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SUPERPOWER NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE OCTOBER 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

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This paper was written in 1976, while the author was a member of the defense analysis staff of the Brookings Institution. The opinions it expresses are solely those of its author.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Examination of U.S. and Soviet military involvement in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War can serve several useful purposes. It can provide insights into superpower policies and practices with regard to local conflicts in the Middle East -- the conditions under which they have elected to become involved, their objectives and some specifics of their modus operandi in such involvement, and the limits beyond which they appear to be unwilling (or unable) to take their involvement. These insights can serve as a guide to what might occur should the same situation arise in the future.* Integrated with other information, these insights can also help to explain superpower policies and practices in other areas and situations.** Such an examination also serves a more narrow purpose. It provides insights into the influence each superpower's actions can have on the behavior of the other. The practical implications of this should require no elaboration.

* This is not a contention that history repeats itself. It is merely a reflection of the difficulty of believing there will not be a fifth Arab-Israeli War. If there is such a war, it is difficult to believe that either the United States or the Soviet Union can avoid involvement in it. And if they do become involved, it is difficult to see their involvement differing substantially from the patterns set during the October War.

** For instance, knowledge of the nature and extent of Soviet involvement in the preparation of the October War is obviously relevant not only to predicting the renewal of conflict in the Middle East, but also to forecasting the long-run prospects for stability in U.S.-Soviet detente.
Obviously a brief discussion such as this cannot address all of those questions. Its objectives are necessarily more modest. It attempts three things. The first is to provide a summary description of U.S. and Soviet naval operations related to the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Neither participated directly in the conflict; but both were actively involved in supporting the belligerents and relied heavily on their naval forces in providing that support.

The two superpowers were also intent upon influencing each other's actions -- each attempting to limit the other's involvement in the conflict. They exerted that influence through political signals, and again relied heavily on their naval forces to transmit and reinforce those signals. The second objective of this discussion is therefore to identify some of the signalling that went on between the United States and the Soviet Union in the language of military -- in this case largely Naval -- actions. That requires detailed examination of movements and activities; they are the very stuff of nonverbal communication, and reconstructing them in detail is the only way to find out what was being said.

Third, much of what the Soviets did prior to and during the initial period of the War is difficult to understand unless one assumes they knew in advance what the Arabs planned to do, and when. However, since that factor is critical to determining what larger implications about Soviet behavior should be drawn from this experience, it cannot be left as an assumption. Consequently, the
question of Soviet foreknowledge is examined as directly as possible. For a variety of reasons, neither the course of events in the War itself, nor the diplomatic exchanges surrounding it, figure prominently in this discussion. Nevertheless, since they provided the context for the superpower actions that are the focus of this discussion, skeletal summaries of both are included.

II. PREPARATION OF THE ARAB OFFENSIVE*

Immediately after their defeat in the June War of 1967, the Arabs -- with Egypt in the lead and assisted by the Soviet Union -- began to prepare for another round in their still unfinished conflict with Israel. Those preparations advanced through three more-or-less sequential stages: rebuilding Arab military capabilities, negating the Israeli offensive advantage, and making ready for the attack.

The first objective was largely realized by the initiation of the

* Many accounts of the background to the October War have appeared -- some from participants, others from observers located at varying distances from the critical events. All of these accounts are after the fact. Despite widespread overlap, there are many areas of disagreement. This very brief recapitulation incorporates elements from several of these accounts. The process of selecting elements for inclusion was subjective, and governed by three criteria:

1. the inherent credibility of each element.
2. its compatibility with other credible elements, and
3. the coherence of the account produced by their integration.

The outcome is not necessarily the truth; but, given the "fit" that emerges in elements drawn from widely divergent sources, it probably is not far from the truth.
"War of Attrition" in late 1968-early 1969, the second at its conclusion in August 1970. The beginning of the third phase can be traced back to 1971 -- President Sadat's "Year of Decision" -- when active preparations were undertaken for an offensive which it was hoped would lead to reconquest of the occupied territories. Those plans suffered a series of setbacks in the two and a half years that elapsed before the attack was finally launched.¹

The departure of Soviet forces from Egypt in July 1972 set the stage for the October 1973 offensive -- increasing Sadat's freedom of action and also his bargaining power with the Soviets.² In the Fall of 1972, the Egyptians scaled down both their objectives and their weapons requirements for the offensive. The Soviets, who had been skeptical of earlier Egyptian plans and unwilling to provide all of the armaments they wanted, eventually agreed to supply these reduced requirements.³

Operational planning for the attack reportedly began in December 1972.⁴ Three optimal attack "windows" in 1973 were identified: the second half of May, 7-11 September and 5-10 October.⁵ In January 1973 a Joint Staff was established under Egyptian command to coordinate

The planned attack that lay behind President Sadat's proclamation of 1971 as the "Year of Decision" did not materialize. Ostensibly, this was due to the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani War; however, its postponement also may have been a reflection of Soviet failure to provide the kind of support the Egyptians considered essential. The attack was apparently reset for early 1972, and then postponed again in anticipation of the May U.S.-Soviet summit meeting.
preparations with Syria, and the active cooperation of the other Arab states was solicited. By February, the attack had been scheduled for May. By March, other Arab states were moving to provide assistance, and the Soviets were actively supporting Arab preparations -- the Soviet transport of Moroccan forces to Syria is an example of both.*

By April, the Arabs were apparently ready to go, but -- for reasons that remain obscure** -- the attack was postponed to one of the later "windows." At the end of August, a date within the October "window" was chosen. The precise timing of the attack reportedly was selected in early October. It was finally launched as scheduled at 1400 local time on 6 October.

* See pp. 8, 9 below for a discussion of this and other such efforts.

** The delay may have been at Soviet insistence -- perhaps because the Arabs were not in fact as ready as they thought they were, or because the Soviets themselves were not ready, or because the situation was not appropriate (a major conflict between Palestinian forces and the Lebanese Army erupted in Beirut in May). The large-scale Soviet airlift of additional air defense weaponry to Syria in April and the Egyptian rehearsal exercises in June lend some credence to the first of these interpretations. The delay might also have been a reflection of Syrian-Egyptian disagreement over the objectives of the offensive or problems encountered in coordinating their operational plans.
III. SOVIET FOREKNOWLEDGE

Familiarity with Soviet activity prior to the war helps explain some of the actions they took immediately after it began. There are two important questions to be addressed in this regard. The first concerns the nature and extent of Soviet foreknowledge: did they know the attack was coming? And the second, which assumes they knew (and that is a safe assumption), concerns the Soviet role in its preparation: support, acquiescence, or opposition?

There is no doubt that the Soviets know that hostilities were imminent. Presidents Sadat and Assad had informed them of the attack in advance; the Soviets themselves claim to have warned the United States about it, and in any event their actions in the period immediately before conflict broke out provide unambiguous confirmation that they knew it was coming: e.g., they began evacuating their dependents from Egypt and Syria three days beforehand. The only questions that remain unanswered are, how much they knew, and how far in advance they knew it.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Soviets had significant strategic warning: that, by mid-September at the very latest, they knew the Arabs would attack and roughly when. Circumstantial evidence also suggests that they had been no less well-informed about the attacks planned for the earlier "windows." Further, it suggests that they were not just bystanders but assisted in the preparation of these attacks. Since this evidence is circumstantial, and much of it is open to interpretation, it deserves discussion.
For purposes of examination, Soviet activities before the October War can be divided into three logically distinct periods: before the Arab decision to attack; between that decision and the attack itself; and immediately prior to the attack. Prior to the Arab decision to launch this offensive, the Soviets had consistently followed two contradictory policies: they had armed the Arabs and simultaneously attempted to restrict the Arabs' use of these arms. They did the latter most effectively with Egypt by refusing to provide, or providing only limited number of, those weapons the Egyptians felt they needed to carry out a successful offensive: fighter-bombers, high-performance medium bombers and long-range surface-to-surface missiles. The Egyptians calculated that, in order to recover Sinai from the Israelis by military means, they first would have to defeat the Israeli Air Force. These were the weapons they thought they must have to do that.

When the Egyptians scaled down their attack objectives in the Fall of 1972, to emphasize recovery of Sinai by political rather than military means,* they also scaled down their requirements for offensive weapons: all they needed to handle Israeli air capabilities was a strategic deterrent and battlefield defenses. The Soviets had already given them the defenses. They now agreed to provide a deterrent: the SCUD-B battlefield support missile. This is a ballistic missile with a range of approximately 185 miles -- sufficient to

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* A move that, in retrospect, must be acknowledged as a stroke of genius.
threaten some Israeli population centers from Egyptian-controlled
territory. The SCUD comes in two versions: one equipped with a
nuclear warhead; the other equipped with a conventional, high-explo-
sive warhead. Some 30 of the conventional version -- roughly one
brigade -- appear to have been deployed to Egypt before the war be-
gan, perhaps as early as April, but certainly by mid-September.
Although placed under Egyptian operational control they were manned
by Soviet crews.

Providing offensive weaponry to the Egyptians was only one of
a number of steps taken by the Soviets to assist the Arabs in pre-
paring their attack. One of the reasons why the attack proved so
successful politically was that it was not simply a joint Egyptian-
Syrian operation but an Arab offensive. The Soviets took an active
part in getting radical and conservative Arab states together to
mount the attack, staying together until it was launched, and support-
ing it afterwards. In at least two instances, this assistance was
rendered more or less in the open.

The first instance involved the movement in Soviet amphibious
lift ships of a Moroccan Expeditionary Force to Syria. Shortly after
the decision to attack had been taken, the principals solicited assis-
tance from the other Arab states. The Moroccans decided to send a
brigade-sized force to the Syrian front. They had no way to trans-
port this unit, however, and were unable to arrange for another Arab

Near the end of the War, several of these missiles apparently were
launched against Israeli forces located in the area of the Suez Canal
bridgehead. None, however, seems to have been aimed against Israel
itself.
power to transport it for them -- apparently as a result of wide-
spread fears that the Israelis would attempt to interdict such a
movement.*23 The Soviets finally agreed to conduct the operation,
and in April loaded a contingent of Moroccans into two LSTs and con-
voied them to Syria.24 They moved a second Moroccan contingent in
similar fashion in July.25 As it turned out, some mixture of prudence
and complacency prevailed in Israel and no attempt was made to stop
either of these movements; but the possibility that there might have
been such an attempt -- and Soviet acceptance of that risk -- were not
lost on the Arabs. And, while the movement of the Moroccans to Syria
cannot be considered an unambiguous tip-off of an impending attack,
its potential significance could not have been lost on the Soviets.
The second instance in which the Soviets provided active sup-
port to the Arab cause also occurred in April -- involving, in this
case, an effort to maintain the radical-conservative Arab unity that
the Moroccan troop lift operation was helping to create. The long-
standing territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait had once more
erupted in violence as Iraq seized Kuwaiti-controlled border areas.
The Soviets immediately sent both Admiral Gorshkov and a detachment

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Those apprehensions were not altogether unreasonable. It had long
been clear that only concerted action by all of the Arabs could
defeat Israel. What unity had existed until then among the Arabs
had been largely confined to the more radical elements. Bringing
the conservative Moroccans to the largely radical-manned front lines
was a step toward a qualitatively new -- and for Israel far more
dangerous -- kind of unity.
of warships to Iraq. The exact purpose of these visits remains obscure. Looking back, however, and noting that the first attack "window" was then roughly a month away, it is not unreasonable to infer that the Soviets were attempting to squelch a significant threat to the unity required for the forthcoming offensive. For whatever reason, as the Soviets arrived, the Iraqis relented. In both instances, the Soviets evidenced a significant willingness to take risks. In the first case, they were risking a military confrontation with Israel; in both instances they were taking a political risk that they had heretofore carefully avoided—identification with an "offensive" action.* It is difficult to believe that they did either without a clear picture of the ends being served by their actions.

After the war, in response to the charge that they had violated both the spirit of detente and the terms of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet "Agreement on Basic Principles of Relations" and the follow-on 1973 "Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War," the Soviets claimed that they had in fact warned the United States of the impending conflict.** Perhaps they did. If so, they showed themselves to be singularly unsuccessful as communicators, which is unusual for them.

* In other words, an action intended to alter rather than reinforce the status quo.

** Something they obviously could not have done without some degree of foreknowledge.
In most instances, when the Soviets want to be understood, the recipient gets the message. Perhaps in this case the "warning" they provided was so obscure that it was recognizable only after the fact.

In any event, while the evidence clearly shows the offensive to have been fundamentally an Arab undertaking, it also shows the Soviets to have supported -- rather than merely acquiesced in -- the attack. There is no reason to believe that they either pushed the Arabs into attacking or were enthusiastic in their support for the venture; the opposite appears to have been the case. On the other hand, their lack of enthusiasm was limited. It was not translated into effective opposition: the attack occurred.*

The Soviets were clearly ready for the attack when it came. Some of their own preparations could have been undertaken with little advance warning, but others required considerable lead time.

Soviet naval units began to leave Port Said the day before the attack.** Since an action of that nature can be initiated in a matter of hours, it doesn't reveal how much lead time the Soviets had -- only that they did have some.

* It is possible (but not very likely) that the Soviets had lost their de facto veto power over major Arab military initiatives (a direct attack on Israeli forces -- even if they were occupying Arab territory -- was no casual gesture). It is more likely that the situation simply came to the point where the actual political costs of continued Soviet opposition to Arab desires began to outweigh the potential military costs of supporting the realization of those desires. It is also possible (but again not very likely) that the Soviets perceived some direct benefit for themselves that justified the risks involved.

** See pp. 49, 50 below for details.
The evacuation of Soviet dependents from Egypt and Syria, which began three days before the attack, could have been initiated on relatively short notice. Given adequate contingency planning, it need not have taken more than a day to move the first transport aircraft to the Middle East and start assembling evacuees. No matter how far in advance the Soviet learned about the attack, however, such an evacuation necessarily would have been delayed until the last minute, in order to minimize the opportunity for the Israelis to recognize what was happening and respond.* Consequently while the amount of lead time the Soviets undoubtedly had is increased, it isn't by much.

It isn't clear how much lead time the Soviet require to modify their normal program of reconnaissance satellite coverage. While it is quite likely that there is enough slack in this program to insure that extra boosters and payloads are available for use on short notice, it is difficult to believe that a significant expansion in coverage could be carried out without some planning and preparation. It may be worth noting in this regard that, with one exception, in

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* Unless, of course, the Israelis were to be enticed into a politically (and perhaps militarily) very costly preemptive strike. In any event, it was common knowledge that the Israeli Defense Force required 72 hours to mobilize completely. Consequently, while it was obviously to the Arabs' advantage to maintain secrecy as long as possible, once that 72 hour point had been crossed the Israelis' ability to activate their defenses began to diminish -- and with it the importance of the Soviet evacuation as a tip-off
the year before the October War the Soviets launched only one or
two high-resolution photo-reconnaissance satellites per month. The
exception was May 1973, when they launched three. During October
1973, on the other hand, they launched five\(^*\) -- three of which were
sent aloft during the first ten days of the war.\(^28\)

It is clear how long it takes, starting from "scratch," to
begin to reinforce the Mediterranean Squadron: a minimum of eight
days for surface combatants, which come from the Black Sea Fleet;\(^*\)
the same for nuclear-powered submarines, which come from the Northern
Fleet; and about two and a half times that long for conventional sub-
marines, following the same route. A contingent of Soviet submarines
was entering the Mediterranean just as the War began.\(^***\) Assuming a
normal speed of advance -- and anything dramatically above the normal
would have been a "tipoff" that something important was about to
happen -- these units could have left the Northern Fleet no later than
mid-September. If, in fact, their entry into the Mediterranean was
meant to coincide with the attack, then the Soviets clearly had quite
a bit of warning: at least three weeks.

\(^*\) In addition to two low-resolution photo-reconnaissance satellites.
\(^**\) Assuming an "extra" declaration to exit the Black Sea via the Turkish
Straits is not available. If one is, and the timing is right, then
the first units can be in the Mediterranean within two days. If the
timing isn't right, it will take three days.
\(^***\) See pp. 48-59 for a detailed discussion of Soviet naval movements
both before and during the war.
As noted below, the first unit of the new KARA-class cruiser was in the Mediterranean until the day before the war began. If its presence there was also intended to be a part of this preparatory process, providing a diversionary focus for Western attention, then it may be possible to specify precisely when the Soviets learned the schedule for the attack. This unit deployed to the Mediterranean on 21 September. In order to do so, it would have been necessary for its declaration to transit the Turkish Straits to be submitted on the 13th. This was roughly when the submarines would have been getting under way from their Northern Fleet bases, and mirabile dictu it was the day after Presidents Sadat and Assad of Egypt and Syria concluded a very significant coordination conference in Cairo by reestablishing solid relations with King Hussein of Jordan -- a political sine qua non for a resumption of conflict with Israel.29

IV. MAJOR EVENTS

Figures 1 and 2 below summarize the major events in the October War and the more significant U.S. and Soviet actions taken in connection with it. The events of the war itself have been described so often and in such depth that their detailed reconstruction here is unnecessary.30 Further, many of the actions taken by the superpowers during this period are not listed; most importantly, the diplomatic maneuvering they undertook in the attempt to control the course of events, and their efforts to reinforce their diplomatic positions through the manipulation of their military postures -- e.g., the
FIGURE 1: MAJOR EVENTS IN THE CONFLICT*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northern Front</th>
<th>Southern Front</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05 Oct</td>
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<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Syrian attack initiated</td>
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<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Israeli counter-attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Syrian advance contained</td>
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<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Israeli offensive/break-out into Syrian territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Israeli advance halted at Syrian defenses</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Egyptian offensive (repulsed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Egyptian advance contained</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Israeli West Bank Force (WBF) established</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>WBF reinforced</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>WBF offensive/breakout south along canal</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Ceasefire I - continuation of conflict</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Egyptian III army cut-off in Sinai</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ceasefire II</td>
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* Data compiled from contemporary news reporting (Washington Post, New York Times, Times (London), Daily Telegraph (London)).
**FIGURE 2: MAJOR SOVIET AND U.S. ACTIONS REGARDING THE CONFLICT***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
<th>United States</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Squadron movements initiated</td>
<td>Sixth Fleet movements initiated</td>
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<tr>
<td>05 Oct (SOVMEDRON)</td>
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<td>06</td>
<td></td>
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<td>07</td>
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<td>09</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Resupply airlift initiated</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Kosygin visit to Egypt</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Kissinger visit to Soviet Union</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>U.S.-Soviet agreement on ceasefire</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td></td>
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<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Airlift interrupted—SOVMEDRON repositioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Alert—Sixth Fleet reinforcement and concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>U.S.-Soviet agreement on UNREF</td>
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<tr>
<td>03 Nov</td>
<td>U.S.-Soviet Naval confrontation terminated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

alerting of Soviet airborne forces, and the U.S. worldwide alert --
are slighted. Both these diplomatic actions and their military
adjuncts are discussed briefly below; but since very little reliable
information is available on either, this remains of necessity a
skeletal discussion.

As the conflict began, the United States and the Soviet Union
were pursuing diplomatic paths that diverged significantly. The
United States was pushing for an immediate ceasefire and return to
the boundaries that had prevailed since 1967. The Soviets were stall-
ing. Two weeks later, the situation had been reversed. The Soviets
were pushing (hard) for an immediate ceasefire in place; and the
United States -- although ostensibly in agreement with the Soviets
on the need for an immediate end to the hostilities -- was stalling
(or, more accurately, may have been stalling).

A number of parallels can be drawn between this reversal in
the diplomatic positions of the superpowers and the successive re-
versals that occurred in the military positions of the belligerents.
The first and most obvious is to be found in the nature and timing
of the two kinds of reversals. Within certain limits, the superpowers
adopted diplomatic postures that favored their clients' interests,
and modified these positions as the ebb and flow of combat affected
those interests. A second parallel can be found in the positions
that the superpowers adopted. Reflecting the limits of their own
situations, both superpowers steadfastly favored the cessation of
hostilities, differing only in the urgency they attached to the
achievement of a ceasefire and the character of the situation each
felt should prevail afterwards. The third parallel is a continuing
and pervasive lack of clarity regarding the actual course of both
diplomatic and military events. Who said (and did) what, to whom,
and when, remains obscure.  

Controversy -- both cause and effect of that lack of clarity --
still surrounds U.S. actions. The United States seems to have
made at least three major changes in its diplomatic position during
the conflict. In the beginning, it apparently favored -- and attempted
strenuously to arrange -- an immediate ceasefire and return to the
situation that had prevailed before the outbreak of hostilities.
Subsequently, (change 1) the United States abandoned its attempt to
restore the status quo ante. It then appears (change 2) to have re-
laxed its efforts to bring an end to the fighting. If it did, then
not long thereafter (change 3) it reversed course and intensified
those efforts dramatically. In the end, it took the lead in arrang-
ing the stand-still ceasefire that brought the war to its conclusion.
The first of these changes appears to have occurred very early
in the conflict -- after the failure of the initial Israeli counter-
attack in Sinai and before the Soviet resupply airlift was fully
underway. It came about as the United States first realized that
restoration of the status quo ante was no longer a reasonable objective,
and then saw that the costs of preserving the overall Middle Eastern
balance were escalating. The second apparent change in the U.S.

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position seems to have coincided with the establishment of the U.S. resupply airlift and to have persisted through the subsequent Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal. It was probably intended to allow both of these developments to impact fully on the situation. The third apparent change in the U.S. position was undoubtedly a reflection of the effectiveness of those actions. It occurred in response to escalating Soviet concern over, and efforts to guarantee the safety of, Egypt.

This was not the first time that the Soviets had evidenced such a concern. It had happened in previous Middle East conflicts. More importantly, it had happened earlier in the October War itself. Immediately after the outbreak of the War, and at least in their dealings with the United States, the Soviets seem not to have attached any great urgency to bringing the fighting to a halt.* In the end,

* There is some evidence that, in their dealings with Egypt (and perhaps with Syria as well), the Soviets took a significantly different position -- attempting very early in the conflict to engineer a ceasefire. Precisely what happened, and why, has not been adequately clarified. It appears, though, that within hours of the initiation of hostilities the Soviets approached the Egyptians and attempted to pressure them into accepting a stand-still ceasefire -- ostensibly at the behest of the Syrians. Part or all of this actually might have occurred. There easily could have been an Egyptian-Syrian agreement to end the conflict as soon as the limited military objectives of both had been achieved, and the Egyptians easily could have concluded from their early successes that those initial objectives were far too limited -- that more was within their grasp, and that consequently the fighting should be continued. If there was no such agreement, and the Soviets did in fact make that approach to the Egyptians, then they probably were attempting -- unsuccessfully as it turned out -- to play off Egypt against Syria, to Soviet advantage.
however, they were so anxious to have a ceasefire that they were
moving -- or, at the very least, they took actions that made it
appear as though they were moving -- to intervene in the conflict
and bring it to a halt themselves. Although difficult to trace in
detail, the principal steps in their shift from one position to the
other can be identified, as can the linkages between this shift and
the successive military reversals suffered by Syria and Egypt.

The Soviets took the first visible steps away from their initial
position between roughly the 10th and the 13th of October, as the
Israeli counteroffensive on the Golan Heights gained momentum and the
Israelis began to talk and look as though they might move on Damascus* --
in spite of the clear signal given by the initiation of the Soviet
resupply airlift. At that time the Soviets apparently threatened
Israel directly, and alerted or raised the degree of readiness of
some of their airborne divisions. They did both again, of course,
between the 23rd and 25th, when the Israelis began to look as though they
might move on Cairo** -- in spite of the signal that had been sent.

* It is doubtful that the Israeli leadership seriously contemplated
such a move -- something the Soviets might have suspected, but
could not have known with certainty (and therefore a contingency for
which they had to prepare).

** An Israeli move on Cairo, although militarily more feasible than an
advance on Damascus, was politically far less likely. Again, how-
ever, it was a contingency for which the Soviets had to prepare.
by the launching of some of the SCUD missiles the Soviets had made available to Egypt. How many divisions the Soviets alerted this time, their ultimate degree of readiness, what accompanying steps were taken to prepare for their movement to the Middle East, and whether that movement actually began, all remain obscure. That some of these actions occurred seems beyond doubt. 41

That the subsequent U.S. alert was primarily a response to these Soviet actions also seems beyond doubt. There is, on the other hand, some question regarding the extent to which it was the appropriate response to those actions. 42

V. DESCRIPTIONS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Figures 3 through 16 contain a considerable amount of useful information on naval operations. These are contour-density plots, resembling topographic maps; but instead of showing altitude, they summarize the locations of ships -- in this case, the locations of U.S. and Soviet ships in the Mediterranean throughout October and into the first few days of November 1973.

This period divides rather neatly into six-day segments. The first of these segments covers overt Soviet preparations for the attack; the next three deal with the 18 days of the War itself, the next-to-last brackets the U.S.-Soviet confrontation at sea that followed the war, and the final segment covers the process of relaxation that set in after the crisis had passed. And just as the period of the war can be divided into uniform segments of time, the Mediterranean can also be divided into approximately equal geographical units: one
FIG. 3: SHIP DENSITIES
U.S. CARRIERS, 1 OCT 73-6 OCT 73

U.S. SIXTH FLEET
Contour interval:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
9, 10 ship days per
3,600 square nautical
mile area.

FIG. 4: SHIP DENSITIES
SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON, 1 OCT 73-6 OCT 73

SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON
Contour interval:
2, 4, 6, 8, 10 ship days
per 3,600 square nautical
mile area.
FIG. 5: SHIP DENSITIES
U.S. CARRIERS, 7 OCT 73-12 OCT 73

U.S. SIXTH FLEET
Contour interval:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10 ship days per
3,600 square nautical
mile area.

FIG. 6: SHIP DENSITIES
SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON, 7 OCT 73-12 OCT 73

SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON
Contour interval:
2, 4, 6, 8, 10 ship days
per 3,600 square nautical
mile area.
FIG. 7: SHIP DENSITIES
U.S. CARRIERS, 13 OCT 73-18 OCT 73

U.S. SIXTH FLEET
Contour interval:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10 ship days per
3,600 square nautical
mile area.

FIG. 8: SHIP DENSITIES
SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON, 13 OCT 73-18 OCT 73

SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON
Contour interval:
2, 4, 6, 8, 10 ship days
per 3,600 square nautical
mile area.
FIG. 9: SHIP DENSITIES
U.S. CARRIERS, 19 OCT 73-24 OCT 73

U.S. SIXTH FLEET
Contour interval:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9. 10 ship days per
3,600 square nautical
mile area.

FIG. 10: SHIP DENSITIES
SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON, 19 OCT 73-24 OCT 73

SOVIET
MEDITERRANEAN
SQUADRON
Contour interval:
7, 4, 6, 8, 10 ship days
per 3,600 square nautical
mile area.
FIG. 11: SHIP DENSITIES
U.S. CARRIERS, 25 OCT 73-30 OCT 73

U.S. SIXTH FLEET

Contour interval:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10 ship days per
3,600 square nautical
mile area.

FIG. 12: SHIP DENSITIES
SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON, 25 OCT 73-30 OCT 73

SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON

Contour interval:
2, 4, 6, 8, 10 ship days
per 3,600 square nautical
mile area.
FIG. 13: SHIP DENSITIES
U.S. CARRIERS, 31 OCT 73-5 NOV 73

U.S. SIXTH FLEET
Contour interval:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ship-days per 2,600 square nautical mile area.

FIG. 14: SHIP DENSITIES
SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON, 31 OCT 73-5 NOV 73

SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON
Contour interval:
2, 4, 6, 8, 10 ship-days per 2,600 square nautical mile area.
FIG. 15: SHIP DENSITIES
U.S. CARRIERS, 6 NOV 73-11 NOV 73

U.S. SIXTH FLEET
Contour interval:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10 ship days per
3,600 square nautical
mile area.

FIG. 16: SHIP DENSITIES
U.S. CARRIERS, 12 NOV 73-17 NOV 73

U.S. SIXTH FLEET
Contour interval:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10 ship days per
3,600 square nautical
mile area.
degree squares, each having an area of roughly 3600 square miles.

Reported ship locations -- one position per day for each ship operating in the Mediterranean -- have been aggregated for each six day period and geographical unit. Contour lines have then been drawn connecting those geographical units with total values equalling or exceeding specified amounts. These contours encircle areas in which naval operations of equivalent size or duration were conducted.

Minor distortions have been introduced in the process: for example, as an artifact of a smoothing feature in the computer program that produces the plots, some contour lines extend over land. On the whole, however, each display accurately reflects the geographical distribution of forces that prevailed during the period covered; and comparing one display with its successor makes possible the identification of major fleet movements.

The plots of U.S. and Soviet ship locations presented below differ substantially. However, these differences do not significantly affect their comparability. The first difference is in the composition of the force depicted. Aircraft carriers are the only Sixth Fleet forces shown. On the other hand, all Soviet surface units operating in the Mediterranean -- both combatants and auxiliaries -- are included in the plots depicting the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. Neither set of plots contains information on submarines. The second difference is in the contour intervals on the plots themselves. The lowest value shown on the Sixth Fleet plots is one ship location per
geographical unit per period. In effect, this makes it possible to
trace the day-to-day movements of individual aircraft carriers. The
lowest value shown on the plots of Soviet activity, however, is two
locations per area per period -- which precludes the identification
of individual units. Concentrations of forces are, nevertheless,
depicted with equal fidelity.*

VI. U.S. NAVAL ACTIVITY

The U.S. Sixth Fleet normally consists of some 40 to 45 ships,
including two aircraft carriers with 85 to 95 aircraft each and one
helicopter carrier with an 1800-man Marine assault force. In addi-
tion, it is supported by land-based reconnaissance and maritime
patrol aircraft. When the October War started, the fleet was near
this normal strength (see Table 1).** The disposition of its forces
within the Mediterranean was also normal.***

By the time the War was over, the Sixth Fleet had been augmented
substantially: a third aircraft carrier task group had been added,
as had a second helicopter carrier and 1800-man Marine Amphibious
Unit. Furthermore, the fleet had been moved closer to the combat

* The information processing tools and techniques that produce these
displays were developed at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) by
N. Bradford Dismukes, Jr., LCDR Frederick A. Ackley, USN, and
Robert G. Weinland. The accompanying plots were prepared at CNA,
and subsequently cleared for public release.43

** Actually, it was somewhat above its normal strength. Not counting
submarines, it had 45 units, reflecting a modest buildup of the
amphibious warfare force for impending NATO exercises and subsequent
relief of its ships and men.

***

Unless otherwise indicated, all information on U.S. ship movements
in the Mediterranean is derived from the preceding figures.
TABLE 1:
SURFACE SHIPS (COMBATANTS AND AUXILIARIES) OPERATING WITH THE SIXTH FLEET AT CRITICAL JUNCTURES DURING OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1973*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>05 Oct</th>
<th>26 Oct</th>
<th>18 Nov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Boats</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Lift Ships</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliaries</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>45**</td>
<td>50**</td>
<td>57**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data supplied by U.S. Navy
** Total does not include submarines
zone, concentrated, and prepared for action. And it had been used
to carry out a variety of tasks -- fortunately without a shot hav-
ing been fired.

Both Sixth Fleet carriers were in port on 6 October when the
War started: the Independence in Athens, the Franklin D. Roosevelt
in Barcelona (Figure 3).* The Independence and three destroyers were
ordered to sea almost immediately. They had arrived on-station
south of Crete by the 8th, and they remained there until the War
was over. The FDR remained in Barcelona until the 10th, when it
departed for a holding area to the west of Sicily (Figure 5). On
the 15th, it moved further east, arriving in a new holding area to
the east of Sicily on the 17th. It remained in this location until
the 25th (Figures 7, 9, and 11).

The eastward movement of the FDR on 15 October was part of a
major redispisition of Sixth Fleet underneath the flight path of
U.S. transport aircraft and replacement fighter-bombers enroute to
Israel. Some eight locations spread out across the Mediterranean
from east of the Straits of Gibraltar to southwest of Cyprus were

As indicated above, the Fleet's activities are described here al-
most exclusively in terms of the movements of its aircraft carriers.
Their locations are in essence the location of the Fleet, since they
provide most of its firepower and it is around them that the Fleet
concentrates when it is preparing for action -- as it did near the
end of October.
occupied at this time (see Figure 17)* Sixth Fleet units were
placed in these locations to provide navigational and other direct
support (such as contingency search and rescue) to the transiting
aircraft, and possibly also to deter attempts at harassment or inter-
diction of these movements from the North African littoral.*45
These locations were manned until the 25th.
Meanwhile, a third carrier, the John F. Kennedy, was ordered
toward the Mediterranean. The JFK had been relieved not long before
by the FDR and departed Sixth Fleet for a NATO exercise in the North
Atlantic. When the War started, it was making a post-exercise port
visit in Scotland. It was ordered south again on 11 October, left
on the 13th, and arrived in its holding area west of the Straits of
Gibraltar not long thereafter. It remained there until the 25th.46
All three carriers played a role in the resupply of Israel.
The support required by transport aircraft shuttling between the
Azores and Israel was minimal. However, due to their relatively
short range, and the inability of the United States to arrange land-
ing rights at intermediate points, the majority of the fighter-bombers
sent to replace Israeli losses could not have made the flight with-
out extensive assistance.

* At least one of these locations -- the holding area south of Crete
assigned to the Independence task group -- was already occupied.

** Earlier in the year, Libya had demonstrated both the willingness and the
capability to undertake such actions. On March 21, Libyan fighters
attacked an American reconnaissance aircraft over international waters
some 83 miles from the Libyan coast. Algeria also had the capability
to interfere, but had demonstrated no inclination to do so.47
+ DESTROYERS
B DLG 17 HE Yarnell
C DE 1043 E McDonnell
D DDG 5 CV Ricketts
F DLG 14 Dewey
H DLG 9 Goontz
I DLG 26 Belknap

Δ AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (Appx. locations)
A CVA 67 John F. Kennedy
E CVA 42 Franklin D. Roosevelt
G CV 62 Independence

FIG. 17: ROUTE OF U.S. AIRLIFT TO ISRAEL AND LOCATIONS OF SIXTH FLEET SHIPS SUPPORTING TRANSITTING AIRCRAFT*

*Data supplied by U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy
The F-4 PHANTOMS could fly non-stop from Lajes in the Azores to Israel,* but required inflight refueling, which was provided by SAC KC-135s. The A-4 SKYHAWKS, on the other hand, did not have this endurance. Staging from Lajes, these aircraft were refueled east of the Straits of Gibraltar by tankers launched from the JFK. They then flew on to the FDR. After remaining aboard the FDR overnight they continued on to Israel, refueling once more south of Crete from tankers launched by the Independence.48

Coincident with the declaration of the worldwide DEFCON III alert on the 25th, Sixth Fleet was both augmented and concentrated; and while the airlift continued, most of the support stations occupied by Sixth Fleet units were vacated. The JFK was ordered to reenter the Mediterranean and join the other two carriers.49 The FDR arrived in the vicinity of the Independence southeast of Crete on the 26th, and the JFK arrived in a subsequently designated operating area to the southwest of Crete on the 27th. That alert disposition was maintained until the 30th, when the two easternmost carriers moved west (Figure 11). The Independence returned to Athens shortly thereafter, and the FDR joined the JFK. This somewhat more relaxed disposition was maintained until November 12th, when all three carriers were again located at sea (Figures 13, 15, 16). Increased readiness, which had been established in the Sixth Fleet on October 6th, was maintained there through November 17th.50 When it was finally relaxed, Fleet operations returned more or less to normal, and the JFK departed the Sixth Fleet once again.

* The first group of F-4s actually flew non-stop from the United States to Israel.
Sixth Fleet played no role in the War itself. It remained well outside the combat zone, and was not challenged directly by any of the belligerents. On the other hand, it had a significant effect on the War's outcome -- playing a major role in U.S. diplomatic efforts to contain, isolate and eventually suppress the conflict. Its strength, disposition and activities were tightly controlled and consciously manipulated to provide signals reflecting and reinforcing those diplomatic efforts. Most of those signals were directed at the Soviet Union; some, however, were intended for the belligerents.

The initial U.S. reaction to the outbreak of the conflict was muted. This was probably a reflection of the widespread expectation that events would provide a rough parallel to June 1967: a short war, ending in an Israeli victory. It also may have reflected a "lesson learned" in the June War, when the proximity of Sixth Fleet carriers to the combat zone lent at least minimal plausibility to the otherwise implausible Egyptian charge that U.S. aircraft had participated in the Israeli "first strike" -- which, in fact, they had not. The Sixth Fleet's initial movements -- from the 6th through the 14th -- were obviously intended to provide two signals: that the United States was concerned about the outbreak of conflict and prepared to take action if necessary; but that, fundamentally, it didn't want to become involved, and didn't want the Soviets to become involved, and therefore was exercising restraint. The first of these signals --
U.S. readiness to take action -- was given by the departure of the Independence and its escorts from Athens and their subsequent movement toward the combat zone. The second signal -- U.S. restraint -- was manifested in several ways. The holding area taken up by the Independence task group was not only well outside the combat zone but significantly further away from the scene of conflict than the position occupied by the Sixth Fleet in the last comparable Mideast conflict: the Jordanian Civil War in September, 1970.54 Furthermore, the second Sixth Fleet carrier -- the FDR -- was conspicuously kept in Barcelona until the scheduled conclusion of its visit; and when it did put to sea it was held in the western Mediterranean. In addition, while steps were taken during this initial period to provide for the augmentation of the Sixth Fleet, restraint prevailed. The JFK and half of its escorts, which were making port visits in Scotland, remained there until their scheduled departure dates. They were then diverted to a holding area west of the Straits of Gibraltar -- outside the Mediterranean.55 The other half of the JFK's escorts were operating in the Baltic, and continued their scheduled exercises and port visits (they were not ordered back to the Mediterranean until the 25th, when the JFK was sent in).56 The helicopter carrier Iwo Jima, which had been scheduled to deploy to the Mediterranean in mid-November, was sent a month early; but while it was prepared for departure and its Marines and their equipment were loaded in the glare of publicity, the entire process reflected a desire to "make haste slowly."57
When it became obvious to the United States that this restraint
was not being reciprocated by the Soviets, and that it could not as
had been hoped escape some degree of involvement in the conflict, the
United States changed its posture -- mounting a massive airlift (and a
substantial sealift) to resupply Israel. The airlift began on 13
October, with the first transport landing in Israel on the night of
the 14th. On the 15th, the Sixth Fleet was dispersed across the
Mediterranean. In this configuration it was extremely vulnerable:
carriers were operating without their full complement of escorts, and
escorts were operating outside the defensive envelopes provided by
the carriers' aircraft. As indicated above, this disposition was
necessitated by the requirement to support the transiting aircraft;
but as long as it remained dispersed, Sixth Fleet was giving a
clear -- although unintentional -- signal to all concerned that it
was not about to undertake any offensive actions.

In implementing the increased readiness requirements that ac-
accompanied the establishment of the DEFCON III Alert, Sixth Fleet
adopted exactly the opposite posture. It concentrated, thereby --
and quite intentionally -- signalling that it might undertake offen-
sive actions. During the subsequent period of alert in the Sixth
Fleet* -- i.e., from 25 October through 17 November -- additional and
equally significant changes were made in the Fleet's strength and
disposition. Some of these changes represented deliberate attempts
to signal the Soviets. Others, although initiated for operational
reasons, contained implicit signals.

* Increased readiness was maintained in the Sixth Fleet long after the
DEFCON III measures had been relaxed in other theaters.
The augmentation of Sixth Fleet coincided with the declaration of DEFCON III, but that was partly by chance. The Iwo Jima had left the United States on 16 October, and just happened to enter the Mediterranean within hours of the alert. On the other hand, the entry of the JFK task group at roughly the same time was not happenstance. It had been holding just outside the Mediterranean for the better part of ten days -- a deliberate signal to the Soviets that the United States was exercising restraint -- and it was ordered into the Mediterranean to amplify the very different signal that was now being given.

Furthermore, when the Fleet concentrated, the location in which it concentrated was the holding area south of Crete that had been occupied by the Independence task group since the first days of the war. This was close to if not directly underneath the flight path of the Soviet airlift of the previous two weeks. The Soviets had stopped flying on 23 October, possibly in order to load airborne forces for intervention in Egypt. Had they restarted the airlift across the Mediterranean to move those forces, the Sixth Fleet would have been in an ideal position to interdict such a movement. This

* Its deployment to the Mediterranean was, of course, a deliberate gesture; the coincidence of its entry with the alert, however, was just that: coincidence.

** Its location was beyond the range of Soviet fighter escorts, and between potential Egyptian fighter escorts and the incoming transports. If the Soviets had elected to take a more direct route, avoiding the Mediterranean, they would have been vulnerable to interception by the Israelis.
was a signal the Soviets could hardly ignore.

On 30 October, the Independence and FDR moved west to join the JFK task group in a new and much larger holding area southwest of Crete. This movement, which had been delayed by heavy weather, was undertaken to provide more room for maneuver.**59 It had the effect, though, of moving Sixth Fleet even further away from the combat zone. This gave the Soviets yet another clear -- and unintentional, but in the end not unwelcome -- signal: the United States was relaxing. That signal was reinforced on 3 November when the Independence returned to Athens.

---

* The Soviets had begun targeting surface-to-surface missiles against the carriers on 26 October. Holding the carriers within a small, fixed radius of a fixed point simplified the targeting problem significantly, and the carriers became extremely vulnerable. Giving the carriers room to maneuver complicated the targeting problem again -- reducing their vulnerability somewhat.
VIII. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

Precise figures on the strength and composition of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean immediately prior to the outbreak of the War have not been made public. Enough information is available, though, to enable reasonable estimates of the relevant figures to be made.

The total number of Soviet naval units operating in the Mediterranean varies. Since 1971, when the rate of growth in their presence there slowed, and with the exception of 1973, the annual average has fluctuated between 50 and 55 units. The annual average for 1973, which was inflated by deployments undertaken after the war broke out, was slightly over 56 units.60

Most of the units located in the Mediterranean prior to the War would have been attached to the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.** However, since the Mediterranean is not only an operating area but also the transit route to and from the Black Sea, some of those units would have been located there only because they were enroute somewhere else.

* Obtained by dividing the reported ship day total for the year by 365.

** There is no general agreement as to precisely what this organization should be called. In Soviet terminology it is the "V Eskadra" (or Squadron). The United States officially refers to it as the "Soviet Mediterranean Fleet" -- a term considered to reflect more accurately its size and firepower. Perusal of Webster's provides little solace here: "fleet" is defined as a "number of warships under a single command;" "squadron" is defined as "a naval unit consisting of two or more divisions [tactical subdivisions] and sometimes additional vessels." "Squadron" seems somewhat less amorphous and consequently is used throughout.
Given these fluctuations, the normal size and composition of the Squadron is more readily described in terms of a range of variation for each of several component force types (see Table 2). Some of the fluctuations within this range are accounted for by units operating with the Squadron for brief periods while enroute to or from the Black Sea. Some fluctuations are produced when units operating with the Squadron are replaced: reductions occur when units depart the Mediterranean before the arrival of those that are to relieve them; increases occur when there is overlap in the presence of relieving and relieved units. Other increases reflect temporary deployments for specific operations such as exercises, or reinforcement of the Squadron during crises.

Crisis reinforcements of the Mediterranean Squadron show few clear patterns. The most readily identified patterns are reflections of the restrictions imposed on the Soviets by the Montreux Convention, which regulates passage through the Turkish Straits.*

*The Convention, which has been in effect for 40 years, places significant limits only on the rate at which the Soviets can reinforce their Mediterranean Squadron. It does so by denying passage to certain types of ships — forcing the Soviets to deploy augmenting forces from other, more distant areas — and by controlling the flow of those types of ships that are allowed passage. Operational deployments to the Mediterranean by the submarines of the Black Sea Fleet are prohibited, so augmenting submarines must come from the other Western fleet areas. Almost all of these come from the Northern Fleet, which also supplies the normal complement of submarines that operate in the Mediterranean. There are no such prohibitions against the operational deployment of Black Sea Fleet surface combatants and auxiliaries, but the number and total tonnage of combatants permitted to be in transit through the Straits each day are constrained. In effect, one cruiser and two accompanying destroyers, or five destroyers, represent the practical daily limits for Soviet deployments. The Soviets must also give eight days' advance notice before any transit can be initiated. By filing declarations for many more transits than they actually undertake, and modifying the apparent identities of individual units to match those "extra" declarations, the Soviets have been able to minimize, but not completely circumvent, the effects of this latter restriction.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submarines</th>
<th>Total Submarines</th>
<th>10-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8-10 Torpedo attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 Cruise missile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surface Combatants</th>
<th>Total Surface Combatants</th>
<th>14-22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-4 Cruiser types</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-12 Destroyer types</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 Minesweepers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 Amphibious lift ships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Auxiliaries</th>
<th>Total Auxiliaries</th>
<th>23-26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-20 Support ships (replenishment, repair, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6 Survey/Research ships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Normal" Squadron Strength 47-61

*Data from: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments: Background Material for Addressing Soviet Naval Developments by U.S. Naval Personnel, April 1974, p. 11; [a revised edition, published in April 1975 by the U.S. Government Printing Office, gives slightly different figures for minesweepers (1-3) and support ships (15-20), and therefore, "normal" strength (43-61). With one exception, the figures from the earlier edition are closer to and hence probably more representative of the prewar situation in 1973, so they are given above. The exception is the torpedo attack submarine strength, which reportedly stabilized at a higher level after the October War than had been the norm before the war.]

-43-
Crisis reinforcement of the Mediterranean Squadron is itself a variable: it does not always occur; and, as shown in Figure 18 below, when the Squadron is reinforced, the magnitude and timing of these reinforcements are often quite dissimilar. To some extent, these dissimilarities reflect dissimilarities in the course of development of each individual crisis.

The Israelis achieved tactical surprise in the June 1967 war, but no one was surprised that conflict occurred. The Soviets saw it coming and deployed in anticipation of its occurrence. Everyone was surprised by the Jordanian Civil War in 1970. In that case, however, the Soviets did not augment the Squadron significantly -- perhaps because they didn't want to become involved; perhaps because, given the built-in constraint on their capability for rapid response, any action they might have intended was overtaken by events.

In October 1973, although they knew beforehand that conflict was imminent, the Soviets did not deploy augmenting forces from the Black Sea in advance of its outbreak. And those steps they did take to augment the Squadron before the outbreak of conflict were carefully masked -- most likely because they wanted to avoid "telegraphing" strategic warning that something was about to occur, but possibly also because they wanted to avoid creating the impression that they had played a role in the conflict's initiation.

Once the War was underway, however, the Soviets carried out a large-scale reinforcement of their Mediterranean Squadron. By October 31st, the Squadron had reached a total strength of 96 ships -- an
FIG. 18: NUMBER OF SURFACE COMBATANTS DEPLOYED FROM THE BLACK SEA DURING INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

all-time record. This was achieved through the steady accumulation of forces in the area rather than by any grand surge deployment (see Table 3). In the week after the U.S. alert was declared, however, the Squadron's combat capabilities increased dramatically. Additional submarines arrived from the Northern Fleet (Squadron submarine strength increased from 16 units on the 24th to 23 units on the 31st), and missile-armed surface combatants deployed from the Black Sea (between the 24th and 31st, the number of surface-to-surface missile launchers in the Squadron more than doubled, going from 40 to 88; and in the same period, surface-to-air missile launchers increased from 28 to 46).\[46\]

As indicated elsewhere, the Soviets did more than just react to the outbreak of conflict, however; they anticipated it -- and, without actually augmenting its strength, prepared the Squadron for it. When the War broke out, the Squadron's submarine component was in the process of being expanded to roughly twice its normal size. The submarine group that had been operating in the Mediterranean since April was in the process of being relieved. The relieving group -- which included at least five conventional torpedo attack submarines -- began to enter the Mediterranean on 5 October, the day before the War started. The group being relieved then delayed its return voyage to the Northern Fleet.\[62\] The delay is not surprising. That the replacement occurred may not be surprising either. It may have been nothing more than coincidence. Then again, while conclusive evidence is lacking, given Soviet foreknowledge, this easily could have been an anticipatory reinforcement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>05 Oct</th>
<th>24 Oct</th>
<th>31 Oct</th>
<th>18 Nov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Escorts)⁴</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweepers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious lift ships ²</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Includes units then classed as DE, PCE, PGGP, PTFG. Four of the latter left the Black Sea during this period. Since PTFG's do not as a rule operate with the Squadron, and none of these particular units returned to the Black Sea, they were probably enroute delivery to other countries -- possibly Syria -- and thus are not included in these totals.

(2) LSTs and LSMs. One additional unit was present in early November. It entered the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar, and thus may have been the LST normally located in the vicinity of Conakry, Guinea.

(3) Total surface combatant strength was reported by COMSIXTHFLT to be 26 units on the 24th and 34 units on the 31st.** The difference in totals for the 31st probably reflects movements through the Straits of Gibraltar.

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A second fact, the significance of which is not really clear, is revealed in the record of Soviet movements through the Turkish Straits. The Nikolaev, the lead ship of the new KARA-class guided missile cruiser, which had deployed on 21 September, returned to the Black Sea on 5 October, the day before the War started. This action may appear more significant when it is noted that, although sitting next door in the Black Sea, no third (KARA, KRIVAK) or second (KRESTA, MOSKVA) and only a few first generation (KASHIN, KYnda) modern surface combatants were present in the Mediterranean when the War started. It is almost as though the Soviets, knowing conflict was imminent and fearing that their naval forces might become directly involved, decided to minimize the potential damage they might suffer through such involvement by withholding their newer, more capable units and deploying their older, less capable units — the loss of which would not be crippling.63

1 - 6 October

In the period immediately before the outbreak of the War on 6 October, the Squadron's general disposition throughout the Mediterranean was roughly what one would expect to find during any period of normalcy — except at its far eastern end, where there were potentially significant abnormalities (see Fig. 4).* Few of the Squadron's

*Unless otherwise indicated all information of Soviet ship movements within the Mediterranean is derived from Figures 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 14.
surface combatants or auxiliaries appear to have been at sea.* The bulk of the force was located at the established anchorages (west of Melilla, in the Gulf of Hammamet, and off Kithira Island) and in Egyptian ports (primarily Alexandria, but also Mersa Matruh and Port Said). A port visit was in progress in Yugoslavia.

One unit that normally would have been at sea -- and was -- was the surface combatant trailing the easternmost Sixth Fleet carrier. It was waiting off Athens for the Independence to put to sea. There was no such tattletale waiting off Barcelona for the FDR. This was also normal, since as a general rule carriers are not trailed in the Western Mediterranean except during crises -- and as yet there was no crisis.

The anomalies in the far Eastern Mediterranean are more easily identified than explained. The intelligence collector (AGI) normally located off the Israeli coast should have been at sea throughout this period, but apparently it was not. In addition, the Squadron's

*This is an estimate. The plots upon which this description of Soviet activity is based do not reveal individual ship locations, the lowest level displayed being two ship days per one degree square in each six day period. Major operations (a large number of ships operating together, or even a single ship operating in one location for several days) are displayed. Low-level activity (an individual ship transit, for instance) is not displayed.
amphibious lift force -- generally one ALLIGATOR-class LST and two
POLNOCNY-class LSMs, but now just the latter -- normally would have
been located in Port Said throughout the period. Those units put
to sea on the 5th, however.64 These movements, undertaken in anti-
ipation of the outbreak of conflict, were the first of a number of
significant changes that occurred in the disposition and activity
of the Squadron. The only change in the strength of the Squadron's
surface component during this period was the departure of the KARA-
class cruiser Nikolaev, noted above.

7 - 12 October

In the period immediately after the outbreak of the War, addi-
tional and far more significant changes were made in the disposition
of the Squadron (see Fig. 6). This was largely in response to the
movement of the Independence south of Crete -- toward the scene of
the conflict. A major concentration of Soviet forces was established
in the immediate vicinity of the holding area occupied by the Inde-
pendence. The east of Crete anchorage -- which was within surface-
to-surface missile range of the Independence -- was also occupied
(compare Figs. 5 and 6).

The contingent operating in the far Western Mediterranean was
augmented by the arrival of the submarine relief group and its escor-
ting units coming from the Northern Fleet. This meant that both
major "choke-points" -- the Straits of Gibraltar and Straits of
Sicily -- were covered.
Although it had moved out into the western basin of the Mediterranean on the 10th, the FDR still had not been placed under surveillance by a surface combatant tattletale at the end of the period. The Soviets seem to have expected the FDR to move into the eastern basin, however, because potential tattletales appear to have taken up positions southeast of the Straits of Sicily and south of the Straits of Messina -- one of which the FDR would have had to transit to reach the Eastern Mediterranean.

The amphibious lift ships did not return to Port Said. On the other hand, the support force, composed of rescue, repair, storage and replenishment ships remained in Alexandria throughout the War.

Further east, the AGI apparently returned to its station off the coast of Israel, units of the Squadron began to collect off the Syrian coast, and the initial augmentees from the Black Sea Fleet (a cruiser and two destroyers) arrived in the Mediterranean.\(^65\)

13 - 18 October

The third significant change in the disposition and activity of the Squadron occurred between the 13th and 18th. For what was probably the first time since World War II, the Soviet Navy moved combat forces into an active war zone. On the 6th, both Egypt and Syria had declared substantial areas off their coasts dangerous to foreign shipping.\(^66\) Sixth Fleet ships never entered this zone;
units of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron did (see Fig. 8). After
the 12th, a significant concentration of Soviet units — including
surface combatants — formed between the eastern tip of Cyprus and
the Syrian coast. At no time during the War were the Israelis re-
ported to have taken direct action against Soviet ships or aircraft
enroute either Syria or Egypt. However, on the 10th they began
bombing Syrian airfields, destroying several Soviet transport air-
craft in the process and causing others to turn back; and on the
12th they sank a Soviet cargo ship while attacking Syrian warships
in the port of Tartus.67 This concentration between Cyprus and
Syria appeared immediately thereafter. The Soviets probably moved
their forces into the war zone to provide direct support to their
air and sea lines of communication to Syria. There have been no
indications that these units actually engaged in combat; but they
certainly must have been ready to do so if attacked.68

Additional Soviet amphibious lift ships began to deploy from
the Black Sea during this period. Two units exited the Turkish
Straits on the 14th; four units transited on the 17th (see Fig. 19).
They went directly to Syria. In the light of subsequent develop-
ments, this often has been interpreted as the deployment of an am-
phibious landing force to be employed if direct Soviet intervention
proved necessary. That is possible, but unlikely. The maximum num-
er of Soviet amphibious lift ships present at any one time in the
Mediterranean was nine — four LSTs and five LSMs — with a collec-
FIG. 19: NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS LIFT SHIPS DEPLOYED FROM
THE BLACK SEA DURING INTERNATIONAL CRISSES*

*Data from: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rapport Annuel sur le Mouvement des Navires
249 tive capability of carrying about one brigade.* Intervention with
250 a force of such modest size would have been at best symbolic. But
251 there is no evidence that the Soviets actually deployed such a force.
252 Few naval infantry were noted aboard these ships. And their move-
253 ments were far more compatible with a cargo delivery than a troop
254 lift mission.** Given the damage inflicted on Syrian port facili-
255 ties by Israeli air and naval attacks, and the obvious threat the
256 Israelis could have posed to Soviet shipping, the Soviets probably
257 resorted to the use of amphibious lift ships for critical materiel
258 deliveries. The fact that they were warships could be expected to
259 have some deterrent effect on the Israelis; if attacked they at least
260 had some defensive capabilities; and their ability to deliver their
261 cargo over the beach made the success of their mission independent
262 of the condition of the Syrian ports.
263 These two undertakings in support of the resupply of Syria --
264 providing combatant protection at the terminus, and employing amphi-
265 bious lift ships to insure that critical materials could be unloaded --
266 represented significant departures from past Soviet practice. Prior

267 *
268 The ALLIGATOR LST can carry 28-30 tanks; the POLNOCNY LSM can carry
269 six tanks. Together, these nine ships could have carried approxi-
270 mately 2,000 men.70
271
272 **
273 For example, the first two LSTs that deployed after the initiation
274 of the War transited to Syria, returned to the Black Sea, and deployed
275 a second time -- after the War was over.71 Their return to the Black
276 Sea on the 23rd coincided with Soviet preparations to intervene in
277 Egypt; but that was happenstance. Their transit through the Turkish
278 Straits could not have been declared later than the 16th, well before
279 the necessity for Soviet intervention in Egypt arose.

-54-
to this, Soviet naval forces had rarely been employed for positive
ends -- to accomplish something.* Most of their activity had been
oriented toward the negative objectives of deterrence and defense --
insuring that things didn't occur.72

Two other noteworthy developments occurred during this period.
Surveillance of FDR was initiated when it moved into the Central
Mediterranean (compare Figs. 7 and 8); and, as if to demonstrate that
nothing was amiss, a cruiser and destroyer that had deployed from
the Black Sea on the 10th began port visits to Italy.

19 - 24 October
For most of the period immediately before the U.S. worldwide
alert was declared early on the 25th, the Squadron's disposition and
activities remained essentially unchanged. Coverage of the "choke
points" was maintained; surveillance of the FDR continued; and the
bulk of the force remained concentrated in two areas: around Crete --
in the Kithira and east of Crete anchorages, off Souda Bay where the
Sixth Fleet's amphibious force was located, and in the vicinity of
the Independence task group -- and along the lines of communication
to Syria (see Fig. 10).

No fundamental changes had been made in the Sixth Fleet's pos-
ture since it dispersed across the Mediterranean on the 15th to
support the U.S. airlift; and none were made until the 25th, when the

* Transporting the Moroccans was another such exceptional action.
Fleet began to concentrate south of Crete in consonance with the alert. That concentration represented a significant change in its posture. Equally significant changes occurred in the disposition and activities of Soviet forces as they responded to those Sixth Fleet movements (compare Figs. 10 and 12, and Figs. 11 and 12). It is noteworthy, however, that the Soviets began their "responsive" movements before the U.S. alert was declared, and hence before the Sixth Fleet began to move. The Soviets apparently anticipated strong U.S. opposition to what they felt they might have to do -- intervene directly in the conflict to protect Egypt -- and they moved as quickly as possible to be in an advantageous position to deal with that opposition.

25 - 30 October

Many of the Squadron's movements and activities in the period immediately following the declaration of the U.S. alert were obviously genuine "responses" to the reinforcement and concentration of the Sixth Fleet. Some, however, were not.

As the Sixth Fleet carriers -- now three in number -- and the amphibious group -- now reinforced by a second helicopter carrier -- all began to converge on the holding area south of Crete, the bulk of the Squadron's combatants formed into Surface Action Groups* and

* The specific composition of these tactical formations varies with the forces available when and where they are put together. They generally consist of three (or sometimes four) units, at least one of which is surface-to-air missile (SAM)-equipped, and another of which is equipped with antiship missiles (SSM). The latter can be either surface combatants or submarines. The SAM ships give these groups some defensive capability; the SSM platforms provide their offensive firepower. One unit trails the potential target to provide locating information to the SSM platforms.
moved into the same area -- one Group being assigned to each of the
carriers, a fourth taking responsibility for the amphibious group
(compare Figs. 9, 10, 11 and 12). By the 26th, Soviet forces were
in position and ready to attack the carriers. They maintained that
readiness for the next week.74

Some of the forces that participated in this anticarrier oper-
ation were already operating south of Crete. Others moved out of
the east of Crete and Kithira anchorages -- emptying the latter com-
pletely. Still others were drawn from the concentration off Syria.

Most of the combatants that had been operating off the Syrian
cost, however, moved to a new operating area north of the Nile Delta
(see Fig. 12). The objective of this movement remains obscure.

Since they congregated in an area located between the Sixth Fleet
and Egypt, their presence there had been interpreted variously as
an intervention or as an interposition -- intended to deter U.S.
intervention. Either is possible, but neither is likely. Those
forces could project little power ashore, and thus could do little
to affect the situation where it counted: on the West bank of the
Suez Canal. And the real deterrent was posed by the Surface Action
Groups deployed around the Sixth Fleet's carriers south of Crete.

It is more likely that, once the Soviet airlift to Syria had been
halted on the 23rd, these units were moved toward Egypt to provide
the same sort of support for Soviet lines of communication to Egypt
that they had been providing off Syria. Such support would have
been necessary had the Soviets actually moved to intervene in Egypt.
Whatever the reason for their assembly, those forces did not remain together for long. They had dispersed by the end of the period (compare Figs. 12 and 14).

These two concentrations -- around the Sixth Fleet and off the Nile Delta -- were the most visible steps taken by the Soviets during this period. However, they were not the only significant actions taken. The Soviets were also reported to have moved nuclear materials from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean -- presumably to Egypt. These were widely assumed to have been warheads for the SCUD missiles they had made available to the Egyptians earlier. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, they could have been nuclear warheads for the Mediterranean Squadron's own weapons -- replacements for the conventional warheads with which units had originally deployed, or reloads for those units surviving an initial exchange.

As noted earlier, the Soviets also reinforced the Squadron substantially in the period immediately after the alert, effecting a net addition of 16 units -- 7 submarines, 8 surface combatants, and 1 auxiliary -- between the 24th and 31st.

31 October - 05 November

The Squadron's movements and activities continued to parallel those of the Sixth Fleet as the atmosphere of crisis began to dissipate. As the United States relaxed, the Soviets relaxed; but the United States did not relax completely, and neither did the Soviets. The combatant concentration around the Sixth Fleet carrier force was maintained. It was also shifted westward as the carriers
moved west (compare Figs. 11, 12, 13 and 14). However, when the
signal of relaxation given by the carriers' movement away from
the scene of conflict was strengthened by the Independence returning
to Athens, the Squadron's posture also relaxed: combatants
began to move back into anchorages, a port visit was begun in Yugo-
slavia, and a few units started to return to the Black Sea (compare
Figs. 12 and 14). Most important, the anticarrier operation that
had been initiated in the wake of the alert was terminated.  
Augmentation of the Squadron's combatant strength also ceased.
Four units -- including two NANUCHKA-class large guided missile
patrol boats -- exited the Turkish Straits on the 31st. These were
the last combatants to join the Squadron from the Black Sea until
mid-November.  

In Retrospect

Two aspects of the Squadron's behavior during the War deserve
added emphasis: its responsiveness to U.S. movements and activities,
and the employment of Soviet naval forces for positive ends in a
high-risk situation, as opposed to merely being present in the area.  
Positive use was new. Responsiveness had long been standard operating
procedure for the Squadron -- with one important exception.

The exception concerns the assignment of a Surface Action
Group to the Sixth Fleet's amphibious force. In previous crises --
including the 1970 Jordanian Civil War, in which there was a real
threat of U.S. intervention -- Soviet attention (and firepower) had
been focused on the Sixth Fleet's carriers; its amphibious force had
been largely ignored. Thus the question of Soviet objectives in deploying countering forces had gone unanswered: did the Soviets target the carriers because of their potential for launching strategic nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union itself, or because of their potential for projecting conventional power into whatever local conflicts had brought them to the littoral? In the October War, the amphibious force -- with no capability to strike the Soviet Union -- received exactly the same treatment as the carriers. One question was therefore answered: at the minimum, the Soviets were, in fact, concerned about the potential for U.S. intervention in the conflict ashore. Whether they were concerned about more than that -- i.e., about the carriers' residual strategic strike capabilities -- was not clarified.

Until the October War, the standard operating procedure for the Squadron on the outbreak of open conflict on the littoral was to move away from the combat zone, and -- except as necessary to monitor events ashore and to stay within attack range of the Sixth Fleet's carriers -- to remain outside that zone until the conflict had subsided. During the October War, however, this policy was cast aside. Squadron units not only operated in strength and for an extended period inside the combat zone, but they were performing what can only be termed combatant functions while they were located there.

This was not the first time the Soviets had accepted the potentiality of conflict in providing support to their Arab clients. They
deliberately exposed a number of naval units in 1967 to deter Israeli attacks on Port Said;\textsuperscript{80} and in 1970, in order to deter Israeli air-strikes deep inside Egyptian territory, they deployed a massive air defense system to Egypt, parts of which they themselves manned.\textsuperscript{81} Neither of these actions involved the performance of any positive function, however. Moreover, in both cases it was reasonable for the Soviets to expect that the deterrent would work -- i.e., that the Israelis would not attack their forces in Egypt.

During the October War, on the other hand, while it turned out that the Soviets could count on the Israelis not to attack their transports moving in international sea and air space, the same did not apply once those transports reached Syrian territory: the Soviets had to deploy forces to defend the terminus of their re-supply effort.\textsuperscript{82} They showed themselves willing to do that. That represented a major change in their modus operandi.

\textbf{VIII: INSIGHTS}

In many respects, the outcome of the October War was no less ambiguous than the situation out of which the War itself emerged. There was no clear winner.

Had the War been halted shortly after it began, there might have been obvious victors: Egypt, Syria, and by extension the Soviet Union. But it continued well past that point, and when it finally stopped only the apparent losers stood out: Syria was losing on the battlefield; Egypt was well on the way to doing the same; Israel was winning militarily but losing politically; and the Soviet Union had been shut out in the cold on both counts.
Before the War, few would have predicted that such a conflict would have such an outcome. Given the military situation that prevailed at the end of the first day of fighting, even fewer would have predicted that the Soviets would wind up among the losers. Tracing the course of events from beginning to end, however, makes it clear that, as far as the Soviets were concerned, the outcome was in a sense foreordained. It was the product of four "givens":

1. Each superpower had an overriding interest in avoiding conflict with the other.
2. Both had an only slightly less vital interest in preventing the collapse of the nations they were backing.
3. Local military superiority continues to be important in deciding contested outcomes.
4. The Soviets were unable to project a significant quantum of usable military power into the Middle East.

Each of these points deserves some elucidation.

At the outbreak of the War, both superpowers had incentives to downplay the nature and extent of actual Soviet involvement in its preparation and prosecution. Both acted accordingly. The Soviets were anxious to downplay their role in order not to jeopardize hard-won improvements in their relations with the United States. The United States was no less anxious to preserve those relations; and therefore it too was willing to downplay the Soviet role -- in order to avoid being forced to respond to things to which it did not want to respond, and to take actions it did not wish to take.
In both cases, an action that directly threatened detente was clearly only the first step onto a potentially slippery slope, near the bottom of which stood direct threats to the other superpower (or worse).

As the War went on, and their clients' military fortunes began to change, the Soviets' incentives and actions also began to change. First, it became important that the Arabs realize that the Soviets were supporting them actively. Then it became important that Israel realize this as well. Finally, it became important that the United States receive the same message. The establishment of Soviet air- and sea lifts conveyed the first of these messages. The movement of Soviet naval forces into the combat zone to protect those lift operations, the direct threats made against Israel and, ultimately, the launching of SCUDS -- which in the Middle East could only be regarded as strategic strike weapons -- conveyed the second message. The alerting and apparent marshalling of Soviet projection forces, coupled with explicit statements of their intent to intervene, guaranteed that the United States received the third of these messages.

The United States did not wholly approve of the Soviets' efforts to end the conflict on terms favoring their own clients; and U.S. incentives and actions began to change also -- but these changes were more closely linked with what the Soviets were doing than with the changes taking place in the military fortunes of Israel. It became important to the United States that the Soviets understand two things: that there were limits to the impact they would be permitted...
to exercise on the conflict, and where those limits lay. The United
States would not permit the Soviets to determine the outcome of the
conflict either indirectly, through their resupply efforts, or di-
rectly, by deploying their ground forces into the combat arena. The
initiation of U.S. air- and sea lift operations conveyed the first
of those messages to the Soviets. The worldwide U.S. military alert
called Soviet attention to the actions that transmitted the second
of those messages. When it called its alert, the United States also
insured that it, rather than the Soviets, had the superior military
capability in the critical place at the critical time: it reinforced
the Sixth Fleet and concentrated it athwart the Soviet's air and sea
tines of communication to the Middle East, making Soviet intervention
in the conflict, at best, potentially very costly, and at worst,
militarily infeasible. The Soviets got that message.

This may or may not have been the message the United States
intended to send. The reinforcement and concentration of the Sixth
Fleet may have been ordered only as a precaution, or undertaken for
some specific purpose that did not include influencing Soviet be-
havior. Regardless of their antecedent(s) -- which the Soviets
could not have known with certainty -- those steps contained a
message no prudent Soviet decision-maker could ignore.

At the very minimum, an outcome like that argues the case for
a better understanding of this unique form of non-verbal communi-
ation. It is obviously in the United States' interest to insure that,
both routinely and in crises, its actions accurately reflect its in-
intentions, although there may be occasions in the future on which
it wants to achieve precisely the opposite effect. On both counts
then, prudence dictates that efforts be devoted to acquiring some
fluency in this mode of discourse.
SOURCES


6. Herzog, op. cit., p. 29; Sabri, op. cit., p. 22.


161 10. The most authoritative evidence is contained in: "The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read," The Village Voice, February 16, 1976, p. 78 [quoting the unpublished final report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, completed January 19, 1976].


27. See number 12 above.


30. The following sample is representative of the wide range of such reconstructions available: a series of three articles by the "Insight Team" of the Sunday Times (London) -- "Secret Arab Deal that Launched the War," (October 14, 1973); "How Israel Confounded the Superpowers," (October 21, 1973); and "Failure of the Superpower Diplomats," (October 28, 1973) -- subsequently expanded into a book entitled The Yom Kippur War, Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1974; a similar series of articles by Christopher K. Dobson and Ronald Payne, appearing under the general title, "Why the Arabs Didn't Win," in the Sunday Telegraph (London) December 9, 16, 23 and 30, 1974; El-Rayyes and Nahas, op. cit.; Herzog, op. cit.; and Schiff, op. cit.
31. The participating countries' official histories remain to be written — or, if written, they remain to be released. Accounts by individuals directly involved have begun to appear, and more are expected. Among the former are: Golda Meir, My Life, New York: Putnam, 1975; and Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life; New York: William Morrow, 1976. The memoirs of Presidents Sadat and Nixon are currently in preparation; Secretary Kissinger's are expected to appear subsequently.


37. A semi-public propaganda war broke out in April 1974 between the Soviet Union and Egypt, with the former accusing the latter of having refused to honor a Syrian request for a ceasefire late on the opening day of the war, and the latter accusing the former of having misrepresented Syrian desires for a ceasefire.


49. Zumwalt, op. cit., p. 443.


51. Information released by U.S. Navy.

52. Johnson, op. cit., p. 299.

53. COMSIXTHFLT (Vice Admiral Daniel Murphy, USN), "after action report" [hereafter: COMSIXTHFLT report], quoted in Zumwalt, op. cit., p. 435.

54. Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. USN, "View From the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flagship," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 98-2 (February 1972), pp. 18-29. A chart accompanying this article indicates that, at the peak period of the Jordanian crisis, a U.S. task force -- composed of two aircraft carriers, a helicopter carrier and 12 escorts -- was operating to the southwest of Cyprus, roughly 150 miles to the east of the position that would be occupied by the Independence Task Group in 1973.


56. COMSIXTHFLT report, quoted in Zumwalt, op. cit., p. 447.


59. Ibid., p. 444.


62. Ibid., p. 437.


64. Herzog, op. cit., p. 48.


71. Rapport Annuel.

72. Weinland, op. cit.

73. COMSIXTHFLT report, quoted in Zumwalt, op. cit., p. 447.

74. Ibid.


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