentia discharge during peacetime is controlled by the legal aspects of in absentia discharges, by the difficulty of deciding among peacetime and a variety of emergency and wartime situations, and by the potential behaviors of soldiers who learn that the in absentia discharge is possible. One legal aspect is the issue of due process afforded the soldier who receives an adverse personnel action in absentia and not in personam. The term "adverse personnel action" is used here because the Army has been moving away from strictly criminal prosecutions for desertions toward several routes of administrative separations—e.g., Chapter 13, expeditious discharge, trainee discharge, etc. Also there is a potential problem that the contractual nature of military service presents problems for establishing an in absentia discharge. Further, the definition of desertion may be legally confusing; proof of desertion rests with the Army: It must show the defendant, in criminal proceedings, intended to desert and knew at the time that the act was wrong. As previously discussed, a second controlling factor is the difficulty in distinguishing among a variety of war and peace situations, where no declared war exists but where the Army is always on call. A third controlling factor is found in relating the data from this study to the in absentia situation: as demonstrated, there would be substantial increases in desertions approaching figures immediately following Viet Nam. This section, therefore, is limited to discussing the legal aspects of in absentia discharges.

2-22. DUE PROCESS AND ADVERSE PERSONNEL SEPARATIONS. A review of military legal literature indicates a trend in extending service personnel their substantive and procedural rights as civilians. Recently, legal criticism has been directed at due process, or the lack of it, in adverse personnel actions. Indeed, since the inception of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Court of Military Appeals has actively infused civilian due process rights into military law. Also, the Department of Defense directives and regulations indicate increasing concern for procedural fairness and due process rights. DOD Regulation 1332.14 (1965) guarantees that a soldier facing an administrative undesirable discharge has the right to free, qualified
military counsel (or individually retained civilian counsel) before an "impartial hearing board." At such hearings for discharge, the respondent may challenge voting board members for cause and may request witnesses in his defense. Other rights under due process include, for example, right to remain silent, to submit depositions and affidavits and to cross-examine witnesses. With the increasing extension of substantive and procedural rights to soldiers, the Army has had to find other disciplinary command and control mechanisms, not requiring full criminal due process procedures. The institution of in absentia discharges which constitute adverse personnel separations simply reintroduces the legal problems of due process. Moreover, with the increasing institution of due process rights an in absentia discharge policy may finally bring about unnecessary adjudication, tying up resources of the Judge Advocate General. Finally, without building in affirmative action mechanisms for survivorship or for amnesia victims, in absentia discharges which are adverse can further clog the military justice system.

2-23. CONTRACTUAL ASPECTS OF IN ABSENTIA DISCHARGES. Increasing support for the contractual nature of military service in an all-volunteer force is found as recently as U.S. v. Nicholas J. Larionoff (45 USLW 4650, June 14, 1977). Also, in U.S. v. Russo (1975) the Court of Military Appeals applied "common law contract principles" in voiding "as contrary to public policy" a fraudulent enlistment where there had been recruiter malpractice. That the soldier's relationship to the military is temporary and limited to contractual enlistment is supported in a line of cases from Toth v. Quarles (1955) to O'Callahan v. Parker (1969). With the increasing application of basic contract law to military service in an all-volunteer force, the Army must remain vigilant about breach of contract as well as insure that the soldier's rights of due process are upheld. Where a soldier deserts and raises breach of contract as the reason, an in absentia discharge could be unsupportable in court. At the same time, the Army could raise the same argument, perhaps a better method than using in absentia discharges at all. Yet several problems would still exist: (1) situations where enlistment contracts omit kinds for personnel separations (i.e., what may void the contract); and (2) situations where 17-year old soldiers may raise minority (age) status as a bar to their understanding the original enlistment contract.

2-24. DEFINING DESERTION FOR IN ABSENTIA DISCHARGES. The entire meaning of desertion is at the heart of any legal argument which would show that a defendant intended to desert and that the defendant knew that this act was wrong. But what does desertion mean? Protracted absence? How long must a soldier be absent without leave to become a
deserter? The GAO Report states that the Army should discharge the deserting soldier after a "stipulated period." Obviously, throughout the history of developing regulations concerning desertion, much time has been spent in writing and rewriting the definition of desertion and in fixing times for administratively dropping the soldier from the rolls. This latter activity has been more for the purpose of strength accounting and replacement. (At one time DFR was at the 90-day point.) Perhaps a better definition of desertion is to define it as protracted absence, place or fix the limit of 30 days for DFR and notify the authorities that the individual is wanted for protracted absence. This is more an administrative definition than a criminal definition. All one would have to do in establishing the protracted absence would be to show that it was unauthorized, that the defendant knew it was unauthorized and wrong, and that it exceeded the stipulated period for unauthorized absence. On the other hand, it is useful to maintain the notion of desertion and the vague perception of criminal penalties and maintain the present system of administrative discharges. This argument is probably circumlocution at its best (or worst); however, the entire definition of desertion deserves expert review.

2-25. SUMMARY. The legal implications of in absentia discharges would probably increase the legal workload of the Army. The additional confusion of maintaining a separate set of standards for peace and for war would compound the legal situation and make it practically impossible to manage an Army which could go to war at a given moment. Finally, there are enough data from this study to support the idea that if deterrent factors are removed under in absentia, then more soldiers...
CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Section 1 - Reducing Desertions

3-1. GENERAL. In the previous sections of this study, desertion rates for FY 77 were given as 14 per 1000 enlisted force. A total of 9,862 desertions and 9,172 deserters were obtained. The present desertion rate appears to be declining steadily since the end of Vietnam. But this decline is not necessarily due to any activity or perceived stronger deterrence of present policy. Also, one should recall that when considering rates of desertion with the highest risk group (rank: E-1 - E-5), desertions are still not that low. A principal assumption in considering ways to conserve manpower is that the continuation of the all-volunteer force will require promoting human services activities at the installation level. Another assumption is that the seeking of qualified recruits lies in the Army's ability to acquire, as a minimum, mostly high school graduates. It is felt that this diploma is an effective predictor of success in the Army.

3-2. ADOPTING THE GAO IN ABSENTIA RECOMMENDATION. This study has demonstrated that desertions will increase with an in absentia situation, as recommended by the GAO. The recommendation is one based mainly upon costs and not upon manpower conservation. It is possible to implement this recommendation, but its implementation overlooks necessary activities in dealing with the human aspects of recruiting, training and maintaining an effective Army. As such, the GAO proposal is not recommended for consideration.

3-3. THE FRONT END: MEASURING THE QUALITY OF RECRUITS. The increased accession of high school graduates to the Army may not mean that new soldiers will be successful. While to date possession of the diploma is predictive of success, recent civilian studies on the educational accountability of high school curricula and training have strongly criticized secondary schools for failing to equip graduates with the basic tools of communication—reading and writing. An incidental hypothesis was raised in conducting this study that many high school graduates tested during the survey process demonstrated inability to read and to understand the survey. That is why the authors originally took great pains to insure comprehension and why the survey was read to each group within the sample. It would appear, therefore, that additional data need to be developed that relate reading levels to general measures of aptitude such as the AFQT. If a useful relationship can be obtained, then it may be worthwhile to provide remedial
communications work for the deficient high school graduate either before entering the Army or immediately upon entrance. The point is that in the future the high school diploma may be a much weaker predictor of success in the Army.

3-4. STRENGTHENING THE GROUP BONDS FORMED DURING TRAINING. The sociological and psychological literature on primary group bonds needs to be examined in relation to sequence of training and assignments from BCT to AIT and from AIT to first tour of duty. At some installations, one station unit training (BCT and AIT) perhaps insures that group bonds will exist during the first two stages of entrance into the Army. Alternatively, screening of applicants could be used in assigning "high risk" personnel together through their initial training experiences. This procedure could reduce the strains placed on newly-formed groups and could minimize the times when desertion is the highest.

3-5. AVAILABILITY OF HUMAN SERVICES. The availability of installation human services is also an important factor in reducing desertions. The authors noted in their visits to BCT sites that little had been done to promote human services, either because of scheduling or lack of knowledge. Certainly, improvement is needed in developing awareness of these services by training cadres. Hopefully, present studies on the integration of human services activities, conducted by USAADMINCEN, should provide a rich source of information on this problem. Also, it is recommended that other Army research resources, ARI and Health Services Command research organizations, for example, examine the human services accessibility problem.

Section II - Reducing Costs

3-6. COSTS OF THE GAO IN ABSENTIA PROPOSAL. The GAO proposal costs significantly less than the present PCF system costs--$180,000 compared to about $27 million. This cost, however, was never adjusted to include real dollar losses in recruitment and training. Once the GAO figures were readjusted for this projected loss, the GAO proposal became more costly than the present PCF system by over $1 million dollars. At the same time, GAO did correctly point out that tremendous costs were being incurred to obtain a small return in replacement savings--just over $2.7 million dollars for this fiscal year. Yet there are hidden benefits, such as the maintenance of a perceived deterrent by present policy, which the GAO found no evidence of. The GAO proposal, therefore, was also rejected on the basis of cost.
3-7. COSTS OF ALTERING THE PRESENT APPREHENSION AND CONTROL MECHANISM. If the PCFs are disbanded, then the authors recommend that the Army consider adopting either of two recommended alternatives--(a) return deserters to original units, court martial them and send them to the Retraining Brigade; or (b) return deserters to original units and administratively order them to nonconfined retraining at the Retraining Brigade. The first of these alternatives is projected to cost the Army $16.9 million in operating costs. But add to that cost the losses from recruitment and training, and the total cost is still high--approximately $47 million. Further, this alternative presents possible unnecessary use of legal resources in courts martial proceedings and could take too long. Additionally, there are still unknown costs in upgrading the professional assets and in developing the physical plant at the Retraining Brigade. The corollary proposal to this involves administratively ordering the deserter from the original unit to the Retraining Brigade in nonconfined retraining status. This could eliminate unnecessary costs and overloads on Army legal resources; however, there are still cost problems to be determined concerning Retraining Brigade personnel assets and physical plant. The authors recommend, therefore, that financial experts examine both these alternatives in greater detail before making a final decision.

Section III - Survey Findings and the Alteration of Present Policy

3-8. DETERRENT EFFECT OF PRESENT POLICY. Most respondents to our survey indicated that present policy on AWOL and desertions did provide a deterrent effect. Most said that they would not desert under any condition. There was, however, an identifiable subsample of the sample (about 200) who had demographic characteristics similar to actual deserters. These personnel, who were 17 or 18 years old, with mental categories at IIIB, IVA, B responded that they would desert for a variety of reasons—such that they would not return to military control unless apprehended. That this group was different from other soldiers in the BCT sample in most of the survey responses was statistically significant. The second time these personnel were surveyed, they did not generally say they would desert under in absentia conditions, when asked the question directly; however, other responses to desertion questions remained the same from the first survey. This discrepancy led the authors to believe that the strength of group bonds at the end of Basic Training was contributing to this difference in responses. Nevertheless, there is still enough consistency on most desertion questions given at Time One and Time Two to maintain that some of these personnel, with characteristics like deserters, would...
desert if certain crises arose in their lives. While not all of these personnel could be realistically expected to desert, only an increase of the present rates from 14 per thousand enlisted force to 28 per thousand enlisted force (approximately 1% to 2.6%) would return desertion figures to those immediately after Vietnam. It is possible, therefore, to conclude that an in absentia discharge would only aggravate present desertion rates. No basic alteration in present policy on AWOL and desertions should be made.

3-9. OTHER SURVEY FINDINGS. While the survey findings do not indicate a basic shift in present policy, the survey data do show that the Army should attempt to conserve "high risk" manpower in several ways. In previous sections of this conclusion, the authors addressed the problems of costs, assignments and human services availability as being appropriate areas to be examined. Many survey respondents, those with characteristics like deserters, indicated an unwillingness to trust Army help. This may be due to pre-formed ideas about the assistance abilities of institutions in general, and not just about the Army. Also, most of these respondents said that they would leave any job for personal reasons, and, perhaps this also indicates that there are established patterns of work that are dysfunctional. These data indicate that the Army has a difficult job in convincing "high risk" soldiers that the Army can provide them legitimate help in solving their problems. Also evident from the survey findings is the fact that if these "high risk" soldiers did desert, the Army would have to actively seek their apprehension. In this respect, the GAO proposal to discharge them in absentia would only make it more difficult for the Army to control them. What needs to be examined are methods of operation concerning the maintenance of recruits and not the alteration of present policy on AWOL and desertion. It is recommended that USAADMINCEN pursue the survey group out through first tour of duty in order to refine the recommendations of this study in general.

Section IV - Feasibility of In Absentia Discharges

3-10. GENERAL. In absentia discharges are feasible, but not practical, as demonstrated in other conclusions to this study. Other English-speaking Armies have avoided such discharges. The legal implications of in absentia discharges--those on due process and contracts--also make in absentia discharges unworkable.
3-11. DEFINING DESERTION AND DISTINGUISHING AMONG SITUATIONS OF WAR, PEACE AND EMERGENCIES. The authors recommend that desertion be re-examined to determine whether a better definition can be made for legal purposes both in adverse personnel actions and in enlistment contracts. It is suggested that a term such as protracted absence be considered as a substitute term; and it is further recommended that any adverse separations—for protracted absence or desertion—include affirmative action mechanisms to handle legitimate recovery of benefits in cases of true amnesia and in cases where the soldier is deceased and the Army does not know it. Legitimate distinctions among war, peace and emergency situations are practically impossible. The Army is established on call for the defense of the Nation. Moreover, different discharge procedures under peace, war and emergency situations would only confuse the average soldier and possibly afford a litigant an effective defense to an adverse discharge.

Section V - Summary of Recommendations

3-12. GENERAL. This study has addressed the problems raised by the GAO report concerning possible excessive costs in apprehending, controlling and re-integrating deserters. Results of this study indicate that the present policy should not be changed, that the present procedures are less costly than the GAO proposal. This study also demonstrated that present Army policy offers a measurable determent to desertion and thus should be retained. The GAO proposal would remove the determent and increase the number of desertions. Alternative Army proposals for dealing with deserters are in part meritorious and can further improve the Army's ability to conserve manpower in an all-volunteer force. Additionally there are indications that an in absentia policy would adversely affect troop morale.
The information in this survey will be used to provide Army researchers specific perceptions of servicemembers' jobs. It includes attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of servicemembers about facets of the Army system, such as certain regulations, policies, and procedures. The information is for research purposes only and will not be transcribed in any form to your Army personnel records.

The social security number is required so that researchers may follow-up the survey participants since the overall study should provide long range information.

The collected data will be used for research purposes only. The data will be retained at USAAD/MCC, Combat Developments Directorate, Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN. The collected data are FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and will be maintained and used in strict confidence in accordance with Federal law and regulations. For the purposes of research these data will be coded and retained on computer cards, computer files and/or individual survey forms. Only the principal researchers will know what the code is and how to match a name to the code. No information will be provided commandants/supervisors which would allow any individual to be specifically identified.

Compliance is voluntary. There is no effect upon the individual for failure to disclose information. However, please answer all items unless you have an extreme reluctance to do so. You are requested to return all sheets of this survey.
SURVEY BOOKLET

PLEASE READ THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW CAREFULLY

This survey is being given to determine information about specific Army policies and regulations. This survey is completely CONFIDENTIAL. Results of this survey will be kept at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN, USAADMINCEN, Combat Developments Directorate. At no time will information pertaining to you specifically be released for ANY purpose. A statistical report, containing findings of all answers from soldiers at posts throughout the United States, will be made and sent to Headquarters, Department of the Army. Nowhere in that report, or subsequent reports, will your name or other specific identifying data be used.

The questions that follow require you to mark an answer on the answer sheet provided. Please mark the answers using the No. 2 pencil provided. When you mark an answer on the answer sheet, make sure you fill in the answer block completely. Make your mark as dark as possible. Do not mark or check other blocks, but if you do or want to change an answer, please erase the mark completely. Here is how a marked answer should look:

1
2
3
4
5
1

NOW THAT YOU HAVE READ THE INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE, DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? If you have questions, raise your hand and the examiner will help you before you begin the questionnaire.

THE EXAMINER WILL NOW READ EACH QUESTION AND POSSIBLE ANSWERS ALOUD. AFTER EACH QUESTION IS READ, MARK YOUR ANSWER.
1. Have you ever filled out a survey before?
   1. Yes
   2. No

2. If you have, how many surveys have you filled out?
   1. one
   2. two or three
   3. four or five
   4. six or more
   5. none

3. Surveys are often personal, but necessary.
   1. Strongly Agree
   2. Partially Agree
   3. I don't know.
   4. Partially Disagree
   5. Strongly Disagree

4. Today a person is likely to change jobs often, instead of working at one job.
   1. Strongly Disagree
   2. Partially Disagree
   3. I don't know.
   4. Partially Agree
   5. Strongly Agree

5. Quitting a job for personal reasons is all right.
   1. Strongly Agree
   2. Partially Agree
   3. I don't know.
   4. Partially Disagree
   5. Strongly Disagree

6. Leaving the Army for personal reasons before end of enlistment is all right.
   1. Strongly Disagree
   2. Partially Disagree
   3. I don't know.
   4. Partially Agree
   5. Strongly Agree
7. Desertion is all right during peacetime.
   1. Strongly Agree
   2. Partially Agree
   3. I don't know.
   4. Partially Disagree
   5. Strongly Disagree

8. Desertion is a federal crime.
   1. Yes
   2. No

9. Punishment for the deserting the Army can be:
   1. a jail sentence
   2. a bad conduct discharge
   3. reduction in rank and loss of pay
   4. discharge under other than honorable conditions
   5. all the above

10. If a soldier has a good reason, desertion is all right.
    1. Strongly Disagree
    2. Partially Disagree
    3. I don't know.
    4. Partially Agree
    5. Strongly Agree

11. A money problem could make a soldier desert.
    1. Strongly Agree
    2. Partially Agree
    3. I don't know.
    4. Partially Disagree
    5. Strongly Disagree

12. A family problem could make a soldier desert.
    1. Strongly Disagree
    2. Partially Disagree
    3. I don't know.
    4. Partially Agree
    5. Strongly Agree
13. If a soldier couldn't get used to the Army, the soldier would desert.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

14. If a soldier had a family problem or money problem, the soldier would ask the chain of command for help.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

15. If a soldier knew he or she could be discharged for desertion, while AWOL, the soldier would desert.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

16. To solve a family or money problem, a soldier would ask someone other than the chain of command for help.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

17. If a soldier had deserted, the soldier would return voluntarily if the Army wrote and asked.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
18. If a soldier deserted, the soldier would stay away from the Army unless caught.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

19. If a soldier deserted, the soldier would return voluntarily if the police told the soldier's family.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

20. If a soldier understood he or she could be arrested and sent to jail for deserting, the soldier would still desert.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

21. It would be all right for a soldier to desert, not return, and get a discharge that was less than honorable.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
NOW, TO HELP US CLASSIFY YOUR ANSWERS, MAY I ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU AND YOUR PERSONAL BACKGROUND

22. **My age is:**
   1. 17
   2. 18
   3. 19
   4. 20
   5. 21 or older

23. **I am:**
   1. White
   2. Black
   3. Mexican American, Spanish American, or Puerto Rican
   4. Asian American (Chinese, Japanese, Korean)
   5. Native American Indian

24. **I have lived longest in:**
   1. **NORtheast**
      (Includes New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine)
   2. **NORTH CENTRAL**
      (Includes Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota)
   3. **SOUTH**
      (Includes Maryland, Delaware, District of Columbia, West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands)
   4. **WEST**
      (Includes Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Alaska, Hawaii)

25. **I am:**
   1. A man
   2. A woman
26. I am a:
   1. Separated
   2. Widowed
   3. Divorced
   4. Married
   5. Single, never married

27. Before I entered the Army, the longest I held a part-time or full-time job was:
   1. less than one month or never held a job
   2. one to three months
   3. four to six months
   4. seven to nine months
   5. ten months or longer

28. My highest level of education is:
   1. More than four-year college degree
   2. A four-year college degree
   3. College work, less than a four-year degree
   4. High School Diploma or G.E.D.
   5. No High School Diploma

29. My family's income level is:
   1. $20,001 or more per year
   2. $15,001 to $20,000 per year
   3. $10,001 to $15,000 per year
   4. $6,001 to $10,000 per year
   5. $0,000 to less per year

30. Before I entered the Army, I was arrested and charged for a crime other than a traffic violation.
   1. Yes
   2. No
INSTRUCCIONES

POR FAVOR, LEE USTED LAS INSTRUCCIONES CON CUIDADO

Esta prueba (survey) se administra para obtener información de valor al
U.S. Army en respecto a las reglas y modos de operación sobre AWOL. Los
resultados de esta prueba (survey) serán completamente privados. Se serán
guardarlos en Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN, USAADMCEN, Combat Developments
Directorate. En ningún caso serán las informaciones que pertenecen a usted en
particular suelto para cualquier uso.

Para su respuestas, hay una pagina para su respuestas. Aquí está un ejemplo
de un respuesto:

EJEMPLO: 1. 2

AHORA, TIENE USTED PREGUNTAS?

A-10
MIL DESERTER
1. Ha hecho una prueba (survey) antes?
   1. Sí
   2. No

2. Si ha hecho, cuantas pruebas (surveys) ha completado?
   1. una
   2. dos o tres
   3. cuatro o cinco
   4. seis o más
   5. ninguna

3. Pruebas (surveys) son personales, pero son necesarias.
   1. Sí
   2. Yo creo que sí.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que no.
   5. No

4. En estos días es probable que una persona cambia trabajos a menudo, en vez de trabajar en un trabajo solamente.
   1. No
   2. Yo creo que no.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que sí.
   5. Sí

5. Dejar un trabajo por razones personales es bien.
   1. Sí
   2. Yo creo que sí.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que no.
   5. No

6. Salir de ejercito militar por razones personales, antes de que el contrato sea terminado, es bien.
   1. No
   2. Yo creo que no.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que sí.
   5. Sí
7. Desertar el ejercito militar durante del tiempo que no hay conflictos es bien.
   1. Si
   2. Yo creo que sí.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que no.
   5. No

8. Desertar es un crimen federal.
   1. Si
   2. No

9. El castigo por desertar del ejercito militar puede hacer:
   1. una sentencia de carcel.
   2. un despaché de mal conducto.
   3. reducción de rango (rank) y pierdo de pago.
   4. un descharge menos de honrado.
   5. todo lo que esta arriba.

10. Si un solcido tiene un buena razon, desertar esta bien.
   1. No
   2. Yo creo que no.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que sí.
   5. Si

11. Problemas de moneda puede hacer a un soldado que se desiere.
   1. Si
   2. Yo creo que sí.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que no.
   5. No

12. Problemas de la familia puede hacer a un soldado que se desiere.
   1. No
   2. Yo creo que no.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que sí.
   5. Si
13. Si un soldado no se pueda acostumbrar al ejercito militar, el soldado puede desertar.
   1. Sí
   2. Yo creo que sí.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que no.
   5. No

14. Si un soldado tiene problemas de la familia o de moneda, el soldado pide ayuda de sus superiores.
   1. No
   2. Yo creo que no.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que sí.
   5. Sí

15. Si un soldado sabe que puede hacer separado por desertar, cuando está AWOL, el soldado puede desertar.
   1. Sí
   2. Yo creo que sí.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que no.
   5. No

16. Para resolver problemas de la familia o de moneda, los soldados piden ayuda de personas afuera sus superiores que el ejercito militar tiene para sus soldados.
   1. No
   2. Yo creo que no.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que sí.
   5. Sí

17. Si un soldado desertaba, el soldado puede regresar voluntariamente si el ejercito militar le escribía diciéndole que regresara.
   1. Sí
   2. Yo creo que sí.
   3. Yo no sé.
   4. Yo creo que no.
   5. No
18. Si un soldado desertaba, el soldado se queda afuera hasta que lo aprenda.

1. No
2. Yo creo que no.
3. Yo no sé.
4. Yo creo que sí.
5. Sí

19. Si un soldado desertaba, el soldado puede regresar voluntariamente si la policía avisa a su familia.

1. Sí
2. Yo creo que sí.
3. Yo no sé.
4. Yo creo que no.
5. No

20. Si un soldado sabe que pueden hacer arrestado o carcelado por desertar, el soldado todavía se desertara.

1. No
2. Yo creo que no.
3. Yo no sé.
4. Yo creo que sí.
5. Sí

21. Esta bien que un soldado se desierta, no regrese, y que reciba un desharche que se menos de honrado.

1. Sí
2. Yo creo que sí.
3. Yo no sé.
4. Yo creo que no.
5. No

AHORA, PARA QUE NOS PUEDAS AYUDAR PARA CLASIFICAR SUS RESPUESTAS, DESEAMOS PREGUNTARLE ALGO DE SU VIDA PERSONAL.

22. Mi edad es:

1. 17
2. 18
3. 19
4. 20
5. 21 o más
23. Yo soy:
   1. White
   2. Black
   3. Mexican American, Spanish American, o Puerto Rican
   4. Asian American (Chinese, Japenese, Korean)
   5. Native American Indian

24. Yo he vivido mas tiempo en:
   2. NORTE CENTRAL (Incluyen Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota)
   3. SUR (Incluyen Maryland, Delaware, District of Columbia, West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands)
   5. TERRITORIAS DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS (Incluyen: Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands, Somoa)

25. Yo soy:
   1. un hombre
   2. una mujer

26. Yo soy:
   1. separado de mi esposa/o
   2. viudo/viuda
   3. divorciado/a
   4. casado/a
   5. nunca he sido casado/a
27. Antes de entrar al ejercito military, el mas tiempo que trabajo en un
trabajo permanente o temporal fue:

1. menos de un mes o nunca tuve un trabajo
2. uno de tres meses
3. cuatro de seis meses
4. siete de nueve meses
5. diez meses o mas

28. Mi grado mas alto de educacion es:

1. mas de cuatro anos de colegio
2. cuatro anos de colegio
3. colegio, per menos de cuatro anos
4. high school diploma o G.E.D.
5. menos de high school diploma or G.E.D.

29. El pago anual de mi familia es:

1. $20,001 o mas anual
2. $15,001 de $20,000 anual
3. $10,001 de $15,000 anual
4. $6,001 de $10,000 anual
5. $6,000 o menos anual

30. Antes de entrar en el ejercito militar, yo fue arrestado y cargado por un
crimen mas ofensico de una violacion trafica.

1. Si
2. No

MUCHAS GRACIAS POR SU RESPUESTAS
Information in this survey will be used to provide Army researchers specific descriptions of servicemembers' jobs. It includes attitudes, beliefs and opinions of the members about facets of the Army system, such as certain regulations, policies, and procedures. The information is for research purposes only and will not be described in any form to your Army personnel records.

A social security number is required so that researchers may follow-up the survey participants since the overall study should provide long range information.

This collected data will be used for research purposes only. The data will be retained at U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE, Combat Developments Directorate, Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN. The collected data are FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and will be maintained and used in strict confidence in accordance with Federal law and regulations. For the purposes of research these data will be coded and retained on computer cards, computer files and/or individual survey forms. Only the principal researchers will know what the code is and how to match a name to the code. No information will be provided to other/owners/supervisors which would allow any individual to be specifically identified.

Compliance is voluntary. There is no effect upon the individual for failure to disclose information. However, please answer all items unless you have an extreme reluctance to do so. You are requested to return all sheets of this survey.
SURVEY BOOKLET INSTRUCTIONS

PLEASE READ THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW CAREFULLY

This survey is being given to determine information about specific Army policies and regulations. This survey is completely CONFIDENTIAL. Results of this survey will be kept at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN, USADMINCEN, Combat Developments Directorate. At no time will information pertaining to you specifically be released for ANY purpose. A statistical report, containing findings of all answers from soldiers at posts throughout the United States, will be made and sent to Headquarters, Department of Army. Nowhere in that report, or subsequent reports, will your name or other specific identifying data be used.

The questions that follow require you to write an answer on the answer sheet provided for each question on the survey. Here is how a marked answer should look:

EXAMPLE: 1. 2

NOW THAT YOU HAVE READ THE INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE, DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, RAISE YOUR HAND AND THE EXAMINER WILL HELP YOU BEFORE THE SURVEY BEGINS.

THE EXAMINER WILL NOW READ EACH QUESTION AND POSSIBLE ANSWERS ALOUD. AFTER EACH QUESTION IS READ, MARK YOUR ANSWER ON THE ANSWER SHEET.
AWOL PERCEPTIONS SURVEY

1. Today a person is likely to change jobs often, instead of working at one job.
   1. Strongly Agree
   2. Partially Agree
   3. I don't know.
   4. Partially Disagree
   5. Strongly Disagree

2. Quitting a job for personal reasons is all right.
   1. Strongly Disagree
   2. Partially Disagree
   3. I don't know.
   4. Partially Agree
   5. Strongly Agree

3. Leaving the Army for personal reasons before end of enlistment is all right.
   1. Strongly Agree
   2. Partially Agree
   3. I don't know.
   4. Partially Disagree
   5. Strongly Disagree

4. Desertion is all right during peacetime.
   1. Strongly Disagree
   2. Partially Disagree
   3. I don't know.
   4. Partially Agree
   5. Strongly Agree

5. While an Army unit is activated to control a civilian riot or strike, it is all right for a soldier to desert the unit.
   1. Strongly Agree
   2. Partially Agree
   3. I don't know.
   4. Partially Disagree
   5. Strongly Disagree
b. While an Army unit is on alert to participate in an international conflict, it is all right for a soldier to desert the unit.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

7. If a soldier has a good reason, desertion is all right.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

8. A money problem could make a soldier desert.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

9. Private Jones got combat arms bonus of $3,000 for enlisting. He bought a car for $4,500. After four weeks the car broke down and couldn't be fixed. Jones owes the loan company $1,300 and can't pay. Jones should desert to solve this problem.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

10. Private Smith came from a farm in West Virginia. He finds out that his father is sick and can't harvest the crops. Private Smith should desert to solve this problem.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree
11. Private Green's girl friend tells him she's pregnant and that he's the father. Private Green should desert to solve the problem.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

12. A family problem could make a soldier desert.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

13. Private Brown thinks his drill sergeant is out to get him. Private Brown should desert to solve the problem.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

14. If a soldier couldn't get used to the Army, the soldier would desert.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

15. When he enlisted, Private Blue thought he would get training as a medic. He learns he will have to be trained as a tank mechanic. Private Blue should desert.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
16. If a soldier had a family problem or a money problem, the soldier would ask the chain of command for help.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

17. A soldier with a family problem or money problem goes to his chain of command for help and gets none. The soldier should desert.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

18. If a soldier knew he or she could be discharged for desertion, while AWOL, the soldier would desert.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

19. To solve a family problem or money problem, a soldier would ask someone other than in the chain of command for help.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

20. Most soldiers in Basic Training know where to go to get help from the Army to solve a family problem or money problem.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree
21. A soldier should not be punished for deserting the Army if the soldier deserted to solve a family problem.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

22. Desertion is all right during war.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

23. If a soldier deserted, the soldier would return voluntarily if the Army wrote and asked.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

24. If a soldier deserted, the soldier would stay away unless caught.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

25. If a soldier deserted, the soldier would return voluntarily if the police told the soldier's family.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
2b. If a soldier understood he or she could be arrested and sent to jail for deserting, the soldier would still desert.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

27. It would be all right for a soldier to desert, not return, and get a discharge that was less than honorable.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

28. A soldier who got a discharge that was less than honorable for deserting would have a hard time getting a civilian job.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Partially Disagree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Agree
5. Strongly Agree

29. Desertion should not be a criminal offense.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Partially Agree
3. I don't know.
4. Partially Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree
Assume a new Army regulation says: "For all enlisted personnel listed as dropped from rolls (DFR) for AWOL in excess of 90 days, an administrative discharge under other than honorable conditions will be mailed to the individual's home of record. In addition, the Army will not try to apprehend the AWOL soldier."

3u. If this statement had been official when you joined the Army, would you have gone AWOL by this time?

1. Definitely No
2. Probably No
3. I don't know
4. Probably Yes
5. Definitely Yes


Shils, Edward and Janowitz, M. "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II." Public Opinion Quarterly, 12 (Summer, 1948), 280-315.


"U.S. v. Nicholas J. Larionoff." 45 United States Law Week 4650 (June 14, 1977)
