ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE U.S. ARMY

FINAL REPORT

Organizational Effectiveness Study Group
Office of the Chief of Staff

APRIL 1977
This study is an assessment for the Chief of Staff, Army of Army-wide Organizational Effectiveness (OE) activities and training and includes a recommended strategy and courses of action for institutionalizing the application of this technology. The study focuses on the long-term development and sustainment of an Army-wide OE capability from the standpoint of organization, staffing, resources, and management requirements.
20. Since the 1950's advancements in the fields of management and applied behavioral science in conjunction with successful command and leadership practices have provided the foundation of OE concepts, methods, and skills. In the broadest sense the use of OE as a technology in the Army represents a desire to (1) more systematically understand the human forces which shape the efforts of large military organizations and (2) decisively act on this understanding in ways which simultaneously improve combat readiness and the motivation, involvement, commitment, and development of people.

Study annexes include (1) Chief of Staff remarks on OE at the 1976 Army Commander's Conference; (2) a concept paper on establishing an Army-wide OE capability; (3) applicable Chief of Staff memorandums; (4) a summary of the historical evolution of OE in the Army; (5) the study group's interviews and trips and (6) an executive summary of a 3½ year OE evaluation plan.
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE U.S. ARMY

FINAL REPORT

by

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ANNEXES

A - Chief of Staff Remarks on OE at the 1976 Army Commanders' Conference

B - Army-wide Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Capability Concept Paper

C - Chief of Staff Memorandums

D - Historical Development of OE in the Army

E - OESG Interviews and Trips

F - OE Evaluation Plan - Executive Summary
FOREWORD

On 17 November, the Chief of Staff formed an Organizational Effectiveness Study Group (OESG). The mission of this study group was to assess the current status of Army-wide Organizational Effectiveness (OE) activities and training and to recommend an appropriate strategy and courses of action for institutionalizing the application of this technology.

Since the 1950's advancements in the fields of management and applied behavioral science in conjunction with successful command and leadership practices have provided the foundation of OE concepts, methods, and skills. In the broadest sense the use of OE as a technology in the Army represents a desire to (1) more systematically understand the human forces which shape the efforts of large military organizations and (2) decisively act on this understanding in ways which simultaneously improve combat readiness and the motivation, involvement, commitment, and development of people. The introduction and eventual institutionalization of OE in the Army is a unique and highly complex undertaking for which there are few guideposts. This is a long-term developmental process requiring at least a decade of concerted effort. It should also be recognized that the Army is working on the forefront of this technology.

Our efforts were, therefore, concerned with the long-term development and sustainment of an Army-wide OE capability from the standpoint of organization, staffing, resources, and management requirements. This study is not a general inquiry into the state-of-the-art of OE as a technology. Lessons learned from applying this technology in the military are included in the study where they relate to structural and managerial issues and formulating a strategy which cultivates a receptive environment for OE. This orientation reflects a commitment to bring OE on line in a substantive and deliberate manner and to fully integrate its use by the chain of command across all levels and functional areas.

The OESG used an analytical framework, which consisted of the following 11 categories, to focus the scope of the study. This framework was heavily oriented on the management and organizational requirements for institutionalizing OE and is the outline around which the findings and recommendations are presented.
Data was obtained using semi-structured interviews with a wide range of people who are responsible for policy, doctrine, training, personnel selection and assignment, staff management, consulting, and research activities. In particular, the OESG emphasized discussions with commands and staff officers who are using OE trained personnel.

Overall the OESG tapped the issues and experiences of 13 major commands and 13 Army Staff and field operating agencies. About 30 general officers were interviewed. A total of 17 CONUS installations and 11 service schools were visited in addition to elements of US Army Europe, the Naval Post Graduate School, and the US Navy Human Resources Management Training Facility.

The US Army's formal involvement with OE began in the early 70's as a combination of "grass roots" initiatives in the field and some formal encouragement by Headquarters, Department of the Army in the form of a 3-year experimental program, which consisted of six pilot projects. One of these projects at Fort Ord, California, provided the capability for training in OE concepts, techniques, and consulting skills and became the Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC) on 1 July 1975.

It is incorrect, however, to assume that the introduction of OE into the Army was the direct result of a tightly planned and coordinated effort. OE simply emerged through the innovative efforts of a few highly motivated people who were skilled in the application of this technology and commanders who saw the potential of OE and were willing to take a risk. As OE demonstrated its value in line and staff organizations, its application began to spread in a highly decentralized and diversified manner. The continued evolvement of OE along these lines is a primary

1/ A more detailed summary of the historical development of OE in the Army is presented in Annex E of this report.
strength of the effort. The use of OE methods and trained personnel is vested in the chain of command in direct support of mission requirements and must not be viewed as an "add-on program."

Perhaps the most crucial questions about OE are "What is the payoff and is it worth the effort?" All of the accumulated experience and data are hardly in on this account. It is evident, at least to OE knowledgeable commanders, that the Army cannot make significant improvements in combat readiness during austere times without giving systematic attention to improving organizational processes, which affect the ability of a unit to accomplish its mission and are governed by the actions of people. OE represents a substantive and economical response to this challenge.

The diversified and dynamic nature of OE in the Army posed a special challenge to the OESG. To the maximum extent possible we tried to capture findings that were representative of the Army as a whole while attempting to preserve the unique differences and needs of each command and Staff agency. Phase I of the OE Evaluation program, which was completed in March 1977 by the OE Training Center, provided a more systematic and data based assessment of the current status of OE in the Army. The findings of this evaluation effort dovetailed with the OESG Study and confirmed the majority of our observations.

In addition, we attempted to meaningfully involve representatives from a variety of Staff agencies and commands in shaping and reviewing the preliminary findings and recommendations and to provide selected commanders and principal staff directors with continuous feedback as the study progressed.

We are indeed grateful for the opportunity to contribute to the advancement of OE in the Army at this critical juncture. We are especially appreciative of those individuals who freely gave of their time and talent to help shape the contents of this study and were open and candid in their remarks. In particular we want to recognize the efforts of those commanders who are actively using OE and the OE staff officers who are the real pioneers in this endeavor.

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS STUDY GROUP

WASHINGTON, DC
6 April 1977

2/The OE Evaluation Program is a 3 1/2 year, five phased effort to assess the progress and impact of OE in the Army. A summary description of this program appears in Annex F of this report.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Foreword and this section of the report provide an Executive Summary of the study. The OESG assessment of the status of OE in the Army, a recommended strategy for the institutionalization of OE, and the principal findings and recommendations are presented in this section.

STATUS OF OE IN THE ARMY

The OESG found a growing interest in and appreciation of OE. People who were interviewed spoke favorably of OE and of the Army's efforts to institutionalize OE. This was particularly true of those commanders who had personal experience using the OESOs. Although in some cases the stated views may not have been based on full knowledge of OE, they did indicate that CSA interest is getting through to commanders. Those commanders who have given the OE process a chance to demonstrate its value have found it useful for improving unit effectiveness and their efforts to maximize the human potential in their organizations. The OE process clearly works.

Considering the status of OE in the Army a year and a half ago, the OESG acknowledges that considerable progress has been made. The subsequent parts of this report focus on outlining the road ahead. The OESG purpose was not to state where we've been, but where we are and where we need to go.

Growing MACOM Interest with Mixed Progress.

The growing interest in OE is particularly evident in two major commands - FORSCOM and TRADOC. FORSCOM's experience for the last year and a half continues to expand. More and more battalion and brigade commanders are using OESOs and a few general officers have become personally involved in OE operations. In TRADOC the efforts of the CG to explain OE and to have the concepts introduced into the service schools are beginning to take hold. Although there is a long way to go before adequate OE and OE-related instruction is presented in the service schools, there is momentum in TRADOC towards that end. It is clear that the first priority of OE assets needs to go to TRADOC for the immediate future.

This is required to enable TRADOC to close the gap which presently exists between OE activities in the field and the paucity of doctrinal, technical, and instructional material. It is also required to enable TRADOC to properly play its key role in educating the Army on OE.

Other MACOMs have not progressed as far as FORSCOM and TRADOC. This is due primarily to the lack of sufficient numbers of OESO's in the system at this time. Certain MACOMs, such as USAREUR, have a particularly difficult time developing an OE structure and establishing OESO positions due to the shortage of available personnel spaces. At Department of the Army, the lack of an adequate capability to do OE staff work, as well as consulting on the Army Staff has hindered the institutionalisation of OE in a number of ways. It has precluded the development of necessary
policies, guidance, and staffing models. OE information is sorely lacking in the field and the DA Staff does not have a true in-house consulting capability.

**Institutionalizing OE Requires Informed and Involved Commanders and Quality OESOs.**

Although this report consists of 36 specific findings and 119 recommendations, certain key findings merit special mention because of their importance to institutionalizing OE. The first of these is that OE will be institutionalized primarily by the OESO in the field through their ability to assist commanders with whom they work. This is closely allied to the attitudes of the senior officer at a particular installation. Where commanders who are informed and knowledgeable about OE are paired with capable OESOs, OE activities are booming.

Two corollaries follow from the above. First, it is essential to retain high quality, well trained OESOs. Secondly, senior officers who do not have any OE education or training need to be exposed to appropriately taught OE education and activities. This will increase the likelihood of the proper use of the OESO. Eventually the TRADOC school system, in conjunction with the Army War College, will ensure that senior officers are knowledgeable about OE. In the immediate future, however, some exceptional measures are required.

**CSA Involvement is Required.**

The next key finding is that the personal interest and involvement of the CSA will be required for the foreseeable future. Everywhere the OESG traveled senior officers warned that if OE was to be institutionalized, the CSA would have to remain personally involved. The introduction of OE into the Army is a complex, long-range effort. It is, in many ways, an attempt to constructively change and revitalize part of the Army culture. Recognition of these facts means that the institutionalization of OE will have to be managed by exception from the highest levels of the Army until some time in the future when its acceptance is more clearly assured.

**No Common Frame of Reference for Senior Officers.**

The necessity for high level management and CSA involvement is also important because there is currently no common vision shared by the senior officers in the Army as to what OE is or how the OESO should be used. Some attempts are already being made to redefine OE to fit the particular ideas of specific individuals who may or may not know much about OE. This lack of a shared frame of reference among senior officers is particularly unfortunate because of its confusing impact at the action officer and OESO level where there is consensus as to what OE is and how
to do it. Again, the requirement to educate senior officers is important in order to prevent this. Additional monitorship of the OE Training Center is required to ensure that its focus does not shift from the current emphasis on organizational and interpersonal processes to a more generalized and mechanical resource manager point of view.

Lack of Policy and Doctrine with Ad Hoc Management of OE.

In an earlier paragraph brief mention was made of the lack of adequate policy and doctrine. This lack of policy and doctrine has hampered OE institutionalization in a number of ways. First, many individuals do not believe the Army is serious about OE since there is nothing in writing except a DA Letter which provides interim guidance. Secondly, the OESOs do not have any documentation to explain their duties, position, utilization, nature of their relationships with their using commander, etc. Third, the many interrelated actions which must go on to create and manage such a complicated effort currently rely on the good efforts of a few action officers in the system who make things happen.

Everything from OESO selection, education, assignment, and utilization, to the expanded Army-wide implementation of OE, is currently ad hoc. Institutionalization requires an Army Regulation as well as incorporation of OE doctrine into Army doctrinal literature.

Lack of Staffing and Structure.

This lack of adequate policy leads to our last key finding. The current attempts to develop a staffing model for OE have not worked very well. Only one command--FORSCOM--has taken the required action to identify and validate in TAADS all the required OESO spaces. The general DA guidance to the MACOMs to identify requirements and convert spaces has not worked for a number of reasons. In some cases the commands do not have enough OE expertise to determine what functions an OESO performs and, therefore, do not know how many they need. In other cases, the manpower constraints inhibit making the required personnel conversions. This issue needs to be solved as soon as possible since the staffing requirements drive the selection and education of OESOs. The OESC has developed a systematic approach, which is outlined in detail in Annex B, to deal with this problem.

This general assessment provided only an overview of what the OESC found throughout the Army and briefly outlined some of the key problem areas. The OESC believes that the institutionalization of OE is ultimately a function of the quality of the OESOs and the willingness of knowledgeable commanders to use their efforts. The strategy and recommendations that are outlined in subsequent paragraphs focus on creating the necessary conditions for this to occur.
STRATEGY

The introduction and subsequent institutionalization of OE in the Army is a highly complex and difficult endeavor for which there are few guideposts. The Army is indeed working on the frontiers of this technology as it applies to the military. The purpose of this section of the OESC report is to outline, as simply as possible, a strategy for accomplishing this ambitious goal. The intent is to provide useful advice for the Chief of Staff while remaining sensitive to the nuances of OE as a technology.

General Considerations.

Institutionalization of OE has two components. The first is the establishment of appropriate organization structures and the staffing of those structures with educated and trained personnel. The objective is to define and create a well-managed system which provides an Army-wide capability to apply and refine OE and has an opportunity to endure beyond the immediate personal interests of a few senior officers. As the DCSPER has said, "We must provide for the continuity of expectations now that the Army is becoming committed to using OE." This objective can be accomplished as a mandatory requirement and will take 2-3 years of intensive effort.

The second aspect of institutionalization is the goal of integrating OE into the bedrock of the Army so at some point in the future people will say "Didn't we always do it this way?" Accomplishing this goal involves constructive change in attitudes and behavior at all levels of the Army. It requires perhaps 8-10 years of patient and diligent effort by knowledgeable commanders who accept and use OE and OE trained personnel. This level of change cannot and should not be mandated or over engineered. It can only be continuously nurtured so that OE has an opportunity to demonstrate its full potential in a wide variety of mission essential areas.

Both of these aspects of institutionalization should be carefully articulated to avoid sending mixed messages to the field and creating confusion. As long as commanders have discretionary authority for using OE and OE trained personnel have a legitimate and well-supported operational role in the structure, the creation of an OE capability will not be an affront to the Army.

It is also important to recognize that OE has emerged as a unique and essentially "grass roots" effort from within the Army. It is not a top-down driven program. Its acceptance and continued application has been and should continue to be predicated on its demonstrated value to user units. Lack of demand for the expertise and consulting abilities of OESOs is clearly not one of the constraints that is impeding the institutionalization of OE.

3/Chief of Staff remarks on OE at the 1976 Army Commanders' Conference are presented in Annex A.
Ten guidelines are offered in the following paragraphs. Collectively they comprise what is considered to be the most appropriate strategy for achieving the goal of institutionalization.

Understand the Nature of OE and Trust the Process.

OE concepts, methods, and skills are derived from applied behavioral science and management as well as successful command and leadership practices. As a technology OE is designed to broadly and constructively impact on organizational processes, such as communications, problem solving, coordination, decisionmaking, goal setting, and planning, which are essential to mission accomplishment and combat readiness. Judgments as to what OE methods are used and the interpretation of unit assessments are left to the chain of command and not the OESO. OE by its very nature, therefore, reinforces and supports the chain of command, proven leadership and management principles, and the core values of the Army.

The organizational processes, which are the target of OE, are dynamic in nature and are distinctly shaped by peoples' attitudes and behavior. It is, therefore, quite understandable that people who are initially exposed to the concept of OE say that it is nothing more than common sense and good leadership. Since this technology is oriented on the total system aspects of an organization or command, it is also a natural initial reaction to fear OE as a possible encroachment on an individual's authority and a threat to one's self perception as a leader or commander. From past experience we know that the only way people will overcome these concerns and fears is for them to be involved in the application of OE where it has relevance to them professionally and personally. Lengthy intellectual arguments, directives, and grand pronouncements simply do not work.

OE is designed to challenge and stretch peoples' ideas and assumptions about how organizations function and how they can better contribute both individually and collectively, to improving the unit of which they are a part. We also know from experience that the use of OE has at least three predictable results (1) improved communications, (2) improved teamwork, and (3) increased involvement of people at all levels in accomplishing the mission. Since these results are virtually guaranteed, OE can be considered a "no-lose" proposition, which tends to sell itself once it is put into use on a consistent basis. It is critical to realize that these payoffs are present so that the Army avoids the temptation to over engineer the acceptance of OE.

Create the Structure and Capability for OE Without Dramatic Pronouncements.

The vast majority of the work that needs to be done in this area can be accomplished simply and decisively through normal staff channels with top level interest. The time phased plan for institutionalizing OE, which is contained in this report, provides the Army leadership with the key actions, check points, and coordinating mechanisms for this to occur. The only danger in this process is that OE is an internal Army initiative and as such can become easily sidetracked unless it is given a high priority and consistent top level attention.
Pay Careful Attention to the Quality Control of OESO Selection, Training, and Utilization.

The term "quality" is subject to a wide variety of interpretations and the Army is limited in the extent to which some ultimate criteria can be used to ensure quality is continuously emphasized in this area. It is dangerous to assume that MILPERCENT can address all facets of the quality issue and that most everyone selected to attend OETC is predisposed and trainable as an OE consultant. In a desire to quickly expand the number of OE trained personnel in the Army, we are beginning to increase the risk of subtly and significantly diluting the quality aspects of OE. The subsequent utilization of OE trained personnel beyond the first tour is also a matter of concern. If a selected number of well qualified and experienced OESOs are not reutilized and do not receive additional professional training, we run the risk of establishing a mediocre OE capability.

Use OE in Direct Support of Mission Essential Requirements.

The introduction of OE into the Army as a new capability will be perceived, at least initially, as an "add on program," which diverts a unit from accomplishing its primary mission. Although this is a predictable reaction, it is important to quickly focus OE methods and trained personnel in direct support of mission essential requirements such as training, maintenance, and administration, as a normal part of day-to-day operations.

Ensure the Total Army Chain of Command is Responsible for Managing and Using OE.

We know from experience, within and outside the Army, that the only way OE can be institutionalized is for the chain of command to be actively involved, supportive, and responsible for its application. A staff function and a group of specialists cannot assume this role. One of the major findings of this report is the lack of a shared understanding on the part of senior officers about what OE is and how it should be used. If this is not addressed rather expeditiously in the next 1-2 years, OE will be relegated to the status of another "gimmick" that had a short existence.

Another facet of this guideline is the orientation of OE trained personnel. As people become trained and educated in a new technology, there is a natural tendency for them to jealously guard this new knowledge and skill as a way of establishing their legitimacy and identity. Hopefully, OESOs are being trained as consultants who are interested in translating and sharing their expertise and permitting commanders to take responsibility for the implementation of OE. This is probably an idealistic assumption and the Army needs to carefully guard against this pitfall.
Maintain a Decentralized, Diversified, and Tailored Approach to the Use of OE.

It is perhaps obvious that OE cannot be institutionalized from Headquarters Department of the Army and even a major command headquarters. However, the pressures for uniformity, predictability, inspecting, and reporting can lead to a situation where OE progressively becomes a mechanical procedure, which is void of any relevance to unit needs. In addition, OE methods that work in one situation for a commander might be rushed into application again without benefit of a careful assessment. This tendency to find short cuts tends to be extremely counterproductive and leads to a "technique" oriented application of OE. The technique is not what is important. It is its tailored application and appropriateness to furthering the accomplishment of the mission.

The Army needs to pay special attention to this facet of institutionalizing OE and be willing to tolerate and manage diversity.

Maintain a Balanced and Evolutionary Approach to the Establishment of an OE Capability.

The lack of trained OE personnel in TRADOC and at HQDA to accomplish doctrine, training, and policy functions is a serious shortfall at this point in time. This situation should be rectified rather expeditiously. However, other MACOMs are at different points on the spectrum with regard to establishing an OE capability and their needs are different. The Army should avoid at all costs a massive push to have all MACOMs fully staffed within a short period of time. Staffing the structure should proceed with priorities that reflect the most essential needs of the Army and the MACOMs understanding and experience with OE. This guideline should also be followed by a MACOM to avoid spreading OE assets a "mile wide and an inch deep."

Tolerate a Healthy Skepticism Toward OE and Encourage a Willingness to Try It.

Frontal assaults on people who are skeptical about OE usually fail and tend to increase resistance. On the other hand, people who are quickly sold on its value and become vocal zealots without any skepticism are prone to misuse and abuse the technology. OE is not a panacea and is best applied by people who understand its strengths and limitations.

Elevate OE Applications to Higher Levels in the Army Structure.

The majority of current applications of OE are occurring at battalion level and as internal improvement activities in staff organizations. Although OE clearly has a payoff at these levels, long-term sustainable improvements will not result until these efforts are linked to higher organization levels, e.g., division, corps, installation, MACOM, and HQDA.
Systematically Gather Evidence of the Widespread Applicability of OE and Its Impact.

There are essentially three reasons for this guideline. First, the Army cannot devote resources to OE without a comprehensive and well-documented understanding of its applicability and impact. Strategically, this information must be convincingly provided at the highest levels, such as DOD and Congress, to assure the long-term survivability of OE as an institutionalized capability. Second, the widespread applicability of OE has not been documented although the evidence exists. As a result, there is a lack of a substantive appreciation of OE and lessons learned on the part of senior officers. Third, the Army's capability to refine and extend the application of OE as a technology and OE training is dependent on an ability to consistently document and analyze accumulated experience.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. STRUCTURE AND STAFFING

Findings.

A. The current OE structure and staffing is not adequate to support the Army-wide institutionalization of OE.

B. There appears to be increasing requirements for OE trained personnel above original HQDA estimates.

C. There is no commonly recognized list of OE functions to serve as a guide in determining an adequate structure for the Army.

D. Absence of a stable structure, increasing student loads, and turbulence at OETC has had a negative effect on mission accomplishment.

Recommendations.

1. Use the OESG concept paper, "Army-wide OE Capability" (Annex B), as a basis for defining and establishing this capability and creating a systematic review process for refining OE structure and staffing requirements.

2. Establish guidance for minimum and maximum staffing required to provide an OE capability and publish to MACOM.

3. Direct MACOM to convert all required OE spaces, formally establishing necessary structure.

4. Identify, clarify, validate, and document OE functions at all levels, to include those requiring AERB validated positions.

5. Determine the role of NCOs and DA civilian personnel in OE.

6. Establish (a) an OE Division in ODCSPER, DA and a (b) staff element for OE consulting in MD(OCSA) consisting of five-seven OE trained personnel headed by an O-6.

7. Assign an OE qualified individual to OCSA to (a) provide direct consulting advice to the CSA, (b) track and review progress in implementing OESG recommendations, and (c) monitoring Army-wide OE activities and initiatives.

8. Support TRADOC realignment of OETC directly under its headquarters by providing training spaces and assigning qualified personnel sufficient to meet expanding missions/tasks, especially in the functional areas of combat development, training development, evaluation, and instruction.
II. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Findings.

A. Efforts to institutionalize OE in the Army have promulgated ad hocracy in training management.

B. While TRADOC schools have begun to integrate OE in NCO and officer courses, there is confusion regarding what should be taught. The introduction of OE into precommissioning courses has not been fully addressed.

C. Training and education in OE generally requires a high degree of experience and technical skill on the part of combat development, training development, and subject matter experts involved in instruction.

D. Senior officers do not adequately understand the technology of OE and how to fully employ OESOs as a command-wide capability.


F. A requirement exists for graduate education in OE.

G. The US Army War College is not teaching OE to its current class. The Command and General Staff College, however, has made a commendable effort to instruct its students on OE.

H. The OETC developed Leadership and Management Development Course (L&MDC) is an effective, highly regarded course of instruction.

Recommendations.

1. Place OE training and education into the existing training management structure and apply the ISD model.

2. Continue ad hoc initiatives to institutionalize OE on a limited basis, but in coordination with the training management establishment.

3. Establish a clearing house for the production and distribution of OE training aids and materials.

4. TRADOC continue present efforts to integrate OE in NCO and officer courses, but expand to include precommissioning courses.

5. Non-TRADOC schools initiate efforts to integrate OE and coordinate with TRADOC.
6. Conduct seminars for CD/TD personnel and training managers to create an understanding of OE and experiential learning methods.

7. Develop a continuing training program to train those individuals who will be responsible for presenting OE instruction at the service schools.

8. Adopt a diversified strategy of informing senior officers about OE which capitalizes on (a) existing educational forums (b) chain of command involvement and (c) learning situations where individuals can translate this knowledge into immediate application with the benefit of OE trained personnel.

9. Ensure that commanders' courses currently under development include appropriate OE instruction.

10. Determine the most appropriate method and means for providing OE instruction to (a) command designees (05-06), (b) OE line and staff managers, (c) selected general officers, and (d) BC designees.

11. Continue the Army policy that supports the concept of OE as a process which flows out of the behavioral sciences.

12. Determine appropriateness of including L&MDC in NCO and basic officer education. If appropriate, recognize it as an official Army course of instruction.

III. MANAGEMENT

Findings:

A. The CSA needs to continuously emphasize his personal interest in OE and to periodically evaluate the progress being made with its institutionalization.

B. The growing number of OE activities through the Army needs to be better coordinated.

C. There is a critical need for key OE staff personnel to stay abreast of OE activities in other services.

D. Another independent assessment should be made with 2 years to reevaluate progress in institutionalizing OE.

E. The US Army Administration Center OE Work/Study Program is a comprehensive and general plan for institutionalizing OE in the Army.

Recommendations:

1. Implement the OESG report.
2. CSA become involved in OE activities appropriate to his level in (a) DA Staff, (b) major commands, and (c) Army Secretariat.

3. CSA continue to emphasize OE through forums such as conferences, meetings, weekly summary articles, and visits to the field.

4. Write a HQDA OE plan for FY 78 for the expanded implementation and conduct of OE activities within the Army Staff.

5. Conduct in progress reviews (IPR) on specific OE actions to ensure substantive and timely coordination.

6. Develop a revised and expanded agenda for the ODCSPER General Officer OE Steering committee which allows for planning by action officers, prior to the meeting, and more interaction by the general officers.

7. Use the ADMINCEN Work/Study Program as a planning and staff coordination mechanism and refine consistent with the OESG findings and recommendations.

IV. POLICY AND DOCTRINE

Findings.

A. Current Army policy and doctrine on OE are inadequate.

B. There is considerable confusion about the primary duties and role of the OESO in relation to RR/EO, comptroller, and IC staff functions.

C. There is general concern about how the IG will examine OE staff functions.

D. The technical system to support OESOs is not well defined and its adequacy varies across major commands.

E. Limited implementation of OE has been initiated in the Reserve Components and presents unique challenges.

Recommendations.

1. Publish an Army Regulation on OE.

2. Publish appropriate OE doctrinal literature and information, such as a Commanders' Handbook on OE.

3. Revise current doctrinal literature, such as FM 22-100 and FM 101-5, to include OE.

4. Develop and test the concept of the combat role of the OESO.
5. Provide appropriate OE instruction and information to RR/EO, comptroller, and IG personnel and likewise provide instruction on these functions to OESOs.

6. Amend, where appropriate, Army regulations, circulars, pamphlets, policies, etc., pertaining to RR/EO, comptroller, and IG functions to provide clarification and support for OE.

7. Describe and sanction an OE technical support system and provide appropriate guidance for managing and sustaining this system.

8. Develop a plan for the introduction of OE into the Reserve Components, to include identification of required resources and expand OE consulting assistance.

9. Augment OE staff elements in ODCSPER, DA, and MACOM headquarters with MOBDES personnel to support OE planning and implementation activities in the Reserve Components.

V. EVALUATION AND RESEARCH

Findings:

A. There is a need for quantifiable research and evaluation programs to support the refinement of OE technology as it pertains to the Army as well as OE policy, doctrine, and training.

B. The link between ODCSPER and ODCSRDA on OE research needs improvement.

C. The US Army Research Institute (ARI) Five Year OE Research Plan is improving and must be implemented in FY 78.

Recommendations:

1. Coordinate and incorporate appropriate OE research and study requirements in the OETC Evaluation Plan, the ARI Research Plan, and the ODCSPER Study Program.

2. Obtain sufficient numbers of well qualified OE research personnel to support the ARI Five Year OE Research Plan.

3. Strongly support the ARI unfunded FY 79 6.3 OE advanced development research request.

4. ARI complete detailing of the OE Research Plan; incorporate all relevant Army research needs; obtain final approval from ODCSPER, DA; and initiate scheduled research efforts in FY 78.
VI. ASSIGNMENT, SELECTION, AND UTILIZATION

Finding.

The expansion of OE in the Army requires personnel management procedures for the selection, assignment, utilization, and professional development of OE personnel which are clearly enunciated and understood.

Recommendations.

1. Provide MILPERCEN policy and guidance reference the priority relationship of OE to other priority assignment considerations.

2. Assign additional staff officers to the OE personnel management functions in MILPERCEN.

3. Provide MACOMs with policy guidance on minimum utilization (in terms of time) of 52 personnel.

4. Publish policy and guidance on stabilization of OESOs for at least 18 months after graduation from OETC.

5. Monitor key OE management positions.

6. Develop more specific criteria, other than general disciplines, for identifying individuals with appropriate educational backgrounds in OE.

VII. PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF OE TRAINED PERSONNEL

Finding.

OE Staff officers need additional professional training.

Recommendations.

1. Conduct OE training courses and activities on a regional basis.

2. Designate a single proponent agency for OE technical information.

3. Collect, disseminate, and publish OE technical information.

4. Legitimize professional OE training activities in policy and guidance documents and support at MACOM level.

5. Develop nonresident instruction in OE-related skills.

6. Develop a series of short training courses in advanced OE skills.

7. Conduct refresher training for OETC graduates returning to OE duties.
VIII. EXTERNAL CONSULTING

Finding.

OESOs require outside support in the form of civilian and military consultants to assist in initiating and reviewing activities.

Recommendations.

1. Maintain an Army policy of using civilian consultants on a selective basis to support specific OE activities and training.

2. Issue definitive guidance on the selection and use of civilian consultants, associated budgetary matters, and reviewing OE contract activities.

3. Devote a portion of the OETC curriculum to educating OESOs on contract processes and working relationships with external consultants.

4. Establish an Army OE strategy advisory group comprised of prominent civilian consultants for periodic assistance in reviewing Army-wide OE implementation efforts.

IX. OE OPERATIONS

Findings.

A. The use of OE and OE trained personnel can lead to significant improvements in unit performance provided this technology is focused on mission essential requirements and is tailored to a unit.

B. OESOs are generally viewed as well trained and are best assigned in teams.

Recommendations.

1. Widely publicize the results of OE applications, to include the publication of articles and case studies.

2. Indicate in the Army Regulation on OE that the duties of OE trained personnel are full time.

3. Establish a policy that "a minimum of two OESOs will be assigned to divisions, installations, and major command headquarters and will not be assigned below these levels, unless authorized on an exception basis."

4. Encourage commands to support close professional relationships and mutual assistance between OESOs, on a geographical basis, regardless of the command to which they are assigned.
5. Include instruction in the OE Staff Officers Course on (a) OE applications in the areas of installation and project management, community development, hospital management, and others as appropriate; (b) design skills involving transitioning units from the assessment to the implementation phase of the OE process and (c) methods for evaluating OE activities and documenting OE experiences and lessons learned.

X. INFORMATION

Finding.

There is a general information void on OE at all levels in the Army.

Recommendations.

1. Implement a HQDA OE Information Plan.
2. Publish OE information in the CSA Weekly Summary.
3. MACOMs establish their own OE Information Plan.

XI. RESOURCES

Finding.

A. There is a lack of general guidance on budgeting for OE activities.

B. The lack of an Army-wide General Organization Questionnaire (GOQ) Survey capability has hampered the conduct of OE activities.

C. More suitable facilities may be required for the OE Training Center.

Recommendations.

1. Publish HQDA budget guidance for OE and MACOMs provide budget planning guidance to subordinate commands.
2. Continue development of the OE data processing system.
3. Approve the GOQ Survey package as a standard Army system.
4. Determine and obtain the most appropriate facilities for OETC.
II - MAIN BODY

A. BACKGROUND.

On 17 November 1976, the Chief of Staff formed an Organizational Effectiveness Study Group (OESG). The mission of this study group was to assess the current status of Army-wide Organizational Effectiveness (OE) activities and training and to recommend an appropriate strategy and courses of action for institutionalizing this technology.

The OESG was originally constituted with three individuals, who had in-depth experience with OE management and consulting activities at various levels—from troop units to Headquarters, Department of the Army. A fourth study group member was added on 1 January 1977 to provide TRADOC representation in this effort.

Chief of Staff guidance emphasized that the study group would operate in a consultative manner and would provide assistance for ensuring that an Army-wide OE capability is institutionalized with an emphasis on quality. This approach was taken to (1) permit a free and open exchange of information and perceptions; (2) avoid slowing down or stopping command initiatives that were already underway; (3) minimize the possibility of causing overaction, and (4) respect the authority and responsibilities of Staff agencies which are assigned proponenty for various facets of OE matters.

This study is concerned primarily with the long-term development and sustainment of an Army-wide OE capability from the standpoint of organization, staffing, resources, and management requirements. It is not a general inquiry into the state-of-the-art of OE as a technology. Lessons learned from applying this technology in the military are incorporated in this report where they relate to structural and managerial issues and to the strategy for cultivating an environment that is receptive to this technology.

The orientation of the study reflects a commitment to bring OE on line as a technology in a substantive and deliberate manner and to fully integrate its use by the chain of command across all levels and functional areas. The establishment of this capability is a top priority Army goal and is mandatory in nature.

The process of using OE methods and expertise, which is distinct from establishing an OE capability at multiple levels in the Army, is a voluntary matter that is left to the discretion of commanders. This crucial distinction between capability and process is based on the following precepts which indicate that the OE process works best:

(1) With top-down chain of command involvement, support, and encouragement rather than by mandate.
(2) When techniques are carefully adapted to fit local command needs with the assistance of technically qualified personnel rather than broad mechanical applications of a single technique.

(3) When focused in direct support of mission essential tasks and decisionmaking process rather than as an add-on program.

(4) When used "to make good units better" rather than as a panacea or quick fix for solving problems.

(5) When commanders, who directly use the services of OE trained personnel, are provided unit assessments on a confidential basis which preserve individual anonymity and focus on organizational processes rather than evaluations of an individual's competence.

The Chief of Staff underscored this distinction between the mandatory and voluntary aspects of OE at the 1976 Army Commanders' Conference. He also added that "those commanders who do not choose to personally use this technology should not preclude their subordinates from using it." A complete text of his remarks appears at Annex A to this report.

In summary, the OESG was created to provide an impetus for establishing and sustaining an Army-wide capability for employing OE concepts, methods, and trained personnel and to assist in the formulation of a strategy for guiding and managing this capability.

B. METHODOLOGY.

General.

Given the complex and dynamic nature of this mission, the OESG used comparative analysis as the study methodology. The approach simply consisted of a subjective comparison between the current and desired status of OE in the Army. This was jointly accomplished in close coordination with five major commands and eight Army Staff agencies and field operating agencies. It included contact with the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and senior staff officers from the Training and Doctrine Command, all of whom received periodic update briefings as this study progressed.

Schedule of Activities.

During the period 17 Nov - 21 Dec 76 the OESG conducted a preliminary assessment of Army-wide OE efforts by focusing on activities within and between Army Staff agencies and the Training and Doctrine Command. This phase terminated on 22 December with an update briefing for the Chief of Staff to ensure that the direction of the study was in consonance with the OESG charter. The OESC was given approval to accomplish the following tasks as a result of this briefing: (1) prepare a Chief of Staff Memorandum (CSM), which tasked selective Army Staff agencies to initiate certain time sensitive actions which were supportive of the study objective
and could not await receipt of the final report (Annex C), (2) draft a concept paper which describes the general parameters of an Army-wide OE capability and suggested procedures for establishing this structure (Annex B); (3) develop a time-phased plan for institutionalizing OE, which is essentially reflected in Section III of this report.

This assessment was broadened during the period 22 December 1976 to March 1977 and draft findings were prepared. The OESC planned and conducted a 4-day conference on 22-25 March with 25 OE staff personnel, who represented a number of major commands and Army Staff agencies. The purpose of this conference was to review the draft findings and develop appropriate recommendations which would be used as the basis for a time phased plan. Attendees were asked to have these draft recommendations informally staffed upon return to their respective organizations. Follow-on briefings and informal coordination were conducted from 25-30 March and a draft final report was prepared.

On 7 April 1977, the Chief of Staff received the final briefing and approved the report. A copy of the memorandum for record on this briefing appears at Annex C. At the request of the Chief of Staff an abbreviated briefing of the study was presented to the Army Staff Council on 20 April and copies of the draft final report were provided to each attendee.

Due to the subjective nature of the study, this sequence of activities provided greater assurance that the findings and recommendations were comprehensive and valid. It also increased commitment to act on these recommendations on the part of those commands and Staff agencies which have a primary role in the furtherance of OE in the Army.

**Analytical Framework.**

An analytical framework consisting of 11 categories was developed by the OESC to focus the scope of the study. This framework was heavily oriented on the management and organizational requirements for institutionalizing OE rather than an examination of the state-of-the-art of OE as a technology. These categories, which are listed below in the order in which they appear in this report, provided the basis for the interviews and the topics around which findings and recommendations were developed. In most cases, an audit trail approach was used to assess the differential impact of policies and actions in each of these areas at various levels in the Army.
Study Categories

(1) Structure and Staffing
(2) Education and Training
(3) Management
(4) Policy and Doctrine
(5) Evaluation and Research
(6) Assignment, Selection, & Utilization
(7) Professional Training of OE Trained Personnel
(8) External Consulting
(9) OE Operations
(10) Information
(11) Resources

Data Collection.

Data was obtained using semi-structured interviews with a wide range of people who are responsible for policy, doctrine, training, personnel selection and assignment, staff management, consulting and research activities. In particular, the OESG emphasized discussions with commanders and staff officers who were using OE trained personnel.

About 30 general officers were interviewed. Overall the OESG tapped the views and experiences of 13 major commands and 13 Army Staff and field operating agencies. This was accomplished either directly with staff visits or indirectly through discussions with points of contact. In some instances where members of the OESG had recent prior knowledge about OE activities in a particular organization, no formal contact was deemed necessary. A total of 17 CONUS installations and 11 service schools were visited in addition to elements of US Army Europe, the Naval Post Graduate School, and the Navy Human Resources Management training facility. A detailed list of these organizations appears at Annex E.

The data collection efforts were further complemented by the results of the Phase I of the 3 1/2 year OETC Evaluation Program. This more sophisticated data-based analysis, which initially focused on the extent to which OE is being accepted in the Army, was accomplished independent of the OESG activities. It included the views of 132 OESOs, command and staff personnel, and units which have used OE consulting support. Collectively, the Phase I results reflect the status of OE at 58 Army locations in the CONUS, Korea, Hawaii, Alaska, and Europe. Some of the user units have been involved in OE applications for more than 18 months. The majority of the OESG observations were substantiated by this evaluation effort.
Other OESG Activities.

1. Meetings and Briefings. The OESG attended a variety of meetings and briefings which were conducted by agencies which have responsibilities for various facets of OE. Three of the more crucial forums were as follows:

(a) ODCSPER General Officer OE Steering Committee meetings on 15 December 1976 and 30 March 1977.

(b) TRADOC OE Instruction meeting in January 1977 at Ft Ord.

(c) ARI OE Working Conference on R&D plans, programs, and requirements on 9-10 February 1977.

2. Review of Staff Actions. The close working relationships which were established with ODCSPER, DA and the existence of OESG within the Office of the Chief of Staff led to the OESG review of selected staff actions on OE matters. This included items, such as the draft Army Regulation on OE and various correspondence.

3. Participation in OE Activities. On occasion the OESG was asked to directly participate in OE activities. This provided an opportunity to directly observe applications of OE and obtain a more indepth perspective of their impact. This included activities, such as designing and conducting a 2-hour OE orientation for the BG (Designee) Conference on 3 March 1977; participating in the OE Workshop at C&GSC on 8-9 March 1977; and attending a commanders' conference on OE at Ft. Hood, TX, in summer 1976.

Summary.

The method of comparative analysis is highly dependent on obtaining valid and useful subjective judgements from a variety of people. This was a difficult and complex process considering the dynamic and fluid status of OE in the Army.

The OESG role was, therefore, a mixture of study, consultation, and on occasion direct staff action. The OESG members approached this task with the full realization that recommended and approved actions would be implemented by others. For this reason, the OESG attempted to fully capitalize on ongoing OE initiatives and involve these commands and Staff agencies which have major responsibilities for Army-wide OE activities and training. To the maximum extent possible, this was accomplished given the breadth of the study and time constraints.
C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

This section presents in detail 36 findings and 119 recommendations which are grouped under 11 major categories. An explanation is provided for each finding. Responsible agencies, completion dates, and control measures are specified for each recommendation. Collectively these recommendations are a time-phased plan for institutionalizing OE in the Army, although they are not presented in chronological order.

For ease of reference the findings and categories are categorized and tabbed as follows:

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<tr>
<th>TAB</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>STRUCTURE AND STAFFING</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>EDUCATION AND TRAINING</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>MANAGEMENT</td>
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<td>POLICY AND DOCTRINE</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>EDUCATION AND RESEARCH</td>
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<td>VI</td>
<td>PERSONNEL SELECTION, ASSIGNMENT, UTILIZATION</td>
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<td>VII</td>
<td>PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF OE TRAINED PERSONNEL</td>
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<td>IX</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>XI</td>
<td>RESOURCES</td>
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The primary focus is on actions to develop an Army-wide OE capability with a secondary emphasis on the use and/or institutionalization of the OE process. Most recommendations specify actions for determining definitive answers rather than providing those answers. The following priorities are offered as a way to interpret the relative degree of emphasis placed on the recommendations:
PRIORITY #1. Proceed to establish and legitimate an Army-wide OE capability and infuse additional OE expertise and resources into TRADOC schools and HQDA; with particular emphasis on the following areas:

- OE Policy and Doctrine
- OE Education and Training
- Selection, Training, and Utilization of OESOs

PRIORITY #2. Expand OE implementation efforts in the following commands and Staff agencies.

- HQDA
- FORSCOM
- DARCOM
- USAREUR

PRIORITY #3. Expand or start initial OE implementation efforts in other major commands.

PRIORITY #4. Initiate planning and expand OE pilot projects in the Reserve Components.
1. STRUCTURE AND STAFFING

FINDING

A. The current OE structure and staffing is not adequate to support the Army-wide institutionalization of OE.

EXPLANATION

Because of the effort to provide a maximum OE capability to the Army in a minimum time period, a thorough assessment of the requirements for structure and staffing was not completed. Optimal staffing requirements for all types/levels of organization were not determined, and of those positions that were identified, not all were validated and documented in TAADS. OE functions at various levels have also not been completely identified/defined/assigned. Although commands and Staff agencies are desirous of using OE trained NCOs and DA civilians, the role of NCOs and DACs is undetermined. The assignment of senior officers to key positions with responsibility for OE policy, doctrine, training, and command-wide implementation has generally been accomplished without regard to their prior experience and qualifications in OE. This has resulted in considerable confusion in HRD staff elements on how to organize, staff, and appropriately support OE.

Positioning of OE staff elements requires considerations over and above the straightforward placement of OESOs within a DCSPER/GL/DPCA organization. In general, OESOs who function as consultants should be located where they can best support the chain of command and be accessible to the units they support. At higher headquarters (Corps, MACOM, HQDA) there is a need for OE consulting experience with some limited augmentation by contracted civilian professionals. Initial staffing has been primarily ad hoc due to the lack of structure and will continue to be ad hoc with shortfalls in trained personnel until the structure is developed.

Commanders and heads of Staff agencies are reluctant to internally reconfigure existing resources and spaces to support OE functions without straightforward guidance from higher headquarters and a clear opportunity to obtain relief from other functions/activities. The situation with regard to OE spaces and trained personnel varies among the major commands and Staff agencies. This is a function of available resources, existing priorities, command commitment, managerial understanding of OE, and the lack of a well defined and coordinated staff system for supporting OE activities and training. This is especially apparent at HQDA and in some MACOM headquarters. For example, ODCSPER does not yet have an adequate staff structure with appropriately qualified personnel to accomplish Army-wide policy requirements. An OE consulting capability in OCSA to support HQDA Staff agencies is not yet established. TRADOC has taken action in the combat development, training development, and DCSPER areas.
Institutionalization of an Army-wide OE capability requires a concentrated effort to identify, clarify, and validate all OE/OEISO functions and positions currently in existence and to give clear-cut directions on how to proceed with future structure and staffing refinements. After minimum requirements are determined and promulgated by HQDA, commands and Staff agencies are in the best position to determine the most appropriate way to configure, support, and employ OE assets after conducting introductory OE activities for 6-12 months with military OE consulting support.

Therefore, current staffing levels are inadequate to meet the demand for OE services, to include the level of expertise required in service schools, OE management positions, and OEISO positions. Commanders and staff managers at all levels must exercise creativity in identifying and resolving the establishment and use of an OE capability command or Army-wide.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<th>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</th>
<th>COMPLETION DATE</th>
<th>CONTROL MEASURES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Use the OESG concept paper, &quot;Army-wide OE Capability,&quot; as a basis for defining and establishing this capability and creating a systematic review process for refining OE structure and staffing requirements (See Annex B). ODCSPER</td>
<td>Apr 77</td>
<td>CSA Briefing *GOSC-IPR (Quarterly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Establish guidance for minimum staffing required to provide an Army-wide OE capability and publish to MACOM. ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 May 77</td>
<td>ODCSPER Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Determine role of NCO in OE. TRADOC</td>
<td>1 May 77</td>
<td>GOSC-IPR (Quarterly) and ODCSPER Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Refine guidance for OE staffing based on MACOM input. ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Jun 77</td>
<td>ODCSPER Action (Publish OE Army Regulation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Direct MACOM to convert all required OE spaces, formally establishing necessary structure. ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
<td>GOSC-IPR (Quarterly) and ODCSPER Action</td>
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*ODCSPer General Officer Steering Committee – In Process Review.
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Continuing</td>
<td>GOSC-IPR (Quarterly)</td>
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6. Train required number of OESO with training load indicated by revised structure.

7. Identify, clarify, validate, and document OE functions at all levels.

8. Determine what academic disciplines are OE-related spaces requiring AERB validation, e.g., OE managers, service school staff, key OESO on MACOM, and HQDA staffs.

9. Review existing structure to determine if functions are adequately staffed.

10. Revise structure and staffing requirements based on determination of OE functions and AERB requirements.

11. Determine role of DA civilian (DAC) personnel in OE.

12. Determine requirements for NCO and/or civilian (DAC) OE trained personnel.

13. Validate and convert spaces required for NCO and/or civilian (DAC) OE personnel.

14. Commence training of NCO and civilian (DAC) personnel at OETC until actions recommended in 3, 11, 12, 13 above have been completed.
FINDING

B. There appears to be increasing requirements for OE trained personnel above original estimates.

EXPLANATION

The optimal OE staffing for major command headquarters, CONUSA headquarters, divisions, installations, and some separate brigades or commands which are geographically dispersed appears to include the following: Four-six trained personnel (a mix of officers, NCOs, and DA civilians); one survey officer; and one clerk typist. Optimal staffing to support the Army-wide OE responsibilities of ODCSPER, HQDA appears to necessitate a division organizational structure headed by an 0-6. To provide an OE consulting capability to the Army Staff, the optimal staffing appears to be five-seven OE trained personnel (a mix of officers, 04-05, and DA civilians) headed by an 06.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<th>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Establish the following HQDA OE staffing requirements: (a) OE division in ODCSPER (b) staff element in MD(OCSA) of five-seven OE trained personnel headed by an 0-6.</td>
<td>OCSA</td>
<td>30 Apr 77</td>
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<td>2. Assign an OE qualified individual to OCSA to (a) provide direct consulting advice to the CSA (b) track and review progress in implementing OESC recommendations, and (c) monitoring Army-wide OE activities and initiatives.</td>
<td>OCSA</td>
<td>15 Apr 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Establish the optimal OE staffing as Army policy for MACOM Hqs, CONUSA Hqs, division installations, and some separate brigades or commands, which are geographically dispersed, at four-six trained personnel (a) mix of officers, NCOs, and DA civilians); one survey officer, and one clerk typist. This action should be taken as an interim means until more refined staffing estimates are obtained during FY 78 by HQDA.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 May 77</td>
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C. There is no commonly recognized list of OE functions to serve as a guide in determining an adequate OE structure for the Army.

EXPLANATION

A wide range of OE-related functions are being performed by various commands and staff agencies, often without having been identified, defined, and included in unit mission statements or organization and functions documents. These functions exceed the workload capabilities of OESOs who are being assigned under current HQDA policy—two per installation/Division and one per separate brigade. This is also apparent at HQDA, MACOM headquarters and in combat development, training development, and instructor positions within TRADOC.

The following functions which are included in the OESC concept paper, are:

- Policy/Plans
- Doctrine
- Training
- Research/Studies
- Assessment
- Information
- Budget/Contracting
- Consulting
- Selection/Assignment
- Instruction
- Joint Coordination
- Conferences
- Long Term Projects
- Professional Training

RECOMMENDATION

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<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 May 77</td>
<td>ODCSPER Action</td>
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FINDING

D. Absence of a stable structure, increasing student load, and turbulence at OETC has had a negative effect on mission accomplishment.

EXPLANATION

Since July 1975, OETC has been subjected to multiple reorganizations; significant staff/faculty turnover; increases in student load; proposals for relocating the center to another installation; and multiple requirements to support combat and training development functions; OE implementation
activities in the field; and evaluation functions. This has had a detrimental effect on the morale and capabilities of the staff/faculty and has negatively impacted on student perceptions of the center and the quality of instruction. The commander of OETC has made progress to stabilize the situation. TRADOC has recently located OETC directly under its headquarters.

Since the Army-wide requirements for OESOC has not been determined, an annual training requirement has not been established. As a result, OETC staffing has been based on projected, estimated training requirements. Although OETC is fully staffed based on current authorizations, the present student load exceeds the basis for staffing. The training requirements for NCO and civilians are still uncertain, as is the status of certain "short courses," i.e., SOC and LMDTC.* The lead time for fill of faculty is 7-11 months. The OETC evaluation program requires an estimated 8 man-years to complete (2 MY currently devoted).* Stability of the evaluation staff is critical. A TDA of 77 spaces has been submitted to support an anticipated student load of 210 (5 courses/year at 54 students/courses). This is a conservative figure derived from an original estimate of 94 spaces and covers OESOC training, limited short courses, limited TD/CD and evaluation functions.

* Survey Officer Course (SOC); Leadership and Management Development Training Course (LMDTC); Manyears (MY); Training Development (TD); Combat Development (CD); OE Staff Officers Course (OESOC).

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<td>TRADOC/ ODCSOPs</td>
<td>1 May 77</td>
<td>GOSC-IPR (Quarterly)</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Jul 77</td>
<td>TRADOC Action</td>
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1. Support TRADOC realignment of OETC directly under its headquarters by providing training spaces, and assigning qualified personnel sufficient to meet the expanding mission/tasks, especially in the functional areas of CD, TD, evaluation, and instruction.

2. Approve the 77 space TDA as an interim measure.

3. Establish requirements for short courses.

(For current courses)
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<td>(For minimum OESO requirements)</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>On determination of firm training requirements</td>
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<td>MILPERCHN</td>
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<td>MILPERCHN</td>
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<td>ODCSPER Action</td>
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4. Determine short-range annual training requirements.

5. Revise the OETC TDA as part of the training base review process.

6. Determine the training programs for NCO and civilians.

7. Provide for stabilization or adequate overlap of the OETC evaluation staff.

8. Maintain proper staffing and personnel stability at OETC.
II. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

FINDING

A. Efforts to institutionalize OE in the Army have promulgated ad hocracy in training management.

EXPLANATION

The efforts to get OE in the Army for the most part, have been done outside of the Army instructional system design (ISD) model. There was no front end analysis, no task list, and no conditions or standards were established. The decision to train OESOs was made before a structure was identified, spaces allocated, and field needs; however, such was not the case in the OE effort. To date the structure has not been defined and a burden is placed on MILPERCEN and the training establishment to determine training loads, class size, and instructor requirements. This ad hocracy has further resulted in massive energy to integrate OE in service schools with little guidance given as to what the instruction includes and should accomplish.

The complexities of institutionalizing and effectively utilizing an OE capability requires education of the total Army leadership. Courses to accomplish this in the past have been "quickfix" and produced limited success. There is also a significant shortage of OE training aids and materials. This situation has hindered the efforts to create an awareness of the need for an understanding of OE among the Army leadership.

The delivery of appropriate OE and OE-related instruction to the service schools is a complex and difficult mission. The recent emphasis by TRADOC and the addition of a special OE Assistant to CDR, TRADOC will contribute significantly to meeting educational and training needs and evolving from an ad hocracy to routine operational practices. Constant vigilance and a carefully coordinated approach over the next 2-3 years is necessary to achieve desired results.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>1 May 77</td>
<td>TRADOC and ODCSPER Action</td>
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1. Place OE training and education into the existing training management structure and apply the ISD model.
2. Continue ad hoc initiatives to institutionalize OE on a limited basis, but in coordination with the training management establishment.

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3. Establish a clearing house for the production and distribution of OE training aids and materials.

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<td>TRADOC</td>
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<td>TRADOC Action</td>
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**FINDING**

B. While TRADOC schools have begun to integrate OE in NCO and officer courses, there is confusion regarding what should be taught. The introduction of OE into precommissioning courses has not been fully addressed.

**EXPLANATION**

On 23 September 1976, CDR TRADOC directed service school commanders to integrate OE in their courses. A videotape was produced to clarify this tasking. However, the tasking has resulted in confusion and a wide array of efforts. Several initial efforts to get OE into the service schools are ongoing at CGSC, and Forts Knox, Sill, and Bliss. The primary confusion revolves around OE and individual interpersonal effectiveness skill training. Service school faculties tend to believe that teaching OE-related subjects such as communications, decisionmaking, counseling and other subjects, is prima facie evidence that OE is being taught.

TRADOC has taken the initiative to develop modules for the schools which should serve to clarify the requirement. Because of the real world problem of scarce "platform time," it will probably be necessary to assert top level influence to get the modules integrated into the service school PDI. Additionally, these modules are only addressing the TRADOC institutional courses. No efforts have yet been made to integrate OE in precommissioning training.

Another source of confusion revolves around the L&MDC course. The OETC and only OETC-certified L&MDC trainers are permitted to conduct this course. Many people in the field see the association of L&MDC with the OETC and assume from this association that the conduct of L&MDC instruction is an alternative to and/or the same as OE instruction. As a result, there has not been any concerted effort to expose NCOs to OE education and training. Experience in FORSCOM shows that NCOs should receive both L&MDC or other interpersonal skill training. They should also be provided a basic understanding of the need for and the concept of OE as an organization or unit improvement process.


RECOMMENDATIONS

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<td>TRADOC</td>
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<td>TRADOC Action GOSC-IPR (Quarterly) CSA Briefing</td>
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2. Non-TRADOC schools initiate efforts to integrate OE and coordinate with TRADOC.

3. Include OE instruction in the POIs of the NCO Educational System.

FINDING

C. Training and education in OE generally requires a high degree of experience and technical skill on the part of combat development, training development, and subject matter experts involved in instruction.

EXPLANATION

Experience inside and outside the Army on the process of educating leaders on OE indicates that the training methodology is as important as the training content. "Hands-on" training methods are as important in this "soft skill" area as they are in teaching such "hard skills" as marksmanship and vehicle maintenance. The functions of developing and delivering instruction in OE can only be accomplished by persons who themselves have been trained in the methodology as well as the content areas of leadership and OE.

Individuals with this requisite background are scarce in the Army and are generally not assigned to the training developments and instructional staffs. The actual delivery of OE education and training, whether as part of existing curricula in the service schools or in specifically developed short courses to meet specified OE needs, cannot precede the technical preparation of those who will develop and deliver this training and education.
RECOMMENDATIONS

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<td></td>
<td>1 Sep 77</td>
<td>all svc school OE instructors and continuing thereafter</td>
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FINDING

D. Senior officers do not adequately understand the technology of OE and how to fully employ OESOs as a command-wide capability.

EXPLANATION

Since the introduction of OE into the Army has not been preceded by any massive information and education effort, it is understandable that a majority of senior officers do not possess an adequate understanding of OE and the capabilities of the OESO. Large scale educational efforts, such as mandatory seminars or briefings, are usually counter productive and run the risk of creating a faddish image of OE. Education efforts are best focused in those areas where (1) people would normally expect them, such as the service schools, BG (designee) Conference, and SCOC*; (2) where the learning has an immediate application and is of personal relevance to the individual e.g., on-the-job; and (3) where the commander is personally involved in the education process. The location of OESOs in the field further supports this more diversified approach to educating the Army about OE.

* Senior Officers Orientation Course (SCOC).
This educational gap at senior levels in the Army does present a few obstacles to the appropriate application and institutionalization of OE. First, senior officers who have been involved in OE activities tend to develop their understanding of the total technology solely in the context of their personal experience. As a result, there is a tendency to reflect a general understanding of OE only in terms of a few techniques, such as Survey Feedback, and in a specific area where the techniques were employed, such as training. This situation can contribute to further confusion around the question "What is OE?" and can lead to a narrow rather than broad application of the technology. Second, senior officers who are familiar and comfortable with a technique, which was applicable in one situation, tend to want to overuse this technique across the board without benefit of a systematic assessment of each new situation and the assistance of an OESO. This desire to find "short cuts" in the OE process is understandable but counterproductive. Third, a few senior officers, who do not understand OE but have experienced positive results from OE activities, have a tendency to want to use OESOs as "problem fixers" or "investigators." Several incidents have occurred where commanders have put pressure on OESOs to report subordinate unit OE assessments to higher headquarters rather than leave this decision as a voluntary matter with the subordinate commander.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<td>ODCSPER &amp; TRADOC</td>
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1. Adopt a diversified strategy of informing senior officers about OE which capitalizes on (a) existing forums, (b) chain of command involvement, and (c) learning situations where individuals can translate this knowledge into immediate application with the benefit of OE trained personnel.

2. Ensure that commanders' courses currently under development include appropriate OE instruction.

TRADOC Prior to implementation of the new CDR training program.

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<td>GOSC-IPR (Quarterly) CSA Briefing</td>
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<td>OCSA</td>
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<td>ODCSPER</td>
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3. Determine the most appropriate TRADOC method and means for providing OE instruction to (a) command designees (05-06), and (b) OE line and staff managers.

4. Determine and implement the most appropriate method and means for providing OE instruction to (a) selected general officers and (b) BG designees.


6. Provide adequate training for OESOs in the OESOC curriculum concerning the most appropriate means and methods for informing and educating senior officers on OE.

7. Publish CSA Weekly Summary articles providing appropriate guidance and concerns to senior officers on OE education and applications.

8. Clearly delineate the principle of confidentiality and individual anonymity in the Army Regulation on OE so that commanders can fully understand its importance and application.

*Army Management and Engineering Training Activity (AMETA).*

36
FINDING


EXPLANATION

Past efforts to clearly define OE and to relate it to the broader areas of leadership and management have been inadequate. Confusion exists as to the nature of the OE process and how it differs from content expertise. OE is a process that focuses on organizational and interpersonal processes and relationships such as communications, cooperation, conflict resolution, etc. Although the OESO looks at the total organizational system, he does so from the perspective mentioned above, and is not to be confused with an efficiency expert or resource manager. This distinction needs to be understood and preserved.

RECOMMENDATION

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1. Continue the Army policy that supports the concept of OE as a process which flows out of the behavioral sciences; that the OESO is an organizational process consultant only.

FINDING

F. A requirement exists for graduate education in OE.

EXPLANATION

The OETC 16-week course trains an individual in basic OE skills. It is evident that additional expertise is required throughout the Army in a number of positions, such as combat development and training development positions, school faculties, OESO at major headquarters, and others.
RECOMMENDATION

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<td>ODCSOP Action GOSC-IPR (Quarterly) CSA Briefing</td>
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1. Identify appropriate AFRB positions for OE and validate these positions.

FINDING

F. The US Army War College is not teaching OE to its current class. The Command and General Staff College, however, has made a commendable effort to instruct its students on OE.

EXPLANATION

The Army War College and the Command and General Staff College are two of the most essential Army educational organizations institutionalizing OE. Although some electives are being taught, little is being done at the AWC to instruct the entire student body on OE. Plans are underway, however, to develop an expanded program of instruction on OE for the 1978 AWC class and integrate this into the core curriculum.

The Command and General Staff College should be commended for the 2 day OE seminar conducted in March 1977. As a first effort it was innovative, useful, and represented a sincere desire to include OE in the curriculum.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<td>ODCSOPS Action GOSC-IPR (Quarterly) CSA Briefing</td>
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1. Ensure appropriate OE instruction at C&GSC.
2. Ensure appropriate OE instruction at AWC.
FINDING

H. The OETC developed Leadership and Management Development Course (L&MDC) is an effective, highly regarded course of instruction.

EXPLANATION

The L&MDC course has gained a high degree of acceptance at numerous FORSCOM installations, and is viewed by commanders as beneficial for improving officer and noncommissioned officer's interpersonal leadership skills. This course is not, however, being pursued anywhere else in the Army nor is it recognized as an official Army course of instruction. This situation creates problems for those individuals who are being assigned as full-time L&MDC instructors and fails to ensure that the Army can later identify personnel who have acquired these skills. The L&MDC course represents one possible way of complying with the CSA instructions to TRADOC to include interpersonal skill development instruction in NCO education.

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<td>CSA Briefing</td>
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1. Determine appropriateness of L&MDC in NCO and basic officer education. If appropriate, recognize it as an official Army course of instruction.
III. MANAGEMENT

FINDING

A. CSA needs to continuously emphasize his personal interest in OE and periodically evaluate the progress being made in its institutionalization.

EXPLANATION

While OE efforts at H/QDA, HILPERGEN, FORSCOM, USAEUR, and TRADOC, are making inroads towards the institutionalization of OE, it is evident that there is still significant resistance. This resistance is abetted by the failure of DA to acknowledge the trade-offs required to staff the OE structure, lack of Army policy on OE, and lack of education for senior officers. Overcoming this resistance is not easy.

Throughout the OESG assessment, senior officers interviewed emphasized the need for constant CSA involvement and mentioned that many of their peers were not supportive of the OE effort. In some instances the impact of the CSA interest has been a mixture of unrealistic expectations and zealous enthusiasm. In others it has been to "wait and see." Overcoming the resistance at high levels requires CSA involvement and expanded ownership by the senior Army commanders of the OE effort. Senior officers need to follow the lead of CDR, TRADOC in supporting the CSA desires. Additionally, as has been noted in this study, OE is most successful where commanders are personally involved in an OE operation. CSA needs to develop and periodically participate in OE operations on the Army Staff and with Army commands.

Lastly, it is essential that the CSA keep track of the progress of institutionalizing OE. An officer with direct access to the CSA is required to serve as his consultant on OE matters and as a monitor of OE activities and the implementation of the OE Study Group report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<td>2. CSA continue to emphasize OE through forums such as conferences, meetings w/ commanders, weekly summary articles, and visits to the field.</td>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Continual</td>
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<td>3. CSA discuss Army OE objectives and initiatives with the Secretary of the Army to (a) broaden legitimacy of the effort and (b) set stage for involving Sec Army in OE activities.</td>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CSA set the example by becoming involved in OE activities appropriate to his level in the (a) DA Staff, (b) major commands, (c) Army Secretariat.</td>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>As desired</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Establish a mechanism within OCSA to track and review execution of OESG recommendations.</td>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>15 Apr 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Write a HQDA Plan for FY 78 with CSA guidance for the expanded implementation and conduct of OE activities within the Army Staff based on (a) the capabilities established under recommendation IB(1), (b) current OE activities in HQDA; and (c) the System Development Corporation Report &quot;Summary of OE on the Army Staff,&quot; dated 21 March 1977.</td>
<td>OCSA</td>
<td>1 Jun 77</td>
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FINDING

B. The growing number of OE activities throughout the Army needs to be better coordinated.

EXPLANATION

OE initiatives and functional requirements have accelerated to the point where there is a serious imbalance between OE implementation efforts and the concerted development of OE policy, doctrine, and training. The extent to which multiple actions and activities are coordinated in support of Army-wide OE matters is a growing area of concern to those Staff agencies which have proponent responsibilities as well as user units. Some of these actions are the OETC Evaluation Plan, ARI OE Research Plan, PAO Information Plan, the integration of OE into service school curriculums, the OE Steering Committee, and diverse OE implementation activities in the major commands. Some positive steps are underway in this area to include the ADMINCEN OE Work/Study Plan and the revised structure for the OE General Officer Steering Committee.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<td>ODSPER</td>
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<td>Same as above</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>After each phase</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
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<td>ODSPER</td>
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<td>ODSPER</td>
<td>15 May 77</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>1 May 77</td>
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1. Plan and conduct IPRs on the following OE actions to ensure substantive and timely coordination.

   a. OETC Evaluation Plan (See Annex F).

   b. ARI OE Research Plan (See Tab V of this report).

   c. PAO Information Plan.

   d. OE integration in service schools.

   e. Others, as indicated, in this report.

2. Develop a revised and expanded agenda for the OE Steering Committee which allows for planning by action officers, prior to the meeting, and more interaction by the general officers involved.

   ODCSPER Action 1977
FINDING

C. There is a critical need for key OE staff personnel to stay abreast of OE activities in other services.

EXPLANATION

Knowledge of the experience of other services is essential if the Army is to capitalize on their successes and avoid their pitfalls.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<td>1. CSA discuss OE efforts with other service chiefs and propose establishment of interservice group.</td>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Formalize the &quot;ad hoc interservice group,&quot; which was formed at the Ft. Benjamin Harrison meetings to explore/discuss OE matters of interest.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Sep 77</td>
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FINDING

D. That another independent assessment be made in 2 years to reevaluate progress in institutionalizing OE.

EXPLANATION

The institutionalization of OE in the Army is a difficult, complex, and highly interactive process and represents the largest attempt in the history of management to change the culture of a large organization. One of the lessons of OE is that complex processes should be periodically reviewed by trained outsiders. This is especially significant in this case because of the many misunderstandings which exist as to what OE is. The tendency will be for commanders at various levels and locations to reinterpret doctrine and redefine OE.
RECOMMENDATION

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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Jan 79</td>
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1. Constitute an OESG follow-up to provide an independent view of the progress made to institutionalizing OE.

FINDING

E. The US Army Administration Center (ADMINCEN) OE Work/Study Plan Program is a comprehensive and general plan for institutionalizing OE in the Army.

EXPLANATION

The ADMINCEN OE Work/Study Program provided the first concerted effort to establish and clarify the major requirements for institutionalizing OE in the Army. As such, it was used extensively by the OESG in the conduct of this study and in the development of a more refined time-phased plan, which is designed to integrate and coordinate the efforts of NODA, MILPERGEN, AR1, TRADOC, ADMINCEN, and OETC in conjunction with OE implementation efforts in the field.

It is unclear at the writing of this report what part ADMINCEN will continue to assume in the furtherance of this program. OETC was placed under direct control of DCST, TRADOC on 1 Apr 77 and will have OE combat and training development, training, and evaluation functions under the TRADOC school concept.

The ADMINCEN program, although comprehensive in scope, is ambitious for one agency or organization to accomplish without a significant increase in current staffing levels and assigned OE trained personnel. It is the opinion of the OESG that this program be continued by TRADOC as a planning and staff coordination mechanism and refined consistent with the OESG findings and recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION

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<td>TRADOC Action</td>
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1. Use the ADMINCEN Work/Study Program as a planning and staff coordination mechanism and refine consistent with the OESG findings and recommendations.
IV. POLICY AND DOCTRINE

FINDING

A. Current Army policy and doctrine on OE are inadequate.

EXPLANATION

There is an understandable but serious imbalance between OE implementation efforts and the development of Army-wide policy, doctrine, and training requirements. OESO assignment priorities initially focused on field commands to meet demands for this expertise, cultivate initial acceptance of OE, and to provide a base of experience from which long-term policy and doctrine could be derived. The newness of OE technology within the military dictated that the Army proceed on this basis during 1975-76 with interim DA policy guidance.

This guidance, which was published in a HQDA Letter on 3 May 1976, is now insufficient to provide the framework for institutionalizing OE and address many of the key issues associated with accomplishing this goal. Some of these issues are in the areas of staffing and structure; the definition of OE and related terminology;* the role of the OESO and the confidential nature of his/her relationship with user units; and the voluntary versus mandatory aspects of OE. For example, the policy which specifies the voluntary use of OE methods and trained personnel is sound. This does require, however, top level understanding, encouragement, and support which are best asserted by personal example on the part of a commander rather than by fiat or benign neglect. How to translate this into policy and doctrine is a key issue. Another issue is that immediate supervisors of OESOs experience difficulty in understanding and accepting the consulting duties of the OESO in contrast to normal staff officers' duties.

*The OESG recommended definition of OE is as follows: Commander's use of a systematic four step process which guides the selective military application of management and behavioral science methods with the assistance of technically qualified staff personnel to (1) assess and improve how a unit functions to accomplish assigned missions, (2) strengthen the chain of command, and (3) increase the involvement of people at all levels in improving unit and individual performance and combat readiness.

The OE process includes the steps of assessment, action planning, implementation, and follow-up/evaluation with the direct involvement of the chain of command and the tailored application of OE methods to meet unique operational needs of the unit.

Staff personnel who assist in this process (1) function as consultants, (2) are trained and qualified through attendance at the USA OE Training Center and awarded an ASI 52, and (3) are normally assigned to a staff element that is external to the user unit.
The absence of definitive guidance on these matters results in commanders at various levels of the Army who are passive or resistant toward further implementation of OE. There is, therefore, a need to reduce this confusion by more clearly establishing Army policy and doctrine on OE and formally legitimizing OE activities through traditional Army channels, such as an Army Regulation.

With the vast majority of OE expertise located in field units, TRADOC and HQDA have not been able to keep pace with rapidly expanding implementation activities. There is, therefore, a lack of published Army educational and doctrinal material on OE. In addition, Army doctrinal publications, such as FM 101-5, do not reflect OE missions, functions, and capabilities.

For the most part, OE material which is available, was developed in an ad hoc manner to meet immediate local needs and varies widely in quality and technical accuracy. Material that is in use was not written by the agency which has been formally responsible for OE doctrine development since 1975.

Thus far, no formal mechanism has been created for substantively documenting OE activities and lessons learned from a technical and managerial point of view. This is a serious shortfall since meaningful doctrine cannot be developed without the benefit of comprehensive knowledge of how OE has been employed in the Army. Although, the OETC Evaluation Plan and the OE Handbook for Commanders were developed to bridge this gap, neither initiative provides documented case studies which are vital to informing and educating the Army, at large, on the wide applicability of OE.

The C&GSC Study of the combat role of the OESO is in a preliminary stage and is considered vital to the long-term institutionalization of OE. It requires further refinement and validation with a field test rather than relegating this concept to an abstract academic exercise.

In conclusion, TRADOC and HQDA are in a "catch up" phase on policy and doctrinal matters. More substantive and long-term guidance is critically needed to assist in rectifying this situation and stabilizing plans for the institutionalization of OE. Attention must focus on adhering to the essentials of OE as a technology in the development of policy and doctrine rather than prostituting its application under growing pressure for uniformity in areas such as structure, staffing, and training.
1. Publish an Army Regulation on OE which includes as a minimum the following areas:

   a. An acceptable operational definition of OE and related terminology, such as interpersonal skill training.

   b. OESO assignment stabilization.

   c. OESO as full-time duty.

   d. Confidentiality and anonymity.

   e. Consulting duties of the OESO.

   f. Structure and staffing requirements, to include space conversion guidance.

   g. Repetitive/reutilization tours for OESOs.

   h. Professional education/training for OESOs.

   i. OE interface with RR/EO, comptroller, AMEDD, chaplain, CPO, and other staffs whose expertise complements OE.

   j. Roles of DA civilian and NCO OE trained personnel.

   k. Mission/functions of HQDA and MACOM headquarters, OE staff, and consulting elements.
1. Mandatory vs. voluntary aspects of OE.
   
   m. Use of external consultants, military, and civilian.
   
   n. OESO mutual support requirements on a geographical basis.

2. Publish appropriate OE doctrinal literature and information, such as a Commanders' Handbook on OE.
   
   TRADOC As directed by TRADOC and HQDA
   
   TRADOC Action

3. Revise current doctrinal literature, such as FM 22-100 and FM 101-5, to include OE.
   
   TRADOC Same as above
   
   Same as above

4. Develop and test the concept of the combat role of the OESO.
   
   TRADOC 1 Jul 78
   
   TRADOC Action

5. Establish IG inspection standards relative to OE staff elements in accord with AR on OE.
   
   ODCSPER 1 Aug 77
   
   ODCSPER Action

FINDING

B. There is considerable confusion about the primary duties and role of the OESO in relation to RR/EO, comptroller, and IG staff functions.

EXPLANATION

OE is based on the military application of behavioral science for improving distinctly human processes which affect organizational performance and combat readiness. It is understandable where other, more established staff elements are concerned about how this technology relates to their missions and functions. This situation is further complicated by the consulting role of the OESO. This consulting expertise is intended to apply to any Army organization and command issue rather than relegating it to strictly human resources development (HRD) actions and programs.
With the emergence of OE in the HRD functional area, there is a natural tendency to view it as another program in the vein of RR/EO. This misperception has surfaced in a number of ways and has led to concern and conflict between RR/EO and staff elements. First, a number of RR/EO positions have been converted to OESO positions at the initiative of some commanders in the field. This action was suggested as an option but not required under the HQDA Letter of 3 May 1976 on Army-wide OE activities and training. Second, the OESO receives extensive interpersonal communications skill training and education in human behavior. Although this training emphasizes the application of these skills as they relate to organizational systems and processes, the OESO is perceived by others who are not knowledgeable of OE as nothing more than another human relations staff officer or a highly trained HRD manager. Third, OESOs work on a voluntary and non-directed basis with user units and have enjoyed a high demand for their services. At some installations/units this has been in contrast to RR/EO staffs. Fourth, although HQDA has stipulated that commands must maintain viable RR/EO programs, there is a perception that OE is intended to ultimately replace these efforts. Fifth, DOD interest in the relationship between RR/EO and OE is increasing since other services, such as the Navy, are also involved in similar efforts in a more integrated manner.

Action has been taken by OETC to ensure OESOs receive a more in-depth appreciation of equal opportunity issues and the need to establish a close working relationship with RR/EO staffs. In some instances, this situation is beginning to improve at MACOM headquarters and installation level. The efforts are too early to indicate a general overall improvement Army-wide. More substantive action needs to be taken by HQDA so that a constructive and enduring resolution of this issue is achieved rather than leaving it up to initiatives in the field.

The impact of OE on comptroller functions is also an area of concern since OE focuses on management assessment and improvement. The nature of the essential differences is two-fold and is substantial. First, OE consulting skills are process rather than content oriented. Although an OESO is knowledgeable of management-by-objectives, for example, he is trained to assist units in adapting this method in a non-directed manner to meet the unique needs of that unit and only at the request of the commander. His focus is on the process of how that unit selects and adopts the method towards meeting some specific requirement rather than developing the mechanical procedures and assuming staff responsibility for its implementation. Second, OE as previously mentioned, focuses on the distinctly human dimensions of organizational structure. Although OE and some comptroller functions can be and should be mutually reinforcing, each is rooted in a distinctly different concept and mode of operating. The OESO is, therefore, not an efficiency expert.
Since OESOs are trained in organizational assessment methods, there is concern that this role duplicates the IG function. OE assessments are only useful when they are conducted on a confidential basis with units, maintain individual anonymity, and are used in a developmental manner to improve a unit rather than as a "report card" or "club." In addition, the OESO is not a resolver of individual complaints nor is he or she an ombudsman. The other major difference between OE and the IG function is the manner in which OESOs perform their consulting duties. The OESO does not render judgments against a set of predetermined standards. This is left to the commander and his chain of command.

In conclusion, there are substantial concerns and perceived conflicts between OE, RR/EO, comptroller, and IG staff elements which need to be reconciled conceptually and operationally.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<th>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</th>
<th>COMPLETION DATE</th>
<th>CONTROL MEASURES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Provide appropriate OE instruction and information to RR/EO, comptroller, and IG personnel.</td>
<td>ODCSPEP 1 Jul 77</td>
<td>ODCSPEP, IG, and COA Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Provide sufficient coverage of RR/EO, comptroller, and IG functions and responsibilities in the OESOC so that (a) OESOs are appreciative of these staffs and (b) are willing to refer problems through a unit chain of command to the appropriate agency when the occasion arises.</td>
<td>TRADOC 1 May 77</td>
<td>TRADOC Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Amend, where appropriate, Army regulations, circulars, pamphlets, policies, etc., pertaining to RR/EO, comptroller, and IG functions to provide clarification and support for OE.</td>
<td>ODCSPEP 1 Sep 77</td>
<td>ODCSPEP Action</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
FINDING

C. There is a general concern about how the IG will examine OE staff functions.

EXPLANATION

OESOs and their immediate supervisors who were interviewed expressed a concern that the IG will require access to unit data and records which were gathered and maintained on a confidential basis in support of OE activities. To date, there have been no reported instances where this has occurred. The widespread nature of this concern could lead to a subtle and substantial undermining of the credibility of the OESO.

RECOMMENDATION

RESPONSIBLE COMPLETION CONTROL
AGENCY DATE MEASURES

1. The IG should not have access to confidential data, but should focus inspections on compliance with the Army Regulation on OE.

FINDING

D. The technical system to support OESOs is not well defined and its adequacy varies across major commands.

EXPLANATION

Since OESOs are assigned to a variety of levels in the Army from HQDA to separate brigades, there is a natural tendency for them to become isolated in the absence of a clearly defined and vigorously managed technical support system. This system must operate and be responsive within and across various staff elements and each of these levels so that (1) adequate resources are provided in a timely manner to support OE activities, especially in those instances where the required resources are greater than those that are normally available (2) new OE technical developments and lessons learned can be quickly disseminated, (3) additional OE consulting support (military or civilian) is readily available, especially when these personnel possess unique skills/experience and (4) OESOs can receive advanced professional training.
OESOs who have worked jointly on a temporary basis with OESOs from other organizations or with management or human resources development specialists (RR/EO, chaplain, AMEDD personnel) on specific projects, contributed to a more comprehensive and effective approach to those projects. This is also true when OESOs have been able to selectively obtain the services of civilian OE consultants and have locally based L&MDC instructors to augment OE activities and training.

The location of OESOs in different elements of a particular division or installation tends to result in dissipated and isolated OE activities. There is also a lack of collaboration between OESOs who are assigned to different major commands, such as FORSCOM and TRADOC, but are collocated on the same installation.

Another factor which affects the OE technical support system is commanders and OE staff managers who are reluctant to provide adequate budget support, computer support for surveys, and/or are fearful of creating a "stovepipe" image of OE consulting activities. There is considerable diversity of opinion as to what constitutes a "stovepipe" and what is permissible to energize and manage an OE staff element. As a result, some OE managers have restricted OESOs to performing only staff work at MACOM headquarters with the rationale that consulting is an operational function that is outside the purview of the organization's responsibilities.

This is further reinforced by manpower analysis guidelines that are applied to headquarters staffs. Other managers narrowly view the OESO as a local resource which should not be used outside their Staff agency or command.

Providing a well coordinated and open OE technical information network and advanced professional training are other major dimensions of this support system. Quarterly newsletters, such as those which are published by FORSCOM, TRADOC, and USAREUR and periodic workshops for OESOs are useful for meeting command needs in these areas.

In conclusion, there is a need for a definitive Army policy which describes and sanctions a technical OE support system and provides the parameters under which this system will operate within and between organizational levels and various staff elements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
<td>ODCSPER Action</td>
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1. Describe and sanction an OE technical support system and provide appropriate guidance for managing and sustaining this system (See Annex B).
2. Staff agencies, which are not under the purview of OE staff elements, e.g., DMIS RR/EO, comptroller, chaplain, AMEDD, and ARI, should establish appropriate guidance concerning their role in the OE technical support system.

FINDING

E. Limited implementation of OE has been initiated in the Reserve Components (RC) and presents unique challenges.

EXPLANATION

FORSCOM has provided limited OE consulting support to a few RC units and by mutual agreement with ODCSPER, DA has initially assumed responsibility to support all pilot efforts within the Reserve Components. During the past 2 years, ODCSPER, DA has used a MDES officer to begin examining the feasibility of implementing OE in the RC and has provided briefings to the RC Policy Council. Fifth Army is interested in participating in a FORSCOM sponsored conference to develop a strategy for OE in the RC and the National Guard Bureau is also becoming involved in OE implementation activities. To date, no concerted analysis and planning have been accomplished relative to the RC.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<td>1. Conduct an analysis of OE activities and capabilities in the RC to determine lessons learned and the feasibility of implementing OE on a broader scale.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>GOSC-IPR (Quarterly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Expand OE consulting assistance within the RC.</td>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>ASAP</td>
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<td>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</td>
<td>COMPLETION DATE</td>
<td>CONTROL MEASURES</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Develop a plan for the introduction of OE into the RC, to include identification of required resources.</td>
<td>ODCSPER, CCAR, &amp; NGB</td>
<td>1 Nov 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Augment ODCSPER, DA and other MACOM headquarters OE staff elements with MOBDES personnel to support OE planning and implementation activities for the RC.</td>
<td>ODCSPER &amp; ODCSOPS</td>
<td>1 Jun 77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. EVALUATION AND RESEARCH

FINDING

A. There is a need for quantifiable research and evaluation programs to support the refinement of OE technology as it pertains to the Army as well as OE policy, doctrine, and training.

EXPLANATION

The US Army Research Institute (ARI) OE Research efforts began on a modest basis in the early 1970's with a project in a USASA unit in USAREUR. Positive results from this project led to exploring expanded applications of OE technology in the 32d AADCOM and 75 company-sized units in USAREUR. ARI OE research efforts are increasing as a result of a CSA briefing on 27 Dec 76 and DDR&E approval of $1.6 million for OE basic or technical base research during FY 78.

A coordinated 5-year OE Research Plan is nearing completion. An ARI sponsored planning conference on 8-9 Feb 77 provided basic input for this plan and identified the need for further coordination with OETC and ADMINCENT OE evaluation and study efforts. Representatives from ARI; ODCSPER, DA; TRADOC; ADMINCENT; and OETC met on 21-24 Mar 77 to accomplish this coordination and interface the respective programs. Detailed input from the OETC Evaluation Plan is needed to complete the ARI Research Plan as well as the incorporation of OETC and MACOM OE research needs.

Although coordination and planning activities have improved, OE research remains susceptible to elimination from the R&D budget due to general congressional hostility toward behavioral science research. In addition, ARI is not sufficiently staffed with personnel who have indepth OE research experience. The two researchers who supported the initial OE projects have departed ARI and GS grade limitations, which affect ARI staffing levels, are a significant obstacle to hiring quality OE research personnel.

Quantifiable results of OE are currently available to a limited degree in the Army. The data and well documented case studies and experiences have not been systematically collected and analyzed.

The OETC 3-year, five phased OE Evaluation Plan is comprehensive in scope, sophisticated in methodology and is vitally necessary for OE policy, doctrine, and training. This effort is an initial attempt to quantify OE progress in the Army and represents a unique and perhaps the finest approach to program evaluation undertaken by the Army (See Annex F).
In conclusion, close coordination and support for the ARI OE Research Plan, the OETC OE Evaluation Plan and other OE study, evaluation, and research efforts are crucial if the Army is to appropriately determine the impact and full potential of OE and provide long term justification and support for its continued application.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<td>1. Coordinate and incorporate appropriate OE research and study requirements in the OETC Evaluation Plan, the ARI Research Plan, and the ODCSPER Study Program.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Sep 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Obtain sufficient numbers of well-qualified OE research personnel to support the ARI 5-year OE Research Plan.</td>
<td>ARI</td>
<td>1 Oct 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Provide ARI with relief, on an exception basis, from current GS grade limitations and reductions so that well-qualified OE research personnel can be obtained by FY 78.</td>
<td>ODCSPER, DA</td>
<td>1 May 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ensure that the TRADOC OE Work/Study Program reflects the ARI Research Plan.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>1 Oct 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Establish a coordination link between ARI and OETC through one or more of the following: (a) establishing an ARI liaison at OETC; (b) conducting work reviews at the request of either organization; (c) ARI representatives attending OETC Evaluation seminars.</td>
<td>(a) ARI</td>
<td>1 Oct 77</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(b) ARI/OETC</td>
<td>Continuing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(c) ARI</td>
<td>1 Jun 77 and as announced thereafter</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Strongly support the ARI unfunded FY 79 6.3 advanced development research request.</td>
<td>ODCSPER &amp; ODCSRDA</td>
<td>1 Jan 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Establish coordination with other Federal Government and civilian OE research efforts.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>15 Mar 78</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

56
FINDING

B. The link between ODCSPER and ODCSRDA on OE research needs improvement.

EXPLANATION

ODCSRDA personnel are primarily trained and interested in hardware-type research. As a result, they have difficulty understanding and appreciating the need for OE research. The existing relationships between these Staff agencies is primarily relegated to administrative and budgetary matters, which further complicates the difficulties in communicating the nature and importance of OE research. The coordination process also takes place below general officer level and, thereby, tends to shield decisionmakers from important personnel research issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<td>1. CSA confirm the requirement for and emphasize the importance of OE research with the DCSRDA.</td>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>2 May 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. ODCSRDA support OE research requirements with DDR&amp;E.</td>
<td>ODCSRDA</td>
<td>1 Jun 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. DHRD/DPPB personally present OE research needs to appropriate level in ODCSRDA.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>16 May 77</td>
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FINDING

C. The US Army Research Institute (ARI) 5-year OE Research Plan is improving and must be implemented in FY 78.

EXPLANATION

A draft 5-year OE Research Plan was developed during an ARI sponsored planning conference on 8-9 Feb 77. The following five priority long term research thrusts were identified and coordinated. Final coordination is underway with DA, ODCSPER and TRADOC and a detailed plan for FY 78 has been prepared.

(1) Criteria of Organizational Effectiveness.
(2) Organization Functioning (Structures, Process, and Problems).

(3) Parameters of the OE Process (OESO Selection and Development and Delivery Systems).

(4) Diagnostic Methods.

(5) Development of Intervention Strategies.

The plan appears adequate for guiding basic or technical base research and will require greater refinement with research sponsors in the area of advanced development research. One of the areas which requires further research is the impact of the Leadership and Management Development Course (L&MDC) on attendees and their units.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

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<th>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ARI complete detailing of 5-year OE Research Plan, incorporate all relevant Army research needs, and obtain final approval from ODCSPER.</td>
<td>ARI</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Initiate scheduled research efforts in FY 78:</td>
<td>ART</td>
<td>(See Schedules Below)</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Develop criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of Army organizations.</td>
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<td>1 Oct 77 - 30 Sep 81</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Develop criteria for organizational processes.</td>
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<td>1 Mar 78 - 30 Sep 82</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Develop taxonomy of Army organizational structures and processes, and typical associated problems and climates.</td>
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<td>1 Oct 77 - 30 Sep 78</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Develop and test hypotheses relating organizational structures/processes and organizational outcomes.</td>
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<td>1 Mar 78 - 30 Sep 82</td>
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<td>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</td>
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<td>30 Sep 82</td>
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<td>e. Develop operational description of the conditions for and dynamics of the OE process.</td>
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<td>30 Sep 79</td>
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<td>f. Develop alternative diagnostic methodologies.</td>
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<td>1 Mar 78 -</td>
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<td>30 Sep 80</td>
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<td>g. Develop taxonomy of OE techniques.</td>
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<td>1 Jun 78 -</td>
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<td>30 Sep 79</td>
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<td>h. Develop new intervention techniques for gaps identified in g above.</td>
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</table>
VI. ASSIGNMENT, SELECTION, AND UTILIZATION

FINDING

The expansion of OE in the Army requires personnel management procedures for the selection, assignment, utilization, and professional development of OE personnel which are clearly enunciated and understood.

EXPLANATION

Within the Army personnel management system there are multiple and conflicting demands for high quality people, e.g., ROTC, USMA, USAREC, and OE. Additionally, no formal priority has been established for MILPERCEN concerning the selection, assignment, and utilization of OE personnel. As a result, MILPERCEN is constrained to fill OE positions with high quality personnel. MILPERCEN's ability to select quality officers is expected to improve now that the requirement for all OESOs to be in OTMS specialty 41 has been lifted.

As OE expands, so does the magnitude and complexity of managing increasing numbers of OESOs and personnel who are identified to fill key OE management positions in the Army. Although the one MILPERCEN action officer is doing an outstanding job, a number of policy issues need to be resolved, written, and promulgated to inform OESOs, their supervisors, and personnel managers, particularly MILPERCEN assignment officers.

The utilization of personnel is a command prerogative. However, OESOs are assigned to a particular command based upon the command's validated requirement for OE trained personnel. Some OETC graduates have not been assigned to OESO positions or have otherwise been utilized in ways that are inconsistent with the skills obtained through their extensive training. Commanders must ensure that these highly skilled individuals are utilized in an OE role in support of the organizational mission. In the past the HQDA stabilization policy has been liberally interpreted in order to meet other requirements. OESOs do not become fully effective until they have 4 - 6 months experience. Considering the length of the course and the field demand for services of OESOs, it is important that 18 - 24 months utilization be achieved. The stabilization policy must be clearly stated and enforced. Additionally, it is apparent that there will be requirements for reutilization of repetitive tours for some OE trained personnel in OE assignments, such as in higher headquarters of at OETC.

Individuals who have an educational background in OE and behavioral science are not intensively managed. Identification of such persons would assist in the selection of key OE managers. However, behavioral science degree requirements vary greatly within the civilian academic world and currently it is not possible to relate a specified degree with OE-related subjects.
Another facet of the OE personnel management issue is the question of intensively managing individuals who have a background in OE. Since OE is not an OPMS specialty, such individuals are not intensively managed. MILPERCEN does monitor the professional development of officers involved in OE. Though it is too early to determine the degree of intensified management, if any is required, monitoring should continue since the career impact of an OE assignment is of some concern to OESOs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Provide MILPERCEN policy and guidance concerning the priority relationship of OE assignments to other priority assignment considerations; i.e., ROTC, USMA, USAREC.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>15 May 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assign additional staff officers to the OE personnel management function in MILPERCEN.</td>
<td>MILPERCEN</td>
<td>15 May 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Provide MACOMs with policy and guidance on minimum utilization (in terms of time) of OE trained personnel.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Publish policy and guidance on stabilization of OESOs for at least 18 months after graduation from OETC.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Institute a procedure to ensure personnel management officers are informed of all aspects of OE.</td>
<td>MILPERCEN</td>
<td>1 Aug 77</td>
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<td>6. Continue to monitor key OE management positions. (Already in progress.)</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>Continuing; ODCSPER Action</td>
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61
7. Continue to monitor the professional development of officers involved in OE.

8. Develop more specific criteria, other than general disciplines, for identifying individuals with appropriate educational backgrounds in OE.

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<td>MILPERGEN</td>
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<td>completion</td>
<td>GOSC-IPR (Quarterly)</td>
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<td>CSA Briefing</td>
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<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Aug 77</td>
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VII. PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF OE TRAINED PERSONNEL

FINDING

OESOs need additional professional training.

EXPLANATION

The formal instruction provided by the 16-week OESOC only provides the minimum essential skills necessary to perform as a consultant. The dynamic nature of the state-of-the-art and the vast amount of information not covered in the OESOC POI requires that the OESO continually receive timely and relevant technical training to update, refine, and expand his/her basic skills. A majority of people interviewed by OESG felt that the Army Regulation on OE should be explicit on the subject of OESO training and development activities which are subsequent to their attendance at OETC. OETC has maintained some contact with OESOs in the field. This contact has been critical to stimulate further professional training and to upgrade OESO knowledge and skills. However, no formal system exists to provide the field with OE technical information, although extensive information is available in academic and research communities as well as within the Army and other military services. Although several OE bulletins are being published by various agencies, they do not adequately meet the field needs for technical information.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<td>1. Conduct OE training courses/activities on a regional basis.</td>
<td>TRADOC &amp; MACOMs</td>
<td>1st activity scheduled May 77; continuing</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Designate a single proponent agency for OE technical information.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>1 May 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Collect, disseminate, and publish OE technical information.</td>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Legitimize professional OE training activities in policy and guidance documents and support at MACOM level.</td>
<td>ODCSPER &amp; MACOMs</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Include professional training in appropriate budget documents.</td>
<td>ODCSPER &amp; MACOMs</td>
<td>Dependent on budget cycle, begin w/FY 78 budget</td>
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6. Develop nonresident instruction in OE related skills.

7. Develop a series of short training courses in advanced OE skills.

8. Conduct refresher training for OESOC graduates returning to OE duties.

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<td>1st course due Dec 77+ continuing</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>1st course due Jul 78; continuing</td>
<td>TRADOC Action</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>1 Oct 78</td>
<td>TRADOC Action</td>
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</table>
VIII. EXTERNAL CONSULTING

FINDING

OESOs require outside support in the form of civilian and military consultants to assist in initiating and reviewing OE activities.

EXPLANATION

Civilian consultants and OESOs at HODA and in MACOM headquarters have been successfully used to initiate and selectively support OE activities at a variety of levels in the Army. The use of this outside expertise to augment the OETC faculty is also considered by many OESOs as one of the primary strengths of the OE effort. This consulting support has enhanced the quality and acceptance of Army-wide OE efforts and is necessary to expand the training and experience possessed by most OESOs. Contracts with civilian consultants are normally requested on an as needed and competitive bid basis with due attention to Army contracting requirements. However, the hiring and use of these consultants has been impeded by (1) OESOs who have not been trained to develop technical statements of work for contracts, (2) OE staff managers and OESOs who are unfamiliar with contract procedures and (3) local contracting and budget offices which are administratively slow and not knowledgeable of this type of consulting.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<td>1. Maintain an Army policy of using civilian consultants on a selective basis to support specific OE activities and training.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Issue definitive guidance on the selection and use of civilian consultants, associated budgetary matters, and reviewing OE contract activities.</td>
<td>ODCSPER &amp; MACOMs</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Review OE consulting contractual procedures and requirements to (a) improve administrative procedures, (2) educate OESO/OE managers, (3) provide guidance and recommendations to MACOMs.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
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</table>
4. Develop a list of consulting firms and their capabilities for referral by MACOMs. This list is for information only and not an endorsement of qualifications.

5. Devote a portion of the OETC curriculum to educating OESOs on the contract process and working relationships with external consultants.

6. Establish an Army OE strategy advisory group comprised of prominent civilian consultants for periodic assistance in reviewing Army-wide OE implementation efforts.
IX. OE OPERATIONS

FINDING

A. The use of OE and OE trained personnel can lead to significant improvements in unit performance provided this technology is focused on mission essential requirements and is tailored to a unit.

EXPLANATION

OE is effectively and systematically being used by commanders who have taken the time to become more knowledgeable of the technology and personally involved in its application. Once commanders take this course of action they quickly see the utility of selectively using OE and its application spreads. As a result, OESO duties are full time rather than part time.

Immediate improvements in organizational communications, teamwork, and problem solving with the application of relatively unsophisticated methods and OESO support have occurred in areas, such as unit operations, training, maintenance, and administration, and staff management in higher headquarters. OE is beginning to also be applied in support of installation management and community development. Some of the organizations and installations which have experienced these results are the 82d Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, Ft. Carson, Ft. Riley, and Ft. Hood, and the Personnel Information and Systems Directorate (PERSIND) in MILPERCEN. PERSIND represents the longest term application of OE (4 years) and the most dramatic organization-wide improvement effort, to date, in an Army Staff environment.

OE techniques have also been usefully employed in ODCSPER, DA since 1975 with part time OE consulting assistance. This has led to OE activities in other DA Staff agencies, such as ODCSLOG, OTSG, and ODCSOPS, to include the Concepts and Analysis Agency (CAA). For the most part these have been pilot efforts due to the limited availability of OE consulting support and have resulted in some short ranged improvements.

OE has been used to support top level planning and goal setting, organizational realignment caused by manpower reductions, streamlining administrative and staff operations; and clarifying intra and inter organizational roles and responsibilities. Similar types of OE applications have been conducted and are continuing in FORSCOM headquarters, TRADOC headquarters, Military District of Washington, and Computer Systems Command. USAREUR headquarters has also recently implemented OE.

One OE technique called the Leadership Transition Meeting is receiving increasing attention by battalion commanders and some staff managers. This technique greatly assists a unit transition to a new commander. An article describing this technique appeared in the March 1977 issue of Army magazine.
In general, OE is considered highly practical and relevant to a wide variety of Army issues and organizations and requires full time assistance of OE trained personnel. Command or organization-wide improvements using OE in division, installation, or major command headquarters require a sustained effort over a period of 3-5 years. Short term results, however, can be achieved provided commanders are willing to become personally involved and focus OE applications on mission essential requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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<tr>
<td>1. Widely publicize this finding as part of the OPA and MACOM OE information plans, to include the publication of articles and case studies.</td>
<td>OPA &amp; MACOMs</td>
<td>1 Sep 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Indicate in the AR that the duties of OE trained personnel are full time.</td>
<td>ODCSPER</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
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FINDING

B. OESOs are generally viewed as well trained and are best assigned and utilized in teams.

EXPLANATION

The majority of commanders and managers, who were interviewed as part of this study, were highly satisfied with the skills, abilities, and credibility of the OESOs assigned to their units. OESOs who are senior captains and field grade officers are preferred, especially those who have had troop or command and staff experience.

OESOs who were interviewed indicated the need to work in teams on specific OE activities due to the significant demands associated with consulting duties and to ensure unit assessments are conducted in the most objective manner possible. On average, OESOs require 4-6 months before they are fully operational as consultants. This is primarily a function of the newness of OE in the Army and the requirement to be personally credible within a particular command. The most common frustration voiced by OESOs is the lack of computer support in the field for the General Organizational Questionnaire (GOQ) survey. A few enterprising OESOs have developed their own rudimentary computer programs to process the survey and one officer in USAREUR had the survey translated into German for OE activities with local nationals who work for the Army.
Thus far, OE is being applied in the field primarily at battalion level and for internal improvements in some Staff agencies. A few OESOs have been able to involve higher levels of command in OE activities. Failure to bridge this gap will ultimately lead to frustrated and dissipated attempts to use this technology. Some inroads are beginning to be made in the areas of installation management, community development, and hospital management. These areas are not covered in any depth in the current OETC curriculum although each presents a unique environment for the application of OE. OESOs, for example, who are assigned to USAREUR need to have more than a cursory appreciation of how OE can be used in support of community development. With the advent of DARCOM's interest in OE, OESOs need to become familiar with OE applications in support of project and depot management in a high technology and complex organizational environment, which has a large civilian workforce.

OESOs need to improve their ability to assist units' shift from the organizational assessment phase into the implementation phase of the OE process. This requires an ability to appropriately and convincingly advise commanders on the necessity for this course of action. It also requires technical design skills for tailoring specific OE methods to assessment findings and the unique needs of the unit. Additional OESO training is needed on how to design and conduct evaluations of OE activities and how to efficiently document their experiences and lessons learned as feedback to OETC and TRADOC. The expansion of OE into different types of organizations, management processes, and environments (to include foreign nationals) and the requirement for the refinement of OE technical skills presents a special challenge to OETC. These developments will probably require additional instruction at OETC, to include a lengthening of the OESOC, and/or advanced professional training which is exported to the OESOs by OETC or a MACOM OE staff.

One of the most common observations of OESOs is that they are a highly motivated group of young officers who are willing to devote endless hours to the furtherance of OE in the Army. This is indeed remarkable since they are highly dispersed throughout the Army; operate in relative isolation and in a fairly autonomous manner with user units; have only the minimum DA guidance in the form of an HQDA letter to legitimize their presence in a unit; have not been preceded by massive information and mandatory educational efforts; are minimally supported by an ill defined and ad hoc staff management system that is easily diverted to other matters; provide advice to commanders in areas that are usually emotionally charged; and frankly don't have the vaguest notion what impact this duty will have on their careers.

As one general officer remarked about OETC: "This is the first time the Army has ever established a course for commanders." The consulting duties of an OESO provide extensive insight and preparation for command by the very nature of the technology, training, and the experiences derived from close working relationships with commanders and managers at a variety of levels. The role of the OESO is extremely demanding because many of the issues he or she is dealing with are closely related to a commander's self image and personal leadership style. The common reaction that "OE is nothing more than good leadership" attests to this fact.
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1. Incorporate the following policy into the Army Regulation on OE: "A minimum of two OESOs will be assigned to divisions and installations and major command headquarters and will not be assigned below these levels, unless authorized on an exception basis."

2. Encourage commanders to support close professional relationships and mutual assistance between OESOs, on a geographical basis, regardless of the command to which they are assigned.

3. Include instruction in the OESOC on (a) OE applications in the areas of installation and project management, community development, hospital management; and other types of management as deemed appropriate (b) design skills involving transitioning units from the assessment to the implementation phase of the OE process and (c) methods for evaluating OE activities and documenting OE experiences and lessons learned.

4. Stabilize OESO assignments be for a minimum period of 18-24 months.

TRADOC Action 1 Sep 77
X. INFORMATION

FINDING

There is a general information void on OE at all levels in the Army.

EXPLANATION

A comprehensive integrated OE Information Plan is required. The HQDA Public Affairs Office's current effort at developing a plan may meet this requirement. However, extensive input and cooperation from various Army headquarters and Staff elements is necessary to develop and execute this comprehensive plan. There is a specific need to inform general officers, senior commanders, and staffs on OE on a periodic and timely basis. For example, OE has not received adequate attention and emphasis in the CSA Weekly Summary. This need cannot be met in the time required by solely relying on existing service schools and senior service schools which meet long term information requirements.

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<tr>
<td>1. Implement OPA OE Information Plan.</td>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>Continuing</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. The CSA Weekly Summary contain appropriate OE information.</td>
<td>OCSA</td>
<td>Continuing (Monthly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. MACOMs establish their own OE Information Plans.</td>
<td>MACOMs</td>
<td>1 Jul 77</td>
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XI. RESOURCES

FINDING

A. There is a lack of general guidance on budgeting for OE activities.

EXPLANATION

With the exception of funds for OETC, there were no funds earmarked for OE in the FY 77 Army budget. OE funding is currently accomplished in an ad hoc manner due to the recent increase of OE activities in major commands.

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<td>30 Apr 77</td>
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1. Publish budget guidance.

2. MACOMs provide budget planning guidance to subordinate commands.

FINDING

B. The lack of an Army-wide GOQ survey capability has hampered the conduct of OE activities.

EXPLANATION

The interim version of the general organizational questionnaire (GOQ) survey ADP program was not approved for distribution until 28 Feb 77. Some ADP hardware in the field does not accept the program. Early OETC graduates lack skill in use of the GOQ. OETC workshops in April-May 1977 will update OESOs on use of new computer software and analysis of the GOQ. However, the final version of the GOQ is based on field input and acceptance of the software program by HQDA and computer Systems Command. TRADOC is producing the final version.
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1. Continue the development of the OE data processing system.

2. Approved the GOQ survey package as a standard Army system.

FINDING

C. In the long term, more suitable facilities are required for OETC.

EXPLANATION

Although the support provided by the host installation has been excellent, the fact remains that OETC is housed in temporary facilities. The importance of the training and its unique aspects dictate more appropriate, permanent facilities.

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As all of you know, I have for sometime been interested in Organizational Effectiveness (OE) as a technology and capability for strengthening and improving the Army in the broadest sense. The results obtained from pioneering efforts with OE during the past four years have been illuminating, but are only the tip of the iceberg. Collectively, these early initiatives in line and staff units signal a significant long term contribution to the Army. For this reason it is important for us to discuss OE at this conference and to use this discussion as a starting point for developing a shared viewpoint of how to institutionalize and employ this capability in the coming years.

As many of you know, we've made a lot of progress already. Bill DePuy has gotten the momentum going in TRADOC and George Blanchard has things moving in USAREUR. We have momentum in FORSCOM, both in the headquarters and the field, after a year of intensive effort. Several FORSCOM divisions are well along with implementing OE. Other command initiatives have been in MDW, Computer Systems Command, and more recently in DARCOM and EUSA/USFK. By 1 January 1977 a total of 126 OE staff officers will have been trained and deployed to the field.

We are also considering how to expand the use of OE here in the DA Staff after three years of deliberate study and application in MILPERCEN and ODCSPER. We also intend to get the NCOs and civilians involved.

My remarks today are derived from these early experiences and initiatives and will focus in three major areas. First, I want to share with you how I see OE in the Army. Second, I want to distinguish between the voluntary and mandatory aspects of institutionalizing OE. Third, I want to provide general guidance and a few words of caution on how to proceed with this capability.

I see OE in the Army from three perspectives. First, OE is a practical and systematic way of looking at how the Army and its organizational elements function by reflecting on the distinctly human nature of any organization. Second, OE is a process - a way of operating - that assists with untangling and streamlining specific functions, programs and entire organizations. As Bill DePuy says, "It helps get the gum out of the system and to eliminate medieval practices." Third, OE encompasses a set of techniques, which can and should be used selectively by the chain of command, to assess, strengthen, and improve how an organization accomplishes its mission. Open channels of communication and constructive problem solving are essential ingredients of these techniques. The total impact of OE, when it is done correctly on a continuing process, is to promote greater understanding, involvement, and commitment to unit goals with people at all echelons.
My goal is to institutionalize OE and to integrate it fully with our leadership and management processes so that after a few years people will say, "Didn't we always do it this way?"

If this goal is to be achieved, we must do it right. This means we will go slow where going slow is appropriate and we will move more quickly in those areas where it is essential. We will move in both areas with commitment.

Commitment means proceeding on the basis of understanding OE as a technology and how it can benefit your command and the Army. It also means a dedication to making the tough decisions which allocate resources for establishing an OE capability; which allow time to derive the maximum benefit from OE; and which judiciously employ these resources and expertise.

We need to proceed toward institutionalizing OE with the same degree of interest that we devote to a new weapon system. But we also need to recognize that the attainment of this goal is even more complex than bringing a new weapon system on line because we are dealing with the human dimensions of the Army.

I realize that OE is a long range effort. It will take several years to get it into the system. Before we can fully implement the OE process, we've got to develop an OE capability. However, we can and we will proceed with implementing the process and developing the capability simultaneously.

There's a lot of confusion about OE being voluntary. Some people are reading this to mean we're not serious. That's wrong! We are serious, so serious in fact that we're going to take the time and follow a strategy to do it right.

We are proceeding to develop an Army OE capability which will be self-sustaining. This part is not voluntary. It is mandatory.

Now let me highlight the nature of what I am calling the mandatory part of OE. This includes such things as creating the spaces for OESOs; allocating funds; developing and publishing doctrine and policy; implementing education and training; and conducting follow-on research and evaluation. This mandatory part will require training and education not only for the Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESO) but also for personnel in service schools and the chain of command in units.

In general, the technology of OE as well as the knowledge, skills, and methods of operating of the OESO are sufficiently unique to require this intensive and continuing educational effort. In other words, we will have an OE capability integrated into the system, but we will do this in a manner that balances this initiative with other top priority Army goals and requirements.
To assist us in analyzing the current status and future thrust of OE I have organized a small study group. This group has the mission of assessing the Army involvement in OE to find out where we are, where we are trying to go, and how we should proceed to get there. I have directed the group members, who have in-depth experience with OE at various levels in the Army from troop units to HQDA, to obtain your input before making their recommendations to me. The existence of this study group should not be viewed as a signal for slowing down or stopping initiatives that are already underway within your respective commands. The study group is a catalyst and opportunity for broadening and reinforcing these initiatives. It is intended to provide assistance by ensuring that an OE capability is institutionalized with an emphasis on quality.

Now I want to turn to that portion of OE which must remain voluntary. Our experience shows that many commanders volunteer to use OE after they have been involved in OE education activities and are provided the opportunity to employ OE trained personnel. Almost without exception, those that spend time understanding and appropriately implementing OE find it helpful in running their units.

However, some commanders do not immediately feel comfortable with the OE process. These people do not initially become involved and some, for that matter, may never want to use it. We must respect these commanders who may feel this way after they have had an opportunity to sufficiently learn what OE is all about. However, even those commanders who chose not to selectively use this technology should not preclude their subordinates from using it.

A lot of people are skeptical at first. This reaction is desirable and to be expected. It is this healthy skepticism and a willingness to give OE a fair try with one's personal involvement that ultimately promotes a full understanding and intelligent application of OE.

In those units where we have provided the capability to do OE and the effort has received adequate command support, more commanders are requesting assistance than OESOs can handle. So from the point of view of available resources, we cannot direct that all commanders will use the OE process even if that were a desirable course of action.

But there is another more important and basic reason why we cannot mandate the use of the OE process and specific techniques. Commanders have a responsibility to be aware of what is available in the management sciences, but they require latitude on how and when this knowledge and skills are used.
In the long run as OE becomes more understood and integrated in the system, I am confident that most commanders will see the potential and will take advantage of it.

Before closing, some words of caution are in order. The hasty or incorrect implementation of OE can be damaging. It is not a panacea and a gimmick for solving all of our problems. It is simply a powerful and useful technology that can be made available for our use. There is a danger of pushing too far and too fast because the successful use of OE involves people. It is not something done to them.

Some people in the Army are trying to second guess my sincerity. Others may be "buying in" because it appears to be a good horse to ride. This can get in the way of attaining any genuine success so we must change these attitudes.

I am committed to institutionalizing OE in the Army because I believe it will help us improve what we are already doing and have traditionally known what is right. It is an evolutionary effort, but we've got to do it with commitment and at a speed that is appropriate. Experience shows that when it is done right, it works.

I have emphasized two major parts of the OE effort: that which can be mandated - the development of a capability to do OE - and the voluntary part, the process itself.

We will be working with you and your people to obtain ideas and inputs for making the recommendations we need to proceed with institutionalizing OE, particularly in those areas to be mandated. If we do a good job in this area and pay attention to emphasizing quality at all levels, the understanding and acceptability of OE can be assured.

I want to close by again stressing that we are institutionalizing OE through the chain of command. Our purpose is to strengthen and improve organizational leadership and management within and between units in the furtherance of our overall mission.
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PREFACE

This concept paper was originally drafted in March 1977 by the OE Study Group. It was subsequently used as a reference during a 4-day planning conference, which was conducted by the study group, to develop the findings and recommendations pertaining to the institutionalization of OE in the Army.

It is intended that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, as the proponent agency for Army-wide OE matters, will use this paper as a guide for determining organization and staffing requirements in coordination with commands and Staff agencies. An earlier version of the paper was provided to this Army Staff agency and has informally served this purpose for about 2 months.

The final study group report was presented to the Chief of Staff on 7 April 1977 and resulted in a decision to establish a minimum required Army-wide OE capability on a time phased basis through 1st Quarter FY 79. An implementing message concerning OE structure and authorization was sent to the field on 25 May 1977 by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. In addition, a draft Army Regulation on OE has been prepared by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. This draft regulation is being staffed for publication in July 1977.

This paper has, therefore, been up-dated to reflect these and other related actions. Its contents are considered to be current through 1 June 1977 and valid, from the OESG viewpoint, as an appropriate concept for progressively establishing and sustaining OE organization and staffing during the next 2-3 years.

FRED W. SCHAUM
Major, GS
OESG
INTRODUCTION

The institutionalization of an Army-wide Organizational Effectiveness (OE) capability is a top priority Army goal. On 17 November 1976, the Chief of Staff established an OE Study Group (OESG) to analyze the present status of OE in the Army and to recommend a strategy and courses of action for accomplishing this goal. One of the OESG tasks is to develop this concept paper, outlining requirements for this capability, for distribution and staffing to Army Staff agencies and their staff support and field operating agencies.

OE is a term for the military application of a technology that is derived from successful leadership and command practices and the applied behavioral and management sciences. As such, this technology encompasses specialized knowledge, skills, and techniques that are made available to an organization through consulting services and the direct involvement of the chain of command.

OE consulting services are provided on a confidential basis to any interested unit by individuals who have received training in the application of this technology. These people, who are trained in a 16-week program at the US Army Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC), are designated with an additional skill identifier (5Z) for assignment to Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO) positions down to installation, division, and separate brigade levels.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a general concept and approach by which commands and Staff agencies can progressively build an OE capability beginning in 1977 and sustain this capability in the outyears. The main thrust is to convey the importance of rigorously analyzing staffing requirements and periodically (perhaps as frequent as semiannually) updating these requirements. This approach is considered essential for the following reasons:

1 - The technology of OE is relatively new to the Army and its state-of-the-art as applied to military organizations is in a formative stage. As such, lessons learned need to be systematically documented and reflected, as appropriate, in organization and staffing considerations.

2 - Until 1976 an identifiable OE capability has not existed in the Army, except in a few commands or Staff agencies which were involved in pilot projects. Functions now need to be identified and staff elements created on a broad scale in organizations where there has been essentially no prior understanding and use of the technology.

1Chief of Staff Memorandum 77-5-5, subject: Organizational Effectiveness, dated 9 February 1977.
3 - OE staff elements will of necessity have to be created out of existing resources during a period when the Army is facing manpower and budgetary reductions. This situation will require careful analysis on the part of each command and Staff agency before resources can be reallocated. It also requires acceptance of the idea that creating an OE capability is integral to mission accomplishment and responsive to the needs of commanders and managers at a variety of levels in the Army.

4 - In order to institutionalize an Army-wide OE capability, the establishment of OE staff elements and consistently filling them with adequately trained personnel requires working within existing force structure and personnel management systems. Since 1975 structure and staffing has been essentially accomplished on an ad-hoc basis with minimal Department of the Army guidance.

Department of the Army guidance on OE activities and training is contained in HQDA letter 600-76-2, dated 3 May 1976. This document, which is currently being revised for publication as an Army Regulation in 1977, and the draft regulation serve as a common reference and point of departure for this concept paper. An OE capability, according to current guidance, is generally interpreted as the assignment of one or more OE trained officers to a particular command or Staff agency.

The concept of an OE capability, which is presented in this paper, expands on this earlier guidance with a broader functional definition of OE. Guidelines are included for identifying necessary OE management and staff positions, personnel requirements, and educational/skill requirements based on an examination of OESO field experiences since early 1976. This more comprehensive approach is designed to ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to OE so the Army can fully benefit from OE methods and trained personnel.

This paper is not intended to be a definitive text on the technology of OE. It is assumed that each command or Staff agency possesses or can readily obtain a basic understanding of this technology and how it is being applied in the Army. It is essential that each organisation involved in this analysis obtain the assistance of OE trained individuals from a major command headquarters or HQDA so that it can proceed from a common technical frame of reference.

Section I of this paper provides essential background information. Chief of Staff guidance as well as experience and issues associated with OE staffing and field applications are highlighted. Section II contains a general description of 14 basic functions that are deemed essential for a quality OE capability to exist Army-wide. The extent to which these functions are applicable at different levels and are organized and staffed varies. Sections III & IV contain a suggested step-by-step method for determining appropriate staffing, skill, and educational levels for each function and position in any OE staff element.
SECTION I - BACKGROUND

A. HQDA GUIDANCE.

During the 1976 Army Commanders' Conference, the Chief of Staff discussed the importance of institutionalising Organizational Effectiveness (OE) as a technology and capability for strengthening and improving the Army. The following excerpts from his remarks provide the basis for establishing a comprehensive OE capability as a top priority goal:

"The goal is to institutionalize OE and to integrate it fully with our leadership and management process...the mandatory part of OE...includes such things as creating the spaces for OESOs (Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers); allocating funds; developing and publishing doctrine and policy; implementing education and training; and conducting follow-on research and evaluation. This mandatory part will require training and education not only for the OESOs but also for personnel in service schools and the chain of command in units."

Establishing an identifiable OE staff structure with adequately trained personnel to support all Army elements is, therefore, a mandatory requirement. In order for OE expertise to exist and be provided in a consistent and quality manner, a broad range of functions, as mentioned above, must be performed and supported at a variety of levels in the Army. These functions must meet command needs and be formally defined, organized, and staffed with a degree of uniformity and structural integrity. Furthermore, the chain of command must be sufficiently knowledgeable of how to optimally manage and use this capability.

In addition, the location of this capability at multiple levels in the Army is designed to provide coordinated OE technical assistance which respects the confidential aspects of OE consulting. Although staff proponency for Army-wide OE is vested in ODCSPER staff channels, there will be no centrally mandated OE program.

Currently the Army is annually training about 150 selected officers in the grades of CPT-LTC as OESOs. This is expected to increase in 1978 to an annual training output of 270 OESOs. These individuals are designated with an additional skill identifier (ASZ 52) and are subsequently assigned to staff positions down to installation, division, and separate brigades. Interim DA guidance of 3 May 1976 authorised commanders to establish a partial OE capability by requesting the assignment of, one or more OESOs and by redesignating spaces to 41ASZ within existing assets. Until 25 May 1977, this action was initiated on a
voluntary basis whereby the organization, staffing support, and use of OE trained personnel was left to the discretion of commanders. The initial restriction of awarding the ASI 5Z to only those individuals managed within the OPMS Personnel Management Specialty (SC41) was lifted. However, a process for redesignating spaces to ensure their alignment within this specialty has been established.

Although OE training has primarily focused on active duty officers, it is apparent that selected noncommissioned officers, DA civilians, and Reserve Component personnel will be involved in this training in the near future. Concept papers on this subject are being prepared by TRADOC in coordination with HQDA. Requirements for these personnel should, therefore, be considered and estimated when completing Sections III and IV of this paper.

B. EXPERIENCES.

Since December 1975 approximately 130 OESOs have been trained and assigned to various commands and Staff agencies in CONUS and overseas. Experience to date indicates the following:

1 - OE has had a major impact on users in a short period of time. Most military users see the utility of OE and once exposed in-depth usually ask for more. As a result OESO consulting and/or staff duties are full-time rather than part-time.

2 - OE is most useful when focused on mission related issues, especially in the areas of unit operations and management, staff management, installation management, and community development.

3 - OESOs are generally viewed as being well-trained. They have had the opportunity to use a wide variety of techniques to meet command needs and the application of the OE process varies. These findings are consistent with Department of the Army guidance which emphasizes the implementation of OE as a decentralized process which is tailored to a unit.

4 - OESOs, who work jointly on a temporary basis with management or human resources development specialists on specific projects, substantively contribute to a more comprehensive and effective approach to these related efforts.

5 - There is a need for OESOs to be assigned to higher headquarters (Corps, MACOM, and HQDA) to do staff and consulting work. The consulting assistance should be provided, on an as-required-basis, to subordinate organizations and to OESOs assigned to these organizations. This generally requires OESOs with higher levels of education and OE consulting experience with some limited augmentation by civilian consultants, who are selectively hired under contract by the using unit or with MACOM assistance.

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2The majority of these observations are substantiated by the results of Phase I of the OE Evaluation which is being conducted over a 3-year period by the OE Training Center at Fort Ord.
6 - OESOs are best assigned and utilized in teams rather than on an individual basis. This is especially apparent at large installations or in commands where units are widely separated geographically. The team approach is also necessitated by the demands of OE consulting which involve responding to multiple client relationships. The assignment of teams to a particular organization means having two or more OE trained individuals operating together. It does not mean that MILPERCEN should necessarily assign individuals in teams as they graduate from OETC.

7 - Commands and Staff agencies are in the best position to determine the most appropriate way to configure, support, and employ OE assets after conducting introductory OE activities with military OE consulting support. This does not eliminate the necessity for definitive Department of the Army guidance in the form of a regulation. It does indicate that each command and Staff agency has unique missions and structures (MTOE/TDA) which require a tailored OE capability.

8 - The optimal OE staffing for major command headquarters, divisions, installations, and some separate brigades or commands which are geographically dispersed appears to include the following: Four-six OE trained personnel (a mix of officers, NCOs, and DA civilians); one survey officer; and one clerk typist.

9 - In those instances where commanders have sought to fully exploit an OE capability for more than a year, it appears desirable to have additional staff personnel receive more indepth OE training (short of the 16-week OESOC) as a way of augmenting assigned OESOs. This augmentation has occurred in the following ways:

(a) Selecting and training individuals on a voluntary basis to serve as part-time interns under OESOs and/or civilian consultants on a specific project.

(b) Training full or part-time Leadership and Management Development Course (L&MDC) facilitators.

10 - Positioning of OE staff elements requires considerations over and above the straightforward placement of OE trained personnel within an ODCSPER/G1/DPCA organization. In general, OESOs should be located in the staff where they can be highly responsive to user units.

C. ISSUES.

The following are the dominant issues which must be resolved if the Army is to establish a quality OE capability.

1 - OE staffing is ad hoc with serious shortfalls in trained personnel.

This particular issue has three facets: (a) An OE capability has been typically interpreted to be the assignment of at least one OESO in accordance with interim Department of the Army guidance which was published on 3 May 1976. This policy was adopted to meet initial command requests
for OE trained personnel and as a means of gaining some field experience with OESOs before committing additional assets. The HQDA message of 25 May 1977 on OE Structure and Authorization expands on this guidance by requiring a minimum OE capability according to the rule of thumb of two OESOs per division and installation and one per separate brigade. The range of functions that need to be performed exceed the workload capabilities of OESOs who are assigned under this policy. This is especially apparent at HQDA, in MACOM headquarters, and in combat development, training development, and instructor positions within TRADOC.

(b) The current estimate of Army-wide requirements for OESOs in full-time consulting positions is 360. This is a rough estimate which was not necessarily based on any rigorous analysis of the functions that must be accomplished at each level and the associated personnel, educational, and skill requirements. Hence, the functions which are described under Section III of this paper have not been well-defined under mission/function statements.

(c) OESO assignment priorities have initially focused on field commands, such as FORSCOM and USAREUR. There is, therefore, an understandable shortfall of experienced OE trained personnel to accomplish critical policy, doctrine, training, and research functions in TRADOC and HQDA. This imbalance seriously constrains the long-term quality of OE efforts and the rate at which a substantive Army-wide capability can be established. Although this shortfall might be simply rectified by changes in OETC quotas and OESO assignments, corrective action should proceed on the basis of a thorough functional analysis.

2 - Commands and Staff agencies are reluctant to internally reconfigure existing resources and spaces to support OE functions without straightforward guidance from higher headquarters and a clear opportunity to obtain relief from pursuing other functions/activities. OE is typically viewed as another additional mission which must be supported with existing assets. For the most part, this mission tends to be narrowly and incorrectly perceived as a new form of "human relations" training rather than as a consulting capability that broadly supports all functional areas in a command. Initial DA guidance, which was recently revised, only permitted redesignation of existing spaces to OESO positions from within the personnel management area. This narrow focus within which tradeoffs were first identified tended to precipitate undue pressure on personnel programs, such as RR/EO, and misperceptions about the nature and applicability of OE. Since no additional officer spaces are available from HQDA for OE positions, commands and Staff agencies will remain hard pressed to provide more than nominal support unless a firm priority is established and followed by HQDA and the major commands.
3 - The officer personnel management system does not, as a matter of routine, intensively manage the assignment of individuals who have educational background in OE and related areas of behavioral science. Although this is beginning to change with the use of the ASI 5Z, there is a pervasive underutilization of people who have advanced degrees or have taken short courses in this area. Many of these people, if identified and given some additional OE training, could capably perform as OE managers or staff personnel. There are four aspects of this issue.

(a) Current attempts to educate senior officers (O5 and above) in OE concepts have not been entirely successful. The majority of these educational efforts have been ad hoc in nature and of short duration (1-2 days) to meet immediate command needs. As a result, many managers who have direct staff responsibility for OE have received little more than a basic introduction to the technology as well as the skills and capabilities of the OESO. These management positions, which require more indepth knowledge, are especially critical at the MACOM and HQDA level. As OE becomes more integral to the service school system this situation is expected to diminish. However, there will be a continuing need to ensure that key management positions are filled by individuals who possess a requisite degree of knowledge and experience by which they can manage and guide OE functions. Until these positions are identified and coded for education/skill levels, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to assign qualified individuals to these positions and for TRADOC to design appropriate OE management instruction.

(b) Selected OE staff and management positions have not been uniformly validated for graduate degrees through the AERB process. In the past commands or Staff agencies have not emphasized this requirement or have requested blanket validations for all OE positions. Both approaches result in a significant shortfall of expertise and an impossible situation for personnel managers. A careful balance must be achieved by selectively identifying and validating these positions and consistently filling them with qualified personnel. Advanced degree requirements for these positions primarily exist in HQDA, TRADOC, and other MACOM headquarters. Advanced degrees, however, are alone insufficient to qualify an individual as an OE consultant.

(c) There is a need for reutilization and, in some instances during the next 1-2 years, repetitive OE assignments for selected individuals within the overall framework of an Army-wide OE capability. This need has not been formally recognized, although it is implied by having this capability at multiple levels in the Army and the current shortage of OE trained personnel. Quality OE expertise and experience can only be cultivated by a healthy interplay between OE management, staff, and consulting assignments. Opportunities should be provided throughout an individual's career for assignments in a primary specialty and continuing OE training and education.
(d) There is a critical need to assure more timely assignments of OE trained personnel and their utilization for a 2-year period in OE positions. Intensive personnel management of quality OE trained personnel cannot be achieved on a consistent basis until: (1) An appropriate number of spaces are designated and documented for OE positions, (2) Commands routinely submit personnel requisitions against these positions, and (3) Assignment priorities and utilization guidelines are formally established and followed. Intensive personnel management is primarily a function of assignment policies and actions in commands and Staff agencies and not simply a MILPERCEN responsibility.

4 - The introduction and development of an OE capability tends to be passive and frustrated at various levels in the Army. There is a widely held perception that OE has the potential of becoming a "stovepipe program" given the recent history of centrally directed and administered programs that have evolved in the Army. Although HQDA guidance has consistently prohibited a "stovepipe" approach, there is considerable diversity of opinion as to what constitutes a "stovepipe" and what is permissible to energize and manage an OE capability. In some instances, staff elements have restricted OESOs to performing only staff work and have viewed consulting as an operational function which is outside the purview of the organization's responsibilities. The manner in which OE consulting is done virtually guarantees that a "stovepipe" will be avoided, i.e., commanders initiate requests for OE consulting assistance on a voluntary basis and the specifics of any consulting work is kept confidential. If an OE capability is to be adequately developed and managed, then OESO staff visits to subordinate organizations and joint consulting activities with other OESOs in these units should be permitted. This is especially critical if technical information channels are to be open and well-coordinated.

5 - There is some confusion about the role and staff assignments of OESOs. The source of this confusion is understandable at this early stage of introducing OE into the Army and is comprised of more than one element.

(a) The OESO is a consultant and not an inspector or an efficiency expert.

(b) The OESO focuses on organizational processes and not just human relations. Although OE has been functionally located in the area of human resources development, the OESO is not intended to replace or be interchangeable with Equal Opportunity or Drug/Alcohol Abuse personnel.

(c) The OESO is trained as a consultant and not an HRD manager. As such, his or her services are intended to be widely used in support of any organization and mission requirement.

(d) Some OESOs are being reassigned without regard to the need for them to complete a 2-year utilization tour. While selection for command,
attendance at senior service schools, and reassignments for compassionate reasons should take precedence, there are other conflicting assignment priorities that can undermine attempts to launch an Army-wide OE capability.
SECTION II - ARMY-WIDE OE CAPABILITY

The previous section of this paper highlighted current experiences and issues relative to establishing an Army-wide OE capability. This section is devoted to outlining the primary characteristics of this capability from a systems perspective. It is intended to convey some of the complexities involved in creating and sustaining a structural base for delivering OE expertise to the Army.

A. Two primary systems are described - an OE Support System and an OE Operational/Field System - and six guidelines are offered to provide general structure and staffing criteria for each of these systems. It is readily apparent that the Army possess sufficient organizational arrangements and resources to support an OE capability. The challenge lies in positioning OE trained personnel in these existing systems and managing a complex array of organizational relationships within and across these systems.

OE SUPPORT SYSTEM. This system, as shown in figure 1, consists of organizational elements which can provide primary support for OE policy, doctrine, training, education, personnel selection and assignment, and research. It is principally defined by selected HQDA Staff agencies and their respective field operating agencies, the Training and Doctrine Command, and ODCSPER staff elements in the major commands. The US Military Academy and the Army War College are also included as well as certain command specific training/educational facilities. The figure is a way of looking at the critical components of this system. It is simply suggestive of the types of organizations and network of relationships that exist or need to be developed.
OE OPERATIONAL/FIELD SYSTEM. This system, as shown in figure 2, is comprised of commands and Staff agencies and their subordinate elements which provide direct OE consulting support to user units. In some instances, elements of both the support and operational/field system will co-exist within a command, such as TRADOC, or will overlap between commands, such as FORSCOM units on TRADOC installations. Coordination of OE resources and an OE technical network within and between these subsystems is a major management responsibility.

Each command or Staff agency has a unique mission. There are important differences in how they are organized and managed; the technologies and personnel they employ to accomplish varied missions; and their geographical locations. Although ODCSPER OE staff elements in the major commands provide a focal point for the management of OE consulting in these systems, it is important to carefully tailor the organization and staffing of OE consulting elements to address the unique needs and differences of each command. For example, DARCOM's needs and requirements are decidedly different from FORSCOM's.

This diagram is also not intended to be all inclusive. It only suggests the scope and complexity of relationships that need to be considered in managing this diverse system. For example, ODCSPER and its field operating agency, MILPERCEN, have full-time OESOs. As other HQDA Staff agencies become involved in OE activities, it is expected that they will follow a similar pattern with assignment of OE trained personnel to their respective organizations.
SECTION II - ARMY-WIDE CAPABILITY

B. The following characteristics of an identifiable and fully operational OE capability at multiple levels in the Army provide the basic structure and staffing criteria for each of these systems:

(1) The application of the OE process and methods is conducted on a voluntary and decentralized basis and tailored to the specific needs of user organizations.

(2) OE as a staff function is principally located and managed within the highest level Staff agency responsible for the personnel management function, e.g., ODCSPER, GI, DPCA staff elements. However, if a commander so elects, the OE staff may be located in the Office of the Chief of Staff or Office of the Commander. The only major exception to this criterion would be in instruction, combat development, and training development functions in TRADOC.

(3) An OE capability consists of a staff element that is organized and staffed with:
   a. Appropriate spaces which are allocated to support all identifiable OE functional requirements and are documented in MTOE/TDAs, and TAADS.
   b. Positions that are described and coded for required duties, skills, education, experience, and grade levels, to include advanced degrees where appropriate. These positions cover management, staff, faculty, consulting, and administrative/technical support requirements and reflect the type of personnel (officer, NCO, civilian) desired to fill these positions.
   c. A minimum of two or more OE trained personnel who are assigned to full-time OE consulting positions. This does not preclude commanders from consolidating OE consulting assets into a single staff element at installation or division levels. It does preclude consolidation of all OE assets at Corps or MACOM levels and the assignment of only one OESO to a unit.

(4) Selected HQDA and MACOM OE trained personnel are permitted to provide direct consulting support to subordinate organizations and other OESOs, on a request basis, and can maintain formal and informal technical information channels.

(5) Limited numbers of OE trained personnel may be positioned in staff functions other than personnel management. This includes additional personnel, with OE related skills such as L&NDC trainers, who are trained and used to augment a command's primary OE capability as part of their normal duty requirements.
OE consulting capabilities are mutually reinforcing and are positioned to be used broadly across a variety of functional areas in direct support of mission requirements.

In summary, the establishment of a fully operational Army-wide OE capability depends on a comprehensive identification of structure and staffing requirements in two major systems: OE Support System and OE Operational/Field System. Implied is the necessity for clearly specifying control and coordinating relationships between these organizational elements. Of equal importance is the necessity to actively manage OE expertise and resources across the boundaries of these systems to avoid a narrow approach to utilizing these scarce assets. The OE functional analysis which is presented in the next section provides a mechanism for accomplishing these requirements.
SECTION III - FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

The 14 OE functions defined in this section must be performed if the Army is to have an institutionalized OE capability. The extent to which these functions apply at various levels within commands and Staff agencies varies.

A. SUGGESTED SEQUENCE.

A suggested guide for conducting a comprehensive functional analysis consists of the following series of steps using the list of OE functions and an OE Capability Worksheet #1, which follow.

STEP 1 - Identify which of the 14 functions apply in whole or in part to a particular organization.

STEP 2 - Briefly describe these functions as they pertain to the organization's level of responsibility.

STEP 3 - Estimate the number of man-years required to perform each function, e.g., .3 man-years, 1 man-year, 1.3 man-years.

STEP 4 - Specify under the projected man-years for each function the breakout of officer, NCO, and/or civilian man-years. The total of these categories for each function should equal the total man-year estimate. For example, POLICY/PLANS = 3 man-years (two officers; none NCOs; and one civilian).

STEP 5 - Identify the office where each function is located or would be performed. Once the functional analysis is completed a personnel analysis should be completed as described in Section IV.

B. OE FUNCTIONS.

1. POLICY AND PLANS. The development, coordination, and execution of written guidance and plans pertaining to all or a portion of OE functions.

2. DOCTRINE. The development of operational concepts which are derived from study, research, test and evaluation to guide the use of OE in the Army both managerially and technically.

3. TRAINING. The conduct of OE education and skill development activities within formally established service school curricula and in the field. This includes a training development function which is designed to translate OE concepts into instructional modules and training aids and materials.

4. RESEARCH/STUDIES. The conduct, coordination, monitorship, or review of scientific or quasi-scientific inquiries pertaining to the state of the art of OE, evaluation of the impact of OE efforts, and related aspects of behavioral science in the Army.
5. **ASSESSMENT.** The conduct of indepth examinations of various organizations using computer assisted survey or other OE assessment techniques and/or management type evaluations of specific OE activities or functions.

6. **INFORMATION.** The development of staff papers, articles, case studies or similar material pertaining to OE. This function also may include briefings, presentations, and activities in support of an OE technical network.

7. **BUDGET AND CONTRACTING.** The development and management of the budgetary and contracting aspects of OE functions. Each command and Staff agency must determine its own needs and budget accordingly through normal channels. In some instances it may be desirable to obtain the services of civilian consultants. This requires the preparation of technical statements of work in coordination with local budget and contracting offices and individuals to coordinate and support the activities of civilian consultants.

8. **CONSULTING.** This function encompasses the full spectrum of primary OESO duties that are designed to provide knowledge, skills, and techniques to user units and organizations. The OESO usually works in two capacities - as an internal consultant in the unit to which he or she is assigned and as an external consultant outside of his or her parent unit. This function should be analyzed carefully to avoid underutilizing or overcommitting OE trained personnel. Criteria, such as the number, size, and geographical separation of potential user units and the complexity of systems and problems govern the scope of this function as well as the desired expertise/experience/grade level of assigned OE personnel. In some instances OE trained personnel may be required to perform instructional and OE staff duties in addition to consulting. These requirements are normally found at HQDA, MACOM headquarters, and in service schools, where OE expertise is needed as an integral part of teaching or staff work.

9. **SELECTION AND ASSIGNMENT.** Certain OE staff elements must devote time to this function, in addition to MILPERCEN and the normal personnel staffs that handle assignment actions. For example, nominations for individuals to attend OETC can be made by the field and the placement of OESOs within the command should be consistent with current and projected OE activities. In addition, this function may include periodic reviews of OE staffing within a command, updating pertinent TO&E/TDA documents, and validation of positions for graduate degrees under the AERP process.

10. **INSTRUCTION.** Commands and Staff agencies usually conduct periodic OE short courses which require full or part-time instructor support. Although instructors for these courses such as the 5-day Leadership and Management Development Course (L&MDC), require competence in certain OE skills, all of the instructors do not need to be OETC graduates. This instructional function, which pertains to a non-service school situation, should be closely analysed and staffed to avoid using an OESO as a full-time instructor rather than as a consultant.
11. **JOINT COORDINATION.** Other services, such as the Navy and Air Force, Federal Government agencies, and civilian universities are involved with OE type training and activities. In this regard, there is a need by some Staff agencies to maintain liaison with these organizations and participate in joint activities, such as conferences or symposia.

12. **CONFERENCES.** This function includes work related to the design and conduct of conferences.

13. **LONG TERM PROJECTS.** This function involves the selective assignment and retention of individuals in positions where extraordinary requirements exist to oversee the design, text and development, and introduction of some aspect of OE technology into the Army. Continuity, technical expertise, and interorganizational coordination are critical to these positions.

14. **PROFESSIONAL TRAINING.** This function involves planning and coordination of civilian education and training (advanced degrees or short courses) for OESOs and OE managers, accreditation of individuals who have prior OE related experience and do not need to attend the full course at OETC; or the conduct of professional development seminars for OESOs.
OE CAPABILITY WORKSHEET #1

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

ORGANIZATION COMPLETING WORKSHEET:

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<td>11. JOINT COORDINATION</td>
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<td>12. CONFERENCES</td>
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<td>13. PROJECT MGT</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
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</table>
SECTION IV - PERSONNEL ANALYSIS

The attached worksheets are designed to identify appropriate OE personnel requirements and personnel on hand, respectively. The purpose is to fit numbers of qualified personnel with the previously identified functions.

A. The number of people required to manage, perform, and support each function identified under Section III should be indicated on OE Capability Worksheet #2 next under. Clerical and administrative personnel should also be listed.

STEP 1 - Indicate the appropriate title for each position and the number of people required.

STEP 2 - Specify whether these should be officer, NCO, or civilian personnel and their preferred grade levels.

STEP 3 - Using the skill and education codes at the bottom of the worksheet, specify those which are applicable for each position. If educational level codes D&E are used, indicate whether or not the positions have been AERB validated. If requests have been made for validation, comment on the status of the requests.

B. OE Capability Worksheet #3 would be completed in a similar manner to indicate personnel authorized and on hand. An indication would be made concerning whether or not a personnel requisition has been submitted for those positions which are not filled and the status of the requisitions.

Together the completed functional and personnel analysis worksheets would provide a more refined estimate of current and projected requirements. Consolidated information could then be made available at MACOM headquarters and at HQDA to identify shortfalls and assist in planning.
## OE CAPABILITY WORKSHEET #2

**PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS**

**MAJOR COMMAND:**

**ORGANIZATION AND UIC:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION TITLE</th>
<th>NUMBER REQ</th>
<th>OFF/NCO/CIV</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>OE SKILL LEVEL</th>
<th>EDUCATIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### SKILL CODE

- **0** - No Knowledge of OE
- **1** - General Knowledge of OE
- **2** - OE Basic or Related Skills, e.g., Instructor or Intern
- **3** - OE Trained (OETC Graduate or Equivalent)
- **4** - OE Trained With 1 or More Years of Actual Experience

### EDUCATION CODE

- **A** - Civilian/Military Short Courses on OE
- **B** - Some College
- **C** - College Graduate
- **D** - Masters Degree
- **E** - PhD

*Specify AERB Status*
OE CAPABILITY WORKSHEET #3

PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED AND ON HAND

MAJOR COMMAND:

ORGANIZATION AND UIC:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MTOE/TDA LINE NUMBER</th>
<th>POSITION TITLE</th>
<th>NUMBER AUTH</th>
<th>O/H</th>
<th>OFF/WCO/CIV</th>
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<td>COMMENTS</td>
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2 - OE Basic or Related Skills, e.g., Instructor or Intern
3 - OE Trained (OETC Graduate or Equivalent)
4 - OE Trained With 1 or More Years of Actual Experience

**EDUCATION CODE**

A - Civilian/Military Short Courses on OE
B - Some College
C - College Graduate
D - Masters Degree*
E - PhD*

#Specify AERB Status
SECTION V - OE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS SEQUENCE

A. The purpose of this section is to provide a summary outline of a sequence of events for shifting from an ad hoc determination of OE Structure and staffing to a process based on systematic analysis and review. The attached diagram is an attempt to portray the main activities and actions and to indicate the use of this concept paper in this process.

The boxed-in portion of the diagram reflects the current area of focus. The HQDA message on OE Structure and Authorization (25 May 1977) and concept papers on the roles of NCO's and DA civilians set the stage for moving toward the systematic analysis and review process. The objective is to progressively determine the minimum required OE capability for the Army over a 2-3 year period. As the structural requirements are refined and up-dated, this process will facilitate establishing training requirements, normalizing assignment actions for OE trained personnel within existing personnel management and career programs, and making necessary revisions to OE education activities.

Throughout this sequence the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is the focal HQDA Staff agency as the proponent for Army-wide OE matters. Assisted by the General Officer OE Steering Committee, ODCSPER is expected to proceed with this process in close coordination with major commands and other Staff agencies and with feedback obtained from the results of the OE evaluation, which is being conducted by the OETC from 1977-80.
MEMORANDUM

U. S. ARMY

SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness

MEMORANDUM FOR: HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES

1. PURPOSE. This memorandum assigns responsibilities for actions directed by the Chief of Staff at a briefing by the Organizational Effectiveness Study Group (OESG) on 22 December 1976.

2. REFERENCES.

3. BACKGROUND.
   a. On 17 November 1976, the CSA established the OESG to analyze the present status of organizational effectiveness (OE) in the Army and develop recommendations on methods for institutionalizing OE throughout the Army. Reference 2b announced the establishment of this Study Group.
   b. On 30 November 1976, in comments to the Army Commanders' Conference, the CSA reviewed the status of OE in the Army. During this review he distinguished between the voluntary and mandatory aspects of institutionalizing OE, emphasizing that the implementation should be evolutionary with personal commitment and appropriate speed.
   c. On 22 December 1976, the OESG conducted a briefing for the CSA to describe activities to date and discuss preliminary findings. During this briefing the CSA discussed the role of the DCSPER General Officer OE Steering Committee and the importance of institutionalizing OE through the chain of command. The possibility of a second commanders' conference later in 1977 with the need to include OE as a key topic, was also discussed.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES.
   a. The OESG will --
      (1) Develop a draft concept paper, outlining requirements for an
SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness

Army-wide OE capability, to be distributed to Army Staff agencies and their
staff support and field operating agencies for staffing.

(2) Develop a time-phased plan which outlines the steps and pro-
cedures required to institutionalize OE in the Army.

b. The Director of Management, OCSA, will establish a capability
within OCSA for OE consulting on the Army Staff and to advise the CSA on
the progress of this effort.

c. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) will --

(1) Compile a list of key management and staff positions at various
headquarters which require knowledge of OE and identify personnel who by
reason of civilian education, training, or experience, qualify for assignment
to those key positions NLT 28 February 1977.

(2) Prepare a DA Pamphlet on OE by 30 March 1977.

(3) Prepare an OE regulation to replace reference 2a by 1 April 1977.

(4) Begin to assign the most qualified officers available to staff
the positions identified in (1) above.

(5) In coordination with OCLL, prepare material to inform Congress
of Army OE efforts.

d. The Chief of Public Affairs, OSA, has been requested by separate
correspondence to develop, in coordination with ODCSPER (HRL), a plan to
inform the Army of the OE program.

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

WILLIAM B. FULTON
Lieutenant General, GS
Director of the Army Staff

SUSPENSE:
OESG--1 Apr 77--para 4a(1)
1 Apr 77--para 4a(2)
ODCSPER--28 Feb 77--para 4c(1)
30 Mar 77--para 4c(2)
1 Apr 77--para 4c(3)

CF:
CPA
CLL
DM, OCSA

C-2
MEMORANDUM FOR: HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness Study Group (OESG) - Final Report and Briefing for CSA

1. On 7 April 1977 the OESG conducted its final briefing and presented a draft final report for CSA approval. The attached Memorandum For Record summarizes the content of the briefing and subsequent CSA decisions relative to institutionalizing OE in the Army.

2. On 20 April 1977 the OESG conducted a briefing for the Army Staff Council. During this briefing the CSA elaborated on his decisions of 7 April and emphasized the importance of a substantive and long-term commitment of both personnel and resources to ensure the accomplishment of this goal. Copies of the OESG draft final report were furnished to you or your representative at this meeting.

3. A CSM is being prepared by the Director of Management based on CSA guidance and the OESG report. The attached MFR serves as an interim tasking document until the CSM is published. CSM 77-5-5, subject: Organizational Effectiveness, dated 9 February 1977 specifies certain actions and responsibilities as a result of a CSA briefing on 22 December 1976 by the OESG. This CSM will remain in effect.

4. The OESG draft report is being reviewed and edited for publication in June 1977.

5. Request ODCSPER furnish each major command a copy of the attached MFR under an appropriate letter of transmittal.

[Signature]
JOHN R. McNELLYERT
Lieutenant General, GS
Director of the Army Staff

C-3
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness Study Group Briefing for CSA

1. On 7 April 1977 a briefing was conducted for the CSA by the Organizational Effectiveness Study Group (OESG). Present were General Rogers, MG Trefry, BG Vuono, MAJ Cavedo, LTC Hord, and the OESG members (LTC Nadal, LTC Ray and MAJ Schaum).

2. The OESG was organized on 17 November 1977 by the CSA with the charter of assessing the status of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) activities Army wide and recommending a strategy and specific actions for institutionalizing OE. Interim DA guidance and background information on this subject are currently provided in HQDA Letter 600-76-2, subject: Army-wide OE Activities and Training.

3. The OESG presented the following points:

   a. Institutionalization of OE will ultimately be accomplished by high quality, well-trained OE staff officers working with commanders who understand the OE process.

   b. Specific actions need to be taken to create the conditions for institutionalizing OE. These actions focus principally in three areas:

      (1) Selecting and properly training high quality officers for duty as OESOs.

      (2) Ensuring that commanders and staff officers at all levels understand the purpose and functions of OE and the OESO.

      (3) Developing and filling selective staff structures to support OE activities.

4. The following actions were directed by the CSA:

   a. The DCSPER will implement the OESG plan as approved. (Action: DAS)

   b. Manpower spaces for institutionalizing OE on the Army Staff and the OESO School will be made available. (Action: DCSOPS)
SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness Study Group Briefing for CSA

1. MACOMs will be required to convert and identify a total of approximately 363 spaces to OESO's with no additional duties (based upon rule of thumb of two per division/installation, one per separate brigade or equivalent.) (Action: DCSPER/DCSOPS)

d. An OE branch will be established within OCSA-DM to provide OE consulting services to the Army Staff. (Action: DM)

e. Director of Management will identify and assist in providing the necessary spaces to support an OE division within ODCSPER. (Action: DM and DCSPER)

f. A memo to CG MILPERCEN will be prepared expressing CSA desires concerning the priority for selection and assignments of OESOs and key OE staff managers. (Action: DM)

g. A memo will be prepared for DCSRDA emphasizing CSA desires that OE research be adequately supported at all levels and receive appropriate priority. (Action: DM)

h. DCSPER will ensure that appropriate OE positions are validated for graduate education. (Action: DCSPER)

i. TRADOC will investigate the most appropriate manner for educating senior officers on OE. (Action: TRADOC)

j. TRADOC will brief CSA on plans for introducing OE and OE related instruction into the service schools. (Action: TRADOC)

k. A study will be conducted to determine the feasibility of fencing personnel research money from other research monies and including these funds in the DCSPER budget. (Action: COA)

I. That the OESG brief the Army Staff Council on 20 April. (Action: OESG)

CARL E. VUONO
Brigadier General, USA
Executive to the Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR: HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES

1. PURPOSE. This memorandum assigns responsibilities for actions directed by the Chief of Staff (CSA) at the final briefing by the Organizational Effectiveness Study Group (OESG) on 7 April 1977 and the Army Staff Council Meeting on 20 April 1977.

2. REFERENCES.
   c. CSM 77-5-5, dated 9 February 1977, subject: Organizational Effectiveness.
   d. Memorandum for Record, DACS-ZA, dated 12 April 1977, subject: Organizational Effectiveness Study Group Briefing for CSA.

3. BACKGROUND.
   a. The OESG was organized on 17 November 1977 by the CSA with the charter of assessing the status of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) activities Army-wide and for recommending a strategy to include specific actions for institutionalizing OE. Interim DA guidance and background information on this subject are provided in reference 2a.
   b. The OESG final briefing to the CSA on 7 April 1977 emphasized the following points:
      (1) Institutionalization of OE will ultimately be accomplished by high quality, well-trained OE staff officers (OESO) working with commanders knowledgeable of the OE process.
SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness

(2) Specific actions need to be taken to create the conditions for institutionalizing OE. These actions are focused in the following three areas:

(a) Properly selecting and training high quality officers for duty as OESOs.

(b) Ensuring that commanders and staff officers at all levels understand the purpose and functions of OE and the OESO.

(c) Developing and filling selected staff positions to support OE activities.

c. On 20 April 1977, the OESG conducted a briefing for the Army Staff Council. During this briefing the CSA emphasized that the commitment to institutionalize OE Army-wide was a high priority goal. The CSA indicated that this is a long-term complex task requiring—

(1) Substantive allocation of both personnel and resources.

(2) Continued emphasis on quality.

(3) Creative use of this OE capability by knowledgeable senior officers and noncommissioned officers.

(4) Retention of the OE Training Center (OETC) as an integral part of the service school system with the highest quality staff and faculty, curriculum, and facilities.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES,

a. DCSPER will—

(1) Implement the OESG plan and recommendations pertaining to ODCSPER contained in the OESG final report as approved by the CSA.

(2) Provide Army policy guidance, in coordination with ODCSOPS, requiring the MACOMs to identify and convert approximately 363 spaces to dedicated positions for OESOs. These spaces will constitute a minimum Army-wide OE capability. Subsequent revisions of this capability, which should include noncommissioned officers, civilian personnel, and Reserve Component personnel, will be made in accordance with the OESG report.

(3) Establish, in coordination with CG MILPERCEN, a sufficiently high priority for the selection and assignment of OESOs and key OE staff managers so that the Army-wide OE capability will be continuously staffed with quality personnel who are fully knowledgeable of OE.
SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness

(4) Ensure OE research is adequately managed and supported at all levels and receives appropriate priority so that all facets of OE activities and training can receive the full benefit of Army scientific expertise.

(5) Validate and maintain appropriate OE positions for graduate education so that policy, doctrine, education, training, evaluation, and research functions are staffed with personnel who have in-depth OE experience and knowledge.

(6) Provide Army Staff coordination for and monitorship of Army-wide OE training and education, to include educational activities conducted outside the service school system as well as those involving senior officers.

(7) As the Army Staff proponent agency, establish and support an OE Division in ODCSPER to provide an adequate level of focus and emphasis for Army-wide OE matters.

(8) Establish an OE technical support system and provide appropriate guidance for managing and sustaining this system, especially with those agencies and organizations which are not under the normal purview of OE staff elements.

(9) Plan and conduct periodic in-process reviews (IPR) relative to the OESG report and specific elements thereof. This will include update briefings for the CSA, on an as required basis but no less frequently than quarterly. The General Officer OE Steering Committee will continue to be the principal coordinating and review mechanism for both the Army Staff and MACOMs.

b. DCSOPS will—

(1) Provide manpower spaces for institutionalizing OE on the Army Staff (an OE Division in ODCSPER and a staff element in the Management Directorate) and the Organizational Effectiveness Training Center.

(2) Provide Army policy guidance, in coordination with ODCSPER (a(2) above), for the conversion and establishment of approximately 363 spaces as the minimum required Army-wide OE capability.

(3) Augment HQDA and MACOM headquarters OE staff elements with MOBDES personnel to support OE planning and implementation activities for the Reserve Components.

c. DCSRDA will ensure OE research is adequately supported and receives an appropriate priority to sustain the research.

d. COA will conduct a study to determine the feasibility of separating personnel research money from other research monies and, if possible, include these funds in the ODCSPER budget.
SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness

e. The Director of the Army Staff will—

(1) Ensure the Army Policy Council is briefed by the OESG at a time deemed appropriate by the CSA.

(2) Develop a plan for the implementation and conduct of OE activities within the Army Staff during FY 78.

(3) Determine and implement the most appropriate method and means for providing OE instruction to selected general officers and BG designees.

f. DM, OCSA will—

(1) Establish a staff element within OCSA (Management Directorate) of OE trained personnel headed by an O-6 to provide OE consulting services to the Army Staff.

(2) Assist in providing the necessary spaces to support an OE Division within ODCSPER.

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

JOHN R. McGINNIS
Lieutenant General, GS
Director of the Army Staff

CF:
DM, OCSA
ANNEX D

The Evolution of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) in the Army

The purposes of this annex are to briefly summarize some of the major advancements in management and behavioral science which are integral to the technology of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) and to present a thumbnail historical sketch of how Organizational Effectiveness (OE) has evolved in the Army. It is against this historical backdrop that OEBO Study can be put into context as another step in a long-term process of assimilating this technology in the military.

In the broadest sense the Army's involvement with OE represents an institutional desire to (1) more systematically understand the human forces which shape the efforts of large military organizations and (2) decisively act on this understanding in ways which simultaneously improve combat readiness and the motivation, involvement, commitment, and development of people.

Technology Advancements.

Since the 1950's advancements in the fields of management and applied behavioral science have provided the foundation for OE concepts, methods, and skills. Pressures for societal and institutional change in the 1960's provided the conditions for expanding the application of this knowledge. Six of the more significant advancements are as follows:

1. The application of management and behavioral science knowledge has become more integrated and reflects a blend of study, research, and successful leadership practices. The net effect is a more comprehensive, sophisticated, and balanced treatment of human and organizational factors in work settings. For example, the personality-trait approach to understanding leadership has evolved into a contingency or situational approach. The contingency approach recognizes that a variety of leadership styles are equally effective depending on the nature of an organization, tasks, and the circumstances surrounding each at a particular point in time. The impact has been to reduce preoccupation with simplistic descriptions of leadership styles, e.g., autocratic-democratic, and shift the focus to ways of creating better conditions under which people are more productive and satisfied in the pursuit of an organization's goals. Other concepts are advancing new knowledge and research with a systems approach to organizations. Briefly some of these are as follows: Social-technical systems theory stresses the importance of understanding and dealing with all aspects of an organization, function, or task in terms of two highly interdependent subsystems—social and technical; Differentiation-integration theory focuses on the importance of achieving an effective fit between the nature and structure of work, human needs, 

and an organization's environment; the Linking Pin concept views organizations as an array of interdependent groups (teams) which are linked together by managers (chain of command) and considers organizational performance as dependent on a variety of intervening human processes as well as management behavior and available resources, such as money and material; General Systems Theory (GST) is the study of the general properties and laws governing systems and represents the most theoretical advancement of the state-of-the art.

2. Knowledge about group dynamics has been expanded to an organization-wide focus with concepts and techniques for better understanding and facilitating organization change. Terms such as organizational processes, organizational climate, force field analysis, open-systems planning, and team building exemplify this advancement both conceptually and operationally. Team building, for example, offers practical small group methods for more systematically applying the Army leadership principle "Train Your Unit as a Team." The impact has been the development of practical concepts and methods for dealing more effectively with the dynamic properties of organizations, especially leader-subordinate and work group relationships within and between organizations.

3. The laboratory model of education or experiential learning, as it is frequently called, is another major improvement which is based on adult learning principles and relies on small group teaching methods. This approach to learning emphasizes active participant involvement in exercises or experiences which are designed to accomplish specific learning and behavioral goals. This "learning by doing" method allows participants to assume more individual responsibility for structuring their learning environment and pursuing educational objectives. The effect is a more intense and personalized educational experience that leads to a greater internalization of new knowledge, skills, and behavior.

4. An operational process called Action Research and trainable skills for employing this process were developed to broaden the involvement of people at various organizational levels in system-wide assessment and improvement actions. This process is typically used by managers with the assistance of qualified consultants to promote constructive long-term improvements; increase an organization's flexibility for dealing with planned and unexpected change; and increase people's commitment to needed change. Action Research is essentially an adaptation of the scientific method for direct use by management. This is in contrast to traditional methods used by researchers or expert consultants who independently analyze and study a problem, develop recommendations, and then have to sell their recommendations to the organization.

5. The use of experiential learning methods in actual work situation is another major advancement. This methodology is designed to create

2/Adult learning concepts and principles are referred to as androgogy and are described in a book called A Trainer's Guide to Androgogy by Malcolm Knowles.
more favorable conditions for reinforcing new knowledge, skills, and methods which were initially acquired through management development and training programs. This advancement is in direct response to the discovery that an individual's work environment plays a significant role in determining the extent to which newly acquired knowledge, skills, and methods are put into practice. The term Organisational Development (OD) was coined to distinguish this on-the-job process from traditional training programs and to emphasize the importance of the human dimensions of organizations.

6. Another major advancement is organization-wide methods which assist decisionmakers to analyze and improve a variety of processes (communications, decisionmaking, planning and goal setting, motivation/reward, conflict management, etc.) which affect the ability of an organization to accomplish its mission. Methods, such as survey feedback, management by objectives, and job enrichment, typically have an organization-wide focus; emphasize the integration of individual and organizational needs; and provide a capability to treat these organizational processes as distinctly human and dynamic in nature rather than resorting to abstract mechanical notions about how organizations function.

These advancements are esoteric and their description in this paper is admittedly brief. The point is that they collectively indicate the beginning of a major change in the way we view organizations and human behavior. Understandably, the routine translation of these concepts into management thought and practice tends to significantly lag these developments. Each is embodied in the technology which the Army calls Organisational Effectiveness (OE).

Historical Summary.

The Army's involvement in OE can be described as a unique "grass roots" effort to more fully capitalise on advancements in management and applied behavioral science. This evolutionary effort spans the past 8-10 years and can be generally described as consisting of four distinct but interrelated phases: AWARENESS; RESTUDY & EXPERIMENTATION; INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION; and INSTITUTIONALIZATION. The events which have occurred in each phase have not been necessarily anticipated or connected within the overall framework of a master plan. The highly diffused nature of these initiatives, which ultimately became focused at the highest levels of the Army and embodied in the Organisational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC), reflects a total Army need.

PHASE I - AWARENESS (Late 1960's - 1972)

Phase I was a period in which the Army experienced societal problems and changes (e.g., racial unrest, dissent, drug and alcohol abuse, and the end of the draft) and became aware of serious shortfalls in leadership and management practices. Initial responses occurred in the form of ad hoc, crisis programs. The methods for institutional change tended to focus on the individual soldier and work around the chain of command,
with a relatively high degree of central direction from Headquarters, Department of the Army.

During this period a number of studies were conducted using behavioral science concepts and research methods and actions were taken to surface issues for open discussion and resolution. For example, the US Army War College Studies on Leadership and Professionalism (1970-71) led to the creation of a CONARC Leadership Board. The board trained and deployed world-wide traveling teams to present the study findings, gather additional data, and conduct short seminars for senior officers and NCO's. The board also made recommendations to Department of the Army, which included recommending that more applied behavioral science be incorporated into service school instruction. Another study was made of job dissatisfaction in the Army Staff and led to an examination of the problem and improvements by the Chief of Staff. These and other events pointed toward the expanded use of applied behavioral science as a basis for understanding and addressing system-wide issues.

With the shift to an all-volunteer peacetime force, the Army as well as the other armed services began to face more intense manpower and economic pressure. Manpower costs soared to over 50 percent of the Defense budget. Organizational layering, "tooth to tail ratios," economic incentives for improving recruiting, civilisation of military jobs, and training became central issues. Decentralization became a by-word amidst budgetary and resource cutbacks and realignments. It became painfully clear that commanders and managers at all levels had to accomplish more with less people to maintain and improve the state of combat preparedness. Reliance on greater firepower and mobility with technological advances in hardware; reorganizations; and administrative streamlining provided important internal improvement strategies for the Army. It was equally obvious that more could be done to improve the management and development of human resources in a total organizational sense.

Phase I was also a time of introspection and numerous grass roots initiatives. Some of these were advocated with mixed reaction under the all-volunteer Army banner and ranged from beer in mess halls to adventure training. The net effect was to encourage commanders to openly experiment with new ideas for improving combat readiness, troop morale and welfare, leadership and professionalism, and the attractiveness of the Army as a way of life. The following three examples of initiatives which occurred during this period are presented since they are especially relevant to the later development of OE in the Army.

(1) Behavioral science methods were used to design and improve an experimental basic training program at Ft. Ord. The effect was to focus on individual performance oriented training; provide incentives for motivating trainees and demonstrate the effectiveness of Action Research.

3/A summary of this study was published by COL D. Malone in Army magazine during 1972 under the title "The Prime."
or what is now known as the four step OE Process. A troop morale survey was also used on a weekly basis as feedback to the chain of command for improving the motivation and satisfaction of basic trainees. Another Ft. Ord initiative, which relied on the use of behavioral science, was a Leadership and Professionalism seminar for officers and noncommissioned officers. This seminar later evolved into a 5-day Leadership and Management Development Course (L&MDC), which is now a primary OE instructional method in communications and group problem solving skills.

(2) Organization Development techniques, which are the civilian equivalent to OE, were used to examine and revitalize the role of Army chaplains with assistance of consultants from the National Institute for Applied Behavioral Science. This effort is still continuing under the direction of the US Army Chaplain Board and now includes a number of chaplains who have been trained as internal consultants.

(3) Army Psychologists were encouraged to devote more time to working in a consulting capacity with commanders on organizational issues in units.

In summary, Phase I involved multiple and disconnected initiatives which attempted to use various facets of applied behavioral science as a basis for coping with pressures for change.

PHASE II - RESTUDY & EXPERIMENTATION (1972-75)

This phase can be characterized as a period of restudy of earlier initiatives and experimentation with new applied behavioral science techniques, which were part of an emerging technology called Organization Development (OD). This technology appeared to offer a systematic and deliberate capability to bring about constructive institutional change at multiple levels in the Army in a way that not only involved the chain of command but enhanced the commitment, motivation, and effectiveness of people and organizations.

It was during this period that a Behavioral Science Study Group was convened at the direction of the Chief of Staff. The mission of this group was to determine how advancements in behavioral science could be used in a practical and concerted manner for improving the Army. The study recommendations indicated the desirability of initiating a number of pilot projects to examine the applicability of OD methods to the Army. It was recognized that these projects required about a 3-year test and development period for discernable results to occur in large organizations.

Pilot projects were established in a variety of organisations and locations using one or more OD techniques. OD applications in an Army Staff setting were examined in the US Army Military Personnel Center. Survey feedback techniques were developed and tested in 40 battalions in US Army Europe. An assessment center for individual leadership development was established for officers and noncommissioned officers.

*See page 3 for a brief description of Action Research.*
at Ft. Benning, Georgia. Brigadier General (Designees) and a group of battalion commanders attended a 2-week assessment center at the Center for Creative Leadership in Greensboro, North Carolina. Battalion level training workshops in communication and group problem solving skills, management by objectives (MBO), and positive reinforcement techniques were designed and conducted at Ft. Bliss, Texas. OD applications at installation level were examined in a training center environment at Ft. Ord by an OD Directorate which was composed of a staff of 27 military and civilian personnel. This directorate provided the expertise and capability for launching the OE Training Center in 1975. Job enrichment and survey feedback research was sponsored by the US Army Research Institute (ARI) in U.S. Army Europe. ARI also provided technical advisory and/or research assistance to all of the projects.

These projects were coordinated during 1972-73 by the Office of the Special Assistant for Training in the Office of the Chief of Staff under the title of the Motivational Development Program. This program was transferred on 1 July 1973 to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. In February 1975, a Motivational Development Conference was held at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, to review the progress of the projects and lay the initial groundwork for expanding the application of these techniques in the Army.

A Human Resources Development Directorate was created in the Army Staff during this period to provide a more coordinated and visible thrust to the infant equal opportunity, drug & alcohol abuse prevention, and leadership & professional development programs. With the reorganization of the Continental Army Command (CONARC) into the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) a number of spaces were given to the US Army Administration Center (ADMINCEN) for human resource development doctrine. An attempt was made to validate more positions for graduate degrees in behavioral sciences as a way of upgrading Army expertise in human resources development and leadership instruction.

Two short range programs were also launched and received Army-wide attention. Management Practices in TOE Units (MAP-TOE) was independently developed by the Comptroller and included some applied behavioral science concepts and techniques, such as job enrichment. Army Chaplains attended a 5-day workshop in communication and group problem solving skills at the Ft. Bliss pilot project and subsequently designed a Personal Effectiveness Training (PET) course for export to the field. PET was a joint effort between the Chief of Chaplains Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. It represented the use of chaplains in support of unit leadership training activities and focused on providing immediate counseling skill training to noncommissioned officers and officers. PET was never conceived as a formal program, per se, and was used in a highly decentralized manner.

Army Chaplains pioneered in the use of small group techniques for improving service school instruction and curricula under the title of the Group Process Plan or Indiana Plan. Although this effort received initial support and resulted in a number of individuals who were trained
in these techniques, it failed to surmount bureaucratic barriers and achieve the desired break-through in the educational system.

It was also during Phase II that the US Navy established a Human Goals Program and began training Human Resources Management (HRM) specialists in OD at a school in Memphis, Tenn. The Navy created HRM centers at various locations around the world for consulting teams to work with ship and shore units. A few Federal Government agencies, to include the US Civil Service Commission, were also becoming involved in OD as a means of productivity improvement.

PHASE III - INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION (1975-77)

This phase began around mid-1975 with the termination of the pilot projects and the creation of the Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC) at Ft. Ord.

A number of the pilot projects began to shift into a fully operational posture for the continued application of OD techniques and use of trained personnel. This primarily occurred in MILPERCEN and at Ft. Ord. The survey feedback project in USAREUR provided spin-off results for a command-wide NCO opinion survey and professionalism program. The workshops at Ft. Bliss were incorporated into the OETC. The assessment center at Ft. Benning was evaluated as a highly useful leadership development method and was established as an officer advanced course elective at the Infantry School. It was later abandoned by the school for manpower and budgetary reasons.

Attempts were made during this phase to breathe life into the small HRD doctrine development group at the ADMINCEN. A special direct tasking relationship was established between ODCSPER, DA, and ADMINCEN by the TRADOC Commander to further the ADMINCEN doctrine development mission. The OETC was formed under the operational control of the ADMINCEN on 1 July 1975 to provide a direct link to this doctrine group and to integrate the training with existing personnel management specialty training.

The decision to train a selected number of officers in a 16-week intensive program to learn OE consulting skills and methods paved the way for broader implementation activities in the Army. This also indicated that OE was to avoid the inherent pitfalls of a centrally directed program and to integrate these skills throughout the Army, especially within the SI/G1/DPCA Staff function. OE was viewed as the means of increasing the capabilities of the personnel management function; reducing reliance on stovepipe activities and the isolated use of single techniques; and generally upgrading the quality of behavioral science applications that had been occurring on a piecemeal basis in the Army.

During Phase III interest in the use of OE methods and trained personnel began to spread with some limited consulting support. In January 1975 OE activities were implemented in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel as a spin-off of the MILPERCEN project. Top level
Seminars and briefings were conducted in Headquarters, Department of the Army; Forces Command; US Army Europe; Military District of Washington; and the Computer Systems Command.

In April 1975 an introduction seminar was conducted for the chain of command of the 82nd Airborne Division at the request of the commander. This was followed later in the year with a special 2-day OE action planning conference. These events provided the impetus for applying OE on a division-wide basis with OE trained personnel and capitalizing on earlier initiatives which had occurred in one battalion.

It is interesting to note that the Division Commander had an advanced degree in behavioral science. One of the assistant Division Commanders had attended the BG (Designee) 2-week assessment center in 1972 and was involved with OE applications during a tour of duty in MILPERCEN. The battalion level OE activities were initiated by an executive officer who had also been previously assigned to MILPERCEN where he had received on-the-job training as an OE intern for the pilot project.

The experience of how OE was started in the 82nd Airborne Division exemplifies the "grass roots" nature of how this technology is being diffused in the Army and the importance of senior officer understanding and personal involvement in the process. As such, it represents the first major system-wide effort in an elite combat unit.

The first formal Army-wide guidance on OE activities and training were published by Department of the Army in May 1976. In September, the Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command conducted a seminar in which he outlined his commitment to incorporating OE into Army doctrine, service school curricula, and TRADOC installations. He also made a video tape to widely communicate the concept and importance of OE within the overall framework of Army training.

Before the end of 1976 a range of OE activities had been initiated at division, major command, and Army Staff levels with the assistance of military OE trained personnel and a few civilian consultants. This was especially evident in Forces Command which had received the bulk of newly trained OE Staff Officers and had moved rapidly with top level command emphasis to establish an understanding and acceptance of OE.

For the most part, these activities quickly outstripped Army OE doctrine, policy, and training capabilities and created an accelerated demand for OE qualified staff personnel.

PHASE IV - INSTITUTIONALIZATION (Mid 1976-80)

This phase officially began with remarks by the Chief of Staff on the subject of OE at the Army Commanders' Conference (See Annex A) and his formation of an OE Study Group in November 1976. Prior to these events the groundwork for this phase had been laid with the following: (1) publication in May 1976 of HQDA interim guidance on Army-wide OE activities and training; (2) a round of information briefings for the principal heads of Army Staff agencies and the Army Secretariat during May-August 1976;
(3) the broadening of "grass roots" OE consulting activities; (4) the assignment of 130 OE Staff officers to the field by the end of the year; and (5) the creation of an ODOSPERS OE General Officer Steering Committee which held its first meeting on 15 December 1976.

Although it is too early to determine exactly what will characterize this phase, a few general observations can be tentatively offered.

First, top level attention will be given to organization, staffing, and related resource issues to ensure an adequate Army-wide OE capability is established and can be sustained in the future.

Second, action will be taken to rectify imbalances in OE expertise that exist between policy, doctrine, and training functions and OE applications in the field. In essence, additional OE trained personnel will be devoted to performing these critical functions.

Third, OE methods and trained personnel will begin to be used more in support of a variety of missions and functions in areas such as operations, administration, logistics, and maintenance, rather than be relegated to the functional area of human resources development.

Fourth, as more senior officers gain experience with the use of OE methods and trained personnel, OE will begin to be used for strategic management purposes rather than for strictly internal organization improvements. For example, OE expertise will be used to assist in coordination, planning, and problem solving on selected issues between HQDA and MACOM headquarters Staff agencies or between MACOM headquarters, installations, and divisions.

Fifth, a selected number of noncommissioned officers, DA civilians, and Reserve Component personnel will be OE trained in addition to active duty officers.

Sixth, other major commands, such as the Material and Readiness Command (DARCOM) and the Reserve Components will develop a substantive OE capability and contribute to the refinement and broader application of this technology.

During Phase IV it is anticipated that the Army will take 8-10 years to fully institutionalize the use of OE knowledge, methods, skills and trained staff personnel. On the other hand, the creation of the structural capability to utilize this expertise at a variety of levels in the Army will take 2-4 years of concerted effort.

In conclusion, the evolution of OE in the Army is a long-term and complex process that is just beginning to take form. Due to the nature of the technology, the evolutionary process represents a unique and challenging approach to innovation and change in large bureaucratic military organizations. It is the interplay between successful OE applications, which are focused on primary missions and tasks by knowledgeable and involved commanders and competent OESO's; the timely
commitment of resources to adequately support and sustain an Army-wide OE capability; and progressive policies and doctrine, which are carefully articulated and based on accumulated OE experiences in the field that will determine the extent to which OE is ultimately institutionalized.
ANNEX E

OESG VISITS

STAFF AGENCIES

Office of the Chief of Staff
  - Management Directorate

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
  - US Military Personnel Center
  - US Army Research Institute

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
  - US Army War College
  - Concepts and Analysis Agency

Office, Chief of Public Affairs

Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison

Office, Comptroller of the Army

Office, Inspector General and Auditor General

Office, Chief of Chaplains

Office, The Surgeon General

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

MAJOR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

US Army Europe and Seventh Army

Training and Doctrine Command

Forces Command

Materiel Readiness and Development Command

Health Services Command

E-1
MAJOR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS (Continued)

* Military District of Washington
* Intelligence and Security Command
* Computer Systems Command
* Communications Command
* Military Traffic Management Command
* Eighth US Army
* US Army Japan
* US Army Recruiting Command

* Not visited by the OESG. Information obtained through points of contact in these commands and/or prior knowledge of OESG members.

INSTALLATIONS, UNITS, AND SERVICE SCHOOLS

Ft. Belvoir
  * US Army Engineer School

Ft. Benjamin Harrison
  * US Army Administration Center
  * Institute for Administration

Ft. Benning
  * US Army Infantry School

Ft. Bliss
  * Sergeant Major Academy

Ft. Bragg
  * XVII Abn Corps
  * 82d Abn Division

Ft. Carson

E-2
INSTALLATIONS, UNITS, AND SERVICE SCHOOLS (Continued)

Ft. Eustis
- US Army Quartermaster School

Ft. Hood

Ft. Knox
- US Army Armor School

Ft. Leavenworth
- US Army Command and General Staff College

Ft. Leonardwood

Ft. McPherson

Ft. Ord
- US Army OE Training Center

Ft. Riley

Ft. Sam Houston
- Health Services Academy

Ft. Sill
- US Army Artillery School

Ft. Wadsworth
- US Army Chaplain School
- US Army Chaplain Board

USAREUR
- VII Corps Headquarters
- V Corps Headquarters
- 21st Support Command
- 92nd Army Air Defense Command
- 8th Infantry Division
OTHER SERVICES

Naval Post Graduate School

Navy Human Resources Management Training Center

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (U.S. Air Force)

Leadership and Motivation Division
The Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC) began operation in July 1975 after a two and one-half year experimental Army program which indicated that individuals who were trained in OE methods and consulting skills could have a significant positive impact on Army operations. Since July 75 the OETC has graduated 132 Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESOs) who are now assigned at 58 Army locations in CONUS, Korea, Hawaii, Alaska and Europe. Some Army installations have been involved with the implementation of OE procedures for over eighteen months. An Army-wide inherent part of OE training is the evaluation of implementation efforts to provide: (1) information on the progress of OE; (2) guidance for modification and up-dating of the training program; (3) information for policy decisions and writing of OE doctrine; and (4) guidelines to DA for OESO field requirements.

The two basic questions that an evaluation effort must answer are: Does the program do what it is supposed to do; and, if it works, is the cost of the program reasonable? If OE is not suitable to meet today's Army's needs, or is too costly, the effort should be redirected or ended quickly to avoid a potential waste of valuable resources.

One critical question is "When will OE be applied long enough in order to measure its impact on the Army accurately?" Five years is a reasonable period of time for OE to be institutionalized and influence enough people and practices to produce a measurable change in the Army's ability to accomplish its mission.

There is a continual need for accurate information on the developing OE effort to serve as a basis for the policy, doctrine, and day to day operational decisions that will make or break OE in the next five years. Therefore, the OETC's evaluation program for OE is a combination of an action research program conducted on an ongoing basis, and a basic research effort that will produce the answers to the key evaluation questions.

The ongoing evaluation effort is set up to develop timely answers to questions decision makers have in order to formulate policy and doctrine. It is designed to give feedback to the OESOs in the field on where OE is, what seems to work and what does not, and how to put OE into practice so that its benefits produce the greatest amount of positive change in unit effectiveness.
The evaluation program is designed to parallel the state of the OE effort. Currently, the OE effort Army-wide is in the process of being examined critically by the field. OE operations are being set up on many installations. On others, OE programs designed to educate the field are being put into operation. On still others, OE programs are in operation with OESOs discovering, often by trial and error, what works and what does not. All of these operations must be considered by the evaluation effort and in particular, how they deal with getting the program accepted.

The first phase of the Evaluation Program is focused on gathering information on how best to go about getting OE accepted. Information was gathered in a number of areas to find out what is going on in OE; how well it is being accepted, and what factors most influence acceptance; what is working and what is not working; how much and what type of support is OE getting; etc. Three different perspectives are used to gather the information: (1) The climate of the organization as reflected by Commanders, their staffs, supervisors, etc.; (2) The perspective of the OESO; and (3) The client's view of the OE process. The data for this phase of the evaluation effort has been collected due to the cooperation of almost everyone associated with OE, and is currently being processed by a computer procedure that will give a composite picture of the state of OE in the Army today, and where it should go to meet the Army's needs. These results will be available in March 1977.

The evaluation program will then enter its second phase to answer the broad question, "How best to supply the field with those things that will allow OE to be effective?" Data will be gathered on the types of education to be supplied to the field as well as to the OESO. In addition, data will be collected on how to accomplish this at the least cost in resources and the question of how to get OE resources to the field most effectively and efficiently will be addressed. Again the three basic perspectives used in phase I (organizational climate, OE process and the OESO) will be combined to form a composite view of how OE resources ought to be prepared and provided to the field. At the end of this phase (Oct 1977) what is needed and how to get it to the field efficiently and effectively will be known.

The focus in phase III of the evaluation is concerned with the question, "How best to use these available resources?" Data from the field will be collected to provide a composite view of how to organize OE resources to get the greatest benefit from them in a particular organization. Once this information is available in March 1978, and used to hone OE practice, the focus will shift to OE and its impact on users (phase IV).

Phase IV will help to define the most efficient and effective way to provide OE to a particular client, and how the practice of OE varies as the client varies. The OESO should be able to put this information into practice in October 1978. At this time OE will have developed to the point that: its purpose has been defined by the needs of the field and successful practice (phase I); OE resources prepared and assigned in the most efficient and effective fashion (phase II); the OE effort in a
particular organization organized to maximize its effectiveness and efficiency (phase III); and OE delivered to users in the most effective and efficient fashion (phase IV) to meet the Commander's needs for increased mission effectiveness.

The final phase of the evaluation program (Oct 1974) will gather information from all perspectives as to what OE can and cannot accomplish and at what price. Even though the final answer to the key questions of the evaluation program will be addressed during phase V, preliminary results for all phases will be gathered during all preceding phases. So phase I, while having the focus as outlined above, will also supply preliminary results on the key questions of phases II, III, IV and very tentative results on the key questions of phase V. The same is true for phases II, III, and IV. These preliminary results allow for the development of the data collection of later phases and serve as a basis for long term policy planning.

More detailed information on OE Evaluation can be obtained from the Evaluations Directorate, OETC, (Autovon 929-7890/4574).