THE INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY SYSTEM:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CURRENT TRENDS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CURRENT STATUS
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by

Lieutenant-Colonel John Child

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FOREWORD

This memorandum was presented at the Military Policy Symposium sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute and held at the US Army War College in early 1977. Under the general theme “Inter-American Security and the United States,” a broad range of issues affecting US relations in the Latin American region were addressed. This memorandum examines the historical development, current status, and US policy implications of the Inter-American Military System in terms of contemporary analytical tools suggested by the systems approach to the study of international relations.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a forum for the timely dissemination of analytical papers such as those presented at the 1977 Military Policy Symposium.

This memorandum is being published as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. The data and opinions presented are those of the author and in no way imply the endorsement of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant
1 June 1977
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN CHILD has been the JCS Military Secretary to the US Delegation of the Inter-American Defense Board since 1973. He is a Latin American Foreign Area Specialist and has lived in South America for over 18 years. He graduated from Yale University, holds a master's degree in Latin American area studies from The American University, and is presently completing his doctoral work at the same institution. Past assignments have included tours of duty in Colombia, Vietnam, and the US Military Academy, where he was a member of the Foreign Language Department.
This paper will examine the historical development, current status and implications for US policy of the Inter-American Military System (IAMS) in terms of contemporary analytical tools suggested by the systems approach to the study of international relations.

The opening section presents the conceptual tools and the theoretical framework. The second portion of the paper examines the historical development of the IAMS over five periods: Prior to World War II; World War II (1942-45); Early Cold War Years (1945-61); Late Cold War Years (1961-67); and, Contemporary Period (1967-76).

Each of the periods will be studied in terms of strategic assumptions; geopolitical perceptions; threat scenarios; rationale and purpose of the IAMS; changes in the IAMS and its components from the previous period; achievements and beneficiaries of the IAMS in this period; systemic functions performed by the IAMS; dominant strategic concept; and, dominant system model. The IAMS at its apogee (1961-67) is then analyzed in terms of the linkages between its various components. Lastly, the future of the IAMS is assessed in light of current trends in the Inter-American System, conclusions are drawn
from the preceding analysis, and possible actions relating to US policy initiatives in the current move to reform the Inter-American System are suggested.

It is evident from even a cursory examination of the Inter-American System and of US-Latin American relations that there exist a number of multilateral and bilateral military entities with a wide range of activities and goals. What is not so clear is whether these entities can be justifiably called elements of a “military system” in the sense of being a part of an organized, integrated and goal-oriented larger whole.

It is quite possible that an IAMS, defined in fairly rigorous terms, does not in fact exist. But the concept of an IAMS merits consideration merely by virtue of the fact that politically significant individuals and institutions within the Americas have acknowledged its existence and have expressed concern over its purposes and strength. For example:

- the VIIIth and IXth Conferences of the Chiefs of American Armies (meeting in 1968 and 1969) passed resolutions calling on each American Army to study the IAMS and means for improving it.¹
- the Staff of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) in 1971 prepared a study entitled “The Inter-American Military System,” but differences of opinion within the IADB Council of Delegates prevented approval of this document.
- at the Xth Conference of American Armies (1973) the Peruvian Delegation called for abolishing the IAMS, while the Argentine Delegation, speaking in support of the Peruvians, demanded a revision of the IAMS’ goals and organization.²
- elaborating on this theme in a recent book, a former Prime Minister (and Army Commander) of Peru presented the argument that the IAMS was created by the United States to serve its anachronistic security interests, and therefore must be reorganized to fit current realities.³

These examples serve to underscore the need to study the IAMS, and project its future, within a contemporary conceptual framework.

This paper will use the tools of systemic functions, linkages and system models to argue that:

- no IAMS existed prior to World War II.
- during World War II the foundations for an IAMS were created in the face of a strongly perceived external threat.
- the IAMS declined as a functional system in the early Cold War years (1945-61) due to divergent US and Latin threat perception.
- the IAMS reached its structural and functional apogee in the
1961-67 period in reaction to the strongly perceived threat of Castro-inspired guerrilla warfare.

- since 1967 the IAMS has entered a period of fragmentation and dysfunctional decline.
- the present moment, and the current moves to reform the OAS, offer an opportunity to halt this decline under a new strategic concept stressing a mature military relationship between the United States and Latin America.

This paper will employ Talcott Parson’s system functions criteria to assess the performance of the IAMS as a system as follows:

- Pattern maintenance: are recurring and identifiable patterns of interaction maintained within the System?
- Goal attainment: does the System and its components have clear goals and is visible progress being made to achieve these goals?
- Adaptation: does the System and its components show a capacity to cope with changes in the environment?
- Integration: is the System progressing towards greater integration, defined as a closer interdependence of its components and a greater sense of shared values?

Rosenau’s linkage concepts will be employed in this paper to analyze the relative significance of individual system components. For each of the 24 different hypothesized components of the IAMS we have potential linkages to each of the other components. Thus: 24 x 23 = 552 possible linkages within the IAMS. Each of these linkages will be classified as: P = penetrative; R = response; E = emulative; I = indirect; or N = none. A matrix showing these 552 possible linkages is at Appendix C.

Borrowing heavily from Kaplan’s possible models of the international political system, we can hypothesize six possible models for an Inter-American Military System. It should be noted that we are not suggesting that any of these models would have an existence independent of the political milieu of US-Latin relations. On the contrary, they would almost certainly merely be the military facet of the broader body of Hemispheric international relations.

The six models we suggest, in decreasing order of integration, are:

- The Universal-regional model, in which military transnationalism is the major force. The model would require almost total submergence of nationalism and could exist only in a political environment of complete regional integration and effective government by an OAS more powerful than any state or group of states in the Hemisphere. Needless to say, this model is highly utopian and extremely improbable.
- The *Alliance* model, in which nations maintain their identity and sovereignty (and thus differs from the Universal-regional model), but in which no nation exercises hegemony. Such a IAMS would require almost unanimous political and military consensus on a clear and present armed threat to make the alliance cohesive. A further condition is that there must be at least two alliance partners with roughly equal power to avoid the emergence of a hegemonic power in the alliance.

- The *Hegemonic* model, in which one major power in the Hemisphere outclasses the remaining nations and uses the IAMS for its own strategic-security purposes. While these purposes are not necessarily detrimental to the interests of the lesser states, they clearly must give up a measure of their independence and sovereignty in order to participate in the system (in fact, they may have no choice about participating if the hegemonic power so decides).

- The *Bipolar* model envisions a polarization of the Hemisphere nations around two axes of approximately equal power. There would be, in effect, two competing IAMS at the service of the two poles.

- The *Multipolar* model with a series of subregional "military systems" which would replace the Hemisphere-wide IAMS.

- The *Fractured* model, which would imply a complete break-up of the IAMS into narrow national military-strategic interests. The United States, if involved at all in this model, would do so by means of bilateral military arrangements with key countries.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IAMS

*Prior to World War II.*

As indicated previously, there was no IAMS prior to World War II. From the time of Independence until the mid-1930's the US strategic approach to Latin America was basically unilateral, with little concern for creation of a multilateral or bilateral IAMS. This unilateral approach was the major factor in preventing the emergence of an IAMS.

*Strategic assumptions.* The basic strategic assumption was that there was no military threat to the Hemisphere and thus no need for an Inter-American Military System.

*Geopolitical perceptions.*

- On the part of the United States: the principal US geopolitical perception of the Hemisphere stemmed from the maritime world views of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and US naval strategists, who saw the
Hemisphere in terms of two geopolitical areas: the “US Lake” (Caribbean, Central America and the North Coast of South America) where US economic, diplomatic and military attention was focused; and, the rest of the Hemisphere outside of the “US Lake,” which had a much lower priority.

- On the part of Latin nations within the “US Lake”: there was no real geopolitical consciousness nor belief that anything could be done about US intervention.
- On the part of Latin nations outside of the “US Lake”: since they were not significantly affected by US actions, there was little reaction to the US geopolitical approach to the “Lake.”
- Other Latin geopolitical concerns included: Chilean attempts to maintain her territorial gains of the War of the Pacific (1879-83), and to keep the Southern Pacific the “Chilean Lake” it had been in the late 19th Century; Colombian and Ecuadorean concern over Peruvian expansion into the upper Amazon basin; and, continuing Argentine-Brazilian rivalry for paramountcy in the River Plate Basin centering on Brazil’s concern with keeping open her riverine lines of communications (Plate, Parana and Uruguay Rivers) to interior Southern Brazil.

**Threat scenarios**: None existed, except for the threat of US intervention in the countries of the “US Lake.”

**Rationale and purpose of the IAMS**: None—no IAMS existed.

**Changes in the IAMS from the Previous Period**: Not applicable.

**Achievements and beneficiaries of the IAMS**: None, except that in a negative sense the United States benefitted from the lack of an IAMS in that an IAMS might have restrained unilateral US actions in the “Lake.”

**Systemic functions**: None.

**Dominant strategic concept**: The unilateral concept of the “US Lake.”

**Dominant system model**: None.

**World War II.**

With the Good Neighbor policy initiative of 1933, the United States abandoned the “US Lake” strategic concept, thus creating a strategic void (“Strategic Benign Neglect”) that was not filled until World War II. The World War II period saw the creation of the IAMS in the face of the strongly perceived threat of the Axis.
Strategic assumptions. It was generally assumed that the War posed a real threat to the Hemisphere in the 1941-42 period, a fear that diminished after the Allies went on the offensive. Moreover, if the Hemisphere were to have political, diplomatic and economic unity in the face of this threat, there had to be a multilateral military structure and a strategic concept which was consistent with this political, diplomatic and economic unity. The unilateral “US Lake” strategic concept clearly was not suitable.

Geopolitical perceptions.

- On the part of the United States: the Military Departments (Navy and War) perceived World War II Hemisphere geopolitics in terms of special bilateral relationships with the key countries (Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Panama) in the so-called “Quarter-sphere,” which was the area enclosed in the optimum US defensive perimeter running from Alaska to the Galapagos to the Brazilian bulge to Newfoundland. Such a strategy can be seen as a limited expansion of the “US Lake” concept, and had the following attractions: it was the optimum military perimeter for defending the Continental United States; it included the soft underbelly of the US (Gulf Coast); it protected the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal; it denied the Axis the strategic area of North-East Brazil, the closest point to potential German bases in West Africa; it committed the least amount of US troops and arms; and, it made minimal use of the Latin American military, which were not regarded as operationally ready for intensive combat by the US military.

The US State Department saw a need for a geopolitical and strategic concept (“Hemisphere Defense”) which would be compatible and supportive of the multilateral thrust of the Good Neighbor Policy. The State Department, and specifically Sumner Welles, argued that if the United States was going to achieve Hemisphere unity in political, diplomatic and economic terms there had to be a military strategy which would give each Latin nation a sense of participation in the defense of the Hemisphere. This strategy was the Hemisphere Defense concept, and it drew its roots from Bolivarian precepts, the original presentation of the Monroe Doctrine, and the ideals of unity of the Hemisphere. This concept was not particularly realistic from a military viewpoint since it overextended US resources and included allies which had been strongly influenced by Germany and Italy, such as Argentina.

These divergent US geopolitical perceptions were reconciled at the 1942 Third Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers where the
State Department got its multilateral symbol of Hemisphere military cooperation (the Inter-American Defense Board), while the US Military Departments kept the IADB impotent and pursued their preferred strategy of special bilateral relations with the principal countries of the “Quarter Sphere.”

- On the part of most of Latin America: while geopolitical perceptions and consciousness was not generally high, there was an emotional and diplomatic commitment (at least in economic, political and psychological terms) in the War on the side of the Allies.
- On the part of Brazil: in addition to the above factors, Brazil saw an opportunity to tip the strategic balance with Argentina in her favor through a quid pro quo arrangement under which the United States would obtain access to the strategic North-East Bulge in exchange for substantial military and economic aid.
- On the part of Argentina: initial doubt that the Allies would win the war and growing concern over the impact of US military and economic aid to Brazil and its implications for the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry for the geopolitically key area of the River Plate Basin.

**Threat Scenarios.** Although the US concern over a direct Axis military threat to the Hemisphere diminished after the Allies went on the offensive, in 1941-42 the following threat scenarios caused grave concern:

- Use of the North Africa—Dakar—Natal—Caribbean “corridor” as a possible German invasion route. It should be noted that in 1944-45 this route was employed in reverse as a major Allied supply line.
- German submarine warfare in the Western Atlantic, especially the Atlantic Narrows between Dakar and Natal.
- Japanese attacks on the Panama Canal and the South-Western part of the United States.
- Axis Fifth Column activities in the Hemisphere nations.

**Rationale and Purpose of the IAMS.** The basic rationale and purpose was to provide a multilateral military device for enhancing Hemisphere cooperation in diplomatic and economic spheres while at the same time permitting the US military to follow their special bilateral relations in the Quarter Sphere for substantive strategic matters.

**Changes in the IAMS from the preceding period.** Changes were major and significant, since there had been no IAMS until World War II. This period saw the creation of many of the important institutions of the IAMS which continue to this day. (For additional data on these institutions, see Appendix D.)
In multilateral terms, World War II gave birth to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) as the principal organ of the multilateral IAMS, although opposition by the US Military Departments limited the IADB’s role to recommending and advising. Other multilateral elements included an increase in the attaché system, both in numbers and activity; the foundations of a collective security arrangement later to be formalized in the 1947 Rio Treaty; and a primitive but growing sense of military transnationalism.

Bilateral elements of the IAMS (favored by the US military) included lend-lease as a precursor to the Military Assistance Program; military missions, bilateral commissions with Brazil and Mexico which coordinated the combat support provided by these nations in the war, and training of the Latin American military in the continental United States and the Panama Canal Zone.

Unilateral elements of the IAMS were also created or enhanced, especially the regional military headquarters for Latin America (US Army Caribbean Command, later to become the tri-service US Southern Command), and US military latinists.

Achievements and beneficiaries of the IAMS. The major achievement of the IAMS in this period was to create a framework of linked institutions which permitted a feeling of Hemispheric military cooperation at the multilateral level (principally the Inter-American Defense Board), and a series of special bilateral military arrangements which solved for the United States the two basic Hemispheric strategic problems of World War II (control of the Brazilian Bulge and protection of the Western approaches to the Panama Canal).

The principal beneficiaries of the IAMS in World War II were the United States in terms of Hemisphere solidarity and of the solution to the strategic problems mentioned above; Brazil in terms of substantial amounts of Lend-Lease and economic aid; Mexico, for the same reasons, but to a lesser degree; and the remaining Latin nations which were provided a channel for psychological participation in the military phase of the War effort.

A notable exception to the “beneficiaries” of the IAMS was Argentina which, because of her reluctance to break relations or declare war on the Axis, received no Lend-Lease or economic aid during World War II.

Systemic Functions. In general the IAMS fulfilled the system functions well in the World War II period.

- Pattern maintenance: patterns of World War II cooperation measures were maintained.
• **Goal attainment:** goals of anti-Axis alliance were attained.

• **Adaptation:** the IAMS adapted itself well to the Allies' war-time goals.

• **Integration:** there was a good sense of shared values, but integration of military establishments was minor (except, in a limited sense, for Brazil and Mexico) because of the overwhelming power of the United States and the US military's lack of interest in operational ties to the Latin military.

**Dominant Strategic Concept.** The dominant strategic concept involved an interplay of a token multilateral symbolic concept ("Hemisphere Defense") which served as a "cover" for the true operating strategy, the "Special Bilateral Relationship" with the key nations in the "Quarter-sphere."

**Dominant System Model.** The dominant IAMS model in World War II was a combination of the Alliance and Hegemonic. Elements of the Alliance model were present in that there was a collective security understanding against the Axis threat. However, the dominant model was basically Hegemonic because of the clearly overwhelming US superiority in all aspects of national power.

**Early Cold War Years, 1945-61.**

In this period the IAMS declined as a functional system from its World War II performance under the pressure of divergent US-Latin perceptions of the threat and priorities.

**Strategic assumptions.** The United States assumed that Latin America was a very secondary arena of the Cold War; that if a nuclear war broke out Latin America would have only a minimal role to play; and, that Latin America's major contribution would be as a supplier of strategic raw materials. These assumptions gave rise to the early US strategic approach to Latin America in the Cold War as an area of "Secondary Space" which could be benignly neglected in the face of higher priorities. There was some thought given to linking the Rio Treaty to NATO in an "Atlantic Triangle" strategic concept, but this idea, proposed by Dulles in the mid-1950's, was abandoned when the Latins received it with little enthusiasm.

The Latin nations assumed that there was in fact no real strategic role for them to play, and that the US "benign neglect" was not only strategic, but also economic and political.

**Geopolitical perceptions.**

• On the part of the United States: the US global geopolitical
outlook in this period had shifted to an aero-space view (propounded by de Seversky and others) under which the monolithic Communist enemy could be best contained by the strategies of Atomic Deterrence and Massive Retaliation.

- On the part of Latin America: in general there was grudging acknowledgement of the geopolitical perceptions held by the United States, but also present was resentment over US neglect of Latin America. Certain Latin American nations were developing significant geopolitical perceptions of their own. Brazil was digesting the implications of the geopolitical “Travassos Doctrine” which stressed the national integration of her interior in a march westward. Of increasing importance were the geopolitical ideas of General Golbery do Couto e Silva which went beyond the Travassos Doctrine in a search for the continental projection of Brazil as an ally of the United States. Argentina continued her traditional geopolitical rivalry with Brazil, but with greater impetus under Peron’s concept of a Greater Argentina exercising influence in the Southern Cone.

Threat scenarios. There was no credible threat scenario involving Latin America in this period, except as a very secondary theater in a Cold War or a nuclear conflict. It was very difficult to postulate any circumstances in which the World War II Hemisphere Defense concept would become operational—the spectre of Russian or Chinese divisions invading Latin America was not particularly believable. With the exception of the Colombian Batallion and destroyer-provided UN Forces in the Korean War, the Latin nations did not respond to US expressions of concern over the Sino-Soviet threat in that conflict.

Rationale and Purpose of the JAMS. With no credible threat scenarios, the rationale and purpose of the IAMS suffered accordingly. US strategists envisioned the Inter-American System primarily in terms of the collective security arrangements (the Rio Treaty), but the 1955 attempt to tie Latin America more closely into the network of anti-Communist containment alliances (NATO, SEATO, CENTO) failed in the face of Latin reluctance to militarize the OAS.

A secondary (and unwritten) purpose of the IAMS in this period from the US perspective was that the US domination of the IAMS was a useful mechanism for denying European arms sellers an entry into the Latin American market. This US concern was operationalized in terms of standardization efforts under which Latin American military establishments would be equipped mainly with US arms and encouraged to accept US training, organization and doctrine.
Changes in the IAMS from the preceding period. In general the IAMS languished due to the lack of a credible threat scenario or a strategic concept in which the IAMS could have a meaningful role. IAMS institutions continued, but with a diminished sense of purpose. The IADB was hard pressed to meaningfully plan for Hemisphere Defense. The collective security arrangement was formalized in the 1947 Rio Treaty, but this was clearly much weaker than NATO, and was soon employed more as a politico-diplomatic instrument than as a military alliance. The OAS Charter (1948) included a hypothetical military organ (the Advisory Defense Committee—ADC), but specifically excluded the IADB from the formal OAS structure, a situation that can be interpreted as a reflection of Latin concern over a militarized OAS. The Joint Mexican-US Defense Commission declined in activity as Mexico showed a clear reluctance to maintain a tight security relationship with the United States.

In the early 1950’s the United States began establishing a series of Military Assistance Groups in Latin America by means of bilateral Mutual Security Treaties with 17 Latin nations. While these Treaties were justified as implementing multilateral IADB plans for Hemisphere Defense, in retrospect they were clearly bilateral in nature and served primarily to operationalize US standardization objectives.

Achievements and beneficiaries of the IAMS. Because of the lack of a credible threat, IAMS achievements were very limited in the early Cold War period. To the extent that Latin America was quiescent, the United States benefitted in that strategic resources could be committed to higher priority Cold War concerns. The United States also benefitted from the standardization aspects of the Mutual Security Treaties. It can also be argued that Latin American military establishments benefitted from the arms and training supplied under the Military Assistance Program, although by the late 1950’s there was mounting criticism that these weapons and training were not being used for Hemisphere Defense as much as for the suppression of internal political dissent.

Systemic functions. In general these were severely weakened by the US-Latin divergence on threats and priorities.

- Pattern maintenance: limited and erratic patterns of an anti-Communist alliance were maintained.
- Goal attainment: US goals of forging an alliance were imperfectly attained.
- Adaptation: poor adaptation as the Latins resisted US efforts to involve them more deeply in the Cold War.
Integration: weakened by divergent goals. The Security Assistance Programs and US efforts at achieving weapons standardization produced limited integration.

Dominant Strategic Concept. No single concept dominated the IAMS in this period. Officially, “Hemisphere Defense” continued as the basic strategic concept for the IAMS, but in a Cold War context there seemed little likelihood of a direct Soviet or Chinese invasion of the Western Hemisphere, even in the case of a nuclear Armageddon. The US global Cold War strategy tended to divide the world into a “Power Belt” of “Primary Space” from latitude 10 degrees North to 40 degrees North in which the bulwark of Western Civilization (NATO) was locked in a bitter struggle against a tight Sino-Soviet block. The rest of the world (including most of Latin America) was in “Secondary Space” with a supporting role in terms of providing raw materials.

In the mid-1950’s the United States attempted to involve Latin America in an “Atlantic Triangle” strategic concept by which the Rio Treaty (Latin America and the United States) would be tied to NATO (Western Europe, Canada and the United States) in a triangular strategic relationship. However, as indicated above, the Latins resisted this concept, which never became operational.

Dominant System Model. The World War II Alliance-Hegemonic model shifted towards a more purely US Hegemonic model in the face of Latin reluctance to become too closely tied to the US anti-Communist alliance network.

The Late Cold War Years, 1961-67

This period saw the IAMS reach its greatest structural, organizational and functional expansion as a reaction to Castro’s attempts to export guerrilla warfare in Latin America.

Strategic assumptions. In the wake of Castro’s 1956-59 triumph over Batista and his subsequent attempt to export revolution, it was assumed that Castro-inspired and supported guerrilla warfare under the “Foco” strategic concept was a very real threat to Latin America and US interests in the Hemisphere; that the “Anti-foco” strategic concept which applied internal defense and development (IDAD) techniques to the Latin environment was a viable counter to the “focos”; and, that the old concept of “Hemisphere Defense” in World War II or Cold War terms was losing credibility as the basis for the US-Latin military relationship.
Geopolitical perceptions. In general, there was agreement on the perception that Latin America was a suitable theater of operations for guerrilla warfare. This perception involved a shift away from classical spatial geopolitical frameworks (i.e., maritime, continental and aerospace geopolitical analyses) to the “Revolutionary” geopolitical concept in which guerrilla warfare would be fought mainly in the interior space of the hearts and minds of the rural (and later urban) masses of Latin America.

Threat scenarios. The predominant threat scenario was the Castro-Guevara-Debray vision of “One, two, three, many Vietnams in Latin America” under the Foco concept in which the Andes would become the Sierra Maestra of America. The first expression of the Foco Theory is contained in Che Guevara’s 1961 book “Guerra de Guerrillas,” in which, contrary to traditional Marxist-Leninist theory, he argued that it is not always necessary to wait for all the objective conditions for a revolution since the guerrilla “foco” can create them.

Castro’s attempts to export the Cuban Revolution in the early 1960’s operationalized this theory and caused major concern among US military strategists. The concern was linked to a growing belief in the quasi-invincibility of the guerrilla in a nuclear stalemate among the major powers. First Mao in China, then Giap in Vietnam, then Algeria and Cuba—all seemed to indicate that conventional strategic concepts were now obsolete.

Mao had preached that the guerrilla had to survive among the people as a fish among water; popular support was the sine qua non for guerrilla movements. For Mao popular support was guaranteed by the objective conditions of harsh repressive governments and the guerrilla’s programs of reform. Obsessed by the victory of Castro, Guevara and Debray agreed that the objective conditions were not as important as the example set by the mystical guerrillas fighting heroically in the mountains.

Despite its immediacy, the threat was not evenly perceived. Several key Latin nations (Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil from 1962 to 1964) saw the threat as much less severe than did the United States or those countries directly affected by the Foco Theory.

Rationale and Purpose of the IAMS. The basic purpose of the revitalized IAMS in this period was to forge an effective counter to the threat of the Focos. For the Latin nations directly threatened by guerrilla warfare, the “Anti-foco” strategy was an exercise in self-preservation.
For the United States, the rationale for the “Anti-foco” contained several elements. It was seen as the militarily most realistic answer to the threat of guerrilla warfare. The “Anti-foco” was considered compatible with the Alliance for Progress in that it gave the Latin American military a role in creating the stable conditions required for the orderly development of the Alliance’s programs. There was also the hope that by giving the Latin military a realistic role in counterinsurgency and nation-building, their energies might be absorbed in productive endeavors which might make them less likely to intervene in the political milieu. The “Anti-foco” concept also produced a rare convergence of US Congressional, State and Defense Department views on the Latin American military, a fact that did much to assure speedy legislative approval of implementing programs.11

Changes in the IAMS from the preceding period. The IAMS in this period saw very significant growth, with the revitalizing of existing institutions and the creation of new ones. Clearly the apogee of the IAMS was reached in the mid-1960’s as US and Latin resources were mobilized to face what was seen as a very real threat.

Initially the framework for this revised US military interest in Latin America through the anti-foco concept was handled in the context of the old Military Assistance Program system. However, the MAP system was basically a series of bilateral US-Latin nation agreements, and had the disadvantage of not lending itself to the multilateral thrust of the Alliance for Progress. Accordingly, a conscious effort was made in the early and mid-1960’s to greatly expand the multilateral aspects of the Inter-American System under US aegis. In functional terms the changes in the IAMS involved a rapid shift from the rather mythical Hemisphere Defense role in a nuclear war to a much more realistic role as the instrument for a cooperative US-Latin military effort to prevent the outbreak, or contain the spread, of the guerrilla warfare “focos.”

In structure, the IAMS saw significant growth in terms of:
* a shift in the Military Assistance Program away from conventional warfare arms and training to the tools of the “Anti-foco”: internal defense and development, counterinsurgency and civic action.
* a revitalized Inter-American Defense Board.
* creation of the Inter-American Defense College (1962).
* establishment of subregional military cooperation agreements, most notably the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA).
* increase in the size and significance of the US military regional headquarters for Latin America, the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).
• periodic Conferences of the Chiefs of each Service.
• frequent maneuvers and tactical exercises, which were both naval (the highly successful “UNITAS” series) as well as ground, air, and combined.
• Inter-American military radio nets.
• increase in the size and scope of US training programs for the Latin military in both the Panama Canal Zone and the United States.
• creation of a US Army Special Forces Group in the Canal Zone whose primary operational area would be Latin America.
• attempts to create a permanent standby Inter-American Peace Force.

Achievements and beneficiaries of the IAMS. Proponents of the IAMS point to the failure of the Focos as a major achievement of the IAMS. A more objective assessment would also have to consider that the Focos failed basically because the Cuban Revolution was not an exportable commodity where specific favorable conditions did not exist. In retrospect, it seems fair to conclude that the IAMS in this period accelerated and made more likely the failure of the Focos, but that they would have eventually failed regardless.

The beneficiaries in this process were both the United States and each of the Latin nations threatened by guerrilla warfare. In addition, there seemed to be a bonus effect for the United States in the existence of a vastly expanded IAMS in the mid-1960’s, especially when the degree of US influence in the IAMS in the period is analyzed. However, as will be examined in the next segment of this paper, the unity and sense of purpose of the IAMS which existed in the mid-1960’s quickly evaporated in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.

Systemic functions. In general, systemic functions performed by the IAMS in this period were effective but somewhat uneven due to the lack of unanimity of the perception of the Castro foco threat.
• Pattern maintenance: strong patterns of reacting to the Foco Theory were maintained.
• Goal attainment: the goal of defeating the Focos was achieved. Two observations should be made in passing. First, in retrospect, the Anti-Foco concept may have had only marginal impact on the Focos. Guerrilla warfare in general, and the Cuban Revolution in particular, no longer seem to be the easily exportable commodity which Castro, Guevara and Debray once believed them to be. The absence of internal objective conditions probably did more to defeat the export of
revolution than any US efforts through the IAMS. Second, the linking of the concept of “development” to that of “defense” may have been a significant factor in the raising of the political, social and economic consciousness of the Latin military, and the resulting military reformist movements in the 1967-76 contemporary period.

- **Adaptation:** there was good adaptation to the IDAD concept by those nations which accepted the concept; however, the adaptation was not unanimous nor was it permanent.
- **Integration:** integration was substantial in terms of the greatly expanded IAMS. However, integration, like adaptation, was neither unanimous nor irreversible.

**Dominant Strategic Concept.** The dominant strategic concept in the IAMS was the “Anti-foco,” which in operational terms meant the application of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) techniques to the specific environment of Latin America.

The IDAD concept has two operating parts:

- **Internal Defense:** the use of military counterinsurgency techniques to trap and eliminate the guerrillas (small unit actions, aggressive patrolling, high mobility, fast communications, etc.).
- **Internal Development:** the employment of civic action by which military resources (educational skills, construction equipment, communications and transportation assets, etc.) are used to improve the economic and social conditions of the lower classes. In so doing, the government, and not the guerrillas, will retain the loyalty and support of the people.

**Dominant system model.** Overwhelming US power and influence in the expanded IAMS make it clear that the dominant model was Hegemonic, although with elements (not unanimous) of an anti-Castro Alliance model.

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**From 1967 to the Present—Background.**

This period has been one of considerable disarray and dysfunctional tendencies in the IAMS. Because of the significance that this trend has for the future of the IAMS, it will be explored in some detail here before turning to our nine paragraph analytical format used for previous periods.

**General factors causing dysfunction of the IAMS.**

- diminished perceptions of the danger of guerrilla warfare in Latin America. With the death of Che Guevara the threat of severe and
victorious rural guerrilla warfare spent itself; the shift to urban guerrilla warfare and terrorism was seen as a real threat in most countries for only a brief period until it degenerated into random violence and political assassination, although it remains a significant threat in a few areas.

- the decline of the Alliance for Progress as it became clear that the optimism of the early 1960’s was unjustified.
- relegation of Latin America to a low priority as the US military, and the United States in general, focused attention on Southeast Asia.
- US abandonment of its 1961-66 attempt to create a tightly integrated IAMS.
- the use of dependency analysis as a theoretical framework from which past and present US actions are seen in imperialistic terms.
- new currents among the Latin American military, especially populist-reformism.
- deliberate attempts by the Latin American military to break dependency on the United States.
- decline in importance of the IDAD concept as other military approaches gained (national defense, classic preparation for conventional war, etc.).
- increased possibility of open conflict in Latin America (Chile-Peru, Honduras-El Salvador, Guatemala-Belize, etc.).

The rise of military reformism. A key feature of this period was the emergence of a totally new and profoundly significant political factor: military reformism. While there had always been isolated cases of military reform movements in the past, these had usually proved to be either opportunistic or incapable of generating coherent plans for action.

Two separate currents of military reformism can be identified in this period. The Peruvian current emphasizes social reforms. While economic factors were not ignored, they clearly had a lower priority than the attempt to restructure Peruvian society along the models developed by the CAEM (Centro de Altos Estudios Militares). What emerged from the Peruvian Revolution was a military reform movement that was radical, populist and intensely nationalistic. While the Peruvian Revolution appears to have recently entered a more moderate phase, its military populism remains a new and powerful model. Brazilian military reformism emphasizes economic growth of the industrial and commercial sectors at the expense of social and political reforms. What emerged was a technocratic and authoritarian reform movement which, for the time being at least, is closely tied to the United States.
There is no general agreement on the causes of the emergence of the so-called "new military" in Latin America, but many observers note the following factors:\textsuperscript{12} a higher percentage of officers from the middle class than in the past; better education (to include heavy doses of the social sciences) than their predecessors; and, more exposure to the realities of underdevelopment in Latin America, especially as seen in the framework of dependency theory.

The following specific cause is also suggested—the emergence of a reformist and nationalistic "new" military can be linked to the heavy emphasis on IDAD and the IAMS by the United States. We can develop this argument as follows:

- the civic action component of the IDAD concept raised the social consciousness of many Latin American military officers by sensitizing them to the plight of the lower classes in their nations.
- the counterinsurgency component of IDAD convinced them that guerrilla wars cannot be won by military means alone.
- politically, this raising of military social consciousness caused many military officers to evaluate the effectiveness of reforms proposed by civilian governments and find them to be unsatisfactory. The result was an increase in coups as the military reformists felt they could do a better job than the civilians.
- the strong US push to create an IAMS was severely discredited by the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention, causing a strong nationalistic backlash among the military, and a profound mistrust of any moves to integrate the military of the Hemisphere.

Decline of US Security Assistance Program (SAP) and increase in European arms sales. This period also saw a very significant decline in the size, nature and importance of the SAP system in Latin America. Apart from the fact that Vietnam requirements left very few US military resources available for Latin America, a series of congressional restrictions and ceilings made it increasingly difficult to grant or sell weapons to Latin America, and caused strong Latin American military reaction to what they viewed as paternalism and interference.

In operational terms the SAP's grant program was sharply reduced and the sales component fell off as more and more of the congressional restrictions made their impact felt. One result of this process was a dramatic increase in arms purchases from Europe, especially France and Great Britain. In the 1967-72 period, the six largest South American countries spent $1.2 billion on major arms purchases (mainly jet aircraft) in Europe, and only $216 million in the United States.\textsuperscript{13}
During the period from 1973 to 1975, with the ending of US commitments in Southeast Asia, US arms manufacturers have made efforts to reverse this ratio. However, the purchase of a major weapons system such as high performance jet aircraft is a long-range proposition which includes maintenance, training and supply support for many years. Thus, these purchases have tended to lock-in significant elements of the Latin American military to European suppliers in a technological dependency relationship which the United States will have difficulty breaking in the immediate future. Of special contemporary concern is the Peruvian-Soviet arms link, with the USSR supplying major quantities of armor, artillery and aircraft. There is considerable Chilean concern that these weapons are being obtained in order to re-fight the War of the Pacific (1879-83) before its Centennial arrives.

**Latin attempts to break military dependency relationships with the United States.** This period also saw several deliberate Latin attempts to break military dependency on the United States. These can be categorized as follows:

- **technological:**
  - Argentina’s “Plan Europa” by which she would enter into licensing agreements with major European arms producers as a means of stimulating her own arms industry while reducing dependency on the United States.
  - the emergence of Brazil as a supplier of arms, aircraft and military vehicles to the smaller South American nations. In 1975 alone she has sold or granted over 35 aircraft and numerous vehicles to Chile, Paraguay and Ecuador. These arms transfers represent both obsolete weapons systems of US origin as well as the more significant products of Brazil’s own weapons industry.

- **strategic:** The move to break Latin strategic military dependency on the United States has been led by Peru, and to a lesser degree Argentina. Some specifics include:
  - a call for changes in the Rio Treaty to make it serve Latin America’s concerns and not merely US strategic interests.
  - identification of economic security, plurality of ideologies and defense against (US) economic aggression as major security problems.
  - the concept of integral security as the cornerstone of Western Hemisphere defense. While no one is quite sure what “integral security” will mean, the Peruvians have defined it in terms of an anti-US umbrella concept which will include economic security and the acceptance of a plurality of ideologies.
• reform of the remnants of the IAMS to make them more responsive to Latin needs and less under US domination.\textsuperscript{16}

• the return of Cuba to the Inter-American System and possibly the OAS and related organs.

• the holding of exclusively Latin military conferences which would exclude US participation. Recently these have included an 8-nation Army Chiefs Conference in Caracas (April 1975), the beginnings of an Andean Pact military arrangement, and an arms limitation agreement stemming from the May 1975 Ayachucho meeting. These conferences have yet to be established on a regular basis which might threaten US participation.

• tactical:
  • There has been a noticeable shift in this period away from the IDAD-counterinsurgency tactical precepts and back to more conventional concepts of a nationalistic defense against a foreign invader.

\textit{From 1967 to the Present—Analysis:}

With this background, we can now turn to an analysis of this period using our nine paragraph format.

\textit{Strategic assumptions.} The most striking characteristic of the present period is the absence of any strategic assumptions accepted by a majority of Hemisphere nations. In part this is a natural result of the decline in the threat of guerrilla warfare from the 1961-67 peak. But as noted above, other and deeper ills beset the IAMS and the Inter-American System as a whole such as the effect of the US obsession with Vietnam and its own internal problems which relegated Latin America once again to a low-priority status; Latin attempts to break the perceived bonds of dependency (including military dependency) on the United States; distrust over US goals and methods stemming from the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention; and, perceptions by several Latin nations (especially in the Southern Cone) that the United States is now an unreliable ally and that they must therefore be prepared to go it alone, either individually or in a subregional alliance against what they perceive to be a renewed wave of guerrilla warfare.

\textit{Geopolitical perceptions.} These are diverse and sometimes incompatible. The United States seems to lack any coherent geopolitical vision of Latin America’s role in terms of the IAMS. From
In the face of an apparent absence of a US strategic or geopolitical vision, geopolitical thinking in Latin America itself is becoming more significant, especially in those Southern Cone nations where the military is in power. In several countries geopolitical frameworks seem to be guiding both international relations and internal development programs. In Brazil, the geopolitical ideas of Travassos, Golbery and Meira Mattos and the Escola Superior de Guerra are the guiding force in the linking of the concepts of “national security” and “development” as Brazil moves from national integration to continental projection to her self-perceived destiny as a world power. In Argentina, geopoliticians (Guglielmi, Atencio, Mastrorilli) express concern over Brazil’s movements and view with particular alarm Brazil’s geopolitical conception of the “living frontier” as it pertains to influence in the traditional buffer states of South America, and to Brazilian control of the hydroelectric resources of the River Plate Basin. Geopolitical concerns on the West Coast of South America focus on the Centennial of the War of the Pacific and the impact of Chile’s military inferiority in the face of Soviet arms to Peru.

**Threat scenarios.** Like current geopolitical perceptions, threat scenarios are varied and inconsistent. The 1961-67 spectre of successful Cuban-style guerrilla warfare remains alive, in both its rural as well as urban manifestations. For the military governments of the Southern Cone the threat is not merely Cuban-inspired guerrilla warfare, but also the perceived close coordination and mutual support between the various indigenous guerrilla movements (Tupamaros of Uruguay, MIR of Chile, ERP of Argentina).

In Central America the border problems between El Salvador and Honduras led to one armed conflict (1969) and rising tensions in mid-1976. Conventional conflict also exists as a possible scenario in terms of Guatemalan-Belicean tensions and, more significantly, in the possibility of a Peruvian-Chilean clash. The 1975-76 Cuban involvement in Angola has given rise to a new threat scenario, that of “Intervention by Consent” under which a revolutionary faction, rump government or party in a border conflict would request Cuban intervention. For the more nationalistic and radical Latin regimes, the major threat scenarios are framed in the context of dependency theory analysis in which an imperialistic United States is the major threat.
The United States itself appears to perceive the strategic threat in terms of a combination of several of the above elements, with emphasis on Cuban military adventurism (guerrilla warfare or intervention by consent), with the added element of concern for a confrontation with a Latin America united by economic or political issues.

**Rationale and purposes of the IAMS.** In light of the present divergences over threats, it is not surprising that there is little consensus on the rationale or purposes of the IAMS. Concern over the Cuban Angolan involvement appeared to provide some common ground in early and mid-1976, but now seems to have substantially dissipated.

The US Government has a considerable vested interest in the institutions of the 1961-67 IAMS and sees value (admittedly diminished) in supporting the IAMS as the framework for military cooperation under US aegis. US arms suppliers also have a vested economic interest in the IAMS, and in particular the SAP, as the principal conduit for arms sales to Latin America. Decline in the IAMS and SAP, coupled with aggressive Soviet and European arms exports, are a threat to these interests.

The more reactionary regimes in Latin America tend to view the IAMS as a useful forum which offers them a more friendly audience than the OAS. Chile in particular has been active in attempts to use the IAMS in this manner and to increase its significance in relation to the rest of the Inter-American System. Two recent examples illustrate this approach. At the July 1975 16th Meeting of Consultation, Chile floated the idea that the IADB should be consulted to determine if Cuba still represented a threat to the Hemisphere. At the October 1975 XIth Conference of Chiefs of American Armies, the Chilean Delegation argued that the IADB should be “institutionalized” (i.e., incorporated into the OAS Charter) to strengthen the military organs of the Hemisphere. Given the current nature of the Chilean regime and the political realities of the OAS, neither of these initiatives is likely to succeed.

The more radical governments in Latin America also view the IAMS as a useful forum, but argue that it should be reoriented to the new threats of “economic and political aggression.” The most noteworthy example of this trend is the recent book by General Mercado Jarrín of Peru.17

**Changes in the IAMS from the preceding period.** In the present period the IAMS has seen a strong decline in both functional and structural terms from its mid-1960’s apogee. Most of the institutions of the IAMS remain, but reflect this decline:
• the Military Assistance Program/Security Assistance Program has diminished greatly in impact due to a series of congressional restrictions (Hickenlooper, Conte, Pelley, Fullbright Amendments), and in particular the 1976 congressionally mandated linkages to human rights actions and the required reduction in size and numbers of Military Assistance Groups. Simultaneously, European, Israeli and Soviet arms sales to Latin America have increased dramatically over their mid-1960's levels.
• a strong reaction to the US-dominated 1965 Inter-American Peace Force made the permanent institutionalization of that entity highly improbable.
• the collective security arrangement (Rio Treaty) came under pressure to include provisions against economic aggression.
• US training for the Latin military has declined as a result of the general drop in the MAP/SAP program, and may decline further in light of negotiations with Panama over the status of US training facilities in the Canal Zone.
• the Special Consultative Committee on Security (an OAS organ created to monitor Cuban subversion) was disestablished in late 1975.

Achievements and beneficiaries of the IAMS. The IAMS can point to few, if any, achievements in this period except for the simple survival of most of its institutions in the face of a general disintegration of consensus, goals and rationale.

Systemic functions. An overall assessment of systemic functions for this period must conclude that they were dysfunctional.
• Pattern maintenance: the momentum of patterns maintained in the 1961-67 period continues, but with greatly declining support.
• Goal attainment: no clear IAMS goals are defined.
• Adaptation: the IAMS has adapted poorly to the new system-changing challenges.
• Integration: the IAMS is seen as disintegrating from its apogee of 1961-67.

Dominant Strategic Concept. There is no single dominant strategic concept in the IAMS at present. The anti-Foco remains, but has lost credibility. The Cuban Angolan episode and Soviet arms supplies to Peru has brought a renewed interest in the Hemisphere Defense concept by the more conservative governments.

Dominant System Model. US hegemony remains in the institutions of the IAMS, but provides fewer dividends to the United States due to increasing criticism. The dominant model appears to be one of Fragmentation in the face of strong divergences on threat, rationale and strategic concept.
More disturbingly, elements of the two other models can be discerned:

- A bipolar model in one of two variants:
  - A "US versus Latin America" bipolar arrangement as an offshoot of further deterioration of US-Latin relations. The hypothetical "Latin American Military System" would not necessarily be hostile to the "US Military System," but would clearly be independent of it.
  - An ideological bipolarity between a "Revolutionary" pole (Cuba, Peru) and a "Status Quo" pole (Brazil, Chile). In this model hostilities between the two poles could break out, possibly in terms of attempts to export revolution via guerrilla warfare.
- A multipolar model with poles coalescing around three or more of the following: a US-oriented block; CONDECA; a Southern Cone; a Brazil block; a Revolutionary block; a Reactionary block; a Venezuelan, Caribbean, or Central American block.

THE INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY SYSTEM:
LINKAGE ANALYSIS

As noted in the introduction to this paper, this portion will analyze the linkages existing within the IAMS in its 1961-67 apogee.

Adapting Rosenau's typology to our needs, we define five types of linkages:

- A penetrative linkage exists from IAMS component "A" to component "B" when "A" participates significantly and authoritatively in the decision-making process of "B."
- A response linkage exists from IAMS component "C" to component "D" when "C" tends to make decisions primarily in response to "D's" influence.
- An emulative linkage exists from IAMS component "E" to component "F" when "E" tends to make decisions based on imitation of "F's" decision patterns.
- An indirect linkage exists from IAMS component "G" to component "H" when "G" and "H" share significant numbers of personnel, or have linkages through a third component.
- No linkage exists when none of the above patterns is found.

The 24 identified components of the IAMS can be arranged in a matrix to generate 24 x 23 = 552 possible linkages, with the nature of the linkage shown as P = Penetrative, R = Response, E = Emulative, F = Indirect, or - = None. Such a matrix for the IAMS is at Appendix C.
Of the total of 552 possible linkages our chart shows 164 actual linkages, distributed as follows:

- Penetrative linkages: 54
- Response linkages: 54
- Indirect linkages: 55
- Emulative linkages: 1
- Total 164

The components which have the largest number of linkages (thus indicating the largest number of integrating ties in the IAMS) are:

- IADB 16
- US military latinists 16
- Military transnationalism 16
- Security Assistance Program 15
- Attache network 9
- CONDECA 7
- Service Chiefs Conferences 7
- Tactical exercises 7

The components having the smallest number of linkages (thus indicating little or no role in the IAMS) are:

- Latin unilateral arrangements 2
- SCCS 2
- Inter-Latin Arrangements 3

The components having the most powerful influence in the IAMS can be determined by noting which components have the greatest number of penetrating linkages:

- Security Assistance Program 15
- Attache network 4
- IATRA 4
- Service Chiefs Conferences 4
- US SOUTHCOM 4
- IADB 3

Our linkage analysis leads us to the conclusion that while the IADB, military transnationalism and US military latinists have the greatest
number of linkages to other components of the IAMS, it is the Security Assistance Program which has by far the greatest quantity of penetrative linkages, thus indicating where influence in the IAMS really lies.

Our linkage analysis, plus the observations made throughout this paper, now allow us to classify the IAMS components according to the following taxonomy:

- Components essential to the IAMS (as presently constituted): the SAP (by far the most important); the IADB; US military latinists; military transnationalism; the attache network; IATRA; the Service Chiefs Conferences; US SOUTHCOM; the IADC.
- Components of some value to the IAMS: CONDECA; tactical exercises; communications networks; IAPF; military observation forces; JBUSDC/JBUSMC; training in the US and Panama; US Mobile Training Teams; Latin commissions in the US; Special Forces Group.
- Components of marginal value to the IAMS: ADC, SCCS; JMUSDC; inter-Latin bilateral arrangements; Latin unilateral arrangements.

THE FUTURE OF THE IAMS: CONCLUSIONS

The IAMS is clearly in a period of decline which has paralleled the increasingly declining and confrontational nature of US-Latin relations since 1967. This part of the paper will list the major IAMS dysfunctional trends identified in the analysis, analyze possible future rationales for the IAMS, assess general US policy options, offer a conclusion, and suggest possible actions for implementing this conclusion.

*Dysfunctional trends*

On the part of Latin America:

- the fear that a strong IAMS would come under US influence and be used for US strategic purposes.
- Latin reluctance to "militarize" or "NATO-ize" the essentially civilian focus of the OAS.
- increasing Latin American nationalism and the concomitant desire to break any US-Latin military links which are perceived to be of dependency.
- Latin reluctance to accept the US military concept of standardization of arms, training and doctrine.
• the possible emergency of subregional military groupings other than CONDECA.
• increase in confrontation tactics in multilateral military fora.

On the part of the United States:
• US preference for using unilateral and bilateral channels and techniques in its military dealings with Latin America.
• US reluctance to give US-Latin multilateral military organs greater control of the Security Assistance Program.
• excessive domination of the multilateral military organs (IADB, IADC).
• declining US influence and interest in Latin America.

On the part of the OAS:
• tendency to create ad hoc military organs (observer and peace-keeping forces) rather than enhance the status of the existing multilateral organ (the IADB) or convene the ADC.
• tendency to use the collective security treaty (IATRA) as an instrument for peaceful settlement, which is a function more properly carried out by the defunct Pact of Bogota.

Possible future rationales for the IAMS

Future rationales will depend on the specific threat scenarios actually experienced in the late 1970's:
• Increased levels of guerrilla warfare may lead to a revival of the 1961-67 Anti-foco rationale for the IAMS. However, the focos of the late 1970's will probably be highly selective and much more geared to favorable local conditions than the focos of the 1960's. Thus, Hemispheric consensus on a renewed anti-foco rationale for the IAMS does not seem as likely as the subregional cooperation against guerrilla warfare which seems to be emerging in the Southern Cone.
• Cuban intervention by consent could lead to an invocation of Article 8 (last clause) of the Rio Treaty and the creation of an Inter-American Force. However, there will have to be a high level of consensus on the threat before such action could take place.
• Intra-Hemispheric clashes could give the IAMS a meaningful role as OAS peace-keeper or observer, but it should be noted that historically the OAS has resisted any institutionalization of a peace-keeping role for the IAMS or any of its elements.
• A Latin American arms race (to include the possibility of nuclear weapons development by Brazil or Argentina) could be moderated if
the nations involved felt that an effective IAMS would make such an arms race less necessary.

- Other rationales and purposes for the IAMS may emerge, such as a coordinating role in disaster relief, or standardized search and rescue procedures.

**Should the IAMS be Preserved?**

The above examination of the current status and rationale for the IAMS legitimately gives rise to a fundamental question: should the IAMS be preserved? This section will briefly explore the arguments for and against a IAMS and offer a conclusion on whether or not continued existence of a IAMS is justified. Many of the arguments have their origin in the narrower debate on the Military Assistance Program, but have applicability here to the broader question of the IAMS itself. First, arguments for preserving the IAMS are considered.

The military-strategic argument holds that the IAMS did in fact make a significant contribution to military cooperation in World War II, in the Anti-foco struggle (both in terms of counterinsurgency as well as nation-building civic action), and has the potential to do the same for a new threat, namely that of Cuban "intervention by consent." Beyond meeting specific threats, the IAMS is presented as contributing to the achievement of US strategic and security goals in the Hemisphere. In a negative sense, the IAMS serves a useful military purpose in terms of "military Monroism" by blocking outside military influences in Latin America.

The political influence argument, rarely voiced officially, maintains that the IAMS is a major vehicle for US influence on a fundamental political actor in Latin America: the military. Beyond any manipulative implications, this political influence serves to strengthen the stability necessary for orderly growth.

The forum/channel of communication argument presents the IAMS as a valuable forum and channel of communication and understanding between important Hemispheric military actors. Using the logic of functionalism it posits the idea that greater communication will make internal conflict less likely and resistance to outside threats more credible.

In the arms control argument, the IAMS is presented as a moderating element in the arms race. The United States is presented as a benevolent if somewhat paternalistic influence motivated by a desire to keep a lid
on excessive arms purchases by the Latin Americans, for reasons that are both military ("reduce conflict potential") as well as economic ("limit resource diversion"). By standardization of US equipment, training and doctrine, as well as preemptive sales where necessary, the IAMS can serve as a vehicle for effective US efforts to control Latin arms spending.

Using the contingency approach, the "insurance" argument holds that the IAMS represents an inexpensive "insurance" against future security requirements which cannot be foreseen. Since it is very difficult to quickly create alliance infrastructures and the intricate network of linked institutions in the IAMS, the System should be kept available and functioning as a hedge against future needs. Thus, the rationales listed previously (peace-keeping, humanitarian, etc.) are in a sense peaceful surrogates for the real threats (Axis, Focos) which the System is intended for. The surrogates thus serve to keep the machinery functioning and the institutions alive between threats.

Among the arguments against preserving the IAMS is the irrelevancy argument. This argument maintains that the IAMS is irrelevant and ineffectual in its major aims: it has not made a military or strategic contribution, has not influenced the Latin military, has not had an impact on the arms race, and serves no useful purpose. Thus, it should be disbanded in the interest of economy and efficiency.

Arguing precisely the opposite, the political cost argument holds that the IAMS has been all too effective and has cost the United States a great political price by linking it too closely to the forces of repression, conservatism and status quo in Latin America. Thus, the United States has in effect become a hostage to the IAMS, which should therefore be dismantled or reduced.

The neo-Marxist dependency argument presents the IAMS as one of several instruments which tie Latin America to the United States in a colonial-imperial structure.

On balance, the author finds the arguments for preserving the IAMS more persuasive than those against. Clearly, the IAMS is not an alliance in the sense of NATO, and it would be unreasonable to expect high levels of strictly military or strategic benefits where threats and resource levels are much lower than in NATO. The limited military benefits stemming from the IAMS must be evaluated in terms of the very modest cost of the System.

The evidence is somewhat unclear on the arms control/arms race argument, but it seems obvious that the Hemisphere nations will make
sovereign decisions on arms purchases whether the United States stimulates or inhibits interest in the subject.

The political influence/political cost debate does not present convincing evidence that the IAMS should be abolished in order to avoid excessive entanglement with the forces of repression and hard-line status quo. Presumably the United States has enough political sophistication to draw the line somewhere between support of legitimate order and illegitimate repression.

What appears to tip the balance in favor of maintaining the IAMS, then, is the fact that it does provide limited but appreciable military benefits at modest cost, while serving as a useful vehicle for communication and influence. The fact that its value has peaked when threats peak supports the “insurance” argument that it would be well to maintain it on the assumption that it could be of value in future and unforeseen crises.

US Policy Options

The United States has the following broad options in regards to the future of the IAMS:

• A “holding action” which would minimize damage to the IAMS in the hope that the current radical overtones of the reform movement are temporary and will go away in the near future.

• Complete abandonment of the IAMS and a retreat to unilateral strategic concepts.

• Partial abandonment of the IAMS, stressing the bilateral organs of greatest pragmatic value and letting the multilateral organs die a natural death.

• A “Mature Military Relationship” stressing mutual respect and a realistic recognition that the US-Latin military relationship involves only a partial convergence of interests, threat perceptions, goals and shared values.

It is concluded that the IAMS is worth preserving as a useful vehicle for US-Latin military cooperation and that the “Mature Military Relationship” concept offers the best possibility of preserving it. The “holding action” option is seen as an unrealistic assessment of the depth and strength of the current moves to reform the Inter-American System. The “Complete” and “Partial Abandonment” options are considered to involve an unnecessary destruction of a complex, long-lived and unique military cooperative arrangement which offers potential for enhancing US-Latin relationships.
The Mature Military Relationship would be based on the following principles:

- mutual respect. This implies abandonment of US military policies (especially pertaining to weapons transfers) which are perceived as being paternalistic.
- realistic recognition of US-Latin divergences in strategic and military areas.
- US willingness to give up its hegemonic role in the IAMS.
- Latin willingness to avoid confrontational situations with the United States in IAMS fora.
- joint commitment to explore areas of meaningful military cooperation such as peace-keeping and observation forces, humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, etc.
- increasing emphasis on the multilateral organs of the IAMS.

The following actions are suggested as possible initial steps in the implementation of the "Mature Military Relationship." First are actions related to the Security Assistance Program. The SAP, as shown by our previous linkage analysis, is the most important component of the present IAMS in terms of its powerful penetrating linkages. A meaningful Mature Military Relationship implies drastic changes in the nature of the SAP. The following are suggested:

- Seek to eliminate paternalistic congressional restrictions on arms transfers to Latin America.
- Gradually eliminate the MAP material grant program and subsidized credit sales of arms.
- Drastically reduce the administrative and bureaucratic requirements of the Security Assistance Program.
- Replace the Military Assistance Groups in each country with a small liaison office assigned to the US Embassy; US Mobile Training Teams sent on a short-term ad hoc basis; Latin purchasing commissions (similar to the Brazilians' in Washington); and, joint US-Latin bilateral Commissions for the larger nations. Patterned after the JBUSDC-JBUSMC, these would facilitate high-level planning and would supervise the carrying out of the revised Security Assistance Program.

The IADB, and the IADC as its subordinate organ, are seen as the principal multilateral organ of the IAMS and therefore the key to implementing a meaningful Mature Military Relationship. Possible actions pertaining to the IADB are:

- Decrease the high US profile by rotating the key positions in the IADB and IADC rather than keeping them under US control.
• Indicate a willingness to consider moving the IADB or IADC to a Latin nation.

• Involve the IADB in the SAP by keeping the IADB informed of the content of the bilateral Mutual Security Treaties; requesting that the IADB consider these treaties when it prepares plans for the defense of the Hemisphere; and, permitting the IADB to make recommendations on priorities and allocations of SAP funds.

• Encourage an operational IADB role in the coordination of the military aspects of disaster relief. This would include a standing IADB plan for Disaster Relief and a small core of IADB Staff members who would be available to go to the scene of a disaster and coordinate requests, priorities and allocations.

• Advocate the creation of an “Inter-American Defense University” to supervise the operation of the existing IADC plus a new entity, “The Inter-American Defense School,” which would assume control of present US military schools in the Panama Canal Zone (see below).

Possible actions pertaining to US military installations in the Panama Canal Zone are considered next. The future status of these installations in the context of current Treaty negotiations could be a powerful indicator of the US willingness to support the concept of the Mature Military Relationship. Possible actions would be to limit the functions of US Southern Command Headquarters to a Command solely for Canal defense; limit military installations to those legitimately required for joint US-Panamanian defense of the Canal; and, propose that the US Army, Navy and Air Force training schools in the present zone be “internationalized” by turning their control over to the IADB.

Some possible actions pertaining to the OAS are:

• Dropping the ADC as an anachronistic and hypothetical organ in the revised Charter.

• Exploring possible incorporation of the IADB into the revised OAS Charter. Should this not be feasible, a separate OAS General Assembly Resolution should reconfirm the Board’s mandate and juridical credentials.

• Encouraging the OAS to solicit and use IADB advice on security matters.

• Encouraging the OAS to use the IADB operationally for military expertise in manning OAS observer elements in the case of inter-American conflicts.

The following actions pertaining to other multilateral military organs of the IAMS are suggested.
- Service Chiefs' Conferences could increase their linkages to each other and to the IADB, possibly through a permanent Secretariat at the IADB.
- Multinational tactical exercises and communication nets could be encouraged and realistically employed, possibly in conjunction with disaster relief or search and rescue plans of the IADB.
- the emergence of subregional military bodies could be encouraged as long as they are not systematically dysfunctional (i.e., as long as they support the IAMS and are not confrontational).

The actions listed above imply a radical change in the nature of the IAMS. In particular, they involve a substantial decline in US control of the IAMS. Their full implementation would undoubtedly make the IAMS less immediately responsive to US interests and will decrease, at least from the US perspective, the efficient operation of the IAMS. However, one of the conclusions of this paper is that the IAMS is in a significant and perhaps fatal decline partly because of excessive US control. Efficiency and responsiveness to US interests have been obtained at the price of increasing Latin resentment and distrust of the IAMS. If the IAMS is worth preserving as an instrument of Hemispheric military cooperation, its meaningful survival can be assured only through a revised and mature military relationship such as suggested here.
ENDNOTES

17. Ibid.
ACRONYMS

The following acronyms are used in this paper:

ADC | Advisory Defense Committee (OAS)
COMDECA | Central American Defense Council (Guatemala)
COPECOMI | Permanent Inter-American Military Communications Council
FBIS | Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FMS | Foreign Military Sales (A component of the Security Assistance Program)
IAAFA | Inter-American Air Force Academy
IADB | Inter-American Defense Board (Washington)
IADC | Inter-American Defense College (Washington)
IAMS | Inter-American Military System
IANTN | Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network
IAPF | Inter-American Peace Force
IAS | Inter-American System
IATRA | Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty of 1947)
IDAD | Internal Defense and Development
JBUSDC | Joint Brazil-US Defense Commission (Washington)
JBUSMC | Joint Brazil-US Military Commission (Rio)
JPRS | Joint Publications Research Service
MAP | Military Assistance Program (US) (In this paper the term “Military Assistance Program” (MAP) refers only to the grant components: training, materiel and US Military Groups.
MILGP | US Military Assistance Group (A component of the MAP)
NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS | Organization of American States
SAP | Security Assistance Program (The term “Security Assistance Program” (SAP) is the broader term which includes the grant components (i.e., the MAP) as well as foreign military sales, both cash and credit.
SCCS | Special Consultative Committee on Security (OAS)
SCIATT | Small Craft Instruction and Technical Team, US Navy (Canal Zone)
SITFA | Inter-American Air Forces Telecommunications System
RECM | Inter-American Military (Army) Communications Net
USARSA | US Army School of the Americas (Canal Zone)
USSOUTHCOM | US Southern Command (Canal Zone)
## APPENDIX A. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS OF LATIN AMERICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Definition</td>
<td>US strategic concerns focused almost exclusively on the Caribbean</td>
<td>Strategic low priority for Latin America</td>
<td>Strategic perimeter from Alaska to the Galápagos to the Brazilian bulge to Newfoundland</td>
<td>Collective responsibility for defending the Hemisphere</td>
<td>Substantive strategic relations with a few selected countries with a key role in US strategy</td>
<td>Cold War division of the world into an industrialized Primary Space and an underdeveloped Secondary Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Geographic representation</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Map" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Map" /></td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Map" /></td>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Map" /></td>
<td><img src="image5" alt="Map" /></td>
<td><img src="image6" alt="Map" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Proponents</td>
<td>US naval strategists; Admiral Mahan T. Roosevelt</td>
<td>None (Not officially acknowledged)</td>
<td>US military planners in World War II</td>
<td>FDR, Welles, State Dept; some US &amp; Latin strategists</td>
<td>US military departments</td>
<td>Cold Warriors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Philosophical bases</td>
<td>Manifest Destiny Big Stick; Dollar Diplomacy; Military-strategic realism</td>
<td>Latin America is taken for granted in the face of higher priority threats</td>
<td>Military-strategic realism, Disregard for Latin military Anti-Panamericanism</td>
<td>Bolivarian and Panamerican ideals, Original Monroe Doctrine</td>
<td>Pragmatic military-strategic realism</td>
<td>Pragmatic military-strategic realism, &quot;Power Belt&quot;, &quot;Primary/Secondary Space&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Time periods</td>
<td>Mid-19th Cent to 1933</td>
<td>1933-1939 1945-1960 1967-present</td>
<td>Early WW II 1939-1942 1939-present</td>
<td>1942-present</td>
<td>Cold War years</td>
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## APPENDIX A. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS OF LATIN AMERICA

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Definition</td>
<td>Strategic partnership between the US, Latin America and Western Europe</td>
<td>A series of guerrilla outbreaks in Latin America which provoke &quot;1,2,3, many Vietnams&quot;</td>
<td>Application of counter-insurgency theory to the Focos</td>
<td>Cuban (or Soviet) military intervention at the invitation of one party in a local conflict</td>
<td>Limited US-Latin military cooperation with emphasis on mature multilateralism</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Geographic representation</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Triangle" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Map of Latin America" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Map of Latin America" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Arrow" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Circle" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Proponents</td>
<td>John Foster Dulles</td>
<td>Castro, Guevara, Debray</td>
<td>New Frontiersmen</td>
<td>Castro (with Soviet support)</td>
<td>None identified to date</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Philosophical bases</td>
<td>The cultural, historic, economic and strategic unity of the Triangle</td>
<td>Classical ideas on guerrilla war as modified by Castro, Guevara and Debray</td>
<td>Counter-insurgency and civic action theories</td>
<td>Cuban support of Marxist faction in an armed local conflict.</td>
<td>Mutual respect. Realistic recognition of strategic divergences and common ground</td>
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APPENDIX B. THE INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY SYSTEM (IAMS).

<table>
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<td>X+</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>8. Tactical exercises</td>
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<td>10. Inter-American Peace Force</td>
<td>X (1965 only)</td>
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<td>11. Military observation forces</td>
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<td>12. Military transnationalism</td>
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<td>13. Special Consult. Comm. on Security</td>
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<td>14. Joint Brazil-US Defense/Mil Com</td>
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<td>17. Training in US and Panama</td>
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<td>19. Inter-Latin arrangements</td>
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<td>20. Latin commissions in the US</td>
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<td>21. US military Latinists</td>
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<td>22. Special Forces Group</td>
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<td>23. US regional Hqs (SOUTHCOM)</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>24. Latin unilateral arrangements</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

X+ = Significant Increase
X- = Significant Decrease
## APPENDIX C. IAMS LINKAGE MATRIX

| 1 | - | I | P | P | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2 | - | - | - | P | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 3 | - | - | - | - | I | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 4 | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 7 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 9 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 10 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 11 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 12 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 13 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 14 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 15 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - | - |
| 16 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - | - |
| 17 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - | - | - |
| 18 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P | - |
| 19 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I | P |
| 20 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | I |
| 21 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 22 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 23 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 24 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

Legend:  
- P = Penetrative linkage  
- R = Response linkage  
- E = Emulative linkage  
- I = Indirect linkage  
- N = No linkage found  

Total:  
- Penetrative linkage: 54  
- Response linkage: 54  
- Emulative linkage: 1  
- Indirect linkage: 55  
- No linkage found: 388  

Grand Total: 552 (23 x 24 = 552)

Notes:  
1. Hypothetical since the ADC has never been convened.  
2. Now hypothetical since the SCCS was disestablished Dec 1975.
APPENDIX D. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
OF THE US-LATIN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

I. Multilateral Institutions

The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)
- created in 1942 by the Third Meeting of Consultation.
- has met regularly since 1942 (the Council of Delegates normally has a session twice a month).
- has a permanent full-time Chairman, Staff and Secretariat.
- the United States as host country holds the key positions of Chairman, Director of the Staff and Secretary. Latin officers hold the second spot for each of these positions.
- 19 Hemisphere nations participate.
- located in Washington, DC.
- missions: stated: plan for the collective defense of the Hemisphere; unstated: forum and channel of communications functions.

The Inter-American Defense College (IADC)
- founded by the IADB in 1962.
- runs one 10-month War College level course each year for 35-50 students (military and civilian) of lieutenant colonel/colonel rank from 12-14 different member countries of the IADB.
- faculty is multinational.
- located at Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
- the United States fills the key position of IADC Director (Major General/RADM).

The Advisory Defense Committee (ADC)
- included in the OAS Charter (arts 64-67) at the 1948 Bogota Conference.
- is only a hypothetical organ since it has never been convoked.
- would be composed of the highest military authorities of the American States.
- if convoked would be a short-term ad hoc organ assembled to give military advice to the OAS Organ of Consultation.

The attaché network
- the United States maintains military attaches in most US Embassies in Latin nations.
- the size of the US attaché office varies from 1 to 6 officers.
- US military attaches have frequent social and professional contacts
with host-country military and military attaches of other Latin nations in most capital cities of Latin America.

Central American Defense Council (CONDECA)
- a subregional military entity founded in 1963 and loosely tied to the Central American integration movement. Six members.
- prepares plans for Central American defense, holds periodic meetings and infrequent tactical exercises.
- exchanges information with the IADB.
- has close ties with US Southern Command in the Canal Zone.
- has headquarters and a small permanent staff in Guatemala.

Service Chiefs’ Conferences
- a series of annual or biannual conferences between the Commanders of each of the three services (Army, Navy, Air Force) of most of the Hemisphere nations.
- began in the early 1960’s. To date (1976) there have been 11 Army, 9 Navy and 16 Air Force conferences.
- the early conferences were held in the United States, the Canal Zone or Puerto Rico. In recent years the venue has rotated between nations.
- the Air Force and Naval conferences tend to be more technical and bland; the Army ones are more political and controversial.

Exercises and maneuvers
- began in the early 1960’s under US aegis.
- combined ground-sea-air: a series of four (1961-65) involving from four to six countries each, always including the United States.
- naval: the annual “UNITAS” exercise from 1960 to date involving a US Navy Task Force (2 to 4 ships) which sails South along one coast and North along the other. As it passes each participating country, ships from that country join the Task Force for maneuvers.
- air: coordinated transport exercise; 6 to 8 nations; 1974 and 1975.

Military Communications Networks
- each Service (Army, Navy, Air Force) has a radio communications net in which the United States and most of the Latin nations have stations.
- net control stations are all in the Panama Canal Zone.
- the services hold frequent communications conferences.

Inter-American Peace Force
- the basic concept of a standby military force was first proposed by Simon Bolivar at the 1826 Amphictyonic Congress.
- the only example of such a force was in 1965 in the Dominican
Republic, in which the bulk of the troops (and almost all the logistic support) was provided by the United States. Seven Latin nations did participate.

- several attempts to make the IAPF a permanent institution in the 1965-67 period failed.

**Peace Observer Groups**

- the OAS has on several occasions created ad hoc military peace observer groups to investigate or monitor tense border crises (1955 Costa Rica-Nicaragua; 1957 Honduras-Nicaragua; 1969-70 and 1976 Honduras-El Salvador).
- the OAS has resisted all attempts to institutionalize these groups and has specifically rejected IADB offers to assume this role.

**Special Consultative Committee on Security**

- created in 1962 by the 8th Meeting of Consultation to collect and disseminate information on Cuban-inspired subversion.
- while not technically a military organ, its focus was guerrilla warfare and its make-up was predominantly military.
- was disestablished in December 1975.

II. Bilateral Institutions

**Joint Brazil-US Defense Commission (Washington) and Joint Brazil-US Military Commission (Rio)**

- created in 1942 as the vehicle for Brazil-US military cooperation in World War II.
- handled the creation, training and equipping of the 23,000 man Brazilian Expeditionary Force which fought in Italy in World War II.
- since World War II the Commission in Washington (JBUSDC) has had only a minor role.
- the Commission in Brazil (JBUSMC) in effect became the US Military Assistance Group in Brazil.


- created in 1942 as the coordinator for Mexican-US military cooperation in World War II, to include support for the 300-man Mexican Air Squadron 201, which fought in the Pacific Theater.
- since World War II has atrophied.

**US Lend-Lease/Military Assistance/Security Assistance Program**

- by far the most significant element of the US-Latin military relationship.
- began with World War II Lend-Lease (approximately $400 million of which Brazil got 75 percent and Mexico 10 percent).
Military Assistance Programs are based on a series of bilateral Mutual Security Treaties signed with 17 Latin nations in the early and mid 1950's. The Program is now called "Security Assistance Program" and includes "Military Assistance proper" (the US Military Assistance Groups and grants of training and materiel) as well as Foreign Military Sales (both cash and credit). Straight commercial sales from US arms manufacturers are not considered to be a part of the Security Assistance Program, although they are monitored and licensed.

**elements of the MAP/SAP:**

- US Military Assistance Groups in 13 Latin nations. From a mid-1960's high of 800 US military personnel, the MILGP's are now down to 264 (Fiscal Year 1977). These Military Assistance Groups have a command line to the regional Unified Command (US Southern Command) in the Canal Zone and thence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

- Grants of US military equipment. This was a major element of the MAP in the 1950's, but is now down to $3 million for Latin America as a whole (FY 77), most of which goes to Bolivia.

- Foreign Military Sales credit to facilitate the purchase of US arms and equipment. Presently this is the major element of the SAP and stands at $195 million for Latin America in FY 77.

- Training of Latin American military personnel in US military schools in the US and the Panama Canal Zone. Schools in the Canal Zone include the US Army's School of the Americas, the US Air Force's Inter-American Air Force Academy and the US Navy's Small Craft Instruction and Technical Team. Instruction is in Spanish. In the 1950-70 period the United States trained almost 55,000 Latin military personnel (24,000 in the United States and 31,000 in the Canal Zone). The Military Education and Training Program (grant) for FY 77 in Latin America is approximately $7 million.

- Tours of the United States by high-ranking individual Latin officers as well as complete War College and Staff classes from some of the larger nations.

It should be noted that recent Congressional actions have severely limited the scope and impact of the MAP/SAP. In addition to a series of paternalistic restrictions of the late 1950's and 1960's (Hickenlooper, Conte, Pelley, Fulbright, etc.), the Congress in the contemporary period has exercised increasing control over the MAP/SAP. In the 1976 "International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act" the Congress stated that: after September 30, 1977 no Military Assistance
Group may exist unless specifically authorized by the Congress; after September 30, 1976 there may be no more than 34 Military Assistance Groups world-wide (This provision resulted in the September 1976 termination of US MILGP's in Uruguay, Paraguay and Costa Rica); and, no security assistance will be provided to any nation "which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

Sources of data on MAP/SAP:
### APPENDIX E. STATUS OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE NATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code:</th>
<th>OAS Member</th>
<th>IATRA Signatory</th>
<th>IADB Member</th>
<th>US MILGP/MAAG</th>
<th>Embassy Security Assistance of.</th>
<th>Resident DAI</th>
<th>Diplomatic Relations w/Cuba</th>
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<tr>
<td>Y = Yes</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N</td>
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Notes:
1. OAS membership requires signing the OAS Charter. Signing IATRA is not a condition for OAS membership.
2. IADB membership requirements are not specified. However, it is generally accepted that IADB membership requires OAS membership in good standing.
3. Canada and Guyana have observer status at OAS.
4. Cuba ratified the OAS Charter in 1952 and the Rio Treaty in 1948 and has never formally denounced either ratification. By a Resolution of the 8th Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Punta del Este, 1962) the present government of Cuba was excluded from Participation in the OAS (to include the IADB).
5. Costa Rica is technically an IADB member, but has not had a representative at the IADB since December 1966. Her flag is present in the Council Room.
6. Mexico never broke relations with Cuba.
7. Summary of nations with relations with Cuba: 7 of 21 IATRA signatories; 10 of 24 OAS members; 13 of 29 Hemisphere nations.
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