MIGRATION AND RIGHTS OF ACCESS: NEW PUBLIC CONCERNS OF THE 1970s

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ABSTRACT

Changed patterns of migration, coupled with a sharp slowdown in overall population growth, have intensified public concern with population movements and their local consequences. These demographic shifts have brought the right to migrate into conflict with the less well-defined rights of the population already living where migrants decide to go. Underlying this contemporary concern with migration is a complex and unresolved issue about rights of access to places.

This paper offers a demographic perspective on migration and the issue of access as they are manifesting themselves in two contemporary situations: (1) "energy boom towns"—e.g., Gillette, Wyoming, Colstrip, Montana, and others like them—where large-scale energy-related industrial development is under way; (2) growth-limiting communities—e.g., Petaluma, California and Boulder, Colorado—which have sought to impose local population ceilings.

Submerged beneath the contemporary concern with migration, and the often unwelcome access it confers on destination areas, are more profound legal and political questions, like "Who gets to live where?" and "Who is to decide, and by what criteria?" Whether or not society poses these questions explicitly, it does not avoid providing implicit answers through a host of private and public decisions that control local settlement patterns. These answers introduce the idea of tinkering with the vast and complex system by which population and economic changes occur throughout the country. The hazard is that there is no clear place for such tinkering to stop.
MIGRATION AND RIGHTS OF ACCESS: NEW PUBLIC CONCERNS OF THE 1970s

by

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I. INTRODUCTION

Last fall, most of the 236 residents of Hardenburgh, New York attempted to exempt themselves from property taxes by becoming ministers in a church that offers divinity degrees by mail. Perhaps to their own surprise they succeeded, for they originally staged their action as a media event to dramatize Hardenburgh's financial plight for New York officialdom: over the past several years, a number of tax-exempt groups have bought large tracts of land in the area, narrowing the tax base drastically. As a result, property taxes for Hardenburgh's residents, most of whom have modest or meager incomes, have tripled or quadrupled, threatening many of them with loss of their homes and farms.**

In northern California a year or so earlier, the Board of Supervisors of scenic, sparsely populated Plumas County voted unanimously to stop paying the county's share of state and federally mandated welfare programs. They took that action in protest against a welfare load whose proportions resemble those of New York City: One in eight

**A tax assessor granted tax exemptions to Hardenburgh's newly ordained clergy early last December, according to The New York Times. What began as a media event has spread in recent months to other neighboring Catskill area communities, most recently, Carmel, New York.
of the county's residents (1,540 out of 12,700 total population) were receiving some kind of public assistance. Local residents blamed the escalating welfare costs on an influx of "long hairs and minorities" that followed the establishment of a small two-year college in the area several years before.

A number of other places have rebelled in recent years against ailments they blamed on "newcomers." Petaluma and Livermore (in the San Francisco Bay area), Boulder, Colorado, and Boca Raton, Florida are among the smaller cities that have imposed population ceilings or enacted other measures to control growth from migration. In Hawaii, Governor Ariyoshi recently proposed Federal legislation to control the influx of migrants to his state.

These tax and welfare rebellions and no-growth ordinances are symptoms of fiscal, socioeconomic, and environmental stresses that arise partly from new patterns of population redistribution. Now, as in the past, people migrate for reasons that are connected with the workings of the national economy. Most of them do so to improve their lot in life, defined chiefly in terms of job or income opportunities, and therefore move from areas where jobs are dwindling to areas where workers are needed.

Until quite recently, the trend of this movement was toward metropolitan areas or between them and was mostly due to employment opportunities in those areas. But in the 1970s, a number of economic trends—along with other forces harder to pin down—have converged to alter this pattern of redistribution. In one of the noteworthy reversals in migratory patterns in the nation's history, more people are now moving away from metropolitan areas than are moving to them, and some of the places they are moving to have experienced little or no growth for decades.

This new dispersal of population, coupled with a sharp slowdown in overall growth due to a lower birth rate, has altered local and regional population growth rates, and the new patterns are having significant social, fiscal, and political repercussions. Suddenly, people are thinking about migration—a topic about which few Americans have thought it necessary to have any opinion whatsoever. Migration is gaining recognition as a powerful and unpredictable force. The essentially private and unregulated movements that make up migration
flows are now being scrutinized for the newly perceived costs they create, both at origin and especially at destination.

This new sensitivity to the costs of migration is partly due to its new directions. When people move away from densely populated areas to sparsely populated ones, instead of the other way around, they cause two important asymmetries. One of them is arithmetic: migrants who move to or between cities for opportunities afforded by "bigness" enhance that bigness; but if large numbers of migrants move to the country for its "smallness," they may destroy what they seek. The second is a cultural asymmetry: the people who are descending on small cities and towns and creating settlements in virtual wilderness areas are a different breed from the relatively poor and uneducated migrants who flocked to the cities in the first half of this century. Many of them are comparatively affluent and well-educated urbanites who, for all their reported affection for "the simple life," are accustomed to urban living standards. For them, the dirt road that was so picturesque in autumn must be paved the minute winter snows and spring rains turn it into rutted mud.

These asymmetries have brought the right to migrate into conflict with the less well-defined rights of the population already living where migrants decide to go—or, in the case of unpopulated areas, with the public's right to conserve the wilderness. The pressure of population on limited spatial resources is producing an array of disputes over issues of access to places. The most notorious, perhaps, are arising between those who value the aesthetics of a space and those who have to pay taxes on it.

Historically, Americans have enjoyed the right to migrate anywhere in the country without any form of official sanction or intervention. Each citizen's right of access to the social, economic, and physical resources of the nation has been vested in the right to migrate and, for generations of migrants, geographical mobility has indeed meant upward social mobility. But an individual's access to social and economic well-being can be abridged by law, custom, prejudice, or disadvantage.

Today, an intensely rights-conscious society is transferring some of the burden of equalizing opportunity from the individual to the
society. Opportunities once secured, if at all, by movement to a more hospitable or economically provident community are now secured by law. The "rights" of access to jobs, to welfare, to better schools and housing, and so forth are to be guaranteed in all places. But increasingly, the rights of migrants are being called into question by those who feel their rights are being impinged upon by migrants' traditionally unlimited access. The local manifestations are as diverse as the circumstances in Hardenburgh or Petaluma, but a common issue is being raised: Does the right to access include a right not to be "accessed"—i.e., subjected to population growth or compositional change and all that it entails? So far the answer has been yes in some instances (Petaluma), no in others (Plumas County).
II. THE CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT

Population change in any given locale is by definition the net effect of changes in fertility rates, mortality rates, and migration rates (including rates of immigration and emigration). Currently, the U.S. population is undergoing some noteworthy transformations attributable to changes in two of these factors: fertility and migration.

The sharp decline in births, especially in this decade, has slowed the overall rate of population growth nationally. This slower growth rate has intensified the effect on the nation's major urban centers of a trend to net out-migration from metropolitan areas. This effect has been most noticeable in the large metropolitan areas, many of which now have a stable or declining number of residents. Fully 10 of the nation's 25 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) were declining as of 1974: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles—Long Beach, Philadelphia, Detroit, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Seattle—Everett, and Cincinnati. All told, nearly one in six of all 259 metropolitan areas had fewer residents in 1975 than they had in 1970, and one in three metropolitan residents was living in an area of population decline.

This new dispersal pattern is multifaceted. First, migrants are gravitating increasingly toward the South and Southwest, producing a wave of growth that has spread throughout many formerly declining Southern areas and leaving behind a situation of population stasis throughout much of the Northeast. This shift, building for many years, reflects basic shifts in regional shares of national employment. The differences in growth rates among regions are due less to the relocation of firms than to the different growth rates of firms that stay put—which perhaps accounts for recent allegations that federal spending and regulation have systematically short—changed the Northeast.

Second, more Americans are now moving away from metropolitan areas than are moving to them, reversing a long established urbanization

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trend. Each year between 1970 and 1975, for every 100 people who moved to a metropolitan area, 131 moved out. As a result, net migration gains occurred in nearly two-thirds of all nonmetropolitan counties, compared with only one-quarter in the 1960s. This reversal is affecting distinctly remote nonmetropolitan areas as well as those adjacent to metropolitan centers; it cannot, therefore, be explained away semantically as just more metropolitan sprawl or "spillover." For now, at least, nonmetropolitan areas have become more attractive, both to their residents and to outsiders, whereas metropolitan areas have become less so.*

It is unclear whether this reversal will be a temporary or a long-term phenomenon. (The shift coincided with, and may be due in part to, the severe economic recession of the past several years.) Its immediate effects, however, are palpable and real. The by now familiar problem of population decline in older central cities has spread outward. Suburbs that were accustomed to resisting the "negative" aspects of growth--higher taxes, higher-density zoning, crowded streets and classrooms--are now dismayed by the loss of the "positive" aspects of growth--rising employment, an expanding tax base, and general prosperity. On the other hand, rural areas that failed to grow despite years of federal economic development subsidies are now growing spontaneously, but not always in beneficial ways.

Together, lower fertility and changed migration patterns have made for surprising--in some cases disturbing--shifts in regional and local fortunes. Over time, economic trends and federal policies give rise to forces that attract migrants to some areas and repel them from others. Federal policies that exert a powerful and largely undirected influence include, for example, oil depletion allowances, federal purchases of goods and services, energy price regulation, and income redistribution (principally through welfare programs and Social Security).

Individual states or local jurisdictions, which in the past have had little say about the effects of these policies, are now organizing to exert more control over their own economic welfare.*

One currently prominent instance of how national policy may have highly visible location-specific effects is energy related industrial development. A new variant of the rapid-growth-through-migration syndrome—the "energy boom town"—has appeared in numerous places throughout the Rocky Mountain and Northern Great Plains states.

III. THE ENERGY BOOM TOWN

The sudden congregation of migrants in some isolated place is not a new phenomenon in the United States. The instant city is an ancient form, as is its special variant, the energy boom town. A rhyme appearing in the June 9, 1866, Meadow Lake Morning Star in Nevada County, California, foreshadowed contemporary developments:

But one short year since first these mines were known,  
Behold, like magic, lo! a town is shown.

In many places in the Rocky Mountain and Northern Great Plains states where large-scale projects are under way to develop energy supplies, the 1970s genre of boom towns is sprouting up: Gillette, Wyoming, Colstrip, Montana and others like them. The energy boom town—brought to life by the lure of sudden treasure and exposed to a freewheeling interplay of social, economic, and political forces—draws people motivated by personal gain to sites possessing few of the standard prerequisites for urban greatness.*

Today's instant cities, like the earlier boom towns, are characterized by a transient, largely male population and the "4 Ds"—drunkenness, depression, delinquency, and divorce. Several of their distinctive features are of special significance in the contemporary context.**

For one thing, the areas in which they have appeared are sparsely populated, by and large, and possess no sizable indigenous labor pool.

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from which workers can be drawn. Most of the work force must come from outside the surrounding region and their influx constitutes a relatively large population increase. Unlike most other types of rural industrialization, which tend to attract a commuting work force, the energy boom towns consist of newly arrived migrants, a sociologically distinct type of human community.

No less significant than the relative magnitude of population change is its duration and pattern. Sharp fluctuations of employment occur as construction commences and then ends, giving way to long-term operation over a 20- to 60-year period. The construction phase of a large-scale energy project may last from several months to several years; generally, there is little overlap in personnel or skill requirements once construction is finished and operation begins.

The extreme disparity in numbers of employees between these two separate phases is suggested in the following estimates from a recent Rand Corporation study of coal development in the Northern Great Plains.** Construction of a 1000 megawatt electric generating plant uses 1250 to 2500 employees at the peak of activity, whereas operation of such a plant requires only 150 to 200 employees. Construction of a large synthetic natural gas plant (250 million cubic feet per day) is likely to require a peak work force of 2000 to 4000, but only 600 to 800 operating employees thereafter.

The typical energy boom town is, in fact, a succession of two different communities. The first, fast-growing but impermanent, consists largely of a temporary construction work force that may number upwards of several thousand people. The second consists of the far smaller group of personnel who will operate the facility afterwards. Numbers and timing may vary from place to place, but the pattern is typical.

Demands for additional classroom space, health care facilities, a larger police force, and other "necessities of life" crop up as

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* The population of the town of Colstrip, Montana, for example, increased from 423 in 1970 to 2682 in 1975. (Data are from Christiansen and Clack, op. cit.)

soon as the newcomers move in, but the finances do not; moreover, construction workers' taxes rarely pay for the instantaneous demands their presence creates, since many of them live in mobile homes with relatively low assessed valuations. In the end, the beleaguered community may well be left with a far smaller population that has to shoulder the long-term debt resulting from these front-end costs for schools, medical clinics, and the like, which by then may stand half empty.

A third distinguishing feature of the energy boom town is the disparity between newcomers and old-timers. Typically, the newcomers are younger and better paid, and are natives of other places, possibly urban. They are likely to judge the adequacy of local services by different standards, and to expect a higher level of services than do the native residents they join.

Migrant influx is never easy to absorb, but both the locale and the phasing of development make it especially disruptive for the typical energy boom town. Local governmental units in sparsely settled areas are ill-equipped to cope with increased demands for basic community services, which are typically marginal before development. They lack manpower and fiscal resources, and these difficulties may be compounded by confusion about the relative responsibilities of local, state, and federal governments.

The post-1970 experience of Gillette, Wyoming, and other communities like it is a foretaste of the stresses in store for other places that undergo sudden increase through migration. Like their predecessors, today's energy boom towns demonstrate that the populations that make instant cities do not make instant citizens.
IV. THE EMERGING CONCERN WITH ACCESS

The issue of access has aroused increasing concern at the local level. Outsiders enjoy a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of entry, and local officials have felt frustrated over their inability to affect the external forces that attract migrants or to regulate directly the numbers and types of arriving newcomers. The result may be high rates of growth (which provoked growth control ordinances in Boulder, Petaluma, and Livermore); or a heavy burden on the pocketbooks of local residents (which prompted religious ordination in Hardenburgh, New York, and unilateral withdrawal from federal welfare in Plumas County, California). The visibility of migrants seems to have made them a ready focus of territorial issues concerning access.

Cities and towns that have felt inundated by new settlers are now stubbornly challenging certain basic, heretofore inalienable rights in actively seeking to regulate further increases in population. Recent years have seen a proliferation of local efforts to impose population ceilings. These have taken various forms: restricting the number of new dwelling units that can be built; making new residential construction contingent upon the provision of additional educational, sewage-disposal, and water-supply facilities; or simply legislating a maximum allowable population (without specifying the fate of the next arriving migrant). Whatever the strategem, the impetus is a stiffening local reluctance to accept the costs of demographic excess. This reluctance can only grow, with the new pattern of migration away from large centers to small places and the arithmetic asymmetry whereby sheer numbers inevitably destroy "smallness."

The right to enact such growth controls has generally been denied by the courts on the grounds that citizens have a constitutional right not to be discriminated against in choosing a place to settle. But communities' growing reluctance to accept more migrants highlights a vexing proposition: If the Constitution prohibits discriminatory barriers against people settling where they wish, then a community has to make room for newcomers without limit.
If issues of territoriality are to be settled rationally, the legal aspects of access will have to be informed by a better understanding of the demographic mechanism of access. In attempting to control its growth, does a community abridge the freedom of outsiders to move in? Interestingly enough, the legal aspects of access may be moot for demographic reasons: explicit growth-control policies would not necessarily eliminate migrants' access to certain locales. Even if Petaluma, Livermore, and Boulder are allowed to continue the growth control measures they have enacted or proposed, the demographic evidence suggests that they will not seriously curtail access through in-migration. The reason is that net migration figures offset in-migrants against out-migrants, showing only the resulting number following what amounts to a large exchange of individuals.

Evidence on this point derives from newly available data on contemporary domestic migration flows into and out of local jurisdictions.* The data furnish a remarkably high-resolution view of local migration flows into and out of individual cities. These figures call into question the contention that population ceiling ordinances necessarily abridge individuals' right of access to a community.

*The data in Table 1 are special tabulations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census migration files, and refer only to internal migration (they exclude international migration). The Census migration files, prepared in conjunction with its population estimation program, are based on individual federal income tax returns filed in each of several years. For the tabulations shown here, rates of migration have been developed for a given geographic area over two intervals of time: 1970-1973, and 1973-1975 (referring to a three-year and two-year migration interval, respectively).

The Bureau of the Census uses the following general procedure to estimate these migration rates: (1) IRS files containing individual tax returns for calendar year i (e.g., 1969) are matched by Social Security number with their counterparts for calendar year j (e.g., 1972); (2) matched records, sorted by geographic area, serve as the base for calculating migration rates into or out of the area. Our special tabulations were designed to show gross rates of migration.

Migration rates furnished by the Bureau refer to areas only and contain no information about the entering and departing migrants themselves. For further information, see U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 576 (or comparable issues) and No. 640, p. 12.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1973 Population</th>
<th>Annual migration rates&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; per 100 residents in 1973</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
<th>Difference&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petaluma, Cal.</td>
<td>31,700</td>
<td>11.3 10.0</td>
<td>8.3 9.5</td>
<td>3.0 0.5</td>
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<td>Livermore, Cal.</td>
<td>46,200</td>
<td>11.0 11.0</td>
<td>7.3 9.0</td>
<td>3.7 2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boulder, Col.</td>
<td>75,300</td>
<td>11.0 12.5</td>
<td>9.3 12.0</td>
<td>1.7 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersburg, Fla.</td>
<td>234,000</td>
<td>9.3 9.0</td>
<td>6.3 7.5</td>
<td>3.0 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boca Raton, Fla.</td>
<td>38,200</td>
<td>16.0 16.0</td>
<td>9.7 9.5</td>
<td>6.3 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Pablo, Cal.</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>10.0 12.0</td>
<td>12.0 14.5</td>
<td>-2.0 -2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redlands, Cal.</td>
<td>37,200</td>
<td>9.0 10.0</td>
<td>9.3 10.5</td>
<td>-0.3 -0.5</td>
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<td>Waterloo, Ia.</td>
<td>73,900</td>
<td>4.7 5.5</td>
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<td>-1.3 -0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tampa, Fla.</td>
<td>276,000</td>
<td>7.7 8.5</td>
<td>7.3 9.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbana, Ill.</td>
<td>33,500</td>
<td>12.0 13.5</td>
<td>13.3 15.5</td>
<td>-1.3 -2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup> Rates shown in cols. 1, 3 and 5 (referring to a three-year migration interval) were divided by 3 to approximate an annual rate; rates in cols. 2, 4, and 6 (referring to a two-year interval) were divided by 2. Rates such as these which are based on intervals of different lengths are not strictly comparable (see text).

<sup>b</sup> Growth-limiting cities are those where efforts have been made to curtail migratory influx during the 1970s (e.g., through population ceiling ordinances). Comparison cities are those which have not absorbed a migratory influx during this decade. (Each of the latter was chosen to be comparable in population size to one of the former.)
Table 1 shows estimated migration rates for several illustrative localities, which are of two contrasting types. The first are five growth-limiting cities, in which efforts have been under way to curtail migratory influx during the 1970s. The second type are five comparison cities, each with roughly the same size population as one of the growth-limiting cities but without major growth through migration: San Pablo (roughly Petaluma's size), Redlands (Livermore's size), and so forth.

The first noteworthy feature underlying these data is the rapid rate at which migrants come and go. Annually, the growth-limiting cities gain anywhere from 9 to 16 in-migrants per hundred residents; the comparison cities tend to be somewhat lower. Rates of departure are nearly as high, ranging from 6 out-migrants per hundred residents in Waterloo to 15.5 per hundred in Urbana.* These figures serve as a reminder that the American city is not so much a place as a process—a flow of people coming and going. In the course of a decade, then, the total number of different people residing in most of these cities could be easily twice the entire number there at any one point in time.

Notice also that the annual rates of net migration (cols. 5 and 6) into the growth-limiting cities are generally lower for 1973-75 than for 1970-73, perhaps reflecting the enactment (or simply threat) of local growth controls.** (Changes in net migration for the comparison cities are, for the most part, nominal.)

* Although scaled to an annual basis, the 1970-73 and 1973-75 rates are not strictly comparable because the migration intervals are not the same. Multiple moves (e.g., by a migrant who arrives at time 1 and departs at time 2) are less likely to be recorded the longer the migration interval, which leads to a downward bias. Shorter migration intervals register a larger percentage of all moves that are made. Accordingly, the 1973-75 rates are subject to somewhat less downward bias than are the 1970-73 rates. Therefore, we expect the former to be higher (i.e., closer to correct) than the latter when each is scaled to an annual basis, other things equal.

** Interpretation here is complicated by a concurrent sharp reduction in housing construction. Around 1973, considerable capital being pumped into suburban housing construction by real estate investment trusts dried up. As a result, some places where growth control measures have been enacted are now awaiting the arrival of growth.
What is more significant for the issue at hand, though, is the consistently high rate of migratory outflow (cols. 3 and 4). Changes in net migration (col. 7), by comparison, are quite small. The principal factor determining access from outside, then, is the impermanence of current residents and the rate at which their departure opens up places for newcomers. Net migration is misleading as an index of accessibility. For example, annual net migration to Petaluma was sharply lower during 1973-75 than during 1970-73, but access by outsiders was still high: between 1973 and 1975, no less than one Petaluma resident in ten could claim to have taken up residence just last year in this supposedly "closed" community.

Zero net migration, whether spontaneously attained or deliberately induced, does not abridge the right of access to a community, because in-migration and out-migration typically produce considerable population change, even without growth. Demographically stable localities remain accessible from outside because each year a sizable percentage of residents choose to depart.
V. WHO GETS TO LIVE WHERE?

Submerged beneath the contemporary concerns with migration, and the often unwelcome access it confers on destination areas, are more profound legal and political issues. The question, "Who gets to live where?" immediately raises the equally vexing question, "Who is to decide, and by what criteria?" Whether or not society poses these questions explicitly, it does not avoid providing implicit answers.

Those answers are provided by a host of private and public decisions that together amount to a rationing system which controls local settlement patterns. When government agencies build highways, regulate energy prices, and choose sites for federal installations, they simultaneously redistribute employment growth and alter incentives for private investment. Although these and other government programs and activities are nominally unrelated, they exert a powerful undirected influence on migration patterns.

Within an individual metropolitan area, residence in many, if not most, communities is allocated by rationing mechanisms of one sort or another. The type and diversity of available housing is one such mechanism, with values set by zoning and adjusted by market forces. The legitimacy of this mechanism is reflected in the Supreme Court's recent decision that zoning rules in Arlington Heights, Illinois which bar multifamily dwellings are not unconstitutional unless discriminatory intent is shown. Jobs are also rationing mechanisms, and by choosing to welcome or oppose a prospective employer a community exercises some control over the number of available jobs and hence job-holders. Some cities like Chicago go so far as to impose residency requirements on municipal employees: to work for the city, you must live in it. Here, too, the Supreme Court has upheld the propriety of municipal residency rules which, in effect, give a reply to the question, "Who is to live where?"

The right to live where one wishes, then, is not so unlimited as Americans have casually assumed; it is strongly modified by the workings of economic and social systems. The legal issues arising out of
the no-growth controversy not only raise profound legal and political questions concerning individual rights, but also introduce the idea of tinkering with the vast and complex system by which population and economic changes occur throughout the country. The hazard is that there is no clear place for such tinkering to stop.

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In Hardenburgh, New York, newly tax-exempted old-timers now greet each other with the question, "Reverend, have you seen the light?"
The way this particular town overcame "the system" is amusing but also disturbing, for it rivets attention on the much thornier question of access that is troubling many different sorts of places throughout the nation. It is a question for which there is, as yet, no consistent answer.