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13 MAY 1977

READINESS SYSTEM MANAGEMENT

BY

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READINESS SYSTEM MANAGEMENT

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

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This study examines the basic concepts involved in measuring and reporting Army unit readiness, and relates these concepts to the conduct of foreign policy and to the role of the military in a democracy. The widespread dissatisfaction with the readiness reporting system is examined and related to inherent problems within the system. Such problems include the basic difficulty of self-evaluation, the contradictory purposes of the system (i.e., management versus status report), the contradictory effect of
objectivity versus subjectivity in measuring readiness, and the relativity, perishability, and cost of readiness. The current reporting system is discussed and continuing unresolved issues are presented. Finally, the paper examines the practical applications of managing readiness with a survey of procedures currently in use at all command echelons from the reporting unit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This study examines the basic concepts involved in measuring and reporting Army unit readiness, and relates these concepts to the conduct of foreign policy and to the role of the military in a democracy. The widespread dissatisfaction with the readiness reporting system is examined and related to inherent problems within the system. Such problems include the basic difficulty of self-evaluation, the contradictory purposes of the system (i.e., management versus status report), the contradictory effect of objectivity versus subjectivity in measuring readiness, and the relativity, perishability, and cost of readiness. The current reporting system is discussed and continuing unresolved issues are presented. Finally, the paper examines the practical applications of managing readiness with a survey of procedures currently in use at all command echelons from the reporting unit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
PREFACE

Purposes. This group study project was prepared under the aegis of the US Army War College Department of Command and Management for the specific purpose of inclusion in future editions of the Army War College textbook Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice (3 volumes). This project was also prepared to fulfill the requirements of the US Army War College Military Studies program; viz, to acquire and apply knowledge in a study effort which seeks solutions or insight into significant problems of national security and military affairs.

Scope. To best fulfill these purposes, the scope of this paper has been narrowed to focus only on selected aspects of the broad field of military operational readiness. Government and commercial study groups have prepared voluminous studies on readiness. The aspects of readiness selected for this study have been determined by the need to provide concise, useful knowledge to students, faculty and staff of the Army War College on:

1. The concept of readiness and its relationship to military preparedness, strategy and foreign policy.
2. The current methodology of estimating and reporting unit readiness.
3. The methodology of readiness management at higher echelons.

In short, the purpose of this paper is to explain current readiness concepts and Army readiness management methods. In this project we have not attempted to discover new readiness measurement methodology but to aid in dispelling some of the confusion and cynicism surrounding the current system. Some of the more perplexing issues are identified and left, unresolved, for confrontation by future Army officials. In this respect we have pursued
the objectives of the Army Command and Management text by not only attempting to provide useful information but also by provoking "thoughts which will serve as a basis for further study and discussion" (Volume I, page 3).

Methodology. This paper was prepared from a study of documents and from extensive interviews with operations personnel at all levels from company level to the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After an initial survey of documents and several interviews, detailed questions were prepared to guide in obtaining the needed information during visits to selected headquarters. (Annex 3 contains these questions.) Headquarters visited included the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of the Army, US Readiness Command, US Army Forces Command, US Army Europe, XVIII Airborne Corps, V Corps and several Army divisions.

LTC Weekley had previously researched and written extensively on readiness matters while assigned to Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1972-1974. In addition to preparing briefings and internal papers on readiness, he authored and coordinated two publications: a new version of Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, "Unit Readiness Reporting," and an original pamphlet, DA Pamphlet 525-10, "Combat Readiness." This current study draws extensively on his previous research.

Acknowledgements. Colonel John H. Madison of the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute, who was a principle author of the recent readiness study by that institute, offered considerable helpful advice and assistance. COL William Rawlinson, the study adviser and COL Edward Tolfa, both of the Department of Command and Management provided valuable guidance and ideas. Numerous staff officers at the headquarters we visited were extremely generous in sharing their time and ideas.
**Recommendation.** The format of this study has been designed so that the body, less the preface and the annexes, can be republished in lieu of the current Chapter 18, *Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice.*
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READINESS SYSTEM MANAGEMENT

Upon what, then, should you expect to see the Army's efforts expended during this current fiscal year and beyond? . . . First, you will find that we mean business when we say that we will strive to enhance the readiness of the Total Army to the highest level that we possibly can. . . . We will no longer have the luxury of . . .

time.1

--General Bernard W. Rogers, 1976

INTRODUCTION

The primary purpose of military forces in peacetime is to be prepared to fight in war. This military preparedness, or readiness, serves two objectives:

1. To reduce the likelihood of actually having to fight (deterrence);

and,

2. To improve the likelihood of victory if deterrence fails.

The multitude of tasks and missions undertaken by military forces are, according to the above criteria, subordinated to and compared to the goal of attaining maximum combat readiness. The Army clearly uses readiness as its principle measure of effectiveness. Not surprisingly, outside agencies also use the readiness yardstick to see how well the Army has managed its fiscal and manpower resources. Such outside agencies include the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Congress, General Accounting Office, and Office of Management and Budget.

It follows that if combat readiness is vital to national security, and is the primary criterion of armed forces effectiveness (short of war), it is imperative to find a reliable means of measuring or assessing readiness. To convert combat readiness from a pure qualitative abstraction to a relatively
quantitative status report, each of the U.S. armed services has developed a way to measure its own organizational readiness and has designed a readiness reporting system with a corresponding readiness management system. These systems are integrated into a common joint readiness measuring and reporting system under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus measuring and reporting systems constitute the hard statistical core of the nebulous field called readiness, or preparedness. This relationship is illustrated by a recent report of the General Accounting Office (GAO) which observed that the readiness of U.S. Army armored units in Europe was lower than desired because of failures of the unit readiness reporting system.

Despite this high interest in readiness and despite the singular importance of readiness reporting, the Army is experiencing widespread misunderstanding of the readiness system concepts and widespread cynicism about the effectiveness of the reporting system. A recent study by the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) concluded that 21 percent of those interviewed admitted they had difficulty understanding the system and the other 79 percent who thought they understood the system tended not to actually understand the details of measuring and reporting readiness. The SSI study, based on extensive field interviews, also disclosed that people throughout the Army hold the system in disrepute, and feel that it fails to produce valid and reliable results.

Yet, in recent years the Army's readiness reporting system has been studied extensively by the best military and civilian minds, and it has been completely revised eight times since it was formally initiated in 1963. Still, it seems that it satisfies almost no one, in or out of uniform. As one critical congressman recently stated, "... the (Army's) reporting..."
system has been changed on the average of once every 1.5 months in the past decade, which indicates not only the general dissatisfaction with the product but the Army's total inability to correct the problem.\(^5\)

The readiness reporting system shares a bad reputation with the officer evaluation reporting (OER) system; no matter how changed, they please almost no one and both are often reputed to fail to accomplish their intended purposes. Much of this lack of understanding and cynicism can be traced to a misunderstanding of the basic concepts of readiness measurement. There are, in fact, inevitable internal contradictions in the purposes and uses of the readiness reporting system which contribute to its poor reputation. The primary purpose of this chapter is to dispel some of the misunderstanding and cynicism by offering a clear explanation of these readiness concepts, by explaining the key features of the current system, by offering several points of view on unresolved issues, and by explaining how readiness data is used for management at each level of command, both service and joint.

**READINESS CONCEPTS**

**Security—primary objective of the nation state.**

We may say that in the state of nature, every entity, whether individual or political unit, makes security a primary objective.\(^6\) This respected axiom of international relations is the starting point of analysis and understanding of readiness concepts, because readiness of armed forces is essential to security. The next step is recognition that although security is a primary objective, possession of security is always uncertain because the outcome of conflict is uncertain.
Can we imagine that a theoretician of power could eliminate war's uncertainty by adding up the weight of various elements, and announce in advance the result of the combat? . . . But if the outcome of the battle is uncertain, it is because military force cannot be measured exactly, and total power still less than military force.

Yet states do wage war despite their inability to insure victory because, as Clausewitz wrote, "'each Cabinet places its confidence in the belief that in this game it will surpass its neighbor in skill and sharp-sightedness.' But its confidence is not always confirmed by the event." Cabinets, or National Command Authorities (NCA) in current U.S. military terminology, come to believe that their armed forces will prevail by estimating the size and combat readiness of their own forces compared to those of the potential enemy. Hence, the need arises for a system which can provide an estimate of the armed forces' ability to fight without actually fighting, i.e., a readiness reporting system. Obviously, the only convincingly accurate method of measuring readiness would be to send the forces to war and observe the results.

Power determination.

To keep readiness in perspective we must recognize that military preparedness is only one part of the equation which determines total national power. Professor Hans Morgenthau lists nine widely accepted elements of power:

1. Geography.
2. Industrial Capacity.
3. Military Preparedness (including technology, leadership and quantity and quality of armed forces).
6. Natural resources.
8. Quality of diplomacy.

Some of these elements of power can be roughly quantitatively compared to those of other nations; other elements are purely qualitative and judgemental. Even if these elements could all be quantified, they can not be summed to compare "total power" because the weakest element may be the determining element, regardless of the strength of all others. But estimating power is even more elusive because the military preparedness element is itself made up of many factors, both quantifiable and subjective. These factors include:

1. Unit readiness (of many units, aggregated judgementally).
2. Design of weapons (both qualitative and quantitative comparisons).
3. Design of force structure (qualitative comparison).
4. Availability of supplies (quantitative inventory; judgemental requirements).
5. Relationship with allies (judgemental).
6. Strategic intelligence capability (qualitative and quantitative).
7. Civilian and military airlift (quantitative inventory, judgemental requirements).
8. Civilian and military sealift (quantitative inventory, judgemental requirements).
9. Line of communications preparation (quantitative assets, judgemental requirements and locations).
10. Availability of prestocked equipment (quantitative inventory, judgemental requirement).
11. Mobilization capability (highly judgemental until executed).
12. Capability to receive forces in theater (highly judgemental assumptions about conditions in theater).
13. Senior leadership—quality of strategic planning and decision making (qualitative judgement).

While other important factors could be listed, the key point is that aggregate unit readiness (force readiness) is but one of many intangible factors which constitute military preparedness, and military preparedness is but one of the many intangible elements of national power. Moreover, unit readiness itself is intangible; it is illogical to attempt to add the aggregate readiness of individual units, any one of which could be a crucial weak link. Even the readiness of individual units is composed of both tangibles and intangibles. (For example, personnel fill is tangible; will to fight is intangible.)

Necessity for readiness reporting and readiness strategy.

The point to this categorical analysis is that estimating the military preparedness element of national power is exceedingly difficult and highly situational. Yet in a democracy, the people and their elected representatives want to know (and have a right to know) how much national security can be purchased for a certain price, and further to know how much security is required. These democratic precepts drive the armed forces in their planning and programming to ask for budgets which will provide the necessary amount of readiness—hence, security. Short of war, the only measure of return on the dollar that the armed forces can show the nation is an estimated level of force readiness—a gross intangible as we have seen. But a means of estimating—i.e., a readiness reporting system—becomes a necessity, regardless of the difficulty in actually making accurate readiness estimates.

Recognizing these frustrating analytical limitations and the inability to attain and ascertain an absolute readiness level, the armed forces have
adopted a readiness strategy; i.e., they attempt to maximize readiness within a given resource allocation. Now instead of attempting to insure absolute preparedness the managers have a more modest goal—to insure the best possible readiness using a given level of resources—in effect, shifting the burden of win or loss to the resource allocators, the people and their elected leaders. The armed forces design a strategy to support foreign policy based on a projected level of readiness, maximized within available and reasonably projected resources. Former Army Chief of Staff Weyand made this clear:

The key is readiness. It is our strategy . . . I am determined to leave no stone unturned toward providing the military options necessary to support our foreign policy objectives. It is appropriate to recall that all our planning, budgeting, recruiting, training, and equipping is designed to gain just one end: that American soldiers will be properly armed and equipped, in sufficient numbers and at the right time and place to fight . . . and . . . win.10

This inseparable relationship between readiness and strategy is evident in B. H. Liddell Hart's definition of strategy: "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."11

Readiness system model.

The Army's readiness strategy dictates the need for effective readiness measuring and management; indeed, Army management is readiness management. Looking at the Army as a system, we have already seen that the system output is combat readiness to support the contingencies and exigencies of U.S. foreign policy. System input is fiscal appropriations and authorization to provide the Army with necessary resources; i.e., people, facilities, materiel and services. Efficient Army management translates these resources into Total Army readiness as efficiently as possible through planning,
recruiting, procuring, organizing, researching, testing, training, distributing, building, contracting, and a myriad of other Army functions. As General Weyand stated above, every Army activity must be analyzed with respect to its impact on readiness; activities which contribute little or nothing to readiness are, by definition, non-productive.

To improve the Army management (readiness) system, as in any system, feedback is essential. There is a need to constantly sample the output, compare it to the input, and attempt to adjust the internal functions so that output is maximized. The Army has many internal channels for this managerial feedback, such as various logistic reporting systems, personnel reporting systems, inspector general reports, audit reports, and command or staff visits and inspections. These are all, in a sense, readiness reporting systems. One of the broadest and most timely of these Army feedback channel is the formal Army unit readiness reporting system. Figure 1 shows these relationships.

**ARMY MANAGEMENT/READINESS SYSTEM MODEL**

![Diagram of Army Management/Readiness System Model](image)

**Figure 1**

8
Characteristics of an ideal system.

Without some kind of timely and accurate readiness reporting, the whole Army management system would be unregulated and unassessable. There would be no means to determine the effectiveness of translating resources into combat readiness. Recognizing the inherent limitations on readiness measurement already cited, the problem is to design the best possible readiness measuring and reporting system. Figure 2 lists desirable characteristics of an ideal system which could serve both as a status report and a management tool.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLUMN A</th>
<th>COLUMN B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serves Status Report Purposes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Serves Management Tool Purposes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMPLE. Easily prepared and understood at all levels. Uses only a few sample criteria.</td>
<td>DETAILED. Provides complete data, such as &quot;on-hand&quot; status of thousands of authorized items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPID. Data to highest echelons fast. Enables accurate planning and deployment decisions.</td>
<td>METHODICAL. Permits time at each echelon for thorough staffing, review and analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECT TRANSMITTAL TO JCS/DA. Data base reflects actual conditions in unit.</td>
<td>TRANSMITTAL VIA CHAIN OF COMMAND. Permits management actions and correction of problems at each level before report is forwarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT. Includes intangible human factors, esprit, experience.</td>
<td>OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT. Quantified data desired to permit computer analysis, aggregation and eliminate human bias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTINUOUS UPDATE. Reports submitted only when changes occur. Insures timeliness, accuracy, best use of staff and facilities.</td>
<td>PERIODIC REPORT. Enables managers to have Army-wide &quot;snapshot,&quot; insures periodic maximizing (peaking).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJOR UNITS AGGREGATED. 1 assessment for each integral unit; i.e., division, separate brigade, separate battalion.</td>
<td>INDIVIDUAL REPORTS OF LOWEST UNITS FORWARDED. Permits maximum management actions and visibility within major units by outside managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANDARD IS FULL TOE. Criteria for measurement is full wartime needs of unit. Determines readiness to fight.</td>
<td>STANDARD IS AUTHORIZATION. Criteria for measurement is current authorized level, even if peacetime authorization less than wartime. Managers can best use to evaluate how efficiently authorized resources are being employed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-ASSESSMENT. Commander considered in best position to assess intangible factors.</td>
<td>OUTSIDE EVALUATION. Eliminate possible commander's bias.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 2

9
Although all of the characteristics in Figure 2 are desirable, it is obvious that many are contradictory. In Figure 2 each desirable feature in Column A is to some degree mutually exclusive of the desirable feature on the same line in Column B. The features in Column A that enhance the status reporting purposes of the system are endorsed by operations personnel and the operational chain of command. The features in Column B that enhance the management purposes of the system are endorsed by the management offices at each level of command. Herein lies the major cause of past misunderstanding of and dissatisfaction with readiness reporting systems and is the major reason for the frequent system changes.

The system can not perform mutually exclusive functions well, and each changed edition has represented a different compromise among these contradictory but desirable features. For example, in response to pressure, during the late 1960's, the Army decided to make the system primarily a management tool. As suggested in Column B, the number of readiness indicators inevitably but gradually tripled, adding useful readiness criteria such as completion of selected training events, status of basic loads and spare parts inventory. The time required for staffing and forwarding inevitably but gradually increased to more than 60 days. The system's value as a management tool was greatly improved but its value as a status report correspondingly sank. By 1971 the report had become such a burden on commanders at all levels that the senior Army leadership considered eliminating the whole system. Instead, the report was sharply changed back to a status report, reducing the number of readiness indicators and the time for staffing and forwarding. As a result the revised system, implemented in July 1973, was a less effective management tool but a better status report. By 1975 Army
managers were starting to clamor again to add on more data items, to make
the report a better management tool.

Subjectivity versus objectivity.

On each line in Figure 2 a compromise between Column A and Column B has
been reached in the current reporting system. One of the most difficult
compromises concerns the degree to which the report should be subjective or
objective. Some of the key elements of this compromise are shown in Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECTIVITY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **EMPHASIS ON PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT AND INTEGRITY.**
   Assumes chain of command is best judge of ability to perform wartime mission. | **EMPHASIS ON INFALLIBLE SYSTEM DESIGN.** Assumes that the data gives most accurate assessment of ability to perform wartime mission. |
| **CONSIDERS HUMAN FACTORS.**
   Assumes need to measure (judgementally) and report on esprit, quality of leadership, experience, willingness to fight. | **CONSIDERS ONLY QUANTIFIABLE STATISTICAL FACTORS.** Assumes that leadership, esprit, etc., match level of personnel fill and equipment fill. |
| PERMITS BIAS. Within limits commanders may rate units on the high or low side. Seldom do two individuals assess subjective factors identically. | **CREATES ANOMALIES.** Since it is impossible to foresee every reporting situation for every type of unit, objective systems suffer from system imperfections. For example, certain equipment or personnel skills may be inconsequential to some units and essential to others, depending on mission, anticipated deployment locations, etc. |

Figure 3
Previous editions of the Army's readiness reporting system have oscillated between these two poles of subjectivity and objectivity, with the advantages and disadvantages of each extreme as shown in Figure 3. The crux of this aspect of the problem concerns the vital question--can the Army trust its commanders? Those who argue for greater subjectivity point out that statistics (OR rates, MOS fill, etc.) can be highly misleading and that the commanders' judgement is vital to assess an organization. Chain of command judgement is considered the only feasible way to assess the level of training, morale, espirit, skill, experience and other factors vital to combat readiness. Blindly tying the report to statistical data, without allowing the commander to interpret that data, disregards the professionalism the Army expects of its commanders. On the other hand, those who argue for greater objectivity feel that the commander perceives pressure; for that reason he can not be trusted and will consciously or subconsciously bias the readiness report to suit his purposes (upward to please his commander and "look good" or downward to obtain more resources).  

Training ratings are one of the most subjective portions of the current readiness report. Recently a scheme to reduce the subjectivity in training ratings was designed and tested in CONUS on a limited basis. To quantify training ratings, a list of prescribed training events and associated time intervals was prepared for various type units. For example, for an engineer platoon to be rated 1 it had to have constructed a fixed bridge with dimensioned native timber in accordance with Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) standards, with 80 percent of full unit strength participating, during the past six months. Such specificity eliminates potential commanders' bias, but can not provide for rating the platoon...
which experienced 50 percent turnover six weeks after the training event, or
only had 79 percent present for the event but is over-strength in experi-
enced personnel now. Further, we see that even such a concerted attempt to
eliminate human judgement actually introduces many additional judgemental
factors. Which events are essential for each type unit? What should be the
relative weight/importance for each event? How often must selected events
be performed? How do you degrade the training rating as personnel depart
who participated in the event? What missions are assumed to be most impor-
tant for multi-mission units? The list of judgements which must be applied
is endless.

The central issue is, what is likely to be the most accurate method for
judging the combat readiness of a specific unit with respect to a specific
mission--a fixed system of rules and standardized criteria or the profes-
sional judgement of the responsible commander? Assessment of one's own
command is difficult, requires soul-searching, expert judgement, and integ-
re. But if Army commander's do not possess these qualities in peacetime,
their likelihood of success in combat is low. Being able to judge the read-
iness of one's own unit, its strengths and vulnerabilities becomes a life
and death matter on the battlefield.

Relativity of readiness.

There is a constant tendency of national security managers, from the
President and Congress on down, to ask whether forces are "ready" or
"unready." The media has publicized apparent disagreements about readiness
which are, in reality, disagreements about where to draw the line between
"ready" and "unready" on the readiness continuum. Not only is the problem
of readiness measurement highly subjective but the decision as to what
level of readiness to call "ready" is highly subjective. In other words, if we determine that equipment "operationally ready" (OR) rates constitute a valid measurement of readiness, we must make a somewhat arbitrary decision about how high the OR rate must be for a unit to be considered combat ready. The cut off point between "ready" and "unready" is always a source of dispute. If we set 90 percent or 80 percent as levels of personnel strength, below which the unit is not fully ready, experienced observers will point out that historical battles have been won with units at 75 percent strength or below. This kind of argument extends to every element of readiness measuring criteria.

Generally the services have established four or five levels of readiness—four are currently prescribed in the JCS and Army systems. The levels are defined as "fully ready" (1), "substantially ready" (2), "marginally ready" (3), or "not ready" (4). The arbitrary line between each level is a constant source of disagreement. The middle categories between "fully ready" and "not ready" have been devised to recognize that a unit can be less than fully ready but still possess considerable combat power.

A related source of disagreement over readiness levels concerns the standards against which a unit is judged. It has been a common practice to measure against the organizational design; i.e., full wartime table of organization and equipment (TOE). This method of measuring readiness is dependent on the quality of judgement of the people who designed the organization. For example, a unit may have all of its authorized cargo trucks, but the unit designers did not give the unit enough trucks for it to accomplish its wartime mission. Such a unit would be rated fully ready but would be unable to accomplish its mission, thus in fact—unready.
This conceptual flaw extends to authorized numbers and skills of people, designed training objectives, authorized amounts and kinds of equipment and supplies, and so on. In the past, Army managers who were overly concerned about numerical readiness ratings have found that they could instantly improve readiness ratings by reducing unit requirements. Obviously such manipulation does not improve war-fighting capability—it simply increases reported readiness levels with the same amount of resources. Those who favor using the readiness reporting system primarily as a management tool rather than a status report have frequently sought to require that units report against authorized levels rather than full wartime TOE levels. Units are frequently restricted to reduced levels of people, equipment and supplies in peacetime in order to distribute shortages rationally. Thus managers often feel a unit should be favorably rated if it reaches authorized levels, even though authorized levels may be far below full wartime levels. They feel a unit is being "penalized" if it can never be rated 1. Rating against authorized levels would enhance management efficiency at the expense of status reporting efficiency. See Figure 2.

A related source of misunderstanding stems from varied interpretations of what readiness means. When the term readiness is taken to mean fast reaction time or high deployability posture, confusion is inevitable. High unit readiness and maximum deployability posture are actually somewhat incompatible. For example, to improve a unit's deployment posture one should restrict leaves and passes, bring troops back from training exercises, stop using equipment for training and get it ready to deploy, load ammunition, supplies and equipment, pack personal gear, and so on. These measures, if maintained, tend to degrade the true readiness of the unit by causing adverse
effects on training and morale, deterioration of stored supplies, and unproductive use of time in standby activities.

Cost and perishability of readiness.

Another readiness concept which has been of great concern at Department of the Army level concerns the incremental costs of readiness. Specifically, current readiness becomes a budget issue that must be balanced against other program needs. For example, assuming a fixed level of resources, the Army could reduce the readiness of a fixed force structure to provide for the research, development and testing of future equipment and forces, or the Army could cut its force structure. It appears that retaining as large a structure as possible, but at reduced readiness has often been the preferred alternative. There are two reasons why it may be better to reduce readiness and retain structure. First, maximum readiness is highly perishable. A unit can attain maximum readiness and six months later the trained expertise and peak maintenance levels have ebbed away unless a continuous intensive infusion of training and maintenance is maintained. (See Figure 4). But units can be maintained at a moderate level much more economically, and brought to full readiness when needed.

**READINESS PERISHABILITY AND COST**

![Diagram showing perishability and cost of readiness]

Figure 4
Secondly, the incremental costs of attaining the highest readiness levels increase sharply as the maximum levels are approached. For example, for this reason we see few large scale, full unit exercises although they are necessary to achieve maximum readiness. Figure 4 illustrates this relationship; note the shape of the readiness/dollar curve, illustrating this tendency to increased incremental cost. Other factors contributing to this increased incremental cost include the wasteful tendency to continuous cannibalization to maximize the amount of operational equipment, the expensive and inefficient increased parts and supplies inventories necessary at the unit level, "uploaded" ammunition tending to environmental deterioration, markedly increased training costs, especially for ammunition and fuel, and wear and tear on combat equipment by hard training. As the projected energy crisis deepens, this aspect of incremental readiness cost will tend to become an even more significant factor.

For these reasons, Department of the Army is concerned with maintaining some units at a high level of readiness for instant deployment and others at a reduced level in order to maximize the use of limited resources. Maintaining every unit of the Active Army and Reserve Components at a peak of combat readiness would absorb financial resources that are needed to buy tomorrow's readiness, i.e. research, development, testing and procurement.

Concept Summary.

An understanding of the following points is essential to understanding readiness management.

1. Security is a primary objective of the nation state.
2. Power determination is vital to national security.
3. Readiness estimating is vital to power determination.
4. Readiness, preparedness, and national power are highly situational and subjective.

5. In a democracy there is a need to justify military expenditures in terms of preparedness (readiness).

6. Readiness is the yardstick of rational military programming and budgeting.

7. Readiness strategy entails maximizing readiness within available resources.

8. A readiness reporting system is an indispensable part of the Army management model; i.e. management processes are adjusted by observing the organizational output (readiness) in terms of efficient utilization of input (funds and authorizations) via a feedback system (readiness reporting system).

9. The ideal characteristics of a readiness reporting system are mutually exclusive and contradictory depending on whether they primarily serve management or status reporting purposes.

10. Subjectivity versus objectivity is a key source of disagreement and misunderstanding in readiness reporting.

11. Readiness is relative and highly sensitive to standards selected. Agreement on the meaning of readiness is essential to good management.

12. Maximum readiness is perishable, declining rapidly after reaching a peak. The incremental cost of readiness increases sharply as maximum limits are approached. These factors force the Army to be conscious of the cost of readiness, allocating funds for both future and current readiness by accepting a lower readiness status for some units.
THE READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM

Historical development.

A recurring theme of the preceding section is the national security requirement for some kind of effective readiness assessment of one's own forces. Since its establishment, the U.S. Army has continuously devised and improved successive means of assessing its own fighting capability, although this assessing was not called "readiness reporting" per se. Morning reports, logistic reports, inspector general reports, and reports of command and staff visits to subordinate units are examples of readiness assessment and reporting that have been used since the American colonists formed a revolutionary army.

The need for a system of formalized readiness reporting was felt in 1961 during the Berlin crisis. As the Army prepared to reinforce its European-based units it discovered that in many cases readiness was considerably worse than had been estimated. The following year a study group was formed within Headquarters, Department of the Army, with the mission of developing a formal Army unit readiness reporting system. After designing, staffing, and field testing a draft system, the first formalized readiness reporting system, AR 220-1, was published in August 1963.

During this development of the Army system, a parallel development took place within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). The National Defense Act of 1947 had established the requirement to provide the Department of Defense with a current combat capability assessment of operational forces, but a formal system was not developed until the 1960's. Using the Army system as a model, the OJCS required each of the services to design a system for combat readiness assessment, and in 1967...
incorporated these into a comprehensive joint system called the Readiness Operations (REDOPS) Report. Since then, the OJCS has gradually increased its requirements, and coordinated them with other aspects of unit operations, logistic and personnel reports under the Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT), which is an integral part of the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS). 14

The Army continued to revise its own system, vascillating between management and status report purposes, adapting its system to new automated data capabilities, and adapting to the additional requirements of the OJCS' FORSTAT. In 1976, the Army reporting system underwent the latest substantial revision to improve its effectiveness and credibility. On June 1, 1976, as the draft revised system was being prepared, the Army's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) completed its comprehensive analysis of the readiness system which included a survey of the attitudes of Army people toward the reporting system. Many of the conclusions and recommendations of the SSI, and many other substantial changes, were incorporated into the revised draft of AR 220-1 which was distributed in late 1976 and underwent field testing in early 1977. The revised AR 220-1 is expected to be published as soon as the field testing can be completed and evaluated, and will probably be distributed to the field in early 1978.

The revised draft AR 220-1 has been substantially reorganized and re-written to reduce its complexity for reporting units. The former assumptions for estimating training readiness have been removed, and commanders are given considerably more specific guidance to assist them in estimating their training readiness and to standardize rating criteria between units to a greater degree. Detailed procedures have been developed and included for the first time for major units to follow in preparing a methodical aggregate
rating of the major unit, incorporating all divisional elements. The revised
draft also includes a new "pacing list" of major equipment items to give
additional weight and visibility to firepower and mobility equipments such as
tanks, howitzers, missiles, personnel carriers and aircraft. The detailed list
of equipment to be rated is now to be controlled by specific MTOE annotations
of "primary weapons and equipment" rather than the former "Reportable Item
Control Code-1" (RICC-1) list. Equipment status ratings have been revised to
show a 30 day operational readiness (OR) rate rather than the old 20th of the
month "snap shot." Personnel ratings have been revised to reflect not only
strength and MOS fill but fill in senior grades, highlighting any leadership
shortages.

Readiness Reporting Procedures.

Details of Army unit readiness reporting procedures are explicit in
AR 220-1. A summary of the key aspects is included here to provide a basic
understanding of the system.

AR 220-1 generally requires all TOE units, company size or larger, to
submit readiness reports each month, using data which is current as of the
20th day of the month. Reserve component units submit data twice annually.
Selected units smaller than company size are also required to report.

Each reporting unit commander determines ratings of personnel status,
logistic status, training status and overall capability using the criteria
in AR 220-1. Normally the overall capability rating is the lowest of the
other three ratings unless the commander determines there are extenuating
circumstances and explains them in his detailed remarks, effectively permit-
ting him to override statistical data with his judgement. Each report permits
the inclusion of free-formatted commander's remarks in addition to the
required statistical data. All ratings are computed against the standard of
full wartime capability authorizations. Readiness condition ratings can range from 1 through 4, fully ready to not ready.

AR 220-1 strongly advises higher commanders not to consider readiness reports as adversely reflecting on the reporting unit, because many locally unmanageable factors can cause a low rating. This guidance is designed to promote an objective reporting atmosphere, stressing accuracy and minimizing command pressure. Of course, whether the reporting commander perceives pressure will depend on the atmosphere generated by his immediate commanders.

Reports generally are forwarded to division or installation level on worksheets (DA Form 2715), then converted to punch cards and transmitted directly to the appropriate major Army command and to OJCS. Information copies are sent to intervening or other appropriate headquarters, as required. (See Figures 5 and 6.) Reports are processed and dispatched rapidly so they can arrive at OJCS by the fifth working day after the 20th of each month. When changes to a unit's overall rating occur between reporting periods, units are required to immediately submit a report of that change without waiting for the 20th of the month. Commanders above the reporting unit level are not permitted to change any submitted ratings but are permitted to submit comments necessary to amplify the report. (Next higher commanders at installation or division or below append their remarks directly to the report as an "RA2 card" comment. Commanders higher than division or installation forward their comments, if any, by separate communication.) Specific readiness data requirements, as proposed by the latest draft AR 220-1 are summarized below. Items preceded by an asterisk (*) are those where the resulting data is retained by JCS. Other items are used solely by the headquarters in Army management channels.
1. Personnel readiness.
   a. Personnel fill. Operating strength expressed as a percentage of full MTOE strength.
   b. Positions filled by qualified people. Military occupational specialty (MOS) qualified people filling authorized positions, expressed as a percentage of MTOE strength. If there is overstrength in a specific skill, excess personnel may not be included in the overall percentage unless they are also qualified to fill a vacant position in another skill.
   c. Senior grade fill. Number of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted grades E5 through E9 expressed as a percentage of full MTOE positions for those grades.
   d. Turnover rate. Number of people reassigned from the unit for the past three months (six months for reserve component units), expressed as a percentage of operating strength.
   e. Deployable strength fill. Number of people who are fully qualified for overseas unit deployment expressed as a percentage of full MTOE strength.
   *f. Personnel readiness rating. Items a, b, and c above are converted to a numerical rating (1 through 4) according to standardized criteria (e.g. personnel fill of 85 to 95 percent is rated 2). The lowest (e.g. 4 is lower than 3) of these three ratings is the personnel readiness rating.
   *g. Reason personnel readiness rating is less than 1 (if applicable.) This is a coded reason from tables in AR 220-1 which permits automatic data processing analysis of readiness, Army-wide.

2. Logistics readiness.
   a. Total reportable equipment line items. Reportable items are
those designated as Reportable Item Control Code 1 (RICC-1) until annotation of MTOE's is completed by Department of the Army. Then reportable items will be those designated "A," "Primary Weapons and Equipment," in the MTOE.

b. Equipment line item density. Fill of equipment lines, based on the percentage fill of each line and expressed as the number of lines rated 1, 2, 3, and 4 according to standardized criteria.
c. Pacing item density. Selected items are also designated as "pacing items," viz., key weapons systems, vehicles and aircraft. The fill of these high visibility items is expressed as a percentage of full MTOE authorizations.
d. Equipment operationally ready (OR) rate. Operational condition of key items, expressed as an aggregated percentage of days available for combat use during a month. In other words, this generally expresses the inverse of deadline rates.
e. Pacing item operationally ready (OR) rate. Operational condition of pacing items (2c above), expressed as a percentage of days available for combat use during a month.
f. Missile system availability. Describes the operational condition of missile units during the reporting period. Expressed as the percentage of time that the system was ready and the degree of readiness during the reporting period. This rating only applies, at present, to the following type units: HAWK, IMPROVED HAWK, LANCE, NIKE HERCULES and PERSHING.

*g. Equipment fill rating. Equipment fill expressed as a numerical rating, 1 through 4, according to standardized criteria. Both RICC-1 (later MTOE "A") items and pacing items are considered; the lower of the two is the
decisive rating. For example, a field artillery unit which had all of its equipment except its howitzers would be rated 4, "not ready," although it would have a very high equipment density.

*h. Reason equipment fill rating is less than 1 (if applicable). This is a coded reason from tables in AR 220-1 which permits automatic data processing.

*i. Equipment status rating. Equipment operationally ready rates, to include data in 2d, 2e, and 2f above, are converted to numerical ratings, 1 through 4.

*j. Reason equipment status rating is less than 1 (if applicable). This is a coded reason to facilitate automatic data processing.

3. Training readiness.

a. Training level. Training status expressed in training weeks required to overcome the current training shortfall. This is a commander's assessment, considering a wide variety of factors to relate present unit training proficiency to the level of proficiency required for a unit to perform its full MTOE wartime mission. The revised draft AR 220-1 contains much more detailed guidance than previous editions to assist the commander in making his training estimate.

b. Training resource constraints. The estimated impact of resource constraints which affect the training level in 3a above is expressed in terms of degree; viz., 1 (insignificant impact) through 4 (prohibits necessary training tempo) for each of the following resource areas:

- Funds
- Equipment/material
- Qualified leaders
In the same manner the commander is required to specifically assess the impact on training of unit commitments not related to the unit mission.

*c. Training rating. Training shortfall (3a above) is expressed as a readiness rating, 1 through 4, through a tabular conversion given in AR 220-1. For example, a battalion size unit with an estimated four week training shortfall would be given a training rating of 2.

*d. Reason training rating is less than 1 (if applicable). The commander provides a coded reason why the training rating is lower than 1. Reason codes are found in AR 220-1.

4. Overall readiness rating.

*a. Unit rating. Using all knowledge available, the commander assigns an overall rating, 1 (best) through 4 (worst) for his unit. AR 220-1 gives a detailed description of the meaning of each rating. Generally, the commander attempts to select a rating which best describes the unit's ability to conduct its full MTOE wartime mission. Normally, the overall rating should not be better than the training rating, but the commander must make the final judgement.

*b. Reasons unit rating is lower than 1 (if applicable). Reason codes, found in AR 220-1, are submitted to show the primary, secondary and tertiary reasons why the unit is rated lower than 1.

*c. Projected rating and date. If the unit can forecast a future change in overall readiness rating, the projected rating and date are shown. Commander's remarks may be used to explain the change.
Readiness Reporting Issues.

The procedures described above present a method of estimating potential combat readiness. Nearly every point represents some degree of compromise. Each unit data item included or not included has been the source of considerable study and debate over the years. As discussed above under "Readiness Concepts," competing needs for different kinds of information have frequently resulted in a compromise which is not totally acceptable to any management faction. A few of the issues which should be the subject of further analysis are summarized below.

**Crew status.** In some units, e.g. tank units, the skill of a crew working together is a critical factor. A unit may have sufficient trained people but the crew composition has not remained intact. Such a unit could be rated 1 in personnel fill and MOS, and rated 1 in unit training, but would be of reduced effectiveness.

**Equipment serviceability criteria.** There is a wide variation in opinion over the establishment of the criteria used to determine operationally ready standards. For example does the lack of a fender, or an oil gauge, keep a wheeled vehicle from performing its combat mission?

**Basic loads, supplies, and spare parts.** Readiness reporting specifically includes equipment but does not directly address basic loads, supplies and spare parts which would be required for sustained combat operations. Inclusion of these items would complicate the report and require specific assumptions about the wartime location and mission of the unit. Basic loads and supplies are often stocked at theater level, but there is often no way to relate those to specific unit readiness reports. The SSI study recommended inclusion of spare parts on readiness reports.
**Substitute items.** The current report permits substitution of older generation equipment for modern equipment. For example, a battalion authorized M60A1 tanks but equipped with M48A5 tanks still has considerable combat power, but less power than if it had its M60A1 tanks. Yet the M48A5 battalion could be rated 1(fully ready) if it possessed the authorized number of tanks. Other examples include 106mm recoilless rifles in lieu of TOW, and older generation radios in lieu of newer ones. The inability of old and new radios to net would not be taken into account under equipment ratings but the commander could include such a limitation in his overall rating and remarks.

**Lack of differentiation between items.** Shortages of different RICC-1 (or later MTOE "A") items affect the capability of the unit differently, yet count the same. For example, which shortages affect a unit's combat readiness most: communications items, mobility items or firepower items?

**Reporting frequency and periodic versus continuous reporting.** The SSI study recommended quarterly reporting to reduce "peaking" and foster longer term management. JCS requires continuously updating the report, i.e., reporting only when changes occur. The other services follow this report-when-changes-occur procedure. Continuous reporting totally eliminates "peaking" but senior Army officials fear it could reduce readiness consciousness and readiness emphasis as well.

**Training status.** How can training ratings be made more objective without creating a centralized training program and seriously reducing the latitude of the commander to determine what training his unit needs most and how best to achieve that training? Attempts to quantify training ratings have been unsuccessful and/or unacceptable to date.
Mobilization readiness. While mobilization is not an MTOE mission, can the capability for mobilization be rated and included in the unit readiness report? Obviously a unit which could fight well, but lacks training, equipment, and supplies to mobilize and deploy efficiently is of little value.

Reports of non-TOE units. General support force units, not intended to deploy, (such as training divisions or CONUS post military police) are not currently rated. Yet those units would play a vital role in supporting the deployment and the sustainability of the combat forces during a conflict. This issue is currently being evaluated by the army staff and JCS.

Many other issues could be raised. The readiness reporting system, despite its shortcoming, has proven to be flexible and dynamic over the years. It can be adapted to resolve these issues and others as requirements develop. New automated command and control systems and functional reporting systems have given the Army a greater capability than ever before to design and operate a better readiness reporting system.

READINESS MANAGEMENT

The primary purpose of this section is to describe how the readiness reporting system is used as a management tool at various headquarters. The procedures used to manage and process the information in readiness reports in these headquarters will also be discussed to give the reader an appreciation for the various techniques that have been devised. A brief look will be taken at the basic reporting unit through the various levels in the Department of the Army chain and in the JCS operational chain.
Readiness management overview.

At all levels commanders use a variety of management tools to improve the readiness of their units. At the lower levels, battalion and below, the primary tool is predominantly daily contact and direct coordination with subordinates. As one goes up the chain of command more reliance is placed on data provided in various reports. At the division level and above, the unit readiness report provides the commander and principal staff a primary source of management information. The readiness reporting system helps fill the void between other management information systems. It provides the commander, in a single report, a snapshot picture of the personnel, logistic and training status of his subordinate units. As such, by the time the report reaches the Army major command (MACOM) level it becomes a primary management tool.

The readiness reports could be better used by commanders than they frequently are. With regards to the Commanders Comments portion of the report, a "tell it like it is" attitude seemed to prevail but most operator level staff officers feel that commanders' remarks could be more illuminating. Since use of the readiness data is made using management by exception techniques that is, homing in on the problems, many action officers feel that a more complete explanation by the commander could improve management at the higher level. As a result of the great emphasis placed on the commanders' submitted comments at various headquarters, sometimes a disproportionate amount of energy was exhausted before the real problem could be identified and attacked.

Readiness management techniques have evolved from individual commander's desires and staff officer's innovativeness. Though there is some commonality
among similar type units at each echelon, there are also vastly differing approaches to using the readiness reporting system as a management tool.

The reporting channels for active Army and Army Reserve units are shown in Figure 5. Those channels used by the National Guard are shown in Figure 6. The following discussion is keyed to readiness actions at commands shown on those figures.

READINESS REPORTING CHANNELS
ACTIVE ARMY AND U.S. ARMY RESERVE

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Figure 5
JCS Level.

JCS Policy Memorandum 172, dated 20 April 1971, initiated the current requirement on the service components to provide information in a uniform format concerning the operational status of their forces. The purpose of this requirement is to provide data to enable the JCS to accomplish its mission of operational control of operating units.

There are three formal readiness inputs to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, (CJCS).

First is the Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT)—the Army readiness report described in the preceding sections. The FORSTAT is
continuously updated by MACOMS and CINCS. The CJCS is provided the readiness status of major units and any unusual conditions mentioned in the reports. The FORSTAT data on all units is available within the National Military Command Center (NMCC) via computer terminals and is retrieved during contingency planning or operations as required. This information would be used in conjunction with the other two readiness inputs in the event the use of U.S. Forces were contemplated by the National Command Authority.

The second part of the formal readiness input is the Semi-Annual Readiness Report. This report is provided by each of the unified/specified commanders and has considerable influence. It is provided to the service headquarters, Department of Defense and CJCS in a narrative format, addressing each aspect of readiness. Service Secretaries are required to provide comment to DOD and JCS on the CINC's assessments and problems.

The third part of the formal input is the daily situation report (SITREP). This is the means whereby each CINC provides any significant change in readiness posture and provides immediate information on matters of operational importance.

Readiness data at JCS is used more as a status report for operations and planning than as a management tool. The data is received and placed in computer storage ready to be retrieved for either routine reporting or in the event of an emergency. Operators at the JCS level feel that although these reporting systems are effective it would always be prudent to check with respective services to obtain additional specific information prior to making critical decisions concerning deployment of forces.

Unified Command Level.

Each unified command submits operational readiness reports directly to
JCS and maintains an accurate status of its assigned forces. The unified commands are not in the chain of command for management of service resources; therefore, they only monitor data on designated operational forces. Readiness data is provided to REDCOM by Forces Command (FORSCOM) by monthly FORSTAT reports. The reports include major combat units, such as divisions and separate brigades but do not include most support type units. The readiness data is used for contingency planning or development of a Joint Task Force (JTF). FORSCOM recommends units for selection but the responsibility for deployment of CONUS elements in times of national emergency and for planning joint force training rests with REDCOM. Readiness report information is essential if REDCOM is to keep abreast of force capabilities.

To process the readiness information the REDCOM J-3 (Operations) has created a readiness section within his directorate. This section receives reports from FORSCOM and Tactical Air Command and is responsible for preparing a monthly written report for the CINC called the "Status of Forces Memo". The report includes readiness trend data for the previous six months, a descriptive paragraph on each division and the "average" readiness of REDCOM forces. Divisions and brigades are analyzed in detail while lesser emphasis is placed on smaller units. The Deputy CINC has a video display tube in his office that both he and the CINC use to review readiness information.

Operations officers at REDCOM express confidence in the readiness data and feel that reliability has continually improved. The amount of information is adequate and provides a common base to enable close coordination with respective service staffs in the joint arenas prior to final decisions. A future project is to improve the computer link between FORSCOM and REDCOM.
to insure rapid and immediate information exchange between the two headquarters.

Department of the Army (DA) level.

The unit readiness reports are used at DA as a management tool. Together with other personnel and logistical reports, readiness information is used to optimize resource management of people, equipment, and programming of facilities and training areas' exercises to increase the combat effectiveness of Army units.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) receives the reports at DA around the first of each month from major commands through JCS. Upon receipt, the DCSOPS prepares readiness report summaries in about 30 different formats for active units and 37 formats for Reserve Component units. Copies of these summaries, in the form of computer printouts, are provided to all elements of the DA Staff as well as other logistic and personnel agencies, and to service schools. A multitude of data is assembled to include trends, projections, aggregation by major commands, listing of major units and commanders' comments. They also depict location, authorized level of organization (ALO), major unit ratings, overall major unit limitations, and units failing to attain a rating as high as their assigned ALO.

The Chief of Staff receives a monthly written readiness summary report from DCSOPS. This report provides the status of major units plus special interest items such as division reorganization or equipment conversion (M60A1 to M60A2) progress. Using data from DCSOPS, the Army Secretariat prepares a continuously updated management book entitled "Army Performance Measuring System" which is distributed throughout the staff. It includes both active and reserve unit readiness data.
Each principal DA staff element uses the information provided by DCSOPS to effect resource allocation in consonance with the DA Master Priority List (DAMPL) and ALO. Inputs from the readiness reports also serve as a yardstick to judge how well the functional systems in the personnel and logistics fields are doing.

At DA level, the unit readiness report is only one part of a larger readiness picture compiled from many other functional reports and sources. The formal institution for monitoring Army readiness and initiating actions to improve readiness is known as the Operational Readiness Monitoring System (ORMONS). The ORMONS steering group is chaired by Director of Operations, ODCSOPS, and is composed of general officers at the director level from the DA Staff elements and other interested agencies such as DARCOM, MILPERCEN and LEA. This group meets infrequently to consider readiness trends and initiates necessary staff actions deemed appropriate. An ORMONS working group, chaired by the Chief of the Readiness Division, ODCSOPS, and composed of action officers, normally meets monthly. The members of this group closely monitor any changes in readiness status and take action on a daily basis if required. These two ORMONS groups look at the total readiness picture.

At DA level the readiness reporting system is not duplicatory to other reporting systems. Rather, it is complementary in nature and provides a quick channel whereby the chain of command is alerted to the overall readiness status, and thus, can exercise the appropriate management actions and provide the required assistance. It is the one report which ties the readiness picture all together.
Major command level.

The use of the readiness reporting system as a management tool is probably more sophisticated at the major command level (e.g., US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and US Army Europe (USAREUR)) than any other level within the reporting chain. At each major command, readiness reports provide information which is used by the commander and staff elements to assist in the management of resources; only two of the Army's major commands, USAREUR and FORSCOM, are discussed here since they control most active Army combat units. Headquarters, FORSCOM has pioneered in devising techniques for processing unit readiness report data with a view towards determining the most effective use of resources and needs for additional resources. Headquarters, USAREUR has tailored their system for handling, analyzing, and using data around the FORSCOM model.

The commanders of all major commands receive detailed briefing on the status of their subordinate commands each month. This briefing is normally conducted by the principals of DCSPER (MILPERCENEUR), DCSLOG and DCSOPS with the latter being in charge of overall coordination. The briefing is conducted after the data has been aggregated from computer printouts, staffed, and put into books, charts, and slides. The readiness briefing is normally attended by the command group, principal staff members, invited major unit commanders and others. At FORSCOM, other attendees often include general officers from the DA staff, DARCOM and TRADOC. At the briefing, each staff section provides a complete overview of the readiness status in his particular area, then highlights the problem areas, and tells what is being done to alleviate problems. In addition to being an excellent tool to stimulate staff actions, this briefing gives invited major subordinate commanders the
opportunity to explain specific complex situations that the reporting systems
do not accommodate. Preparation for the monthly briefing is in itself a
major management process; obtaining the detailed information which is
required by DCSLOG and MILPERCENT results in intensive management and improve-
ment of readiness conditions. Some specific data included in the monthly
FORSOM briefing slides, and briefing books, is shown below.

Personnel: Status by unit.
Breakout of major units by branch to show % authorized.
Deployment strength.
Comparison of units and trends.
Commanders' comments pertaining to personnel.
Selected critical skill status displays.

Logistics: Status by unit, equipment fill and equipment readiness.
Commanders' comments relating to logistics.
Units failing to meet ALO for equipment shortages or main-
tenance.
Status of selected items of equipment.
Operational readiness rates.

General: Percentage of units attaining overall readiness goals.
Training notes from each major combat unit.
Historical record of unit readiness.
ALO attainment of major unit organic battalions.
Specific charts on divisions and brigades.
Deployment packages status.
Reports shown by type unit.
Reports shown by installation.

In addition to briefing major divisional forces, Army National Guard and
Reserve round-out elements are reported along with their respective affilia-
ted division. Other special category non-divisional units are also reported.

Both the Commanding General, FORSOM and CINC USAREUR actively pursue
answers to questions on the depicted critical personnel, equipment, training,
or monetary shortfalls at their readiness briefing, and each has the requi-
site representation of general officers from his and other headquarters to
give impetus to efficient management of resource allocation and shortage
difficulties.
Needless to say, much has been accomplished at major command level, prior to presentation of the readiness briefing to the commander. The reports from subordinate units normally arrive three working days after the 20th of each month. They are verified, checked for accuracy, and forwarded to JCS by the fifth working day. (At this point, the regulatory reporting requirement for the month is completed unless change reports are submitted prior to the next reporting period.) As soon as all of the reports have been received, the readiness report information really begins to be analyzed and put into a format where it can be evaluated and used as a management tool. Full use is made of computer printouts to display and arrange the data to make it more meaningful, in the types of reports and displays for the briefing listed above.

A key management tool at both Headquarters FORSCOM and USAREUR is an array of data assembled in what is called the monthly "Blue Book." While there are some differences between the two headquarters' "Blue Books" the FORSCOM book is typical of the kind of management action which takes place at a major command. The Blue Book is a complete and detailed report depicting, with charts, graphs, and tables many varied aggregations of the latest readiness data. This book depicts trends, and highlights units not attaining readiness ratings equal to their ALO, allowing for management by exception techniques to be used. Highlights of the Blue Book are listed below:

- Listings of major units.
- Commanders' Comments
- Data on organic battalions.
- Status of selected items of equipment:
  Shows NORS/NORM by item.
  Shows OR rates for key items.
Non-major units - aggregated and listed in type-unit (TPSN) sequence. Type B, exceptional, and special interest units (units undergoing reorganization) are also listed.

Deployment packages, listed in aggregated form and separately by installation.

Other data is also categorized by installation. Examples include:

1. Percent of units attaining rating equal to ALO.
2. Personnel and equipment needed to bring units to ALO. (This serves to highlight problems in CONUS personnel and equipment distribution.)
3. Units rated 4.
4. Nuclear surety inspection (NSI) results.
5. Training shortfall, by unit.
6. Training completed by unit (attainment of selected training milestones.)
7. Aggregated personnel strength.
8. Comparison of grade distribution of officers and NCO's in major units (non-readiness report source).

Major unit "Commander's Comments". (The commander's comments are reviewed personally by the principal of each staff section receiving the report. Inaccurate descriptions can cause work to be done needlessly that could be used to seek solutions to real problems.)

The DCSOPS is the staff focal point that receives, processes, rearranges, distributes, and ultimately stores the data, but with the exception of training and the establishing of priorities, DCSOPS does not use the data as a resource management tool as much as the other staff agencies do. For
example, in DCSLOG, USAREUR, there are personnel who devote their full time to unit readiness. They receive the printout information described earlier from DCSOPS and check the logistical ratings of all reporting units. They work closely with the USAREUR Maintenance Management Center (MMC) who also receives copies of the DCSOPS printouts. Together with the MMC, each problem is researched in detail and answers for each are provided to the DCSLOG who is prepared to discuss them at the monthly meeting with the CINC.

The USAREUR MILPERCEN also considers the readiness information a valuable tool which he uses in distributing the personnel assets. The MOS shortages reported are extracted and used to identify to DA on a quarterly basis the critical skill shortages in the command. MILPERCEN provides feedback to corps and division commanders on the MOS situation and advises commanders where they can substitute MOS, or take other local action. Reports are used to "cross level" personnel (within PCS constraints) and the personnel data is compared with other USAREUR sources for accuracy. The CG, MILPERCEN is briefed monthly by his staff and attends the CINC's monthly briefing prepared to address personnel problems surfaced by units. To get required answers, staff officers deal directly with units and with appropriate action officers at DA.

These detailed analyses of unit readiness reports allow for the detection of trends such as recruiting mismanagement or logistic mismanagement and enables the major command to anticipate problems. It can evaluate command and staff actions and expedite programs as necessary. Since the readiness report is more timely than most other reports or management systems, it provides a key tool for the commander to influence the action.

One can conclude that a tremendous amount of information is gained from
the readiness reports at major command level and is used to assist in the management of Army assets. While there are other reports which are designed to provide personnel and logistical data, the unit readiness report is used extensively to check and complement these other sources. The briefings, books, training, and actions taken all contribute toward solving problems and improving unit readiness.

Corps level.

The official readiness reporting channels bypass the corps (except where the corps commander is also installation commander) and go directly from the reporting units to the major commands. However, corps receives information copies of the same readiness data from each of its subordinate units. Some corps commanders are using the system as a primary management tool although management methods vary substantially from corps to corps. Each corps has developed a readiness management system which is designed to meet its particular needs.

CONUS corps have more detailed and centralized readiness management procedures than the deployed corps, since CONUS corps commanders are also installation commanders. Both III and XVIII Corps have established Readiness Management Centers (REDMAC) to provide for effective readiness management. The REDMAC is an ad hoc organization which is the focal point for all aspects of readiness and deployment data. Normally a REDMAC is manned by part time or full time representatives of AG and G4 staff sections, supporting clerical people, and operates under the auspices of the G-3 operations officer. The REDMAC is responsible for assembling and reviewing all divisional/unit "roll-up" data and coordinating all readiness data for presentation to the Corps Commander. The REDMAC also validates, edits, and prepares
data for final transmission to FORSCOM and JCS.

The Corps Commander normally receives a monthly briefing which is frequently attended by Division Commanders, Assistant Division Commanders, principal staff officers and DARCOM representatives. Prior to the meeting, the Corps Commander has received each of the Commanders' comments provided in their readiness reports. Another management technique in use is the presentation of a readiness projection briefing to the Corps Commander some four to six days prior to the 20th of each month. The purpose of these briefings is to present the current and projected readiness status of selected units and force packages, and to enable the Corps Commander to assess current and projected personnel, logistic, and training levels. Necessary actions can then be taken to maintain the highest state of readiness for the corps on a current and future basis. Items of discussion during the monthly briefing include:

-- Current and projected capabilities for all units.
-- Current and projected deficiencies for failing or marginal units.
-- Indicators projecting downward or upward trends.
-- Significant installation skill shortages.
-- Deployable/non-deployable personnel status.
-- Critical equipment or parts supply shortages.
-- Equipment readiness rates.
-- Individual weapons qualification and familiarization status by major subordinate commands.
-- Crew served weapons and crew status of appropriate commands.

An analysis of future unit TAADS actions is also presented monthly. This is a useful practice as it anticipates effects on readiness for future MTOE changes.
To provide additional information to manage readiness, some corps require monthly, instead of quarterly, equipment availability rates and require units to perform serviceability checks on equipment every 30 days. In some commands, crew served weapons qualification status is also an additional required report to assist the corps in assessing training readiness. Emphasis placed on TOW and Dragon systems.

Another independent measure of unit readiness is the Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE). The Corps EDRE program is excellent and compliments other readiness management systems. On an unannounced basis, units are alerted, checked for plans, procedures, readiness to deploy, and training. These exercises also include maintenance inspections, administration inspections, equipment accountability, personal clothing and equipment inspections, and other areas as deemed necessary. This is an important means for insuring the credibility of the unit readiness report, because discrepancies between the report data and EDRE results would be highly visible.

In a deployed Corps, such as V Corps, the readiness data is also received by the G-3 and disseminated to appropriate staff sections. Readiness operations are much more decentralized and less formalized than those described for the CONUS Corps. While there is no formal monthly Corps Commander's briefing, the G-4 holds monthly meetings with appropriate logistical unit representatives such as the Corps Support Command, where each equipment problem is discussed in detail. The readiness information is considered a key tool in the management of logistical readiness for a deployed corps. Likewise, the readiness report provides the AG with data unavailable from other sources concerning personnel strength and MOS status.
Division level.

Use of the unit readiness reporting system as a management tool varies among divisions as well as among the staff sections within a division. Some Division Commanders use the readiness report as a primary management tool to determine whether subordinate commanders effectively use available assets. Other Division Commanders use the data provided in the readiness report primarily to direct the efforts of their staffs. In most instances management by exception is the technique used.

There appears to be as many different techniques in using the readiness reporting system as a management tool as there are divisions, but there is a great deal of commonality. For example, most division commanders take advantage of the Commander's Comments section of the readiness report to give an extensive assessment of the command's combat readiness, and to highlight areas where additional assets are needed.

In a typical division, subordinate unit readiness reports arrive at the Division AC of S G-3 the first working day after the 20th of the month. Copies are provided the AC of S G-1 and G-4 where they are reviewed and checked for correctness. Actions are immediately initiated to solve problems or find out "why" by respective staff sections. The G-4, with the Division MMC, compares equipment readiness data with other source data, and follows up on all requisitions and job order requests. On the second working day after the 20th, the division Chief of Staff is briefed, then the CG. The reports are usually forwarded to the major command the third day.

Basic reporting unit level.

At the separate detachment company or battalion level organization
where the initial DA Form 2715 is prepared, there is little use of the readiness reporting system as a management tool because of the close daily contact between the commander and his subordinate elements. Therefore, at this level the unit readiness report serves primarily as a status report for senior headquarters in the reporting channel. An important element of the report, at the reporting unit level, is the Commander's Comment portion. It is often used to highlight situations where special attention or intensive management is needed. This becomes important in the management process as the report passes to the next reporting level.

**SUMMARY**

The unit readiness reporting system provides the commander of each echelon information with which he can better manage his organization. The data can supplement information from other reporting systems in the personnel and logistical areas, and it can also be used to cross-check inputs from other systems. At the organizational level, it gives the preparer the opportunity to "tell it like it is" and the vehicle to highlight problems that the standard systems are not accommodating. At higher levels, it provides data which the staff can use to assist subordinate units, as well as providing an excellent vehicle to keep the commander informed. The system is currently being used in this manner, and operations staff officers seem to have considerable confidence in the system. Independent inspections tend to verify the current validity of readiness data. Without the information obtained from the readiness reporting system, managers' jobs would be much more difficult.

Future developments in functional data management information systems could render the readiness report obsolete by providing instantaneous
correlation and visibility of unit personnel factors, logistic factors, and training factors. Until then, the separate unit readiness report will probably continue to be considered an indispensable status report and management tool by commanders and staff at all higher levels. Like the Officer Evaluation Report, the unit readiness report will probably never become popular, nor will it become a perfect measure of combat readiness, but it will be highly useful until someone invents a better way.
FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 3.


7. Ibid., p. 54. (Emphasis added).

8. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, as quoted by Ibid., p. 54.


10. General Fred C. Weyand in Hearings on Military Posture and HR11500 before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 94th Congress.


12. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army Unit Readiness Reporting, pp. E-14 through E-17 and throughout.


INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT PREFERENCE STATEMENT

STUDENT (LAST NAME, INITIALS)
WEEKLEY, H. N.
29 October 1976
(Date)

MEMORANDUM THRU: COL H.T. Reed, FACULTY COUNSELOR

FOR: DIRECTOR, MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM, DIRECTORATE OF ACADEMIC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Preference Statement for Individual Study Project, Military Studies Program

1. I request permission to conduct an individual study as indicated at Inclosure 1. My proposed title is: Readiness System Management.

2. The basis for my request is: (Explain: Use continuation sheet if necessary.)
   - X Experience.
   - Special qualification.
   - Personal interest.

   While assigned to HQDA, 1972-74, I developed the readiness reporting system which is in current use. Concurrently I completed several original studies on the theory of readiness, part of which have been incorporated into the USAWC curriculum.

3. Attached, as Inclosure 1, is a statement of the problem, and an outline of the study effort proposed. Included are paragraphs at the end of the outline that explain why the subject is appropriate for research at the US Army War College level; and, why the project holds promise of contributing to the military or to national security. (Do not exceed four pages)

4. The individual study project requested in paragraph 1 is approved. Study Adviser is COL W. E. Rawlinson, Department Chairman.

   ROBERT M. WEEKLEY, LTC, PA
   Student's Name, Grade, Branch
   1 Incl

1 Prepare original and three copies. Faculty Counselor and Study Adviser will retain one each. The original, with inclosure, will be submitted to the Director, Military Studies Program. Students desiring individual study projects will first discuss the project with their Faculty Counselor, and then will justify and secure approval directly from the department or directorate concerned. See Appendix III, Military Studies Program Directive for a listing of areas-of-interest associated with each department/directorate. Also follow instructions contained in paragraph 12d of the MSP Directive. Notify your Faculty Counselor of the approved topic.
INCLOSURE 1 TO INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT PREFERENCE STATEMENT

READINESS SYSTEM MANAGEMENT

1. **Statement of the problem.** The purpose of this individual study project will be to update, expand and revise Chapter 19, Readiness System Management, of the reference text "Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice," published by the USAWC. Specifically:

   a. The chapter should be updated because readiness system management is currently a highly dynamic area of management interest. Evolution in both concepts and methodology is constant. Since the current chapter was written, two significant developments have occurred; viz., the publication of a critical study of the Army's unit readiness reporting system by the SSI, and the preparation of a revised regulation governing the present system by HQDA (draft AR 220-1). Integration of these developments is essential for the USAWC reference text to continue to be a current and useful compendium.

   b. The chapter should be expanded to explain more fully the evolution and current status of readiness reporting methodology.

   c. The chapter should be revised so that in addition to integrating new concepts and methodology, the clarity of presentation is improved. The current chapter, as a first effort, is a significant step forward in improving the Army's understanding of readiness reporting. Further refinement to improve clarity and organization is needed.
2. **Outline of study.**
   a. **Introduction**
      (1) Explanation of readiness as a concept.
      (2) Purpose of chapter.
   b. **The current readiness reporting system.**
      (1) Evolution.
      (2) Requirements and purposes of system.
      (3) Operation of system.
   c. **Current issues of readiness measurement and reporting.**
      (1) Measurement methodology: problems and proposals.
      (2) Reporting methodology: problems and proposals.
   d. **Conclusions.**
      (1) Suggestions for commanders and staff officers in the reporting chain.
      (2) Considerations for readiness policy makers (at JCS, HQDA, unified command and Army major command levels).

3. **Study methodology.**
   a. Preliminary research can be accomplished with sources available at USAWC.
   b. Visits to key headquarters should be made to properly complete this study. Visits should include most of the following echelons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCS (J3)</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQDA (DCSOPS)</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ USAF</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ USHC</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ USN</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Purpose of visits at each echelon would include one or both of the following:

(1) Discuss measurement and reporting concepts and problems with responsible action officers.

(2) Observe the operation of readiness reporting system at that echelon.

4. Relevance and value for Army War College.
   a. See paragraph 1, statement of the problem.
   b. The ability of a nation to assess the capabilities and current readiness of its military forces is essential to the successful conduct of foreign policy. Conversely, if a nation formulates an incorrect assessment of its own capabilities and readiness to exercise those capabilities, the results could be disastrous, especially in this era of potentially short- or no-warning conflict. The national command authorities and the Congress require and deserve an accurate capability and readiness assessment of the military forces, made by the forces themselves. Inherent in this requirement is the need to be able to relate funding levels to capabilities and readiness. For these reasons, an understanding of readiness measurement and reporting is essential to USAWC graduates and other senior Army people. Updating and revising the readiness chapter of the USAWC command and management manual can assist in imparting such an understanding.
MEMORANDUM THRU: CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT

FOR: DIRECTOR, MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

SUBJECT: Military Studies Program Travel Plan (OCONUS/CONUS)

Travel is planned as follows to support the study project: Readiness

System Management

OCONUS TDY REQUEST (Use continuation sheet if necessary)

1. USAWC, Student(s):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>DOB</th>
<th>POB</th>
<th>SSN</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scuro, William K.</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Student # 1)</td>
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</table>

2. Security clearance of traveler(s): [Redacted]

3. Departure date and duration of visit: 12 Mar 77 7 days

4. Mode of Transportation: Commercial or scheduled government air

CBKS (MSP) FORM 596
1 Nov 76

19 December 1976
(Date)
5. Proposed itinerary: (Specify commands, commercial agencies, foreign individuals and activities to be visited on each day of the itinerary).

NOTE: Itinerary subject to change as soon as readiness review date in USAREUR is set.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DEP</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Mar 77</td>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>Carlisle Barracks, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Mar 77</td>
<td>ARR Frankfurt, FRG. WH-16 Mar visit</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HQ V Corps, 3d Armd Div and HQ 3d Spt CMD</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Mar 77</td>
<td>ARR Hanau</td>
<td>Visit EN or FA Rn And Maint Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Mar 77</td>
<td>DEP Hanau</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Mar 77</td>
<td>ARR Hanau</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Mar 77</td>
<td>DEP Heidelberg. Visit HQ USAREUR (DCSOTS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Mar 77</td>
<td>ARR Frankfurt</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Mar 77</td>
<td>ARR Carlisle Barracks, PA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

6. Purpose of visit: (To each activity. Outline fields of interest and scope of material to be covered.)

A. HQ V CORPS and USAREUR: To obtain data on procedures for measuring and monitoring unit readiness, actions taken to improve readiness, and internal Headquarters actions to staff, review and report readiness information to higher echelons.

B. 3d Armd Div, 3d Spt Cmd, Engr, FA and Maint Bns: To obtain data on procedures in use at unit level for measuring and reporting combat readiness.

7. (Statement as to whether classified information will be disclosed and to whom. If disclosure to foreign nationals is involved, a statement of security classification and authority for disclosure will be included. If not, a specific statement to that effect is necessary.)

Classified information will not be disclosed. Final report will be unclassified.

No classified data will be carried. Classified information may be discussed at the headquarters visited.

8. 2172020 57-1021 PB10000-2120 S36004 (812783.12011).
9. Logistical support requested: (Hotel reservations, in-country transportation, etc.)
a. BOQ or hotel for 1 person as follows:
   13-16 Mar Frankfurt
   17 Mar Heidelberg
   18 Mar Frankfurt
   NOTE: Dates subject to change based on itinerary changes.
b. Military sedan and driver available daily, 13-18 Mar 76.

10. (Statement of concurrence of appropriate approval authority when commercial air transportation is requested in lieu of scheduled government transportation.)

11. (To be used if one of the travelers has a 3 or 4 medical designation in his physical profile. See USAWC Administrative Officer for special instructions.)

12. NA

13. NA

14. Traveler(s) last visit to area (country) and inclusive dates:

15. (Leave blank, will be completed by USAWC Administrative Officer.)

16. Implications if travel is disapproved. (Extremely important. Requires detail—DON'T be brief. Attach additional sheet if necessary.)

   In this study of combat readiness system management, the methodology in use by the deployed forces in Europe is an important aspect to be considered. Travel will enable observation of readiness criteria and will enable accurate gathering and reporting of this information which will be used to update Army War College instruction. Recent and continuing interest of Congress in readiness status of US Army forces in Europe adds importance to gathering data in that theater.
Traveler for CONUS portion of travel: WEEKLEY, Robert M., LTC.

**CONUS TDY REQUEST (Use continuation sheet if necessary)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
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<th>TRANSPORTATION MODE</th>
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</thead>
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<td>DEP Carlisle Barracks, PA</td>
<td>Auto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Mar 76</td>
<td>ARR Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Mar 76</td>
<td>DEP Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Commercial Plane</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Mar 76</td>
<td>ARR Fayetteville, NC</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Mar 76</td>
<td>DEP Fayetteville, NC</td>
<td>Commercial Plane</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Mar 76</td>
<td>ARR Tampa, FL</td>
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<td>17 Mar 76</td>
<td>DEP Tampa, FL</td>
<td>Commercial Plane</td>
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<td>17 Mar 76</td>
<td>ARR Atlanta, GA</td>
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<td>19 Mar 76</td>
<td>DEP Atlanta, GA</td>
<td>Commercial Plane</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Mar 76</td>
<td>DEP</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARR Carlisle Barracks, PA</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Request authorization for use of rental auto in Fayetteville, Tampa, and Atlanta. Such use is expected to result in overall savings to government.*

Travel Justification

\[Signature\]

Student's Signature

Study Adviser's Signature
# JUSTIFICATION FOR MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM TRAVEL

**Research Trip for Project**  
Readiness System Management

**To**  
Washington, D.C.; Fayetteville, NC; Tampa, Travelers  
LTC R. K. Weekley  
FL and Atlanta, GA.

**Length of Visit** 6 days  
Study Adviser COL W. E. Rawlinson  
Department Command & Management

**Persons or Offices Visited (List)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Data to be Collected</th>
<th>Use of Data in Study Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCS (J3)</td>
<td>Survey each echelon to determine current methods for compiling, staffing and forwarding readiness data. Discuss current developments in methods of measuring combat readiness and the response to recent DA initiatives. Observe the procedures for review and dissemination of readiness data to trigger readiness improvement measures. Determine degree of integration of readiness reporting system with other resource reporting systems. Determine status of current initiatives to quantify training readiness. Determine effectiveness of the management aspects of the readiness system at each echelon by analyzing their techniques of compiling, displaying and disseminating data.</td>
<td>Analysis of effectiveness of readiness management system at each echelon and overall; i.e., how readiness data is generated, reported and used. How valid is data? How system is perceived by each echelon. Identification of key issues, and methods of improving the readiness management system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQDA (DSCOPFS)</td>
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<td>RDECQ (J3)</td>
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<td>FORSCOM (CCOMPS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>XVIII Abn Corps (G3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>82d Abn Div (G3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ USAF</td>
<td>Readiness system management procedures in use by each service.</td>
<td>Compare to procedures in use by Army; identify key issues and possible means of system improvement.</td>
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<td>HQ USMC</td>
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<td>HQ USN</td>
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**NOTE:** It is proposed that the Readiness System Management Study travel be divided into two phases, conducted concurrently: Germany and CONUS. This sheet identifies and justifies CONUS portion and travel to be completed by LTC Weekley. Paragraphs 5 and 6 identify and justify the CONUS portion and justification of travel to be completed concurrently by LTC Seago.

**NOTE:** Comments must be specific.
MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM.
THE READINESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Questions to be explored at selected Army and Joint headquarters

1. The Unit Readiness Reporting System (URHS) (AR 220-1).

- Peaking at report time. Does peaking take place to significant degree? What is impact? Would "change only" reporting be a preferred solution? Would different reporting interval be a solution, i.e., quarterly or bi-weekly instead of monthly?

- Validity of Unit Readiness Report (URR). How valid is report considered by each headquarters? Is data sufficiently accurate and reliable to use in deployment decision making? What would improve the report's validity? Examples: include crew ratings? include gunnery and other combat skill ratings? revise criteria for maintenance/logistic ratings? include basic load in ratings? revise rating system for substitute items (M48 counted same as M60 tank)?

- Periodic versus change reporting. What would be impact of reporting only as changes occur instead of submitting complete report for each unit monthly? Effect on headquarters workload? Focus on units which change (management by exception)? Improve or degrade reliability of data? (At Joint headquarters: compare Army periodic reporting to other services reporting changes only.)

3-1

Annex 3
- Reserve Component reporting. What aspects of UHR system should be unique to the Reserve Components? Examples: Reporting frequency? Personnel or logistic criteria? Training criteria? Additional information required pertaining to mutual support, affiliation, mobilization preparedness, geographic dispersion of unit?

- Training readiness. What would be impact if training ratings were dropped from UHR, with the report focusing on personnel and logistic assets? How can training readiness best be measured on a continuous basis? How should training degradation be incorporated (i.e., months since ARTEP coupled with personnel turnover)? Could training ratings be effectively quantified? (In CONUS get feedback on FORSCOM trial system). To what degree should training rating rely on judgement of that unit's commander? Higher commanders? Evaluators outside the direct chain of command?

- Studies for UHR improvement. Has headquarters made or compiled studies or submitted recommendations for UHR improvement? Obtain copies or general description.
11. Management of Unit Readiness.

-Describe flow of readiness data through headquarters.

What are recurring dates and internal suspenses? Is ADP processing completed on all reports before data is forwarded to operations personnel? How soon after reporting date is data presented to key personnel in the operations staff? command group? other staff? How fast can data be made available when needed, e.g., for emergency deployment planning?

-In what formats is data aggregated by each headquarters? Are special reports prepared for each staff agency and the command group? What is the general format of briefing charts/slides? Are data trends over time depicted?

-How is data used at each headquarters? By operations personnel? By logistics managers? By personnel managers? By the command group?

-For what purposes (if any) is data used at each headquarters? Deployment planning? Contingency planning? Resource distribution/redistribution? Budgeting allocations and justification of budget requests? Training planning—revision, time allocation, facility allocation and justification?

-Command readiness briefing. Does headquarters have a regularly scheduled readiness briefing/conference?
What is frequency of readiness briefing? Is briefing held before or after units submit URH each month?

What is purpose of briefing/conference? What are the expected results? Who normally attends briefing, e.g., command group only? command and staff? subordinate commanders? If briefing/conference is held prior to 20th of each month, is reallocation of resources a purpose?

What management tools are used by each headquarters to estimate unit and force readiness? URH(AR 220-1)? Emergency deployment exercises or equivalent? AGI?

TPI? ARTEP? Command maintenance inspections? Budget review and analysis? Other asset reports such as SIDPERS, logistic shortages, PLL status, etc.? Obtain regulations, SOPs, or other pertinent directives.

Commanders comments on the URH? Who, if anyone, at headquarters reads all of the subordinate commanders comments each month? Are selected comments brought to the senior commander's attention?

Feedback on the URH from higher to lower. Does the headquarters provide specific information back down the chain of command pertaining to issues raised by reporting commanders?

What additional information is needed by headquarters to better manage subordinate unit readiness?
-Unnecessary data. Does the URR provide data which is not useful to your headquarters? Could data be eliminated from report requirement, or placed in an optional category? Could some data be placed in a "when called for" category?

-Alternatives to the URR. Could the URR be eliminated and other means devised to estimate unit readiness? Examples: Rely on other functional systems which have come into existence for personnel and logistic asset reporting and accounting? Obtain data when and if needed from units about to be deployed rather than keep a continuous file? Eliminate URR since in the event of general war units will have to be deployed and fight in the condition they are found anyway?

-Means of readiness improvement. What actions does each headquarters take for the specific purpose of improving readiness in specific units? Examples: Redistribution of people or equipment? Reallocation of supplies, facilities, or finances? Conduct inspections of maintenance, training, deployability posture, etc.?
1. What comprises the readiness reporting system in each headquarters/unit?

2. How is the readiness reporting system (RRS) used as a management tool? Techniques?

3. Is the URR the primary management tool at each echelon in the Army?

4. Does the RRS provide accurate, reliable information on readiness conditions of subordinate units?

5. How is the report received, analyzed, disseminated (to whom), used and stored? (What are the internal handling procedures?)

6. Is the DA Form 2715 monthly report only a status report or is it used as a management tool? If so how?

7. Is the URR/FORSTAT used to determine where additional assets are needed and how assets are being managed?

8. What is done with the Commanders comment portion of the report? Does it receive special emphasis?

9. What is done within respective headquarters to resolve problems identified in URR’s?

10. Who in each Hqs (staff sections) have access to and receive copies or information from the reports? How is the information provided? What do they do with it? How do they use it as a management tool? What other management tools do they use? (DCSP/PER/G-1/S-1; DCSOPS/G-3/S-3; DCSLOG/G-4/S-4; MMC’s; etc)

11. Is the data on the URR’s compared with data from other sources/reports?

12. Are priorities and allocation of resources affected by information in readiness reports? How?

13. Is the readiness report used to manage and control or is it used to surface problems caused by malfunctions or inadequacies in designed systems, i.e., personnel and logistical systems?


15. Does the uniform format prescribed provide the appropriate information needed on Army (subordinate) units.

16. Is all the information provided needed? Used?

17. JCS
   a. What additional specific information is needed if readiness reports only serve as a point of departure?
   b. Why is the report needed if it only goes into a computer? Why can’t they get what they need when they need it from respective service departments?
18. READINESS COMMAND (Receives FORSCOM's FORSTAT)
   a. What do they do with the report?
   b. How is the information used to develop initial deployment plans?
   c. How does it assist in planning joint exercises?

19. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
   a. How are readiness reports used in conjunction with other existing reports in Personnel, Operations, and Logistical areas? How does this optimize resource management of people, equipment and programming of facilities and training areas/exercises to increase combat effectiveness?
   b. Is the URR used to check adequacy/effectiveness of other Army systems? Which ones? How done?
   c. Is resource allocation affected by URR's? How?

20. When is the commander briefed? How is it done? Composition of group? Procedures/techniques to display data?

21. How is the data from reports used? Different ways of comparing/grouping data?

22. What is the purpose of the briefing? What usually results from the briefings?

23. How is the URR used to determine effective use of resources and needs for additional resources?

24. Is there a focal point (Readiness Management Center) for all aspects of readiness?

25. Does the Comptroller or IG get readiness report information on a routine basis?

26. Is readiness report information used in the budget process at each level?

27. Is the training evaluation portion realistic, helpful, necessary?

28. Could/does Div Cmdr use his readiness reporting system to determine whether or not subordinate commanders effectively use available assets?

29. How much time is spent gathering information for the RRS? Is the information used for anything else?
DISTRIBUTION

Major Edward Mitts
HQ USAREUR
DCSOPS--Current Ops
APO New York 09403

LTC Robert Morrison
HQ 3d SUP COM--SPO
APO New York 09757

Headquarters
US Army Forces Command
DCSOPS--Readiness
ATTN: COL Luxemburger
Fort McPherson, GA 30330

Headquarters
US Readiness Command
J-3--Status of Forces
MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33608

Directorate of Operations
ATTN: Readiness Division (MAJ Williams
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

US Army Logistics Management Center
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
ATTN: Technical Information Officer
Department of the Army
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801