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8 JUNE 1977

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES—A STRATEGIC STUDY

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES--A STRATEGIC STUDY

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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Study examines the strategic importance of US military basing in the Philippines in the post-Vietnam era. Data was gathered in personal interviews with representatives of State and Defense Departments, including members of CINCPAC Staff, and from an extensive literature search on the subject. US National Interests in the Pacific are examined as well as the changing Asian and Pacific power relations. Among these are the rising nationalism of Southeast Asia nations, proposed US withdrawals from Korea, the Taiwan question, the US-Japanese connection, US-PRC normalization of relations, and the growing Soviet naval capability. A rational strategy of forward basing is developed and proposed as the best means of protecting US interests in the area. Alternatives to Philippine basing are developed and discussed. The study concludes that a concept of forward basing is the most efficient and effective strategy for the US to follow. The study suggests that, in light of a forward defense strategy, the Philippine bases constitute an irreplaceable physical asset and an invaluable force multiplier for projection of US military power and influence in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. The US should therefore pursue current negotiations on Military Basing Agreement and Mutual Defense Treaties with a view toward retention of Philippine bases in exchange for adequate concessions and compensation to the Marcos government.
The Republic of the Philippines—A Strategic Study

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PREFACE

This Group Study Project was produced under the aegis of the US Army War College Military Studies Program. The scope and methodology were suggested by the four-student study group and approved by a faculty advisor. The authors chose the study topic on the basis of mutual interest and experience in Pacific affairs and the future of US-Philippine negotiations on military basing and mutual defense. The group attempted to look critically at US interests and Pacific strategy rather than justifying the status quo. The frank and open discussions with CINCPAC Staff officers and the guidance and criticisms of War College faculty members were particularly helpful in completing the study.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The Republic of the Philippines (RP) has served as a military ally and has provided a strategic land base for the United States for three quarters of a century. The strategic central location of the Philippines in the Western Pacific, in conjunction with its large size and population, was a significant factor contributing to its evolving role as an extension of American influence and power in the region. Its strategic military importance to the United States was underscored by General MacArthur in his conduct of both defensive and offensive operations during WWII. Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base subsequently played major logistical and operational roles in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, while the Philippines Government furnished both diplomatic and manpower support. Throughout the period between armed conflicts, the United States has used its forces and bases in the Philippines to maintain a dominant military influence in the region under the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). The American military presence has contributed to the Philippines economy and provides a defensive umbrella against external aggression.

The changing patterns of international relationships and interests accruing in the post-Vietnam period, to include the transition from a bipolar (Communist versus non-Communist) alignment of nations
to the multipolar and regional alignments of today, and the growth of a spirit of nationalism and independence in the RP, have now caused both nations to question the continuing role and importance of the US military presence. This assessment is demonstrated not only in the bilateral base rights negotiations underway, but also in the continuing reevaluation of global military strategy and concepts being made within the US military community.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This study addresses the value and importance of the Philippines in relation to US strategic military operations and objectives. The examination includes a brief review of the contribution of the RP in both the Korean and Vietnam wars and its peacetime use for basing for major naval and air forces and logistical support. The most important military question is the extent to which the US needs the two major bases at Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base. Both operational and logistical factors will be discussed in light of projected peacetime as well as contingency war scenarios.

Also included is an appraisal of the overall environment which exists and is projected for the future. The realignment of national interests in the post-Vietnam period has given rise to a new set of parameters from those which existed during the period from 1945 to the early 1970s. These include such items as the Sino-Soviet split; the emergence of Japan as a major industrial state; the worldwide concern about petroleum supplies; the normalization of US-PRC relations; regional security pacts and the growth of ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations); the rapidly developing Soviet naval capability; the development of new technologies in industry, transportation, communications and defense; the proposed US military withdrawals from Korea; and the Taiwan-PRC question. All are germane to the question of US strategy in the Pacific during the next two decades.

METHODOLOGY

This study was undertaken by four Army War College students in November 1976. The group gathered information from personal interviews with knowledgeable representatives of the State Department and the Department of Defense, and from written documents. A bibliography and list of interviews is included at the end of the paper. The intent of the study was to focus on the significant strategic issues involved in a continued US military presence in the Philippines.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

The study begins with a review and definition of US interests in the Pacific and a discussion of strategies. It then addresses a Pacific strategy and discusses alternatives to retention of the Philippines bases. It closes with a summary and general conclusions related to the strategic importance of the US military presence in the Philippines.
CHAPTER II

US INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC

"National Interest" might be defined simply as--

The interest of a nation as a whole . . . , independent from the interests of subordinate areas or groups . . . , and other nations or supranational powers.¹

National interests, so defined, could cover a wide range of concepts from economic to socio-political considerations. If, however, we were to confine ourselves to but a single vital interest, it might be--

... survival of the State, with an acceptable degree of independence, territorial integrity, traditional life styles, fundamental institutions, values and honor intact.²

VITAL/NONVITAL INTERESTS

The above definition of a vital national interest suggests that there may be differing opinions as to what constitutes "an acceptable degree" of independence or integrity. It also suggests that a nation's vital interest, so defined, is enduring, changes gradually (if ever), and cannot be eliminated by congressional fiat, presidential decree, or public opinion.³ Several other aspects of vital interests may be discussed. First, if a nation changes or abandons a national vital interest, or even seems to do so in the eyes of neighbor states, it will signal a loss of national resolve or will. A second observation is that if attainment of world
domination by communist forces would preclude survival of our nation in its present form, then a corollary vital interest is the containment of communism or the prevention of world hegemony by the USSR.

A listing of nonvital national interests in the Pacific would include the promotion and support of free and democratic governments, expansion of friendly US relations and influence (or denial of such influence by potential enemies), protection and promotion of economic trade with other nations and access to raw materials, deterrence of aggression and protection of allies, maintenance of sea and air routes of communication, and protection of US-owned private investment, lives, and property.

TRADITIONAL US STRATEGY

Returning to our discussion of vital national interest, the next question seems to be, "What strategy choices do we have to secure this interest?" It has been suggested by some that a direct close-in defense of the North American continent, to include Hawaii, is a feasible and plausible strategy to secure our vital interest. A second strategy concept is that of defending as far forward as possible. This second strategy has been the traditional US strategy for protecting our vital national interests. Our system of foreign basing in allied nations clearly contributes to this forward defense strategy. An alternate mechanism to actually stationing troops at foreign bases in the forward area might be termed "foreward deployment" in which air and naval forces, with marines afloat, deploy to forward areas from US bases rearward.
In the West Pacific such bases might include the continental US, Hawaii, or US protectorates or trust territories. Because other major world powers maintain a capability to project military power beyond their own shores and also due to the soundness of maintaining US power options and flexibility, a forward defense strategy has many advantages over one confined to a static defense of North America. Forward basing provides a force multiplier effect in comparison to forward deployment in that fewer ships and planes are needed to provide an equivalent force presence. The forward bases also provide a basis for rapid reinforcement and buildup of forces into an area. However, this advantage of forward bases on foreign soil must be balanced against the direct and indirect costs to sustain the bases. Such costs include US military and economic assistance to the host nation, increased base operations and support costs, undesirable dependency relations, and political, social and cultural problems stemming from national differences.

A forward deployment mode, on the other hand, requires larger forces and increased US bases and facilities to support such forces. It does have the advantage of reducing the monetary and "imperialistic" ramifications of foreign basing, however. The Western Pacific lends itself to either or both of these modes to some degree and requires a careful evaluation before a decision is made.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

A current assessment of the external threat to the Philippines by the CINCPAC Staff and others is that there is none. Of late,
the internal threat posed by dissident communists and Muslim elements
has been reduced to manageable proportions by President Marcos. A
regional threat, however, from the USSR or the PRC remains a separate
matter and should be taken into account in any analysis of a
threat to the Philippines.

**SUMMARY OF INTERESTS**

In concluding this introductory chapter on interests and
general strategy, it might be well to review the purpose of a US
presence in the Pacific. The US is a duly constituted, legitimate
government which occupies a position of power and influence in the
world. The US has traditionally had many legitimate interests and
commitments throughout the Pacific and the world. We've discussed
our vital national interest and listed other significant Pacific
interests. In addition to these interests the US has made commit-
ments over the years with various Pacific nations. Mutual security
treaties, regional pacts, and trade treaties are examples.
Therefore, separate and apart from any defense considerations,
a case could be made for a US presence in the Pacific to
protect these agreements and to abide by our commitments. This
case could rest very simply on the fact that the US is a leading
world power and, as such, bears a responsibility for defending free
world affairs as well as our own destiny and security. The following
discussion will further define the application of US strategy to
these interests.
CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES


5. Interview with Roland F. Morrison, Philippines Affairs Desk, Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC), Honolulu, Hawaii, 21 March 1977.
CHAPTER III

US STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC AND EAST ASIA

FORWARD: POINT OF REFERENCE

The term strategy can be defined in a number of ways dependent upon its intended use or application. For the purposes of this document and more specifically the section that immediately follows, it is simply the concept that best describes the method or approach used to accomplish a task, attain an objective or complete a mission.

In a narrower sense, strategy deals with military planning for and the actual waging of war— it is the art of handling troops and troop support in the conduct of a battle or a war. In a broader sense it deals with and considers a wide variety of nonmilitary factors: economic, political, psychological, and technological, as well. All of these in one way or another integrate or interact to produce or bring about a set of circumstances favorable to the designer and/or implementer of the strategy. On a national level, the highest type of strategy is commonly called "Grand Strategy." In its purest application, it represents the marshalling of the nation's finest thinking, manpower and resources in support of first its vital and then its lesser interests. It is in this broader context that the word strategy is herein used as it applies to the United States perspective on the Pacific, East Asia, and more specifically the Republic of the Philippines and its role in the evolution of Pacific strategy past, present and future.
THE PACIFIC--AN OVERVIEW

US interests in Asia can be traced back to the 1840s when America entered into its first trade agreements with China. US presence became more firmly entrenched in 1899 when the Philippines were ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris after the Spanish American War. As a result of that war, the US military, in one form or another, has been present in the Philippine Islands since Admiral Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Since that time, American presence has been justified on the basis of close US and Filipino ties resulting from treaties, agreements and other international correspondence. These relationships were directed towards providing the Philippines with assistance and towards mutual security considerations and the protection of American citizens and interests.

Subsequent to World War II, the US became more deeply involved and committed to a regional presence with the withdrawal of European commitments to the region and with the development of the postwar threat of the Sino-Soviet communism. The so-called "Cold War" led to a US policy of containment. During this period, the US became involved in a series of treaties and agreements with Japan, Korea and Taiwan. These commitments are still in effect today. In conjunction with these developments, the Philippines achieved full independence in 1945 but retained a US presence under the arrangement of mutual political, economic, and military benefits that had previously existed.
In the last forty years, Americans have fought three major wars in the Pacific and as a result of these experiences have come to realize that a failure to preserve the power balance in the region could lead to the area's exploitation of manpower, industry and natural resources for political, economic, military and psychological aggression against the United States.

More recently, specifically linked to the defeat of South Vietnam, American presence in the Pacific and particularly East Asia is being challenged abroad and seriously questioned at home. The question being raised on the domestic scene is to what degree is US presence really needed to preserve the balance of power? Abroad, our Asian allies are closely scrutinizing the credibility of our security assurances. Former close allies and Western-oriented nations in the region, like the Philippines, are raising the banners of sovereignty and making larger political and economic demands on the US and the developed, industrialized nations, and at least publicly making overtures that suggest the US may have to leave. One outcome appears to be certain: a shifting pattern of relationships is taking place which will have a significant impact on US decisions and options related to the Pacific strategy for the 1980s and out years. Although the final result is uncertain, the prelude to this transaction is clear: the US and the countries both within and outside of the area will be required to reassess their own situation, interests and policies as they relate to the world and the Pacific Basin.
THE STRATEGY: CONTEMPORARY ASPECTS

Although influenced by the Vietnam experience, current US national strategy in the Pacific continues to be based on the concept of forward defense and support of the idea of a balance of power between the US, the USSR and the PRC. This national strategy was publicly reiterated in 1969 in Guam by the President of the United States and came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. This doctrine was further amplified in 1970 and 1971 in foreign policy reports by the President to Congress. It contains three essential elements:

-- The US will keep its treaty commitments;

-- The US will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied to us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security or to the security of the region as a whole; and

-- In cases involving other types of aggression, the US will furnish aid and economic assistance when requested and appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.\(^1\)

Reemphasis was given to the strategy outlined in the doctrine on 3 April 1975, when President Ford stated that the Nixon Doctrine remained as the basis of US national strategy in the Pacific. Excerpts from his address follow:

... We will stand by our allies and I specifically warn any adversary they should not, under any circumstances, feel that the tragedy of Vietnam is an indication that the American people have lost their will or their desire to stand up for freedom any place in the world.
Moreover, he said:

Neither the friends nor the adversaries of the U.S. should interpret the losses in South Vietnam as a sign that American commitments would not be honored anywhere in the world.²

More recently, during the presentation of Secretary Rumsfeld's Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1977, to Congress, he indicated that the US military strategy is and (at least in the near term) will remain essentially the same as it has been since its adoption in 1969. In essence, the strategy provides for a one and one-half war capability that does not envision a worldwide war in Europe and the Pacific simultaneously. In support of this strategy, approximately 6 percent of the total US military strength (both ashore and afloat) is currently deployed to the Pacific.³ (See Figure 1.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Military Overseas (thousands)</th>
<th>Actual at End FY68</th>
<th>Actual at End FY73</th>
<th>Actual at End FY76</th>
<th>Planned for End FY77</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Area</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Total US Forces Deployed Worldwide</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Military Forces Deployed Pacific</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6+%</td>
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Figure 1. Military Personnel Stationed Overseas

The present US strategy as it applies to the Pacific and Asia is, in many respects, a plan of evolvement rather than design. As a result of victory in WWII, the US leaped from a low-key Pacific presence to a dominant power status. In the mood of withdrawal
that followed the war, it was decided that our strategic objectives and military commitments could best be served in the Pacific by primarily naval and air power. The important objectives appeared to be maintaining some kind of a Pacific presence that would contain communism and militarily cover our Western flanks so as to prevent another surprise like the one we experienced at Pearl Harbor.

With these objectives in mind, the US attempted to develop a military base structure designed to support a respectable military force for the protection of the Philippines, Alaska, Micronesia and Hawaii. The objectives were generally clear but the threat was ill-defined. In 1949, the Chinese Communists took over mainland China. Shortly thereafter the US containment strategy was tested in Korea. By 1953, it became apparent that the French would not be able to retain Indochina. By 1975, both Vietnam and Cambodia had fallen and the Pacific-Asian defensive strategy of the US was seriously jeopardized in terms of its future viability.

Now in 1977, despite these recent experiences in Asia and the Pacific, the existent US strategy in the region is still in many respects contradictory. On the one hand, the strategy calls for the protection of US interests in the area and the mutual defense of Asian allies like Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan. On the other hand, the US continues to eye withdrawal of military forces from the Pacific as a very viable option. Similarly, our treaties, agreements and other national announcements speak of upholding mutual defense interests, deterrence and military presence. At the same time, the US is planning to reduce its forces.
in Korea and continue on its concessionary course relative to US
base rights agreements in the RP. At the same time, the US continues
to verbally reassure its allies that its agreements will be honored
including protection from nuclear blackmail. Among the nations in
the Western camp, Japan feels most threatened by the lack of a
well-defined US Pacific strategy. The Japanese seem to be saying,
and perhaps rightfully so, that US actions are beginning to speak
so loud that they can't hear what the US is saying. The net result
is that the US-Japanese tie surfaces as the primary driving force.
At the same time there is serious concern on the part of Korea and
Taiwan for a clarification of US strategy and political intention
in the Western Pacific.

Returning to provisions of the Nixon Doctrine, the commitment
to honor our treaty obligations remains an essential element in the
design of our strategy. The keystone is that we have stated an
intent to protect our national interests and support our allies
wherein our survivability and common interests are at stake.

THE STRATEGY: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Can and should the US revise its current Pacific/East Asian
strategy in the near term? Perhaps a more vital question that tends
to be obscured by the broader issue is, can a respected, creditable
and influential US presence be maintained in the region without the
US bases that are now operational in the Philippines?

The balance of power and influence is undergoing a continuing
transition in that part of the world. As Japan continues to grow in
political and industrial might, the earlier triangular force structure (US/USSR/PRC) is tending to reshape into a quadrangle. For the moment, the PRC appears preoccupied with internal problems. Conversely, the USSR is very active and has a highly motivated desire to expand its influence in the area. The Soviets would probably be quick to take advantage of any real or perceived withdrawal of American presence from the region. The American-Japanese partnership remains intact but is somewhat less assured than it has been in the past due to the US-Vietnam experience and the pending US drawdown of forces in Korea. Occurring in conjunction with these US moves is the publically announced shift of many of the nations of the region, such as the RP, toward a policy of political nonalignment with any of the super powers.

In view of these and other rapidly changing inputs to the political power equation of the region, the US is being pushed to reassess its role in the Pacific.

IS A US PACIFIC PRESENCE NECESSARY TODAY?

Those who contend that a Pacific presence is necessary base their position on the contention that the USSR, and potentially the PRC, pose a serious threat to US security and interests in the region. That school of thought maintains that so long as that threat remains viable, the Pacific and East Asia will continue to be a region requiring considerable attention and strategic concern. The following extract from the USAWC Strategic Studies Institute Study, Pacific/Asian Study for Tomorrow, completed in 1973, explains
the advocates of that concept's position superbly:

It is of vital importance to the survival of the United States and its institutions that no nation or coalition of nations be able to marshal the industry, manpower, and natural resources of Asia for offensive use against the United States.⁵

The proponents of that position go on to say that closely associated with its own security interests are a significant number of multilateral and bilateral treaties and international agreements that legally bind and morally commit US interests and military presence in the area on behalf of our allies. The region is also increasingly important to the United States because of the potential of a considerable wealth of natural resources, industrial production capability and the closely associated economic ties. These factors are critical not only for the US, but for Japan and other pro-Western nations in the region. Trade in the Pacific, and in particular in East Asia, has grown steadily and significantly and the indicators are that it will continue in the upward direction.

Finally, the Pacific is the largest ocean in the world and provides the line of communication between the US, Asia, and the Indian Ocean. It encompasses a large number of critically important air and water passages for both commercial and military considerations. Distance between critical areas are vast. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the vastness of the Pacific region.

In summary, there are a significant number of scholars, authors and political scientists who contend that a US forward based strategy which is encompassed by a creditable and meaningful US
PACIFIC OCEAN
Azimuthal Equidistant Projection
Centered at Honolulu

Figure 4
Azimuthal Equidistant Projection
Centered at Honolulu
military presence in the Western Pacific is not an alternative but rather an "only option" situation that America is faced with if it is to retain world power status. This group argues that the US must ensure, by a physical military presence, that the Pacific/Asian region will remain free of domination by any single power or coalition of powers that could marshall the political strength and influence to deny the US access to the region. This same group holds that the Pacific-Asian nations, as well as the rest of the world, must perceive and be firmly convinced that the US is capable of and willing to project its political, economic and military influence in support of peace, security, economic growth and stability throughout the region. In support of this position, they maintain that the US military bases in the Philippines are virtually irreplaceable elsewhere in the Pacific and therefore should be retained at any cost. They conclude that a US movement out of the Philippines, especially under pressure, would not only prove to be impractical and costly, but more importantly, would serve to exacerbate a loss of US world prestige, confidence and respect following the American experience in Vietnam. Withdrawal from the Philippines would further enhance the perception that the US is very probably resigned to the acceptance of something less than a world power status, at least insofar as the Pacific and East Asia is concerned. There is ample evidence to support the contention that the Marcos Government needs American presence in the Philippines as much as the US needs the bases. In the way of hardcore economics, the Department of Defense is the second largest single employer in
the Philippines and its absence from or serious curtailment of operations in the RP would deal a dastardly blow to an already precarious economy. Moreover, if the US is forced to vacate its bases, it follows that it could terminate the many forms of direct aid it now provides to the Marcos Government. Currently, the US assists in arming and training the Philippine Armed Forces and Police, supports important rural development projects through AID, and is a primary friend in providing essential backing to uphold the credit of the Philippine Government itself in the international loan market.

The real question, then, is whether we ought to pay the price that Marcos asks. If we want the bases, it is conceivable that the United States could respond in like terms to the hard line that the Marcos Government has assumed. That may not be the American way but it may be the only language that the Marcos Government understands and in the end will place the US in a better bargaining position in the Philippines and on the International scene throughout the region.

The counter position is that a military withdrawal from the Philippines could very well be in the best national interest. This position is summarized by Francis T. Underhill, Jr., US Ambassador to Maylasia and former political counselor at the US Embassy in Manila who states that our presence in Southeast Asia is no longer of critical military or political importance. The substance of the Underhill thinking is that there is little threat to the United States that can be identified in Southeast Asia and as a
result no justification for the US to meet the demands of President Marcos for base rights. One other footnote of Ambassador Underhill's position is that the Philippines bases could and most probably would become expediently available if a threat common to US and RP interests were to evolve in the future. This concept may have some merit in view of the fact that although the government of the Philippines officially voices discontent with and tables unusually high demands for continued US base use, American presence in the Philippines appears to be in the best interest of both nations. In this regard the research of the study group tends to support that position in that most Filipinos value the overall US-Philippine relationship and desire that close US-Philippine relations be continued.

For many Filipinos, particularly for the middle-aged and older ones who fought with Americans in World War II, the bases symbolize this traditional relationship:

- For thousands of Filipinos, the bases mean jobs.
- For businessmen and foreign investors, the bases provide the psychological reassurance of stability.
- For the Philippine military, the bases represent a contribution to defense, as well as a means of obtaining military equipment from the US.

In the final analysis, the question of continued US base rights in the Philippines boils down to whether or not the US is willing to meet RP terms in return for the benefits which the bases afford to US forces. To a large extent, it appears that President Marcos has patterned much of his demands on the US/Spanish bases model. The entire US-Philippines basing is best summed up by
Mr. T. A. Hull (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) in his report to the Department of State on 28 February 1977, which stated:

-- In the short term, Marcos is willing to have the bases remain in return for what he considers ample compensation; increased recognition of Philippine Sovereignty; significant Philippine control over use of bases; greater jurisdiction over U.S. base personnel; and a clearer statement of the U.S. security commitment to the Philippines.

-- Over the longer term, Philippine support for the bases will decrease as a consequence of growing nationalism, a reduced perception of threat, and the desire to have a foreign policy less identified with the U.S. and more with the Third World. Taking this longer view, Marcos probably would like to have the bases gradually phased out by mutual agreement—provided this could be accomplished without adversely affecting his regime's stability, the regional power balance, or the fundamental US-Philippine relationship.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, East Asia is undergoing its own transition from an unfortunate past to an uncertain future, albeit with high hopes for what the future will hold. The changing circumstances in East Asia and the US attitude toward the region require a fresh look at our present policies. The study group concludes that US policy in the region is best described as follows:

-- US political influence and military presence in the Pacific is required if the US is to retain its status as a world power and the balance of power in the region is to be retained; but this must be accomplished in a manner compatible with East Asia's national aspirations and with the support of the American people.
-- US foreign policy and national strategy in the Pacific has to result from a well-thought-out plan that reflects long- and short-range goals and a specific plan of action for implementation. The design should include a balanced and flexible military posture in the Western Pacific.

-- US foreign policy in the Pacific should shift further toward a quid pro quo arrangement vice its current concessionary attitude of eager willingness to accommodate everyone else's desires on the international scene, quite often to its own political and economic disadvantage.

-- The Pacific and East Asia treaties require US national attention and the application of a planned strategy on a par with the NATO interest and commitment.

-- Withdrawal of US influence and military presence in the Pacific nurtures the concept and perception that US status as a world power is in the early stages of its demise.

-- Loss of US national influence and military presence in the Pacific is tantamount to an abrogation of its responsibilities and commitments to its allies and long-standing friends in that region of the world.

-- US basing in the Philippines in the near term (i.e., next 15-20 years) is an urgent requirement if forward basing is to be retained as a part of the American Pacific strategy.

-- US basing in the Philippines in the long term should be drawn down on a planned, regulated schedule so as to take place in
an orderly fashion that is not contradictory to US strategy or presence in the Pacific.

-- Loss of the US bases in the Republic of the Philippines represents a significant reduction of US ability to control sea and air lines of communication vital to US security and economic well-being in the Pacific.
CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES


7. T. A. Hull, Marcos and the Philippine Base Negotiations, p. 5.

8. Ibid.
CHAPTER IV

BASING ALTERNATIVES

In assuming the role of a super power and a leader of the Western or free world grouping of nations, the US has been required to pursue a foreign policy which is capable of adjusting to rapid and frequent changes occurring in the international arena. To keep pace with the many forces which drive the complex network of relationships between the increasing number of nations has necessitated following a flexible and responsive foreign policy which can more readily adapt to a constantly changing situation. As much as any other region of the world, the Western Pacific has undergone a transformation of great magnitude during the period since WWII. The instigation of President Marcos to renegotiate the US base rights agreements in the Philippines is but one manifestation of that transition and turmoil. In seeking to maintain a strategy which is best prepared to provide for on-going US programs, the foreign policy planner and the military planner must constantly seek to predict what conditions will be as far into the future as possible.

In any examination of the future status of US forces in the RP, there is sufficient uncertainty to warrant, and indeed to require, an assessment of alternative force basing options in the event the Philippines bases are either severely constrained or totally lost to the US.

In examining possible host nations to replace the RP, it appears that basing opportunities and agreements are extremely
remote if not wholly unattainable. Actual diplomatic communications would have to be undertaken in any event before specific evaluations could be made. In looking at the region with this limitation in mind, the following brief analysis is presented. First we'll discuss considerations involved with alternate bases in other regional nations, and then will look at Guam and the Trust Territories.

**JAPAN AND KOREA**

Japan and Korea are farther north than would be desired by the US military for Southwest Pacific operations. At the same time, however, these countries are allies and presently sanction US bases. The Japanese government, although permitting some basing, has been beset on numerous occasions by anti-military and anti-American antagonists and would not be responsive to additional basing of an unrestricted nature. Sovereignty and host nation limitations on base usage are already serious concerns for existing Japanese bases; to seek additional bases under these conditions would not appear to be beneficial for either nation. South Korea differs from Japan in that it has a continuing need for US military support in defense against the North Korean threat. Based on Korea's actions to sustain such US assistance and support, it is probable that that government would be responsive to additional basing of a strategic nature. Korea is a mainland country, however, and is located in close proximity to both China and the USSR. The US would not be inclined to disturb the existing strategic power balance in the area for this reason. Furthermore, our government
has stated its intent to further reduce existing US defensive ground forces in Korea and there would be little political support in the US to now completely reverse that policy intention.

TAIWAN

The third nation to the north is the Nationalist Republic of China on Taiwan. The US has some basing rights there and is still honoring the mutual defense agreement established in the 1950s; however, the subsequent schism between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets and the more recent recognition of the PRC by most of the non-Communist world has since altered the "two China" picture considerably and leaves Taiwan's long-range future as a separate entity uncertain. The US is unwilling to disturb that complex problem for now and should not do so in regard to additional basing. Furthermore, Taiwan lies too close to the mainland to permit the freedom of movement and degree of security desired for strategic force basing.

AUSTRALIA

Far to the south, Australia has long been a staunch US ally in the Pacific and does provide some support for US military activity in communications facilities, combined exercises, and a limited basing provision. However, at the present time and for the foreseeable future, the Australian people and government would generally be opposed to allowing any significant US operational basing on their soil. Australia will continue to be a stabilizing
influence in the region and can be expected to participate actively
to protect its interests in the event of any major armed conflict,
but it will retain its spirit of independence and its conservative
color in meeting international relationships. Similar to
Australia in political character, New Zealand lies farther to the
south and would be impractical for basing because of its remote-
ness. The Trust Territories would provide a closer and more
favorable option in that regard.

CENTRAL SOUTHEAST ASIA NATIONS

A review of the countries in the center of the region points up
additional difficulties. Of the mainland countries both Vietnam and
Cambodia are now under communist domination and beyond considera-
tion. Thailand, a significant US ally with major US air bases
during the Vietnam War, withdrew that allegiance following the loss
of Vietnam and subsequently required American military forces to
leave the country. Thailand now espouses a more neutral and inde-
pendent political position, in line with that of other regional
nations. Thailand will seek to secure its borders with Cambodia
and Laos against intrusions, and will attempt to walk the political
tightrope between the many counter-currents that are operating in
the region. Chances for US basing are remote and any efforts to
secure basing rights at this time could be disruptive to the politi-
cal balance which has emanated from the Vietnam War conclusion.

Mainland countries beyond Thailand border on the Indian Ocean
and are not favorable for Western Pacific forces because of this.
Furthermore, President Carter has indicated an interest in seeking a demilitarized status for the Indian Ocean in terms of the major powers and this policy direction would preclude that area from prospective alternate basing.

The oceanic nations of Indonesia and Malaysia would appear to have the most favorable locations for possible replacement bases. These countries lie in the strategic center of the region, are removed from the mainland, and straddle the boundary interface between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. These countries also contain the key international straits between the two oceans, of which the Malacca and the Lombok straits are the most important from both a military and a commercial viewpoint. A principal US interest in the region is to maintain these passages as international seaways, with unrestrained free and open access for surface, subsurface and airspace passage. The commercial and the military significance of the issue of unrestricted passage is readily apparent, and has global implications relating to the accessibility of other straits and choke points elsewhere.

Indonesia and Malaysia both appear to have potential natural resources which could dramatically enhance their importance and influence in the region and in the world if development proves feasible and profitable. The most significant prospect at present is that of Indonesian oil deposits. Considerable development of potential oil sources is well underway along with continued exploratory efforts. The probability of meaningful oil reserves is rapidly advancing the international interest in these two
nations. This is especially so for Indonesia, which is projected to become a more influential nation in the region with its large size and population and its probable resource developments.

Dr. Donald E. Weatherbee presents an excellent summary and update of US military relations with Indonesia in a recent study for the US Army War College. The general theme of this analysis is that Indonesia seeks a regional autonomy and neutralization from major power military dominance and presence, while at the same time seeks to increase economic development and social and political relations within the region and with industrialized nations outside. Dr. Weatherbee develops the thesis that US security interests in Indonesia are best served through the continued progress of military assistance programs and mutually cooperative relations aimed at strengthening Indonesian security and its stability within the area. He writes that Indonesian policy is directed towards a role of nonalignment and of diplomatic equidistance with the US and other major powers, to include Japan. The article also notes that the US Congress would be reluctant to pursue any program which might lead in turn to a repetition of the gradual response scenario experienced earlier in Vietnam. Thus, the establishment of US bases in Indonesia at present is considered to be unacceptable to both nations and would generally be inimical to the interests and policies being pursued by the two governments.

Malaysia, like Indonesia, is essentially an island nation although its western portion is joined to the mainland of Asia by a thin neck of land shared by Thailand and Burma. Like many of the
other regional nations, Malaysia is a developing nation with a large, rapidly expanding population requiring ever more food, resources and jobs. Malaysia does not have the identified oil resources and is not as large geographically as Indonesia. Because of its many needs it would probably be more receptive to US basing than some of the other nations should the US express a positive interest and demonstrate a willingness to pay a quid pro quo for use of the territory in terms of economic and military development assistance. But the same considerations mentioned for Indonesia and the other nations apply here as well: would the US public and Congress be willing to support such a proposal? How would the USSR and the PRC perceive such a development; would it be upsetting to the existing balance in the area? Would US basing actions add to any arms race pressures in the area? How long could the US hope to maintain and use such bases before local political pressures would demand their closure? Would the Malaysian people and government be favorable to long-term bases, and how much additional costs would be required to sustain host country support? The questions and their answers are very complex and are critical to the issue. As with the other nations mentioned, a positive outlook for Malaysia is far from promising.

For the US military planner the answers to these key questions affect the probable success or failure of any of the proposed alternative courses of action. Any choice of option selected must necessarily stand the scrutiny of the administration and of Congress, which in turn carries with it the spill-over ramifications
of the media and the public. It is considered very unlikely that base proposals of the nature envisioned would be sustainable under the current post-Vietnam environment. Nor does it appear likely that DOD would go forward with any proposal which lacks a reasonable assurance of acceptability and success.

GUAM AND THE TRUST TERRITORIES OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

The most significant possible alternative for replacement basing is to look to the island of Guam and to the adjacent Trust Territories. Guam is an unincorporated territory dependency of the US and lies at the southern extremity of the Marianas chain. Guam already supports major military facilities and is a key operational element in our Pacific force structure. The Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands is a large grouping of islands, atolls, and ocean territories located in the central part of the Western Pacific between the Philippines and Hawaii. It is also called Micronesia. The Trust Territories were mandated under United Nations sanction to US trust control and include the Marianas, the Caroline Islands, the Marshall Islands and the islands of Ponape.

The Trust Territories have been used by the US for various purposes since WWII and contain some development and facilities in scattered locations. The test areas of Kwajalein and Eniwetok are the most notable and have been used both in the atomic and the space programs. The numerous islands of Micronesia have frequently and recurrringly been discussed for US military basing purposes.
The base negotiation developments with the RP have once again focused attention on using some of the islands for bases. An excellent summary article which develops this subject is that written by Dean Allan W. Cameron in the October 1976 Military Review, "The Strategic Significance of the Pacific Islands." The major advantage which the islands offer is that they fall under US control and protection. Thus, the questions of sovereignty and of operational usage of bases are more directly addressable and resolvable. Furthermore, any such bases would have a more predictable and viable future over the long range, insuring a continuing return on the investment required for base construction. Bases under agreements with the Trust Territories would not be expected to have the extent of problems associated with bilateral agreements with a foreign government such as future restrictions or treaty abrogation.

There are numerous disadvantages associated with using the trust islands for basing. The islands first of all are very small in size, with only a couple of exceptions. There are 2,100 islands in the territories and their total area is only slightly more than 700 square miles. Only a few of them offer sufficient size and topography for modern bases. The small size also severely limits the island from supporting any appreciable population needed to run the base. Not only construction materials and supplies but also daily items needed to sustain people living on the island would have to be brought in from outside, to include food, fuel and perhaps even fresh water. The costs of this would
have to be incorporated in base operations and support allocations.

The impact of size is already noted on Guam, which is one of the few larger islands available. "Acquisition of real property is severely constrained by speculative buying, commercial development and urban growth of the civilian population." Labor costs for accomplishing ship repair and maintenance work on Guam as compared to similar work elsewhere are of interest. "In Subic Bay the cost is approximately $28 per man day, whereas in Japan it is $98 and in Guam closer to $150 for the same work." The higher cost for Guam is in part due to the cost of sustaining a large number of people on a remote island. Any proposed expansion of Guam facilities would have to take into account the geographic, economic, environmental and socio-political ramifications of such a decision.

A second major disadvantage of TTPI basing is that these islands are located at a much greater distance from the Southwest Pacific operational area. Guam, on the western and closest edge of the island territories, is still 1,500 nautical miles from Manila. Although US Naval forces can and do operate at much greater distances, the optimum distance is generally 1,200 to 1,500 miles from the point of resupply and repair. Pulling back to the TTPI from the Philippines would result in much higher operations costs and in reduced capabilities because of the greater time and distance factors involved. The added distance would limit the ability of providing timely support and rapid reinforcement or immediate deployment within the region. In essence, relocating
rearward from the Philippines to bases in Guam and the Trust Territories would have the effect of shifting the forward basing line by roughly that distance. But more importantly, it would move US forces farther away from both the key sea lanes and straits to the southwest, and from remaining US bases in Taiwan, Okinawa, and South Korea. Both air and sea reinforcement factors would be curtailed.

A third disadvantage of island basing is related to size constraints. Basing would have to be accomplished at austere manning levels and would preclude allowance for dependents to accompany career service members. This limitation impacts adversely on both morale and retainability and adds to the indirect costs and problems associated with maintaining a fully prepared force.

In his analysis Dean Cameron states that only a few of the trust islands possess the size and topography that might be considered viable for the establishment of major military installations. Guam would continue to be an important element in any future basing plans. Careful planning might allow for some expansion on Guam without adverse effects. On some of the other islands where natural harbors exist, the prospects of a supporting airfield and sizable port facilities are poor due to lack of space and exhorbitant construction costs, if construction could be accomplished at all. In summary, Cameron states:
Aside from Guam, only Palau in the entire area possesses the geographic requirements for both air base and major port development. Saipan and Tinian, both of which are suitable for large airfields, have limited harbor facilities. Saipan's facilities are minimal; on Tinian, the situation is marginal even with the impressive artificial harbor constructed during World War II which may be adequate for logistic support of an airbase complex but not for sustained support of seagoing weapons systems. Consequently, base development in the Marianas must consider Tinian, Saipan and Guam as an integrated system, a point frequently overlooked in considering the problem, particularly in connection with proposals for airfield development on Tinian. In Palau, any base development must start from scratch which presents economic obstacles in addition to hitherto significant political difficulties with the Paluans.

This analysis by Cameron is predicated largely on geographical size, topography and construction feasibility. Fortunately for the Western Pacific strategy involved, Guam and the islands of Saipan and Tinian are located on the western edge of the Trust Territories. The Palau grouping is located southwest of Guam and thus closer to the desired operations region. But both political problems and construction costs mitigate against Palau. It becomes necessary then for the US military planner to determine what set of conditions and variables would serve to maximize desired operational results. The critical variables involved are force/basing requirements, location and distance factors, geographic and terrain factors, construction/investment costs and operational capabilities. Climate and weather play a minor role in that there is little variance throughout the islands under consideration; typhoon probabilities would have to be evaluated to determine
their impact on construction and operational considerations. Other lesser, more indirect considerations would be analyzed and included in the final decision matrix as appropriate. An important and more recent item would be that of environmental concern. The US government would have to make the difficult choice between military necessity and environmental degradation. Conversion of any island to a major base would have the effect of totally transforming its natural habitat and ecosystem. Efforts would have to be taken to lessen the impact in this regard.

The study group believes that the Trust Territories present the most probable and favorable long-term alternative to losing the Philippines bases. As a consequence, however, the US would have to accept the ensuing forfeitures of reduced capabilities and increased costs in comparison to using the bases at Subic Bay and Clark.

OTHER ALTERNATIVES

Another consideration which should be examined in evaluating alternative choices is the availability of existing commercial facilities in the regional area. In particular the shipyards in Singapore, Japan and perhaps Korea and Taiwan might be capable and feasible for limited usage by the US Navy. Similarly, it might be feasible to consider limited use of existing commercial airfields in various countries to augment otherwise limited US bases. In the absence of any other more acceptable solution, the US military should consider whether at least some or a part of its needs couldn't possibly be
filled on a lease or a rental basis. There may be many problems and disadvantages associated with such a proposal. Among the negative factors would be: limited US control and management, security ramifications, usage and sovereignty limitations, political squabbles, contractual problems, etc. At best, such support actions could only serve to provide a portion of the needs of normal US base support. However, it is emphasized that the pro-Western and the neutral nations in the region all claim to favor a level of US military presence, and it is wholly probable that they would be favorable to assisting the maintenance of what might constitute police forces as opposed to strategic forces. The arrangements negotiated for contracted services would be more informal and flexible than those associated with permanent basing. Further, most of the nations would appear to welcome the US financed economic input which would accompany such a program.

Two remaining courses of action which must be mentioned are: to follow a wait-and-see approach and do nothing to replace the lost bases; and to seek to obtain an ally or a coalition of allies to provide a proxy force in lieu of existing US forces. In terms of US global strategy, these two courses contain little merit in that they necessarily call for a significant reduction in US capabilities in the far West Pacific, especially for the Navy, and a corresponding withdrawal of US military forces from ocean areas that have been dominated by the US since WWII. This carries with it the perception on the part of other nations of a demonstrated lack of resolve or
national will on the part of the US. It would in turn provide an opening if not an actual power vacuum in terms of the concept of strategic denial, which could lead to intrusions from adversary forces. It might also carry with it a dynamic momentum which would be difficult to reverse once put into motion.

The idea for a coalition of allies is a welcome concept in principle, but it flies in the face of physical and geo-political realities. Only Japan and Australia possess any positive capability of providing for blue-water navies and corresponding strategic level air forces. Neither nation has given any indication of a willingness or interest in doing so. Australia has a modest but growing industrial capability and does not presume to be either a global or a dominant regional power. Japan, on the other hand, still pursues a national policy of antimilitarism as a by-product of WWII. Caught in common waters with both China and Russia, Japan is unwilling to provoke either adversary, preferring instead to pursue economic and diplomatic channels in a live-and-let-live posture. Similarly, the communist powers have not sought to provoke their near neighbor into commencement of a possible rearmament. Again, both Japan and Australia are allies who want to be included in the wedding so long as they don't have to furnish the bride or the groom.

It is emphasized that the study group does not feel that the US is faced with an impossible and wholly unacceptable dilemma in terms of the Philippines bases and their alternatives. The RP under President Marcos has placed the US government in the extremely
difficult position of having to make some key decisions which will have implications extending far beyond either the associated costs of the decisions or the geographical boundaries of the region. The decisions impact directly on strategies, programs and policies in a fundamental manner and force evaluation of past and existing programs to determine if they will still be applicable in the future. However, the alternative courses are in no way mutually exclusive of one another and, although the picture is complex and is so far dealt with only in terms of generalities, there is no reason why the US could not utilize a combination of any or all of the possible actions cited. Herein even the Philippines bases must be considered as possible elements, but in a different context distinct from our experience to date. Although no one of the alternatives appears to have very attractive merits, at the same time there are a number of alternatives and the US is not entirely boxed in by a situation from which there is no escape. It is, however, reiterated that there is no alternative which is as favorable as that of retaining the Philippines bases.
CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES


3. JCS, A Study Sponsored by the JCS for Congress, Pacific Basing Posture Study for Congress, p. 29. SECRET


CHAPTER V

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

John M. Collins, in his book Grand Strategy, reiterates the single two dominant points which control the overall global strategy of the United States.¹ These are that the USSR is the principal threat towards which our efforts must be directed, and that Europe represents the most critical geopolitical and military target area wherein the security of the US is directly threatened. Thus, as in World War II, US strategy is predicated on an "Europe first" policy with its NATO alliance. Other global areas must defer to Europe in terms of military preparedness and objectives. This does not require that other essential, sensitive areas are to be neglected; rather, it requires a balanced force structure based on a set of interrelated priorities. The US objective of securing the peace through policies aimed at deterring aggression and war is still a proper direction.

US military strategy does not thereby relegate the Pacific to a role of minimal importance, an operations theater which can be neglected because of the emphasis on Europe. The demonstrated response of the US in the Korean War and again in Vietnam refutes any argument that the Pacific has not been an area of major national importance. But the military and civilian leadership of the US must necessarily correlate strategy and force structures with the resources available for security purposes, seeking always to optimize the return on national defense expenditures. Collins supports the thesis that the defense of Europe is one of immediate vital interest, whereas the
Western Pacific is a developing interest which must continue to be protected and nurtured. He states that: "In Asia, the United States does well to adopt an indirect strategic approach that relies less on direct military participation than has our strategy in the recent past."² The reference here is to our involvement in Vietnam.

The theme of a more neutralized, independent, nonaligned region of nations is one which is generally noted in most articles about the subject area. Asian students will continue to monitor the developments on the mainland to see what degree of influence will be exerted by the PRC and the USSR on the former European colonies, both communist and noncommunist, from Bangladesh in the West to the Indochina countries to the east. Whether these nations will be able to retain and pursue a more independent, autonomous form of government relatively free of major power domination is the major unanswered question for the moment. Analysts generally agree that the region now holds major interests for four of the great powers: the US, USSR, China and Japan. Although Europe may hold a lesser interest at present, the Asian region does not go unnoticed in terms of future interests for that fifth power as well. This is demonstrated in an increasing economic dialogue with Europe, the third trading partner with the Philippines after the United States and Japan. To what degree the diverse regional nations will draw together under a regional identity is also a future question of great importance. An embryonic reflection of this effort is shown in the more recent establishment of ASEAN.

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This organization has invited representatives from Japan, Australia and New Zealand to attend their conference this summer (1977), a further indication of their interest in a regionalism outside the influence of external powers.

In terms of the Philippines bases, the study group feels that some degree of accommodation will be accomplished with the Marcos government. We base this on both our readings and our discussions with various officials interviewed. Unfortunately, unlike news reporters who might have greater degrees of freedom in pursuing a question of this nature, we were unable because of time and physical constraints to discuss the question with officials of the Republic. But it is believed that one statement heard over and over must be given considerable weight; that is that "They need us as much as we need them." What will be the extent of the accord remains to be seen. The trade-offs, limitations, costs and future matrix of military cooperation between the two governments may have to wait several more months before it can be articulated and formalized by the new Carter Administration, and then require a few years to determine what the results will be in practice.

The study group gained from all of the personnel interviewed and from most of the documents studied that any major reduction or actual termination of the Philippines bases would pose a severe setback not only for the US Pacific military force structure but also for the US as a whole. Such a reduction in the
capability of the US to project forces rapidly and decisively into the region would significantly add to the contention that the US can no longer afford to maintain its prior dominance in the Western Pacific. It would greatly lessen our government's credibility throughout the region in that it follows in the wake of the total withdrawal and defeat in Vietnam and the announced policy of further withdrawals from Korea. O. Edmund Clubb, writing in Current History in December 1975, cites the redirection of President Marcos towards both the PRC and the USSR, and sums up the general theme of many who believe that US policies and strategy in the area are coming apart at the seams by stating that: "In sum and substance, the American system of military alliances in SEA has come apart." 3

More importantly, however, the study group feels that a new era is evolving from the demise of imperialism and the regrowth of Europe and Japan following WWII. Previous traditions, philosophies, programs and shibboleths no longer obtain. New arrangements must be developed based on recognition of new and future currents and trends. The world of economics and trade is perhaps more flexible in adapting to changing circumstances than that of the more structured diplomatic relations and that of military strategy. It is imperative that the military leader and planner recognize and accept these changes for what they are in order that defense resources can be correlated to future rather than past circumstances.

A highly probable outcome of the base renegotiations is that current US military capabilities as a result of the bases will be
considerably restricted. A second result will be that costs will go up, which will have a negative impact on capabilities. Greater administrative and judicial workloads will be placed on assigned forces as sovereignty issues and status of forces agreements are effected. But these ramifications, unless allowed to get out of hand, usually have only a small, indirect impact on capabilities as compared to more direct inputs. The US military will have to make the most of these changes with their restrictive measures to preclude aggravating the situation further.

The study group also believes that the longer range availability of Subic Naval Station and Clark Air Base is more doubtful given the trend towards military neutrality and nonalignment in the region. This does not mean that friendly relations with the RP will be terminated; it does mean that the RP will seek relationships which are founded more and more on a perception that the Philippines must be treated as a mature, independent nation rather than a former dependent of the US. If the RP government is going to actively pursue a positive regional leadership role as a neutral, nonaligned state, and at the same time continue its initiatives towards rapprochement with the USSR and the PRC, then it will continue to reduce its ties to the US military as a consequential action. The US must seek to lessen the impacts of this course of action while at the same time developing alternative programs to maintain acceptable force projection capabilities. The US military must recognize that even if current negotiations achieve an accommodation which still permits some degree of strategic
flexibility from the RP bases, that the accommodation is probably a question of time until political forces in the Philippines call for a further reduction. These pressures will come from the younger Filipinos, those born since WWII, who no longer feel a need to look to the US to make "their" nation viable.

To accomplish its objectives the US military will have to look to a combination of all of the possible alternatives discussed in this paper. Additional elements of operational and logistical support capabilities will have to be sought with friendly nations, from ship repair bases to communications sites to berthing facilities. Greater dependency will have to be placed on rental and leasing activities, whether on a piecemeal, task basis, or longer term arrangements. Some additional basing capability must be planned for the Trust Territories, with emphasis being given to expendable, modular engineering planning to permit rapid development from cellular units in the event of hostilities. Continued development of friendly military forces should be an important leg of this program. This step would be directed towards strengthening developing states against external aggression. Lastly, greater emphasis must be placed on improved technology and equipment modernization to permit our forces to operate at greater distances, for longer periods, and to deploy more rapidly. Technology should permit some trade-offs between the number of personnel required versus effectiveness.

The study group does not believe the US should follow a wait-and-see, do-nothing policy. Because of probable limited
resources, it will be essential that resourceful, innovative actions be planned and implemented so as to retain some initiative in dealing with projected future problems. Some force reductions will come about as a natural consequence of peace in the region. US forces in Korea, Japan and Okinawa will see additional modifications as those states' potential increases. The future role of the US throughout the region may be more one of security monitor, ombudsman, and third-party negotiator than that of a guardian police force. As in the Middle East, the US will seek to avoid a major power confrontation with the USSR or the PRC. To retain the credibility and influence which goes with being a major world power, however, the US must nevertheless continue to maintain an acceptable force structure of both strategic and tactical elements in the Western Pacific. Such a commitment of military resources in conjunction with political and economic programs undertaken by the US is considered essential in protecting our current and future interests in the area.
CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid.

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