MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT IN THE MAIN BATTLE AREA. (U)

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MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT IN THE MAIN
BATTLE AREA

A STUDENT STUDY PROJECT SUBMITTED BY
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**Summary:**

The author reviews the new tactical doctrine to determine the roles and missions of Military Police to aid the commander in concentrating combat power. The Military Police mission in the main battle area appears to be considerable.

**Key Words:**

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1-1. Problem.

Recent changes in US Army tactical doctrine designed to counter the threat of the large armored forces of the Warsaw Pact nations has significantly altered the concept of employment of maneuver units within the main battle area. These changes in doctrine specifically recognize three realities of modern warfare for NATO: 1) the probability that NATO forces will have to fight outnumbered with little or no warning; 2) the necessity to defend as far forward as possible; and 3) the necessity to win the first battle. These changes in doctrine also reflect the realities of modern warfare learned during the 1973 Mid-East war where the need for rapid movement on the battlefield was a crucial element of success for both sides. To insure that adequate military police resources are available within the main battle area, an analysis will be made of new doctrine to determine what mission and functions exist for the military police and what type organization would be best suited to perform them.

1-2. Assumptions.

a. That the European Scenario for warfare will continue to be the threat for US Army combat development activities through the mid-time frame from 1977-1987.

b. That current missions and functions of the military police will continue to be valid.
c. That the evacuation of prisoners of war will continue to be a capturing force responsibility.

d. That selected military police units will have organic wheeled armored vehicles.

1-3. Background.

a. Current doctrine for military police support within the main battle area provides for military police platoons to be placed in direct support of each of two committed brigades, one platoon in general support of the division rear area; one platoon to operate the division PW collection point; and one platoon to provide security for the division commander and the division main command post. These five platoons are organized into one company which has its headquarters located at the division main CP. Also organic to the company is a provost marshals section located at the division main CP which provides the provost marshal as a special staff officer on the division staff. The provost marshal, although a special staff officer, exercises operational control of all military police resources within the division area.

b. Each of the MP platoons is responsible for providing the full spectrum of military police support within its assigned area. When missions requirements exceed the capabilities of the division military police resources then augmentation is requested from Corps. Augmentation units when provided come under the operational control of the division provost marshal.

c. This method of providing military police support to
the division proved to be reasonably efficient and effective in the past even though many missions required augmentation by Corps military police units. The development of new tactics, however, has generated new requirements for military police support within the division. These requirements are:

1. The need for rapid movement by battalion size maneuver units within the main battle area requires responsive centralized control of military police platoons in the brigade area.

2. The increased movement expected of battalion size maneuver units laterally on the battlefield places greater requirements for responsive traffic control by military police units in the main battle area.

3. The need for the division to operate a tactical command post (TAC CP) near the forward battle area increases the security requirements for the division headquarters.

4. The need to reduce the size of the division main headquarters requires relocating some units and staff personnel to include the MP company headquarters and provost marshal sections to the division support area.


a. Alternative one is to retain the present organization and doctrine relying on augmentation from corps to perform those tasks beyond the capability of the division MP company.

b. Alternative two is to expand the present organization and doctrine where necessary to accommodate missions and functions identified in the new tactical doctrine.
c. Alternative three is to organize military police resources within the division according to requirements identified in the new tactical doctrine and in a manner which provides for the most responsive and effective support to the main battle area.

1-5. Methodology.

This study was conducted using current doctrine in published and draft field manuals and tables of organization and equipment for military police units operating in the armored, infantry, and mechanized infantry division. Also used were GGSC reference books which provided information on anti-armor defense and breakthrough offense. Identified requirements for military police support were compared with available resources within the division area in the European Scenerio. From this comparison and evaluation increased requirements for military police support were identified and a preferred organizational structure was designed.
CHAPTER 2
CURRENT MILITARY POLICE DOCTRINE AND ORGANIZATION

2-1. General.

a. Current military police doctrine for employment in the main battle area is contained in FM 19-1, Division Military Police Combat Support: Division and Separate Brigades. Military police doctrine for the employment of corps military police units in augmentation to the division military police is specified in FM 19-4, Military Police Support in the Theater of Operations which is currently under revision. FM 19-40, Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees contains the doctrine for PW operations in the theater and provides the interface between activities in the division, corps and the communication zone.

b. Military police doctrine for employment in the main battle area has evolved mainly from the experiences of World War II and the Korean War. During World War II military police support was provided by an MP platoon that was organic to the division headquarters and headquarters company. The platoon consisted of four officers and 60 enlisted men. The platoon’s mission was to perform law enforcement, traffic control, and prisoner of war operations in the division area behind the committed regiments. Not long after divisions were committed to combat in Europe, it was recognized that the military police resources in the division were insufficient to meet the require-
ments of the main battle area. Extensive augmentation of the military police within the division was required and accomplished either by detailing infantry personnel to assist the military police or by attaching corps MP units to the division. After World War II, the deficiencies of the military police support to the division were corrected with the organization of a military police company.

c. The Korean War provided the first test of the military police company's ability to effectively support division operations in the main battle area. The division MP company consisted of seven officers and 169 enlisted men and was organized with one police platoon and three traffic platoons. The basic design of the company was suitable for the support of the infantry division and was retained during subsequent changes to the division structure.

d. The reorganization of the army division in the late 1950's produced the last major change in the division structure. The military police company was organized as shown in Figure 2-1 and has remained in this configuration to date. The only significant change that has taken place is the replacement of the two criminal investigators in the provost marshal section with military police investigators.

2-2. Missions and Functions.

a. The mission of the division military police company is to:

(1) Provide the full range of military police support
Figure 2-1

ARMORED, INFANTRY, MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION

MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

Co. Hq

MP Co.

Scv. Flt

Inf. Flt

791

191

21

31

39
based on the needs and priorities established by the division commander.

(2) Fight as infantrymen or assume limited combat infantry roles when required.

(3) Defend the unit areas and installations against hostile ground attack.

(4) Provide a provost marshal section to the division staff for military police staff support and staff supervision and operational control over assigned military police units.

b. The functions of the military police company are:

(1) Operates a provost marshal section in the division headquarters.

(2) Provides circulation control of vehicular traffic, refugees and individuals as well as population and resources control and control of lines of communications.

(3) Establishes motor patrols, circulation and control posts, or combinations thereof, in support of division operations.

(4) Provides route reconnaissance, convoy escort and security of high priority shipment and movements including air and water shipments.

(5) Provides security to division command post as well as personal security for designated personnel.

(6) Conducts military police investigation and institutes crime prevention measures within the division.

(7) Operates a central PW and civilian internee collecting point at division and forward collecting points on the axis.
of advance for up to two of the committed brigades as well as providing records reporting systems and accountability for PW's and civilian internees.

(8) Provides security of PW's and civilian internees during evacuation from forward collecting points to the central division collection point or Army transfer points.

(9) Provides temporary detention for US military prisoners pending further transfer to corps or TAAGOM confinement facilities.

(10) Participates in combined and joint police operations.

(11) Provides support in the maintenance of law, order and discipline in the combat zone through the enforcement of command directives and policies.


a. The military police company is employed throughout the division area as shown in Figure 2-2. The platoons of the company depending on their location provide either direct support to committed brigades or general support to the division rear area. Platoons are not normally attached to brigades or other commands unless distance, time, or other factors preclude effective support and control by the company. By placing platoons in direct support or general support roles the company commander retains centralized command and control and can more effectively utilize the MP resources available to meet the total division requirements. Because of the austere configuration of the division military police company, there are frequent occasions when the company must be augmented by corps military police, for
LEGEND

* MP Platoon [i] supporting committed brigades
** SCTY Platoon provides CP security
*** MP Platoon providing area support
**** MP Platoon engaged in PW operations.

Figure 2-2
example when all three brigades are committed to combat, during major river crossing operations, in support of internal defense and development operations, and when large numbers of PW's are captured. The division provost marshal exercises operational control over all MP units within the division area. The provost marshal determines military police requirements to support division operations and assigns missions to the military police company. When the requirements of the division operation exceed the capability of the division military police company than the provost marshal makes the necessary request through the G-3 for augmentation from corps.

b. Each committed brigade is normally provided one military police platoon in direct support of its operation. The platoon is usually located in the brigade rear area in the vicinity of the brigade trains. The platoon provides support on an area basis which extends from the rear boundary of the committed battalions to the brigade rear boundary. The primary effort of the platoon is devoted to traffic control operations in order to assure the orderly movement of combat, combat support, and combat service support units according to the scheme of maneuver. Prisoner of war operations are also important for the platoon which operates a PW collecting point in the vicinity of the brigade trains. Normal employment of the platoon in support of a committed brigade would have two MP squads performing traffic control operations and one squad performing PW duties. The platoon leader, however, based on his mission analysis decides how much of his resources he will devote to any
particular activity. Other missions the MP platoon performs in the brigade area are enforcement of military laws, orders, and regulations; collection of stragglers; circulation control of individuals; route security; and refugee control and displacement. Because of the extended distance that the platoon operates from the company headquarters, the platoon leader is normally given mission type orders which he executes with a minimum of supervision from the company commander. The platoon leader does coordinate extensively with the supported brigade commander and staff to stay abreast of the tactical situation and support requirements.

c. Military police units employed within the division rear area consist of the division provost marshal section, the company headquarters, security platoon, and one or more MP platoons.

(1) The provost marshal section is located at the division main headquarters. The section is responsible for performing staff planning, direction, supervision, and coordination of military police support of division operations. The section also provides representation to the division traffic headquarters, coordinates with allied forces or host country military and civil police, arranges for augmentation by corps military police units when required, and conducts and coordinates crime prevention and investigation activities. The provost marshal as the senior law enforcement officer in the division exercises operational control over all military police units assigned or attached to
the division.

(2) The company headquarters is located at or near the division main command post. From this location the company commander directs the activities of the subordinate platoons and provides the necessary administrative and logistical support to sustain their operation.

(3) The security platoon is located at the division main command post and is responsible for providing internal security for key portions such as the tactical operations center, the division war room, the communications center, and the division commander's quarters. The platoon provides security continuously even during relocation. The platoon also provides security to the division tactical command post when employed in the battle area.

(4) Two military police platoons are required in the division rear area. One platoon provides full military police support to the entire division rear area while the other platoon operates the division central PW collecting point. The platoon supporting the division rear area is also responsible for providing direct support to the reserve brigade when committed to combat. When this occurs augmentation from corps MP units is necessary until a brigade returns to reserve status and a military police platoon is freed for support to the division rear area.

2-4. Augmentation.

a. Augmentation of the division military police company
is normally required under the following conditions:

(1) Extended commitment of the three combat brigades of the division.

(2) Extended independent employment of one or more brigade task forces requiring military police support.

(3) Tactical situations involving large daily PW capture rates.

(4) Situation involving the control and movement of large numbers of local civilians, refugees, or displaced persons.

(5) Extensive employment of the company in support of rear area security or area damage control operations.

(6) Employment of the division in internal defense and development operations.

(7) Extensive civil disturbance operations.

(8) Additional tactical and support units are attached to the division.

(9) The division is executing river crossing operations.

b. Augmentation may require platoon or company size units. These units are either attached or placed in direct support of the division. Attachment is the preferred method as this allows the division provost marshal maximum operational control.
CHAPTER 3

TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR THE EUROPEAN SCENARIO

3-1. General.

a. The basic concepts of US Army doctrine for combat operations in the main battle area are set forth in FM 100-5, Operations. These concepts are the foundation for what is published in other manuals and taught in service schools. They also guide training and combat developments. FM 71-100 currently in draft form, provides the guidance on how the division will conduct combat operations within these concepts.

b. The driving thrust for the development of new doctrine for combat operations is derived from two sources. The first is the realization acquired from the 1973 Mid-East War that modern weapons have substantially altered the conduct of warfare. The second source is the analysis of the increased threat posed in Europe by the modernization and expansion of Soviet military forces.

c. The primary objective of the new doctrine is to win the air-land battle realizing that US forces are facing Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces that are at least as effective and in greater number. The lethality of modern weapons systems can produce such large losses in a short period of time that the outcome of any conflict between the US Forces and the Warsaw Pact could be decided by the results of the first battle. The US Army therefore must prepare to win the first battle.
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3-2. Offense.

a. The conduct of offensive operations in Europe by US Forces will be guided by six basic concepts:
   (1) See the battlefield.
   (2) Concentrate overwhelming combat power.
   (3) Suppress enemy defensive fires.
   (4) Shock, overwhelm, and destroy the enemy.
   (5) Attack deep into the enemy rear to destroy his system of defense.
   (6) Provide continuous mobile support.

b. Since US Forces are already deployed in a defensive posture, offensive operations would likely not be initiated until the enemy shifted from the offense to the defense. In this situation the US division would be conducting a deliberate attack requiring a major effort to develop the combat power necessary to overcome strong enemy resistance. To develop this power, the division commander uses all sources of information about the enemy, terrain, and weather to see the battle clearly. He focuses on enemy weak points and vulnerabilities seeking ways to exploit them to the attackers advantage.

c. The division commander decides where to concentrate for the attack and selects deep objectives. He allocates sufficient forces to the attack so that brigade commanders are able to concentrate and multiply combat power at the point of concentration to achieve a relative combat power ratio of 6 to 1 or more. To do this it will be necessary to accept prudent risks and economize in other areas.
d. In the past, deliberate attacks habitually included a main and a holding attack. However, in a European setting, it is unlikely that divisions will have sufficient power to conduct both. Attacks will probably include the conduction of a limited objective or deception operation to accomplish the purposes of the holding attack. These operations will probably be no larger than one or two battalion task forces in size.

e. The attack is conducted with overwhelming violence, speed and surprise to shock the enemy. Suppressive fires from all weapons systems are brought to bear on the enemy forces to isolate that portion of the battlefield at the point of concentration. Brigades will either attack in columns or two abreast depending on how wide a penetration is desired and depth and strength of the enemy defenses. Enemy strong points are either overrun or bypassed to be captured or destroyed by follow up units. Reserves and lightly committed units are shifted to maintain the momentum of the attack, reinforce success, widen points of penetrations and thwart counterattacks against the leading elements. All information collection sources are exploited to provide timely information as the attack progresses in order to capitalize on success and prevent surprise. Once the breakthrough appears imminent all available combat power is committed to exploit the success (Figure 3-1) and strike to seize objectives deep in the enemy's rear. Field artillery, air defense artillery, disorganized maneuver units as well as
DELIBERATE ATTACK
command and control headquarters, combat support units and combat service support units should be destroyed thus degrading the enemy's combat effectiveness. Deep penetrations present special problems and greater coordination for supporting units. Because of the limited amount of routes available within the narrow zone of penetration, supporting weapons systems will have to integrate their movement with the attacking units. The depth of the attack will also require combat service support units to tailor their activities to provide continuous support and supplies over extended distances.

f. Exploitation is the follow on phase of a successful attack and is designed to keep the enemy from reorganizing his defenses. During the exploitation the division advances on multiple routes with maximum combat power forward maintaining relentless pressure on the enemy. The division accepts prudent risks, retains a small reserve and moves rapidly to secure deep objectives.

g. As the enemy becomes demoralized and begins abandoning prepared defenses the pursuit can be initiated to envelope and destroy the enemy. Normally the conduct of a pursuit requires more forces than are available to the division. Corps will either attach units to the division or conduct the operations using the exploiting divisions and other maneuver forces.


a. The conduct of defensive operations in Europe by US Forces will be guided by five basic concepts.
(1) Understand the enemy.
(2) See the battlefield.
(3) Move to concentrate.
(4) Exploit the advantages of the defender.
(5) Fight as a combined arms team.

b. US divisions employed in Europe must defend across extended frontages against significantly superior numbers during the outset of hostilities with Warsaw Pact forces. To compensate for this, the divisions will employ a new tactical concept called the active defense. The purpose of the active defense is to capitalize on the mobility of the maneuver and fire support systems of the division to concentrate sufficient combat power at the decisive time and place. The defense is designed to defeat a superior force by identifying where the main attack is to come and then concentrating favorable force ratios of at least one to three (defenders to attackers) against the main thrust. This concentration requires that risks be accepted in less threatened sectors. The division must maximize the effectiveness of its weapons systems and exploit all the advantages of the defender.

c. The division will conduct the active defense by allocating forces for operation in three areas: covering force area, main battle area, and division rear area (Figure 3-2). The mission and organization of forces as well as the width and depth of the areas will depend on the commander's analysis of the division mission, knowledge of the terrain, strength
ACTIVE DEFENSE

Figure 3-2
and usual tactics employed by the enemy, and the capabilities of the division forces.

d. The covering force area extends forward of the edge of the sector that the division has been assigned to defend to where contact is made with the enemy. Units allotted to the covering force must be sufficiently strong to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, making him deploy his forces and deceiving him about the location of the main battle area. It may be necessary to deploy three to four battalion size task forces with supporting artillery to achieve the desired results.

e. The main battle area is bound by corps designated coordination points that establish the forwarded edge of the battle area and division designated rear boundaries of the forward defending brigades. It is here that the decisive battle to be fought, consequently the bulk of defending force is deployed in this area. The division commander conducts the active defense in the main battle area by employing three brigades on line and allocating maneuver battalions to the area where he expects the main attack. The maximum amount of combat power is deployed in the forward battle area with only small reserves retained at battalion, brigade and division. Instead of retaining large reserves, the division commander will reinforce the threatened area from the flanks or rear using uncommitted or lightly committed units. The success of the active defense will depend on how fast the division commander
can determine the enemy's main attack and how quickly he can concentrate his forces to defeat a penetration of the main battle area. To insure he has immediate information of the course of the battle, the division commander will control the defensive operations from his tactical command post located in the rear of the main battle area.

f. The division rear area is located behind the main battle area. It extends from the rear boundaries of the committed brigades to the corps designated division rear boundary. Located in this area is the division support area where the Division Support Command conducts logistical support to sustain the defending force. The division main headquarters is located in this area as are supporting communications centers. Reserve elements from corps and division may also be located in this area.
CHAPTER 4

MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY POLICE
IN THE MAIN BATTLE AREA

4-1. General.

The missions and functions of the military police in the main battle area identified in the new tactical doctrine are similar to those stated for the current doctrine in Chapter Two. No new missions or functions for the military police were identified to support combat operations in the main battle area. Functions such as command and control of MP units, circulation control, route and area reconnaissance, and security of command post headquarters were identified as having greater importance and requiring greater amounts of military police resources.

4-2. Brigade Area.

a. Military police Platoons placed in direct support of committed brigades have as their primary mission responsibility for providing responsive and effective circulation control of traffic, stragglers, and refugees within the brigade area. The success of military police support will be measured on how quickly MP Platoons assist in moving maneuver battalions laterally from one brigade area to another to exploit the breakthrough during the attack or to thicken the battle area in the defense.

b. To provide the quick response needed, military police Platoons will have to perform thorough and continuous
reconnaissance of routes throughout their area. Reports of road conditions, brigade outages, ford sites, defiles and other restrictions to movement must be provided to the brigade commander and updated on a timely basis to insure that subsequent movement orders will get maneuver battalions to their destinations as rapidly as possible. Once the move to concentrate is directed, military police units will support by establishing control points to expedite movement, enforcing road movement priorities, and escorting maneuver battalions to their blocking positions.

c. Military police platoons will also perform convoy escort, route security, law enforcement, and prisoner of war operations. The platoons will provide assistance to host country law enforcement agencies during joint operations within the brigade area.

4-3. Division Rear Area.

a. Military police activities in the division rear area will be primarily concerned with these five functions:

(1) Providing provost marshal staff operations.
(2) Providing security for command posts.
(3) Providing circulation control of vehicles, stragglers and refugees.
(4) Providing convoy escort and security.
(5) Conducting prisoner of war operations.

b. Provost marshal staff operations in the new doctrine have been relocated from the division main command post to the
DISCOM headquarters as part of the efforts to reduce the size of the division main CP. The function performed by the provost marshal section remain unchanged.

c. Security of the division tactical operations center (DTOC) located at the division main command post will require one MP platoon. This platoon will also control circulation within the division main CP and will operate the temporary detention facility for US military prisoners.

d. Security of the division tactical command post (TACCP) as discussed in draft FM 71-100 is provided by a rifle platoon from the division reserve. The utilization of a rifle platoon for this function is not considered appropriate in so much as it depletes the combat power available with which to engage the enemy. Since the security of command post headquarters is one of the missions of the military police, the assignment of one MP platoon equipped with armored cars on a permanent basis would provide adequate security without reducing the division combat power.

e. Circulation control of vehicles and personnel within the division support area requires one MP platoon. This platoon establishes control points, provides convoy security, and enforces discipline, orders and directives. The platoon also operates the PW collecting point in the DSA for MI interrogation of selected PW's.

f. The division main prisoner of war collecting point will require one MP platoon to secure and process enemy prisoners
of war. This platoon is also responsible for evacuating PW from the brigade collecting points to the division collecting points.
5-1. Military Police Support Requirements.

a. From an analysis of the current military police doctrine for support of the division in the main battle area and the newly developing tactical doctrine for the main battle area in the European Scenario, certain changes in the military police support requirements can be derived. These changes are:

(1) Current military police doctrine is designed to support employment of two committed brigades with the third brigade retained in reserve. The military police platoon that would support the third brigade when committed is used to perform general support to the division rear area. The new tactical doctrine, however, envisions the habitual commitment of all three brigades in order to bring as much combat power as possible on the enemy. This commitment will require three military police platoons on a full time basis (Figure 5-1).

(2) The new tactical concept of retaining only small division reserves and utilizing the uncommitted or lightly committed battalions in the brigade area to thicken the battlefield poses challenges of swift and responsive support to the military police. The coordination of highway movement and traffic control to move battalions laterally across the battle area between brigades while also moving reserve and combat support units will require effective centralize command and
Changes in MP Support Requirements

Figure 5-1
control of the military police platoons in the forward portion of the main battle area.

(3) The continuous employment of a division tactical command post in the area where the critical fighting is to take place is a departure from past procedures and represents new security requirements for the military police. Although this mission has been initially assigned to a rifle platoon from the division reserves, the security of division command post is a mission that is doctrinally assigned to the military police. The utilization of a rifle platoon for a security mission is a great waste of its combat potential and represents a reduction of combat power available to the division. A military police platoon specifically configured for the security requirements of the DTAC would be able to accomplish the mission in a more efficient and economical manner (Figure 5-1).

(4) The new tactical doctrine has also altered the size of the division main command post. The drive to make the command post small for survivability has moved many functions normally performed at the main CP to the division support command headquarters in the division support area. The provost marshal office and the military police company headquarters were two of the units relocated to the DISCOM. This action adversely affects the military police because the provost marshal is no longer near the G-3 and G-4 with whom he must coordinate the military police combat support mission and the MP company headquarters is now too far to the rear to effectively command
and control the platoons in the brigade area (Figure 5-1).

5-2. Brigade Area.

a. Military police units in the brigade area should be organized to perform these functions in order of priority:
   (1) Route and area reconnaissance.
   (2) Circulation control vehicles, individuals, and refugees.
   (3) Straggler collection and disposition.
   (4) Route security and convoy escort.
   (5) Enforcement of discipline, law and order.

b. Military police platoons are currently organized with three squads of nine men each equipped with three one-quarter ton trucks with radios. Each squad is capable of providing three motorized patrols for a total of nine per platoon in the brigade area. The platoon may also employ these patrols in static positions at critical road junctions, bridges or defiles. Although this organization is considered suitable for mission requirements of the new tactical doctrine, a better configuration would be to trade off one one-quarter ton truck per squad for three motor bikes. This would increase the route reconnaissance capability of the platoon from nine vehicles to fifteen and would allow greater flexibility and quicker response to fast moving tactical situations.

5-3. Division Rear Area.

a. Military police organizations in the division rear area should be organized to perform these functions:
   (1) Tactical security of the division tactical command post.
(2) Security of the division main command post.

(3) Operation of the division central prisoner of war collecting point.

(4) General support to the division rear area.

(5) Centralized command and control of military police resources within the division area.

b. Tactical security of the division TAC CP will require one MP platoon with armored cars. The platoon should be highly mobile and equipped with weapons systems capable of overcoming threats in the rear area. A platoon consisting of two squads with one armored car and ten men each and one squad with three one-quarter ton trucks with machine guns and ten men would adequately meet this requirement.

c. Security for the division main command post will be accomplished in much the same manner as is presently being done. One MP platoon organized into three squads of nine men each and equipped with one three-quarter ton truck per squad. This platoon will secure the DTOC and the division all source intelligence center using static and walking security posts. The platoon will also provide limited security during movement of the division main CP.

d. The division central prisoner of war collecting point located near the division support area will require one platoon organized similar to the platoon providing security for the division main CP. The three squads, each with nine men and one three-quarter ton truck, will operate the division collecting
point and evacuate PW's from the brigade area.

e. Military police support for the division rear area
requires one MP platoon for general support. This platoon
will perform convoy escort and route security on the main
supply routes. The platoon will also perform circulation control
of vehicles, individuals and refugees and enforcement of discipline,
law, and order. The platoon can best perform its mission
organized with two armored car squads consisting of ten men
with one armored car each and one squad of ten men and three
one-quarter ton trucks. This platoon is similar in organization
to the platoon providing security to the division TAC command
post.

f. Criminal investigation support to the division will
be provided by the criminal investigation unit in support
of the corps force. A total of four criminal investigators
with supporting administrative assistants and interpreters/
translators is required to support the division.

g. The total requirements for military police support
within the division area normally exceeds two company size
units. To control the operations of these units, the division
provost marshal needs a staff which has the capability of
performing operations similar to that of a battalion head-
quarters. The functions of the military police are performed
much the same as other combat support activities which have the
battalion commander dual hatted as a special staff officer
on the division staff. This arrangement could be utilized for
the military police when two or more MP companies are employed in the division area. A small bifunctional staff could adequately plan, direct and control military police operations as well as provide the necessary staff functions for administrative and logistical support. Such an arrangement would provide clear responsive channels of command and control for military police units in the division area.


a. General. Analysis of the requirements for military police support in the main battle area under the new tactical doctrine has identified a need for seven different military police platoons. Three platoons are required in the forward area of the three committed brigades and four platoons are required in the division rear area. Currently the division military police company provides only five platoons to meet the division requirements. To satisfy the requirements of the division, three alternative concepts have been developed.

Concept A - Retain the MP company in its present configuration relying on augmentation from corps to satisfy total division requirements for MP support.

Concept B - Expand the present division MP company to the required seven MP platoons.

Concept C - Reorganize the military police resources into a battalion with two companies, a DS company in the forward brigade area and GS company in the division rear area.

b. Concept A. Under this concept the division military
police company would remain as presently organized under TOE 19-27. Since the company cannot accomplish all the missions required in the division area, corps would provide one military police company in direct support to augment the division. Operational control over all MP units would be exercised by the division provost marshal (Figure 5-2).

(1) Advantages.

(a) Eight military police platoons totaling 376 men would be available to meet division requirements.

(b) No changes would be required in the division military police company.

(c) The corps MP company would have sufficient organic armored cars to meet division requirements.

(d) No increase in total division strength is required.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Augmentation by corps would be permanent in order to meet division requirements.

(b) Platoons from both the division and corps MP company would be intermingled in the division area.

(c) The division MP company commander could not adequately exercise command and control of both the platoons in the forward and rear area while he is located in the division support area.

(d) The provost marshal lacks adequate staff organization to exercise effective operational control from the DISCOM.
CONCEPT A

Figure 5-2
(e) Platoons are not properly structured to meet the functional requirements of the missions they will be assigned.

c. Concept B. Under this concept the division MP company will be reorganized and expanded to add two additional platoons to meet the expected division requirements. The total strength of the company would be approximately 250 men (Figure 5-3).

(1) Advantages.

(a) Meets minimum division requirements without full time augmentation from corps.

(b) Provides platoons of the types and quantity needed by the division.

(c) Increases the MP combat support to the division within the company size organization.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Enlarges the MP company beyond the abilities of one company commander to command and control.

(b) Does not provide for adequate operational control by the provost marshal.

(c) Administrative, supply, and maintenance support by the company headquarters would be extremely difficult and time consuming.

(d) Does not provide for adequate command and control of platoons employed in the forward brigade area.

d. Concept C. Under this concept division military police resources are reorganized into a military police battalion
with one DS company consisting of three platoons and one GS company with four platoons (Figure 5-4). The battalion commander will be dual hatted as the division provost marshal. Total strength of the battalion would be approximately 291 men (Figure 5-5).

(1) Advantages.

(a) Provides sufficient military police platoons to meet division requirements without augmentation.

(b) Provides adequate command and control resources to the provost marshal for directing military police operations in the main battle area.

(c) Provides centralized command and control of MP platoons in the brigade area.

(d) Provides centralized command and control of MP platoons in the division rear area.

(e) Provides MP companies with organic mess facilities.

(f) Provides all MP units with responsive and dedicated administrative and supply support at battalion level.

(2) Disadvantage. Increases the size of the division by approximately 100 men.

5-5. Selection of alternative. After consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the three alternative concepts, Concept C was chosen as the best solution for the following reasons:

a. Provides specifically tailored MP platoons to meet division requirements.
ARMORED, INFANTRY, MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION
MILITARY POLICE BATTALION

Diagram with various units and numbers.
b. Provides for centralized control of MP platoons in the forward brigade area and in the division rear area.

c. Provides battalion level administrative and supply support to military police units in the division.

d. Provides a more responsive means for the provost marshal to exercise control over division military police resources and still perform necessary division staff functions.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

6-1. That under the new tactical doctrine military police requirements in support of the division are greater than under the current doctrine.

6-2. That military police units can greatly assist the division commander in concentrating his combat power at the time and place of decision.

6-3. That military police platoons in the brigade area should be organized into a DS company and those in the division rear area into a GS company. This will provide greater control, coordination, and utilization of MP resources.

6-4. That military police platoons in the brigade area should be organized with motorbikes and one-quarter ton trucks to better perform circulation control and route and area reconnaissance missions.

6-5. That two platoons in the GS company should be organized with armored cars for security of the division TAC CP and for convoy escort and route security in the division rear area.

6-6. That the provost marshal office should be formed into a battalion headquarters to provide command and control of military police units as well as staff administrative and supply support. The battalion commander would also perform the duties of division provost marshal.
CHAPTER 7
RECOMMENDATIONS

That current doctrine for the organization and employment of military police in the main battle area be changed to:

a. Provide for a military police battalion organized with one DS and one CS company.

b. Provide for the DS company to be organized with three platoons of three squads each. Each squad will have ten men and be equipped with three motorbikes and two one-quarter ton trucks. One platoon will support each of the division’s brigades.

c. Provide for the CS company to have two armored car platoons of three squads each. Two squads will be organized with ten men and one armored car and one squad with ten men and three one-quarter ton trucks. One platoon will provide security for the division TAC CP, the other will provide area support to the division rear area. Two additional platoons will have three squads of nine men each and one three-quarter ton truck. These platoons will secure the division main CP and operate the PW collecting point.

d. Provide for a battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment to command and control military police activities within the division and function as the provost marshal office for the division.