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AFTER THE COLD WAR:
USIA'S ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD

By Dino J. Caterini

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1972-1973
# After the Cold War: USIA's Role in A Changing World

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**Abstract:**
This study explains the need for public diplomacy as a key element of American foreign policy. It defines public diplomacy as the attempt by one nation to influence public opinion in other nations through direct communication with the people of other nations, using all the tools of modern communications. The purpose of such efforts is to influence foreign public opinion in support of a nation's foreign policy and interests; the tools include information programs, cultural and educational exchanges and what might be called a verbal strategy in foreign affairs.
Noting that USIA was created at the height of the Cold War, in 1953, the study counters accusations to the effect that USIA is a "Cold War agency." Rather, it is asserted that USIA has an important role to play in American diplomacy due to the psychological impact of the revolution in mass communications technology.

USIA is charged with explaining U.S. policies and actions to foreign audiences and advising the U.S. government on the implications of foreign public opinion for American policies. According to the study, no nation in the world can practice modern diplomacy without operating a program that puts modern tools of communication to work for it. Thus USIA, well known abroad and virtually unknown at home, has a vital role to play in the "orchestration" of U.S. foreign policy.
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AFTER THE COLD WAR:
USIA'S ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD

I INTRODUCTION

"...the rhetoric in international affairs does make a difference."

President Richard M. Nixon
January 4, 1971

This year--1973--marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the institutionalization of a peacetime United States Information program and the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the United States Information Agency (USIA).

In 1948, Public Law 402--the Smith-Mundt Act--was passed.¹ This act is still the basic enabling legislation for the peacetime information program of the United States. Five years later, in 1953, the information programs were taken out of the Department of State and placed in an independent agency called the United States Information Agency.² The transferral took place by executive decree with the concurrence of Congress.

Today USIA operates 169 posts in 100 countries, reaches 150 to 230 million people a year, and has an annual appropriation of approximately 200 million dollars.³ The Voice of America (VOA), the broadcasting division of USIA, speaks to the world in thirty-five languages twenty-four hours a day.⁴ In addition to radio, USIA also communicates to the world through television, films, exhibits, magazines, pamphlets, books and through personal

1
contacts by its representatives abroad with host nationals of
the country to which they are accredited.

USIA—which is known abroad under the acronym USIS, the
United States Information Service—is also the cultural arm of
the American government abroad, handling American cultural and
educational exchanges, such as the Fulbright Scholarship pro-
gram. American performing artists are also programmed abroad
by USIS under the auspices of the State Department's Cultural
Presentations program. 5

As the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information put it in
its latest 1973 report to Congress on USIA operations: "To for-
eigners abroad the USIS symbol means the information, cultural
and education arm of the United States. Next to the American
Embassy, USIS has become the best known American public insti-
tution abroad." 6 Undoubtedly, as the Advisory Commission's re-
port indicates, much has been accomplished in the past quarter-
century in the establishing of information and cultural programs
as integral parts of the American foreign policy machinery.

The world, however, is quite different today from the world
that existed when the American information program first came
into existence. In 1948, for example, there were only 82 na-
tions in the world; today there are 132. 7 Above all, the Smith-
Mundt Act was passed during the darkest days of the Cold War.
Stalin was at the helm in Russia at the time and the Communist
bloc was considered to be a monolith directed from Moscow. An
Iron Curtain divided the world between the Free World and the Communist Bloc.

It is important to recollect the atmosphere of those days because American bias is against propaganda. America's only prior experiences with propaganda programs were under "hot" war conditions. During World War I, the Creel Committee created an American propaganda machine that was immediately dismantled upon the resumption of peace. Between the wars—except for a small effort in Latin America—America had no information program; but in 1942, immediately after World War II began, an Office of War Information (OWI) came into being. The OWI, like its predecessor in World War I, was also dismantled with the cessation of war in 1945.

Granted the American aversion to propaganda, the development of a peacetime American information program would have been a long tough uphill struggle had post-war political conditions developed along cooperative, peaceful lines, as envisioned by Roosevelt and others. Roosevelt's vision of the world did not come about, however, and by 1948, any such dreams had long since been shattered as the world began to divide itself into antagonistic camps. By 1948, the term "Cold War" was a household phrase, a verbal reflection on the state of the world. Soviet pressures on Western Europe, Turkey, and Greece, coupled with a certain Stalin crudeness of personality, created an atmosphere of mutual distrust and enmity. Though there was no hot, shooting
war as such, the atmosphere of the time was more akin to war than to peace. The Cold War atmosphere was such that it overcame the traditional American aversion to propaganda and justified the creation of America's first peacetime information program.

Many people now claim the Cold War is over; others do not agree. But whether the Cold War as such is officially over or not, there is no disputing the fact that the world is changing. The break-up of the Communist bloc, the switch from a bipolar to a multipolar power structure, the re-emergence of the balance of power as a political tool, and a greater reliance on traditional diplomacy are some of the landmarks of this changing world.

These changes raise questions as to the role of USIA in a changing world. Even a conservative writer like Brian Crozier—who does not believe the Cold War is over—writes: "The west faces the fluid, mobile security problems of the 1970s with the organization created for the rigid 1950s. And it faces them under the psychological handicap of a generalized reluctance to face up to the problem. There was once a monolithic force called Communism... Yet there has been no real attempt to adopt the machinery of international security planning to the changed realities of the 1970s." 10

Speaking of USIA specifically, Kenneth R. Sparks, a communications expert who formerly worked for USIA, claims that USIA is "lagging behind the changing world we are trying to influence.
As relations thaw with the Soviet Union and Communist China, hard-hitting anti-Communist themes, long a staple of USIA's menu of activities, seem anachronistic. The same writer says that in the 1970s, audiences will be more sophisticated.

"No longer can we divide the world into two hostile camps—one free and the other Communist—and ask the people to choose."  

Those words are reflective of a group of USIA critics who look upon USIA as a Cold War agency. Because USIA came into being as a result of the Cold War, does it necessarily follow that USIA is a Cold War agency? The answer to that question is crucial to the future of America's information program for whether USIA is or is not a Cold War agency is not an academic question. It is central to the future of USIA, as the latest 1973 Congressional hearings clearly reflect. In reading through the hearings, one is tempted to say that the Cold War aspects of USIA—its Cold War origins and flavor—marked the major theme of the debate on whether to cut or not cut USIA funds for Fiscal Year 1974. The following quotations are reflective of the major thrust of the debates:

I notice that a general attack on the United States Information Agency is that it is a part of the cold war rhetoric. The fact of the matter is that it is needed more than ever right at this time...in promoting what we call detente. I do not look upon the Voice of America as a weapon in the cold war...  

Senator Hubert Humphrey, Minnesota

The point, as expressed by one Committee member, is not that all of the functions which USIA performs
are cold war anachronisms, but rather that the existence of a separate agency oriented toward selling America appears to be one.\textsuperscript{14}

Senator J. William Fulbright, Arkansas

Senator Fulbright... has long quarreled with the USIA role of promoting the image of the United States around the world. He sees it as too much of a hard-sell operation. He believes that much of it is, or appears to be, a cold-war anachronism. That is an arguable point... \textsuperscript{15}

Senator James B. Allen, Alabama

As the above quotations show, there is a continuing debate as to the exact nature of USIA and its role in a changing world. Because USIA came into being in a Cold War environment, it unquestionably makes sense to ask whether it is still employing many of the concepts, techniques and ideas created for a Cold War and applying them to a situation which is outwardly different.\textsuperscript{16} Put another way, it makes sense to ask whether the American information program is as well adapted to today's world as it was when the Smith-Mundt Act was first passed.\textsuperscript{17}

But to say that those questions make sense is not the same as saying that USIA is a Cold War agency. The major thesis of this paper is that USIA is not now and never was a Cold War agency. Its major function was and is public diplomacy; it always was and still is the public diplomacy arm of American foreign policy. Its aim was and is the open advancement of American foreign policy through the influencing of public opinion abroad by means of modern communications, information and culture. USIA did not and does not make foreign policy; it publicizes and
explains it. When American policy was a Cold War policy, its purpose was to enhance that policy. When American policy changes, it changes with it. Every nation today, from the biggest to the smallest, engages in some form of public diplomacy. They do this because they realize that the success or failure of their foreign policies is affected by how foreign publics view them.

A second main contention of this paper is that the foreign image of a nation—especially a great power like the United States—affects the viable application of that nation's power and affects greatly the successful execution of that nation's foreign policy. The Vietnam War offers an example of the interaction of foreign public opinion on American foreign policy. Whether Vietnam turns out to be right or wrong over the long haul, the short term effects have tended to lower American prestige in the world. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the long-time editor of Foreign Affairs, claims the Vietnam War "scandalized and disgusted public opinion in almost all foreign countries." He further says, "Not since we withdrew into comformable isolation in 1920 has the prestige of the United States stood so low." One needn't agree entirely with Armstrong's words to realize that adverse foreign public opinion greatly influenced American policy in Vietnam and that the image of America abroad in the wake of the Vietnam War will create one of the greatest challenges to America in general, and USIA specifically, throughout
the greater part of the seventies. This presents a situation quite different from that of the forties and fifties when American power and prestige was hardly questioned in the world but only its resolve to use its influence in a creative manner.

Because foreign perceptions of American policy, purpose and culture are important to the execution of a successful foreign policy, another main contention of this paper is that words, both oral and written, do make a difference. What one says and how one says it are often as important as the underlying actions the words are meant to explain.

Franck and Weisband, in their book, Word Politics, say:

How important a factor in world politics are words, principles, and doctrines? What weight should be attributed to what states say? There are many Americans inside and outside government who regard verbal strategy as very much on the fringes of national policy. It is fashionable for "hardheaded realists," a category of intellect much prized in government, to discount words and principles. Words are weaklings, principles are "just hot air," and what is said is rarely meant or believed by speaker or listener. By deeds alone do we know and are we known. . . . This scorn for verbal conceptualization in international politics is a persistent and widely shared folly.21

Words, in sum, do count; the image of a nation does make a difference in international affairs, and a part of the image a nation projects is dependent on the words it speaks. President Nixon himself sanctified that fact when he said in 1971 that ". . . the rhetoric in international affairs does make a difference."22

It does indeed, and because USIA is the major element in the American foreign policy set-up dealing with words, it has a
crucial role to play in the seventies in the enhancement of American foreign policy. In this respect, to bring up the Cold War origins of USIA is irrelevant, for with or without a Cold War, USIA has a major role to play. It follows policy and can foster detente as readily as containment, for as the public diplomacy arm of the American government, its purpose is to advance American foreign policies whatever they be. To try to tie USIA exclusively to the Cold War is not only unfair but also untrue to the larger role it has always played.

Policy is not a static thing, nor is the world in which it operates. It makes sense for a nation to reassess its policy on a continuing basis; it makes sense for foreign affairs agencies to do likewise. President Nixon, after coming into office, made just such a reassessment. In his U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, Nixon—after listing the cumulative changes in the world since 1945—asks, "How is America to conduct itself in a world so different? How should we define the form and content of American participation in the 1970's?" 23

In effect, USIA has to ask itself those very same questions: How is USIA to conduct itself in a changing world? How should USIA define the form and content of its participation in the 1970's?

The purpose of this paper is to explore the answers to those questions—not because USIA is a Cold War agency that must somehow change its ways—but because in foreign affairs it makes sense to do so on a regular basis.
II THE CHANGING WORLD

Elements of the Changing World

The past few years have been filled with statements and writings on the changing world of the seventies. President Nixon in his foreign policy report to Congress in 1971 stated categorically: "The postwar period in international relations has ended."¹ He said that a new approach to foreign policy was needed, to match the new era of international relations.² "Today," he stated, "the 'isms' have lost their vitality—indeed the restlessness of youth on both sides of the dividing line testifies to the need for a new idealism and deeper purposes."³

Nixon, in his same report, listed some of the cumulative changes that have taken place in the world since the end of World War II in 1945:⁴

1. Western Europe and Japan have regained their vitality.

2. Many new nations emerged from the disintegrating empires of the West and these new nations are now possessed of greater self-confidence and influence.

3. The Communist bloc is no longer monolithic.

4. The Soviet Union has reached relative parity with the United States in the nuclear strategic field.

5. The rigid bipolar world of the '40's and '50's has given way to the fluidity of a "new era of multilateral diplomacy."

6. New issues that transcend national frontiers have arisen, such as space, oceanography,
population, ecology, pollution and the environment.

Nixon's visits to China and Russia dramatically confirmed the changing nature of the world of the seventies. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, in April 1973 added another element to what he termed factors in a changing world: "a period of relaxed tensions."5 We are, in sum, entering a period of detente, which some people see as a period wrought with a danger all its own. Brian Crozier says, "The uniqueness of the present dangers lies in the total absence of a crisis, or a sense of crisis. Detente is in the air; the Chinese are returning, or so it seems, to the civilized ways of international diplomacy; the Americans are pulling out of Vietnam; the Egyptians ask the Russians to leave; the British are entering Europe."6 Detente, Crozier contends, can create for the West a relaxed atmosphere more dangerous than the atmosphere of tension that symbolized the Cold War.

But whether or not detente represents a danger, the fact remains that the world has changed. Hans J. Morgenthau, of the realpolitik school of political science, says that following Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow, "...it will be difficult to revert to the ideological fervor of the Cold War."7 Future disputes among the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China, he says, "are likely to take the form of traditional power conflicts rather than ideological struggles between 'good' and 'evil.'"8
In the same vein, David Watt, writing in Foreign Policy, says, "The moralistic spell which has bound American foreign policy has been broken and the United States is no longer obliged to behave as if its privileged duty is to carry a uniquely revealed form of democracy to the rest of the globe or to regard anyone who thwarts or even opposes this objective as an instrument of hell itself. . . . Henceforth. . . .American foreign policy can be conducted in a cool, adult fashion. . . ."9

Secretary of State William Rogers has called the switch in American foreign policy a change "from containment to engagement."10 In a speech entitled "A United States Foreign Policy of Engagement," Rogers says, "... we have replaced an approach motivated largely by containment of adversaries with a policy of engagement—engagement with adversaries in building new ties and engagement with allies on a basis of confidence and commitment."11

The first few years of the seventies have been characterized by rapid change. "... we are at the end of an era," President Nixon said in 1971,12 and his trips to China and Russia in 1972 ratified his statement. In his 1970 foreign policy report to Congress, Nixon reviewed his first year in office and said, "We could see that the whole pattern of international politics was changing. Our challenge was to understand that change. . . ."13

In the world of the seventies, that's USIA's challenge as well.

The Cold War: Dead or Alive?

Because USIA was conceived in a Cold War atmosphere and because many people (wrongly, this writer believes) think of
USIA solely as a propaganda instrument of the Cold War, it would seem appropriate at this point to ask whether or not the Cold War has ended.

Basically, there are two schools of thought. Some writers believe the Cold War is definitely dead; other observers think it is still alive but in another guise.

Hans Morgenthau, in the 1973 preface to the Fifth Edition of his classical text of realpolitik, Politics Among Nations, says, "The explicit recognition by the West of the territorial status quo in Europe has brought the Cold War to an end. The ideological orientation that at one time characterized the foreign policies of the superpowers, while it has not altogether disappeared, has certainly abated." 14

The International Institute for Strategic Studies in its annual Strategic Survey 1972 says that the Cold War is not only dead but buried. "Whatever else history may say of 1972," the Survey states, "it will remain the year of President Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow. They not only buried the cold war with due spectacle...; they also underlined the divergent characteristics of the new international normalcy." 15

More and more writers tend to speak of the cold war in the past tense. In May 1970, two years before Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow, the Congressional Quarterly was already writing: "As the United States entered the decade of the seventies, both the international arena and American foreign policies
were in transition. The cold war had ended, but a new pattern of international relations had not yet taken clear shape. . . ."16

Not everyone agrees that the cold war has ended. Brian Crozier writes about "...the fallacy, virtually erected into a Western dogma, that 'the cold war is over.'"17 He says that "...the past tense is now habitual in reference to the cold war in speeches and editorials" and that to claim that the cold war is not over is to open one to the charge of being a "cold warrior" which carries the "connotation of blimpish right-wingery."18

Crozier points out that there has been little, if any, reduction in Communist propaganda against the West and its way of life; he says that the "...systematic misrepresentation of all aspects of life in Western countries continues in the press of Communist countries (including China). . . ."19 He further states that "the widespread acceptance by Western liberals of the Soviet definition of the Cold War and of the belief that it is over (or ought to be) is indeed one of the greater triumphs of the Soviet propaganda machine in recent years."20

Despite Crozier's words, the majority view at the moment is that the Cold War is over. This fact affects USIA because once you accept the fact that the Cold War is over, it becomes intellectually easy to accept the following syllogism: The Cold War is over. USIA is a Cold War agency. Therefore, there is no longer a need for USIA. Whether USIA is, in fact, a Cold War
agency will be dealt with later,* but for the moment it suffices to know that there is a widespread belief that USIA as a propaganda agency has relevancy (or at least greater relevancy) only under Cold War conditions. This author believes this premise to be completely false.

No matter how one views the Cold War, however, it seems indisputable that the world of the seventies has changed radically from the early post-war world of the forties and fifties. No information program can avoid these changes and still remain relevant in a changing world.

*See pages 27-37
III THE CHANGING DIPLOMACY

The New Diplomacy

Traditionally, diplomacy was defined as the art of negotiation between sovereigns or between one sovereign government and another. Nations did not go over the heads of government to speak directly to the people. With the advent of modern communications, however, the strictures of traditional diplomacy began to erode.

According to Hans Morgenthau, the decline of traditional diplomacy was due to four factors:

1. The development of modern communications.

2. The depreciation of secret diplomacy following the disaster of World War I.

3. The founding of the League of Nations and the United Nations with its emphasis on "Diplomacy by Parliamentary Procedures."

4. The Russian and American lack of diplomatic experience following World War II.

There are those people, like Morgenthau, who decry the demise of traditional diplomacy, but the fact remains that virtually every nation in the world today includes Public Diplomacy as a part of its diplomatic machinery.

Public diplomacy can be defined as the attempt by one nation to influence public opinion in other nations through direct communication with the people of other nations using all the tools of modern communications--television, radio, films, books,
magazines, pamphlets, fairs, cultural presentations, person-to-
person contacts, etc. It is called "public" because it is open
and above-board; it is called "diplomacy" because its purpose is
to enhance the foreign policy of a nation. Some people prefer
to use the terms "propaganda," "information" or even "psycholog-
ical warfare," but in this writer's opinion, the term public
diplomacy is the proper one because it rightly ties the attempts
to influence public opinion abroad to diplomacy, or foreign pol-
icy. One writer refers to public diplomats as "Diplomatic
Persuaders," but whatever the name, the function is basically
the same: to influence foreign public opinion in support of a
nation's foreign policy and interests.

Even an advocate of realpolitik like Hans Morgenthau recog-
nizes public diplomacy as a new and important element in foreign
affairs. "Psychological warfare or propaganda," he says, "joins
diplomacy and military force as the third instrument by which
foreign policy tries to achieve its aims." At another point he
says "the struggle for the minds of men is a new dimension of
international politics to be added to the traditional dimensions
of diplomacy and war." Morgenthau places the economic aspect
of foreign policy under diplomacy; others place economics in a
separate niche. A report by Congressman Dante Fascell says
there are four main channels to foreign affairs today: diplo-
macy, trade, communications and force. "The first three are
complementary," he says, "the fourth an alternative." Although
Americans have a healthy disrespect for propaganda, he says, "We should realize that public diplomacy is here to stay regardless of what we think and do about it." He says that we are living in an age of public diplomacy and that "today the success or failure of foreign policy undertakings is frequently affected more profoundly by what people think and say than by the workings of traditional diplomacy."9

Traditional diplomatists still tend to regard public diplomacy as anathema and somewhat undignified.10 But the Vietnam War and the Czech crisis of 1968 are both dramatic examples of the uses of public diplomacy to win support; in both cases, calculations of public opinion and attempts to influence public opinion were integral parts of the maneuverings of all the parties involved.11

The Role of Public Opinion

In the past one hundred years, public opinion has wrought a revolution in diplomacy. Already, in the mid-nineteenth century, there was a growing realization of the importance of public opinion. Sir Harold Nicolson, in his classic book, Diplomacy, remarks, however, that "to a diplomatist of the old school such as Metternich the very idea that the public should have any knowledge of, or opinion upon, foreign policy appeared both dangerous and fantastic."12

Resistance to the idea is still prevalent even today. A distrust of information, propaganda and public diplomacy programs
by the State Department go back to World War II, and the re-
moval of the information program from State Department to an
independent USIA is laid to the traditional misunderstanding
and resentment of diplomatists within the Department of State.

An independent USIA has not really solved the problem. One
observer writes, "...old-line agencies of government, includ-
ing the Department of State, do not give enough attention to
psychological factors in foreign policy execution and remain,
unfortunately, skeptical of USIA expertise." There is a lack
of appreciation of the role of modern communications and the im-
portance of public opinion. Diplomats, writes Lloyd Free, "do
not include in their calculations the degree to which the public
all over the world has, in fact, got into the act; nor the ex-
tent to which propaganda, popular persuasion, and information
and cultural programs have become major instruments of the new
diplomacy."

Underlying the antagonism of the traditional diplomatist
and the public diplomatist is the belief that information and
propaganda are somehow inconsistent with secret negotiations and
diplomacy. Are the two really irreconcilable? It would not seem
so. In his book, Diplomacy, Nicolson makes a nice distinction
between foreign policy and negotiations. Foreign policy, he
says, should never be secret; in a democracy, it is important
that the nation’s foreign policy be understood domestically. It
would likewise seem important that a nation’s foreign policy be
understood abroad. "...foreign policy," Nicholson says, "should never be secret. But negotiations should always be confidential." In this respect, USIA's job is to make American foreign policy understood abroad; it has nothing to do with negotiations. Public diplomacy still leaves plenty of room for secret diplomacy and negotiations, as Kissinger's secret negotiations with China in Peking and with the North Vietnamese in Paris prove.

In a sense, the two must work together for it is impossible to turn back the clock to the days before modern communications made public diplomacy a necessity. Public diplomacy did not create modern communications but is, on the contrary, the result of a world grown smaller and more communicative. The Vietnam War would seem to offer proof of the importance of public opinion, both domestic and foreign, to a nation's foreign policy. Morgenthau believes that the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policies is breaking down and that there are no longer any purely domestic affairs. "It is not enough," Morgenthau says, "...for a government to marshal national public opinion behind its foreign policies. It must also gain the support of the public opinion of other nations for its foreign and domestic policies. ...foreign policy is being pursued in our time not only with the traditional weapons of diplomacy and military might, but also with the novel weapon of propaganda." Morgenthau elaborates upon the theme by saying that "the power
of a nation . . . depends not only upon the skill of its diplomacy and the strength of its armed forces but also upon the attractiveness for other nations of its political philosophy, political institutions and political policies. . . . A nation, for instance, that embarked upon a [domestic] policy of racial discrimination could not help losing the struggle for the minds of the colored nations of the earth. 20

There seems to be little doubt, therefore, that public diplomacy is here to stay. Every major nation today has recognized the importance of international information and cultural programs directed towards the peoples of other societies. 21 Among the 116 countries with diplomatic missions in Washington, for example, everyone has at least a part-time officer working on information and cultural matters. 22

The issue therefore isn't whether America needs an information and cultural arm as an adjunct to its foreign policy. Modern diplomacy demands it. 23 The issue really revolves around the role of public diplomacy in the changing world of the seventies and the part USIA should or should not play in an era President Nixon has described as one of negotiation not confrontation.
IV THE CHANGING ROLE OF USIA

USIA History and Background

On August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered. Even before the formal surrender took place aboard the USS Missouri on September 3, 1945, America decided to disband its wartime propaganda institution, the Office of War Information (OWI). President Truman formally abolished the OWI on August 31, 1945. The haste with which America disbanded the OWI was reflective of American distrust of propaganda and its tradition against a peacetime information program.¹

Unlike World War I, however, this time, although OWI was abolished, a small peacetime information service was established within the Department of State. This represented a departure from the past and a recognition by Truman that "the nature of present-day foreign relations makes it essential for the United States to maintain information activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of foreign affairs."²

Traditional diplomats within the State Department greeted the idea of a peacetime information program with little enthusiasm, and William B. Benton, who headed the first program, tried to make the idea palatable by stating that "The State Department does not intend to engage in so-called propaganda."³ He said he intended to set up a dignified information program as opposed to a "propaganda" campaign—the word propaganda having a bad name in America.
It was rough going for the fledgling American information program for the first few years—the program was re-organized and re-named with disrupting regularity and Congress tended to look askance at requests for appropriations. The House of Representatives at the Fiscal Year 1948 hearings wiped out the appropriations altogether, claiming that the peacetime information program was without legislative authority. It took prompt intervention by President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall to get Congress to repent; it did, but only reluctantly, appropriating only $20.7 million instead of the $52.5 requested.

It is not the purpose of this paper to go into the detailed history—the ups and downs—of the information program from the end of World War II to the establishment of USIA in 1953. Suffice it to say that within those eight years, the information program was renamed six times and reorganized four times.

What finally prompted specific Congressional approval for a peacetime information program—the Smith-Mundt Act—was the recognition that America was involved in a Cold War with Communism. World War II had been over almost two years in Europe when President Truman, on March 12, 1947, went before a joint session of Congress to deliver the famous message later known as the Truman Doctrine. He requested American aid for Greece and Turkey, with the words, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."
Then on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall made his famous speech at Harvard University in which he offered American assistance in the reconstruction of a war-shattered Europe. Though the aid was offered to Russia and the other Communist states as well, the Russians refused the offer. Instead, they organized the Cominform with the object of creating a propaganda offensive on a worldwide scale. Their main target was the United States and the Marshall Plan.

The Cominform—short for Communist Information Bureau—was formed on September 22, 1947, when representatives of all the principal Communist parties in Europe were brought together in Polish Silesia. A.A. Zhdanov, who, under Stalin's orders, was given the task of bringing foreign Communist parties under Moscow's discipline, told the Communist delegates, "The Soviet Union...will bend every effort in order that [the Marshall Plan] be doomed to failure... The Communist parties of France, Italy, Great Britain and other countries...must take up the standard in defense of the national independence and sovereignty of their countries." The Cominform—short for Communist Information Bureau—was formed on September 22, 1947, when representatives of all the principal Communist parties in Europe were brought together in Polish Silesia. A.A. Zhdanov, who, under Stalin's orders, was given the task of bringing foreign Communist parties under Moscow's discipline, told the Communist delegates, "The Soviet Union...will bend every effort in order that [the Marshall Plan] be doomed to failure... The Communist parties of France, Italy, Great Britain and other countries...must take up the standard in defense of the national independence and sovereignty of their countries."

It was at this time, in the winter of 1947--following the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Soviet creation of the Cominform—that Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey and Representative Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota visited Europe specifically to investigate the operations of the American information program. Earlier, Smith and Mundt had co-sponsored
legislation to give the American peacetime information program a definitive legislative charter.

Smith and Mundt reported back to Congress with these words:

Europe today has again become a vast battlefield of ideologies in which words have to a large extent replaced armaments as the active elements of attack and defense. The U.S.S.R. and its obedient Communist parties throughout Europe have taken the initiative in this war of words against the western democracies. They have devised and are directing a campaign of vilification and misrepresentation which throughout Europe has the United States... as its primary target. ...the United States must take positive steps to carry the true story of her ideals, motives and objectives to a demoralized and groping Europe.\[11\]

The report said that the Communists were "conducting aggressive psychological warfare against us" and stated that a "strong and effective information and educational exchange program is essential."\[12\]

The Smith-Mundt Act was passed and President Truman signed it into law on January 27, 1948. As John Henderson says in his book on USIA, "For the first time in American history, the United States was committed to a peacetime program of international information and educational exchange on a worldwide, long-term scale."\[13\]

Although the Smith-Mundt Act had obviously grown out of the anti-communist Cold War atmosphere of 1947-48, the language of the act itself is quite bland and nowhere mentions the Communists by name. According to the act, the stated purpose of the information program is "to promote a better understanding
between the people of the United States and the people of other countries."  

Though the American information program was now established on a firm, legal basis, criticism of the program did not disappear. Although the idea itself seemed to be accepted, criticism shifted to how the program was conducted and whether or not it was effective. Under the Smith-Mundt Act, the information program was still within the Department of State. Other departments of the government were also dealing in information programs abroad, and critics began to attack organizational defects in the information program.

The State Department never felt entirely comfortable with the information program, and a number of committees were appointed to examine the overseas information program. The trend of separating information from diplomacy was begun when the informational and educational offices were consolidated in January 1952 into a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of State. When Eisenhower was elected president in 1952 and John Foster Dulles was named Secretary of State, Dulles was reportedly anxious to separate propaganda from diplomacy and thereby "free the Department from operational responsibilities and enable it to concentrate solely on foreign policy and diplomacy."  

In 1953, four different committees were examining the United States information program: the President's Committee on Foreign Information Activities, headed by William H. Jackson; the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, headed by
Nelson Rockefeller; the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, headed by Dr. Mark A. May; and the Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired first by Senator J. William Fulbright and later by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper. Although the Jackson Committee at first recommended that the information program stay within the State Department, it later changed its mind, and the eventual consensus of all four committees was that an independent agency was desirable.

Following the advice of the various commissions, President Eisenhower established the United States Information Agency as a separate agency on August 1, 1953, with the approval of the Secretary of State and the Congress. There have been no name-changes nor re-organizations of the American information programs since that time.

Is USIA A Cold War Agency?

There seems to be little doubt that the catalyst for the establishment of a peacetime information program in the United States was the onset of the Cold War. The language used by Smith and Mundt following their fact-finding trip to Europe in 1947 clearly shows their Cold War concern. Their joint report, which was instrumental in gaining Congressional passage of their bill, is filled with such statements as the following:

"Europe today has again become a vast battlefield of ideologies. . . ."
"We saw with our own eyes and experienced the pattern of the Communist infiltration."\textsuperscript{20}

"...the incessant falsification of our country's motives."\textsuperscript{21}

"Communist propaganda is busily engaged in distorting and maligning American life and motives."\textsuperscript{22}

"It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the Soviets and the Communists are today conducting aggressive psychological warfare against us in order thoroughly to discredit us and drive us out of Europe."\textsuperscript{23}

"It is the opinion of the committee that America is old enough and strong enough to warrant a change of voice—a voice that will rise confidently above the false call of Communism."\textsuperscript{24}

Such statements clearly reflect the Cold War atmosphere of the times and lend support to the thesis that PL 402—the Smith-Mundt Act—was passed as a consequence of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{25}

This being the case, it is therefore relevant at this point to ask whether the avowed influence of the Cold War on the passage of America's first peacetime information act means that USIA is a Cold War agency. With so many people claiming the Cold War is over, the answer to the question becomes crucial because the demise of the Cold War—if in fact it is over—raises the further question of whether USIA has any role to play in a non-Cold War world.

John Henderson, in his book on USIA, succinctly states the problem:

...USIA and its predecessor overseas information programs achieved peacetime acceptance primarily
because of the nation's need to counter Communist propaganda attacks. Therefore, both Congress and the public are accustomed to judging the work of USIA mainly on the basis of its utility in fighting Communism. This standard has continued to be applied even though over a twenty-year period the Agency's mission has been broadened and its targets expanded to deal with shifting political conditions.26

The image of USIA as a hard-hitting anti-Communist Cold War agency is the result of three main factors:

2. President Truman's 1950 "Campaign of Truth."
3. The McCarthy period.

We've already discussed the Cold War atmosphere surrounding the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act.* This was followed in 1950 by Truman's Campaign of Truth. Truman launched the campaign in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. In the speech, Truman said:

The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world today by the forces of imperialistic Communism. This is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the Communists have in this struggle. Deceit, distortions and lies are systematically used by them as a matter of deliberate policy.

This propaganda can be overcome by truth--plain, simple, unvarnished truth... We must make ourselves heard 'round the world in a great campaign of truth.27

The campaign had the backing of Truman and the National Security Council. Congress, reacting to the Cold War tensions of the

*See pages 23-25, 27-28

29
moment, passed a supplemental "Campaign of Truth" appropriation almost four times the size of the regular budget request.28

In what is certainly an ironic twist, the Campaign of Truth--despite Truman's admonition to tell the "plain, simple, unvarnished truth"--changed the style and approach of the American information program. The switch was one from information to propaganda, from the soft-sell to the hard-sell, from factual uncolored reports to hard-hitting propaganda programs more akin to psychological warfare than information.29 The campaign received much publicity, and the American information program became associated with the Cold War in the minds of the public and Congress.

Then in the early 1950's, Senator Joseph McCarthy strode on the scene. In his search for Communists in government, he investigated the information programs along with the others.30 His assistants, Cohn and Schine, investigated American libraries abroad.31 Charges were made that USIS libraries carried books by Communist authors and fellow-travelers. Books were withdrawn; some even burned.32 Employee loyalties were questioned, and the entire McCarthy era had a debilitating affect on America's information program.33 The ultimate impact was to re-inforce the tendency on the part of program managers to prove their loyalty by becoming Cold Warriors devoted to attacking the Communist bloc rather than focusing in on the positive aspects of American policy and culture.
USIA became an independent agency in 1953, towards the end of the McCarthy period. It was the heir to the Cold War image handed down to it by its predecessor organizations, an image growing out of the Cold War atmosphere of the late forties, the Campaign of Truth of 1950, and the McCarthy investigations of the early fifties. Images die hard and though the atmosphere out of which the peacetime information program in America developed has changed, the original Cold War image persists.

In a sense, there has been a perceptual lag, for though the mission of USIA changed over the years considerably, Congress and the public still tended to judge USIA in Cold War terms. And because they did, USIA had to continue to sell itself on Cold War grounds. The two inter-played while the world, in an objective sense, changed considerably around them. As one professional observer of USIA put it, "Since congressional attitudes toward the agency have traditionally been related to our 'success in winning the Cold War,' top officials at USIA have had to provide Congress with a variety of specious proofs of effectiveness at conversion."34

Congress tended to look askance at programs that were not aimed at the Communist bloc or in other related crisis areas such as the Third World. One student on USIA has remarked, "If legislators are convinced of the need for USIA activities, it is with reference to either the Communist bloc, the new Afro-Asian nations, the unsettled Latin American republics, or, in the
mid-1960's, Vietnam. . . . Information programs designed for Western Europe or Australia and New Zealand, where the threat of Communist penetration is relatively slight, drew criticism in appropriation hearings. In referring to New Zealand and Australia, for example, Senator Ellender commented in one hearing that, in his opinion, these nations did not warrant the spending of even a "dime" because there were "no people in the world more pro-American than the New Zealanders and the Australians. Actually, any worthwhile information program is an everyday, long-term project and efforts in friendly countries are as justifiable as programs directed at unfriendly ones on two grounds: (1) to retain their friendship and (2) to have an ongoing program available should the political situation change, as it has recently in both New Zealand and Australia, for example.

Congressional hearings offer an example of the Congressional habit of looking at America's information programs in a Cold War context. In 1963, for example, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives held a long, thorough series of hearings on the entire American information effort. It entitled the hearings, "Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive." In 1968, five years later, and with the world having changed considerably in the meantime, the same committee held another long hearing. Once again, it entitled the hearings "Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive."

In both cases, the hearings actually covered much more than the Cold War aspects of propaganda. The 1968 hearing, for
example, was really a very sophisticated inquiry into "The Future of United States Public Diplomacy." Both hearings could actually serve as educated primers on information, propaganda and public diplomacy. But the point is this: both hearings felt obliged to couch their inquiries in Cold War terms, like religionists invoking a ritual.

Critics of USIA outside Congress, in the private sector, also tend to see USIA in Cold War terms, whether the facts warrant it or not. One critic writes, in 1968, for example, that, "the Agency's statement of mission, spelled out by President Kennedy in 1963, reeks with Cold War phraseology, but attempts to rewrite it during the past two administrations have met with failure." Actually, the Kennedy statement of mission, which is still in effect, is a very reasonable statement, free of rhetoric. It doesn't mention the Cold War, it doesn't mention Communism, and it doesn't mention any ideology. The statement is, in fact, a fairly bland statement of purpose. It says:

The mission of the United States Information Agency is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements.

The statement goes on to say that USIA is to influence attitudes only by overt means and gives some guidelines. The closest the statement comes to mentioning the Cold War is the statement that
Agency activities should "unmask and counter hostile attempts to distort or frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States."42

The statement certainly does not "reek with Cold War phrasology," but the point is that the commentator referred to above was so convinced that USIA is a Cold War agency that he felt its statement of mission must reflect that fact, even though it doesn't. A recent writer in Commonweal also refers to USIA's "cold war ideology,"43 while the late John Franklin Campbell, in his book, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory, looked upon USIA as a Cold War anachronism.44

This discussion therefore brings us back to the question of whether USIA is or is not a Cold War agency. While it is true that the American post-war information program grew out of the necessities of the Cold War, it does not therefore follow that the USIA is a Cold War agency. Those who claim it is do not understand the changing nature of diplomacy and the role of public diplomacy in the modern world. The crucial point--a point often forgotten by many critics of USIA--is that USIA does not make foreign policy; it merely explains and reflects it. If American policy during the late forties and fifties was a Cold War policy of containment, USIA--as an extension of that policy--was a Cold War agency. It was no more a Cold War agency, however, than the Department of Defense, the State Department, AID, the White House or any other agency involved in foreign affairs at
the time. The point is that if containment or liberation were Cold War policies, then USIA had to reflect them. By its mandate, it had no choice.

But in fact, USIA's role has always been greater than the Cold War. Even at the height of the Cold War, its main task was to act as the American government's public diplomacy arm—not as the arm of any given policy, be it containment or otherwise, but as the arm whose function it is to support American foreign policy objectives through the communicative processes of public diplomacy—whatever that policy may be. To say that USIA is somehow tied exclusively to the Cold War is to confuse policy with function, as if one were to call the State Department a Cold War agency because it fostered containment in the '40s. The truth is that though policy changes, functions do not. Though American policy may change—as indeed it has over the past few years—the State Department's diplomatic functions still remain. As do USIA's public diplomacy functions or the Department of Defense's military functions.

Even if there had never been a Cold War, there would have still been a need in American foreign affairs for an organization performing the functions now being performed by USIA. It was an inevitable concomitant of the development of modern mass communications. Once it became feasible for nations to talk directly to the people of other nations, public diplomacy was bound to develop. The mass media could not help but play an
important role in modern international relations. At first it was the written word that was spread beyond the borders of one nation directly to the people of another. One of the shocking things about the French Revolution to traditional diplomats was the way republican France went over the heads of neighboring governments to spread the revolutionary ideas of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" directly to the masses through the use of pamphlets, leaflets and newspapers. Public opinion was beginning to count, and the development of radio, films and television merely increased its importance. We are now living in an age of communications satellites, transistor radios and video tapes. Can anyone seriously doubt that the communications revolution itself would have required some sort of American governmental information program in support of American foreign policy even without the catalyst of the Cold War? It might have taken a different form; it might have come a few years later rather than a few years sooner. But it would have had to come, with or without a Cold War.

The fact that virtually every other nation in the world, big and small, practices public diplomacy as an adjunct of its foreign policy lends support to the idea that USIA, or something like it, would have been developed with or without a Cold War. It is inconceivable that America would have eschewed the development of an information and cultural program while the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, Switzerland, India, Cuba and virtually every
other country in the world did. Everyone of the 116 nations accredited to Washington, for example, carries on informational and cultural programs in the United States.45 These nations realize that American public opinion vis-à-vis their nations affects the success or failure of their foreign policies toward us. This has nothing to do with the Cold War. In a modern world with modern communications and modern diplomacy, it just makes sense to use the tools modern science and technology have made available and which everyone else is using.

Once one learns to distinguish policy from function, realizing that public diplomacy is not tied to any one policy, be it the Cold War or otherwise, but has a function to perform whatever the given policy—once one realizes, in addition, that modern mass communications makes public diplomacy a necessity in the modern world—and once one realizes that every other nation in the world uses public diplomacy as a part of its diplomatic arsenal—then the fact that USIA developed out of the Cold War climate of the late forties becomes irrelevant. Though it may have espoused a Cold War policy at the time because that was American policy, USIA was never a Cold War agency per se. It was the public diplomacy arm of American foreign policy. Its purpose was to advance American foreign policy, whatever it might be. That was its purpose in the past and that should be its purpose in the future. The Cold War has nothing to do with it.

37
USIA: Propaganda, Criticism, Problems and Issues

In the past most of the criticisms of USIA have masked what is, in reality, a basic American aversion to "propaganda." Though the word propaganda comes from the Latin word "propagare," meaning to extend, enlarge, increase, carry forward, advance, and spread—a meaning connoting neither evil nor good—to most Americans, as one commentator put it, "the word propaganda implies something morally evil: dirty, underhanded, cynical, manipulative, deceptive techniques of persuasion if not outright lying."47

Although the word propaganda comes down to us from religion—the Vatican's "College of Propaganda" was set up by Pope Urban VIII in the seventeenth century to educate priests for missions—in the American mind, propaganda became associated first with the Fascists, then with the Nazis and finally with the Communists. Sponsors of propaganda were non-democratic and somehow un-American, and to the average American, the core meaning of propaganda became so overlaid with connotations of moral evil that the word could hardly be used except in a context of disapproval.48

Although Americans might accept the idea of propaganda as one of the necessary evils of war—provided the propaganda was called "information" as it was in both World Wars—Americans found the concept of a peacetime propaganda agency particularly offensive.

Congressman Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, which held a lengthy investigation into America's information programs in
1968, observed then that "there is a strong liberal strain in our national consciousness which rebels against the attempt by any government to mold the opinions or shape the attitudes of the governed. We view propaganda with healthy disrespect."

This basic attitude often causes critics of USIA to shoot from the hip with a gut reaction to USIA efforts, as in John Kenneth Galbraith's journal entry when he was American ambassador to India in the early sixties: "The Washington USIA is horrible. Day after day it belches out dreary and boring attacks on the USSR and China in the most repulsive and stinking prose. Nothing could do more to promote neutralism, or anyhow total inattention."50

Such statements are reflective of America's innate bias against propaganda per se. They exhibit a lack of understanding of the role of information in modern diplomacy, as an instrument of foreign policy which, if used properly, can enhance the other arms—diplomacy, trade and force. The same innate aversion to propaganda results in some critics recommending the complete abolition of USIA, as in Benjamin H. Oehlert's article "Toward the Abolition of the Program,"51 Bruce J. Oudes' "The Great Wind Machine,"52 or in John Franklin Campbell's book, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory.53

These represent extreme views, however, and most critics of USIA in the past have recognized the need for some sort of information program in the modern diplomatic setting while questioning the effectiveness of USIA in carrying it out.54
Regarding effectiveness, in truth, the state of the communicative arts at present is such that no adequate measure of effectiveness has yet been devised. In an article entitled "Effectiveness of International Propaganda," L. John Martin says, "What it all boils down to is that if our persuasive communication ends up with a net positive effect, we must attribute it to luck, not science." Edward R. Murrow, when he was Director of USIA, put it more elegantly when he said, "No computer clicks, no cash register rings when a man changes his mind or opts for freedom." Although we can measure adequately enough the inputs into communications—-the number of magazines distributed, the number of hours broadcast, or the number of foreigners who see USIA films—the output—the actual effect on the reader or listener or viewer—is not truly measurable. To compound the problem a USIA officer must be a political animal as well as a communicator, and as John Franklin Campbell points out, "... no one knows how to measure the most important thing in diplomacy: good political judgment."

Regarding effectiveness, virtually everyone agrees that you can't even begin to measure effectiveness without first having a clear-cut objective in mind. Unfortunately, in the case of USIA, its mission and objectives have never been clearly spelled out. One scholar, Ronald I. Rubin, devoted an entire book to this subject alone. The book, entitled The Objectives of the U.S. Information Agency, points out the fuzzy nature of the USIA
Is the USIA objective to provide information or to persuade? Should it attempt to build a favorable image of America—to see to it that America is popular abroad—or is its task strictly limited to winning support abroad for specific American foreign policy measures? Is the USIA role that of an anti-Communist Cold War agency or should it emphasize positive American virtues instead? Should USIA emphasize long-term cultural programs or short-term information goals? Are the two incompatible? Should USIA, and especially the Voice of America, tell the unvarnished truth—the good news as well as the bad—or should it tailor its reports so as to persuade its listeners of America's cause. Put another way, is USIA propaganda too long on information and too short on persuasion?

The USIA mission, in sum, has been filled with ambiguity and has tended to shift emphasis, depending on a variety of factors ranging from the mood of the times to the personalities of the various directors.

At least two books have been written urging USIA to change its mission from one of information to one of persuasion. Walter Joyce in The Propaganda Gap argues that the American aversion to propaganda has resulted in a bland, ineffective information program and urges that we change from a policy of information to one of persuasion. Arthur E. Meyerhoff, in the same vein, wrote a book called The Strategy of Persuasion in which he advocates the use of advertising skills in fighting the Cold War.
The criticisms point out the problem of finding objectives satisfactory to everyone—the President, the Department of State, Congress, advertisers, public relations experts, social scientists, scholars and above all, the public. There is common agreement that USIA's purpose is to project America's image, culture and policy to foreign peoples beyond America's borders through informational, educational and cultural means, as opposed to political, economic and military ones. But beyond that—when it comes to the substance of what is projected and why—agreement dissipates and politicians and experts differ as to just what USIA's mission should be.

This author feels that USIA's political role should be emphasized, that USIA is an arm of American foreign policy and that its mission should be to further American foreign policy objectives. As one observer put it in a symposium reappraising the American overseas information programs, "...we have the feeling that President John F. Kennedy's definition of information policies, as action designed to help achieve general foreign policy objectives, comes much closer to the central purpose that we seek than does the idea of creating popularity for ourselves...the real problem is to achieve over-all policy objectives and not simply to achieve popularity."64

In the same vein, but perhaps carrying the idea one step further, USIA—in its 37th Semi-Annual Report to Congress, covering the period July-December 1971—stated, "The mission of the
U.S. Information Agency is to advance the interests of the United States abroad. . . ."65 To speak of national interests—rather than America's image or popularity—places the role of USIA in its proper political context and merges its mission into the general fabric of America's machinery of foreign affairs.

Frank Shakespeare, the USIA Director under President Nixon from 1969 to 1973, succinctly stated the USIA purpose as follows:

Its purpose, fixed by law, is to support the foreign policy of the United States. We do that through the process of: one, making clear to the world what that policy is; two, seeking support for that policy where we can gain support, and three, minimizing opposition where it is not possible to gain support. It is also a purpose of USIA to assess international attitudes as they appear relevant to United States foreign policy for consideration by the President and the Secretary of State in their formation of that policy.66

In order for USIA to perform its role, American foreign policy itself must first be clear and precise. USIA cannot explain American foreign policy and help win support for it when the policy itself is unclear. Rubin, in his book The Objectives of the U.S. Information Agency, states, "...the USIA suffers whenever there is an absence of generally understood strategic doctrine. . . . Indeed a failure to clarify American foreign objectives is perhaps more keenly felt in the information realm than the other foreign policy instruments. . . . Since [USIA] must operate on a more subtle plane than the other available instruments, it must evidence a surer understanding of national objectives than they."67

43
Compounding the problem of explaining American foreign policy abroad is the fact that USIA operates in more than one hundred countries and must adapt its programs to the cultural and political conditions in each of them. Just as it is hard to make our foreign policy palatable in every part of the globe, so it is difficult to make our information policy completely palatable in each country. The most USIA can do is to help make our policies understood.68

In any case, the problems and issues facing USIA have been identified by a number of observers.69 Edward L. Bernays, one of the most knowledgeable men in the field of public information, gave one of the most cogent and comprehensive lists of problems besetting USIA in 1968. The Agency, he said, has suffered in the past from the following eight handicaps:70

1. Its objectives have not been made clear. . . .

2. The skepticism and passivity, and sometime disapproval of Congress and the people of the United States. Our efforts to enlist the interest of other populations has been derogated as false propaganda. The organization has nowhere like the importance in Congress and the national consciousness which it should have.

3. Too much emphasis has been given to words, too little to giving advice to our policymakers before they make policy. . . .

4. Lack of continuity. Reorganizations in 1948 and 1953, investigations by Senator Joseph McCarthy, changes in budgets allotted by Congress have seriously handicapped the Agency.

5. Rapidly changing leadership of the Agency. Many directors, highly competent in their own
field, have not been professionals in the work involved.

6. Too little longtime planning, based on social science oriented research.

7. In an open society and free flow of news here and abroad, foreign relations start with our domestic product. Leadership must remind our citizens that actions deviating from our national ideals often adversely affect our international relations.

8. Lack of recognition that the modern social sciences have a wealth of knowledge that can serve Agency orientation in defining objectives, appeals, strategy, and tactics.

Although other lists might vary in wording and emphasis, the Bernays list is representative of the problems listed by competent observers of USIA. What about the recommendations made in the past to overcome the problems presented?

USIA: Some Past Recommendations

Since the establishment of USIA twenty years ago, there has been no dearth of criticism of its programs and operations nor has there been a failure to isolate the problems involved, as the foregoing indicated. Recommendations to overcome the problems have also been put forward on numerous occasions. Over the years, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information—the watchdog body set up by Congress under the Smith-Mundt Act—has annually written reports reviewing the year’s operations and making recommendations. The latest report, submitted in January 1973, lists eighteen recommendations, ranging from a suggestion that USIA should have a greater voice during the policy-making stage of
foreign affairs to the recommendation that an independent, outside organization make a comprehensive reexamination of USIA's mission and operations.\textsuperscript{71}

It is not the purpose of this section to analyze all the various recommendations made over the years by both official bodies and by private observers but merely to point out that the recommendations have been many.\textsuperscript{72} Most of the recommendations overlap each other in the various reports and critiques. A representative list of recommendations is that contained in the report made by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1969 following hearings on "The Future of United States Public Diplomacy."\textsuperscript{73} The committee recommended that:

1. The USIA's objectives be clearly defined and related to today's needs and the Agency's true potential.

2. The Agency be brought into the process of foreign policy formulation not as an interested observer but as a full-fledged participant who has a valid contribution to make.

3. The Agency's structure and operations be reorganized to fit its new missions and the new realities of the world environment: such realities as the generation gap, speedier communications, as well as pertinent political developments such as polycentrism in the Communist world, and multipolarity. . . .

4. The Agency's strategies be developed by anthropologists, sociologists, and other social scientists working together with political policy-makers;

5. The Agency's research programs be greatly expanded to enable it to decide the relevancy of communicated information and to buttress its strategies. . . .
6. The Agency's tactics in the field follow patterns laid down by its objectives, research and strategy.

In a sense, the recommendations are the mirror image of the problems. One of the solutions most often proposed is that of retaining an information program but changing its organizational form. This suggestion is in keeping with the American tradition of tinkering with the machinery of government in order to improve it.

The organizational approach involves three possibilities:

1. Abolish USIA and return it to the State Department.

2. Retain USIA as an independent Agency but improve its effectiveness.

3. Remove information and culture from the machinery of government and place its functions into the hands of private organizations or quasi-governmental institutions, similar to the Alliance Francaise or the British Council.

Regarding the first two alternatives, this author does not believe it makes a great deal of difference organizationally whether USIA is an independent organization within the American governmental structure or a part of the State Department. Americans have a great faith in organizational re-organizations—witness the many re-organizations of the American effort in Vietnam and the various "Hoover" commissions that have been created over the years—but as far as the American governmental information effort is concerned, to talk about re-organization is to evade the real information/cultural problems that exist and to
deflect solutions away from substance to shadow. Does it really make a great deal of difference how the American information program is organized, how it appears on governmental charts, when the real issue involves what the organization says and does and how it carries out its mission?

A more serious problem organizationally is the issue of whether a private or semi-private information/cultural program would be more effective.75 This recommendation reflects the basic American bias against governmental propaganda. The rationale behind the suggestion is that government information programs are tainted per se—that they are not believed and are therefore ineffective.76 A privately organized or quasi-governmental information organization, the argument runs, would be more believable abroad and therefore more effective. For one thing, it would not be tied directly to foreign policy and could therefore take a more dispassionate long-range approach to programs and objectives.77

Quasi-governmental informational and cultural organizations such as France's Alliance Francaise, Germany's Goethe Institute, and Britain's British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and British Council are often cited as examples to be emulated.78 No objective proof has ever been offered, however, to prove that these quasi-governmental institutions are any less associated with their country's governmental institutions and policies than purely governmental informational-cultural organizations, such as

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USIA. The suggestion to abolish American governmental information/cultural programs and replace them with privately-run or quasi-governmental ones may actually be an example of American ethnocentrism. Because we, as Americans, tend to feel more comfortable with privately-controlled organizations, especially in the information and cultural fields, we project these feelings onto other cultures and countries and presume they too feel more comfortable with them. We tend to feel foreigners will somehow believe more in information and cultural programs disseminated through private organizations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Asian Society, or the Columbia Broadcasting System, than in the same programs offered under the auspices of the United States Government.

Is it being realistic, however, to think that most foreigners make the fine distinction that we do between governmental and non-governmental institutions? Not only in the less-developed nations of the so-called Third World is there misunderstanding regarding the differences between government and private informational and cultural programs in America, but even in the more sophisticated countries of Western Europe, the government/private distinction is not completely understood. The British, whose system is closely akin to ours, have long had this same problem not only in relation to the Third World but in relation to Europe as well. As Nicholson, in reference to Europe, says in his book *Diplomacy*, "Foreign governments do not really believe that the
British Press is as independent of the Foreign Office as is actually the case."79 The same could be said of the American press. Anyone who has served in a country where *Time* or *Newsweek* has written articles unfavorable to the host country and has tried to convince the host country that those magazines represent their own views and are not controlled by the American government can readily appreciate what is meant by the statement that many foreigners do not understand the American distinction between government and private organizations.

American ethnocentrism aside, an argument could actually be made that the creation of a private or quasi-governmental informational/cultural body would not be in America's interest because a great many nations in the world will only deal with America in these fields on a government-to-government basis. Burma in Asia and all the Communist countries in general are examples of countries that demand government-to-government informational and cultural exchange programs. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations are anathema to Burma, for example, though the Burmese government is not opposed to dealing with America in the cultural field on a government-to-government basis.

It should also be understood that in many countries of the world information and culture are government-controlled. America, for example, is one of the few countries in the world without a Ministry of Information. For information and culture to be under the auspices of government carries no stigma in most of the
world; on the contrary, it is merely accepted as the normal nature of things. It may be that the American feeling that its government information and cultural programs abroad—those run by USIA—are somehow tainted because they are government-controlled is merely another example of our ethnocentric tendency to project our own values onto foreign cultures and people. Certainly a survey of foreign attitudes on this subject—using the most up-to-date scientific methods—should be made before a reorganization of this type is undertaken.

In any case, America's informational and cultural problems are not, in this writer's views, truly an organizational problem. The problem is one of style and approach, of policy programming and planning—and these problems would exist whatever the organizational form adopted. Perhaps an organizational re-organization might actually bring about an improvement, but it would require an enormous effort and a great amount of time lost that could be better spent on improving the presently-existing organization. The latest report to Congress by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information supports this view; the report analyzes the possible re-organizational options and then strongly recommends that USIA be retained in its present form as an independent agency. 80

For one thing, even if a quasi-governmental information and cultural body were established or if private organizations were to take on the responsibility, there would still be a need in America's foreign affairs machinery for a public diplomacy input
into both policy-making and into policy-implementation. The end result would be a proliferation of informational organizations rather than a consolidation. Under the present set-up, there are many American private institutions working abroad in the informational and cultural fields—the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Asia Society, the American Field Service and a host of others. The fact that government and private American organizations work side-by-side abroad in these fields is reflective of the true nature of American society; this is the way we work domestically as well. The present system is a flexible one—able to work on a government-to-government basis where that is necessary or on a private basis where that is feasible. The options are greater, the opportunities broader. To get America out of the government informational and cultural picture would actually reduce America's options abroad in these areas.

In any case, whatever organizational form America's information program might adopt, it won't change the fact that the psychological climate in the world today is different than it was twenty or twenty-five years ago and that America's information and cultural programs in the seventies must reflect that fact.
V USIA'S ROLE IN THE SEVENTIES

The Psychological Climate of the Seventies

The psychological climate of the seventies is unlike any other period since the end of World War II. Its main characteristic is that of detente, or as President Nixon put it, an era of negotiation not confrontation leading to what he hopes will be a generation of peace. In such an atmosphere, the importance of ideology is bound to decline. As Joseph Morgenstern said in an article on propaganda in Newsweek in early 1972, "This is a time of declining ideology."1 He recognized that times have changed and that USIA must find "the right words and the right tone of voice" in the world of the seventies.2

Not only is policy changing, but world audiences are changing as well. A new generation has arisen—not only in America—but all over the world. This new generation hardly remembers the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Berlin Blockade of 1949, the invasion of Korea in 1950 or the suppression of Hungary in 1956. It does remember Vietnam, however, and the Soviet suppression of the Prague Spring, and it tends to be opposed to both.3 Henry Kissinger, in a recent talk on American relations with Europe, spoke about a European generation that doesn't remember World War II and which takes stability for granted.4 He referred to the "dramatic transformation of the psychological climate in the West—a change that is the most profound current challenge to Western statesmanship."5 In referring to some of the changes in
Europe in recent years, Kissinger said:

We have entered a truly remarkable period of East-West diplomacy. The last two years have produced an agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West Germany and the U.S.S.R., a SALT agreement, the beginning of negotiations on a European Security Conference and on mutual balanced force reductions, and a series of significant, practical bilateral agreements between the United States and the U.S.S.R.6

The significant aspect about all of the diplomatic agreements and negotiations listed by Kissinger is that all contribute to the atmosphere of detente now prevalent throughout the world of the seventies. In Asia, the Nixon visit to Peking, the ending of the Vietnam War, and the beginning of negotiations between North and South Korea all contribute to the same feelings of detente.

In an atmosphere of detente, the psychological factors can be crucial. The fluidity of relations in a multilateral balance of power world will place a premium on mutual confidence and the psychological climate that supports it. Certainly any future relations between the five great power centers of the seventies—America, Russia, Western Europe, Japan and China—are dependent on the feelings of mutual confidence existing between the powers involved. One is even tempted to say that the success or failure of detente in the seventies is dependent on the degree of mutual confidence exhibited by the five great power centers toward each other. As Henry Brandon, a writer on foreign affairs, put it, "... mutual confidence... does play a role in international relations and to undermine it is a loss to both sides."7
In America's relations with Europe especially, Brandon seems to think that psychological factors are of prime importance. He writes:

Unquestionably...the U.S. will want to maintain an influence in Western Europe, though the relationship will come to rest more on psychological than institutional foundations. As the power of NATO declines and the security guarantee seems to become open to question, this psychological relationship will provide the necessary index. If it is good, then so will be the deterrent value of the guarantee; if it deteriorates, then the guarantee will be devalued with it. The growing fluidity in international relations will not make all this any easier.  

Because the psychological factors are so important to the success of American policy in the seventies, it would seem that USIA has an important role to play in fostering a climate of mutual confidence upon which so much of the success of that policy depends. Programs of information and culture are ideally suited for this purpose. But what specifically should be the USIA role in the changing psychological climate of the seventies?

In the remaining years of the seventies, USIA's mission should emphasize the following:

1. USIA's major objective should be that of winning support abroad for American foreign policy; the importance of foreign public opinion to the success or failure of American foreign policy will increase in the seventies.

2. USIA should play a major role in the creation of a verbal strategy for the seventies in support of American policy and actions.

3. In order for a verbal strategy in support of national strategy to be successful, USIA must
have a greater voice during the policy-making stage of development.

4. Though USIA should have an input at the policy-making juncture, its major role in the seventies, as in the past, will still be to explain American foreign policy abroad, not to make policy.

5. In the seventies, both our foreign policy and our information policy in support of it should concentrate on long-range objectives.

6. In order for USIA to fulfill its role in the seventies, it must have the support of both Congress and the public; in the future, USIA must educate both Congress and the public as to the nature of public diplomacy striking a realistic balance between exaggerated hopes and unwarranted cynicism.

The balance of this section will concentrate on the above six aspects of USIA's role in the seventies.

The USIA Role: Support Foreign Policy

USIA's primary role in the seventies should consist of gaining the support of foreign public opinion for American foreign policy. It is important to emphasize the foreign policy aspect because too often in the past the role of USIA has been interpreted to be that of enhancing the American image abroad in some vague generalized way not necessarily related to foreign policy. This in turn has resulted in the American image being seen in terms of "popularity," in terms of whether America was liked or disliked, popular or unpopular.

The generalized image of America should not be of concern to USIA; public opinion becomes important to USIA only in so far
as it affects a nation's attitude towards American foreign policy. Those aspects of public opinion which are important—perhaps even crucial—are (1) feelings of mutual solidarity towards America and (2) confidence in our foreign policies and our capacity for world leadership.\(^9\) It is in precisely those areas where the world's conception of America has deteriorated in recent years.\(^10\) The Vietnam War has played a crucial role in eroding the feelings of mutual confidence upon which a solid foreign policy can be based. But the Vietnam War cannot be blamed entirely. American domestic problems—the race problem, crime, and political assassinations—have also played their role in foreign perceptions of American prestige.\(^11\)

Foreign policy and domestic policy interact in creating foreign perceptions of America. American domestic policy in handling rising inflation, for example, will affect foreign perceptions of the state of the American economy which in turn affects foreign perceptions of American power. In the end, however, it is American foreign policy towards the world in general and specific countries in particular that will determine whether or not we will gain the support of governments and public opinion abroad.\(^12\) If our policies are in keeping with the basic aspirations and national interests of the countries involved, that support will probably be forthcoming; where our policy is at odds with those hopes and interests, it will probably not. The point is that foreign policy plays the crucial role, not propaganda.\(^13\) There
is little USIA can do to make bad foreign policy palatable or to make acceptable a policy not in keeping with a specific country's perception of its own interests. USIA can make the American policy better understood, but that alone will not necessarily make it acceptable.14

The ideal, of course, is when understanding of America's foreign policy and interests is coupled with approval based on mutual interests and mutual confidence. In this respect, the Nixon policy of negotiation, not confrontation, seems more in keeping with the mood of the seventies than the containment policies that preceded it. Nixon's winding down of the Vietnam War and his visits to Moscow and Peking have won almost universal approval.15 "Yet," as the Advisory Commission on Information points out, "for almost a decade no amount or type of USIA effort to explain U.S. intentions and purposes in Vietnam—short-range or long-range—has succeeded in persuading most nations of the world about the righteousness and wisdom of our course."16

The Vietnam War certainly offers objective proof of the importance of public opinion to foreign policy. Public opinion, both abroad and domestically, played a crucial role in determining American foreign policy towards Vietnam, especially following the Tet offensive of 1968. Foreign reactions to American bombing of North Vietnam were instrumental in American decisions to halt the bombing. In the seventies, with the communication revolution
expanding if anything—foreign public opinion will be more important than ever in determining the success or failure of American foreign policy.

In the seventies, the USIA task of winning foreign public support for U.S. policies will be at once both easier and harder. It will be easier because—with the Vietnam War ending and détente in the air—the American policy of negotiation, not confrontation, is more in keeping with the mood of the times. It will be harder, however, because the Cold War, whatever its faults, provided a clear-cut integrated framework within which interests and policies could be delineated. Under Cold War conditions, many policies and programs could be justified on the basis that stopping Communism overrode all lesser interests. In a sense, the higher interest of stopping Communism overcame many lesser interests that would have otherwise assumed importance; the overall goal of containing Communism provided an umbrella under which lesser national interests were shaded and subordinated. Foreign economic and military aid could be sold to the American electorate—and to Congress—on the premise that the greater national interest in containing Communism overrode the lesser national interest of maintaining a favorable balance of trade. What was true for America in a Cold War world was also true of other Western nations. The Bonn government, for example, could help support American troops in West Germany under Cold War conditions by appealing to the Communist threat and thereby subordinating German economic interests to political ones.
The old arguments are losing sway, however, for in a multi-
lateral world consisting of powers and interests that cut across
ideological frontiers, the clear-cut lines of the past tend to
fade and become obscure. Narrow national interests—interests
that might have been buried in the past in the common effort to
win the Cold War and forestall Communism—may assume greater
importance. The United States, for example, in pursuit of spe-
cific American interests may espouse policies at odds with its
avowed desire to create a stable world order. This could be
especially true in the economic sphere where, for example, Am-
erican concern for a favorable balance of trade may run counter
to its desire to create a firm and stable monetary system.18

What this means for USIA in the seventies is that its mes-
sage will have to be more subtle as it goes about the task of
winning foreign public support for American foreign policies in
a shifting, multilateral, balance-of-power setting.

A Verbal Strategy for the Seventies

In readings on propaganda and persuasion, one of the most
commonly espoused theories is that action speaks louder than
words, that what we do is more important than what we say. Ed-
ward R. Murrow when he was director of USIA said, "...above
all, it is what we do--not what we say--that has the greatest
impact overseas."19 Other writers talk about the "propaganda of
the deed." One expert says, "...the propaganda of the deed is
much more powerful than any particular interpretation of or
Another expert says that the best strategy for cross-cultural communications is to make persuasion more by deed than by words.21

No one denies the preeminence of deeds, and words unsupported by deeds soon sound hollow and lose credibility. But the danger in thinking that action counts is the obverse theory that words don't matter. Words, in fact, play a crucial role in diplomacy, and always have. An important book, entitled Word Politics, by Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, emphasizes the vital role that words play in foreign affairs. The authors discuss the importance of a verbal strategy. They write:

"Verbal strategy, like other aspects of foreign policy decision making, introduces into the weighing of policy options an awareness that actions taken must also be explained and that the explanation may be in the long run more costly or more beneficial to the national interest than the act itself. No action should ever be taken without assessing the long-run strategic and systemic costs and benefits of what is said to explain and justify the action. Verbal strategy, in other words, requires the same careful planning as any other aspect of strategy for the achievement of national goals."22

The authors contend that America's verbal justification for its invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1964 was short-sighted in that it appeared to enounce a theory of limited sovereignty; an almost identical word-for-word justification was later used by the Soviet Union to justify its invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.23

The authors write, "The tendency in the pragmatic West is to regard rhetoric at best as ornamentation. . . . It is what
is done that counts." This is false, the authors claim, citing as an example how "the cumulative effect of United States pronouncements" regarding the Dominican intervention appeared "to authorize the Soviet Union to do exactly what it did to Czechoslovakia in 1968."  

The authors refer to the separation of words and acts as "The False Dichotomy." They say that we must "...rid ourselves of cultural preconceptions about a dichotomy between words and deeds and learn to appreciate the importance of a strategy of verbal behavior." They contend that a verbal strategy should be a part of all strategic thinking and planning. A nation's explanation of its actions, in sum, is not to be taken as mere window-dressing or propaganda; they have a strategic significance and affect the images and reactions of listening nations.  

"Verbal weapons are as 'real' in their strategic potential as missiles and submarines," the authors contend. "As long as this is not understood, the United States will continue to be maneuvered into strategic positions it need not have taken and which are not in its national interest." The authors further state that "a verbal strategy is as important as military strategy." Though this is a conclusion not to be found in traditional military texts, such as Clausewitz, Mahan and others, who can deny that in modern strategy the essence of deterrence is psychological not the military hardware per se. What a nation says and how it says it has a profound affect on the listening
nation; how deterrence is explained has strategic significance and affects the psychological atmosphere in which the nation's deterrent strategy operates. As the authors put it, "Deterrence is not really a military concept; it is, rather, psychological and perceptual in nature involving the creation of certain credible expectations."

The classic example of the importance of words to national strategy and security is Dean Acheson's remarks in 1950 implying that South Korea was outside the belt of American interests in the Pacific. The omission of South Korea from America's "defensive perimeter" emboldened Stalin and North Korea to act; Acheson's words did not serve a deterrent purpose as they did not give any indication that America would in fact fight to protect South Korea should it be invaded.

A recent example of the interaction of words and deeds was President Nixon's announcement of his intended visit to China. The visit—the act or deed—was painstakingly planned; but the announcement—the words used to explain the act—appeared to be hurried, at least as regards Japan. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the longtime editor of Foreign Affairs, comments, "The approach to Peking was not precipitate; it had been carefully prepared. But the announcement that the President would go there in person was made in a way that caused maximum embarrassment to the Japanese government." The point here is not whether Nixon was or was not justified in handling the announcement the way that he
did regarding Japan—there may have been good reasons for doing so—but the point is that the words themselves had an importance commensurate with the act.

What then is the importance of words for American strategy in the seventies? With the superpowers in a nuclear stalemate, force is in a sense immobilized and non-military concepts assume a new strategic significance. Such things as "mutually-shared expectations, images, climate, signals, patterns of behavior and reciprocity" take on an importance otherwise denied them. The Nixon Doctrine implies a verbal strategy of cooperation—of partnership and mutual interests mutually understood and accepted.

If foreign public opinion is important to American foreign policy in the seventies and if words and acts are to be in harmony with each other in the verbalization of American actions, then USIA—as the only professional arm in the foreign affairs machinery of government dealing with words and their affect on foreign audiences—should in the future play a greater role in the formulation stage of American foreign policy. The next section deals with this aspect of USIA's role in the seventies.

USIA and the Making of Foreign Policy in the Seventies

In order for USIA to influence a verbal strategy for the seventies, it must participate at the policy-making stage of foreign policy. At the moment, USIA has only a limited input at the policy-making juncture. Its role is conceived basically as that of explaining foreign policy after it is made or of making a foreign policy decision palatable after the fact.
There have been many suggestions over the years that psychological factors should be given greater weight at the policy-making stage of foreign affairs, but very little has been done to institutionalize the psychological input. At the 1968 symposium reappraising the American information effort, one expert said, "...USIA's point of view carries little weight. USIA leaders need daily access to the White House and to the Department of State at the highest levels to advise on the release of news with possible impact overseas—and the advice provided must be sophisticated, at a professional level, fully comprehending the complexities of formulating and conducting United States foreign policy."

A scholar on USIA makes the same point. "The inadequate arrangement for USIA in the Executive Branch," Ronald I. Rubin writes, "illustrates, in some measure, the absense of recognition of the Agency as a permanent and vital instrument of foreign policy." Barry Zorthian, a longtime officer with USIA and presently a Time-Life executive, draws a neat mental image of the problem when he says that USIA must be "in on the takeoffs as well as the crash landings."  

A number of cases could be cited wherein USIA has not been in on the take-off—the policy-making stage—but had to try to pick up the pieces at the crash-landing—the policy-explaining stage. Some of the more famous ones are the Sputnik launching in 1957, the U-2 incident in 1960, the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, and the Vietnam War.
The launching of Sputnik by the Russians in 1957 was certainly one of the most significant propaganda feats of the post-war period. Its impact on America and the world was swift, dramatic, and permanent. The Soviets undoubtedly recognized the psychological dimension of the launching and Soviet psychological experts undoubtedly made an input into the Soviet decision to concentrate on rocketry and space. As Walter Joyce said in his book *The Propaganda Gap*, "Unquestionably, years earlier, the Soviet leaders had recognized the propaganda benefits, as well as the military advantages, of being first in space. The Sputnik was a propaganda defeat for us second only to the loss of China." Meanwhile, the American space effort was being purposely held back. "There was no voice," Joyce says, "to utter: Even if we have it all sewed up in terms of our military and diplomatic needs, the propaganda advantage that the Russians would gain if they were first in space would be fantastic." The point here is that the American machinery of government was not then--nor is it now--so constituted that the psychological dimension of a decision was taken into account on a systematic, organized and well-integrated basis.

Rubin in his book on USIA says that "a cardinal operating principle for an effective political communication program is that the information instrument engage in the policy formulation process." He cites the U-2 episode of 1960 as a classic case to illustrate his point. The downing of the U-2 spy plane while on
an espionage mission over the Soviet Union greatly affected the American image among its allies, among neutral nations, within Communist countries and within the United States itself. The incident occurred after Eisenhower and Khrushchev had met in the United States in what was later called "The Spirit of Camp David." A summit conference in Paris was due to take place at the time of the incident. USIA was completely divorced from the decision to permit the U-2 to continue its spy flights over the Soviet Union with only fifteen days to go before the Summit Meeting.

Meanwhile, USIA had been publicizing the Spirit of Camp David. America Illustrated, the USIA Russian-language magazine, had just published its May 1960 issue devoted exclusively to showing President Eisenhower's longtime efforts on behalf of peace. The American Embassy in Moscow had reported that the issue was spectacularly popular. Rubin says:

It would appear that the USIA found the atmosphere generated by the "Spirit of Camp David" beneficial to United States information objectives. Had the policy-makers responsible for the U-2 flight of May 1, 1960, consulted the elaborate polls of the Agency's Research and Reference Service, they might have postponed the flight, in view of the detrimental impact its discovery would have on foreign public opinion. The polls, as well as any other form of advice the Agency could supply regarding the desirability of the U-2 intelligence mission, were ignored by those responsible for the mission.

The effect was that the United States eventually conceded publicly that it had deliberately lied, committed espionage, and violated the territorial integrity of another country. Such an act was bound to affect dramatically public opinion abroad.
As it turned out, however, not only was USIA not consulted regarding the decision to go ahead with the U-2 flight only two weeks before the scheduled summit but in addition, once the craft was shot down, the error was compounded by refusing to consult USIA regarding the handling of the matter now that the flights had been exposed.46 "As the U-2 episode developed" Rubin says, "The United States committed a succession of blunders that the USIA would ultimately be forced to explain."47 In sum, USIA had not been in on the take-off of the U-2 but it was supposed to be there at the crash-landing by which time it was too late to make the United States look good. The incident certainly supports Rubin's contention that "...the USIA remains a neglected instrument in foreign policy planning--especially in crisis situations."48

During the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, the same situation remained, though by then Kennedy had replaced Eisenhower as President. There was no psychological input into the decision to go ahead with the Bay of Pigs venture despite the fact that polls were in existence indicating the people of Cuba supported Castro and would probably not rise in support of the invaders.49 The polls, conducted by Lloyd A. Free of the Institute for International Social Research at Princeton, were taken in the spring of 1960. The report contained such statements as:

Whatever the opinions of outside observers might be about current trends in Cuba, the Cuban people were highly optimistic at the time of our survey--optimistic in terms of what they conceived to be
vast improvement over the days of Battista and optimistic about future progress, both personal and national.\textsuperscript{50}

In short, the prevailing mood of the great majority of Cubans in April and May, 1960 was one of hope and optimism.\textsuperscript{51}

...we feel reasonably confident in predicting that, had a national election been held at the time of our survey, Fidel Castro could have won by overwhelming odds.\textsuperscript{52}

The moral, of course, is that the program of the Castro regime—with particularly (sic) emphasis upon the agrarian reform, educational and industrial programs—was enormously popular with the Cuban people at the time of our survey.\textsuperscript{53}

One of the premises upon which the Bay of Pigs invasion was founded was that the people would rise in support of the Cuban exile army.\textsuperscript{54} This did not happen and was not likely to happen, as the above-cited poll indicated. The point here, however, is that some consideration of the psychological factors should have been taken at the policy-making juncture and that USIA, which was in possession of the poll, should have been brought into the decision-making process. The decision might have been the same in any case, but at least all of the factors would have been considered and weighed before making the decision. Granted the hesitancy with which President Kennedy approached the Bay of Pigs invasion, however, a strong indication that the people were in fact behind Castro might have influenced the President against the invasion plan.

The Bay of Pigs case also shows that in order to give proper advice to the policy-makers, scientific research must often be
carried out abroad. Congress, however, has been reluctant to appropriate adequate moneys for this purpose. \footnote{55} Yet the Vietnam War represents another dramatic example of how a psychological input into the decision-making process might have prevented what turned out to be a fairly traumatic decision to intervene in Vietnam. W. Phillips Davison, professor of sociology and journalism at Columbia University and editor of the \textit{Public Opinion Quarterly}, has observed:

\begin{quote}
It is not too much to say that if USIA had had an adequate public opinion research program on Vietnam from 1954 on we would very probably not face the difficult situation that we encounter in Vietnam today. The situation in Vietnam was incorrectly defined as a primarily military one, when it actually was much more a public opinion and political organization problem. Much of the misery we have encountered there could have been avoided if USIA had been able to deliver the kind of information and advice that it is supposed to be able to deliver. \footnote{56}
\end{quote}

The problem, in other words, is a two-fold one: (1) the problem of getting accurate, scientific information regarding public opinion abroad and (2) the problem of institutionalizing the USIA input into the foreign policy decision-making apparatus. Though there may be political constraints in given countries, \footnote{57} the former problem is largely one of money as the means and expertise are available, both within and without the USIA, for analyzing foreign public opinion; \footnote{58} the latter problem, on the other hand, involves the recognition on the part of foreign affairs decision-makers of the importance of foreign public opinion--of the psychological dimension of foreign affairs--in the making of foreign policy.

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To date, there has been little evidence of a recognition of the importance to foreign affairs of the psychological input. More often than not, USIA has the information regarding actual or potential foreign reactions to American foreign policy initiatives, but the information isn't being tapped by the decision-makers. The problem actually transcends USIA because, for the most part, the charge could actually be made that decision-makers, from the President on down, do not in general make use of the expertise available to them in foreign affairs within the professional career governmental services, whether such expertise be within the State Department, AID, the CIA or USIA.

Regarding USIA specifically, it is the organization best-suited to advise the President and other decision-makers on potential foreign public reactions regarding American foreign policy decisions. This is, in essence, a public relations function, which is USIA's special expertise, and which should be worked into the decision-making process. In this respect, it does seem curious that Presidents, Congressmen and other political figures are excruciatingly sensitive about their own personal public images—pollsters are often hired to find out how they are doing—and yet when it comes to America's image abroad—the impact of policies on America's image—these same people are often blithely unconcerned about the affect on foreign public opinion of the decision being made.

Yet, it would seem that if a favorable public image is important to a political figure personally, then a favorable
public image is equally as important to a national collectively. How others see a political figure personally does affect his ability to act—his power—and the same is true of a nation: how foreign publics view it does affect its power—its ability to maneuver and act on the world scene.

In any case, the problem of getting decision-makers to take the psychological dimension into account when making foreign policy is largely an organizational problem. On the contemporary scene, this means that USIA must make some input at the National Security Council level because the Council is the major institutional element making foreign policy in America today.

Over the years, the relationship between USIA and the National Security Council has varied from administration to administration. The USIA Director does not have a statutory seat on the Council and with the exception of Edward R. Murrow, no USIA Director has ever played a prominent role at the National Security Council level. Under President Kennedy, Edward R. Murrow, as Director of USIA, sat regularly on the Council. But no Director has done so since that time and Murrow's participation was based more on his personal prestige than on any attempt to institutionalize the psychological input in foreign-policy decision-making in America.

Under the present Nixon Administration, the USIA Director "attends meetings of the National Security Council at the pleasure of the President." President Nixon has placed great
stress on the National Security Council as the main formulator of foreign policy. His annual reports to Congress on foreign affairs—U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's—contain sections devoted exclusively to the National Security Council. But no mention of USIA nor of the importance of the psychological dimension of foreign affairs is made in any part of his first three annual reports. Though there is a USIA input into the lower reaches of the National Security Council system—especially at the Interdepartmental Group Level—the input is largely pro forma. At this present juncture in American foreign policy, the psychological input into American foreign policy decision-making is minimal at best and completely ignored at worst. Yet it seems short-sighted not to have a USIA input before decisions are made—not because USIA will always have something significant to say—but because, in the modern world, it is another element in the foreign policy equation that should be considered before a rational decision can be made.

As the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information put it in its latest 1973 report: "...USIA can serve as an important feedback to the President on the success or failure of his proposals and plans as measured by foreign public reaction to them. ...USIA's feedback role is to increase the understanding of U.S. policy makers and to keep them aware of the opinions and attitudes of foreign populations, in order that these views may be taken into consideration before policies are set and decisions made and announced."
Brant Wedge, a social psychologist who specializes in the study of psychological factors in international relations, wrote recently:

We already have a foretaste of the effect of accelerated global communication—enough to predict crudely the likely consequences of the impact of the next quantum jump. ... World public opinion will gain in influence. ... We have recently seen evidence that widespread disapproval on the part of a world audience regarding the American conduct of the Vietnam War has had a very potent effect on United States policies and even on domestic political events. ... As the global communication flow accelerates, governments will have to add weight to considering the impact of policies and announcements on international public opinion. ... The scientific art of public diplomacy will take its place in the councils of state as it develops new techniques of analysis and practice. ... I can imagine established systems by which communicators and political leaders could be continually reminded of the reaction of global publics to their messages. ... I can imagine that professional communication analysts will be attached to every agency and organization with significant international operations. ...  

That is a picture of the future drawn by one expert on international propaganda and statecraft. Though public opinion has undoubtedly increased in importance so far as it affects foreign policy—the Vietnam War would seem to offer objective proof of this—its importance has not as yet been recognized by the highest levels of the American foreign policy establishment. Yet if this dimension is not to be ignored in the future and if America is to formulate a verbal strategy in harmony with its actions and deeds, then USIA—or some other agency with expertise in the psychological field—will have to participate at the policy-formulation stage of the process. The importance of tying USIA
into the decision-making process at the highest levels was rec-
ognized by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information in its 1973 report when it placed this recommendation first among the eighteen offered. The Commission recommended that "USIA's unique resources and knowledge of foreign public opinion should be com-
municated by its Director at the highest levels of government—
the President, the Secretary of State and the President's Assis-
tant for National Security Affairs. USIA should be 'in on the takeoffs as well as the landings' in foreign policy."66

The USIA Role: To Explain Foreign Policy

To say that USIA should make an input at all levels at the policy-formulation stage is not to say that USIA should make policy. It shouldn't. The White House and the Department of State make policy and USIA's primary role is to support it. Once USIA has made its input and the decision is made, USIA's job is to publicize and explain the policy with all the communication expertise at its disposal. USIA's input should help the decision-
maker grasp the psychological implications of the various options; it adds another dimension to the resolution of the problem. But it's still the foreign-policy decision-makers that have to decide which policy to pursue.

In the final analysis, it's the substance of America's for-
eign policy that will determine whether a nation will or will not support America's policy and objectives. That's where the making of foreign policy and the attempt to win psychological support
for it intermesh; there is no way to separate the making of foreign policy from its explanation: an awareness of the psychological impact of foreign policy must be present at both stages or the attempt to win foreign support is almost bound to fail.

In referring to our Asian policies, Hans Morgenthau says, "The psychological weakness of the West in Asia... results from the weakness of its political policies." He says that our intervention in Indochina has produced an adverse psychological effect throughout the world creating a situation where psychological countermeasures are of little help. He writes:

In situations such as these, the immediate answer to the psychological liability of a given political or military policy is not propaganda, but policies that will establish the psychological preconditions for successful propaganda. (Italics mine)... Propaganda is not only a struggle between good and evil, truth and falsehood, but also of power with power. In such a struggle virtue and truth do not prevail simply upon being communicated. They must be carried upon the steady stream of political power that makes them both relevant and plausible. ... Political warfare is but the reflection, in the realm of ideas, of the political and military policies it seeks to support. It can be worse than these policies, but it can never be better. From the qualities of these policies, it draws its strength. With them, it wins or fails.

What Morgenthau is saying is that propaganda is no better than the policy it propagates. Andrew Berding, a former Deputy Director of USIA, put the problem in perspective when he wrote, "At times the Agency has also been blamed because a given United States policy has not been accepted by a foreign government. In all probability the Agency advertised the policy as much as could be expected, but the policy itself proved unacceptable."
One major problem involved in explaining America's foreign policy abroad is the ambiguities in the policy itself. As one scholar on American foreign policy has written, "America's limited ability to communicate articulately her working principles in foreign affairs to others derives largely from a limited ability to grasp them coherently and concretely herself."71 An information program obviously suffers whenever foreign policy makers fail to enunciate a clear and unambiguous policy.72 The problem is obviously more complex in a non-Cold War world. The Cold War provided a clearer framework in which to operate than does the evolving multipolar, balance-of-power world of the seventies. "To pursue a balance-of-power concept a clear definition of basic interests is needed," Henry Brandon wrote recently in The Atlantic.73 Then he added, "The Nixon Doctrine is too vague a definition of American interests and priorities."74 Robert R. Bowie, the Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, goes one step further and claims that "the Nixon Doctrine expresses more a mood than a policy."75 He says the Nixon Doctrine may have been purposely vague at first and that this may have served a purpose in the short-run, but in the long run it is necessary to clarify the basic aims and priorities of our foreign policy for if we don't both our allies and our enemies may be misled.76

In any case, the more vague policies evolving at present, in contrast to the more unambiguous policies of the Cold War period,
definitely complicate the problems of USIA in explaining American policy abroad. On the other hand, if a multipolar policy is more imprecise than the prior bipolar one, the USIA task of making it clear and comprehensible becomes that much more important. A more fluid foreign policy requires more deft explanations, and in the short-run, USIA will be taxed to the limits of its professionalism in responding to the changing needs of the times.

In the long-run, however, it is incumbent upon the United States to develop a clear and unambiguous long-range policy to which USIA programs can be tied. Any successful information program needs clearly-defined long-range objectives within which to work—a grand strategy with a long view in which national interests can merge with world interests and with which people abroad can identify.77 Though it may not always be possible to win support abroad for every short-run day-to-day decision made by American foreign policy makers, America's long-range objectives should be as clear and unambiguous as possible—objectives in keeping with the aspirations of the overwhelming number of the world's peoples and in consonance with their interests as well as ours. Our policy, in sum, should be clear and comprehensible not because that will make an information program easier but because a sound world order requires it. As Nicholson says in his book Diplomacy, "Uncertainty and the unpredictable are dangerous elements in any international situation. It is impossible to conduct sound banking when there exists no stability of exchange."78
USIA: The Long-Range View

In the information field, there has long been a dispute between those who advocate that USIA would be most effective if its programs are cool and restrained, directed primarily toward idealistic, long-range, mutually-shared goals and those who think USIA programs would be most effective if aimed at supporting the day-to-day policy interests of the American government through strong, hard-hitting and purposeful actions. In this writer's opinion, the two are not necessarily irreconcilable. The ideal, of course, is where short-range goals and long-range goals intermesh and give mutual support to each other. Short range policy decisions that are at odds with long-range goals vitiate the long-range goals and affect adversely a nation's credibility.

To say, for example, that America's long-range goal is a world of diverse nations free to choose their own future and then to intervene in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic due to short-run crises vitiates the credibility of the long-range goal. The short-run decisions may have been correct in both cases—that's not being argued here—but the point is that the effect on long-range goals of short-range decisions must be clearly understood at the time the decisions are being made.

Franck and Weisband in their book *World Politics* address the problem this way:

*The verbal behavior of a state is seldom random. Almost always it is designed intentionally to advance the national interest. It is therefore*
a part of national strategy, intended like mili-
tary or economic strategy, to produce certain
predictable and desired effects. Problems arise
when the national interest is not exhaustively
defined by the speaker, when the verbal beha-
vior is designed only with an eye to its effect
on an immediate crisis, forgetting that words
do not cease to be systematically and strategic-
ally important once the crisis is over.
The authors go on to say that the long-range effect of words may
be more important than the short-run expedient effect. "A strat-
egy of verbal behavior that fails to keep this longer range of im-
pact in focus can be costly," they state, "no matter how success-
ful it is in helping with any single strategic encounter. . . ."81

Regarding American foreign policy, Henry Kissinger says that
we tend to deal in emergencies rather than with variations in a
long-term program.82 USIA's success or failure has often been
measured in terms of the single master stroke--the headline-
winning success of an American exhibit in Russia, for example--
rather than in terms of the long-run cumulative effect of its
ongoing programs. J. Leonard Reinsch, a former Chairman of the
U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, told the Congressional
committee on information in its 1968 hearings that "...the
major thrust of our ideology must be on a long-range basis. And
our success will be measured only by the extent to which cumula-
tive, unrelenting, steady efforts eventually result in attitudes
and opinions which are favorable to the interests of the United
States and the rest of the free world."83

Unfortunately, in order to sell itself to Congress and the
public, USIA has had to emphasize the big-splash one-shot item--
the huge single-time exhibit, the Academy Award winning movie, etc.—at the expense of selling short the importance of the routine, day-to-day, cumulative operations that really represent the core of its programming and its long-run potential for making an impact.84

Though it is undoubtedly true that the creation of understanding is a long, constant and relentless process requiring steady, patient and reiterative efforts, the attempt will not be successful without long-range information goals tied tightly to long-range policy goals. The Nixon administration is apparently aware of the necessity of long-range objectives in foreign affairs for the first annual Nixon report to Congress on American foreign policy in the seventies abounds with such phrases as "over the long pull"85 and "over the long run."86 In the report, Nixon makes such statements as:

Our opportunity today— and challenge—is to get at the causes of crises, to take a longer view....87

Our contribution and success will depend not on the frequency of our involvement in the affairs of others, but on the stamina of our policies.88

In the central area of policy, we have arranged our procedure of policymaking so as to address the broader questions of long-term objectives first....89

The stakes are too high, and the task too great, to judge our effort in any temporary perspective.90

The concept of addressing long-term objectives first and making sure short-term policies are not in conflict with them is precisely in keeping with the thesis of this paper that USIA in the
seventies should concentrate on long-term objectives even when forced by necessity to handle short-run crises. If the dichotomy between long-term and short-run objectives is to be reconciled, such reconciliation must come about through a recognition that long-term objectives take precedence over short-term goals. The ineluctable truth of this statement must be recognized by the policy-makers first; otherwise USIA, as an implementer of policy, will find itself at the mercy of fast-breaking and contradictory short-run events.

In sum, both American policy and American propaganda must be viewed in long-range terms. An expedient, short-run "thrust" or "victory," no matter how tempting, should be avoided. If American policy in general, and USIA objectives in particular, were seen in their proper long-term perspectives, then short-run attempts to use USIA to "throw the book at Castro" or to "Get Nasser" would not occur without looking closely at the long-range consequences of such an approach. The United States needs a long-run strategy, and as an adjunct to it, the United States needs a long-range verbal strategy to support it. In order for the two to work, USIA must have a formalized and recognized input at the policy-making stage; otherwise there is no way of assuring that short-term decisions do not erode long-range psychological goals.

In a sense, in its foreign policy, the United States would do well to adapt a Chinese concept of time, Dr. Clyde B. Sargent, an expert on China, writes:

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...people of the United States tend to function within and under the influence of a concept of time that is very short, whereas people of traditional China tend to function within and under the influence of a concept of time that is extended. By concept of time I mean the ability to conceptualize time. Concept of time is one's time consciousness. It is the extent of time within which a people envisage accomplishment. It represents the time factor within which accomplishment is planned, programmed, and pursued. A Chinese easily feels personal involvement within a time frame of a century—-for some Chinese much longer. China can visualize goals that may be attainable only within, say, 100 years. Directly related to concepts of time are the attributes of, inter alia, patience, endurance, tolerance, and resolution. Americans tend to have culturally created short fuses on patience, endurance, tolerance and resolution. In contrast, the Chinese pursue long-range objectives with culturally created patience, endurance, tolerance, and resolution. The Chinese expect accomplishment to involve extended time. "Time is on our side," says Mao Tse-tung, "we are in no hurry." Americans, thus, by their cultural conditioning have made an enemy out of time, while the Chinese have made it an ally.

Because of America's cultural conditioning, it would probably be impossible for the United States to adopt the Chinese concept of time in a wholesale manner, to see time as a Chinese might. But it is certainly possible for the United States to view its foreign policy in a longer time frame and a larger perspective. Crises appear in a different light when viewed through long-range lenses. This is probably what President Nixon was alluding to when he said in his second annual foreign policy report: "We need a vision so that crises do not consume our energies, and tactics do not dominate our policies."
in the direction of a longer view of America's role in the world.

Illustrative are the following statements by Nixon:

''...our aim is to place America's international commitments on a sustainable, long-term basis...''

Gone for Americans is a foreign policy with the psychological simplicity of worrying primarily about what we want for others. In its place is a role that demands a new type of sustained effort with others.

[Regarding the National Security Council structure Nixon asks:] Where do we want to go in the long run? What are our purposes? Our analysis must bring out all reasonable interpretations of the facts, and treat the facts in the framework of longer-range trends and our objectives.

In summary, in the seventies, just as American foreign policy must concentrate on long-range objectives, so must USIA's complementary information strategy. In order for the two to jibe, USIA must be integrated into the policy-making structure so that the psychological dimension of foreign affairs can be considered along with the other elements. If one of the tasks of the National Security Council is to "bring out all reasonable interpretations of the facts," then the information input must be present for the picture to be complete. In any case, in a well-integrated foreign policy, there need not be any disconnect between long-range and short-range goals. The two are not irreconcilable; on the contrary, they should merge into one integrated whole. In the world of the seventies, USIA's tone should be muted by a long-range view of both itself and the world for its long-run objective is clear: to create, in harmony with American policy, a
favorable psychological soil abroad in which American foreign policies can take root and grow. No short-run objective should be allowed to vitiate that overriding goal.

**USIA: Congress and the Public**

Perhaps no agency of the American government is as little understood by either Congress or the public as USIA. The overwhelming majority of Americans have never heard of USIA and many Congressmen only have the vaguest notion of the Agency's charter or purpose.

Ronald I. Rubin, a scholar on USIA, has written: "...the Agency has identity problems within the government, and other people in the government do not appreciate what modern communication is. ... So the question is one of educating other people in the government about the true significance of communications." 98

In his list of eight factors handicapping USIA, expert Edward L. Bernays placed "The skepticism and passivity, and sometime disapproval of Congress and the people of the United States" in number two position, directly after the number one problem of USIA's lack of clear-cut objectives. 99 Bernays writes, "Our efforts to enlist the interest of other populations has been derogated as false propaganda. The organization has nowhere like the importance in Congress and the national consciousness which it should have." 100

The problem of educating Congress and the public about America's information efforts is a difficult one for USIA because of
the intent of Congress, at the time of the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act, to prohibit the internal dissemination of USIA materials. When the first American peacetime information program was established in 1948 under the Smith-Mundt Act, Congress feared the creation of a propaganda instrument that could be turned against the American people. The internal propaganda machines of the Fascists, the Nazis and the Communists were very much in the minds of the Congressmen and the American people at the time.

USIA is therefore a peculiar element in the American governmental structure in that its constituency is strictly abroad; all of the USIA effort is aimed at foreign audiences; none of its products can be seen or heard by Americans. Although there was some disagreement as to just how far Congress intended the original prohibition to extend, the precise intent of Congress to prohibit the domestic dissemination of USIA materials was made clear in 1972 through the passage by Congress of an amendment to the Smith-Mundt Act stating explicitly that USIA materials "shall not be disseminated within the United States, its territories, or possessions." An exception was made for limited access to USIA materials for examination only for Members of Congress, the media, research students and scholars. The amendment merely made explicit what was already a long-standing policy within the USIA of not distributing its material internally within the United States. In any case, the effect of the ban is to
place USIA in the unusual position of being very well-known abroad and virtually unknown at home.

This creates a dilemma for USIA because although its efforts are often understood and appreciated by its constituency abroad, it is misunderstood, ill-appreciated or just plain unknown among the domestic elements at home upon which its very existence depends—Congress and the public. Frank Shakespeare, the USIA Director under the first Nixon Administration, felt the prohibition against internal dissemination had the disadvantage of creating "a certain mystery about what we do, and makes it difficult for the American people to learn what their country is doing abroad."  

Joseph Morgenstern, in a 1972 article in Newsweek on USIA, argued against the outright ban against domestic distribution of USIA materials. He felt that the public and Congress had a right to know what USIA was doing and that safeguards could be devised against the possibility of USIA being transformed into a domestic propaganda agency supporting the particular administration in power. He suggested the creation of a citizens screening committee or a bi-partisan Congressional group to decide which USIA materials should be distributed internally and which should not. "If the voters can't see and discuss what USIA is doing, how can Fulbright or anyone else convince them that the Agency must change?" Morgenstern argued. Neither Morgenstern nor anyone else ever argues for a mass distribution
of USIA materials. The kind of distribution contemplated would be aimed at Congress, libraries, universities, cultural organizations and other institutions with a probable interest in the American information program abroad.110

The ban on the domestic distribution of USIA materials is not likely to be lifted in the near future, however, granted the Congressional fears about the creation of a domestic propaganda agency. Still, within the limits set for it, USIA can attempt to inform Congress and the public about its role in foreign affairs. USIA does maintain a Congressional Liaison office which "coordinates and manages the Agency's relations with the Congress for the Director."111 USIA also possesses a small Office of Public Information which "responds to questions from the American public concerning the purpose and operations of the Agency; prepares and issues news releases on appropriate activities, policies, and personnel actions; prepares the semiannual report to Congress; publishes a house organ ten times a year; and conducts public tours of the Voice of America facilities in Washington, D.C."112 Regarding Congress, the annual authorization and appropriation hearings offer the Agency an opportunity to explain to Congress its plans, programs, objectives and purpose.

What should the Agency emphasize in its contacts with the public and Congress? In the first place, there should be no exaggerated claims of purpose or accomplishments. The emphasis should be on the long-range nature of an information program and
the role of public diplomacy as an adjunct of America's total foreign affairs effort. The tendency to play up the bold stroke, the single success, as a dramatic evidence of effectiveness should be avoided, despite the fact that this is what Congress and the public often seem to want. This tendency grew out of the Cold War and the need to justify programs in terms of Winning the Cold War. USIA programs were always much broader than the Cold War, but Congress insisted on seeing USIA in Cold War terms, and almost in self-defense, the Agency responded as desired. In doing so, it did itself a disservice because in tying itself too closely with the Cold War in Congressional eyes, it laid itself open to the possibility that its mission would be considered over once the Cold War should end. The point is that, in the modern world, there is a need for public diplomacy with or without a Cold War, and both Congress and the public must be made to understand this.

At the same time, it is incumbent upon USIA to understand the problems Congressmen have in explaining to their constituents the expending of public funds on information programs that are admittedly not easy to explain and about which even experts differ. In this respect, it was undoubtedly easier to "sell" an information program to Congress under Cold War conditions than it is today under conditions of detente; by the same token, it was easier in the past for Congress to "sell" the program to its constituents because the public could identify quite readily with
the idea of "Winning the Cold War" through an "Ideological Offensive" on the part of USIA.

That approach is no longer valid, however, and the present post-Vietnam mood of the country makes the task more difficult than ever. Congress does have a problem selling USIA to its constituency, especially in an age of limited resources, and USIA must recognize this problem if it is to win support. America has turned inward--domestic problems loom larger than ever--and the public is less inclined towards foreign affairs than it has been in the past. The isolationist mood is a real one in America today, and every agency involved in foreign affairs must understand that mood, and the Congressional response to it, if it is to win support for its programs in the seventies.

In a sense, USIA--and the entire concept of public diplomacy--is on trial. For the first time, USIA will have to stand on its own two feet, without the Cold War to lean on for support. In this respect, there seems to be a real need to educate both Congress and the public not only as to what public diplomacy can do but also as to what it can not do. It cannot, for example, make bad policy into good policy. The secondary, derivative role of public diplomacy must be emphasized lest USIA be accused of failing to accomplish something it cannot by the nature of things accomplish. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, in its fourteenth report to Congress in 1959, had this to say on the subject:
Probably the most frequent, certainly the most bitter criticism of USIA is simply this: "It does not do the job that it is expected to do."

The cause of that criticism is a basic misunderstanding of just what USIA is expected to do and what it is possible for USIA to do. Consider just a few of the more common "expectations".

- USIA is expected to "win the cold war and the battle for men's minds" and to do it in short order.
- USIA is expected to achieve quick success in combating, containing, and exposing international communism.
- USIA is expected to "win friends and influence people" all over the world at once.
- USIA is expected to explain United States foreign policy and make it immediately palatable everywhere.
- USIA is expected to project an accurate picture of the United States, its way of life and its culture that will be instantly grasped by people of other countries.

More could be listed but these are enough to illustrate an important point—too much is expected of USIA—and too soon. (Italics theirs) . . . people should be encouraged to understand how unreal their expectations are, and to replace the unrealistic with practicable, attainable goals for USIA.113

This exaggerated image of propaganda as a "miracle worker" must be expunged. Comparisons to successful advertising campaigns are often made. If Madison Avenue can sell tooth paste to an American public that doesn't necessarily want it, why can't USIA sell the Vietnam War to a world public that doesn't necessarily like it? These kinds of fuzzy analogies should be attacked at the root. In the first place Madison Avenue may be able to
Induce a gullible public to buy an inferior product for a limited period of time, but in the end, its advertising is no better than its product; in the second place, USIA is not in the business of "selling" America's foreign policy or culture. In a sense, there aren't any "buyers." And because there aren't any buyers, there's no way to measure its effectiveness in the same dollar-and-cents terms that an ad agency can. What USIA can do is to make American policies and culture better known and to place policy and culture into the specific context of the individual country abroad so that it can better see the mutual, reciprocal nature of our acts and policies. Our objective is simply to help win support for American foreign policy objectives. The task is a long-range, constant, reiterative one. There are seldom, if ever, any dramatic conversions. There are seldom any glamorous or heroic victories. The totality of the effort is necessary, however, if America is to achieve its goals: a better understanding of American policy and culture abroad leading to a greater likelihood of foreign support for American foreign policy goals. There may not be anything dramatic about an explanation of USIA in these terms, but it is closer to the realities of its operations and it does place USIA efforts in its proper context: as an arm of American foreign affairs engaged in the long-range goals of public diplomacy.
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VI CONCLUSION

The time has come for a maturing America to accept the fact that in a modern world with modern communications, public diplomacy is here to stay. The world has changed considerably in the twenty-five years since the establishment of America's first peacetime information program and in the twenty years since the founding of USIA as an independent agency within the executive branch of the government. Though the USIA mission has also changed over the years with the changing times, what hasn't changed is the popular conception that information programs have relevancy to America only under wartime conditions.

Because of America's innate aversion to propaganda, information programs in the past have been justified only under "hot" or "cold" war conditions. America should now be mature enough as a nation, however, to understand that the word "propaganda" connotes neither good nor evil in itself and that propaganda programs can be either good or bad depending on the policies they espouse. The idea that propaganda can somehow help win a Cold War but not an enduring peace should be dispelled for the exact opposite is the case: it is much easier to win support abroad for a policy of peace than for a policy of war.

In any case, Congress and the public must be made to understand that in a modern world with modern communications, propaganda—by whatever name you call it—is a necessary fact of international diplomacy. Whether you give such programs a "dirty"
name like "propaganda" or whether you refer to them in more neutral terms, such as "information programs," "cultural diplomacy," "psychological operations" or "public diplomacy," the fact remains that no nation in the modern world can practice modern diplomacy without operating a program that puts the modern tools of communication to work for it.

In this respect, the Cold War is irrelevant, and America must beware of the tendency to indulge in the simplistic notion that because USIA developed out of a Cold War environment, it is therefore a Cold War agency. The world has changed considerably since the program was first established, and the primary change lies in the fact that most observers now feel the Cold War is over. Once you add the premise that the Cold War is over to the premise that USIA is a Cold War agency, it is an easy task to conclude that there is then no longer a need for USIA or an information program.

Such reasoning is totally fallacious, and should be attacked as such, for though the Cold War was undoubtedly the catalyst that drove Congress and the public to overcome their inherent bias against propaganda and establish the first peacetime information program in the history of the United States, the function of the program was always broader than the Cold War per se. Its major mission was public diplomacy—the overt advancement of American foreign policy through the cultural and communicative processes—and as such its programs were tied to American foreign
policy. USIA did not make policy; it explained it. When Amer-
ica's policy was a Cold War policy, USIA's job was to advance
it; when it changed, USIA changed with it, as it did in the late
fifties during the "Spirit of Camp David" period.

The USIA role, in sum, was always political—though many
observers tended to see it in vaguer terms—as an institution
somehow involved in making America liked or loved abroad. The
USIA role was thought of in terms of the American image abroad,
in terms of popularity and in terms of whether we were liked or
appreciated. Such notions miss the point, however, for the USIA
mission has always been political in nature—completely tied to
American foreign policy—and as such its role was—and should
be—to foster the foreign policy of the United States abroad
through means of public diplomacy.

Seeing the role of USIA in Cold War terms indicates a mis-
understanding of the changing diplomacy of our times and of the
importance of public opinion to contemporary foreign policy for-
mulation and implementation. In the world of the seventies, the
importance of public opinion will increase if anything. Can
anyone doubt the crucial role public opinion played in the suc-
cess or failure of our Vietnam policy? Still there was no psy-
chological input into the decision-making process at the time
the important decisions on Vietnam were made. Surprisingly
enough—in view of the importance public opinion was later to
assume in our Vietnam policies—the Pentagon Papers do not show
any psychological input by USIA or anyone else during the period when American policy towards Vietnam was being formulated. Neither the shorter version published by the New York Times nor the five-volume work produced by Senator Gravel indicates any reliance on USIA. Viewed as a whole, the Pentagon Papers show a gross disregard for the psychological element of the Vietnam problem.

Yet, would it not have been relevant to have had some information on (1) what the Vietnamese think about their own war—who they support—how they see the conflict; (2) how the rest of the world would view our intervention—the Europeans, the Communists, the Asians, the Third World; and (3) most crucially, how American public opinion would react to it. It should be emphasized that we are not here talking about public opinion for the sake of popularity; not how much more or less America would be liked or disliked should we intervene in Vietnam but how much support for our policy would we have or not have. Policy and politics are the controlling factors, not popularity.

In the past—as the Vietnam case emphasizes—USIA has played only a very minor role in the formulation of American foreign policy. It has had only a routine pro forma input into the making of policy. Its role in the seventies should be expanded so that it makes a meaningful contribution at the policy-formulation stage in the development of American foreign policy. The psychological input should be a standard input into all foreign policy
decisions, not because it will always be significant or crucial, but because it is an important element that should be considered along with others before any decision is made. The easiest way of assuring this input is to make the USIA Director a member of the National Security Council, as was the case when Edward R. Murrow was Director of USIA under President Kennedy in the early sixties.

The misconception that acts matter and that words don't—or that one can separate acts from words—should also be dispelled. How one explains an act can be as important as the act itself. The world listens and remembers more than we give it credit for. As Franck and Weisband point out, we need a verbal strategy that serves our national interest and understands the importance of words. "The strategic planner whose task it is to choose the verbal strategy to accompany an act," they say, "must calculate the total aggregate of consequences, those for the immediate, present management of the interaction and those of the future."^2

Though USIA should play a role in policy-making, its major role in the seventies will still be to explain American policy and culture. This it is equipped to do through the full panoply of communications—radio, television, films, books, pamphlets, exhibits, educational and cultural exchanges, personal contacts, etc. It should concentrate on long-range objectives, in keeping with the changing emphasis of our foreign policy, and it should recognize that long-term objectives take precedence over short-term ones.
In the seventies, the USIA message should be delivered in a cool, muted tone, in keeping with President Nixon's concept of a low-profile and a quieter role for America in the world. Secretary of State William Rogers has described American foreign policy today as one of engagement not containment. Engagement, he says, means "engagement across lines of ideology to build a more stable international order." 

President Nixon in his Second Inaugural Address said:

Let us continue to bring down the walls of hostility which have divided the world for too long and to build in their place bridges of understanding. . . . Let us build a structure of peace in the world in which . . . those who would influence others will do so by the strength of their ideas and not by the force of their arms.

Those are the words of detente, not of the Cold War. As Secretary of State Rogers put it, "During the cold war the conventional wisdom was that because of fundamental differences between adversaries they could not talk. We have proceeded from the opposite belief that because of important differences we must talk. Our foreign policy therefore is based on the conviction that communication between strangers—and negotiation between adversaries—serves the cause of a more tranquil world."

In this respect, it is important to remember that the USIA mission has always transcended the Cold War. As former USIA Director Leonard Marks wrote in 1968:

The USIA contribution to national security today encompasses more than the Cold War assignments of an earlier time; probably never again will we
enjoy the simplicity of a world consisting of those "for" and those "against" us. . . . Just as surely as a USIA broadcast or pamphlet refuting a Communist distortion about America serves our national interest, so in equal measure is that interest served by stimulating dialogue between Americans and the peoples of other countries on the great issues of our common security and well-being. 

With negotiations and communications replacing confrontation and isolation in world affairs, the opportunities and potentials of an information program increase. As the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information said in its latest report, "... USIA is an ideal agency in a time of detente and dialogue among nations." 

The Commission adds:

The communications of detente reinforce and help perpetuate atmospheres of detente. For they reiterate and emphasize the more pacific means of resolving international political and economic disputes and conflicts by overcoming or undermining psychological obstacles and barriers and by reducing the animosities and hostilities that have accumulated over the years. Just as crisis tends to feed on crisis so detente can generate detente without creating an exaggerated euphoria built upon unrealistic expectations that ignore the indispensable necessity of a solid security structure.

In this regard, it should be remembered that though the legislation creating the American information program grew out of the Cold War, the language of the enabling legislation itself was free of Cold War rhetoric and was in perfect keeping with the policy of detente now abroad in the world. The Smith-Mundt Act stated that the intention of Congress in setting up a peacetime information program was to "promote a better understanding of the
United States in other countries, and increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. Diverted from that broad mission by the exigencies of the Cold War, USIA—under the emerging policies of detente and engagement rather than confrontation and containment—can now revert to its original mission of supporting American foreign policy by creating a foundation of understanding through the medium of public diplomacy.

The importance of that mission has increased for in a multilateral world of detente, the psychological element of reciprocal trust and mutual understanding represents the very foundation of the structure upon which engagement and detente can be built. Without the proper psychological climate, the policy is bound to fail, for mutual confidence is a pre-condition for its success. Hard-headed realists may claim that "reciprocal trust" and "mutual confidence" are meaningless phrases—the product of fuzzy thinking—because they conjure up images of words rather than action or power. But as Richard Rovere points out, "... words often do have consequences (Bombs away!), and though there is frequently a disparity between what governments say and what they do, what they say is generally to be regarded as part of what they do—and, at times, the more important part."

In any case, in making policy, the reciprocal nature of words should be kept in mind. The words used to explain policy is a form of policy-making and influences the responses that
develop. Somebody out there is listening—diplomats, in fact, are noted for going over statements with fine-tooth combs—and a verbal strategy must be a part of any foreign policy—especially when the object of that foreign policy is to bring about a change in the international system that has dominated the world since the end of World War II.

In fact, in the seventies, to change from a policy of hostility—the Truman Doctrine of containment—to a policy of cooperation—the Nixon Doctrine of engagement—a verbal and psychological strategy stressing mutual understanding, common interests and reciprocal trust is essential. It is in precisely this area where USIA—using the tools of public diplomacy—can play a vital role. After all, the Smith-Mundt Act—which is still USIA's basic enabling legislation—gave it a mandate to do precisely that: "to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries."12

In the end, however, USIA is an instrument of American foreign policy and its role is to enhance that policy through the tools of public communication. It must be attuned to policy and creatively primed to adapt to its nuances. Cold War and containment policies demand one approach; detente and engagement policies, another. But however American policy might change in the seventies, virtually every expert on foreign affairs today, whether a realpolitiker like Hans Morgenthau, a traditionalist like Sir Harold Nicholson, an internationalist like Hamilton
Fish Armstrong or a conservative like Brian Crozier, recognizes the growing importance of world public opinion to the successful development of modern foreign politics.

In the seventies, the accelerated pace of communications means world public opinion is bound to increase in influence and with it the role of public diplomacy. Once one understands the increasing importance of public opinion to the successful prosecution of a foreign policy, USIA's double-plied role in the seventies becomes clear: (1) to assess and measure the impact of foreign public opinion upon American foreign policies and (2) to influence that opinion when it is in America's interest and potential to do so.

It should be pointed out that this double-barreled role emphasizes the USIA function in the seventies. This function has nothing to do with any given policy—whether that policy be Cold War, détente or something in-between. Whatever America's policy of the moment may be, USIA's function remains the same: to advance it. Though the policies may change—as they are almost bound to do in a changing world—the function remains. Whether USIA evolved out of the Cold War or not—whether it is a Cold War agency or not—these aspects will become irrelevant once its function is viewed as something that transcends any given policy of the moment. Once USIA's function is understood, information in the seventies will finally join diplomacy, trade and force as one of the four permanent elements of American
foreign affairs. For as John Henderson points out in his book on USIA, "...whether it is called propaganda, information, or political communication, [in the modern world,] some form of international psychological activity by government is an essential element in national security."13
NOTES

I. INTRODUCTION


4. Ibid.


7. Ibid., p. 15.


12. Ibid., p. 120.


17. Ibid.


20 Ibid., p. 2.


22. President Richard M. Nixon, quoted in Ibid., p. 2.


II. THE CHANGING WORLD


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 4-5.


8. Ibid., p. 56.


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid. Also see, Frank Shakespeare, "Who's Winning the Propaganda War?" *U.S. News & World Report*, May 1, 1972, p. 49.
III. THE CHANGING DIPLOMACY


4. Ibid.


6. Ibid., p. xiii.


11. See Bernays and Hershey, eds., The Case for Reappraisal, p. 158-159.


20. Ibid., p. 149.


IV. THE CHANGING ROLE OF USIA


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 37.

4. Ibid., p. 38.

5. Ibid., p. 38-39.

6. Ibid., p. 57.


8. Ibid., p. 121.

9. Ibid., p. 150.

10. Ibid., p. 151.

12. Ibid., p. 4-5; also see Henderson, p. 40-41.


18. Ibid., p. 49.


20. Ibid., p. 2.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 4.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 5.


27. President Harry S. Truman, as quoted in Henderson, p. 44-45.


29. Ibid., p. 46.

31. Ibid., p. 110.
32. Henderson, p. 236.
36. Ibid., p. 203.
42. Ibid.
48. Ibid.


58. Campbell, Fudge Factory, p. 80. (Campbell's italics.)


67. Rubin, p. 28.


69. See, for example, Henderson, p. 264, or Bernays and Hershey, eds., p. 126.

70. Bernays and Hershey, eds., p. 126.


72. See, for example, Bernays and Hershey, eds., p. 111, 112-113, 126, 187; Rubins, The Objectives, p. 140-141; Henderson, p. 264; and the 26th Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, p. 19-34.

73. See Bernays and Hershey, eds., The Case for Reappraisal, p. 112-113, wherein the House report is re-printed.


V. USIA'S ROLE IN THE SEVENTIES

2. Ibid., p. 60.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 40.
10. Ibid.
14. See the 26th Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), p. 7 which states, "We have learned from our limited experience with USIA and its predecessor agencies that improvements in understanding do not necessarily mean acceptance or approval of U.S. policies and positions or of peace." (Commission italics.)
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 74-75.
20. Frances X. Sutton, "Importance of the Program," in Bernays and Hershey, eds., The Case for Reappraisal, p. 58.
23. Ibid., p. 8.
24. Ibid., p. 9.
25. Ibid., p. 8.
26. Ibid., p. 118.
27. Ibid., p. 119.
28. Ibid., p. 126.
29. Ibid., p. 118.
30. Ibid., p. 119.
31. Ibid., p. 139.
32. Ibid., p. 147.
34. Franck and Weisband, p. 120.


41. Ibid., p. 143.

42. Ibid., p. 145.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 145.

45. Ibid., p. 143.

46. Ibid., p. 146.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 142.


51. Ibid., p. 2. (Free's italics.)

52. Ibid., p. 9. (Free's italics.)

53. Ibid., p. 17. (Free's italics.)


56. Ibid., p. 91.


60. See Elder, The Information Machine, p. 70.


68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., p. 337-338.


72. See Rubin, The Objectives, p. 28.


74. Ibid.

75. Robert R. Bowie, "Forging a New Foreign Policy," Current, July/August 1972, p. 54.

76. Ibid.

77. See Rubin, The Objectives, p. 10, in which he says, "Any national information program in the 1960's should serve national interests and should be related to grand strategy."


81. Ibid., p. 122.


86. Ibid.

87. Ibid., p. 4.

88. Ibid., p. 6.

89. Ibid., p. 19.
90. Ibid., p. 135.

91. See Rubin, The Objectives, p. 111.


94. Ibid., p. 10.

95. Ibid., p. 21.

96. Ibid., p. 227.


100. Ibid.


104. Ibid., p. 40, 36.


108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.


112. Ibid.


VI. CONCLUSION

1. See The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department's History of U.S. Decision-Making on Vietnam. The Senator Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-72), v. 1-5; the New York Times, The Pentagon Papers (New York: Bantam Books, 1971). The five-volume Senator Gravel edition mentions USIA in passing only seven times; no USIA documents are reproduced. In the New York Times edition, on p. 363, Document 84, entitled "William Bundy Draft on Handling World and Public Opinion," is reproduced. Written November 5, 1964, Bundy—despite the title given to the document by the Times editors—hardly touches the issue of public opinion, and what references are made are hardly done in a professional manner. Bundy mentions USIA in the last part of the document, with the words, "USIA must be brought into the planning process not later than early next week, so that it is getting the right kind of materials ready for all our information media, on a contingency basis." The idea of bringing USIA "into the planning process" was a good one, but there is nothing in the rest of the published Pentagon Papers to indicate that there was ever any follow-up on the proposal.


4. Ibid.


Bowie, Robert R. "Forging a New Foreign Policy." Current, July/August 1972, p. 51-64.


Sparks, Kenneth R. "Selling Uncle Sam in the Seventies." The Annals, November 1971, p. 113-123.


"Deputy and Deputy Director Discuss USIA." U.S.I.A. World, April 1973, p. 5.


"What to Expect Until '77." Newsweek, November 13, 1972, p. 33-35.
