A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR 1965-1972

Editor: Thomas C. Thayer

Volume 12
CONSTRUCTION AND PORT OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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**A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR**
1965-1972 VOLUMES 1-12

**Thomas C. Thayer**

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**ABSTRACT**
This twelve volume set includes every article printed in the fifty issue series of the *Southeast Asia Analysis Report*. The SEA Analysis Report represented a month-by-month analysis of Vietnam War activity including forces and manpower, VC/NVA operations, Allied ground, naval and air operations, RVNAF, casualties and losses, population security, war costs and inflation and construction and port operations in South Vietnam.

CONSTRUCTION AND PORT OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

Final rept.

Editor: Thomas C. Thayer

18 Feb 75

127 F.
A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

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Volume 11 - Economics: War Costs and Inflation
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A Systems Analysis View Of The Vietnam War: 1965-1972

VOLUME 12

CONSTRUCTION AND PORT OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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<td>Feb 67</td>
<td>120</td>
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</table>
This volume, plus the other eleven volumes in the series, contains every article ever printed in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report (a few additional papers not printed in the report are occasionally included, too).

Fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report were published from January 1967 through January 1972 by the Southeast Asia office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The Report had two purposes. First, it served as a vehicle to distribute the analyses produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. It thus provided other agencies an opportunity to tell us if we were wrong and to help prevent research duplications. We solicited and received frequent rebuttals or comments on our analyses which sharpened our studies and stimulated better analysis by other agencies. Second, it was a useful management tool for getting more good work from our staff -- they knew they must regularly produce studies which would be read critically throughout the Executive Branch.

The first page of the Report stated that it "is not an official publication of the Department of Defense, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or comparable officials." The intent was solely to improve the quality of analysis on Southeast Asia problems -- and to stimulate further thought and discussion. The report was successful in doing precisely this.

We distributed about 350 copies of the Report each month to OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), the Military Departments, CINCPAC, and Saigon, and to other interested agencies such as the Paris Delegation, AID, State Department, CIA and the White House Staff. Most copies circulated outside OSD were in response to specific requests from the individual person or agency. Our readership included many of the key commanders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington and in the field. Their comments were almost always generous and complimentary, even when they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts appear below:

"I believe the 'SEA Analysis Report' serves a useful purpose, and I would like to see its present distribution continued." (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 31 May 1968)

"We used a highly interesting item in your May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to the Secretary, which I've attached." (State Department, 28 June 1967)

"We were all most impressed with your first monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. Not only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we would appreciate it if we could receive 4 (four) copies from now on." (White House, 9 February 1967)
"Ambassador has asked me to tell you that he has much appreciated and benefited from the studies and analyses of this publication." (State Department/White House, 24 January 1969)

"Congratulations on your January issue. The 'Situation in South Vietnam' article was especially interesting and provoking." (State Department, 24 January 1969)

"I let Ambassador take a swing at the paper. He made several comments which may be of interest to you. Many thanks for putting us back on distribution for your report. Also, despite the return volley, I hope you will continue sending your products." (MACV-CORDS, 17 June 1968)

"As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA Analysis Report, I see a need for more rounded analyses in the pacification field and fewer simplistic constructs." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 17 April 1968)

"The SEA Programs Division is to be commended for its perceptive analysis of topics that hold the continuing concern of this headquarters... The approach was thoughtfully objective throughout and it was particularly pleasing to note a more incisive recognition of factors that defy quantified expression." (Commander, US Army Vietnam-USARV, 29 November 1967)

"In general, I think it is becoming the best analytical periodical I've seen yet on Vietnam (though there's not much competition)." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 21 April 1967)

"Statistical extrapolations of this type serve an extremely useful purpose in many facets of our daily work." (CIA, 6 February 1967)

"One of the most useful Systems Analysis products we have seen is the monthly Southeast Asia Progress Report... Indeed it strikes many of us as perhaps the most searching and stimulating periodic analysis put out on Vietnam." (President of The Rand Corporation, 22 October 1969)

In November 1968, 55 addressees answered a questionnaire about the Report: 52 said the report was useful, 2 said it was not, and 1 said, "The report does not meet an essential need of this headquarters;" nonetheless, it desired "to remain on distribution" for 7 copies. From 48 questionnaires with complete responses, we found that an average 4.8 people read each copy -- a projected readership of 500-950, depending on whether we assumed 1 or 2.4 readers of copies for which no questionnaire was returned.

Readers responding to the questionnaire reported using the Report for the following purposes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Making</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefings</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 100%
In addition, readers reported about equal interest in each of the seven subject areas normally covered in the Report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Operations</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacification</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly Forces</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployments</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics/Construction</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was some negative reaction to the Report. Concern was expressed about "the distorted impressions" the Report left with the reader and its wide dissemination which "implied its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving the document increased credibility."

Given the way in which the Southeast Asia Analysis Report was used, the important responsibilities of many of its readers, and the controversial aspects of the report, I decided to include in these twelve volumes every article ever published in a Southeast Asia Analysis Report. This will allow the users of these volumes to arrive at their own conclusions.

Thomas C. Thayer
February 18, 1975
The military construction program in support of SEA operations is currently funded (through FY-66S) at $1,726.2 million. (See Table 1). As of December 31, 1966, the Military Services reported that $1,616.0 million had been released to the field. The current cost estimate of the projects under way with these funds is $1,782.8 million, and the dollar value of the construction completed (i.e., Work-In-Place, or W-I-P) is $557.8 million, indicating a 37.5 percent completion based on current cost estimates.

**Prospects Reporting**

Table 2 shows progress on the MILCON program by month and by country. The table starts in March 1965 with data from the first monthly Construction Progress Report (DD-6610). "Work-Planned" is the forecast of the W-I-P to be completed in next month. A comparison of the Work-Planned and Work-Actual entries for a given month indicates the success of the construction units, contractors and troops (in SVN and Thailand), in meeting their monthly estimate. Table 3 shows progress and planning at selected bases and ports. These data also come from the DD-6610 report.

**Program/Budget Decisions**

The December decisions for the FY 1967 Supplemental and FY 1968 MILCON program budget are summarized on the right side of Table 1. Included in the 67S figures is $126.4 million to cover the unfunded part of the REK-BRJ contract overrun in SVN. Including $77 million provided from the FY 66S, the total overrun funding will be $203.4 million. However, data in the NAVFAC Construction Status Report of January 1, 1967 shows that the difference between current cost estimate and funding is $231.5 million. OSD(I&I) states any increase in cost over programmed funds must be absorbed by the necessary scope reductions.

**Jet Airbase Pavements Analysis**

An analysis of the programmed airfield pavements at the eight jet-capable bases in South Vietnam was conducted to determine if the pavements (runways, taxiways, and operational aprons) will be adequate to support approved Program #4 aircraft deployments. Planned base loadings for all types of aircraft were considered at Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, Chu Lai, Da Nang, Phan Rang, Phu Cat, Tan Son Nhut, and Tuy Hoa. Pavement assets considered were those originally available plus MAP and MILCON projects funded through FY-66S. The time frame was December 1968, when all programmed-pavement should be completed.

The analysis concluded that:

1. Runways programmed at the eight jet bases will support sustained Program #4 operations. This table summarizes the major characteristics of these fields:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Runway</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Width</th>
<th>Runway Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>8,000 ft</td>
<td>200 ft</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>6,500 ft</td>
<td>150 ft</td>
<td>Asphalt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>5,000 ft</td>
<td>125 ft</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>7,000 ft</td>
<td>175 ft</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
<td>6,000 ft</td>
<td>180 ft</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Cat</td>
<td>7,500 ft</td>
<td>200 ft</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Son Nhut</td>
<td>10,000 ft</td>
<td>250 ft</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Hoa</td>
<td>4,500 ft</td>
<td>100 ft</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
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## Airfield

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Airfield</th>
<th>Length (Ft)</th>
<th>Runway</th>
<th>Operational Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
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<td>Concrete</td>
<td>Completed May 1967</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>AM-2</td>
<td>Completed May 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>4,000 a/</td>
<td>AM-2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,000 a/</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4,000 a/b/</td>
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<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
<td>Completed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
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<td>Completed</td>
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<td>Phu Cat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuy Hoa</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9,000</td>
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\[a/\] USMC Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS).
\[b/\] Crosswind.

At Cam Ranh Bay, Chu Lai, Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa, where the secondary runways are AM-2 expeditionary matting, continued close attention must be paid to maintaining them for backup use, especially during the rainy periods.

2. Sufficient taxi-ways, holding and warm-up aprons, and wash racks will be provided at all bases to meet Program #4 aircraft and operational needs.

3. In operational apron, Cam Ranh Bay, Chu Lai, Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa will have surpluses, which should be considered for reprogramming. At Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Phu Cat, and Tan Son Nhut there will be significant deficiencies, some of which could be met by reprogramming. At Tan Son Nhut this would not help because of the lack of real estate. However, crowded parking could be reduced there by redeploying units to other bases. The details by base are shown on the following Table.
By considering the aggregated jet bases only, there is a sizeable deficiency (365,577 SY) in total operational apron. This could pose a serious problem in case one or more fields was closed for an extended time due to enemy action or other emergency. In those cases, redeployments would have to be made, and non-jet aircraft might have to be sent to other than jet bases.

This SA/SEA Programs Division analysis is available in that office to interested parties.
## TABLE 1

**SOUTHEAST ASIA MILITARY CONSTRUCTION**

**FUNDING SUMMARY**

($ millions)

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<td>30.3</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<td>21.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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<td>11.9</td>
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<td>14.2</td>
<td>97.1</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>165.7</td>
<td>1,202.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

|                |          |           |          |            |           |
| South Vietnam  | 36.1     | 74.9      | 73.4     | 108.0       | 684.5     |
| Thailand       | 8.9      | 20.6      | 0        | 26.9        | 160.7     |
| United States  | 0.5      | 0         | 0        | 7.3         | 153.7     |
| Other          | 7.6      | 12.3      | 9.5      | 23.5        | 203.8     |

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- Includes transfers of $168.5 million from DOD Contingency Fund to Services.
- Includes $2.5 million for RVNAF facilities.
- Includes $6.95 million for NIKE-X TACMAR Building on Kwajalein.
- Includes for PRACTICE MIKE: Army, $2.3 million in USAF; $6.0 million in SVN and $4.0 million in Other.
- Includes for PRACTICE KIM: Army, $2.3 million in USAF; $6.0 million in SVN and $4.0 million in Other.

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CONFIDENTIAL
## Tabled Data

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3/ Includes transfers of $168.5 million from DOD Contingency Fund to:

4/ Includes $2.5 million for RVNAF facilities.

5/ United States and Other.

6/ Includes $5.95 million for MIKE-X TACMAR Building on Kwajalein.

7/ Includes for PRACTICE NINE: Army, $0.3 mill in USAir Force, $5.0 mil

8/ Plus $200 million DOD World-wide Contingency Fund.
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*rvices.

...ion in SVN and $4.0 million in Thailand. (Budget Acont. FY-1967B)*

OASD/SA/SEA Programs Division
February 1, 1967
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**TOTALS FOR ALL 10 WEEKS**

- Project Total: 1,234,675
- Project Actual: 1,234,675
- Project Variance: 0
- Project Variance as %: 0%
- Project Variance / %: 0

**CONFIDENTIAL**

---

*Note: The document appears to contain a table with data comparing actual and planned values, including week-specific and total figures. The data seems to be related to some form of project or task tracking, possibly in a business or organizational context. The table includes columns for 'Week', 'Actual', 'Plan', 'Plan - Actual', 'Plan - Actual as % of Plan', and 'Plan - Actual / % of Plan', and the data spans several weeks with totals for the entire period.*
### Table: Program Cost Forecast

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### Table: Program Cost Breakdown

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</table>

**Source:** USDA Report

**OAKLY Plastics Program Div.**
**January 10, 1957**

**Page 3 of 3**
### III. PHILIPPINES

**Base (Service) with estimated cost over $10 million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Program Amount Funded (b)</th>
<th>Current Working Estimate</th>
<th>Physical Completion in $</th>
<th>Work - Planned</th>
<th>Work - Actual</th>
<th>Scheduled NOD (Airfield Pavements)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

### IV. OKINAWA

**Base (service) with estimated cost over $10 million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Program Amount Funded (b)</th>
<th>Current Working Estimate</th>
<th>Physical Completion in $</th>
<th>Work - Planned</th>
<th>Work - Actual</th>
<th>Scheduled NOD (Airfield Support)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

### V. OTHER BASES (Service) with estimated cost over $10 million

1. **Andersen, Guam (Air Force)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Program Amount Funded (b)</th>
<th>Current Working Estimate</th>
<th>Physical Completion in $</th>
<th>Work - Planned</th>
<th>Work - Actual</th>
<th>Scheduled NOD (Fuel Storage)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. **Ching Chuan Field, Taiwan (Air Force)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Program Amount Funded (b)</th>
<th>Current Working Estimate</th>
<th>Physical Completion in $</th>
<th>Work - Planned</th>
<th>Work - Actual</th>
<th>Scheduled NOD (Airfield Pavements)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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**Notes on page 1, Table III**

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### CONFIDENTIAL

**SOUTHEAST ASIA MILITARY CONSTRUCTION**

**TABLE 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Program Amount Funded (b)</th>
<th>Current Working Estimate</th>
<th>Physical Completion in $</th>
<th>Work - Planned</th>
<th>Work - Actual</th>
<th>Scheduled NOD (Airfield Pavements)</th>
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</thead>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Program Amount Funded (b)</th>
<th>Current Working Estimate</th>
<th>Physical Completion in $</th>
<th>Work - Planned</th>
<th>Work - Actual</th>
<th>Scheduled NOD (Airfield Pavements)</th>
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</thead>
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</table>

### CY-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Program Amount Funded (b)</th>
<th>Current Working Estimate</th>
<th>Physical Completion in $</th>
<th>Work - Planned</th>
<th>Work - Actual</th>
<th>Scheduled NOD (Airfield Pavements)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

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**OAKDA/S/5261
February, 1962**
Program Summary and Progress

The military construction program in support of SEA operations is currently funded (through FY 1966) at $1,728.2 million. As of January 31, 1967, the Military Services reported that $1,669.4 million had been released to the field. The projects started with those funds are now estimated to cost $1,869.4 million. Construction completed on January 31 was valued at $804.6 million, which indicates a 44 percent completion based on current cost estimates. Table 1 shows progress on the MILCON program by month and by country. A review of Work-Actual and Work-Planned for the ten reporting months shows that in all but two the actual output of the construction units, contractor’s and troop (in SVN and Thailand), exceeded their planned performance. December 1966 output exceeded the planned by 12 percent and January 1967, 45 percent. This table summarizes the Work-in-Place performance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1966</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work-Planned</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work-Actual</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                   | 1966 |          |        |        |        |        | 1967 |
|                   |      | September| October| November| December| January|
| Work-Planned      | 74.7 | 87.9      | 86.2   | 91.9    | 90.8    |
| Work-Actual       | 85.1 | 78.7      | 99.3   | 106.6   | 131.3   |

Underfunding of SVN Projects

Data in the NAVFAC Construction Status Report of February 1, 1967 shows that the difference between current cost estimate and funding for projects underway in SVN is $176.1 million. Included in the FY 1967 budget request is $126.4 million to complete funding of the $203.4 million cost overrun estimated in September 1966. When these FY 1967 funds are applied to the current estimate of underfunding, there is still a deficit of $49.7 million, up $4.6 million over 1 January. OASD(T&L) states that scope adjustments must be made to absorb any cost growth.
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Jan</td>
<td>Apr</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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Jet-Capable Airbase MILCON Costs

The eight jet capable airbases in SVN will cost about $4.01 billion, or 37% of the total MILCON funds now approved for in-country construction. The following table summarizes the estimated costs for airfield pavements, airfield support facilities, cantonments, and communications facilities under construction at eight sites.

SVN JET AIRFIELD CVE SUMMARY
($ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base (Service User)</th>
<th>Airfield Pavements</th>
<th>Airfield Support Facilities</th>
<th>Cantonments</th>
<th>Communications Facilities</th>
<th>TOTAL CVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa (AF, A)</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay (AF, N)</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai (MC)</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang (AP, MC, A)</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Rang (AP)</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Cat (AP)</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Son Nhut (A, AP)</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Hoa (AF)</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a/ Proportionate share of total base program that will be occupied by aviation units.
b/ Includes Ky Ha Air Facility.
c/ Includes Marble Mountain Air Facility (Da Nang-East).
d/ Includes FFCS 08, Ammunition Storage.
e/ Includes interim Port Facilities with CVE of $5,069,000.
f/ Excludes Hospital: 200 bed with CVE of $900,000.
CWE: Current working estimate of cost.
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At Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Cat, Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa virtually no facilities existed before the military construction projects started. However, at the other sites, sizeable assets existed and the MILCON projects have added runways, parking aprons, and supporting facilities to handle high density jet aircraft operations.

C-130 Capable Airfields in SVN

CINCPAC's requirement through FY 1968, as revalidated by message of January 24, 1967, is for 62 C-130 capable airfields in SVN (in addition to 8 jet capable and 17 other airfields). These fields will fulfill all currently known tactical and operational requirements in SVN.

The C-130 airfields selected by MACV and validated by CINCPAC are divided into three categories according to tactical use: thirty Forward Deployment Fields, twelve Logistical Airfields, and twenty Tactical Unit Bases. The pavement characteristics of these fields are summarized in this table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Field</th>
<th>No. of Fields</th>
<th>Runway</th>
<th>Taxiway</th>
<th>Parking Apron</th>
<th>Total Pavement</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fwd Deployment</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3500'x60'</td>
<td>150'x150'</td>
<td>1260'x36'</td>
<td>153,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical Unit</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3500'x60'</td>
<td>150'x150'</td>
<td>1260'x36'</td>
<td>153,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5000'x60'</td>
<td>150'x150'</td>
<td>2760'x36'</td>
<td>374,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The runways and turnaround areas will be constructed of AM-2/MX-19 heavy duty aluminum matting and taxiways and parking aprons will be of MS61 steel matting. Average material cost of aluminum matting is $4.83/sq ft and $1.39/sq ft for steel, or $1,498,950 for a Forward Deployment Base.

Locations of the 87 airfields planned for SVN are plotted on Chart 1. Changes in the tactical situation may require that some of the C-130 fields be built at other sites, but the chart shows current CINCPAC plans. This table summarizes the types of airfields by Corps Tactical Zone:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>Jet Avn Units &amp; Helicopter</th>
<th>Forward Deployment</th>
<th>Logistical</th>
<th>Tactical Unit</th>
<th>Total Fields</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>III</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In general, the C-130 fields will be built in the most expeditious
manner, using matting, troop labor and expeditionary airfield techniques
not requiring MCP support. The matting requirements and its availability
are under close control by the Services in Vietnam and MACV J-4 so that
operational needs will be met on schedule. A review of the MACV repov,
"Construction Program, South Vietnam, Status and General Requirements
revised 1 December 1966, shows that requirements have been stated for
permanent asphalt runways at 7 single runway fields where matting runways
are also being programmed. These bases are Ban Me Thout, Phan Thiet,
Dalat Cam Ly, Boa Loc, Phu Loi, Le Khe, and Baria. Construction plans
for these bases should be reviewed to confirm the type runways that will
be built, so that only the necessary supporting resources are programmed
and required material procured.
An Ninh
Tuy Hoa (North)
Ban Ho (South)
Binh Hoa
Go Cong
Lei Hoa
Logistical Airfields

Tactical Unit Base Airfields

Numbers refer to locations on chart.

MACV plans to complete these fields during FY 1968.

Types of Airfields
- Jet-Capable Airbase
- Other Airfield
- Forward Deployment Fields
- Logistical Airfield
- Tactical Unit Base

Refer to text for names associated with numbers

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CONSTRUCTION COST GROWTH IN SVN:

The estimated cost to complete MILCON projects underway in SVN increased sharply during February; the underfunding (difference between current working estimate and funding) increased by $95.2 million to a total of $145 million, according to the March 1, 1967 NAVFAC Construction Status Report, Vietnam. This table shows the cost growth and underfunding for the past six months.

**CONSTRUCTION COST GROWTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM a/**

($ Million)

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Working Estimate</td>
<td>862.1</td>
<td>1,044.9</td>
<td>1,147.7</td>
<td>1,153.3</td>
<td>1,173.1</td>
<td>1,207.2</td>
<td>1,302.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funds Released to Field</td>
<td>806.9</td>
<td>832.0</td>
<td>998.6</td>
<td>1,000.7</td>
<td>1,001.6</td>
<td>1,031.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicated Underfunding</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>212.9</td>
<td>149.1</td>
<td>152.6</td>
<td>171.5</td>
<td>176.0</td>
<td>271.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overrun Funds Not Released</td>
<td>203.2</td>
<td>203.2</td>
<td>143.2</td>
<td>143.2</td>
<td>126.2</td>
<td>126.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Underfunding</td>
<td>(148.0)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>145.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Source: NAVFAC Construction Status Report, Vietnam (monthly).
b/ Excludes TURNKEY, for which in February 1967 CWE = Funding = $52.0 million.
c/ Includes funding from FY 1965R thru FY 1966S.
d/ Includes funding from FY 1962R thru FY 1966S. For FY 1962R thru FY 1964 Reprog. CWE = $5.3 million, Funding = $5.0 million.
CINCPAC established a study group in February, chaired by CINCPAC J-4, to study the history of SVN construction cost growth, and to determine the causes and methods of preventing it in the future. Results of the study are not yet available.

As a means for keeping construction costs within approved funds, the Level of Effort (LOE) concept was developed and is currently being placed in effect. Under this concept MACV and the 0.2C-RVN will establish a financial plan within which the contractor must operate. The contractor's level of effort and workforce plans will be tailored to fit the established financial envelope. This allows contractor control on the basis of out-of-pocket expenses rather than the previous "CWE" control. Inherent in the LOE plan will be authority for the 0XCC-RVN to have the contractor partially complete projects. In essence the LOE plan encompasses the following:

a. Those projects assigned for contractor completion within the contractor funding envelope.

b. Those projects to be partially completed by the contractor within his funding and workforce level and to be finished by troop units using contractor material assets.

c. Those projects to be accomplished by troop construction only.

d. Those projects requiring appropriate scope reductions or deletion:
SVN LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOCs)

The funded construction program provides $24 million through FY 66S for LOC improvement, maintenance and new construction. In addition $59 million has been provided in the FY 67S and FY 68 budgets for additional inter-facility programs. However, MACV has stated requirements for a major inter-facility program costing over $200 million (in contractor costs) that has not been funded. Besides being costly, the latter program raises questions of design, security, and whether it should be funded by AID or DOD.

Current Program. The funded (through FY-1966S) LOC program in SVN provides for minimal improvements to road networks local to military installations and port areas. Major bridges at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay are partially funded, and some intra-base railroad spur work has been done.

Table 1 shows existing LOC improvement projects, which are estimated to cost $41.6 million, are funded at $24.4 million, and were $9.4 million complete on March 23, 1967. Excluded from this list, because the costs are unidentifiable, are projects under way for roads and railways in the the local areas of cantonments, ports, airfields, and supply facilities. Besides these projects funded in the MILCON appropriation, there are many projects for intra-facility LOC maintenance and improvement funded from O&M appropriations. This work is done by base civil engineering units and contractors. Since O&M funds are interchangeable among projects, subject only to over-all Service ceilings, it is impossible to identify the amount of construction being done with O&M funds.

The FY-1967S and FY-1968 MILCON budgets have the following funds approved for LOC improvement projects:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY-1967S</th>
<th>FY-1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>6,638</td>
<td>36,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>4,919</td>
<td>10,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,225</td>
<td>46,554</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A breakdown of these funds into projects by base appears in Table 2. The projects all support military bases and operations and are therefore funded in the MILCON program.

Some of MACV's interfacility requirements in the I-CTZ will be met by construction approved for PRACTICE NINE. National Route 1 will be upgraded to a 2-lane, 35-ton capacity, all-weather road from Da Nang to Dong Ha (110 miles). The work will be done by an NMCB for an estimated material cost of $4.6 million. In addition Route 9 from Dong Ha to Thon Son Lam (15 miles) will be upgraded to similar standards by troop labor for a cost of $0.4 million. Bridges along these routes will be 2-way, 35-ton capacity.
Requirements. In addition to the program discussed above, MACV has stated a need for 1166 miles of priority road improvement and new construction and over 300 miles of railway main lines and spurs.

The priority road program would provide two-way, all-weather, 50-ton capacity, 22 feet wide roads with 5-foot shoulders. In general, this program would provide improvements and new construction where necessary for:

1. 627 miles of coastal Route 1-2A from Saigon to Dong Ha, near the DMZ;
2. 95 miles of Route 9 from Qui Nhon to Pleiku;
3. 94 miles of Route 21 from Ninh Hoa (33 miles north of Nha Trang) west to Ban Me Thout;
4. 68 miles of Route 11 from Phan Rang northwest to Dalat;
5. 104 miles of Route 4 from Saigon to Can Tho, in center of the Mekong Delta Region; and
6. 178 miles of roads connecting Saigon with Trang Bang, Phouc Vinh, Tai Khe, and Vung Tau.

These roads are plotted on Chart 1.

VC Action Against LOC's

Only limited data are available on Vietcong interdicting of LOC's. Chart 1 shows those sections of the national highway system, which MACV has given priority for improvement, which have been reported closed for at least the last three months. Intelligence data does not disclose if these roads are closed because of VC activity against traffic or because of enemy damage to the roadbed or bridges. Nor have we determined the sections closed for short periods. The CY 1967 Combined Campaign Plan for SVN set a goal of 900 miles of national and inter-provincial routes secure for unescorted travel. Recent intelligence indicates that this goal may be met, thus providing one essential element for the interfacility highway improvement program.

Funding Responsibility. The MACV national highway and railroad construction program, desired also by AID for country redevelopment, has not been funded or started. The question is who is to fund the program if it is to be initiated. The Army has responsibility for funding sabotage repair of the highways and railways. Approved O&M funds for the Army to carry out this work are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1967</th>
<th>FY 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highway Maintenance</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Replacement</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MACV feels that these funds are only enough to provide minimum support to the GVN Ministry of Public Works, and that they will not permit the major upgrading that should be undertaken.

MACV, with Embassy/Saigon and AID/Saigon support, has requested $100 million and authority to contract with RMK-BRJ for upgrading the RVN highway system. Both CINCPAC and the JCS have endorsed MACV’s request, including a proposal for AID funding of the work, and have emphasized the importance of LOC improvements to military operations in SVN. This matter will require prompt attention by OSD and AID if the funds are to be found and the contractor assigned projects starting in July 1967.
## TABLE 1

LOC Improvement Projects Funded thru FY 19668

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Scheduled Completion</th>
<th>Cost Estimate ($000)</th>
<th>Funding ($000)</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>Railroad/Highway Bridge, 1400 Ft.</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Dec. 67</td>
<td>10,640</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>13 miles Railroad to GVN Net. System</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Dec. 67</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>Roads and drainage, 8 miles</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Mar. 68</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>Roads and drainage, 10.5 miles</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Mar. 67</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>Da Nang Bridge, 5400 Ft.</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Apr. 67</td>
<td>18,676</td>
<td>7,042</td>
<td>7,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>Roads, 15 miles</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Mar. 68</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>Roads (no scope reported)</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Mar. 68</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khe Trang</td>
<td>Roads, 2 miles</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Mar. 67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>Roads, 6 miles</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Feb. 67</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>1,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>Roads, 6 miles</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Apr. 67</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9/ Source: 9 March 67, NAVFAC UHBB Report. MILCOM funding, FY 1965 thru FY 19668

## TABLE 2

LOC Improvement Projects Funded in FY 19678 and FY 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 19678</th>
<th>FY 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport RR Spur, 0.84 miles</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road, Vung Ro to Ty Hoa</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local roads at various locations</td>
<td>3,173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| NAVY | |
| 33 miles of local roads at Da Nang, Da Nang-East, Chu Lai, Thu Bai, Cam Ranh Bay, and GVN Warden bases in Delta | 4,919 |

| AIR FORCE | |
| 30 miles of local roads at Bien Hoa, Binh Thuy, Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, and Khe Trang | 666 |

*Total FY 19678 Funding* 12,225

| FY 1968 | |
| **ARMY** |         |
| An Khe-2k mile RR spur | 7,560 |
| An Khe-.09 mile RR Bridge | 1,728 |
| Chau Rang-14.5 mile RR spur | 4,923 |
| Cam Ranh-Bay-4 mile RR spur | 1,860 |
| Long Binh-14 mile RR spur | 5,892 |
| Newport-RR LA Road Interchange | 977 |
| Qui Rbon-17 mile RR to Ammo area | 5,251 |
| Qui Rbon-3.3 mile RR spur | 354 |
| Saigon-5.3 mile RR network | 2,655 |
| Saigon-0.33 mile RR Bridge | 6,844 |

| NAVY | |
| Local roads at Da Nang, Da Nang-East, Chu Lai, and Thu Bai | 10,300 |

| AIR FORCE | |
| Total FY 1968 Funding | 16,554 |

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CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM SUMMARY AND PROGRESS

The following table summarizes the status of SEA MILCON funding, estimated cost, and work completed as of March 30, 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNDING</th>
<th>FY 1966S &amp; Prior</th>
<th>FY 1967S</th>
<th>FY 1968</th>
<th>TOTAL to Field Work</th>
<th>Current Est.</th>
<th>Completion $</th>
<th>Completion %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SVN</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>1,086/</td>
<td>1,356/</td>
<td>731/</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>464/</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>586/</td>
<td>591/</td>
<td>329/</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,728</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>2,666</td>
<td>1,672</td>
<td>1,947</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Includes $200 million DOD worldwide Contingency Fund.
b/ Rev: 1 April 1967 NAVFAC Construction Status Report, Vietnam, plus TURNKEY.
c/ Rev: March 1967 DD-6610 Reports.

During March contractor (RMK-BRJ) and troop work-in-place in SVN fell about 21% short of their planned output ($85 million vs. $107 million).

The apparent cost overrun (excess of planned scope cost over available funds) for SVN construction dropped by about $4 million during March. The table above shows that the current cost estimate for projects started exceeds the released funds by $268 million. When the $126 in FY 1967S overrun funds are applied to the current estimate of underfunding, there is still a deficit of $142 million.

The Level of Effort (LOE) system for control of contractor construction in SVN discussed in the April SEA Analysis Report was started on April 1. Under this concept the total contractor effort will be sized to live within funds available. In addition, a site-by-site reappraisal of construction plans is being conducted by MACV to make appropriate scope adjustments and assign the remaining work to the contractor or troop units. The LOE concept is designed to get the maximum construction from the available construction dollars.

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MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

SVN Summary

As of June 30, 1967, the approved (through FY 1967) military construction program in SVN was 63.5% complete. Work assigned to the contractors was 69% done, and troop projects, 35%. Port facilities in the approved program are 92% complete, while airfields are 73%, troop housing and utilities 51%, and hospitals and dispensaries 73%. Table 1 summarizes the status of SVN MILCON funding, estimated cost, and work completed by contractor and troops.

The apparent cost overrun (excess of planned scope cost over available funds) has dropped to $43 million, down $100 million from that indicated on March 30, 1967. As a part of the Level of Effort management system now used in SVN, many projects are still being evaluated for conversion from contractor to troops. These changes will bring the cost in terms of military construction funds of FY 1966 and prior year projects to within available MCF funds.

Table 1

**STATUS OF SVN MILCON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funds ($ Million)</th>
<th>AVS</th>
<th>COMPL</th>
<th>% Complete</th>
<th>Funding ($ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALL SERVICES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>1,204.4</td>
<td>1,237.2</td>
<td>851.6</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop</td>
<td>253.0</td>
<td>262.9</td>
<td>101.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,457.4</td>
<td>1,500.1</td>
<td>952.9</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a/ All Funding Programs, FY 1964 through FY 1967.
b/ Additional approved funding for SVN includes $2.5 million for AF MAP, FY 64 and Prior; work completed; $1.45 million AF Unassigned; and $9.735 million OICC Undistributed.
On 30 September 1967, the approved (through FY 67s) military construction program in SVN was 66% complete. The funded program is divided 82% contractor and 18% for troop construction. (Since only the construction materials part of the troop effort is charged to the MilCon appropriation, the scope of work is divided almost equally between contractor and troop effort.) The contractor program is 71% complete while the troop assigned program is 37% complete. Table 1 summarizes the status of SVN MILCON funding by Service. Not included in the funding totals is $55.6 million in the FY 68 regular MILCON program for SVN or any portion of the FY 68 contingency funds.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Funds ($ millions)</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Completed (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(a/\) Includes MAP transfers (all from FY 1962-1966), AID, AIK, State Department, and miscellaneous.

\(b/\) FY 1968 funds not included.

The lag of the Army program behind the Navy and Air Force reflects the Army's greater use of military troop effort. Contractor construction capability reached a peak in July 1966, whereas the major buildup of military construction units did not occur in SVN until 4 to 10 months later.

A closer analysis of the work completed shows that several categories in the Army program are considerably less than 50% completed (based on percentage of current working estimate), and all of these are lagging the construction plan. These are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2

Status of Army Low Priority Construction Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual less Planned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communications Facilities</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>- 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Bldg.</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maint. Facilities</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo. Storage</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covered Storage</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>- 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Facilities</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>- 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads &amp; RR</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above percentages reflect MACV action in assigning highest priority to operational facilities such as ports and major airfields and lower priority to logistical facilities, particularly covered storage.

Level of Effort (LOE) System

The LOE system for control of contractor construction in SVN was discussed in the April and May SEA Analysis Reports. The system was initiated on 1 April 1967 to get maximum construction from the available construction dollars and to prevent costly overruns. Since that time contractor personnel strength and construction capability have decreased substantially as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

CONTRACTOR (RMK-BRJ) CONSTRUCTION EFFORT a/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>WIP</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Placement/Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 66</td>
<td>48,886</td>
<td>3,832</td>
<td>5,028</td>
<td>40,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 66</td>
<td>44,091</td>
<td>3,726</td>
<td>5,543</td>
<td>34,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 66</td>
<td>44,207</td>
<td>3,529</td>
<td>5,231</td>
<td>35,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 67</td>
<td>31,697</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>4,322</td>
<td>24,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 67</td>
<td>22,228</td>
<td>1,967</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>18,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 67</td>
<td>15,851</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>1,195</td>
<td>13,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 67</td>
<td>15,600 (target)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NAV FAC

a/ Totals as of the end of the month.
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Contractor reached a peak strength of over 51,000 in July 1966 and is now approaching his planned strength of 15,000 by the end of October 1967. Correspondingly, the construction capability has been reduced from a high of $58 million to $14.5 million in September 1967. The Contractor work force has been regrouped into three major enclaves - Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon/Delta for more efficient utilization of his reduced resources. The current LOE labor plan calls for phasing out the contractor starting in October 1968. If Congress substantially reduces funds requested for FY 1968, an earlier phase out may be required.

Military Engineer Strength

As of 30 September 1967 the total Engineer strength in SVN is as shown in table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total Force</th>
<th>Engineers</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>297.5</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy - MC</td>
<td>105.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>459.5</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In SVN one man out of every eight is an engineer. Engineers are organized into some 52 battalions or equivalents, 42 separate companies and several miscellaneous detachments. In WWII the engineer strength in the South Pacific Theater averaged 16.2% of the Army strength. During the Korean War Army engineers made up about 14% of the Army troops in Korea. Data for the other Services is not available.
SVN FY 69 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

The FY 69 South Vietnam Military Construction Program approved by the Secretary of Defense totals $282.8 million including a $70 million SEA contingency fund; an additional $30 million contingency fund is provided for world-wide use. The FY 69 program is about $137 million larger than the $146 million provided in the FY 68 program ($65.7 million plus an estimated $80 million contingency) but considerably less than the programs in FY 66 and 67 ($973 and $394 million respectively). Table 1 summarizes the history of SVN construction funding. Table 2 shows the funds made available by Calendar year. The dollars provided to the field peaked in 1966 at nearly $800 million and have declined significantly in subsequent years.

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS ($ Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 65 Basic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 65 Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 66 Basic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 66 Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 66 Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 67 Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 68 Basic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 68 Contingency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 69 Basic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 69 Contingency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RCS DD-I&L(6727)

a/ Does not add due to rounding.

b/ FY 68 contingency not broken out. Eighty million estimated for use in SVN.

c/ In addition to $70 million in FY 69 contingency funds for SEA, each Service has a $10 million contingency fund for world-wide use, some of which may be used in SEA.
TABLE 2

CONSTRUCTION FUNDING ON YEARLY BASIS

($) Millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CY 64</th>
<th>CY 65</th>
<th>CY 66</th>
<th>CY 67</th>
<th>CY 68</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 65</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>114.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>181.7</td>
<td>791.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>973.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 67</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>393.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>393.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 68</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>145.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>145.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 69</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>256.0</td>
<td>791.5</td>
<td>539.5</td>
<td>1910.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b/ Totals do not add due to rounding.

b/ Includes $80 million from contingency fund.

c/ Includes $70 million from contingency fund.

FY 69 Program

The FY 69 program is about half the amount requested by the JCS and the Military Departments as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

FY 69 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM - SVN

($) Millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Department</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Contingency</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>$317.5</td>
<td>$232.0</td>
<td>$50.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$599.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS Recommendation</td>
<td>$314.9</td>
<td>$199.6</td>
<td>$23.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$537.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD Alternate Program</td>
<td>$144.1</td>
<td>$54.1</td>
<td>$14.6</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>$282.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Approved program includes $41 million for LOC/highway rehabilitation that was not contained in the JCS and Department's recommended programs.

b/ Does not include an added contingency fund of $10 million for each of the Military Departments which may be applied to unanticipated construction requirements world-wide.

c/ JCS did not address all requirements.

The bulk of the hard core facilities (ports, airfields, storage, troop housing, maintenance, etc.) was funded prior to this year. As a result, about 65% of the recommended programs of the Departments consisted of up-grading existing facilities (housing, hospitals, etc.), provision of welfare and community buildings, and furnishing utilities. While these projects might have aided morale and comfort of the troops and perhaps increased somewhat the efficient operation of our support forces, most were either not essential or would not have had sufficient probable use to amortize their cost. Deletion or delay in construction of these projects should not have an adverse effect on military operations.
Army Program

The Army requested $317.5 million of which 65% was for added and upgrading of troop housing, community facilities, utilities and ground improvements. Table 4 compares the Army proposed program and the approved OSD alternative program by major project category.

**TABLE 4**

**ARMY FY 69 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION - SVN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Facility</th>
<th>DA Request</th>
<th>OSD Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>$16.4</td>
<td>$3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital/Medical</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Housing/Community</td>
<td>146.1</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities/Real Estate</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC Rehabilitation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$317.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>$144.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Secretary of Defense added $41 million to the Army program for construction and rehabilitation of major lines of communication.

Navy Program

The Navy requested $232 million for FY 69; the approved program totaling $54.1 million provides the urgent items in support of Program 5 deployments and anticipated military operations in Vietnam (largely in the I CTZ). The most significant new requirements were in support of the buildup in the Phu Bai complex which includes Hue, Dong Ha and Quang Tri. In addition, funds were provided for limited upgrading of troop housing and utility systems in various other locations.

**TABLE 5**

**NAVY FY 69 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Facility</th>
<th>DN Request</th>
<th>OSD Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational and Training</td>
<td>$58.0</td>
<td>$14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital/Medical</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Housing/Community</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities/Real Estate</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC I CTZ</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$232.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>$54.18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Does not contain any portion of the recommended contingency fund.
Air Force Program

The Air Force request totaled $50.1 million and consisted primarily of Program 4 related requirements and replacement and upgrading of existing aircraft aprons, runways, housing and utility systems. The Air Force only had a few Program 5 force increases, thus a large requirement for new facilities did not exist. The approved alternative program of $14.6 million provided for limited operational, maintenance, supply, living quarters, and utilities.

**TABLE 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Facility</th>
<th>AF Request</th>
<th>OSD Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations / Training</td>
<td>$24.5</td>
<td>$ 8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital/Medical</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities, Ground Improvements</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>$50.1</td>
<td>$14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Contingency**

The OSD approved program contains $100 million for contingencies. Seventy million is earmarked for new requirements in Southeast Asia that cannot be foreseen at this time. In addition, the Army, Navy, and Air Force each were provided a $10 million contingency fund for construction in support of operations world-wide.

**Other Military Construction Costs**

Military construction appropriations constitute only a portion of the total dollar cost of the construction effort in South Vietnam. Substantial amounts of operation and maintenance (O&M) and procurement funds are also used to support the construction effort. For example, much of the upgrading and finishing work on cantonments is done with O&M funds and bridging material and airfield matting are purchased with procurement funds. Only fragmentary information is available on amounts of O&M and procurement funds used in the construction effort. Our preliminary estimate is that they now total about $160 million per year. We hope to acquire better data on this question in the coming months.

An even larger element of cost is the pay, allowances and normal operating expenses of the U.S. military personnel in construction units in Vietnam. At present we have 49 engineer battalions in SVN. In addition, there are a large number of smaller units (e.g., dump truck companies, light equipment companies) supporting the engineering battalions which raise the total number of military engineering personnel to about 60,000. Divisional combat
battalions are engaged almost entirely in combat support and do not contribute to the construction effort. A portion of the effort of the other battalions is also devoted to combat support, maintenance, mapping, etc., not new construction. We estimate that 43,600 military personnel are actually engaged in military construction work. An estimated $550 million is required annually for the operations (including pay) of these 43,000 engineer personnel.

Thus, the total cost of the construction effort in South Vietnam during FY 69 will be closer to $1 billion than the $282 million in the military construction funds for FY 69 that were approved by the SecDef.

Expected Change in Future MilCon Programs

Even though the hard core major facility requirements in Vietnam have been largely provided for, limited amounts of military construction funds will continue to be required as long as we maintain a sizeable presence there. Funds will be necessary to provide for essential upgrading or replacement of existing substandard facilities, to meet contingency requirements, and to provide for adjustments in the base structure as they occur. Additionally, as facilities are built, more and more resources (funds and personnel) must be allocated to maintenance and repair. This will most likely result in growing requirements for O&M funds.

One area that will undoubtedly require large inputs of construction and O&M funds for years to come is LOC construction and rehabilitation to support military operations and economic development. There are 2600 miles of major roads in the Vietnamese highway system that require maintenance and upgrading. The road beds are in bad condition in many places and bridges that have been destroyed have to be replaced. The rail net must be rehabilitated and modernized as much of it is virtually worthless. Many of the key canals and waterways must be reopened and cleared of debris and silt. To accomplish this work will probably require the use of U.S. and ARVN military engineers or civilian contractors or both. The costs will undoubtedly be very heavy and the requirements could be virtually open-ended.
SVN CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS

The presently funded SVN construction program is approximately 70% completed. Approved military and contractor construction forces should be able to complete the assigned military construction program by early CY 1970. Barring a major increase in US forces or a decision to rebuild communication lines and civilian facilities, we should begin phasing out the 18,000-man contractor force and withdrawing some of the 60,000 military construction troops about mid-1969. The status of construction in South Vietnam as of end February is shown on the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Program ($ Millions)</th>
<th>WIP ($ Millions)</th>
<th>Percent Complete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>813.1</td>
<td>504.9</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>355.4</td>
<td>265.1</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>378.6</td>
<td>313.1</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1557.1</td>
<td>1083.1</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a/ Includes $55.8 million FY 1968 regular program plus $24.0 million from the FY 67 contingency fund.

Current Engineer Deployments

At the present time there are 64 engineer battalions/squadrons in SVN and nearly 200 smaller engineer units. These units are manned by approximately 60,000 engineer troops. The bulk of these personnel (approximately 55,500) are assigned construction and combat and combat support missions, while the rest are engaged in such activities as "repairs and utilities," maintenance and supply, mapping, staff, and advisory roles. Of these, 16,500 engineer personnel are in units organic to or in direct support of the divisions. Thus, about 40,000 engineer personnel are available for projects funded by the military construction appropriation. The engineer units in SVN are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bde/Agency</th>
<th>Gps/Regt</th>
<th>Ens/Sqdns</th>
<th>Co's</th>
<th>Misc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33a/</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12b/</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5c/</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14d/</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a/ Includes 7 Division Ens.
b/ All 5 considered Division Ens.
c/ Includes 9 Base Civil Engineer squadrons.
CINCPAC Construction Review

A recent CINCPAC review, held on 25-28 March 1968, showed that currently deployed construction units, augmented by the RMK-BRJ contractor, should be able to complete the assigned military construction program by February 1970. The fold out table shows the projected capability and the approved construction program.

Barring a major increase in US forces which would generate new construction requirements, or a decision to rebuild the road, canal, rail net or other non-military projects, a phase-down of our construction capability may begin next year. Decision is required as to whether to retain the contract capability, and begin withdrawing US forces, or hold on to the military capability as long as possible. Retaining the military units gives the most construction output for each dollar of MCP funds. Using the contractor permits a reduction in US personnel (and probably in the total cost) and has "nation-building" advantages.

Construction Trends

The troop construction effort has gradually shifted from military construction projects to lines of communications (LOC) maintenance and combat support. A year ago over 60% of the troop effort was devoted to military construction funded projects. Now, only 40% of the troop effort is for Milcon, with over 60% now funded from procurement and operations appropriations. Should this trend continue, completion of the Milcon program will be delayed and more O&M funds will be needed. The breakdown of the work during March is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Milcon</th>
<th>LOC</th>
<th>Other Combat Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Units</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Units</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Units</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, a number of engineer units have been relocated. A year ago all construction in I Ciz was performed by contractor or Navy construction battalions. Most of the units were located south of the Hai Van pass in the Hue and Da Nang areas. The Army had construction responsibility for II, III and IV CTZ. The Air Force units were engaged in air base construction assisted by Army and Navy units and the contractor.

However, with the deployment of additional Marine and Army units to I CTZ, several engineer units have moved from II and III CTZ, delaying the completion of some on-going projects. At present, there are seven Army
engineer battalions (including three divisional battalions) in I CTZ. An additional Seabee battalion was deployed in February and 60% of the Navy horizontal construction capability has moved north of Hai Van Pass to work on LOC maintenance and upgrading.

The RMK-BRJ contractor will increase his work force because of an added workload rather than decrease it as had been planned in the fall. The original goal as outlined in the Full Funding Concept dated February 28, 1967 was to reduce the force to 15,000 personnel. The current RMK-BRJ work force is 17,844 (1399 US, 1280 TCN, and 15,165 LN) and they can expand the work force to 22,000 personnel if required. The extent and rate of the buildup will depend on the funds made available, the rate at which projects can be assigned, the availability of contractor capability in the area where the work is to be done, and the urgency of the work.
## CONFIDENTIAL

### VIETNAM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

**MACV CAPABILITY FORECAST**

(Includes FY 1968 & Prior Programs)

($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART I</th>
<th>Troop Capability Based on Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Included in Program #5 &amp; #6</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>No. Bus In-Country$/</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capability$/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>80.4/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114.7</td>
<td>FY 67s &amp; Prior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 67s Adjusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>No. Bus In-Country$/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capability$/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>33.0/</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>FY 67s &amp; Prior</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FY 67s Adjusted</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FY 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>No. Bus In-Country$/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capability$/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>6.3/</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<td>FY 67s &amp; Prior</td>
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<td>FY 67s Adjusted</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FY 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-totals</th>
<th>Capability (Quarterly)</th>
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<tr>
<td>110.3</td>
<td>119.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176.7</td>
<td>FY 67s &amp; Prior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 67s Adjusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART II</th>
<th>Contractor Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>205.3/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126.0</td>
<td>166.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>497.6</td>
<td>FY 67s &amp; Prior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 67s Adjusted</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FY 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART III</th>
<th>Combined Troop Contractor Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cumulative Workload Remaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>440.1</td>
<td>325.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137.3</td>
<td>212.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>674.3</td>
<td>FY 67s &amp; Prior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 67s Adjusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**a)** Workload adjusted by $41.5 M; $5.9 transferred to Navy Troops; Est. $5 M transferred to Army Troop.

**b)** $5.9 M Army Troop transferred to Navy Troop.

**c)** $5.0 M troop to contractor.

**d)** Workload adjusted by 44.5 M1; $50.0 M1 contractor prepaid assets; -44.5 M1 error corrected.

**e)** Includes $55.8 FY 68 basic plus $81.3 M1 FY 68 contingency. Does not include $10 M1 for FY 69 contingency not included. ($212 million basic)

**f)** Based on approved deployments as of April 3, 1968, does not include seven divisional engines.

**g)** Total troop effort available has been reduced to provide for combat support & O&M projects.

**h)** Includes $1 M1/month for Vinnell Contractor.

**i)** MACV estimated capability; $3.4 N Army troop for 27 engr bns; $2.1 N Army troop for 12 NMBs.

**j)** RNK-BRJ workforce increased to 19,000 in May. Contractor capability $1 million per 1000 ems.

**k)** RNK-BRJ workforce increased to 20,000 in August.

**l)** Excess capability available.
## CANTON WORKLOAD

### CAPABILITY FORECAST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 69</th>
<th>FY 70</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Qtr</td>
<td>2nd Qtr</td>
<td>3rd Qtr</td>
<td>4th Qtr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Qtr</td>
<td>2nd Qtr</td>
<td>3rd Qtr</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 68</th>
<th>FY 69</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>176.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 68</th>
<th>FY 69</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156.4</td>
<td>135.5</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126.0</td>
<td>166.3</td>
<td>297.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>843.6</td>
<td>375.6</td>
<td>328.6</td>
<td>268.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137.3</td>
<td>212.0</td>
<td>674.3</td>
<td>280.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes:
- $15 M transferred to contractor; Est $20.6 M WIP not reported.
- Includes seven divisional engineer bns (units become effective 2nd month in-country) or 5 USMC bns.
- Combat support & O&M projects.
- $16.8 M Navy troop for 12 WMCS; $.2 M Army troop for 5 CE squadrons.
- Utility $2 million per 1000 employees.

**OASD/SA**

April 18, 1968
THAILAND CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

The approved military construction program in Thailand for FY 68 and prior years is 70% complete as of March 31, 1968. By the end of this year practically all of the FY 67 and prior programs will be completed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Work in Place</th>
<th>Percent Complete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$114.7M</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$16.0M</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$235.8M</td>
<td>174.7</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$366.5M</td>
<td>258.3</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RCS: DD-T&L (THN) 6727 March 31, 1968 Report

a/ Includes $1.7 million FY 68R program.
b/ Includes $1.9 million FY 68R program.
c/ Includes $18.4 million FY 68R program.

About one-quarter of the Army construction program is being done by troops and three-quarters by contract. The Navy program is being constructed entirely by contract and over 90% of the Air Force program is assigned to contractors.

Future Milcon Program

The military construction program in Thailand is rapidly being completed with no major new requirements anticipated. The FY 70 construction program should be less than the $12.6 million projected for FY 69. Table 2 shows the Milcon program by Fiscal Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>FY66 &amp; Prior</th>
<th>FY 67s</th>
<th>FY 68</th>
<th>FY 68s</th>
<th>Projected</th>
<th>Projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>134.9</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>250.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>125.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>222.2</td>
<td>122.2</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>392.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OSD(I&L)SEA Construction Division.
a/ $199,000 being reprogrammed to the Philippines.
b/ Contains $1.9 million for Laos.
c/ Includes $8.5 million FY 68 Contingency.
Current construction backlog is about $100 million. The contractors are placing $10 million work-in-place (WIP) per month. The troop units are placing another $1 million per month. As of April 3, 1968, the Officer-in-Charge of Construction (OICC) Bangkok expected to have all but three contracts awarded. The current OICC estimate is that work will be largely completed by April 1969. Architect-engineer contracts will have been reduced to three by July 1968 from a high of 29 in January 1967. The two Cost-Plus-Adjusted-Fee (CPAF) contractors should be phased cut by end FY 69. Residual work or new requirements can easily be accomplished by local contractors (who do high quality and low cost work) and US military construction units.

Use of Military Construction Units

The major engineer units in Thailand consist of one engineer construction group, nine engineer battalions/squadrons and some 23 smaller engineer companies and detachments totaling nearly 4400 military personnel. Of these troops only 3200 are available for use in the military construction program. The remainder (1200) are utilized on repairs and utilities, maintenance, advisory and other miscellaneous assignments. Engineer troop make up 9.5% of the military population in Thailand.

### TABLE 3

#### ENGINEER UNITS IN THAILAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Gp</th>
<th>En/Sqdns</th>
<th>Co's</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy/MC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7/8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Includes 6 Base Civil Engineer Squadrons (1056 airmen).

The mission of the Army's 44th Engineer Group (Construction) consists of road building, construction of training facilities for the Thai Voluntary Division force, and providing facilities for the logistic infrastructure. The Air Force Red Horse Squadron (556 CE Squadron, Heavy Repair) is divided among the six major Air Force bases. Its work consists of revetment and lighting construction, emplacement of relocatable facilities such as modular dispensaries and hospitals, and erection of pre-engineered storage and maintenance facilities. We estimate that less than 50% of the Red Horse construction is funded by the military construction program.
Construction Augmentation

Both the Army and the Air Force use rental contracts to obtain large amounts of construction equipment to augment their organic capability. These contracts provide equipment with local operators and mechanics. These augmentations together with direct hire Local National laborers and military supervisors provide a substantial increase to troop construction capability. During the 1st half of FY 68, the Army spent over $2 million for equipment rental services and the total cost for the year is expected to exceed $4 million. The Air Force has at least eight contracts totaling $3.1 million in FY 68, almost entirely from operations and maintenance funds.

The Army in Thailand employs about 2500 Local Nationals of which 2200 are paid from Milcon funds. The Air Force employs another 4300 Local Nationals in addition to the 1700 IN utilized by the six Base Civil Engineer squadrons.

Thus, overall, the troop construction capability in Thailand has been augmented by 400 major items of equipment (185 Army, 211 Air Force) at a cost of over $7 million. The military work force on troop construction projects has been further augmented by 6800 Local Nationals.
SEA MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

FY 70 marks the first time since the US involvement in the conflict in South Vietnam that no military construction (MILCON) funds are being programmed for SEA construction. A $25 million world-wide contingency fund is being requested for unforeseen projects that may occur. Since FY 65, about $2.8 billion has been provided to support the war effort in SEA. Table 1 summarizes the history of SEA military construction funding by fiscal year. Table 2 (enclosed) breaks out the construction program by country and indicates progress.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfers from MAP</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1965</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>166.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1966</td>
<td>655.1</td>
<td>352.8</td>
<td>430.7</td>
<td>1,438.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1967</td>
<td>288.5</td>
<td>133.9</td>
<td>190.4</td>
<td>612.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1968</td>
<td>142.8</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>315.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1969</td>
<td>108.8</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>181.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,320.5</td>
<td>640.7</td>
<td>819.0</td>
<td>2,780.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the $2.8 billion authorized, $1.7 billion (64%) has been used in SVN; $367 million in Thailand (14%); and $388 million (22%) for training, operational and logistical support bases in CONUS and the western Pacific bases. This work was nearly 80% complete by end of February 1969. The major elements of the construction program in SVN include:

a. Six deep water ports at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Ro, Vung Tau, and Saigon with 27 deep draft berths providing capacity of 600,000 short tons per month (Saigon was the only deep draft port prior to US involvement). In addition, shallow draft facilities were provided at nine other ports to handle 800,000 short tons per month of coastal shipping. Mooring buoys and unloading facilities capable of discharging 1,250,000 barrels of POL daily were constructed at or near the various ports.

b. Eight jet-capable air bases with fifteen 10,000 foot concrete runway/taxiway systems and parking aprons (3 existed prior to 1965). In
# TABLE 2

**AUTHORIZATION BY COUNTRY**

(FY 1965 - 1969 SEA Construction)

($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total 1/</th>
<th>% Complete 28 Feb 69</th>
<th>%/Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>887.0</td>
<td>418.7</td>
<td>411.0</td>
<td>1,716.7</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>64.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>122.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>237.2</td>
<td>374.3</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>163.9</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>260.3</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 2/</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1/</td>
<td>1,264.2</td>
<td>612.8</td>
<td>802.4</td>
<td>2,679.4</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** Table 600 Military Construction in Support of SEA, Feb 28, 1969. Format II RCS DD-I&L(H) 915, dtd Feb 28, 1969.

1/ May not add due to rounding
2/ Other includes countries such as Midway, Wake, Laos, Canal Zone, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.
3/ Total varies from Table 1 by unapportioned FY 69 funds.
addition, there are some 83 auxiliary logistical airfields capable of handling C-123 or C-130 type aircraft. The facilities support over 5,750 aircraft of all types.

c. 9760 hospital beds for US and Free World personnel.

d. Four major depot complexes at Na Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh. Each of these complexes support a deep water port and two or more major air bases.

e. Maintenance and upgrading of 2537 miles of Vietnamese highways.

In Thailand, the construction program provided operational, logistical, and personnel support facilities for 49,000 US personnel. Major facilities include: expansion of six existing Royal Thai Air bases; construction of a new $110 million airbase at U-Tapao with 11,500 foot runway for B-52s; a deep water port and depot complex at Sattahip; a forward depot at Korat; and about 300 miles of new and upgraded roads. The Thailand program is nearing completion and our construction capability there is being phased down.

Support facilities for aircraft, waterfront operations, ship repair, storage of supplies, POL, and ammunition, maintenance of aircraft and equipment, communications and troop housing were provided in the offshore Pacific Islands. CONUS construction in support of SEA consisted primarily of an expansion of the training base.

The bulk of the remaining construction workload is located in SVN. On March 1, 1969, MACV had a work backlog of $409 million. All other SEA countries combined had a MILCON workload remaining of $159 million. The rest of this paper focuses on the work still to be completed in SVN.

SVN Construction

Periodic six-month reviews are being made of the SVN construction capabilities, workload and requirements by the JCS and OSD. These reviews are being performed to reduce unobligated backlogs, and to match funding with capabilities and requirements. Work remaining to be placed is divided between the contractor ($260 million) and the military troops ($149 million). While the contractor has the largest part of the funds (64%) remaining, the troops actually have more projects to be completed since troop costs are largely unfunded by the MILCON program. The generally accepted ratios of MILCON costs between troop and contractor is 1:2.5 to 3. Total costs are estimated to be about equal.

Contract construction in SVN is performed under the supervision of the Navy Facilities Engineering Command through its field office in Saigon. Project directives are prepared and approved by MACV for submittal to OICC (Office In Charge of Construction). OICC prepares the design and assigns the work to its contractors for construction. The bulk of the contract construction in SVN is accomplished by Raymond, Morrison, Knudson – Brown, Root and Jones (RMK-BRJ) operating under a
cost-plus-adjusted fee (CPAF) contract. Its work force consists of about 25,500 personnel and is staffed and equipped to construct about $22 million per month of MILCON work. The contractor requires about $100 million of useable backlog (projects designed, notice to proceed issued, and materials ordered or on hand) in order to operate efficiently. Hence, it was recognized at the time of the FY 70 budget reviews that no FY 70 MILCON program for SVN would require phasing down or terminating the RMK-BRJ contract in CY 70.

Some contract capability will always be required in SVN as long as US forces are employed there. Specifically, contractors performing dredging, electric power and distribution, and mechanical construction will be required. It will be more economical to terminate the CPAF contractor and keep the specialty contractors because of the large overload involved with the RMK-BRJ contractor. Local lump sum contractors have the capability of performing about $1.5 million of work per month.

The MILCON work remaining for troop accomplishment amounts to $146 million broken out by Service as shown in Table 3. The military engineer work force and its assigned JCS capability for MILCON is shown in Table 4. It is interesting to note that the current troop MILCON capability is about $5 million per month. This work placement rate represents about 20% of the total effort available for MILCON work (exclusive of LOC) and about 17% of the total military engineer effort in SVN. Table 5 shows the battalion/squadron equivalent capability by type of mission.

### Table 3

**MILITARY TROOP CONSTRUCTION**

SVN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Assigned Work Program</th>
<th>Work Completed</th>
<th>Work Remaining</th>
<th>% Complete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>223.4</td>
<td>118.7</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>337.2</td>
<td>188.0</td>
<td>149.2</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** MACV Placement SITREP dated February 28, 1969.
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**TABLE 4**

**MILITARY ENGINEER BNS/SQDNS IN SVN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Program 6</th>
<th>Assigned Missions</th>
<th>Monthly Capability</th>
<th>Monthly Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Bns</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$41,000</td>
<td>$533,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Bns</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$183,000</td>
<td>$2,379,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCBs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Corps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Bns</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Bns</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Horse Sqdns</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$80,000</td>
<td>$400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4,812,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Divisional engineer battalions are excluded since their work is entirely combat support.
2/ One Construction battalion converted into a land clearing Bn to support combat operations.
3/ The 116th Army Engineer Combat Bn (a reserve unit) is scheduled to depart SVN in September 1969.
### Table 5

**Engineer BN/Sqdn Equivalent by Mission**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Operational Support 1/</th>
<th>LOC 2/</th>
<th>MILCON Base Development 3/</th>
<th>Non MILCON Base Development 4/</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Bns</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Bns</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCBs</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Corps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Bns</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Horse Sqdns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage</strong></td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Field data collected from MACVPD on March 1969 trip. Data based on information submitted to MACV during July 68 – January 69.

1/ Operational Support - includes maintenance and construction support provided in active or projected areas of operations to assist maneuver elements, combat support elements, or immediate supporting units. Effort includes tactical bridging, assault airfields, land clearing, combat roads, etc.

2/ LOC - includes work expended on LOCs such as national, interprovincial and local highways and railroads. It excludes on-base roads and maintenance and construction of roads in direct support of tactical operations.

3/ MILCON Base Development - includes all Milcon projects except for LOCs.

4/ Non-MILCON Base Development - includes all projects built with other funds (O&M, procurement, AIK, etc.).
Most of the hard core logistical requirements (i.e., ports, airfields, and depots) have been essentially completed in SVN. Current projects reflect improvements to the existing bases and fluctuating requirements in conformance to tactical operations and the shifting of troop units. Remaining uncompleted and unfunded projects concern primarily the LOCs and support of RVNAF accelerated improvement and modernization. The LOC requirements are well identified and discussed in detail below. RVNAF construction requirements are being identified and analyzed by MACV. Some MILCON funding will be required in "VN each year to meet expected contingency requirements and to provide for base structure adjustments. Funds to be provided, however, will be limited to well defined urgent requirements and matched with the construction capability in-country.

Line of Communications

The land lines of communication (LOC) are in dire need of extensive restoration and improvement. Prior years of sabotage, lack of maintenance and heavy wartime traffic have virtually destroyed the road and rail networks. Reconstruction of these national assets are necessary to reduce heavy reliance on air and coastal shipping to support military operations; to improve internal security; and to assist in nation building. Prior to FY 68, the military construction program concentrated on on-base roads and largely ignored the railroads.

Now the highway emphasis is placed on the upgrading of 2,537 miles of national and interprovincial highways and city streets. This program covers minimum essential requirements to link population centers and military facilities. It does not include upgrading and new road construction required for support of combat operations in areas not served by the major road networks. Cost of this restoration is borne by a multiple funding program that includes MILCON, O&M, AID/DOD, OPN, USAID, MAP, and GVN funds.

Railroads have received increased attention during the past year. Forty-four percent (552 km) out of a total 1240 kilometers have been restored to an operational condition. Current plans call for restoration of all rail lines from Saigon to Phu Cat plus the line between Da Nang and Hue by the end of CY 69. Funding of the Vietnamese National Railway Service (VNRS) involves both GVN piaster funding and US AID/DOD support in commodities. MILCON funding has been limited to railway spurs connecting the VNRS with US military installations. For a more complete discussion of the VNRS see August 1968 SEA Analysis Report pp. 8-15.

The road program is funded as shown in Table 6.

Additional FY 70 and FY 71 funding to complete the current approved road program are estimated by CONUSMACV to be $79.5 million as shown in Table 7.
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**TABLE 6**

**ROAD FUNDING IN SVN** 1/  
($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund Source</th>
<th>FY 67 &amp; Prior</th>
<th>FY 68</th>
<th>FY 69</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCON</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>87.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;MA</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>104.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPN</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID/DOD</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>145.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>94.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>308.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Construction Program South Vietnam (Complex Review) HQ MACV dated March 1, 1969.

1/ DOD assumed responsibility for major repair and upgrading of key GVN roads on 1 July 1966 since the GVN lacked the resources to fulfill this responsibility. Maintenance of the highways is a GVN responsibility.

**TABLE 7**

**ADDITIONAL ROAD FUNDS REQUIRED**  
($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund Source</th>
<th>FY 70</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCON</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;MA</td>
<td>13.6</td>
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<td>13.6</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID/DOD</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>70.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>79.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ No MILCON funding is being requested for SEA in FY 70. This action reduces the available funding for road upgrading and restoration to $49.1 million in FY 70.
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As of the end CY 68 about 500 miles (19.7%) of highways had been restored to MACV standards. Another 500 miles are presently under construction by a combination of troop-contractor effort. The CY 69 goal calls for completion of 750 miles of roads so that by the end of this year, 49.3% of the road program will be completed. Final completion of the current road program is scheduled for end CY 71.

Five classes of roads are being constructed under the current program. Four-lane highways are to be built where traffic is heavy (over 6000 vehicles per day). Lesser standards are provided for traffic at various traffic densities as shown in Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Traffic Density</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-Lane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A</td>
<td>24' paved roadway</td>
<td>Heavy (over 6000 per day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with 8' shoulders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class B</td>
<td>20' roadway</td>
<td>Heavy (under 6000 per day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with 8' shoulders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class C</td>
<td>20' roadway</td>
<td>Medium (limited two-way traffic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with 5' shoulders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class D</td>
<td>15' roadway</td>
<td>Light (one-way traffic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with 5' shoulders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total  | 2,537  |

Expansion of the road program to include secondary roads to province, district and hamlet levels would add about 18,000 miles of class C and D roads to the program. These roads, though not presently considered or approved by MACV, are receiving increased attention in SVN as the major highways are being completed.

Summary

Essential construction requirements for our forces in SEA have been largely provided for. Future programs will be limited to high priority requirements and funded at levels that can be completed within a year after funds are made available. Some construction will be required as long as the US maintains forces in SEA. After termination of the SVN conflict, additional requirements may develop as our post-Vietnam force and stationing posture is approved.
CARGO DISCHARGE CAPABILITY AND REQUIREMENTS OF U. S. MILITARY PORTS IN SVN

The attached Table summarizes the cargo discharged at all SVN U. S. Military Ports from August, 1965, to December, 1966, and presents the MACV forecast of capability and the OASD(I&L) forecast of requirements through August, 1967.

In view of the number of factors which can affect actual performance (weather, peaks and valleys in ship arrivals, equipment, cargo onload workload, tactical emergencies), the computed "Reserve" capability cannot at this time be equated to Excess" capability.

Nevertheless, in at least 7 of the last 18 weeks in 1966, there was insufficient cargo at Danang to fully utilize available resources and a similar situation may develop in the future at other ports. The following Table summarizes workload data at Danang for the last four months of CY, 1966, the period during which the worst of the Northeast Monsoons occurs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week Ending</th>
<th>Week Disch Total</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Discharge</th>
<th>Backlog in terms of</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capabily</td>
<td>(M/T)</td>
<td>Cargo in week</td>
<td>(M/T)</td>
<td>(Days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/3/66</td>
<td>59,500</td>
<td>47,906</td>
<td>15,833</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/10/66</td>
<td>50,400</td>
<td>25,303*</td>
<td>7,990</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/17/66</td>
<td>44,400</td>
<td>27,519*</td>
<td>27,569</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/24/66</td>
<td>44,100</td>
<td>30,117*</td>
<td>25,136</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1/66</td>
<td>44,100</td>
<td>34,856</td>
<td>11,116</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/8/66</td>
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<td>27,896</td>
<td>24,896</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/15/66</td>
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<td>40,320</td>
<td>46,931</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/22/66</td>
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<td>51,707</td>
<td>38,479</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/29/66</td>
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<td>48,424</td>
<td>35,507</td>
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<tr>
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<td>54,651</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>28,501</td>
<td>37,162</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13,509*</td>
<td>22,036</td>
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* Low total discharge identified by COMUSMACV as due to inadequate cargo available for discharge.

Note: COMUSMACV is currently forecasting Danang April, 1967 discharge capability as 88,200 N/T per week.
After a longer period of experience, COMUSMACV should be requested to identify resources excess to requirements, plus reasonable contingency or surge reserves, and either to reallocate them within SVN or nominate them for withdrawal. The resources that should be evaluated include lighterage, equipment and contractor/military personnel.

OASD(SA)/SEA Programs Division is in the process of cataloging the cargo handling resources of each major port complex in order to develop the capability to assess productivity rates and identify apparent shortages or excesses.
TOTAL CARGO DISCHARGE BY U.S. MILITARY
ALL SVN PORTS
(000 Short Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Discharged</th>
<th>1/</th>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>2/</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>3/</th>
<th>Computed Reserve Capability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual 1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>713 (36)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forecast 1967</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>825 (85)*</td>
<td>790 (85)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>800 (85)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>970 (85)*</td>
<td>800 (85)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>170</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
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<td>835 (100)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>170</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1060 (100)*</td>
<td>835 (100)*</td>
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<td>225</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1105 (100)*</td>
<td>840 (100)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>265</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>1160 (100)*</td>
<td>850 (100)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>310</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>855 (100)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>350</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Data furnished by SASM.
2/ COMUSMACV Port Capability Forecasts.
3/ OASD(I&L) requirements forecast.

* All figures in parentheses are amount of AID cargo discharged by U.S. military included in total figures.

OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div.
January 10, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA

The attached Table summarizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August, 1965 to December, 1966, and presents the OASD(I&L) forecast of shipments through December, 1967.

OASD(I&L) and OASD(SA) believe that the forecasted tonnage for CY 1967 is probably a maximum since the experience base used for projection includes a substantial volume of non-recurring shipments for purposes such as construction, establishment of initial levels of supply, contractor mobilization and a number of special project shipments. As soon as the major non-recurring shipments can be quantified the forecast will be revised.

The present level of MSTS ships (including 142 NDRF ships in service and 19 NDRF ships in the process of activation) should be adequate to meet the requirements presently forecasted. The unbooked cargo for SEA is below the 100,000 M/T considered optimum for ship scheduling and efficient ship utilization and ship turnaround time should be reduced as the weather improves and port capability in SVN increases. Barring unforeseen contingencies, it is unlikely that the 20 additional NDRF ships included in the 67 Supplemental ($11 million) will have to be activated. The same view was presented by the MSTS representative at the December 21, 1966, Joint Transportation Board meeting. MSTS stated that although the MSTS long-range forecast showed a 6 - 10 cargo ship deficit each month for the period March through July, 1967, they recommended no additional breakouts since such a deficit would be manageable.
### OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA (000 M/T)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>Unit Equip</th>
<th>Ammo</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>TOTAL ALL OTHER SEA DESTINATIONS</th>
<th>GRAND TOTAL SEA</th>
<th>UNBOOKED CARGO CONUS TO ALL SEA DESTINATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actual 1965</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>197</td>
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<td><strong>1966</strong></td>
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<td>425</td>
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<td>372</td>
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<td>469</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>1001 (*)</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>368</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Forecast 1967</strong></td>
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1/ SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii.

2/ Data from MMNS adjusted to include Air Force Special Express ammo shipments data furnished by SASW. MMNS data maintained on weekly basis. Monthly totals by aggregation of 4 weekly periods result in some distortion of actual monthly totals. Subsequent editions this Table will be adjusted to eliminate aggregation distortions.

3/ OASD (EZL) forecast (includes AID-GPA military handled cargo).

(a) December 1966, decline attributable in part to weekly aggregations and in part to temporary restrictions on cargo shipments to Cam Ranh, Nha Trang and Qui Nhon because of port congestion and Saigon because of strike. Total cargo withheld by CINCPAC (PAMPA) estimated as 70,000 M/T.
As the attached Table shows, the input of shipping into SVN from October to December, 1966, was the highest of any quarter to date. During the same period, however, despite record numbers of ship completions and departures, the average length of time spent in SVN and SEA Holding Ports increased. The significant increase occurred in November which had an average of 22.2 days. This was slightly higher than the 21.9 days experienced in November, 1965, but significantly lower than the all-time peak of 35.4 days experienced in January, 1966. The December, 1966, rate of 19 days shows a 3.2 day improvement over November, 1966.

A major cause of the increased turnaround time during November, 1966, was the inability of Cam Ranh Bay (and to a lesser extent Qui Nhon) to achieve its forecasted discharge rates. The following summarizes the performance of the two ports during the period 30 October to 3 December 1966.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Week Ending</th>
<th>CAM RANH BAY</th>
<th>QUI NHON</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/T Discharged/Day</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/5/66</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/66</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>3,778</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/19/66</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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<td>11/26/66</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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<td>12/3/66</td>
<td>4,270*</td>
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*Revised COMUSMACV capability forecast

The following summarizes the substantial reductions which have occurred in COMUSMACV's forecasts of the capability for discharge at Cam Ranh Bay.

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<tr>
<th>Performance Month</th>
<th>S/T per day</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
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<td>6,000</td>
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<td>7,600</td>
<td>4,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>March, 1967</td>
<td>7,570</td>
<td>5,200</td>
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*Made 4 months prior to forecasted month.

A combination of factors including weather, shortages of Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) and diversion of personnel to Vung Ro have been identified by COMUSMACV as factors responsible for Cam Ranh's current problems. However, indications are that depot receiving capability may be a principal problem. The Joint Transportation Board has tasked SASM to determine what actions are necessary to improve Cam Ranh Bay's cargo handling performance. In addition, the Department of the Army has been requested by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC to expedite production and shipment of MHE.
Since the COMUSMACV capability forecasts control the amount of cargo which is released from CONUS and the off-shore bases into SVN, if the reductions in capability could have been perceived and communicated to shipping control agencies earlier for the months of November and December, greater shipping efficiency would have been achieved. At an average cost of $4,000 per day for each ship in SVN, the increase in the average number of days in SVN between October and November, 1966, resulted in increased costs of approximately $2.4 million and adversely affected the timely return of shipping to CONUS for reloading.
### MSTS DEEP DRAFT CARGO SHIP FLOW THROUGH SVN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
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</table>

- **No. of ships arriving in SVN**
  - 1965: 78, 87, 86, 77, 60, 87, 63, 92, 106
  - 1966: ...

- **No. of ships departing in SVN**
  - 1965: 36, 57, 72, 72, 70, 62, 107, 76, 92, 94
  - 1966: ...

- **No. of ships in SVN at E.O.M.**
  - 1965: 16, 37, 52, 66, 73, 71, 51, 38, 38, 50
  - 1966: ...

- **No. of ships in SEA Holding Ports at E.O.M.**
  - 1965: 2, 21, 21, 2, 2
  - 1966: ...

1/ Data derived from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammunition.

### ANALYSIS OF TIME SPENT BY MSTS CARGO SHIPS IN SVN AND HOLDING AREAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **Avg No. of days in SVN**
  - 1965: 8.6, 10.6, 12.8, 18.6, 21.2, 29.1, 30.5, 20, 14.8, 11.7
  - 1966: ...

- **Avg No. of days in SEA Holding Ports**
  - 1965: ...
  - 1966: ...

- **Total Avg No. of days**
  - 1965: 8.6, 10.6, 12.8, 18.8, 21.9, 31.3, 35.4, 27.3, 16.1, 11.7
  - 1966: ...

1/ Data from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Based on ships departing during month. Excludes storage ships.

2/ Includes unloading/loading time, time holding in SVN, sailing time between SVN ports.

CONFIDENTIAL
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<td>9</td>
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Force Special Express Ammo ships and floating storage ships.

1/

SVN AND HOLDING AREAS

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<td>18.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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Ammunition during month. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and floating storage time between SVN ports.

"SD/SA/SEA Programs Div."

January 13, 1967
The attached table summarizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August, 1965, to January, 1967, and presents the revised OASD(IML) forecast of shipments through December, 1967.

The revised forecast represents approximately a 200,000 M/T monthly reduction from previous forecasts and is based on evidence that the heavy build-up phase, particularly in the off-shore bases, has passed and that the great proportion of material shipped in the future will be resupply for replacement of consumption. Another factor which will result in reductions in shipments to the off-shore bases is the Army plan to reduce the use of Okinawa for logistic support of SVN. In the first half of CY 1965 Army shipments to Okinawa totalled 192,000 M/T; in the last half of CY 1966 these shipments totalled 610,000 M/T. Direct shipment from CONUS to SVN of much of this tonnage, eliminating transshipment through Okinawa, should have negligible effect on the total tonnage handled by the SVN ports.

The increase in unbooked cargo in January to 133,000 M/T was due primarily to actions taken to temporarily reduce shipments from CONUS to Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon because of port congestion. These restrictions were relaxed in early February, resulting in a surge of shipments.

Barring unforeseen contingencies, no further ITRP ship activations should be necessary.

Cargo flow forecasting is subject to a large number of variables, not the least important of which are the essentially decentralized requisitioning systems and the inability to predict requirements under combat conditions. Nevertheless, reasonable accuracy in the forecasting of gross requirements can be achieved by the use of factors applied against in-country force levels and planned deployments. CINCPAC has developed a computer model to do this and it is now operational. Based on the forces to be supported by each port, the model predicts total port throughput requirements separately for 8 SVN ports and each of the off-shore bases. The tonnages are forecasted for 8 major categories of requirements; i.e., supply build-up, resupply, construction material, special projects, JAP, AID, unit equipment and ammunition. The model applies different factors as appropriate to forces of each Service and has the capability to vary the Service factors by geographic location. The CINCPAC model is a valuable addition to the tools available to logistic planners and strongly merits continued resources support to improve its capabilities. Factors must be further refined to reflect the unique consumption rates being experienced in the SVN environment and transportation management data reporting systems throughout DOD require modifications to facilitate analysis of variances between forecast and actual.

CONFIDENTIAL

Feb-67
## CONFIDENTIAL

**KSPR OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENT PLAN THROUGH 1967**

(000's t/c)

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*SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual data from HIMS adjusted to include Asia Sash. Forecast data from OASD(I&E).*
### CONFIDENTIAL

Note: Ocean Cargo Shipment Flow Oceania to R.A.

(Units H/T)

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<th>Acre</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Other</th>
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**Footnote:** SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual Int SASH. Forecast data from C&F (ZaL).
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Adjusted to include Air Force Special Express ammo shipments data furnished by

OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div.
February 13, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
As the attached Table shows, January was the second consecutive month in which the average number of days spent by ships in SVN and SEA holding ports decreased. The average of 18.5 days compares favorably with the most recent peak of 22.2 days which occurred in November, 1966. The 138 ships completed during January was the highest monthly total achieved to date in SVN.

Continued improvement can be expected from better weather and a policy change by CONVSHACV. He has directed that ships with minimum levels of cargo remaining (1,000 M/T of ammunition or 1,500 M/T of general cargo) will be given the highest discharge priority. This should eliminate the uneconomical practice of holding ships in SVN ports with remnant or other low priority cargo remaining on board.

The progress made in cargo operations in SVN can be appreciated by comparing performance in January, 1967, with January, 1966.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January 1966</th>
<th>January 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total cargo discharged (CCO M/T)</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>1,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cargo backloaded (CCO M/T)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cargo handled (000 M/T)</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total average number of days of ships in SVN and SEA Holding Ports*</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
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</table>

*Based on ships departing during month and excluding Air Force Special Express Amo ships and floating store ships.
## CONFIDENTIAL

### MSTS DEEP DRAFT CARGO SHIP FLOW THROUGH SVN

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Oct</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of ships arriving in SVN</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of ships departing in SVN</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of ships in SVN at E.O.M.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of ships in SEA Holding Ports at E.O.M.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
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</tr>
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1/ Data derived from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Excludes Air Force Special Express A;

## ANALYSIS OF TIME SPENT BY MSTS CARGO SHIPS IN SVN AND HOLDING AREAS

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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>1966</th>
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<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>107</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avg No. of days in SVN</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>30.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg No. of days in SEA Holding Ports</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Avg No. of days</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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<td>12.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
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</table>

1/ Data from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Based on ships departing during month. Excludes storage ships.

2/ Includes unloading/loading time, time holding in SVN, sailing time between SVN per
### SHIPS IN SVN AND HOLDING AREAS

<table>
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<th>May</th>
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- = ships departing during month. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and floating storage ships.

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### SHIPS DEPARTING DURING MONTH

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</tbody>
</table>

- = ships departing during month. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and floating storage ships.

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*CONFIDENTIAL*

OASD/SA/SPA Program

January 13, 1966

69
### Monthly Data 1967

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<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
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### Total for the Year:

- January: 70
- February: 13
- March: 12
- April: 12
- May: 12
- June: 12
- July: 3
- August: 11
- September: 3
- October: 9
- November: 8
- December: 7

### Special Express Ammo ships and floating storage ships.

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### ODDING AREAS

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</table>

Figures are for the corresponding month. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and floating storage ships between SYN ports.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

CASD/SA/SEA Programs Div.
January 13, 1967

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70
As the attached Table shows, February was the third consecutive month in which the average number of days spent by ships in SVN and SEA holding ports decreased. The average of 16.1 days was the lowest since May 1966 (15.5 days) and was 11.2 days lower than February 1966. The significance of the reduction over a year ago is that if it had not been achieved, ship demurrage charges in February 1967 would have been approximately $5.7 million higher (average of $4,000 per ship day of delay).

The interim goal for average days should be 10 days since current MSTS shipping contracts provide for 10 days agreed "lay time" (discharge/delay time) without additional charges. Any subsequent improvements could result in reduction of the agreed lay time and commensurate reductions in shipping costs to the Government.

The number of ships in SVN ports at the end of the month was 54; this is only 3 in excess of the current MACV prescribed optimum of 51. The optimum level is computed on the basis of port capability and the ship flow necessary to maintain maximum cargo discharge rates. However, under-utilization of some ports and over-commitment of others can be expected on the basis of cargo generation patterns and port operation experience to date.
## MSTS DEEP DRAFT CARGO SHIP FLOW THROUGH SVN

<table>
<thead>
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<td>arriving in SVN</td>
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<tr>
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<td>52</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>71</td>
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1/ Data derived from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammunition.

## ANALYSIS OF TIME SPENT BY MSTS CARGO SHIPS IN SVN AND HOLDING AREAS

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<tr>
<td>No. of ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avg No. of days in SVN</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
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<td>30.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avg No. of days in SEA Holding Ports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Avg No. of days</td>
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<td>12.8</td>
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<td>21.9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1/ Data from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Based on ships departing during month. Excludes storage ships.

2/ Includes unloading/loading time, time holding in SVN, sailing time between SVN ports.

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### CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
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**Special Express Ammo ships and floating storage ships.**

1. **AND HOLDING AREAS**

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>May</th>
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<th>Jul</th>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.8</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
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<td>18.2</td>
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<td>22.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
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2. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and floating storage ships.

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OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div.
March 13, 1967
SAIGON PORT

Background

The rate of discharge and movement of cargo through the port of Saigon is critical to ensuring that the supply of civilian goods is adequate to control inflation, since approximately 90% of all non-military cargo enters SVN through Saigon. The attached Chart shows the tonnage handled by the port, on a monthly basis, since September 1965.

The capability of the port to handle cargo has increased from approximately 287,000 short tons of cargo a month to over 450,000 tons since July 1965. Of the current total approximately 45% is U.S. military cargo. As the Chart shows, the key problem is discharge of the commercial/AID cargo, not the military cargo.

December Crisis

The commercial/AID cargo sector of the port reached a crisis point in December 1966, when the discharge fell to a record low of 102,000 S/T and the backlog soared to a record high of 311,000 S/T. This was due to several factors:

(1) There was a strike against the port by Vietnamese longshoremen over the decision to operate Newport with U.S. military instead of Vietnamese stevedores.

(2) The limited in-transit storage facilities were saturated by goods since importers were not taking delivery. This situation was a manifestation of market congestion, rather than port congestion, resulting from the heavy imports during the preceding months. Import licensing in FY 1966, peaking late in the year, totalled $194.7 million as compared to $239.5 million in FY 1965.

(3) The then incumbent GVN Port Director (who was replaced in January) experimented, contrary to U.S. advice, with discharging barges at deep draft berths with the result that not only did the deep draft tonnage discharge decline sharply but also the staging areas became further congested with cargo which the importers either would not or could not pick up.

Remedies

The drastic drop-off in discharge performance in December made it apparent that the entire port was in danger of becoming paralyzed. To correct the situation a number of actions were taken -- some of which previously had been recommended by MACV and USAID but were not agreed to by the GVN. Actions taken included:
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(1) Improved responsiveness by the GVN Port Authority to U.S. advice.

(2) Active U.S. military participation in barge discharge operations at one of the principal sites, Block 22 on the Kinh Te Canal (Map attached). Specific barges are being called forward by the GVN Port Authority for discharge and consignees are being notified in advance of cargo arrivals by USAID Importer Contact Teams. USAID continues its actions to ensure that the consignees accept their cargo and remove it from the port area. As part of the operation, the U.S. military provides personnel to document all cargo discharged from barges and prepares inventories of all cargo in transit storage at Block 22.

(3) Bulk commodities are being pre-cleared through GVN Customs based on barge manifests which permits discharge at improvised sites along the extensive Saigon canal system.

(4) Pressures are being exerted to discharge general cargo at alongside berths and restrict the use of barges as much as possible to bulk commodities. This should help to minimize mixed consignee loads in the barges which delays and complicates port clearance and acceptance by importers.

(5) MACV is discharging additional commodities designated by USAID, principally fertilizer, to relieve the workload of the commercial port.

(6) Construction of additional barge facilities and warehousing is being expedited, principally along the Kinh Te Canal and at Thu Duc. The Thu Duc facility is now partially in use and is expected to be fully operational in April 1967. It will have double the capability of existing Saigon in-transit storage facilities.

(7) The GVN has implemented a new port tariff which acts as an incentive for importers to take delivery of their cargo. The previous unrealistically low charges encouraged leaving cargo in barges and scarce in-transit storage as cheap warehousing. (The still missing action is confiscation of goods left in the port over specified maximum time.)

(8) MACV is inventorying the Saigon barge fleet and monitoring the barge turnaround rate (Chart attached). The inventory has not yet been completed because of the problem of locating and identifying the many barges constantly moving in the port and the canals.

(9) USAID is constructing warehouses at Nha Trang and Danang in order to permit cargoes to be discharged and distributed directly from up-country ports to avoid imposing the burden on the already over-committed Saigon port.
Recent Performance

The results achieved to date by the above-described actions can best be measured by comparison of data for the latest three months (December, 1966 - February, 1967) with the previous three month period (September - November, 1966).

SAIGON PORT - COMMERCIAL/ AID CARGO DISCHARGED

(Short Tons)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>191,000</td>
<td>6,367</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>3,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>6,935</td>
<td>267,000</td>
<td>8,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>254,000</td>
<td>8,133</td>
<td>199,000</td>
<td>8,652*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mo Avg</td>
<td>216,700</td>
<td>7,145</td>
<td>189,300</td>
<td>6,851</td>
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</table>

*Feb. computed on 23-day month because of TET (8-12 Feb).

The February 1967 performance should be interpreted in the light of the occurrence of TET (8-12 Feb) during which the Vietnamese did not work the port. If the port had worked during TET and February had been a full 30 day month (assuming the same daily average discharge rate of 8,652 tons had been maintained), the total tonnage discharged would have been 260,000 S/T and the backlog would have been down to about 110,000 tons. While the actual February backlog of 171,000 tons was the lowest since September 1966, the following Table demonstrates that a major cause was the lowest input of new cargo since before May of 1966:

Saigon Port Commercial/Aid Cargo Input - Output Analysis

(000 Short Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Beginning Backlog</th>
<th>Arrivals during month 1/</th>
<th>Total Avail. Cargo</th>
<th>Discharged</th>
<th>Ending Backlog</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>101</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>179</td>
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<td>June</td>
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<td>Nov</td>
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<td>220</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>267</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>171</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1/ Arrivals a computed rather than reported figure.

* No backlog data available prior April 1966.
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It should also be noted, however, that the backlog of loaded barges at the end of February was the highest since records have been maintained. Unless the barges can be turned around faster, ship discharge will bog down again.

Future Prospects

On balance, the precipitous decline in discharge that occurred in December has been reversed and pre-December productivity restored. The January to February decline in backlog was due almost entirely to the abnormally low input of new cargo. Lacking a mechanism to control the flow of commercial/AID cargo into SVN, no meaningful forecasts can be made of the future levels of monthly cargo arrivals and resulting backlogs. However, there has been an approximately $90 million decline in the import licenses issued during the 1st half of FY 1967; the effects of this should be felt over the next 6 months. While the port is obviously still congested, particularly the barges with over-age cargo still on-board, even undelivered cargoes serve a useful purpose as they exert a downward pressure on prices. Their presence in the port discourages hoarding and market speculation.

Over the longer run the outlook for the port is favorable due to the accelerated construction programs, the beginning of improved SVN management and cooperation, the stronger "operational" roles of MACV and USAID, and the increased utilization of up-country ports.

In view of the Saigon port problems, of incidental interest is a March 6, 1967, message from CMUSMACTHAI describing port of Bangkok congestion which now causes ships to wait approximately 12 days for a berth (an average of 26 ships waiting at any one time). CMUSMACTHAI states Bangkok's problems in similar terms as the Saigon experience — inadequate port clearance capability which affects berthing, barge discharge and over-all port throughput. While MACTHAI believes U.S. military shipping delays will be eliminated as Sattahip becomes operational, he expects commercial shipping congestion will continue to be a problem for an indeterminate period.
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<th>SWALLOW DRAFT</th>
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<tr>
<td>Song Dong</td>
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*ammo & fuel facilities not incl.*

*scattered throughout area*
SAIGON BARGE REPORT
(COMMERCIAL ONLY)

NO. OF BARGES

- DISCHARGED DURING WEEK
- LOADED DURING WEEK
- UNDER LOAD
- UNDER LOAD OVER 30 DAYS

<table>
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<th>FEBRUARY 1967</th>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>1227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) DATA NOT AVAILABLE
(**) REPORTING PERIOD CHANGED TO 10 DAY PERIODS

38
SAIGON PORT CARGO DISCHARGED AND BACKLOG

|  SHORT TONS (000) |
|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|                  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| SEP  | OCT | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB | MAR | APR | MAY | JUN | JUL |
| 350  | 250 | 150 |  0  |  0  |  0  |  0  |  0  |  0  |  0  |  0  |

* GVN BACKLOG FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE

* GVN COMM'L/AID CARGO DISCH
U.S. MIL. CARGO DISCH
AID CARGO DISCH BY U.S. MIL
The Table on the following page summarizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August 1965 to March 1967, and presents the OASD (I&L) forecast of shipments through December 1967.

Total SEA shipments reached a new high of 1,289,000 M/T in March, up 129,000 M/T over February, and 13% greater than forecast. Most of the increase was in cargo to other than SVN ports. Non-SVN shipments totaled 493,000 M/T, up 109,000 M/T from February and 30% greater than the forecast. A closer look at non-SVN shipments in the light of shipments during the previous 14 months, shows that the cargo was distributed as follows:

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<td>114.0</td>
<td>117.2</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>16.5</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>120.0</td>
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<td>93.7</td>
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<tr>
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The greatest increase in March were into Thailand and Okinawa with about 50 percent each. The increase into Thailand was probably due in part to air ordnance for the B-52s that deployed to U-Tapao in early April. There were no apparent reasons for the sharp and surprising increase in Okinawa tonnages. Further investigation into Okinawa shipments will be made in light of the decision by the Secretary of Defense in December to restrict the role of Okinawa in the Army's PACOM logistic system. In view of the reduced role to be played by the Okinawa depots, reduction in shipments should be occurring.

Shipments to Vietnam also hit a new high of nearly 800,000 tons. The cargo mix is shifting, with unit equipment tonnage well below last summer's levels when major combat units were arriving. Ammunition tonnage was down sharply from recent months as shipments on the "push" system are eliminated, and may reflect some diversion of air ordnance to Thailand to support the B-52s. The largest segment of the SVN tonnages is in "other" cargo. This category will continue to grow as the in-country troop population increases and the resupply and replacement demands rise.

Unbooked cargo remained in March at extremely low levels (29,000 tons), well below the optimum 100,000 ton level.
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**LSTs OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA**

(000 N/T)

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SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual data from MIMT adjusted to include Air Force SASM. Forecast data from OASD(I&I).

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</table>

MIMS adjusted to include Air Force Special Express ammo shipments data furnished by

C&SD/SA/SEA Programs Div.
April 15, 1967

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As the chart above and the attached Table show, the average number of days spent by ships in SVN and SEA holding ports continued to decrease. The March average of 12.9 days was the lowest since April 1966 (11.7 days) and was 3.2 days lower than a year ago. At the end of March no ships were in SEA holding ports, the first time this has been true in a year.

A new high was achieved in the number of ships completed when 151 ships departed SVN in March. The previous high was 139 in January. The March total was 65% above March of last year and more than double the average number of ships handled during the second half of 1965.

The number of ships in SVN ports at the end of March was 48, three less than the current MACV prescribed optimum of 51 ships working. This optimum is computed on the basis of port capability and the ship flow necessary to maintain maximum cargo discharge rates. Under-utilization of some ports and over-commitment of others can be expected because of cargo generation patterns and port operation experience to date.
### MSTS DEEP DRAFT CARGO SHIP FLOW THROUGH SVN

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Jan</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Apr</td>
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1/ Data derived from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and losses.

### ANALYSIS OF TIME SPENT BY MSTS CARGO SHIPS IN SVN AND HOLDING AREAS

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<th></th>
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<td>Jul</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Sep</td>
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<td>Nov</td>
<td>Dec</td>
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<td>Feb</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of ships</td>
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<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avg No. of days in SVN 2/</td>
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<td>12.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>30.5</td>
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<td>11.7</td>
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</table>

1/ Data from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Based on ships departing during month. Excludes Air Force Special storage ships.

2/ Includes unloading/loading time, time holding in SVN, sailing time between SVN ports.

CONFIDENTIAL
### CONFIDENTIAL

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1 Express Ammo ships and floating storage ships.

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Month. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and floating between SVN ports.

CASD/SA/SEA Programs Div.
April 13, 1967
OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA

The attached table summarizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August, 1965 to April, 1967, and presents the OASD(T&L) forecast of shipments through December, 1967.

Total shipments from CONUS to SEA in April remained at the same high level as in March. However, shipments to SVN increased by 10% to establish an all-time high of 876,000 M/T. Within the SVN total, increases occurred in the ammunition and "other" categories. In view of the steady growth in the "other" category and other indicators, it appears that excessive stocks of material may be building-up in SVN.

Total shipments to the non-SVN ports in SEA totaled 409,000 M/T which was a 84,000 M/T reduction from the March level. Detailed information as to the distribution among the ports is not yet available; however, preliminary information indicates the majority of the reduction may have occurred in shipments to Okinawa. If the final data confirms this, it will be a significant reversal of the March, 1967 experience commented on in last month's Southeast Asia Analysis Report (pp. 47).

In view of the Secretary of Defense decision in December, 1966 to restrict the role of Okinawa in the Army's PACOM logistic system, continued reductions in the tonnage shipped to Okinawa for the 2nd Logistic Command depot should be expected. Information available indicates the following requisition cancellation request actions by the 2nd Logistic Command.

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If a significant portion of these cancellation requests are acted upon before shipment from CONUS, major savings in packing, in-land transportation, ocean shipping and replacement procurement costs should result.

1/ "Other" includes all material except unit equipment, ammunition and aircraft.
### CONFIDENTIAL

**MTS OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA**

(000 Tons)

#### ALL SOUTH VIETNAM PORTS

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**Note:** SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual data from MTS are adjusted to include Air Force and military forecast data from USAF (TAC).
## CONFIDENTIAL

### ALL APO'S BY DESTINATIONS

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Notes: Adjusted to include Air Force Special Express cargo shipments data furnished by OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div. May 15, 1967

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SAIGON PORT

As the table and attached charts indicate, the AID-Commercial cargo sector of the Saigon port is in its best condition in a year. Despite the highest rate of cargo arrivals in the port since October, 1966, the April discharge of 296,000 short tons results in the lowest end-of-month backlog of undischarged cargo experienced to date. The backlog on April 30, 1967 was equal to only 1 week's work.

**SAIGON PORT COMMERCIAL/AID CARGO INPUT - OUTPUT ANALYSIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Backlog</th>
<th>Arrivals during month</th>
<th>Total Avail.</th>
<th>Discharged</th>
<th>Ending Backlog</th>
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1967

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<th>Month</th>
<th>Beginning</th>
<th>Arrivals during month</th>
<th>Total Avail.</th>
<th>Discharged</th>
<th>Ending Backlog</th>
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<td>98</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>296</td>
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</table>

* Arrivals are computed rather than reported.

The overall progress in the port is due to the cumulative effects of improvements in facilities, equipment and management; however, as the following table indicates, U.S. military cargo handling has made a major contribution. While GVN discharge rates have remained relatively constant (excluding the low performance in December, 1966 due to the strike and February, 1967 due to TCL), the U.S. military is handling about one-third of the cargo discharged (in addition to 200,000 S/T a month of U.S. military cargo).
### Saigon Port Commercial/AID Cargo Discharged by GVN and U.S. Military

(000 Short Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Discharged by GVN</th>
<th>Discharged by U.S. Mil</th>
<th>Total Discharged</th>
<th>% Discharged by U.S. Mil</th>
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<tr>
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SAIGON PORT CARGO DISCHARGED AND BACKLOG

short tons
(000)

GVN COMM'L/AID CARGO DISCH
U.S. MIL. CARGO DISCH
AID CARGO DISCH BY U.S. MIL

* GVN BACKLOG FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE
SAIGON BARGE REPORT
(COMMERCIAL ONLY)

NO. OF BARGES

2000

DISCHARGED DURING WEEK
LOADED DURING WEEK
UNDER LOAD
UNDER LOAD OVER 30 DAYS

1579

DATA NOT AVAILABLE

(•) REPORTING PERIOD CHANGED TO 10 DAY PERIODS
AIR CARGO SHIPMENTS TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following table illustrates the sharp increase in air cargo shipments from CONUS to Southeast Asia.

Air Cargo Shipments from CONUS to SVN and Other Southeast Asia 1/ (Short Tons)

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<th>SVN</th>
<th>Other SEA</th>
<th>Total SEA</th>
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<td>5,600</td>
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<td>Apr-Jun, 1966</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>6,600</td>
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<td>Jul-Sep, 1966</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>17,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct-Dec, 1966</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>23,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan-Mar, 1967</td>
<td>17,300</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>27,900</td>
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</table>

1/ Data source: OASD(I&L). Other SEA defined to include Thailand, Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan, and Guam.

ASD(I&L) recently instituted a mandatory pre-shipping challenge procedure for all shipments of certain commodities exceeding 1,000 pounds. This action resulted from the continued growth of air shipments to Southeast Asia, an OSD sample of air export cargo which indicated questionable priority assignments, and expenditures for commercial augmentation of MAC reaching the rate of $600 million a year. The commodity groups placed under the mandatory procedure include:

(a) construction materials  
(b) fuels, lubricants and gas generators  
(c) printed forms  
(d) clothing  
(e) rations  
(f) office supplies

Under the procedure, detailed lists will be submitted to ASD(I&L) and the Services each month identifying all shipments made by air after challenge because of reaffirmation of the requirement for air shipment.

In a parallel action, ASD(I&L) also directed an embargo on low priority shipments in the ocean cargo system called Sea Express (SEA-EX). This will restore the SEA-EX system to its intended use of providing expedited ocean transportation for high priority cargo. The effect of these two sets of actions should be significantly reduced air and Sea Express shipments and costs.

As a direct result of these ASD(I&L) actions, CINCPAC has instituted similar procedures for intra-PACON air and expedited ocean shipments. CINCPAC also reemphasized that control must be exercised on requisitions to prevent abuses of the priority system.
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POL SUPPORT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SVN

As the table shows, the consumption of POL in SVN has increased sharply since the introduction of U.S. forces in 1965.

Monthly Average Military POL Consumption

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<th>Mogas</th>
<th>Diesel</th>
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<td>217</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-Jun 1966</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-Sep 1966</td>
<td>1,188</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>1,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-Dec 1966</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>2,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Mar 1967</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>2,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1967</td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>2,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Off</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>3,013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The current military POL requirements for the entire Pacific Command (PACOM) are approximately 13.9 million barrels a month. The sources of supply for these requirements have been:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Western Hemisphere (000 Bbls)</th>
<th>Middle East (000 Bbls)</th>
<th>Total (000 Bbls)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-5*</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avgas</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogas</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Special Fuel Oil</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>13,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* JP-5 is used in Navy carrier-based aircraft.

At the beginning of the Middle East crisis in early June, total PACOM operating stocks and reserves were estimated to be capable of supporting operations at current consumption rates (assuming no interruptions of normal Western Hemisphere inputs) for the following periods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Days of Supply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avgas</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogas</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Special</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AvGas and JP-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Infinite since JP-5 and essentially all Avgas supplied from Western Hemisphere.

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Actions have been taken to procure product from Western Hemisphere sources and MSTS is spot chartering tankers to avoid major drawdowns of reserve stocks. Since a shift to the Western Hemisphere requires an additional 15 days steaming time to Western Pacific destinations, approximately 35 extra T-5 (200,000 Bbl) tankers are required to replace the Middle East deliveries.
The $152 million construction effort has increased port capacity from the July, 1965 level of approximately 240,000 ST/month to the present 1.2 million ST/month. Additional projects which are under construction will increase capacity to 1.4 million ST/month by August, 1967, barring slippages in construction. (See attached table).

Port capacity estimates are based on facility design factors. Actual port capability depends not only on facilities but also personnel, equipment, the cargo mix and, particularly in SVN, weather conditions. Consequently, MACV estimates the peak throughput capability at 1.2 million ST to be achieved in September, 1967. This represents a 200,000 ST/month or 15% reduction. The MACV capability estimate coincides closely with the CINCPAC forecasted peak Program 4 throughput requirement of approximately 1.1 million ST in May, 1967 (actual May throughput was 1.0 million ST).

However, MACV's estimates of both design capacity and capability may be too conservative, based on actual performance to date. For example, Danang's capability was estimated at 197,000 ST for May, 1967 despite its handling 216,000 ST in April. Danang actually handled 199,000 tons in May and could have handled more if more ships had been available to offload.

MACV's directives to shipping control agencies state that the optimum number of deep draft ships required to maximize Danang's productivity is 10 (1 at each of the 6 berths and 4 in the stream for lighterage discharge); however, the April performance was achieved with a daily average of only 5.2 deep draft ships available for discharge. The ships at Danang on selected dates were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of Ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 31, 1967</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10, 1967</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20, 1967</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30, 1967</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall the 13 SVN ports performed in accordance with forecasted capability and requirements in April and May, 1967. However, the following number of ports reported low performance due to insufficient cargo being available for discharge:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Period</th>
<th>No. of Ports with Idle Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-10 April 1967</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20 April 1967</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30 April 1967</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10 May 1967</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20 May 1967</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-31 May 1967</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data indicates that improved capacity and capability estimates, together with improved ship scheduling (to minimize peaks and valleys in SVN port workload), would permit the required tonnages to be handled with fewer resources. The healthy stock levels now in place in SVN should permit the improved ship scheduling.
**SVN MILITARY PORT DEVELOPMENT STATUS SUMMARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. OF DEEP DRAFT BERTHS</th>
<th>TOTAL CAPACITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>1 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Chu Lai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>6 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Tam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Hue-Phu Bai/Tan My/Dong Ha/Cua Viet/Dem Sai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Phan Rang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>4 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>5 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuy Hoa/Vung.Ro</td>
<td>2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>6 1 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                          | 240,000 1,200,000 1,437,000 |

1/ Data from CINCPAC SVN port development plan dated Apr 11, 1967.
2/ Includes deep draft berths, shallow draft and lighterage discharge.
3/ Estimated.
4/ Saigon berth data includes only those used by U.S. military; assumes return of 2 berths to GVN use when last two berths at Newport are completed.
* Shallow draft and/or lighterage ports.

June 15, 1967
The attached table summarizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August, 1965 to June, 1967 and presents the latest OASD(T&L) forecast of shipments through December, 1967.

Total shipments from CONUS to South Vietnam in June resulted in the first significant month-to-month decline which has occurred since December, 1965. The June total of 796,000 M/T was 79,000 M/T or 9% below May and 59,000 M/T or 7% below forecast. The major decrease (96,000 M/T) occurred in the "Other" category. 1/ While 1 month's experience does not establish a trend, a resumption of the steady growth of this category should be expected as a result of the levelling-off of new unit deployments, the larger stocks on hand in-country and a general shift into the resupply phase of logistic operations. Efforts are underway in OASD(T&L) to examine the commodity groupings in the "Other" category to determine commodity trends. The data may be useful to appraise whether the shift from initial stock build-up to resupply is being accomplished in a timely enough manner.

Total shipments to the non-SVN SEA destinations also declined from the May level. While complete data for all destinations is not yet available, the June preliminary data confirms that the heavy input trend to Okinawa has been reversed. (April, Southeast Asia Analysis Report, pg. 47). Pertinent statistics are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total (000 M/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>107.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>164.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>116.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>87.5 (P)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ocean Shipments from CONUS to Okinawa (000 M/T)

It should be of interest to the Logistic Community that while between August, 1965 and June, 1967 ocean shipments from CONUS to SVN increased by only 63%, shipments to all other SEA destinations increased by 200%. When this fact is considered together with the monthly input of an average of 170,000 M/T into SVN from non-U.S. ports, it suggests there may be a considerable amount of unnecessary inventory build-up, transshipments and double-handling of cargo for SVN by the off-shore bases.

1/ "Other" includes all material except unit equipment, ammunition and aircraft.
## MTNS Ocean Cargo Shipments from CONUS to SEA

### (000 M/T)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>ALL SOUTH VIETNAM PORTS</th>
<th>ALL OTHER SEA DE</th>
<th>May '67</th>
<th>Forecast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unit Equip</td>
<td>Ammo</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>412</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes
- SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual data from MTNS adjusted to include NSMN. Forecast data from OASH(IAS).

**Confidential**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALL OTHER SEA DESTINATIONS</th>
<th>GRAND TOTAL SEA</th>
<th>UNBOOKED CARGO CONUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May '67 Total</td>
<td>May '67 Forecast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forecast</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>283</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>1161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308</td>
<td>1103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>1160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>382</td>
<td>1269</td>
<td>1205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>388</td>
<td>1276</td>
<td>1276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>821</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>1,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>855</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>1,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>850</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>1,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>872</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>866</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>901</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from MIMOS adjusted to include Air Force Special Express ammo shipments; data furnished by

OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div.
July 1, 1967

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As the table and attached charts indicate, the Saigon port has maintained the excellent condition reported in the May Southeast Asia Analysis Report (p46-49). The end-of-the month backlogs in May and June were the lowest experienced to date. This performance was achieved despite heavy arrivals of cargo. The end of June backlog was equal to only one week's work.

A particularly favorable development is the sharply improved status of the barge fleet. As the attached Saigon Barge Report chart indicates, at the end of June only 94 barges still had cargo on board and of these, only 9 had cargo aboard longer than 30 days. In contrast, on March 20, 1967, there were 979 loaded barges and of these 642 had cargo aboard longer than 30 days. The improved facilities and management of the port have made this significant progress possible.

A less favorable aspect is the increase in the percentage of the cargo being discharged by the U. S. military instead of by the GVN. As the following table shows, while the U. S. production was the highest to date, the GVN production was the lowest since February 1967. The U. S. is now discharging 45% of the AID/Commercial cargo in the Saigon port. Perhaps it is now timely to reappraise the continued need for such large-scale U.S. assistance.

---

**SAIGON PORT COMMERCIAL/AID CARGO INPUT - OUTPUT ANALYSIS**

(000 Short Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Beginning Backlog</th>
<th>Arrivals during month</th>
<th>Total Avail.</th>
<th>Discharged</th>
<th>Ending Backlog</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>244</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Arrivals are computed rather than reported.

* Data not available for April, 1966 and prior months.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Discharged by GVN</th>
<th>Discharged by U.S. Mil</th>
<th>Total Discharged</th>
<th>% Discharged by U.S. Mil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul*</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>165</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>258</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>45</td>
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</table>

SAIGON PORT CARGO DISCHARGED AND BACKLOG

SHORT TONS (000)

* GVN BACKLOG FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE

54
SAIGON BARGE REPORT
(COMMERCIAL ONLY)

No. of Barges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Discharged During Week</th>
<th>Loaded During Week</th>
<th>Under LOAD</th>
<th>Under LOAD Over 30 Days</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1579</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(•) Data not available
(••) Reporting period changed to 10 day periods
OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA

The attached table summarizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August, 1965 to July, 1967 and presents the latest OASD (I&L) forecast of shipments through December, 1967.

In July shipments from CONUS to South Vietnam continued unchanged from the June level and totaled 783,000 M/T. However, shipments from CONUS to the non-SVN SEA destinations increased by 84,000 M/T to a total of 468,000 M/T. Thus, of the 1.3 million M/T shipped to SEA, shipments to the non-SVN destinations were 37%. In contrast, U.S. military forces in other than SVN (excluding dependents) are only 26% of the total U.S. military population in SEA. Considering the higher tempo of operations and accelerated rates of consumption in SVN, the continued heavy influx into the non-SVN ports appears high.

The following table compares shipments to the non-SVN ports for the 2nd quarter CY 1967 and July 1967 on a port-by-port basis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO NON-SVN SEA PORTS</th>
<th>2nd Qtr CY 1967</th>
<th>July 1967</th>
<th>Net Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>(5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>110.5</td>
<td>38.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Data from MSTS, July data preliminary.

With the exception of Korea, which increased by 54%, the changes were relatively minor. As there are no known factors which account for the sharp increase in shipments to Korea, OASD (I&L) is asking the Department of Army to investigate.

July was the sixth consecutive month in which the unbooked cargo backlog was less than the optimum 100,000 M/T level. During the month there were several instances of insufficient cargo generation which resulted in idle MSTS ships in CONUS ports. The Secretary of Defense has approved a Navy recommendation that 15 GAA ships should be inactivated and returned to the NDRF. OASD(I&L) is studying the possibility of further inactivations. The excess ship capability, despite continued high lift requirements, results from the improved ship turnaround times in SVN and the employment of a more efficient mix of ships such as the container ships, which have been serving the Philippines and Okinawa and in July began service to SVN.
### MTBS Ocean Cargo Shipments from CONUS to SEA

(000 M/T)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>Unit Equip</th>
<th>Ammo</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Forecast</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1965</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>171</td>
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<td>130</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>129</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 1965</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>284</td>
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<td>76</td>
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<td>424</td>
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<tr>
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<td>42</td>
<td>419</td>
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<td>476</td>
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<td>891</td>
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**S/ SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual data from MTBS adjusted to include BASM. Forecast data from OASD(ILL).**
<table>
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<th>May '67 Actual</th>
<th>May '67 Forecast</th>
<th>May '67 Forecast</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>Forecast</td>
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<td>128</td>
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<td>570</td>
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<td>792</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>891</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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Data from MINIS adjusted to include Air Force Special Express ammo shipments data furnished by OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div.

August 14, 1967
CARGO SEALIFT FROM CONUS TO SVN

The following table shows DOD dry cargo sealift movements to Vietnam from July 1965 to the present, both in total and by type of ship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nucleus</th>
<th>GAA</th>
<th>Charter</th>
<th>Berth Term</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Qtr</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Qtr</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Qtr</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Qtr</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>2,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>2,825</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>6,338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FY 1967 |         |     |         |            |       |
| 1st Qtr | 601     | 729 | 930     | 25         | 2,335 |
| 2nd Qtr | 563     | 786 | 1,069   | 154        | 2,572 |
| 3rd Qtr | 590     | 906 | 1,179   | 134        | 2,869 |
| 4th Qtr | 671     | 1,092 | 1,822 | 53         | 3,108 |
| Total   | 2,425   | 3,513 | 4,520 | 366        | 10,824 |

| FY 1968 |         |     |         |            |       |
| 1st Qtr | 646     | 923 | 1,151   | 83         | 2,803 |
| 2nd Qtr* | 613     | 924 | 1,176   | 58         | 2,771 |
| Total   | 1,259   | 1,847 | 2,127 | 141        | 5,574 |

*Estimated

a/ Includes reefer, aircraft, ammunition, general and AID cargo moved by MSTS controlled ships.

It appears that the peak tonnages occurred in the 4th quarter FY67. Despite the Program #5 force level increases, it is unlikely that the 4th quarter total will be exceeded since stock levels are in place, the heavy influx of construction material is over and improved in-country supply management procedures should result in better utilization of stocks on hand.

The data point up the vital role of the GAA (General Agency Agreement) ships reactivated from the National Defense Reserve Fleet which carried approximately one-third of the total cargo in FY67. The initial request for GAA ships was approved in July 1965 and by March 1967 there were 166 operating as part of the MSTS controlled fleet. In view of the leveling off of shipping requirements and improved ship turnaround times in SVN ports, it was clear that excess shipping capability would exist in FY68. Thus, the Navy was authorized to deactivate and return 15 GAA ships to the National Defense Reserve Fleet. Of the remaining 151 ships, 139 are in full operating status and 12 are in a reduced operating status, available to meet unexpected surge requirements for SVN or elsewhere.
EFFECTS OF TET OFFENSIVE ON SVN PORT OPERATIONS

The impact of the Tet Offensive on SVN port operations was confined almost entirely to the Saigon port. The following Table displays the data available at the time this publication went to press.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships with Mil. Cargo</th>
<th>Ships with AID/Comm't Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>Waiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/20/68</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/31/68</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/10/68</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/20/68 (P)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Includes Cat Lai ammunition discharge site.

Being heavily dependent upon civilian stevedores and truck drivers, the Saigon port's resumption of work was severely hampered by the curfew which reduced the workday from two shifts of ten hours to less than one full shift. This, coupled with port clearance delays, accounted for the rapid build-up of shipping in the port.

Information available on February 20th indicated the military port's production was back to normal and, barring further interruptions, the number of ships would be reduced to normal levels within approximately 3 - 4 weeks. In view of the number of ships with military cargo in transit to Saigon (46 ships to arrive during the balance of February or in March), MACV has taken the following actions:

a. Limited CONUS outloadings for Saigon (less ammunition) to 30,000 M/T per week. This is a 30% reduction.

b. Curtailed backloading at Saigon except for RO/RO and containerships.

c. Diverted some ships with Saigon cargo to other SVN ports for discharge.
The following table compares the military cargo workload of the ports in I CTZ with all other SVN ports over the past 13 months.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Dong Ha</th>
<th>Hue</th>
<th>Danang</th>
<th>Chu Lai</th>
<th>Total I CTZ</th>
<th>SVN</th>
<th>Total of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967 Jan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>133.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>181.1</td>
<td>632.3</td>
<td>813.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>7.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>141.2</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>197.6</td>
<td>678.4</td>
<td>876.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>20.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
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<td>35.0</td>
<td>221.5</td>
<td>688.0</td>
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<td>310.9</td>
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<td>728.8</td>
<td>1023.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>228.2</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>336.7</td>
<td>730.2</td>
<td>1056.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>209.1</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>298.6</td>
<td>683.1</td>
<td>981.7</td>
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<td>Aug</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>232.7</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>331.5</td>
<td>699.0</td>
<td>1030.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>211.8</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>299.2</td>
<td>647.4</td>
<td>946.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>197.7</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>286.9</td>
<td>633.5</td>
<td>920.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>236.5</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>344.7</td>
<td>742.2</td>
<td>1086.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>211.7</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>312.9</td>
<td>786.1</td>
<td>1099.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 Jan</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>306.7</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>419.9</td>
<td>810.1</td>
<td>1230.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total workload is the sum of cargo discharged and cargo outloaded.

The most significant fact indicated by the data is that while the workload of all other SVN ports increased only 28% between January 1967 and January 1968, the workload in the I CTZ increased nearly 132%. This is a reflection of not only the steadily increasing troop strength in the I CTZ but also the primary reliance on sealines of communications for intra-corps resupply. Danang, the only deep draft port in the I CTZ and the site of the major Navy and Marine supply and maintenance facilities, is the logistic hub. All cargo arriving in the I CTZ aboard deep draft ships must be unloaded at Danang and if required elsewhere in I CTZ, must be transshipped either to Chu Lai for the southern sector or north to Hue or Dong Ha. The vast majority of the transshipped cargo must go by sea in shallow draft craft because of the interdicted roads and bridges.

One measure of the volume of intra-corps sea transshipments is the fact that during the past 3 months 35% (266,000 S/T) of the 755,000 S/T of cargo handled at Danang has been cargo outloaded from the port. In contrast, outloading of cargo at all other SVN ports accounted for only 22% of the total cargo handled during the same period.

When Danang's total port workload is compared only against the other three major deep draft ports in SVN, the following data results:
## Table 2

**Principal SVN Deep Draft Ports Military Cargo Workload**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Danang</th>
<th>Qui Nhon</th>
<th>Cam Ranh Bay</th>
<th>Saigon注</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>139.8</td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td>173.8</td>
<td>250.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>141.2</td>
<td>132.6</td>
<td>186.0</td>
<td>247.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>157.0</td>
<td>160.8</td>
<td>189.8</td>
<td>243.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>215.7</td>
<td>155.7</td>
<td>169.8</td>
<td>276.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>198.7</td>
<td>159.6</td>
<td>150.4</td>
<td>305.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>228.2</td>
<td>166.4</td>
<td>176.2</td>
<td>272.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>209.1</td>
<td>161.5</td>
<td>183.1</td>
<td>224.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>232.7</td>
<td>186.2</td>
<td>174.2</td>
<td>232.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>211.8</td>
<td>184.9</td>
<td>138.7</td>
<td>211.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>197.7</td>
<td>135.7</td>
<td>149.7</td>
<td>237.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>236.5</td>
<td>143.4</td>
<td>197.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>306.7</td>
<td>168.0</td>
<td>199.4</td>
<td>299.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注: Includes ammunition at Cat Lai

The data indicates that Danang is now the major U.S. military port in SVN. Its vital importance for support of the augmented forces in the I CTZ is obvious. Even a temporary loss of Danang's integrated logistical capabilities, either through enemy action or natural phenomena, could have grave consequences.
The FLAGPOLE System for designating critical items for SEA support was discontinued as an OOD requirement in August 1966; however, CJCS PAC has retained it as a system for reporting to JCS. The following provides the current status of the six items on FLAGPOLE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Comments/1/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-10</td>
<td>Herbicide</td>
<td>CONSECR has a stated requirement for 11.9 million gallons of herbicides for defoliation during FY 66. USAF budget provides only for purchase of 6.1 million gallons for that period. Additional funding will be required. Plant expansion will be necessary as well and will require 12-18 months leadtime. Hence, expanded production will not be available prior to 4th quarter FY 65.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-1</td>
<td>Lightweight</td>
<td>Production continues to increase and now essentially meets the demands of all troops in SEA. However, in order to meet the requirement for issue of 5 sets of the lightweight uniforms to all combat forces in SEA, increased production and time are required. It is expected that by July 1967, production and stocks will permit the issue of the required 5 sets to all those requiring them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>Tropical</td>
<td>Reports from SEA indicate that minimum requirements for all combat ops have now been met. However, requirements for issue of 2 pairs of boots to each individual combat man in SEA will not be met until July 1967 when production and stocks catch up with demand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5</td>
<td>MK2 MOD1 Impulse</td>
<td>Cartridge is used in conjunction with the MER/TER* bomb racks and is a vital part of the system. The cartridge, which somewhat resembles a shotgun shell, is used to &quot;blow away&quot; or eject ordnance stores (bombs, rockets) away from the bomb rack. Heavy usage by Navy in SEA operations has created a temporary shortage of this item. Supply should meet demand by end of February 1967.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Source: JCS J-4

* MER/TER - Multiple ejection rack, Tripal ejection rack
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-6</td>
<td>Aircraft/Multiple ejection rack/Triple ejection rack.</td>
<td>These racks were principally made by Douglas Aircraft for the A-4 aircraft. Since the A-4 was designed essentially as a nuclear bomb carrier, provision was not originally made for the carriage of multiple loads of &quot;iron&quot; bombs and rockets. The racks are not a &quot;simple&quot; item; they are made of several complex mechanisms and an electrical wiring system in association with the impulse cartridge. Supply should meet demand by November 1967.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-7</td>
<td>5 Inch/38 AAC/HC Gun Ammunition</td>
<td>Naval gunfire support missions and &quot;SEA Dragon&quot; have markedly increased consumption of 5 inch gun ammunition. To meet immediate needs the Navy has converted 50,000 rounds from VT to HE-PD; production of full charges has been accelerated to provide 40,000 rounds/month; and a portion of COMUS assets were shipped to SEA. Increased production should meet demands by June 1967.**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Source: JCS J-4

* MER/TER - Multiple ejection rack/Triple ejection rack.

** OASD(SA) Comment. Production is now meeting SEA consumption requirements and will fulfill FY 68 logistic guidance objectives in June of 1967.