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US ARMY INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY PUBLICATIONS

MAJOR JAMES K. McCASLIN, JR.

GARMISCH, GERMANY
APO NEW YORK, 09053

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FORWORD

This special project was prepared by Major James K. McCaslin, Class of 1976. The report highlights criticisms of the Soviet Army in nontechnical fields, as expressed in selected Soviet military publications. While not conclusive in itself, the report describes some of the problems of training, motivation and discipline faced by the Soviet Army.

Major McCaslin was assisted by Mr. Gregory M. Victorov, Professor of Military Science, who provided the initial research from Voennyi Vestnik, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, and Tyli Snabzhennie.

This report is a continuation of a pilot project begun in 1975 and will serve as the model for future annual reports on self criticism of the Soviet military expressed in these key publications.

Comments of the readers are invited and should be addressed to the Commander, U.S. Army Russian Institute, APO N.Y. 09053.

RICHARD P. KELLY
LTC, MI
Commander
PREFACE

This paper examines Soviet press treatment of current shortcomings and problem areas in nontechnical fields of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is based on a thorough review of three key Soviet military publications, listed and described below. These journals were selected as the most important and the most representative of current Soviet military writings.

An essential premise of this research is the belief that meaningful research can be accomplished using widely published Soviet military writings. While it is recognized that the Soviet press contains much propaganda, it must still serve as an important method of communications for a vast armed forces complex. The myriad of problems facing the Soviet military, as any other military force, cannot be dealt with exclusively through communications with limited readership. It is the position of the author that the Soviets do address real and important problems openly in a number of cases and that a reading and comprehension of these problems is important to a broad understanding of the Soviet military.

A particular characteristic of Soviet writing that should be explained prior to an analysis of this report is that it is normal in Soviet writings to limit criticism to a particular unit or individual. It is felt that this is primarily a matter of style and not a suggestion that it represents an isolated instance. Considering the function and the circulation of these periodicals, it seems logical to assume that these incidents reported reflect concern of problems far more widespread.

The following open press Soviet sources have been used as the basis for this research document:

Voennyi Vestnik (Military Herald), Issues 1-12, 1975. A monthly army journal which concentrates its efforts on military training, combat and combat support functions, and military leadership. The primary target audience is the regular and reserve officer corps of the army.

Til i Snabzhenie Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil (The Rear and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces), Issues 1-12, 1975. A monthly military journal which concentrates its efforts on support organizations and systems of the rear. The primary target audience is regular and reserve officers of the Armed Forces and specialists in combat service support fields.
Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), Issues 1-24, 1975. A semimonthly military journal which disseminates Party policy and provides current interpretation of political theory, discusses political work and political organization in the Armed Forces, and analyzes questions of military training and education. The primary target audience is commanders, political workers, propagandists and Party activists.
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For simplicity, the following abbreviations are used:
VV = Voennyi Vestnik (Military Herald), T&S = Tyl i Snabzenie (Rear and Supply), KVS = Kommunist Vooruzhenykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces). Following these abbreviations appear the volume number of the given journal for 1975, the assigned number of each article analyzed within a given volume, and the page number within this work on which the article can be found. For example, VV 1-1-1 indicates Voennyi Vestnik, volume 1 for 1975, the first article summarized from that volume, and page 1 of this work.

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General of the Army I.G. Pavlovsky, CINC Ground Forces, summarizes the results of the 1974 training year in this issue's lead article for 1975. As the main shortcoming in combat field training he cites the poor solution of certain problems at the battalion level and below. This uncharacteristic deficiency was apparent in the Baltic, Transbaikal, and Central Asian military districts. Specifically some commanders did not maneuver boldly or swiftly attack the enemy, and march training was weak in certain units. Certain commanders and staff officers have not yet learned how to firmly control the operations of their subordinates in battle, they do not always use APC's and infantry combat vehicles properly in the breakthrough of a prepared defense, they poorly organize the interaction of the means of fire suppression, and they do not take strong measures for the destruction of antitank guided missiles and antitank weapons. Also certain officers simplify the training of subordinates in the defense against weapons of mass destruction, and they are not well versed in the methods of reestablishing the combat capability of the subunits (battalion and below). Last, but not least, is the commanding of regiments and smaller units. Not all commanders and their staffs have learned to obtain and analyse intelligence reports in a timely and efficient manner, to consider them when making combat decisions, and to achieve strict execution of orders issued. The general also feels that in places attention to the training of officers in the conduct of battles against superior forces has been illegally weakened. Some battles must be won by successful maneuver, by a stealthy turning movement from the flanks and the rear, by deceiving the enemy, by forcing one's will upon him, by deploying and opening fire first, and by the use of high quality machinery and weapons. Special attention must be directed toward competition among officers, an area with many shortcomings.

Colonel P. Kunitsky states that the value of intelligence lies in its timely delivery to places where it is needed. At times, however, certain staffs fail to report fresh data, wanting to accumulate more so as to arrive at proper conclusions. The colonel points out that this is incorrect. Data must be processed, evaluated, and disseminated as quickly as possible. With regard to another problem area of staff work, he cites as an example a battalion which "lost" its combat effectiveness only because it entered a contaminated zone without means of defense. This happened because the staff and the CO himself incorrectly evaluated the radiation conditions. On another problem, a regimental tank headquarters received a march order, however, it failed to consider the state of training of its mechanics and drivers, the march distance, and the weather conditions. This led to the incorrect positioning of the refueling area, which resulted in subunits arriving several hours late, having left much technical equipment along the route.


LTC M. Tychkov describes a tactical exercise in which small units (battalion and below), having penetrated the "enemy" defense, were developing an offensive in depth. The defenders were falling back trying to occupy an advantageous line. This had to be prevented, but the APC's were bogged down somewhere behind. The battalion CO decided to mount his infantry on the tanks, but while the infantry was deploying on the tanks and receiving instructions, the "enemy" managed to break contact and dig in on a ridge line. The colonel concludes that this action again confirms the fact that for infantry to operate successfully mounted on tanks, they must be specifically trained in this.

4. Colonel V. Kalinin. "A Gde Zhe Tanki?" (And Where are the Tanks?), pp 77-79.

Colonel V. Kalinin discusses problems of tactical radio communications. One young Battalion CO, a Captain, selected an excellent CP site except that command and control radios failed to function due to the presence of excess foliage. Another CO cluttered up his CP with support elements, such as a mess truck and an ammo point, which should have located away from the CP. Certain commanders avoid using radios.
themselves and rely on their signalmen. This is partially due to their lack of skill in using radios, a situation which causes them to doubt whether they can maintain control by radio. On one exercise, a commander decided to launch a swift attack. He issued the order by radio, and his infantry and artillery began to respond, but his tanks could not be contacted. It turned out that although his chief of staff had managed to communicate with the CO of the supporting tank company, the order to attack was somehow not properly received. Upon checking, it was discovered that many officers in this unit did not know how to operate a radio and that they grossly violate the rules of radio-telephone procedure.


COL V. Pashkovsky discusses shortcomings in the conduct of antiaircraft firing exercises. There are cases where gun crews occupy firing positions long before the aircraft appear in the sky. The crews take up battle positions slowly, and they check the readiness of their firing equipment several times. Also at times the young commanders are replaced by officers. The forced idleness of waiting for the aerial "enemy" has a harmful effect on the mood of the soldiers. They become distracted, their enthusiasm is dampened, and their psychological attitude created by their commanders and political workers becomes depressed. Responsible officers cite various reasons for this. They claim that conditions do not permit dynamic and intensive firing exercises, but this is not true. Almost every firing center has two equipped sectors for firing at aerial targets and a base line (directrix) for firing at ground targets, i.e., three firing areas where several batteries can deploy simultaneously. There is a main and temporary command posts, control radar, and stationary communications between all elements of the system to control firing and the targets. The problem is that certain officers find it hard to discard old, outdated methods and to risk creating complex situations in which poorly prepared units will have difficulty fulfilling their firing missions. In the more difficult environment, all training deficiencies will show up quickly, for good organization of the firing requires greater efforts. The inevitable mistakes often disappoint people and dampen enthusiasm, therefore, commanders who want to set up a new system must be given assistance.
Volume 2


Colonel-General V. Yakushin, Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces, discusses problem areas in staff work with regard to tactical training. The general is especially concerned with the training of tactical commanders. He notes that at times insufficient attention is devoted to the mastering of weapons and combat equipment and to the driving of tactical vehicles. Sometimes officer training is postponed or cancelled altogether. With regard to tactical training in general, the general criticizes commanders and staff officers who, fearing serious mistakes, place their battalions and companies in relatively easy tactical circumstances, for example, facing an enemy who is passive and poorly equipped technically. Staff preparation is at times hasty, and consequently training time is often wasted on organization of the exercise. As a result, the more complex training activities are worked out haphazardly. The general also criticizes the repeated use of the same firing ranges and training areas, the failure to create demanding and complex training situations, and the tremendous waste of time in movement between garrison and training areas. Staff officers, serving as exercise controllers, are cautioned not to step in for the participants and stifle their initiative and independence. There are also problem areas in the conduct of command post exercises. On these the staff officers periodically receive maps with updated enemy and friendly information. These are at times too complete so that the staff does not have to work at collecting and analyzing information. The officers receive a false impression of the realistic circumstances of war, and they do not get the chance to practice radio-telephone procedure or disseminating orders to the troops. Staffs are also receiving combat orders too far in advance. These should come gradually, at first in warning orders, so that staffs will have to think and plan ahead and to take certain measures prior to the receipt of concrete orders.


LTC N. Zhdanov cites training problems in the Port Arthur motorized rifle regiment. Concerning alert procedures, there are at times confusion and delays in assembling and the moving out of equipment. In one subunit, two officers were not informed about an alert when the duty officer "forgot" that a contingent was on guard duty. In places mechanics
and drivers arrive late, and the SOP for issuing weapons and equipment is not thought out. Not all soldiers know how to properly load equipment into a BMP, and so it hinders their entering and leaving the vehicle. Another problem area in this regiment concerns the logistical support of exercises. At times, certain support material was lacking, the tactical setup did not fully agree with the concept and goals of the exercise, and there were not enough targets.


LTC I. Dynin maintains that airborne training should be as realistic as possible, even while still at the airfield. He cites one incident in which the transport aircraft were lined up wing to wing, not dispersed and uncamouflaged. And this was during the loading. The colonel points out that an enemy fighter bomber with a conventional payload could wipe out half the aircraft and that men and equipment should remain under cover until the actual loading, and then they should load rapidly and get airborne as quickly as possible.


General-Major M. Popkov, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Central Asian Military District, points out that certain commanders and political workers have a "formalistic" attitude toward the organization of competition. Insufficient attention is given to the publicity and comparison of training results and to the propagation and inculcation of progressive methods. Training deficiencies are at times taken lightly. Instead of lively organizational work, certain staffs are attracted to "shuffling papers," and they fail to help small unit commanders organize competition. The general also admits that at regimental level and below competition among officers is poorly developed in many units.

5. LTG V. Merimsky. "Takticheskii Krugozor Ofitsera" (Tactical Outlook of an Officer), pp 75-79.

LTG V. Merimsky, Deputy Chief of the main Directorate for Combat Training of the Ground Forces, cites a specific example of a "defeat" in a training exercise in which a battalion commander failed to follow the recommended tactical procedures. His battalion had penetrated a prepared defense
and was receiving strong opposition for control of the forward positions. The attack began to slow, and the commander was indecisive in committing his reserve, which is the recommended procedure after having seized the forward positions. Due to this indecisiveness, the "enemy" was able to halt the offensive.


Colonel V. Vinnikov criticizes the irrational use of mission planning time during tactical exercises. One regimental commander instructed his battalion commanders to meet him at a certain time and place to receive his order. They travelled two hours to the designated location, and then they had to wait two hours for their commander's arrival. Thus they lost four hours of daylight planning time, and the company commanders and platoon leaders got down to work only two hours later. This was due mainly to the fact that the battalion commanders went to meet the regimental commander and conduct reconnaissance without having decided on the combat formations of the battalions and companies, the line of deployment, and the missions of the units. Moreover, they did not even know the situation. The unit personnel were waiting in ignorance in an assembly area. After receiving their missions, the subunits had to prepare in haste since there was not enough daylight left. Trying to justify this lack of organization, the commander cited a shortage of time, being unexpectedly delayed by his superior, and regulations requiring battalion and company commanders to organize their attack on the ground. Therefore, they said that they couldn't make any decisions or conduct any other work until they had made a reconnaissance. It is a sad thing, the colonel says, when inexperienced commanders try to justify their mistakes by a "formalistic" interpretation of the requirements of certain regulations. In fact, this particular regulation recommends that senior commanders give their subordinates the majority of the available daylight hours for work on the terrain.


Colonels Iu. Nikiforov and S. Sarapulov state that certain staff car drivers are poorly prepared technically and that they are not well-versed in the rules of the road or in vehicle maintenance. Specifics include only the case of a driver who started a trip with a flat tire and the fact that certain drivers have trouble in crowded city streets. The authors also point out that political indoctrination and socialist competition are poorly organized for drivers in certain units.
LTC M. Savochkin, CO of an "honor" tank battalion, discusses shortcomings in young officers. Many, fresh from military schools, are timid about going into the field. In these schools, they receive insufficient practical work in leadership, especially under field conditions. Many are unable to work with a map, apparently considering this a secondary requirement. When planning a battle, they cannot correctly identify terrain features on a map, at times being off by hundreds of meters in their calculations. Young officers are unable to determine distances to various terrain features and targets, and they have not developed a feel for judging distances visually. The colonel then cites four specific examples of problems with young officers.

a. One senior lieutenant was leading a reconnaissance patrol (BRD). He got lost in fog and came out four kilometers south of the appointed location. If this had happened in combat, the patrol would not have fulfilled its mission.

b. A platoon firing exercise was led by an officer who had just joined the battalion from another regiment. He operated on the highly controversial principle: "attack and see what happens." He attacked, but without tactics or accurate fire.

c. On a company exercise, one officer acted without sufficient deliberation. When asked why, the senior lieutenant replied: "We all worked that way in my regiment."

d. On a company firing exercise, a senior lieutenant was ordered to attack a strong point on a hill. Without thinking things through, he gave an order, and his company taking the shortest route, moved out along a country road in the indicated direction. He deployed his company where he felt it convenient, rather than along the designated line, and the movement itself was more like the "crawling" of platoons through areas convenient for the drivers.
General-Major V. Stakheev states that one of the basic reasons for combat and training failures is a scornful attitude toward intelligence/reconnaissance. This attitude is manifested in the improper selection of personnel, the incorrect assignment of missions to intelligence personnel, and the failure to supply them with the proper equipment. Commanders must remember that they cannot intelligently assign collection missions if they do not know their intelligence capabilities and do not constantly study changes in enemy organization, armament, and tactics. On one command-post exercise, a regimental commander issued an order which did not contain a word about intelligence/reconnaissance. The general also points out that small-unit intelligence training is conducted poorly at times. He adds that intelligence officers must be sharp observers and must be able to conduct in depth analyses, think logically, and determine the nature of enemy actions and plans on the basis of available and often fragmentary data. Training exercises do not always, however, demand the creative thought and resourcefulness necessary in actual combat. It is harmful for training scenarios to provide commanders and their staffs with detailed enemy information beyond their ability to collect.

Colonel-General B. Ivanov, CINC Southern Group of Forces (Hungary), voices his concern that some commanders think that "training" orders do not always have to be executed. On one exercise, a battalion commander ordered a senior lieutenant to have his company by-pass an "enemy" strong point through a swamp and to hit the enemy on the flank. The lieutenant, knowing the enemy was not real, led his troops to the left of the swamp in full view of the "blue" forces. Thus, the "blues" quickly grasped the maneuver, and the battalion's attack was disrupted. The lieutenant stated that he avoided the swamp because it was "wet there". He received only a reprimand, thereby drawing the conclusion that it is not especially serious to disobey training orders. At the worst he'd get "C" in tactics. The general states that there is nothing more dangerous than a frivolous attitude toward the execution of orders, especially during training exercises. He also considers it very dangerous for commanders to issue vague and indecisive orders and fail to firmly insure their execution.

LTG F. Ishchenko, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Southern Group of Forces (Hungary), stresses the need for close coordination between commanders and Party organizations. He cites the example of an officer who took over an excellent regiment and worked hard to improve it; however, he worked mainly through punishment, reprimands, and arrests. He failed to heed the advice of his communists, and his Party secretary stood by ineffectively. Deficiencies in the unit increased, and senior commanders had to step in to correct the situation.

4. Sr. Lt. V. Kniazev, "Kogda k Sorevnovaniiu Otnosiatsia Formal'no" (When there is a Formalistic Attitude toward Competition), pp 44-46.

Senior Lt V. Kniazev deplores the "formalistic" attitude toward training and the organization of socialist competition which characterized a company - level tank driving exercise. The results were only satisfactory. The competition was poorly and unenthusiastically organized, the charts for displaying results were left blank, and the soldiers were not informed of their scores. The field Lenin reading room was filled with old booklets and outdated information. Communications was lost due to the absence of spare radio batteries, and other necessary devices and equipment were unavailable. Unsatisfactory tank crews were not briefed on their deficiencies prior to repeating the test course. Not one soldier checked the display boards for results, and not a single soldier achieved outstanding results. The commander and Komsomol activists had simply given up as hopeless the task of organizing the competition.

5. General-Major I. Skordumov, "Atake - Vysokuiu Skoro'st' " (To the Attack at High Speed), pp 47-51.

General-Major of Tank Forces I. Shordumov criticizes motorized rifle and tank units that still follow outdated operational procedures without regard for changes in equipment and armament. At times the tanks break away from the dismounted infantry and are deprived of its support in close combat just when the defending enemy begins to employ the mass of his armor-piercing weapons (AT grenade launchers and rifles and recoilless rifles). At other times, in order to reach the FEBA simultaneously, the tanks attack at a low speed so as not to break away from the infantry. On a recent exercise a motorized rifle battalion conducted a dismounted attack against a hastily prepared defense. In
view of this, the attached tank company attacked at low speed so as not to leave the infantry; nevertheless, the tanks reached the FEBA a full five minutes ahead of the infantry; the automatic riflemen, machine gunners, and grenade launchers lagged 300-350 meters behind their supporting tanks.

6. LTG L. Sapkov, "K Novym Rubezham Boevogo Masterstva" (To New Heights of Combat Mastery), pp 72-76.

   LTG of Artillery L. Sapkov, First Deputy CINC of the Rocket Troops and Artillery of the Ground Forces, points out that there are commanders who recognize that training should approximate actual combat conditions, but who, nevertheless, allow simplifications. At times training is conducted on all too familiar terrain, firing positions are selected on slopes facing the enemy, and engineer preparations are not carried out completely. It is even worse when foxholes and camouflage are not prepared.


   General-Major I. Yakimovich reports that certain officers underestimate and make poor use of their unit's fire power. They look to their superiors for support and figure that attached and supporting weapons will suppress the enemy, thereby leaving their automatic riflemen and machine gunners with nothing to do. Others lack confidence in their ability to direct their company's fire. On one company defensive firing exercise, extra ammunition was issued and extra targets were set up; however, the officers could not handle the mission. They were especially confused when more targets appeared than they had expected. As a result, the evaluation of targets, the determination of their priority of engagement and the selection of weapons were incorrect. All ammunition was expended with less than a 30% kill factor. The reason for this failure was the inability of the commanders to direct fire.

8. LTG V. Pikalov. "Polevaia Vyuchka Khimicheskikh Voisk" (Field Training of Chemical Troops), pp 103-108.

   LTG of Technical Troops V. Pikalov, Chief of Chemical Troops, discusses problem areas in the training of chemical troops. Some commanders are devoting insufficient attention to march training. March discipline is violated with
resultant low march speeds. Columns sometimes stretch out excessively, unplanned stops are made, and individual vehicles fall behind. Assigned routes are at times missed due to poor orientation. Such incidents occurred in the Transbaikal, North Caucasian, and Far East military districts. Training is often oversimplified without using equipment to simulate radioactive and chemical contamination. Units are not adequately trained in deploying from the march on unfamiliar terrain or in the practical aspects of NBC decontamination of personnel, armament, and equipment. In some regiments, the chemical troops do not possess sufficient skills in reconnoitering sectors for water crossings or in decontaminating assault crossing equipment and floating bridges. Nighttime training is at times conducted "formalistically," being scheduled at twilight and carried out in abbreviated time frames. In addition, special devices for radiation and chemical reconnaissance are not prepared for night use. Darkness has also led to mistakes in measuring radiation levels and in determining the type of poisonous gas being used by the enemy. Decontamination and reconnaissance operations are at times conducted slowly and in an unorganized manner.

Volume 4


Colonel-General S. Vasyagin, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces, states that the organization of independent work for officers remains a bottleneck in many Marxist-Leninist study groups. The relation between theoretical themes and real life is at times presented "formalistically" and in a simplified manner. Soldiers are currently studying topics which allow the propagandists to show the advantages of the Soviet way of life and the superiority of the socialist system, to reveal the contradictions and aggressive nature of imperialism, and to inculcate a burning hatred toward enemies of socialism. Political classes are sometimes conducted poorly, and certain group leaders and participants come to class unprepared. A related problem is that many servicemen are deviating from regulations.

2. LTG I. Voloshin, "Initsiativa i Samostoiatel'nost' Komandira v Boiu" (The Initiative and Independence of a Commander in Combat), pp 55-59.

LTG I. Voloshin, Commander of the Odessa Military District, describes an exercise in which a battalion was serving as the advance guard on a march. The "enemy" attacked
the point element with airborne sabotage groups, but the point element reacted correctly and decisively. The battalion commander, however, expecting additional reports on the "enemy," hesitated in committing his main body, and he did not call for artillery. The "enemy" jammed his radios, and, instead of issuing orders by other means of communication, the commander kept trying to reach his subordinates by radio. As a result, both time and the initiative were lost.


Colonels V. Shatunov and I. Efron state that measures to eliminate the effects of the employment of enemy mass-destruction weapons are not always carried out properly. There are cases when defense measures on the march are organized "formalistically," without the necessary equipment, and with violations of safety rules for decontamination. On one exercise, a chemical alarm was given, and the commander failed to take decisive measures to protect his troops. The tanks continued with open hatches, not all soldiers put on their protective masks, and partial decontamination was not immediately conducted. Serious mistakes were also made in decontaminating weapons and equipment.

(No articles from Volume 5)

Volume 6


Colonel-General I. Mednikov, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, criticizes political organizations for poor political classes. On one regimental test, six officers received unsatisfactory grades. A chief reason for this is poor leadership training and the failure of Party organizations to strictly call to account those, who have a poor attitude toward military and political training and who allow errors in the training and indoctrination of their subordinates. The general also decries quantitative, in place of qualitative, measures. Political lectures at times fail to relate to actual military missions. There are even violations of discipline in the organization of the training process.
LTG P. Shkidchenko, "Umelo Primeniat' Ustavnye Polozheniiia" (To Skillfully Apply the Regulatory Statutes), pp 39-42.

LTG P. Shkidchenko, Deputy CINC for Combat Training of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, points out that certain commanders attempt to justify their incorrect actions by stating that they displayed initiative, while others say that they followed regulations strictly. The general then cites an example of each type. On one exercise, a battalion commander decided to change his direction of march in order to avoid difficult terrain, but his companies came out on the march route of adjacent units, and a "traffic jam" occurred. On another exercise a tank column got bogged down in a swampy area, but the battalion commander, instead of bypassing the obstacle, continued to struggle along on the assigned route. As a result, his unit arrived at the appointed area late and without all its personnel.

LTC V. Pishakov and Major L. Kirpach, "Boevye Mashiny Pehoty v Boiu" (Combat Infantry Vehicles in Combat), pp 43-47.

LTC V. Pishakov and Major L. Kirpach state that at times, when the command "Prepare for dismounting" is given, the infantry combat vehicles, instead of making a dash right up to the tanks, continue to move 200-300 meters behind them. When the dismounting occurs, this distance increases, and the tanks and infantry wind up attacking the enemy FEBA independently, thereby losing their mutual support.


General-Major Zh. Kereev points out the tactical errors of a company commander in a meeting engagement. Although serving as the point element, the CO did not expect a quick meeting with the "enemy". His mounted patrol, moving along calmly, failed to notice the patrol and main body of the "enemy" and ran into an ambush. Instead of going forward himself to assess the situation, the CO had his entire point element follow him in column. Only when the deployed "enemy" tanks and APC's appeared from behind a hill did the company begin to dismount, but the meeting engagement had already been lost. At the critique the commander stated that the situation was unclear, but he should have prepared for and identified probable danger points when organizing the march. And even after the initial contact, he might have saved the situation through decisive action. The general cautions however, that tactic must be used in critiques so as not to stifle initiative. He adds that initiative and independence can also be harmed by commanders who give hints or open suggestions as to the proper solution of a complex tactical problem.
5. COL Yu. Zolin, "Uluchshat' Artilleriiskuiu Razvedku" (To Improve Artillery Intelligence), pp 71-73.

COL Yu. Zolin states that certain artillery staffs are conducting target acquisition through outdated procedures. Responsible officers are often late with their analyses and recommendations. They are unable to digest all the incoming information, and, as a result, fires are sometimes planned against probable enemy dispositions rather than concrete targets. Therefore, finding more time for analysis of intelligence data is an important problem.

6. CPT N. Abrosimov, "Uchebnoe Pole Razvedchikov" (The Training Ground for Intelligence Personnel), pp 73-75.

CPT N. Abrosimov points out that in places target acquisition personnel are trained according to oversimplified stereotyped patterns. Sometimes several exercises are conducted on the same terrain, and if an "enemy" is designated, the scenario is the same. The FO’s "locate by intersection" terrain features, whose ranges and azimuths they know by heart.

7. LTC E. Skorupo, "Preodolevaia Zagrazhdeniiia" (Overcoming Obstacles), pp 89-91.

LTC E. Skorupo reminds commanders that they must consider all possible obstacles to movement which a defending enemy might create and that they must be prepared to employ various types of engineer equipment to overcome them. The colonel cites as an example a battalion commander who had prepared a comprehensive plan which entailed breaching a minefield and then crossing a swampy area on two existing dykes. He planned for and cleared the minefield quickly, but he had not expected the enemy to blow the dykes. Since he had not planned for this contingency, he was delayed and did not fulfill his mission.
This issue's lead editorial notes that some training exercises are conducted without proper preparation and equipment and that competition is poorly organized. Training time is at times wasted. On one tank firing exercise, only one or two out of four ranges were operational, so many soldiers wasted several hours just waiting to use the ranges. There are commanders and political workers who are unaware of the true status of training in their units. Such leaders tend to rely on reports rather than personal observation. Lenin rooms are sometimes poorly maintained, without honor rolls of unit personnel and the results of competitions.


LTG V. Bukharenko, Deputy CINC Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia) for Combat Training, points out deficiencies in tactical training. Insufficient attention is devoted to operations at night and during periods of limited visibility. On one exercise, a company, making a night march, got lost and arrived late in the assembly area. In the attack, the tanks operated indecisively, and they moved into the assault slowly and in a bunch. Firing tests are an extremely important part of training, but some commanders prepare for them hastily, simplify the problems, and teach stereotyped actions. One motorized rifle company tried valiantly to seize a strongly fortified position, but the attack stalled due to uncoordinated and ineffective fire. Effective fire is decisive in battle, and yet firing results in some units are inconsistent.


General-Major V. Zemzerov, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia), states that there are many shortcomings in the organization of political training. One experienced officer conducted a class on the history of the Soviet Armed Forces in a gymnasium when there was a well-equipped room for military history only 20 feet away with visual aids which would have enhanced his presentation. The general points out that ideological work at times suffers from a lack of coordination between the commander's assistant for
political affairs and the Party and Komsomol committees. Certain Party secretaries are not fully aware of the true status of training in their units. Even experienced political workers are following old methods, i.e., simply giving theoretical lectures instead of concrete leadership. The general also mentions lack of coordination between political work and combat training, poor maintenance of weapons, and violations of military discipline.


LTC N. Bukhteev, a regimental commander, regrets that there are young officers who get confused in complicated situations. He also criticizes battalion and company commanders for suggesting tactical solutions to lieutenants. The colonel also points out that modern warfare will offer frequent opportunities for maneuver, but certain officers are afraid to conduct daring maneuvers because they require decisive and precise judgment and have an inherent risk.

5. COL V. Shcherbakov. "Nakhodchivost' Komandira v Boiu" (Resourcefulness of the Commander in Battle), pp 31-34.

COL V. Shcherbakov emphasizes the need for resourcefulness in commanders. He cites the example of a battalion pursuing a retreating "enemy". The unit encountered a blockaded mountain pass and spent three hours negotiating it, pulling each vehicle through separately. Having cleared the pass, the unit found itself in a fire pocket created by the "enemy". In the critique, the commander learned that had he been more resourceful, he could have by-passed the obstacle to the right. The colonel points out that there is a certain risk inherent in resourcefulness and that overly sharp criticism should be avoided so as not to stifle initiative.


LTC L. Burulev describes two live-fire exercises in which individuals panicked and failed to complete their mission. In one combat vehicle, the gunner, when loading, had failed to seat the round in the breech. When the target appeared, he pressed the launch button, but nothing happened. He panicked, and, by the time he found his mistake, his time to engage the target was gone. The other example involves an artillery crew firing on tanks. All went well until the gunner cut his eyebrow on the sight, and his comrades, seeing the blood, forgot about their fire missions. The colonel concludes that superior technical knowledge is not enough; the troops must also be psychologically hardened.
7. COL N. Burnos. "O Shtabnoi Kul'ture" (Concerning Staff Standards), pp 51-55.

COL N. Burnos states that tactical staff work is at times limited to the correct preparation of combat documents and the proper and rapid posting of maps. Information on the enemy, adjacent units, and the missions of the higher headquarters is given too completely and not as it would be in actual combat. This prevents staff officers from having to screen and analyze incoming data. He especially criticizes officers who waste time writing all data down in a notebook prior to posting the maps. The colonel also criticizes senior commanders who retain most of the available planning time for themselves, thereby forcing their subordinates to issue incomplete orders.


Marshal of Artillery G. Peredel'sky, CG of the rocket troops and artillery of the Ground Forces, states that target acquisition is at times conducted "formalistically" and incompetently. Certain officers don't even attempt to collect intelligence data, relying instead on reports from higher headquarters. On one exercise, a fire mission was called for against targets in an "enemy" strong point. Not only had the reconnaissance of the enemy defenses been conducted superficially, but also the wrong weapons were selected. The targets were on the reverse slope of a hill, but instead of using howitzer and mortar fire, cannon fire was used. Most shells flew over the targets, and the advancing infantry met dense enemy fire from the undestroyed strong point.

9. LTC A. Sedykh. "Ukazanii na Initsiativu ne Budet" (There will be no Directions for Initiative), pp 72-75.

LTC A. Sedykh criticizes certain artillery officers for lack of initiative and for stereotyped approaches in engaging targets. Supporting a reinforced motorized rifle company in the attack, one artillery senior lieutenant was slow to notice and engage an "enemy" AT guided missile and recoilless rifle. Only after two tanks and a combat infantry vehicle had been knocked out and the company commander gave him a specific mission, did he attack the targets, and then one at a time instead of simultaneously. At the critique, the senior commander stressed that the combined arms commander controls the battle, but that artillery battery and battalion commanders cannot simply carry out orders from supported units automatically and passively. They must be active and ready.
if necessary to take upon themselves the conduct of the battle. The colonel then gives two examples of officers reluctant to abandon fixed procedures. Both had near first round hits on their targets, but instead of making a slight correction and firing for effect, they continued to adjust fire by bracketing the target. As a final example, he mentions an incident in which improper fire commands delayed the completion of the mission.

Volume 8

1. **Lead Editorial.** "Umelo sovershat' Marshi" (The Skillful Conduct of Marches), pp 2-5.

   This issue's lead editorial points out that there are cases of combat marches which are poorly prepared and conducted. In many cases march columns move slowly, pass check points late, and move out late for appointed areas and designated lines.


   Colonel-General S. Belonozhko, Commander of the Turkestan Military District, discusses diligence and dispatch in executing orders. He states that training situations must approximate actual combat, but notes that certain commanders fail to set high standards and see nothing wrong in units being a few minutes late to assault positions and other designated areas. On one exercise, a commander correctly attempted to coordinate a complex flanking movement with an adjacent unit, but his plan was too complicated to complete on time so the exercise controller had to give him additional information on the "enemy" so that he would make the necessary corrections. One battalion commander failed to coordinate the timing of a flanking movement, a frontal assault, and an airborne assault. He also failed to organize reconnaissance of the enemy positions and the fire support plan. These failures prevented the timely accomplishment of the mission. On another exercise, the commander scheduled a river crossing for the following morning. The officer who disseminated the order confused the mission, and preparations did not begin during the night as planned, but only on the following morning. This testifies to the fact that certain officers do not feel the responsibility for the precise and timely execution of orders.
3. LTG N. Shchukin, "Na pervom plane - polevaia vyuchka" (Top Priority - Field Training), pp 24-29.

LTG N. Shchukin, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Turkestan Military District, states that certain political workers in his district are not well versed in organizing political work in the field. Often their plans substitute quantity for quality. On a recent regimental exercise, certain communists failed to display initiative and occupy a leading role in the competition and in the accomplishment of assigned missions. The general also points out that certain officers have trouble navigating in desert and mountain terrain.


General-Major A. Bogdanov, Deputy Commander of the Turkestan Military District for Combat Training, stresses the need for better coordination of tactical plans. He cites the example of one battalion commander who devoted only ten minutes to coordinating instructions, indicating only the fire support plan and the line of deployment into company and platoon columns. As a result, the offensive was uncoordinated, and AT weapons were employed poorly against a counter-attack. Questions of artillery and close air support are often overlooked, and combat infantry vehicles and engineer (sapper) units are not used effectively. The general further points out that certain commanders have excellent plans, but after the battle begins they fail to clarify missions for their subordinates to inform them about changing situations, and to insure the timely displacement of attached units and reliable communications with them.

5. LTG V. Budakov. "Ne Prosto Inspektor" (Not Simply an Inspector), pp 60-63.

LTG V. Budakov, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces, points out that staff officers must not serve only as controllers for subordinate units, but they also help them solve their problems. They must not only find deficiencies, but they must also advise, suggest, and teach. Some staff officers are too lenient with shortcomings, and some commanders tend to evaluate their work not according to how well they eliminate deficiencies, but according to the number of visits they make to subordinate units. One staff officer who was ordered to assist a young artillery officer proved to be weak himself in the fundamentals of firing procedures.


LTG of Artillery I. Afanasenko finds that certain anti-aircraft artillery units are conducting firing exercises in
primitive conditions, not making full use of all technical capabilities at the firing complexes. For example, certain units were firing at very slow-moving targets on familiar courses at optimal altitudes with little "enemy" radio-electronic jamming. This gives a distorted picture as to the true state of combat readiness. More use should be made of radar to verify firing results instead of relying on optical devices. Some commanders fail to insure proper maintenance of such technical equipment.

7. Colonels A. Gorkin and F. Dragamiretsky. "Maskirovke Nado Uchit'" (Camouflage Must be Taught), pp 97-100.

Colonels A. Gorkin and F. Dragamiretsky conclude that certain officers are only paying lip service to proper camouflage on training exercises. Poor camouflage is worse than none at all. One platoon dug foxholes and trenches on a flat meadow, not hiding the dirt. Slit trenches for machine guns were dug at regular intervals and were camouflaged identically. Dummy positions were prepared, but left uncamouflaged. The authors cite an example of two tank targets, one camouflaged effectively and the other primitively. Both were revealed simultaneously to an artillery crew. The poorly camouflaged tank received six direct hits, while the well camouflaged one received not a single hit.
1. LTG I. Repin. "Otchetam i Vyboram Partiinykh Organov Vysokuiu Organizovannost" (For Good Organization in the Reports and Elections of Party Organs), pp 2-5.

LTG I. Repin, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces, calls for general improvement in political work in the educational-indoctrinational process. Many vague, generalized shortcomings are mentioned: communists are not working diligently; training time is being wasted; the compilation of statistics on the state of training receives more attention than hard work to eliminate shortcomings; violations of military discipline still occur; political work is not always closely connected with real-life problems; and the work of many activists is characterized by too much talk and not enough action.


Chief Marshal of Armored Forces A. Babadzhanian points out that tank columns on the march are not achieving sufficiently high rates of march in spite of the high-speed capabilities of modern tanks. Even when drivers are well trained, the unskilled actions of certain officers in controlling the march lead to extremely slow rates and late arrivals at appointed areas. The marshal adds that young drivers receive insufficient driving practice, especially in column at the highest possible speeds.

3. COL M. Mcnt. "Taktika ne Terpit Shablonu" (Tactics will not Tolerate Stereotyped Patterns), pp 46-50.

COL M. Mcnt maintains that in spite of good training programs for officers, some are not capable of effectively organizing and conducting training. The most basic defect is conducting training in simplified conditions. Camouflage is at times poor, and displacements are unorganized. There is a need to more often simulate artillery and air strikes on command posts, to create situations requiring the transfer of command from one CP to another, and to stop pampering commanders and their staffs by giving them complete information on the "enemy" and adjacent friendly units. The colonel adds that training films have tremendous possibilities, but that existing ones are often uninteresting and deal too much with problems of secondary importance. Senior officers must insure that young officers are well qualified as instructors. Certain young officers cannot rapidly organize for combat, issue precise orders, or command their units effectively, especially in critical situations. The
colonel again points out that certain officers are well prepared theoretically, but lack practical skills, especially in working on the ground and in commanding units in rapidly changing situations. He concludes: "The gap between theory and practice must be eliminated as quickly as possible."


COL M. Kramskoi states the certain commanders have not mastered the hard skills of commanding troops in complex, rapidly changing situations. As an example, he cites the case of a battalion serving in the second echelon. The commander had received a designated line of departure and time for joining battle, but after the offensive began, the situation changed drastically. He had to commit the second echelon in a different direction. He was unable, however, to indicate to his subordinates the new line and organize the rapid movement to it in a timely manner. As a result, his unit was very late arriving at the new line of departure into the battle.

5. COL I. Kononov. "Ispol'zovanie Kino v Uchebnykh Tseliakh" (The Use of Training Films), pp 59-61.

COL I. Kononov states that certain commanders do not understand how valuable training films can be. Some say they are too much trouble. Others say that equipment and good films are lacking; while others doubt the effectiveness of the films. The colonel admits that there is a certain amount of truth in the first two views, but concludes that experience has demonstrated the great instructional value of the films.

Volume 10


This issue's lead editorial discusses leadership problems among officers. Some have problems organizing for combat and tend to follow stereotyped patterns. Sometimes too much time is used to assign missions, and thus subordinates receive orders which are vague, confusing, and untimely. At times hasty or the poor professional preparation of officers leads to the preparation of orders which are not clear, concise, and complete. Some commanders and staff officers prepare vague coordinating instructions for their units without considering the actual circumstances under which they are to be fulfilled. There are also shortcomings in other areas of staff work, such as ensuring that communications are maintained and that orders are properly
executed. The article further states that increased training of officers is needed in the conduct of the battle against an enemy with superior strength.


General-Major B. Utkin states that certain communists are displaying negative traits, such as "formalism", lack of principles, and indifference. At times decisive measures are not applied against violators of Party and military discipline. There have also been cases of certain leaders trying to cover up the objective reasons for errors in organizational and indoctrinational activity.


Colonel-General V. Varennikov, Commander of the Carpathian Military District, discusses training deficiencies. At times the scenarios for combat actions are determined in advance, to include when, where, and in what strength the defender will counterattack and what strength will be needed to repel the counterattack. Often one side, usually the defending, is wittingly assigned a passive role. The general states that tactical mastery, initiative, creativity, and organizational ability cannot be learned during such exercises and that they do more harm than good. Even on familiar terrain, many young officers cannot dispense with maps and trace the enemy FEBA and the deployment of his weapons using identifiable terrain features. This, he maintains, is not only the fault of the officer himself, but first of all of his immediate superior. Certain senior officers limit themselves to cursory checks of training exercises. Some officers don't rely enough on their staffs, and they farm out the training of their officers to the chief of staff. As a result, staff officers learn mainly how to prepare orders and evaluations, but they do not spend enough time with the troops, exercise constant control over the execution of orders, or help subunit commanders in the preparation of combat plans.

4. LTG P. Folkichev. "Uspekh Kuetsia v Rote" (Success is Forged in the Company), pp 25-29.

LTG P. Folkichev, Chief of the Political Directorate of Carpathian Military District, states that in certain units the level of ideological-organizational work is too low. In many units there is a tendency to work mainly on the regimental level instead of the battalion and company levels. A significant part of this problem is the lack of an orderly
system for the training and indoctrination of company-level officers. The role of the company level political workers is at times underestimated, and they are overloaded with inappropriate tasks.

5. LTG of Tank Troops A. Bondarenko. "O primenenii BMP v Boi" (On the Use of the BMP in Battle), pp 57-61.

   LTG of Tank Troops A. Bondarenko states that far from all commanders have a firm grasp of the employment of units in infantry combat vehicles (BMP's). They employ them frequently in the first echelon. Personnel have not been fully taught bold maneuver with the goals of by-passing strong points and penetrating the flanks and rear of the enemy. He concludes that stereotyped patterns are still allowed on training exercises.


   LTC B. Budymenko complains that officers do not have enough time for independent study and self-improvement. All too frequently higher headquarters call meetings or change training schedules so that, in general, officers barely have time to prepare for the following day's training. On the other hand, certain officers simply are not organizing their time well and are trying to do everything themselves and be everywhere at once.


   COL V. Subbotin discusses poor organization and employment of anti-aircraft weapons. On a recent exercise, a battalion was conducting an airborne assault. The commander boiled his organization of antiaircraft defense down to assigning the attached AA battery the mission of defending against aircraft and helicopters in the departure area. He neglected the question of AA defense in flight, in the assault area, and during the course of the battle. His main mistake, however, was that he failed to organize AA defense out of organic resources. For example, he did not effectively use mass fire from infantry weapons and portable AA rocket systems. Most rockets were used during the landing, and mass fire from infantry weapons was hardly used at all. The colonel concludes that enemy aviation should not be underestimated.

8. CPT D. Chernomazov. "Uchim Serzhantov Metodike Ognevoi Podgotovki" (We Teach Sergeants the Methods of Fire Preparation), pp 95-97.
CPT D. Chernomazov points out that certain company commanders sometimes have a tendency to personally demonstrate or explain training points, thereby undermining the initiative of squad leaders and forgetting that they will train their subordinates independently. In other cases, when officers are poorly prepared for a class, they will enlist the aid of sergeants to demonstrate a point, although this is considered a harmful practice.

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   LTG I. Semenov, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Odessa Military District, states that many blunders in the field can be directly attributed to weak Party-political work. Unexpected changes in the tactical situation unsettle some political workers, thus weakening their influence. During a river crossing operation, political workers forgot about reminding the soldiers that their fathers and grandfathers had forced the very same river under tremendous enemy fire. The general concludes that certain officers are not taking the fulfillment of the Party tasks seriously.


   LTG of Artillery I. Anashkin, Chief of Combat Training and Institutions of Higher Education and Deputy Commander of Rocket Troops and Artillery for the Ground Forces, notes that some artillery and rocket units are not giving sufficient attention to the complete preparation of weapons for firing so as to guarantee sudden and effective fire. In many cases, security measures during firing are violated. Also the requirement to conduct field training in unfamiliar terrain is not always observed.


   Engineer Colonel-General S. Aganov, Chief of Engineer Troops, discusses improper use of engineer troops. At times, combined arms commanders have sufficient means at their disposal to solve various engineer problems, but they do not fully comprehend their engineer capabilities. Therefore, engineer forces are sometimes left in reserve, and commanders frequently forget about and lose communication with them. Engineer units are at times given inappropriate missions,
such as preparing and erecting targets, simulating artillery fire, and preparing training areas. Certain commanders relegate engineer problems to a secondary position. On one exercise, the commander paid little attention to engineer preparation of his defensive position. As a result, minefields were placed where they would do little harm to the "enemy" and where they hindered the movement of his own troops. Poor use is made of "table construction" (prefabricated) of fortifications, which facilitates the construction of shelters and which provides for reliable defense against various weapons. Infantrymen mistakenly consider "digging-in" an engineer function. Engineer support in water crossings is often not considered. As a result, delays occur. Commanders sometimes fail to designate locations for passages through minefields and they fail to coordinate with supporting sappers. As a result, tankers maneuver in front of obstacles and become vulnerable to "enemy" fire or "hit" mines. Not all commanders are capable of directing mobile detachments for erecting and removing obstacles. At times, such matters are incorrectly left up to the engineer chief. Certain engineer officers are weak in presenting their recommendations to commanders. Pontoon bridge companies tend to erect bridges in the most favorable locations, on familiar terrain, and without "enemy" opposition in order to achieve the highest construction rates possible. The general notes that such situations are extremely unrealistic.


COL A. Demidov states that the valuable aspects of "two way training are lost if the defending battalion does not launch a counterattack, occupy favorable terrain and commit its second echelon or reserve. Some commanders fail to establish for their units conditions for the creative execution of missions. They determine in advance the "winner" and the "loser", thereby stifling the initiative of their subordinates and creating simplified conditions.


LTG of Tank Troops S. Varichenko and COL V. Tiumnikov state that there are frequent cases of commanders proving to be weak in taking defensive measures against mass destruction weapons. On one exercise, the "enemy" suddenly employed a nuclear weapon against a tank battalion moving to a line of departure. The commander, having lost contact with his superior, decided not to waste time clarifying the situation. His reconnaissance was not well organized, but he continued to move along his designated route, whereupon he entered an area of great destruction and dangerous radiation. Here his unit had to stop, dismount, clear the blockages, and seek a bypass. In a real battle, the contamination would have neutralized
a great number of his personnel. Many officers, especially at first, are unable to apply their knowledge of proper defense measures to a practical situation. The opinion still persists that such questions more properly belong to specialists and senior commanders. Such exercises sometimes reveal fundamental deficiencies in officer preparation. Some react slowly, become confused, and give vague answers to their commander's questions. Some are unable to use their reference tables, rulers, and templates for map plotting, estimating possible losses, and evaluating the radiation and chemical conditions.

6. COL of Engineers A. Bessarab. "Klassnost' - Vazhnoe Slagoemoe Boegotovnosti" (Specialty Ratings - an Important Component of Combat Readiness), pp 72-76.

Reserve Engineer COL A. Bessarab regrets that certain units still display "formalism" toward the preparation of first-class specialists. In one tank company, no one controlled the growth plan for rated specialists, and there was no exchange of experience between seasoned soldiers and new specialists from training units. As a result, many first and second-class gunners did not fulfill their firing missions, largely due to a "formalistic" approach to the competition for raising class ratings. In one unit, an individual with a good record was not allowed to take the second-class examination, while another individual with a disciplinary record was appointed senior driver of the company without having passed the examination. The colonel recommends a change in the system for awarding incentive pay to high-rated specialists. If, for example, in the system of interchangeability, a loader in a tank crew is awarded a second or first-class rating as a driver or gunner, he does not receive the extra pay unless he is appointed to a corresponding established post. Also warrant officers and sergeants who are qualified "master" or first-class lose their supplemental pay if they are advanced to the position of sergeant-major or platoon commander. In many regiments there is no system to encourage young officers to achieve a class rating since there are no incentives for those who pass this difficult examination.

7. COL S. Chumarin. "Sud Chesti" (Court of Honor), pp 76-77.

COL S. Chumarin discusses the role of the officer court of honor. He cites the case of a senior lieutenant with a drinking problem who was reduced one grade by the court but eventually rehabilitated. On the other hand, the colonel speaks out against those courts that give extreme punishments without having exhausted all other possibilities. Such punishments evoke offense and apathy, especially in the young, and they undermine self-confidence and the will to correct deficiencies. Therefore, certain decisions are overturned at higher
levels. Some commanders "run" to these courts to get rid of undisciplined officers and to spare themselves the effort of rehabilitative work.

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Colonel-General G. Salmonov, Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces for Combat Training, states that the low level of instructional methodology among certain officers has led to a less than effective use of training time and training areas. Many weaknesses are found in tactical and firing training. Some commanders fail to devote sufficient attention to maneuver, the application of ruses, and camouflage. During firing exercises, tactics is neglected, and firing is on targets whose locations are known to the trainees. Tank firing at times does not emphasize the identification of targets and firing at long ranges.


General-Major N. Cherednichenko points out that some units are forgetting that in indoctrinational work the education of the educators themselves occupies an important place. The weakest area in the ideological-theoretical study of officers is their independent work with primary sources and other recommended literature. The general adds that a weakness in this area usually leads to fundamental deficiencies in practical work. Certain Party organizations are guilty of not devoting sufficient attention to raising the ideological level of officers.


Colonel-General A.I. Gribkov, Commander of the Leningrad Military District, notes that there are still cases of commanders who fail to consider changing circumstances during the course of a battle and who are reluctant to conduct maneuver. This, the general concludes, is due to low quality tactical training. Such commanders, when they get into complicated, rapidly changing situations, become confused, fail to observe the battlefield, and often make stereotyped decisions.
TYL I SNABZHENIE

Volume I

1. COL V. Kudriavtsev. "Dorozhit' Kazhdoi Minutoi Uchebnogo Vremen" (Value Every Minute of Training Time), pp 15-19.

COL V. Kudriavtsev emphasises the importance of not wasting training time. Some classes do not begin or end on time, and time is wasted moving between training areas. Training is at times conducted in simplified conditions. On one training exercise, it was decided not to deploy the service elements, but rather to transport food to the training area from the messhall and not to refuel since the training area was not far from the unit's location. There are also cases of poor instructor preparation, the use of poor instructional techniques, and insufficient use of field manuals.


COL K. Kleshchinov points out that not all deputy regimental commanders for the rear display creative initiative in maintaining control of the rear during tactical exercises. On one exercise, the deputy for the rear was late in issuing the order for rear services, and he failed to establish reliable communication in the rear. There were cases where his service chiefs did not know how the regimental units were being supplied, and they failed to exhibit the initiative necessary to find out. Thus, they could not influence the supply process during the course of the offensive.


Quartermaster LTG N. Simonenkov discusses problems in clothing supply service. Some warehouses are crowded and under-equipped, and property is not stored systematically. In places uniforms and shoes are stored carelessly, and new and used items are mixed together. In some repair shops, assigned tools are not all on-hand. In the Turkestan Military District, shoes become quickly unserviceable due to the lack of second echelon maintenance. In certain units of the Pacific Fleet, not all troops on extended active duty are provided with "housekeeping" items, such as bed-side rugs and barracks slippers. In several places, tailors are allowing great waste in the cutting of uniform material. In some units, consumer services (laundry, repair shops, etc.) are not regularly supplied with repair materials, clothing records are poorly maintained, and measures to prevent clothing loss are not being taken. Field maintenance of clothing is also poorly organized at times.

Medical LTC M. Shelest states that certain medical specialists and senior doctors fail to fully utilize field training for increasing the combat readiness of medical units. Preparation for training is not always timely and thorough. Problems of finding and evacuating the "wounded" are not worked out, and the medical phases of exercises develop primitively.

5. COL G. Babkin. "Pitaniiu Voinov - Zabotu i Vnimanie" (Concern and Attention about the Feeding of Soldiers), pp 55-59.

COL G. Babkin discusses low standards in messhalls. In some units, equipment is either missing or poorly maintained. Sanitation standards are at times not adhered to. Soldiers assigned to mess detail are sometimes given only vague instructions and work without proper supervision. Their outward appearance is at times slovenly, and they work without special clothing. Menus are sometimes monotonous when they are prepared by clerks who simply copy old menus. There are also problems with the training of cooks. In one cook's school, there were no practical exercises, and visual aids were inaccurate. In some units, classes for cooks are conducted haphazardly in primitive classrooms and with a lack of individual training. This results in improperly cooked food and unsanitary working conditions.

Colonel-General I. Tret'iak the CG of the Belorussian Military District, states that certain rear services officers are poorly prepared for combined arms operations, especially in the areas of controlling columns on the march and defending against weapons of mass destruction (NBC weapons). The general adds that certain supply officers are unable to make sound decisions in complex situations and to formulate and transmit precise orders to subordinate units in a timely manner.


Medical Corps COL N. Safonov concludes that some ships' doctors make insufficient and incomplete medical preparations prior to embarking on long cruises, especially in the area of sanitary conditions. He cites one example where a series of gastro-intestinal disorders broke out on one such cruise due to poor sanitary conditions. He further states that there are cases where ships captains and doctors do not agree on work and rest schedules for the crew.


Co-authors, General Major L. Sorochenko and Major V. Nepodobny feel that in certain units "socialist competition," which is considered to be a most important element in raising the combat effectiveness of Soviet troops, is being poorly conducted. They blame both military commanders and staff officers and Party and political workers for this deficiency. The essence of the problem is that, with regard to the planning organization, and conduct of "socialist competition," the various leaders are simply "going through the motions" and approaching the entire matter in a lackadaisical manner, a phenomenon which the Soviets refer to as "formalism".

This issue's lead editorial points out that certain rear services units conduct field exercises in simplified conditions. When deploying into the field, they are not issued certain types of equipment, they do not always apply the necessary measures for defense against weapons of mass destruction, and they fail to completely work out questions of defense and security. Such practices can give a false impression of the nature of modern war.

2. COL V. Khrobostov. "Ideinoe Vospitanie Voinov - Zadacha Pervostepennoi Vazhnosti" (The Ideological Education of Soldiers a Task of Primary Importance), pp 6-11.

COL V. Khrobostov reports that indoctrinational work for strengthening military discipline is not effective in all cases, and he calls on propagandists to emphasize the importance of regulations and the military oath and to extol the experiences of the best commanders, who have established efficient and firm military order.


COL A. Yaremchenko states that there are officers who are losing sight of essential details of military regulations. For example, they are not upset if a class starts a few minutes late, if formations drag out, if personnel are dressed slovenly or wear unauthorized items of clothing, shoulder straps, tabs, or insignia. The colonel concludes that such officers may well stop noticing important deficiencies also.


Naval Captain 3rd Class (Lt Cmdr) engineer B. Kaliakin discusses weaknesses in supply training on certain ships. There are commanders who are weak in this area themselves, and therefore, they train their subordinates poorly. Weaknesses include accounting and stock control procedures, and inventories are at times conducted "formalistically." Training supply specialists at sea is hampered by a shortage of pertinent literature, textbooks and visual aids.

Captains V. Zakharov and V. Urazhtsev, senior instructors in the department for Komsomol work in the Main Political Directorate, state that certain Komsomol organizations are failing to clearly explain the importance of the oath and military regulations and of strengthening military discipline to young soldiers. A general criticism is that some organizations are still following old procedures and repeating the mistakes of previous years.


COL M. Chuguriaev, Chief of the Political Department of the Ul'ianovsk Higher Military Technical School named for Bogdan Khmel'nitsky, states that in certain lectures material is not presented clearly or in depth. Important questions of theory and practice are at times presented superficially, without the proper argumentation and scientific basis. Criticism of bourgeois ideology, reformism, and revisionism is not sufficiently sharp and convincing. The colonel also calls for an increase in contacts between instructors and Party and Komsomol organizations.


LTC of Quartermaster Services L. Sarychev discusses problems in unit financial planning. A specific problem area is the preparation and processing of the annual estimated unit budget and the disbursement of financial allocations. Finance offices at time fail to explain increases or decreases in allocations. In some cases, units underestimate their needs and have to request additional funds. In others, units ask for more than they need, hoping to get extra resources. Another problem is the uneven expenditure of funds throughout the year, with December being the most active month. Classes on the proper preparation of financial planning documents are not always effective. In conclusion, the colonel calls for reductions in authorizations to exceed approved budgets.

G. Kamensky, a military district engineer for trade management, discusses bottlenecks in equipping mobile field stores ("PX on Wheels"). They have not been adequately equipped for travel on country roads in that packages cannot be securely tied down. They are not equipped with thermoses or water containers, and the author states that "it wouldn't be bad to have a small refrigerator." The civilians who man these trucks are at times poorly taken care of in field conditions, there is insufficient concern about quarters and basic conveniences for them, especially for women. In conclusion, Kamensky calls on rear service personnel to render greater assistance to these workers.


General-Major of Technical Troops N. Chichikin states that the supplying of units by rail is not being done with maximum efficiency. Deficiencies in the planning and execution of loading operations frequently lead to excess stoppages of rolling stock. Fines are constantly levied for such stoppages on construction organizations, many of which are mechanized but use their equipment inefficiently, for example, loading only during day time. Construction units are responsible for over half of these military stoppages. The general considers it alarming that such stoppages are continuing to grow. Problems also exist in the planning of long hauls by rail. Some central organs plan long haul of goods which the consumer could obtain from a closer source. For example, collapsible barracks and iron/concrete items have been transported over great distances. There have also been unjustified long hauls of aviation-technical, artillery, armor, and other types of equipment. Short runs are also inefficient, and some of these are being switched over to road transport. But some short runs still occur, for example, a 35-55 km move of some iron/concrete items. Great waste is also incurred when the same goods meet each other proceeding from opposite directions. This happens most frequently with building material and automotive equipment going in for repair. Once in 1974, a
unit shipped 84 cars of construction material 65 km and received from its recipient 24 cars of similar material. Presently both industry and the military are generally using a four-axle car with an average capacity of 60 tons, but such cars are at times used incorrectly. The main problem is not loading them to capacity. In January 1975, one unit used a four-axle car to ship an automobile (UAZ-450) for repair over a distance of 2876 km.

(No articles from issue number 5)

Volume 6


This issue's lead editorial indicates that the advanced experience of successful soldiers and units is not receiving sufficient publicity or being introduced into practice. As a result, company "housekeeping" is being conducted with violations, maintenance is not being done on schedule, and equipment is becoming unserviceable. The article adds that a lot can sometimes be learned through mistakes and failures.

2. LTG M. Poliakov. "Marsh na Bol'shoe Rasstoianie" (Long Distance March), pp 17-21.

LTG M. Poliakov, Deputy Commander for the Rear of the Kiev Military District, states that certain commanders and driver-mechanics are weak in organizing refueling operations. At times, even when refueling tanks from barrels, drivers don't know how to use the small refueling sets which are assigned to the tank. The general also points out that there are significant problems in feeding the units that provide traffic control services on long marches. Some commanders simply issue them dry rations to avoid the problem of providing hot food over extended distances. There are also special problems in supplying water when moving through underpopulated areas with few water sources. Some commanders lose sight of this, and, as a result, personnel are not provided with hot food, tea, etc., in a timely manner. Another problem area discussed is communication on the march between the regimental CP and the control point for rear services (TPU). In addition to conventional communication means, it is recommended to have one or two liaison officers from the TPU at the unit CP in case communication is lost.
An example is cited in which this principle was not followed, communication with the TPU was lost, and additional fuel could not be ordered forward to top off the tanks prior to an attack.


LTG N. Levchenko states that certain rear service units and officers are poorly prepared due to poor training. Instruction for rear service specialists is sometimes conducted "formalistically", without practical demonstrations of how to execute certain operations by the unit officers.


LTC V Iurchenko reports that recent inspections have revealed certain shortcomings in rear service activities. Maintenance is at times done superficially and incompletely, and spare parts are lacking. After lubrication of equipment, excess lubricants are being thrown out instead of saved. Food supplies are sometimes issued to mess halls improperly. For example, the mess steward and the regimental doctor may not be present. At times the invoice is not used, and a cook simply takes as much as he wants. Records checks have indicated that not all soldiers awarded the "Honor Soldier of the Soviet Army" (Otlichniki) have been issued the badge. Certain soldiers have also failed to receive awarded monetary incentives. Inspectors have also noted some valuable equipment missing.


LTG V. Zhovkovsky discusses the tremendous paperwork burden in the rear services. The current system has many different forms which must pass through several administrative levels. Turn-around time for a document submitted to military district can take several months. Considering that supply units prepare tens of thousands of orders annually, the number of documents in circulation for each category of supply is colossal. This inevitably leads to supply delays. Many documents call for too much detail, and many which are the same in content are different in form. The desire to have comprehensive information has led to the appearance of a multitude of graphs in accounting books and documents. These have become extremely time-consuming to prepare, and their information is not used fully.

Quatermaster Colonels V. Dvoinikov and G. Babkin discuss low standards in certain mess halls. Food processing and sanitary procedures are at times violated. Problems also exist in mess hall layouts and equipment. There are also cases of unreliable sewage and hot water systems. In places even bread (extremely important to Russians) is not prepared and served properly.

Volume 7

1. Admiral L. Mizin, "Obespechivaia Vysokuiu Boego tovnost' Sil Flota" (Insuring the High Combat Readiness of the Navy), pp 8-12.

Admiral L. Mizin, Chief of the Rear for the Soviet Navy, states that in the fleets there are insufficient studies and classrooms for the training of specialists in combined arms supply. In certain units supplies arrive late, galleys and mess halls are not in order, and accidents still occur. The admiral points out specifically that there were cases of improper safekeeping of valuable equipment in certain rear depots of the Northern Fleet. In conclusion, he regrets that not all supply personnel participate actively in establishing order in the storage, safekeeping and issue of equipment.


LTG Ia. Maiorov, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Railroad Troops, reports that there are still several bottlenecks in the work of his units. Some units are slow to adopt scientific methods for the organization of labor, advanced technology, and the newest construction equipment, without which the attainment of a high rate of railroad construction is inconceivable. Certain jobs are not finished on time, and there are shortcomings in the organization of "socialist competition." Certain leaders, the general concludes, plan their time poorly and follow outdated procedures.

3. LTG A. Marbyenko. "Nastoichivo Povyshat' Kachestvo Polevoi Vyuchki" (To Persistently Raise the Quality of Field Training), pp 26-29.

LTG A. Marbyenko, Deputy Commander for the Rear of the Odessa Military District, states that combat and political training is at times poorly organized. Certain commanders
fail to rely on assistance from their Party and Komsomol organizations. A specific problem mentioned is that rear service units are not always aware of the tactical situation. Their commanders, carried away in fulfilling the mission, forget to brief their subordinates, and they fail to insure that their units train under complex conditions.

4. COL L. Radishevsky. "Ob Organizatsii Zaniatii s Mladshimi Spetsialistami Tyla" (On the Organization of Training for Young Rear Service Specialists), pp 30-34.

COL L. Radishevsky reports the existence of low-quality training for young rear service specialists. Classes are at times poorly thought out, instructors are not well prepared, and necessary equipment is lacking.


LTG A. Fedorov, Chief of the Billeting and Maintenance Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, points out that certain military settlements are not well maintained. Many billets are maintained unsatisfactorily. Without proper maintenance normal functions cannot be guaranteed, especially in winter. In certain units deficiencies from the previous winter have not been completely corrected. In certain garrisons in the Transbaikal, Ural, and Transcaucasian military districts, late starts were made in preparation for winter, which resulted in hasty, low-quality work. This has resulted in serious accidents in connection with faulty heating systems. In certain units roofs, heating systems, water supply systems and sewage systems have not been repaired.


General-Major of Technical Troops V. Petrov states that rear service specialists at times receive poor training. There are few exercises on driving during periods of limited visibility. Classes on the working principles and basic use of vehicles are sometimes conducted in classrooms from charts and not in the motor pools. The general adds that it is no secret that training young drivers on unserviceable equipment often influences them to maintain their assigned vehicles in the same condition. Some truck unit commanders simplify field training exercises. For long convoys they substitute several trips over the same rouce and return to the billets at night. At times training and work schedules are not coordinated so that some soldiers miss necessary training.
In some units insufficient attention is devoted to the training of mechanics. This can lead to poor maintenance and even to vehicles becoming unserviceable before the expiration of their life expectancy.


   This issue's lead editorial warns garrisons not to wait any longer to prepare for winter living and working conditions. In certain units, repairs are not being completed on time. During the past winter (1974-75), there were cases of stoppages in water supplies, boilers and electricity. The article also points out that some newly erected buildings were put into use hastily and with incompletions. In addition to problems in billets, there are also shortcomings in military stores, mess halls, warehouses, and factories. Certain factories are still housed in buildings poorly suited to their needs and there are stores in which it is not much warmer inside than outside.


   Colonel-General of Aviation V. Loginov, Chief of the Rear of the Air Force, discusses training problems of air support personnel. Training is at times too simplified and does not force commanders and staffs to make in-depth analyses and function under pressure. Long marches are not conducted and units at reserve airfields do not deploy completely for field exercises. In many units, command and control techniques are extremely weak, especially on long marches and during deployment to a new airfield. Camouflage discipline is sometimes lax, especially at night. Some rear unit commanders are not well versed in the capabilities of various types of modern weapons, how to defend against them, and measures to take to neutralize the after-effects of mass destruction weapons. Some units even have poor quality specialist and technical training, a condition which can lead to flight and road-transport accidents.


   Guards LTC S. Klimenko points out that in the Transbaikal Military District there are vehicle accidents due to violations of the "rules of the road." Certain commanders are not well versed in rear area tactical situations or various provisions of regulations and manuals. Some units lack training in deploying to and working in the field.
4. COL I. Kaz'min. "Organizatsiia Pitaniia Letchikov" (Organizing the Feeding of Pilots), pp 47-51.

COL I. Kaz'min, Chief of the Food Supply Service of the Moscow Anti-Aircraft (PVO) District, states that many aviation garrisons still have combined mess halls for pilots and technical support personnel. This creates problems in using the equipment and in providing every man with the required norm. There are also shortages of dishes. In connection with this, the colonel recommends the replacement of breakable china with stainless steel.


Rear Admiral S. Zuzenko, Chief of the Auxiliary Fleet and the Rescue Service of the Naval Forces, feels that the effective use of auxiliary vessels has not improved significantly. The main reason for this is idleness of the vessels, often due to planning mistakes. Ships are often tied up too long in loading and unloading operations, and, as a rule, ships are down for repair from 1.5 to 2 times the established norm. In many fleets, especially in the Pacific and the Baltic, there are still cases of ships fulfilling unplanned missions assigned by a senior commander. This extra work has a negative influence on assigned missions, personnel work loads, training, accident levels, and leave policies. Ships are also often delayed during loading and unloading operations by having to wait for moorings or by an absence of dock workers. There are still moorings that are not mechanized so that loading must be done manually. There are also great delays when ships deliver goods to units and garrisons located along the coast without dock facilities. In such situations, unloading is at times done with launches and pneumatic rafts when there are landing and amphibious craft available for this work.

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This issue's lead editorial regrets that in certain units insufficient attention is given to the creation of the training center. At times this is done only "formally," i.e., a site is selected and objectives are determined, but it is all done so primitively that it is difficult to achieve good training results.

COL K. Kleshchinov, Chief of Staff for the Rear of the Baltic Military District, states that there are certain regimental commanders and deputies for the rear who do not devote sufficient attention to the management of the rear. Combat orders tend to neglect the work of the rear units. On one exercise, the CO specified a certain area for refueling, but during the offensive the tactical situation changed drastically, and the maneuver units wound up in a different area. Reliable communication had not been established with the rear so fuel could not be brought to the new area in time. At times troops fail to receive hot meals on time due to the commander's failure to include this in his planning. The deputy for the rear is guilty too, however, for not displaying initiative to solve this problem. Some rear chiefs are weak in processing management documents on short notice and they do not show initiative in maintaining communication with their commanders, thereby losing sight of the situation.


Medical Colonel Iu. Balandin (and others), Party Secretary for the Directorate of the Rear of the Ural Military District, participated in a surprise inspection of various regiments to check their preparations for winter. One particular unit was in terrible shape. The deputy for the rear was on leave and his assistants could not produce the winter preparation plan. It seemed that they had not thought about winter and there were deficiencies in virtually every area. Fuel tanks were not cleaned or painted to prevent rust. Tools were scattered about. Vehicles were dirty and in a state of poor maintenance. Roofs needed repair. Barrels with fuel were strewn around the warehouse. Dry grass presented a fire hazard, and there was no sand in the fire bucket. In the new mess halls, storage bins were not ready for winter. Animals were kept in an area resembling a garbage dump. Some were sick and plagues occurred frequently. The main reason for all these shortcomings was poor leadership by the deputy for the rear.

Volume 10


Colonel-General M. Khomulo, Commander of the Siberian Military District, notes that certain rear service officers are poorly prepared for combined arms operations. In some
rear units, equipment is not used to its full potential and is at times entrusted to unqualified personnel. This is due to a low technical training level, the absence of the necessary training equipment and poor storage practices. The general cites an example to show that a careless attitude toward equipment can lead to failures in fulfilling missions. A mechanized field bakery deployed to support a long march, but within an hour it was determined that one oven was in a state of disrepair. The bakery was consequently late in producing even low-quality bread. This delay for repair was caused by a lack of control in the maintenance of equipment in storage.


LTC V. Pogosov states that certain rear service officers are providing poor training for their subordinates. Such officers are not thorough in their selection of personnel for positions responsible for materiel, and they do not attach sufficient importance to the training area as the basis for improvements in training. Specialists are not given individual training when they have to miss classes to perform their duties. The colonel also calls on the various rear services to give more practical assistance and training aids to the units.


General-Major V. Tkachev, Deputy Commander for the Rear of the Baltic Military District, regrets that certain commanders approach the preparation of the annual "housekeeping" plan "formally," and they carry it out poorly. Some plans do not envision requirements for field training. For example, on one exercise field messing for tankers was poorly organized. Stocks were insufficient and the automatic water tank had not been repaired. Often requisitions for supplies are not submitted on time, materiel and financial needs are not properly estimated, and financial allocations are not spent properly.

Volume 11

LTG D. Petrov notes that certain rear service units are training in simplified conditions, that appropriate measures for the protection of personnel and equipment against enemy action are not taken, and that truck transportation is not always properly utilized. After delivering equipment to a designated area, trucks are unloaded slowly, and unloading directly onto the ground is not practiced everywhere, a fact which makes it difficult to use the trucks for transporting equipment and evacuating "wounded."

2. COL L. Doroshenko. "Obshchevoiskovala Podgotovka Ofitserov Tyla" (Combined Arms Training of Rear Service Officers), pp 29-32.

COL L. Doroshenko states that certain rear service officers are poorly versed in enemy mass destruction weapons and in correctly and rapidly evaluating radiation and chemical conditions. Some officers become confused when determining the degree of contamination of foodstuffs, and they don't know allowable contamination levels. There are also officers who have trouble with map reading. On one exercise, the chief of the POL service got lost in steppe terrain and was late in refueling a tank battalion. As a result, the battalion was late in completing its mission. On another exercise, additional deficiencies were revealed. Certain chiefs of clothing supply service were weak in setting up the field equipment for the automated chemical decontamination of clothing. Food service officers were weak in operating field kitchens, and POL officers had trouble with fueling equipment.


Engineer COL I. Vasil'ev and retired COL S. Skriabin report that some regiments and military schools have not yet established tearooms (very important to a Russian). Some that do exist are located in crowded, improvised areas and offer low quality service.

Volume 12


General of the Army S. Kurkotkin, Chief of the Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces, in reviewing the 1975 training year, calls for a qualitative improvement in the combined arms training of certain rear service officers. Some officers cannot precisely assess the tactical and rear area situation,
clearly and concisely brief conclusions, and make decisions in a short time. Many need more training in making sound evaluations for organizing a march. The general also calls for an end to oversimplified, soft, stereotyped training conditions.


General-Major G. Tarasov, Deputy Commander for the Rear of the Group Soviet Forces in Germany, states that not all rear service officers have fully mastered instructional techniques. Some prepare for classes superficially, use old lesson plans, and fail to obtain necessary equipment. The general concludes that insufficient attention is given to the study and propagation of the experience of advanced methodologists.


COL I. Pavlov criticizes low quality political work. At times drivers are pulled out of political classes for routine work. Certain communists are failing to set the example with regard to strict military discipline. Violations of discipline occur, as a rule, where the ideological work is weak, where military regulations are insufficiently studied and implemented and where commanders devote little attention to individual soldiers. The colonel also points out that Komsomol organizations are not relied on enough and that not all Party members understand the growing significance of firm discipline with regard to raising combat readiness. Pavlov even adds that there are cases of poor repair jobs as a result of poor indoctrination work.


Quartermaster Colonel N. Bedniakov discusses deficiencies in the clothing supply service. At times new uniforms are issued before the old ones have become unserviceable. In certain units personnel receive measured material or ready-to-wear items of a higher quality than that to which they are entitled by rank or position. Clothing is sometimes wasted due to poor accounting procedures, insufficient control of its proper use, and poor fire prevention measures.
A main reason for this is a careless attitude on the part of some officials. In one regiment in the Kiev Military District a collation of warehouse and production inventories had not been conducted for three years. The warehouse chief had been "juggling the books" and stealing the excess property. Other inspections have also found units to be "short". Many problems are caused by the improper selection of personnel for positions of materiel responsibility. For example, one warrant officer, a warehouse chief, was a habitual drunk, but he continued to occupy this responsible position.

In this largely theoretical article, Colonel-General G. Sredin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate (GPU) of the Soviet Army and Navy, criticizes the depth and quality of research work in the social sciences. This work is considered so important because it is intended to yield specific recommendations to political workers and commanders for improving military discipline, personnel management, basic training, and specialist training. Sredin feels that many of today's research products, (e.g., military textbooks) are giving only superficial recommendations. He states that this research work is generally characterized by formalism, wasteful duplication of effort, needless repetition, lack of analysis, and a general lack of applicability to the practical management problems encountered by the officer corps.


Although not citing specific examples, Air Force CINC Chief Air Marshal P. Kutakhov criticizes personnel training. He states that certain Party organizations and their members are not displaying the necessary effort in this area, and he cites unjustifiable loss of training time and poor training methodology as specific problem areas.


General-Major V. Komissarov, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Moscow Military District, voices his concern about the low level of Party work in his district. He points out that unenthusiastic Party work inevitably leads to a lower standard of military effectiveness and discipline. He calls on Party members to lead by example and states that there is nothing more harmful than for a Party member to violate military discipline or to perform his duties haphazardly. The general strongly emphasizes the need for political workers to approach their duties from a "human relations" viewpoint. He states that it is incorrect for Party workers to simply criticize shortcomings, on
the contrary, they must now be able to encourage, teach, listen, advise and help.

4. CPT V. Urazhtsev. "V Distsipline - Nasha Sila" (Our Strength is in Discipline), pp 53-59.

CPT V. Urazhtsev, a senior instructor in the GPU section for Komsomol work, points out the fact that certain Komsomol members are carrying out their duties carelessly and are even violating military discipline and that in certain cases Komsomol organizations are not even reacting to this. This, in turn, creates an environment in which other young soldiers may act improperly. He further criticizes Komsomol organizations for conducting dry and boring lectures and meetings, which fail to appropriately motivate the young soldier. He specifically condemns Komsomol members for periodically not attending meetings themselves and for a "formalistic" attitude toward their organization and conduct.

5. COL V. Mogutov. "O Lektorakh i lektsiakh na Politicheskikh Zaniatiakh" (Concerning the Lecturers and Lectures for Political Classes), pp 60-65.

COL V. Mogutov, a political lecturer states that political training in certain units is being conducted in a manner of "pure formalism." He cites one example where hundreds of soldiers were crowded into the unit club with an inadequate seating capacity for a seminar; in another case, soldiers of more than 20 nationalities heard a lecture in Russian, which many of them did not fully understand. The colonel then criticizes the prevalence of poor public speaking and instructional practices, such as the verbatim reading of canned texts, the indifference of speakers toward their listeners, and the failure of lecturers to explain theoretical points in terms of concrete problems.

Volume 2


In this issue's lead editorial article, criticism is raised against Party organizations for their failure to fully utilize existing capabilities and as yet undiscovered reserves. Substantive defects and omissions are found especially in indoctrinational work and it is such deficiencies which lead to "formalism" in the attitudes of certain Party workers. As a result of this, political and military training, military discipline and "socialist competition" suffer. "Formalism" also gives rise to phenomena "alien to the socialist system," such as "red tape," "eye wash," crudeness and the abuse of power.

LTG A. Shelep in, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Trans-Caucasian Military District, points out that certain political organizations are only paying lip service to such important concepts as the "scientific founding" and "analytical approach" to problem solving. Insufficient time is devoted to the research and analysis of important practical problems in comparison to the time spent on secondary, tangential questions. There exists an attitude among political workers, especially at corps level and below, that, "We don't have time for 'science'; we have work to do." The general feels, however, that they are mainly involved in "busy-work," which indicates their poor organizational ability, their lack of capability and desire to study facts, and their inability to make rational, comprehensive decisions on a variety of complex questions. The essence of the problem is that the political sections are only superficially aware of the actual situation regarding training and discipline in their units. They are bogged down in a "formalistic" recapitulation of statistics and facts and all their bureaucratic paper-shuffling cannot produce as clear a picture of the actual situations in the units as can direct, personal contact with communist and non-Party soldiers.


LTC K. Permiakov discusses deficiencies in the moral education of students at the Ulianov Guards Higher Tank School. Even among students who do well academically in such courses as philosophy, ethics and morals, there are those who violate military discipline. There are also students who conduct themselves properly on duty, but who act improperly while on leave or after they have left the service and are no longer under the control of their commanders. Many students apparently are not absorbing the essence of Soviet ethics. They are adhering to these principles only out of a feeling of compulsion and not out of internal convictions as to their correctness. The colonel is also concerned that students are being corrupted by harmful Western ideas. One manifestation of unethical principles has been academic cheating among certain students. A most effective means of dealing with misbehavior has been Komsomol meetings, at which the errant student is confronted and judged by his comrades. This sort of peer pressure has a tremendous psychological impact on the entire student group, as well as on the offender himself.
Volume 3


The lead editorial points out a problem among political organs which is usually associated with Soviet economics: the emphasis on quantity at the expense of quality. Ideological-political workers are striving to give as many lectures and conduct as many meetings as possible, without regard for their content. The fact that certain political workers compromise with shortcomings and are ineffective in their indoctrinational measures testifies to their tendency to be satisfied with the minimal standards to which they are accustomed.


General-Major P. Edemsky complains about the fact that certain commanders and political workers are lax about keeping the troops informed about important domestic and international events. Two themes receiving insufficient emphasis are imperialist aggressive intrigues and military build-up and the growing spiritual crisis of the capitalist system. The general further points out that troop information programs are conducted superficially, that newspapers arrive late, and that political agitators are often poorly prepared for their work.


LTG M. Sobolev, Chief of the GPU's Directorate of Organizational-Party Work, criticizes Party organizations for low quality work and "formalism," especially in the areas of training, socialist competition and military discipline. He points out that many of the same mistakes are being repeated and that certain Party organs are not dealing with them properly. A specific criticism is leveled against those organs that maintain impressive statistics on lectures given and meetings held, but that do not maintain high qualitative standards in their work. The general feels that there is much room for improvement in the use of mass media, to include periodicals, radio, television, movies, libraries and posters. Poor work is also found in the field of individual counselling. Party workers are not making thorough, imaginative, and specific preparations for the conduct of each session, and follow-up sessions to insure the desired
results are often not scheduled. There are also certain leaders of Party organizations who are concerned mainly with ensuring that every Party member and candidate member has a task to fulfill without regard for its qualitative effect on ideological indoctrination. Certain Party members are also lax in maintaining high standards regarding their recommendations of individuals to be considered for Party membership.

4. COL F. Fedchenko. "Rotnyi Politrabotnik i Politzaniatiia (The Company Political Worker and Political Studies), pp 64-69.

COL F. Fedchenko points out some specific problems in political instructional methodology. Certain instructors are unprepared and unenthusiastic, and they fail to assist the troops in understanding confusing points. Many are unable to explain the significance of socialist competition in raising combat readiness. Another problem is one of organization, in that many soldiers have to miss political classes in order to pull other duties and, in many cases, only a third of these are able to attend the make-up classes. Another recurring problem is that of "formalism," or the unimaginative approach to the organization of these classes. Many soldiers have insufficient experience in working independently with assigned texts and many speak Russian poorly. Russian language classes are often given a secondary priority and special Russian texts for non-Russians are often left in the company supply room. In conclusion, the colonel criticizes instructors who present their material in a monotone, not leaving the podium, who imprecisely present certain aspects of Marxist-Leninist theory, and who are unable to effectively relate their theory to the practical tasks confronting today's soldier.

Volume 4


According to Colonel-General A. Gribkov, the CG of the Leningrad Military District, some of his officers have displayed a slowness to grasp the concepts of modern warfare and the employment of new technology during tactical exercises. Such commanders do well enough until a situation suddenly becomes complicated and demands creative action and initiative. For example on a recent motorized rifle exercise, the unit suddenly was ordered to repel an airborne assault in its rear. Such a mission was unexpected, and the unit became confused. It turned out that the exercise was being conducted according to a scenario well-known to many of the
officers and they were not prepared for abrupt changes. The general also noted that many officers were weak in combined arms operations and in evaluating the results of the use of nuclear weapons. With regard to small unit tactics, he pointed out that certain commanders were giving their soldiers poor instruction on the employment of machine guns mounted on combat vehicles, on maneuver techniques, and on the rapid changing of combat formations. As a final note, the general criticized certain officers for continuing to call their subordinates to the CP to receive orders instead of using the radio and others for requiring briefings from their subordinates before making any decision.


COL N. Zheltov, the Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Southern Group of Forces (Hungary), complains about the inability of political workers to relate their theory to practical matters. He states that this "sickness" does not help the troops apply theoretical knowledge to the recurring tasks confronting them.

3. Editorial. "Povyshat' Uroven' Voeno-Shefskioi Raboty" (To Raise the Level of Military - Patronage Work), pp 71-75.

This article points out the fact that movie studios and publishing houses rarely produce works about misslemen, sailors, aviators, airdefensemen, or those who occupy tense border sites, serve in isolated areas, or serve abroad. Writers, poets, artists, and musicians are called upon to describe the heroic peacetime deeds of these servicemen and to accompany them on their exercises in order to gain a deep understanding of the essence of military service.

Volume 5


In this issue's lead article, the Central Committee of the CPSU criticizes Party organizations at all levels for poor, listless work in the fields of training, indoctrination and military discipline. The article points out that in 1974 many soldiers, sergeants, and even officers did not fulfill their socialist obligations. In spite of this, the Party organizations did not critically evaluate the problem, nor did they study methods for mobilizing communists and other personnel to carry out their duties properly.

General-Major V. Balakirev states that certain political organs have become fascinated with meetings, conferences and creating paperwork, and that insufficient demands are made of communists responsible for carrying out specific tasks.

3. COL D. Shevchenko. "Komunisty Shtaba i Sorevnovanie v Podrazdeleniakh" (Communists on the Staff and Competition in the Sub-Units), pp 47-51.

COL D. Shevchenko points out that the routine planning of "socialist competition" at regimental level and below is characterized by fanfare, general slogans and paper shuffling. He states that the first months of the winter training period have indicated that it is not fully understood that every mission must be accomplished in an outstanding manner. The colonel calls on all communists to help company commanders, and especially young officers, develop competition among the soldiers and to eliminate elements of "formalism" and oversimplification.

4. LTC E. Makhov. "Rukovodstvo k Deistviu" (Leadership to Action), pp 58-63.

LTC E. Makhov, Assistant to the Chief of the GPU for Komsomol Affairs, decry the existence of "formalism" and "working by spurts" in certain Komsomol organizations. He points out that the race for quantity to the detriment of quality yields poorly organized thematical meetings and discussions among Komsomol members. This leads to the lowering of standards, which results in individual violations of military discipline and these go uncondemned by other soldiers within the unit.

Volume 6


Admiral G. Egorov, Commander Northern Fleet, reports that problems exist regarding personnel training on long cruises. He states that one reason for this is that certain commanders and political organs fail to critically evaluate their training status and that there are even cases where deficiencies are "covered up" and in-depth analyses of crew activities are replaced by "parade-type fanfare." The admiral cites one example in which the crew of the large submarine chaser "Dostoiny" (Worthy) was unable to cope with any of its exercises.

General-Major V. Mitropov, First Deputy to the Chief of the Political Directorate of the Strategic Rocket Troops, points out that in places insufficient attention is being devoted to the training of young officers and warrant officers regarding practical work with and indoctrination of subordinates. Also, there are certain weak Party organizations where even communists violate military discipline. One weak area regarding personnel training is the failure of certain commanders and political workers, especially young-inexperienced ones, to get to know their personnel. Certain commanders fail to find time for personal contact with their subordinates, for giving talks to them, for attending Komsomol meetings, and for participating in other political activities. Certain officers also fail to set the example and settle for simply pointing out deficiencies without taking corrective action.

3. COL S. Tutushkin, "Vnimanie Batal' onnoi Partiinoi Organi- 
zatsii" (Attention to the Battalion Party Organization), pp 47-54.

COL S. Tutushkin, Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Odessa Military District, criticizes the political sections of larger units (brigades, divisions and corps) for failure to assist in Party work at battalion level and below. In one such case, the higher political department failed to observe battalion level Party work on field exercises and at firing ranges and tank training areas for an entire year. They failed to analyze the organization and contents of Party work and they did not participate in the indoctrination of communists on the ground. The colonel also points out that certain Party organizations are guilty of "formalism" in the conduct of their political meetings. He continues that certain communists are not pulling their weight in local activities and again calls on the higher level, more experienced and qualified Party workers to help out at battalion level. A key problem in this regard is that many Party secretaries at battalion level are lacking in knowledge and experience, are weak in working with people, and are inexperienced at organizing political work on field training exercises. In connection with the problem, great effort is being devoted to accepting new people into the CPSU and hardening them. This is being done in order to fulfill the requirements of a resolution by the Central Committee of the CPSU "Concerning serious deficiencies in the work of Party organizations of the Odessa Military District and the Baltic Fleet regarding the acceptance into the Party and indoctrination of young communists."

COL P. Kevdin condemns unscrupulousness, liberalism and "formalism" in Party work. Specifically, he is concerned with violations of military discipline and regulations which go unreported, are covered up, or are dealt with too leniently, especially when Party members are involved. The colonel then cites examples. One communist who was drunk on duty was only counseled instead of receiving a strict reprimand. One engineer major, guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer, received only a warning three times before he was expelled from the Party. A certain communist LTC authorized a payment order for work not performed, which resulted in material loss to the government. Commenting on these cases, COL Kevdin points out the fact that certain Party organizations are failing to screen new candidate members sufficiently.

Volume 7


This issue's lead editorial calls for increased, painstaking political work in order to eliminate violations of military discipline. Current Party work in certain units is characterized by general conversations and appeals, superficial checks, the issuing of numerous orders and plans, and a general "formalistic" approach. In certain units minor infractions grow into flagrant ones and higher headquarters has to step in. A specific problem area cited is that of drunkenness.


Marshal P. Batitsky, CINC Air Defense Troops (PVO Strany) and Assistant to the Minister of Defense, points out that indulgence and oversimplification are still allowed in certain units. Frequently little concern is given to making training conditions as complicated as possible, and troop actions against enemy airborne landings and sabotage groups are insufficiently worked through. As a result of this, certain young soldiers and officers are developing an incorrect concept of the real character of modern war and its difficulties. One of the basic reasons for such shortcomings, according to the marshal is the fact that the preparation of commanders does not always meet the contemporary demands of managing troops.

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Rear-Admiral V. Sheliag, PhD, reports that at times groups of poorly disciplined personnel are forming in units and that such groups are adversely influencing unit morale. Especially intolerable are groups of older personnel who display negative attitudes toward young soldiers.

4. LTG M. Shapovalov. "Zamestitel' Nachal'nika Politotdela" (The Deputy Chief of the Political Department), pp 52-59.

LTG M. Shapovalov, Chief of the Cadre Division of the GPU, complains that the records of officers being appointed as deputy chiefs of political departments are being poorly and "formalistically" screened and that many low-quality officers are consequently being selected. The general notes that a cadre rejuvenation program is in process, but it too has some defects. Some under-age cadre are being selected and many cadre are being reshuffled to the detriment of continuity. Some weak workers are even being "kicked upstairs", just to get rid of them. As a specific example of a poor selection, the general mentions a LTC Iu. Bushev. He was appointed a deputy chief of a political department and it was subsequently discovered that he had participated in illegal financial disbursements for a longtime.

Volume 8

1. LTG M. Morozov. "Za Vysokii Uroven' Raboty Voenkomatov" (For a High Level of Work by the Military Commissariats), pp 63-70.

LTG M. Morozov, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Urals Military District, explains that shortcomings in the work of local military commissariats (similar to US draft boards) are largely explained by the fact that certain workers are limiting their efforts to "pushing papers" and that they fail to coordinate with local government officials. Certain military commissariats have not established and do not maintain contact with those military units, in which soldiers from their districts are serving. Their efforts are further hampered by the fact that during recent years they have been increasingly staffed by inexperienced officers in need of constant help and practical advice.

Volume 9

Colonel-General I.Tret'iak Commander Belorussian Military District, points out certain deficiencies in tactical training. Certain officers have still not fully mastered troop-leading techniques at battalion level and below, especially on the march and during deployment from the march. Certain soldiers have not made a thorough study of enemy tactics and armament. This is a result of poor training techniques and poorly organized "socialist competition." These deficiencies were the subject of a recent district level meeting of the Party "Aktiv" (most active members). The general continues that certain instructors fail to take full advantage of the training system. Some fail to use visual aids, and others are tied to their lesson plans. As a specific example of methodological inefficiency, the general cites the case of a well-equipped firing range of a tank regiment. After every completion of an exercise by a firing order, controllers would run out to the targets. This inefficient method of scoring was being used because someone was "forgetting" to display the results on the targets.


Colonel-General of Justice A. Gorny, Chief Military Prosecutor, states that violations of military discipline are occurring in the areas of guard and other unit duties, the economic use of military technology and equipment, and the use of military transportation. Specifically cited are cases of drunkenness and "hooliganism". In connection with the struggle against waste, bad management and negligence, a display was held in a regimental club in the Odessa Military District, in which items (uniforms, boats, kitchen dishes) damaged through troop negligence were exhibited. The cost of each item was indicated and discussions about the proper care of equipment were led by the regimental commander. Other poor practices regarding military discipline mentioned by the general were "illegal" methods of teaching subordinates, permissiveness toward violators of military discipline in order to cover up negative facts so as to maintain a good external appearance, imposing punishments only "on paper," and giving a violator "time off" in the guardhouse while his unit is undergoing intense field training exercises.

LTG M. Popkov, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Central Asian Military District, discusses low quality political work during field training exercises. He points out that many political organs are trying to do more in the field, but that their poorly prepared measures fail to achieve concrete results. A contributing factor is complacency among many officers. They are satisfied with what has been achieved, are living on past successes, and fail to realize that the level of combat readiness has got to increase along with the growing demands of modern warfare. These attitudes lead to the establishment of fixed patterns, oversimplification and the hindrance of creative approaches to the conduct of battles and of the organization of political work associated with the solution of complex tactical missions. The general further criticizes the "formalistic" approach to "socialist competition" among soldiers and officers, and he points out that certain political staff officers are failing to work directly in the platoons, companies and batteries in the field. He also mentions the fact that certain sergeants are insufficiently prepared to make independent decisions and to take warranted risks. They often wait for instructions instead of bravely leading their crews and squads.


General-Major V. Soshnev, a division chief in the GPU's Directorate of Organizational-Party work points out that certain political organs are conducting poor quality analyses of current problems. Regarding the training of technical specialists, for example, analysts cite the high percentage of available specialists without taking into account their state of training on various technical modifications. Such general conclusions can lead to complacency and indifference. Another shortcoming of analytical work is the tendency to adjust facts to fit preconceived conclusions. Analytical work at times boils down to the simple arithmetical compilation of facts and figures and the drawing of conclusions based on these oversimplified computations. Still another dangerous tendency is the basing of conclusions on a single negative sensational factor, a process which often nullifies more comprehensive work. Still another problem mentioned is the lack of
thorough screening of the files of those personnel nominated for Party membership. As another example, the general cites analysis of the status of military discipline, which is done by comparing data for the various calendar quarters and for the winter and summer training periods. He concludes, however, that such comparisons are sometimes invalid, since the intensity of training is not the same for all periods considered. The general also feels that Party meetings are receiving insufficient attention. In the Bakinsky PVO (Air Defense) District, for example, political officers only reluctantly attended Party meetings of remote small units in 1974.


COL M. Sukhov discusses several areas, in which communists are not fulfilling their obligations:

1. Not all communists are correctly organizing field training exercises so as to teach soldiers initiative, gumption and independence.

2. Military discipline suffers because soldiers are receiving instruction only on the punitive articles of military regulations and not on the regulations in their entirety.

3. Certain commanders of small units, in working with their subordinates, are not relying enough on their Party and Komsomol organizations.

4. Certain communists work laboriously with machinery to the neglect of individual soldiers, and discipline suffers as a result.

5. Certain commanders lack troop-leading skills and decisiveness.

6. Communists themselves are violating military discipline; officers are overlooking these violations; and Party organs are settling for mild punishments of offenders.

7. Political meetings are being conducted passively and without visual aids and are consequently often boring. Staff specialists on politics, technology and legal matters rarely give lectures to the troops.

8. Political departments (brigade level and higher) are failing to coordinate with and actively assist lower political organizations.
1. COL V. Glushets. "Po Uchebno-Boevym Zadacham i Normativam" (According to Training - Combat Missions and Norms), pp 31-37.

COL V. Glushets points out that certain leaders of tactical competitions fail to make the training interesting for the troops and fail to give encouragement and praise to young soldiers who have enthusiastically done their best. On one company level tactical problem, the first phase went sluggishly, but the leader informed the troops that all had satisfactorily fulfilled their missions. He failed to create any enthusiasm for improvement during the remaining phases of the exercise.


V. Drugov, a deputy department head in the Central Committee of the CPSU, criticizes Party organizations for not maintaining sufficient administrative control over their subordinate leadership cadre. Certain cadre leaders are ceasing to coordinate with these organizations and are showing favoritism in the selection of other cadre members. Certain administrators of industrial enterprises supporting the military are dealing leniently with shortcomings and are covering up "trifles," a process which leads to "eyewash" and outright criminal acts. Party organizations are at times lax in their control of the administration of officers clubs. Club activities are often too numerous to retain their quality, and lectures and discussions are often lacking in such important themes as the unmasking of modern imperialism, its aggressive character, bourgeois and revisionist ideologies, and the theories and policies of Maoism. Returning to the theme of military enterprises, Mr. Drugov points out that certain political officers responsible for overseeing these industries are often poorly informed as to the details of their industrial operations and that the political departments of these enterprises at times have only loose contacts with the military districts, to which they are subordinate.

3. COL V. Spiridonov. "Rabota Vazhnaia, Otvetstvennaia" (The Work is Important and Responsible), pp 53-56.

COL V. Spiridonov reminds Party organizations that more work needs to be done with young people on an individual basis. He then discusses administrative deficiencies in the registration of Komsomol members. Membership cards are not kept up-to-date; members with disciplinary records are not followed closely; departed members are not removed
from the rolls; and some members are transferred to the reserves with old cards.

Volume 12


In this issue's lead editorial, the opinion is expressed that the status of "otlichnik" (designation awarded an "honor" soldier) is being awarded too liberally. At times such soldiers gradually lose their mastery, lower their standards of personal conduct, lose their modesty and begin to put on airs. The cheapening of this award is attributed to "formalism" and to enthusiasm for quantity to the detriment of quality.

2. COL K. Pogozhev. "Politicheskie Informatsii v Podrazdeleniiakh" (Political Information in the Sub-units), pp 80-84.

This article criticizes the quality of political meetings and classes at battalion level and below. During 1974 in the Bakinsky PVO (Air Defense) district, about half of all such meetings were devoted to analyses of individual violations of military discipline. While considered important, such themes are also somewhat overworked. Themes concerning dry, general scientific, technical and military information are considered inappropriate. Important themes concerning explanations of current domestic and foreign policies and events received only slightly more than a third of available class time. Some propagandists are only able to report on events without giving good explanations as to their significance. Others rely on the use of atypical, negative, sensational facts, a procedure which distorts the true picture of the topic under discussion. Still others feel that a convincing lecture must be interspersed with words such as "must" and "obliged to", spoken in an unnaturally loud voice. The article logically concludes that Party organizations are giving insufficient emphasis to the training of propagandists.

Volume 13


General-Major E. Dvoriansky stresses the need for improving political work among ASU (Automated Management Systems) specialists. Communists must set the example in the use of automated systems. Political meetings should devote more
time to ASU topics, especially to the psychology of automation. Commanders must learn to rely on their ASU specialists. Even in units where excellent ASU specialists are assigned, some commanders do not want to "risk" relying on them during training exercises. Instead they return to old, manual methods of computing.


General-Major of tank troops A. Zyrianov points out that certain NCO's are weak in leadership traits and techniques. The general discusses such shortcomings as assigning missions which cannot be accomplished in the allotted time, failing to set the example, giving orders in a rude and crude manner, setting low standards of conduct, failing to know and have confidence in subordinates, and not acquiring and maintaining thorough knowledge of military regulations and of the appropriate military occupational specialties. He also stresses the need for allotting more time for NCO individual study and preparation.


LTG L. Vakhrushev, Secretary of a GPU Party commission, criticizes certain Party commissions for not completely and properly fulfilling their missions. Many are guilty of allowing unworthy individuals to become Party members. Other Party commissions are erring in their judgements on imposing punishments. Some are allowing infractions to go unpunished; whereas, others are imposing punishments too severe for the violations committed. The general states that such commissions are failing to thoroughly evaluate all evidence and the total file of the individual concerned. Other commissions organize their work poorly, and far too many commission members fail to attend meetings regularly. In 1974, the General's commission upheld about a third of the appeals regarding expulsion from the CPSU, and the great majority of those reinstated conducted themselves properly.


Guards Lt A. Arzhanov, a regimental Komsomol committee secretary, explains how he had to increase his committee's participation in the political training of the soldiers.
His main problems revolved around boring Komsomol meetings, which had to be enlivened by measures such as the showing of documentary films and speeches by young soldiers themselves about their military experiences.

Volume 14

1. LTC I. Lugansky. "Kazhdyi Inzhener i Tekhnik - Aktivnyi Propagandist" (Each Engineer and Technician is an Active Propagandist), pp 41-45.

LTC I. Lugansky, a political department inspector, indicates that certain engineers and officer technicians have not mastered correct methods of training and indoctrinating their subordinates and that the Party committee has been lax in assisting them. The central problem is that they are unable to satisfactorily combine training and political indoctrination. The indoctrination aspect is often played down or ignored altogether. This limits the officer's ability to influence the moral development of his subordinates.

2. CPT N. Koshelev. "Energiia Iunosti" (The Energy of Youth), pp 54-60.

CPT N. Koshelev notes that certain Komsomol members in his regiment lack enthusiasm in carrying out their duties and are going through their military service passively, not excelling, but not lagging behind either. In one battery almost all Komsomol members had high school education and eight had higher education, but their Komsomol secretary was making little use of their talents and education. The captain concludes that Komsomol bureaus must get their members more actively involved in meaningful and interesting regimental affairs.

Volume 15


This issue's lead editorial points out that shortcomings still exist in certain units in the organization of training and in the carrying out of military duties and that some units are essentially "going through the motions" on tactical training exercises. Regarding propaganda, the article states that it is no longer sufficient to simply list and narrate the deeds of outstanding soldiers and units. Instead it must be clearly,
convincingly, and graphically explained how the best soldiers achieve success. Party and political organizations do not always exert proper influence on military personnel, set high personal standards for communists, or organize effective "socialist competition."

2. LTC Iu. Mel'nikov. "Za Nauchnyi Podkhod k Organizatsii Sorevnovaniia" (For a Scientific Approach to the Organization of Competition), pp 9-17.

   LTC Iu. Mel'nikov proposes a new, more effective approach to "socialist competition." Usually such competition is two-sided-squad vs. squad, platoon vs. platoon, etc. The colonel feels that a many-sided approach would be more effective - 3 squads within a platoon simultaneously competing, for example. He concludes that this approach would facilitate the comparability of results.

3. General-Major M. Maslovsy. "Kazhdyi - v Aktive, Kazhdyi - Boets" (Everyone is in the Aktiv, Everyone is a Warrior), pp 30-38.

   General-Major M. Maslovsy, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Siberian Military District, reports that certain regimental chiefs of staff, especially newly appointed ones, are not relying enough on their communists when making complex decisions on management and the organization of training. Another problem area concerns communists, who at the beginning of the training year vow to achieve new higher personal results. These worthy promises do not always yield positive results. In this connection, Party organizations are at times guilty of not noticing shortcomings while there is still time to make improvements. Another weak spot concerns the assigning of various tasks to communists. Some are constantly overloaded, while others have nothing to do. Party workers complain that certain communists fail to actively seek responsibility. Certain Party organizations also mistakenly assume that they do not have direct responsibility for specifically military affairs, such as combat readiness. The general also criticizes the preparation and conduct of political meetings. He points out that in one typical unit 60% of the communists did not make a single speech all year, while others spoke five or six times. He also mentions that these meetings are lacking in meaningful criticism and self-criticism.

4. LTC A. Dudko. "Komsomol'tsy vse Dovodiat do Kontsa" (Komsomol Members Complete all Assignments), pp 51-56.

   LTC A. Dudko criticizes Komsomol organizations for engaging in "fanfare and busy work." Komsomol members are not achieving their promised goals and are even falling from the ranks of "honor soldiers." Certain members are
lacking in initiative and are content with looking busy. The colonel notes that, when an individual repeatedly fails to live up to his promises, he gradually loses his sense of responsibility for his actions.

Volume 16

1. Colonel-General A. Zvartsev. "Utverzhdenie Avtoriteta Ofitsera" (Strengthening the Authority of the Officer), pp 29-34.

Colonel-General A. Zvartsev, Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of Cadre in the Ministry of Defense, states that certain commanders, including some senior officers, treat their subordinates sharply and rudely. Such officers consider commanders who strive to intelligently develop relations with their subordinates and to help them eliminate deficiencies to be "liberals." Such a commander, who has many years of service and who has given punishment to almost all of his officers, cannot understand that strict adherence to regulations does not exclude warm relations with subordinates, but, on the contrary, makes provision for them. Such commanders tend to punish a young officer severely, or they create circumstances in which he cannot make the slightest independent move. This is especially true on tactical training exercises, such commanders make decisions for the young officer and deny him the opportunity to prove himself in complex situations. Such a situation stifles the leadership growth of the young officer and undermines his authority within his unit.

2. COL M. Barabash, "Rastim Partiinyi Aktiv" (We are Training the Party Aktiv), pp 49-56.

COL M. Barabash, Chief of a political department (found at Army through brigade level), admits shortcomings in the instruction of the Party "Aktiv" (most active members). Specifically, he states that the "Aktiv" is poorly informed about intra-Party work and the domestic and international life of the country. He also points out that theoretical conferences on important Party questions have not been introduced and that incompetent personnel are at times assigned to instructor duty.

Volume 17

1. Lead Editorial. "Zabota o Byte Voinov" (Concern about the Life of the Soldier), pp 12-17.

In this editorial article, low living standards in certain military units are discussed. The article maintains that such shortcomings are attributable to the negligence
of the military economic planner and the commander. Deficiencies include monotonous, tasteless food and low quality clothing and furnishings. Shortages also exist in barracks, mess halls and day-rooms. Retail stores for consumer goods are often inadequate to service the military community. Supply personnel are called upon to insure that a variety of goods does not remain only in the big cities. Such goods must be directed to areas where troops are quartered, to include remote garrisons. Improvements are also called for in unit services, such as tailor shops, laundries, cobblers and barber shops.


General of the Army A. Epishev, Chief of the GPU, writes on military discipline. He states that the troops are often informed about the importance of military discipline only in very general terms and without regard for their level of knowledge and military experience. The general points out that any deviation from the established norms of discipline can give birth to complacency and create an atmosphere conducive to violation of order. He continues that certain commanders and political workers talk too much about achievements to the detriment of comprehensive analyses of their actual situations. As a result, reasons for violations of discipline often go undiscovered. General Epishev also condemns rudeness, which wounds people and hinders the maintenance of stable order and of true comrade- ship. He also points out that the system of rewards and punishment is a delicate instrument, which must be used wisely to achieve the desired results.


COL N. Chebykin, Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Transcaucasian Military District, expresses regret over the lack of proper concern for military studies in his district. He states that certain propagandists lack a "feeling for time". Some are played out in 15 minutes, and others run over the allotted time. At times information classes are characterized by loud readings from newspapers without any commentary or connection with the life of the unit. Often the contents concern only international affairs, when attention should also be devoted to discussion of the success of the Soviet people in the building of communism, demonstration of the advantages of the Soviet system over
the capitalist, and explanation of missions before the unit.
Too much time is devoted to going over individual cases
of violations of military discipline, while insufficient
time is devoted to newspapers, radio and television.

4. Retired Colonels P. Ermakov and A. Gorbunov. "Proforga-
nizatsii i Politicheskaya Ucheba Rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh"
(Trade Union Organizations and the Political Training
of Workers and Employees), pp 66-69.

Retired Colonels P. Ermakov and A. Gorbunov discuss
shortcomings in political study in the trade union organiza-
tions in the Odessa Military District. Although much
is done, the effectiveness is not great and there are viola-
tions of labor discipline and anti-social acts. In many
beginning political schools, independent study is not stressed.
Many students fail to take notes or read the recommended litera-
ture. Certain workers, who have a basic political education,
tend to "sit too long" in beginning groups and fail to
strive to study on advanced levels. Even fewer attend
evening courses at the district Marxist-Leninist university.

Volume 18

1. Lead Editorial. "Otchety i Vybory Partiinykh Organov"
(Reports and Elections in Party Organs), pp 5-10.

This issue's lead editorial reveals that the Party
organizations of the Moscow, Belorussian, Urals, Transbaikal,
Odessa, and other military districts, which met in June-July
1975, discussed the attempts of certain communists to
represent the status of training and discipline in their
units as better than it actually is. The communists of the
Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division were subject to
especially sharp criticism for failing, during a recent
check, to live up to previously attained high standards. The
article also mentions that there are still cases of improper
conduct by certain Party members and candidate members, of
their deviations from the norms of communist morality, and
of their abuse of their official positions. The editorial
calls for a critical, exacting evaluation of those Party
organs which lately have tended to curtail their meetings
to account for their work and their efforts to uncover the
reasons for passiveness among certain Party members.

2. LTG G. Demidkov. "Shtab i Vnedrenie Peredovogo Opyta"
(The Staff and the Inculcation of Advanced Experience)
pp 38-44.

LTG G. Demidkov, First Deputy Commander of the Siberian
Military District, criticizes certain headquarters of his
district for failure to properly study and inculcate the
achievements of "honor soldiers" (otlichniki). Their feats are poorly publicized, especially outside their own regiments. The inculcation of progressive training methods is also going slowly and without special enthusiasm. This leads at times to studies which are poorly organized and lacking in proper preparation and the required materiel support. At battalion level and below the inculcation of new, helpful training techniques is especially weak and certain people cling to old methods and resist new ones.


General-Major L. Sorochenko, Deputy Commander Transcaucassian Military District for Rear Services, points out that certain units have not learned how to economically use all types of machinery. Certain commanders prefer to follow old methods and do not want to burden themselves with the problems of mechanizing labor-consuming processes, the application of modern technology, and the training of highly skilled specialists. Another problem area mentioned by the general is creation of good living conditions in the field. Certain economic planners at times try to substitute dry rations for hot meals and they fail to provide for shower facilities. He also states that Party organizations must become more active in influencing communists to eliminate "foot dragging" and lack of initiative in improving the training process. The general concludes that experience has shown that communists must constantly set the example in order to maintain high standards of training and discipline.


MAJ V. Kovtun, a senior instructor for organizational - Party work in a political department, points out that certain members of Party bureaus are approaching their work "formalistically" and that they have only general responsibilities. In one Party organization the bureau delegated to individual communists responsibilities which it should have kept at bureau level, such as maintaining the progressive role of communists in studies, discipline and the leadership of ideological work. Certain Party meetings are characterized by ostentation and a lack of criticism, and if criticism and an exchange of opinions are lacking, then the principle of collective leadership is violated. At times bureaus simply make decisions and formulate plans and then let everything drift. Some bureau secretaries seem unable to distribute the workload and try to do it all themselves, while individual members simply attend meetings.
5. Editorial. "Ne Oslabliat' Vnimanie k Obmenu Komsomol'skih Dokumentov" (Don't Relax Your Attention Concerning the Exchange of Komsomol Documents), pp 59-63.

This editorial criticizes the organizational-political work of Komsomol committees and bureaus in general and their "formalistic" attitude toward the exchange of old membership cards for new ones. This exchange period is viewed as an excellent opportunity for raising the military academic and political activity of young soldiers. The article states that indoctrination work is being done according to old methods without regard for contemporary requirements. Certain Komsomol organizations are only superficially evaluating the training of members, are rarely interested in the results, and do not always work properly with young soldiers who are failing to master their military specialty and who conduct themselves improperly. In certain units, they are beginning to forget about conducting technical quizzes, question and answer sessions, and conferences. Political meetings are at times neglecting questions of raising the personal responsibility of every member for deficiencies in training, for cases of careless use of equipment, and for making strict demands on those satisfied with only satisfactory ratings. Corrective work with young violators of military discipline is sometimes poorly conducted. "Socialist competition" is often poorly organized and fails to embrace all aspects of military studies. There is a penchant for organizing mass meetings at regimental level, but few discussions are organized at company level. In certain Komsomol organizations, the members received no feedback this year on how well they had mastered their studies of the Leninist ideological legacy. Certain activists do not fully understand the essence of counseling individual members and they approach these sessions "formalistically."

6. LTG F. Ishchenko. "Povyshat' Ideinuiu Zakalku Ofitserov" (To Increase the Ideological Hardening of Officers), pp 64-68.

LTG F. Ishchenko, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Southern Group of Forces (Hungary), discusses poor attitudes of officers toward theoretical political training. Some classes are taught on too low a level, and, at times, officers with higher political training have to attend classes with officers having less preparation and experience. In such cases, the more experienced officers tend to "coast," relying on their prior knowledge and lesson summaries. Shortcomings also exist in the organization, contents and methods of Marxist-Leninist training of military cadre. There are also cases where certain comrades attend seminars
without having studied the recommended sources, remain passive, or state theoretical tenets superficially, relying only on their prior knowledge. There is also insufficient emphasis on political information, discussions on important themes and analyses of military journals. Indoctrination is not receiving proper attention, especially where young officers are concerned.

Volume 19


This issue's lead editorial states that certain Komsomol organizations are failing to make the importance of strict military discipline clear to young soldiers, some of whom are becoming more tolerant of misbehavior among their comrades. Komsomol members don't always set the example in fulfilling all "social obligations." Certain Komsomol organizations fail to consider the individual interests and the level of training and education of young soldiers, and mass measures are not always supplemented by work with individuals. Criticism and self-criticism must be directed toward any signs of disloyalty or sympathy toward foreign, bourgeois views. Full use is not being made of the exchange of Komsomol membership cards for the intensification of these struggles.

2. COL I. Belov, "S Neba - v Boi" (Into Battle from the Air), pp 24-30.

COL I. Belov, First Deputy Chief of a political department in an airborne unit, points out shortcomings in field exercises. These mainly concern the failure of the individual soldier to carry out all his personal duties. For example a sub-unit (battalion or lower) occupies a defensive position, but not all soldiers set to digging in and camouflaging their positions. Often gun crews, APC crews and SP artillery crews, having occupied an indicated line, fail to lay their guns and conduct fire missions, and the sergeants don't practice giving commands for the observation of the battlefield and the destruction of identified targets. In summary, training time is not used to its maximum effectiveness.

3. COL I. Pavlenko and MAJ I. Shatilo. "Opora na Polozhitel'noe" (Support the Positive), pp 31-37.

Co-authors COL I. Pavlenko and MAJ I. Shatilo state that certain leaders, instead of trying to give practical help to those lagging behind, are simply trying to disgrace them into fulfilling their missions, a method which creates

COL A. Chinenny criticizes lecturers who are constantly tied to their texts and fail to maintain eye contact with their listeners. He cautions that a speaker can completely lose his audience in this manner.

Volume 20


In this issue's lead editorial, lack of unity between theoretical studies and practical military matters is noted. Political training is at times dry, uninteresting and "formalistic". The article also calls for the increased use of technical means of propaganda, visual aids, and literary works. Soldiers and NCO's are encouraged to study independently as well.

2. Naval Captains first class P. Ablamonov and V. Polivanov. "V Bor'be za Vypolnenie Obiazatel'ств" (In the Struggle for Fulfilling Commitments), pp 40-44.

Naval Captains P. Ablamonov and V. Polivanov point to indifference and false pride as primary causes for deficiencies in the Northern Fleet. Combat readiness suffers due to the tendency of certain commanders and political workers to avoid coming to grips with problem areas. Some glory over their numbers of "honor soldiers" (otlichniki) while remaining silent about shortcomings in training and discipline. There is also the tendency to exaggerate and embellish the state of affairs in various units.

3. COL A. Shirokov. "Komunisty i Tekhnicheskaia Propaganda" (Communists and Technical Propaganda), pp 45-50.

COL A. Shirokov, Chief of a regimental political department, states that in certain units insufficient attention is being given to the propaganda of technical knowledge. He gives one example when a serious error was almost made in the maintenance of some technical machinery. This occurred because the specialists did not fully understand its working principles and control equipment and they were conducting certain operations incorrectly. The colonel also states that certain political workers are failing to create favorable conditions for the creative work of
military skilled craftsmen. At times technical lecturers and propagandists are poorly selected. Some are lacking in technical knowledge and have not mastered the techniques of instruction.


General-Major V. Volovich and Colonel Bodenkov point out that there are shortcomings in the work of the National Control organizations (which have fiscal control responsibilities similar to the US-GAO) in many military districts. These control workers at times avoid problems which require deep study. At one repair factory, a control group failed to take action against "sturmovshchina" (non-rythmic productivity in which most goods are produced near the end of the month to meet production quotas) and changes to accounting reports. There has also been a growth in the duplication of inspections by various commissions representing different services and branches. These constant inspections are hindering the work of military units. These commissions often conduct their inspections haphazardly and superficially, as if only to satisfy a requirement. To a certain degree, the controllers' work is being judged by the number of checks they perform and not by their success in eliminating deficiencies.


COL F. Kriuchkov states that there are still cases of "formalism" in competition, oversimplification in field exercises and violations of military discipline. Concerning political meetings, the colonel states that many communists simply attend, while only a certain group participates actively. Many orators attack shortcomings passionately in their speeches and then ignore them after the meeting. Others cite quotations which have little to do with the subject at hand and never get to the heart of the matter. Some Party secretaries not only assign speakers for certain topics, but they assign the text for the speech as well. Many communists find it difficult to criticize others. Before meetings they point out specific deficiencies, but during the meetings they speak only in generalities. In some cases, criticism is not respected, and in others the speaker simply does not wish to "damage relations". There are also cases where speakers are interrupted by insulting heckling and such intimidation goes unchecked.

Navy Captain-Lieutenant Ia. Stroka, a freelance correspondent, describes the low morale and despondency that can occur among young sailors on long voyages when their Komsomol organizations fail to work with them properly. Some Komsomol secretaries conduct boring meetings without discussions, apparently just to keep the sailors "busy". Even on the occasion of celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the defeat of Germany, the speeches were only correct, but unenthusiastic. Many Komsomol organizations do not seem to be considering the emotional aspects of the work with young sailors, often away from home for the first time. The lieutenant especially criticizes those secretaries who fill their lectures with off-color anecdotes, which have a negative effect on the young seamen.

Volume 21


LTG P. Shkidchenko, Deputy CINC GSFG for Combat Training, states that there are many unsolved problems in the area of field training. In places oversimplified and stereotyped patterns are followed. All too familiar training areas are used. Certain young officers and newly appointed commanders (battalion and below) have not completely mastered organizing for combat on the ground. Some conduct reconnaissance poorly, vaguely organize coordination with attached units, and do not always assign timely missions to intelligence. Political - indoctrinational work is conducted poorly in the field in certain units. "Socialist competition" is at times poorly supervised. Often commanders and political workers limit themselves to checking and supervising their subordinates instead of teaching them by example.

2. LTC A. Lukashov. "Kommunisty za Vse v Otvete" (Communists are Accountable for Everything), pp 37-44.

LTC A. Lukashov, a regimental commander, complains that there is sometimes too much talk about successes and not enough analysis of shortcomings. As a reflection of this, some honor units and soldiers do poorly on training tests. Certain communists are not setting high standards. Some demand the elimination of all deficiencies from the podium, but then they fail to notice mistakes and violations of military discipline. Others promise to do great things, but then they fade into the background.

COL N. Sedov, Chief of the Department for Cadre of the GPU, points out that in places professional training for political workers is not well thought out and organized. In one unit a class was given on a Sunday when only one political worker was present for duty. The colonel adds that inexperienced political workers are not receiving the necessary assistance from more senior comrades. Some think that a new officer does not have things to learn and this can lead to failures of promising young officers.

4. Senior LT N. Kuzmichenko. "Kazhdyi na Vidu" (Everyone is in the Public Eye), pp 64-69.

Senior LT N. Kuzmichenko, a Komsomol Committee Secretary, relates the case of a young sergeant returning late from a pass. The heart of the matter is that the unit's Komsomol secretary does not know the individual well enough to advise the commander concerning the sergeant's possible motivations. The lieutenant continues to emphasize the importance of working with every soldier as an individual and he concludes that a passion for mass measure weakens work with people.

(No articles from Volume 22)

Volume 23

1. Lead Editorial. "Za Vysokoe Kachestvo Boevoi i Politicheskoi Podgotovke" (For High Quality Combat and Political Training), pp 3-8.

This issue's lead editorial states that oversimplified training conditions cannot be allowed. It calls for a declaration of war against non-objectivity and the lowering of standards. The article also points out that the value of socialist competition is often lowered by "formalism" and superficiality on the part of leaders. "Honor" status is being awarded too easily to units and individual soldiers.


LTG A. Shelepin, Deputy Chief of the GPU, notes that there have been shortcomings in Marxist-Leninist ideological political work with unit personnel. Some officers have been using a dogmatic, academic approach, relying on quotations,
without giving clear explanations and showing the practical value of theoretical tenets. The general specifically criticizes political work for not giving systematic, thought-out help to warrant officers, many of whom lack experience in independent work. Quality instructional techniques are also a problem area. Political workers are again reminded that simple quantity of lectures given cannot substitute for quality. Ideological workers are called upon to pay more attention to the power of the written word and to carefully select the proper form for transmitting information. Cultural work is at times too "entertaining," and not sufficiently instructive from an ideological viewpoint.


LTG M. Ponomarev, Deputy Chief of the Rear for the Soviet Armed Forces, states that there are still many officers who accept shortcomings. One such LTC managed his rear services poorly. His barracks, mess hall and kitchen were in poor condition. He was not dealing adequately with waste and theft, and he was not instilling a sense of "conservation" in his personnel. This leader's main problem was a lack of initiative. He was also weak in establishing work priorities and in organizing and directing the efforts of his unit.

4. LTG V. Dement'ev. "Opyt Tsenen Povtoreniem" (Experience is Enriched by Repetition), pp 32-37.

LTG V. Dement'ev, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Kiev Military District, criticizes certain commanders and political workers for "formalism," simplification and a lack of initiative in conducting socialist competition. Some communists are not setting the example, are not adequately analyzing problems in weak units and are not determining measures for improvements. Some are forgetting that the important thing in socialist competition is to bring the weaker soldiers up to the level of the good ones. Propaganda on advanced results is often not thorough and lacking in analysis as to how such results were achieved. Many soldiers strive only to achieve "good" or "excellent" ratings and not to fulfill specific pledges of advanced performance. In certain units, personnel are vague as to their missions for a given month or training period and they do not conduct their training in a spirit of "healthy rivalry". Communists are aware of this, but they fail to take necessary measures to eliminate these shortcomings. A related deficiency is that outstanding units and soldiers may tend to rest on their laurels and become complacent and Party organizations at times fail to foresee and prevent such attitudes.
5. CPT P. Tur'in. "Vystupaite, a ia Poslushaiu" (Speak, and I will Listen), pp 69-72.

CPT P. Tur'in an assistant chief of a political department for Komsomol work, discusses lack of initiative, indifference and violations of discipline by certain Komsomol members. Citing comments of soldiers, the captain explains why certain members fail to participate actively at Komsomol meetings. Often the same subject will be repeated at platoon, company, and then battalion level. The subject of military discipline comes up often while there are rarely discussions on more general political themes. Political workers are reminded not to squelch active participation by neglecting to consider suggestions from Komsomol members. The captain further criticizes Komsomol decisions which contain words like "intensify", "activate", and "improve", but fail to specify by whom, when, and what is to be done.

Volume 24


This issue's lead editorial notes that certain communists are not only forgetting to set the example, but they are also failing to observe Party and military discipline themselves. One commander found it necessary to severely punish a senior lieutenant, but the regimental Party organization failed to react to this problem. Only after a second violation of military discipline by the lieutenant did the Party organization call him to account.