STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

MAJ John F. Concannon
THE SOVIET CONCEPT
OF THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

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THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

MAJ John F. Concannon
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Student research report
FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of the overseas phase of training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

Only unclassified sources are used in producing the research paper. The opinions, value judgments and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the United States Government; Department of Defense; Department of the Army; Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence; or the United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies.

Interested readers are invited to send their comments to the Commander of the Institute.

RICHARD P. KELLY
LTC, MI
Commander
SUMMARY

In this paper the author presents Soviet views on the meeting engagement. It is the author's contention that from an analysis of Soviet military writings, the essence of current Soviet doctrine can be extracted. The author provides a general discussion of the Soviet concept of the meeting engagement, and then focuses on the Soviet tank battalion in the meeting engagement. The detailed description of the actions of the Soviet tank battalion commander personalizes the tactical problem. It is the author's intention to draw the US military reader into a personal consideration of the salient points of the Soviet concept. The author concludes that the Soviet emphasis on speed, aggressiveness, combined arms combat, and decisiveness in the meeting engagement poses a serious challenge and demands a reexamination of US concept.
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INTRODUCTION

"...and one blind man decided that the elephant is very much like a rope. But another blind man, having touched the elephant's leg, decided that the elephant is very much like a tree..."

Soviet and US military concepts of the meeting engagement are not as disparate as the blind men's concepts of the elephant, but the concepts of the meeting engagement do differ. The meeting engagement is important since both Soviet and US forecasts of the nature of future war, either nuclear or conventional, include the meeting engagement as a likely, common, combat action. This study concentrates on a general analysis of the Soviet concept of the meeting engagement and a specific analysis of its practical application on the battlefield from the perspective of a Soviet tank battalion commander. Differences in the Soviet and US concepts can then be shown to be substantive or insignificant.

GENERAL CONCEPT OF MEETING ENGAGEMENT

Definition of Meeting Engagement:

(US) "A meeting engagement is the combat action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy force, static or in motion, concerning which it has inadequate intelligence; The action ceases to be a meeting engagement when the enemy's situation is developed and subsequent planned and coordinated operations are undertaken."

(Soviet) "A meeting engagement is the clash of forces who are both simultaneously striving to carry out their assigned missions by vigorous offensive action."
Circumstances of Meeting Engagement:

The Soviets anticipate that the most frequent circumstance for the meeting engagement will be "during the development of an offensive in the depth of the enemy defense." In such a situation Soviet units might encounter enemy reserves, moving to counter-attack or to seize a key position. Should the enemy attempt a withdrawal, Soviet units will encounter attacking units of the enemy covering force. In the conduct of a pursuit, Soviet forces will encounter advancing enemy reserves from rear areas beyond the battle area. After an airborne or air mobile assault on an enemy objective, Soviet forces will encounter enemy units attacking to eliminate the position. When Soviet forces are completing an encirclement of the enemy, Soviet forces will encounter enemy units determinedly attempting to break out.

In a defensive situation, meeting engagements will occur when Soviet forces counterattack the enemy. They will also occur when Soviet forces, moving up to firing positions or to close a gap or breach in the defensive positions, encounter enemy attacking units. In attempting to break out of an encirclement, Soviet forces will encounter enemy reserves, committed to restore the encirclement. Soviet forces in a defensive situation will be required to eliminate enemy diversionary elements who have conducted an airborne or air mobile assault in the defensive area.
Meeting engagements can occur from the march. A meeting engagement from the march can also fall into the overall category of an offensive or defensive situation.

In an offensive situation, when the attacking force meets a counterattack, the attacking force is already deployed. With all fire support means, it attacks the enemy, but it is limited in its capability of maneuver. The counterattacking force, while it needs a certain period of time to deploy, has a greater possibility for maneuver on the flank or rear of the enemy force or in the least expected direction. One must keep in mind that in the defensive situation, the Soviet forces have sustained the brunt of an offensive, the enemy force is superior and has the initiative. In such a circumstance, exceptional operational efficiency is required to make a decision, quickly assign the combat mission to the troops available and accomplish the maneuver against the enemy.

Characteristics of the Meeting Engagement:

"The contemporary meeting engagement is characterized by an intense fight to capture and retain the initiative; deployment of troops, chiefly from columns, simultaneously with the initiation of combat; insufficient clarity of the situation, sharp and rapid changes and high speed of combat; a rapid change of the combat formation of the forces; the development of combat on a wide front; freedom of maneuver and the presence of open flanks on both sides."

One of the most important characteristics of the meeting engagement is the continuous and intense combat to capture and retain the initiative. The outcome of the fight for the
initiative determines the final result of the entire battle. Within this characteristic, it is recognized that a part of the unit conducting the meeting engagement may be on the defensive temporarily in the course of the engagement.

Deployment of troops in combat formation occurs chiefly from a column, simultaneously with the initiation of combat. This view is disputed by some Soviet military authors who consider that the meeting engagement in doctrinal development and training becomes too tied with the march. This causes canned training exercises, inflexible combat response, and lack of initiative.

Prior to and during the meeting engagement, information on the enemy force is by far incomplete. The time available for reconnaissance and clarification of the situation is extremely limited. The great mobility of the forces, rapid changes in groupings and direction of forces, hamper reconnaissance. Therefore, insufficient clarity of the situation at the initiation and in the course of the meeting engagement is a characteristic. Modern reconnaissance means, however, tend to preclude a sudden unexpected encounter. This view also has been challenged by a Soviet military writer. The writer contends that including such a characteristic as lack of clarity of the situation provides an excuse for poor organization and passive conduct of reconnaissance.

On the modern battlefield, in an effort to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's nuclear strikes, commanders
are forced to move their units in greatly dispersed formations in the area of the meeting engagement. Therefore, the action develops over a wide front, with the constant threat of enemy strikes on the flanks of the combat formation and in the gaps between units.\textsuperscript{14}

The power of modern forces, their high mobility, and the emphasis on the offensive, make high speed of the action, rapid and sharp changes in the situation traits of the meeting engagement.\textsuperscript{15} Even considering the power of modern forces and the real possibility of quickly destroying the enemy in a meeting engagement, Soviet writers point out the possibility that the engagement may be protracted. Citing the following meeting engagements conducted in WW II gives an idea of both duration and area in a more protracted engagement. In December, 1943, there was a meeting engagement between the Soviet 8th Guards Mech. Corps and the German 20th Mech. Division. The duration of combat was eighteen hours. The area of the battle had a front of 8 km and a depth of 18 km. Another meeting engagement took place between the Soviet 19th Tank Corps and the German 4th Tank Division in August, 1944. The duration of combat was thirty hours. Combat took place over an area 10 km in front and 25 km in depth.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, the study of the meeting engagement in the Soviet view must not be limited to making the decision on deployment and entry of the main forces into combat, but also the development of the fight up to the final destruction of the enemy.
Success in the Meeting Engagement:

"...success in the meeting engagement is attained by timely detection of an advancing enemy and establishment of continuous observation; by timely decision and rapid relay of missions to troops; by anticipating the enemy in nuclear attacks, air attacks, and artillery attacks and gaining fire superiority; by anticipating him in capturing advantageous positions and in deploying main forces in combat formations; by bold troop maneuvers and inflicting powerful, disruptive, fore-stalling attacks mainly on the flanks and rear of the main enemy formations; by rapid division of the enemy and his destruction in detail; by reliable flank and rear security of one's own forces; by broad initiative and independence by all commanders."

Active and organized reconnaissance measurably contributes to the success of the meeting engagement. Information may be obtained from higher headquarters, from their forward recon elements and aerial recon elements and from neighboring units. The unit itself must, however, aggressively conduct reconnaissance in order to locate an advancing enemy, determine his formation, predict and constantly observe his actions.

Speed in making a decision and passing it on to subordinate units contributes to success in the meeting engagement. To delay a decision until the situation is more clear means to doom the forces to passivity and indecision. Speed in making a decision, resoluteness and troop action will contribute to victory in the meeting engagement, even against a superior enemy force.

Anticipating the enemy in nuclear strikes and winning fire superiority are prime factors of success in the meeting
engagement. Being first to open fire is considered the main factor ensuring success.\(^{19}\)

Anticipating the enemy in seizing key terrain contributes to success in the meeting engagement. The forward detachment, the advanced detachment, airborne/air mobile assaults, or even units in contact can accomplish the seizing of key terrain.\(^{20}\)

In spite of the huge role of fire support, completion of enemy destruction is ultimately attained by a direct strike by advancing troops. The force of the initial strike, its speed and continuity are decisive. Being first in deployment of main forces is an important condition for success in the meeting engagement.

Reliable, uninterrupted communications are important in the meeting engagement. Communications, however, may be hampered or totally lacking; therefore, the initiative and independence of the commander are important for success.

**Organizational Concepts in the Meeting Engagement:**

When a meeting engagement is anticipated, force organization usually includes a forward detachment, elements for march security, and the main forces. (See Diagram 1) Considerably in advance of the entire formation will be reconnaissance elements from a higher headquarters. In combination with aerial recon, these elements provide initial information on enemy activity and then continue their mission. As the enemy and friendly units close, recon activity becomes
the responsibility of the unit anticipating contact. A forward detachment may be dispatched to anticipate the enemy in seizing key terrain. (See Glossary, Forward Detachment) With this mission, the forward detachment may sometimes avoid combat in order to carry out its mission. The distance the forward detachment will operate in front of the formation depends on the assigned mission. Supporting distance can be a problem for a unit assigned as forward detachment. It is considered that a reinforced battalion is capable of fulfilling the mission of forward detachment for a reinforced regiment. There is no requirement to dispatch a forward detachment in all circumstances.

Diagram 1
(Schematic of March Elements in anticipation of Meeting Engagement)

The march security elements of the main force are generally, the vanguard, flank security detachments, and the
rear guard. (See Glossary, Vanguard) The concept is all-round security. Security is weighted toward the major threatening direction. Considering it to be the front, the vanguard would consist of about one-third of the overall force. The vanguard is the lead security element for the major unit, a reinforced regiment for example. (See Glossary, Lead Security Element) A reinforced battalion is capable of executing the mission of vanguard for a reinforced regiment. The vanguard operates 20 to 30 km ahead of the main force.

The vanguard ordinarily dispatches a combat recon patrol. The vanguard itself is organized into march security elements and a main force. The concept of all-round security applies on a reduced scale. The lead security element of the vanguard is generally company-size and operates 5-10 km in front of the vanguard main force. The combat recon patrol is generally platoon-size and operates 10 km in front of the lead security element of the vanguard. The vanguard has the mission of engaging the enemy, preventing his penetration to the main force, and securing the deployment and entry into combat of the main force. This type mission will pass to other units in the case when the enemy attacks the flank or rear of the main column. Remembering the concept of all-round security, in such a circumstance a flank security detachment and its parent battalion in the main force will fulfill the essential mission planned for the vanguard. The same applies to rear security.22
Artillery units are placed at the head of the column of the main force. Artillery in the vanguard follows after the lead security element of the vanguard. The logic is to have artillery support forward to occupy positions and rapidly support deploying units or units in contact. Tanks would follow artillery. This is not a required pattern. In the case of employment of a nuclear strike, tanks and motorized infantry would lead artillery in order to move out in exploitation. Another case would be when deployment to the flank is anticipated, then artillery is better located in the center of the main force. Anti-aircraft equipment is usually distributed throughout the formation.

Combat engineers and chemical/radiological recon teams are generally placed well forward. The combat engineers may be with the lead security element of the vanguard. The chemical/radiological recon team can be dispatched with the combat recon patrol in front of the vanguard.

**Conduct of the Meeting Engagement:**

The meeting engagement usually starts with an encounter of reconnaissance elements, forward detachment, and elements of march security with the security and advance units of the enemy. The period of active combat operations from the encounter of the recon units to entry of the main forces into combat is called the initiation of the meeting engagement. Actions of the forces must be decisive and swift.

Recon units coming into contact with the enemy usually do not become involved in combat with the lead elements of
the enemy. They bypass them, boldly penetrate the main forces, determine their composition, formation, direction of movement, intervals, flanks, possible positions of deployment, and character of enemy action. The main task is detecting nuclear weapons.23

When a forward detachment is employed, it advances at maximum speed to its designated position, destroys small groups along the way, seizes the position and holds it until the main force arrives. The enemy may anticipate the forward detachment. The forward detachment may engage superior enemy forces. In this case the forward detachment holds the enemy at subsequent favorable positions, to secure advantageous conditions for the deployment and entry into combat of the main forces.

Combat actions of the march security elements are important in capturing the initiative. The lead security element, encountering enemy recon and elements of enemy lead security, rapidly destroys them and continues the mission. Upon encountering a superior force, the lead security element seizes a favorable position, holds it to ensure the deployment and entry into combat of the main force of the battalion. When the lead security element becomes engaged, the main force of the vanguard accelerates its movement. If the enemy prevents the vanguard from occupying a favorable position, the vanguard will attempt to take it, attacking from the march.
Actions of the Main Force:

A rapid and decisive transition to the attack by the main force can lead, in a meeting engagement, to the defeat of a stronger enemy unit which cannot deploy. The following variants depend upon pinning the enemy down.

1. Strike against one flank as enemy force is fixed from front.
2. Strikes against both flanks as enemy force is fixed from front.
3. Frontal Attack.

Diagram 2
(Schematic of Strikes in the Meeting Engagement)24

Troop deployment should be varied. It can be consecutive (piecemeal) or simultaneous. Artillery should take up positions that have the enemy within half its range. In the case of simultaneous enemy action, front and flank, the most dangerous enemy group must be defeated first. This is no small task. It requires resolute and rapid action by the commander. In the course of the meeting engagement, reconnaissance continues. The main target is enemy nuclear capabilities, and possible targets for Soviet nuclear weapons. There is a continuous search for enemy activity on the flanks and a search for enemy vulnerabilities.
Although the simultaneous transition into the attack is probably the strongest initial strike, a piecemeal attack, despite the lesser force of the strike, may be important to capture the initiative.

Motorized rifle units presently are equipped to operate jointly with tanks as a single armor striking force. The main forces attack swiftly, advancing in depth, disperse the enemy, defeat him in detail. The main forces do not allow the organized deployment of approaching enemy reserves and prevent the enemy from regrouping his forces and organizing a defense. Defeat in detail is an important principle of the meeting engagement. The meeting engagement should end in the complete defeat of the enemy.

Additional Considerations in the Night Meeting Engagement:

Deployment of the main forces at night requires more time. Several additional measures are required in anticipation of a meeting engagement at night: prior preparation of equipment for night operations; guaranteeing illumination and light signals for the units; organizing light security; light signals for troops for coordination and warning; order of unit identification and target designation.

In the night meeting engagement, more often than in daylight, it is possible to deny the enemy an offensive action, a temporary transition to the defense, or even a withdrawal. If the enemy defends, he must be illuminated, suppressed by fire, and destroyed by an attack from the march. If the enemy withdraws, he must be pursued and destroyed.
SOVIET TANK BATTALION IN THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

Combat Mission and Combat Formation of the Tank Battalion in the Meeting Engagement:

The Soviet tank battalion may be part of the first echelon of an attack. It will have an immediate mission and a direction of further advance. Usually the immediate mission consists of the destruction of an enemy force in the area and the seizing of a line, securing advantageous conditions for the development of future actions.  

The mission of a tank battalion, operating in the direction of the main force of the enemy, may consist of holding an advantageous line and inflicting maximum loss by fire from tanks in place and securing favorable conditions for the deployment of the main force of the regiment and the inflicting on the enemy of strikes on the flank and in the rear. In development of the situation after the fire-fight, the battalion may attack independently or in coordination with neighboring units.

The mission of the tank battalion in reserve generally includes only a direction and order of displacement.

Generally the combat formation of the tank battalion in the meeting engagement is one echelon with a reserve element (one or two tank platoons). Such a combat formation is used when the mission is to pin down the enemy on a wide front and secure the operation of the main force of the regiment and all three of the battalion's tank companies can simultaneously deploy on the line of attack. This is not
always possible and a piecemeal attack by the lead two tank companies will be employed. The third tank company will constitute a reserve and displace to the threatened flank, in echelon right or left. 

**Beginning and Conduct of the Meeting Engagement in Deployment from the March:**

The organization of the meeting engagement includes making a decision, assigning combat missions to subordinate units, and coordinating the actions of subordinate units, attached units, and fire support units.

Some aspects of organizing for combat are already anticipated in preparing for a meeting engagement. This is a peculiarity of meeting engagements. A higher commander may, if time permits, personally assign the mission to the battalion commander. He will inform the battalion commander of his concept and possible lines of contact. When this is not possible, he may give a combat order to the battalion commander by radio—this is the usual case. Most Soviet tactical training exercises begin this way but an interesting variant of this practice occurred in a training exercise when the regimental commander came up on the battalion net. As the order was given to the battalion commander, company commanders monitored. With a short frag order the entire battalion was on the way. There isn't time for a detailed order, so the battalion commander receives the regimental mission, direction of attack, and the mission of the tank battalion. Additionally, in the combat order may be indicated
enemy objectives to be destroyed by supporting strikes, nuclear and non-nuclear, and also the missions of neighboring units.

In a meeting engagement it may happen that the battalion commander does not receive a combat order from a higher headquarters. In this case he must act independently to determine the objective of the battle, make a decision based on the current situation and the concept for a possible meeting engagement, previously given by the senior commander when the march was organized. The battalion commander must not only know how to employ his forces and do it quickly, but he must appreciate its role in the overall regimental mission.

In order to personalize the theoretical discussion of the meeting engagement, COL Maikov, a co-author of the text, *Tank Battalion in Combat*, set up the following problem and fully discussed the working of the problem. His intention is to instruct Soviet armor officers. The problem is equally instructive to American armor officers.

"Cdr of 2d Tk Bn at 10.00 8.6 (1000 hours, 8 June) received a combat order from the Cdr of 5th Tk Regt:

1. Two enemy columns of a depth up to 15 km are each moving in the direction, Dobrodaevo-Petrovo. At 10.00 8.6 the heads of the columns were noted at the line, Panenko-Eremevo (30 km West of Dobrodaevo). At the same time movement of an enemy column of a depth up to 3 km is reported. The head of the column is located near Petrovo.

2. 5th Tk Regt, from the line, Saltykov-El 152.7 (North of Petrovo), at 1200 8.6,
strikes in the direction, Vetrovo Farm-
Dobrodaevo, to defeat approaching enemy
reserves.

3. 2d Tk Bn is the vanguard of the regt. 2d Tk
Bn is to destroy the enemy column, which is
moving out of Petrovo, in the area North of
Ponizove, and having seized the line, El
152.7-168.0, is not to allow a penetration
by the enemy in the direction, Petrovo-Samsonovo,
and is to secure the deployment of the main
force of the regt. With the beginning of the
attack of the main force of the regt from the
area North of Petrovo, 2d Tk Bn is to be ready
to attack in the direction, El 168.0-Košovo."

The battalion, acting as vanguard for the regiment,
must destroy the lead security elements of the enemy, block
his main force from moving in the direction, Petrovo-Samsonovo,
secure the deployment of the regiment and participate in a
coordinated attack to destroy the main enemy force. A
sketch of the situation is provided for reference on the next
page. The first step in the working of the problem is the
commander's use of available time.

"It is now 10.05 8.6. It is 5 km to the line of
expected contact with the enemy, Brickyard (1 km
South of El 152.4)-Ponizove. 20-25 min total are
required in order to reach the area, considering
movement at 20-30 k/hr, and the time necessary
for the companies to deploy into attack formation.
In this time it is necessary to make an estimate
of the situation, make a decision and assign the
missions to subordinate units. The available
time for organizing the meeting engagement is
divided as follows: for the estimate of the situ-
ation - 5 min; combat missions will be assigned to
subordinate units by radio at 10.15 8.6."

Obviously some of the analysis necessary to the estimate of
the situation is accomplished beforehand and the commander
carefully follows the situation during the march.
The battalion commander made the following estimate of the situation:

"1. Enemy column, observed at 10.00 8.6 in the area of Petrovo, judging by its depth, is most likely the vanguard of the enemy. Vanguard strength is a reinforced bn. Enemy main forces at that time were observed at the line, Panenko-Eremeovo (30 km West of Dobrodaev)."
Movement of the vanguard of the enemy into the area North of Ponizove, considering the time for its deployment in combat formation, is possible at 10.30-10.35 8.6. Considering the terrain, the enemy strike is possible from the line, El 152.4-Ponizove, in the direction, El 152.4-Samsonovo, or in the direction, Brickyard-El 158.0-Samsonovo.

Movement of the enemy main force into the area of Ponizove can be expected in 1-1/2 to 2 hrs. (approx. 11.30-12.00 8.6). This allows time to destroy the vanguard before the entry of the main forces into the area.

2. 2d Tk Bn is located about the same distance from the line, El 152.4-Ponizove, as the enemy column moving out of Petrovo.

Consequently, considering the closing speed and the time necessary for deployment, 2d Tk Bn can deploy and attack the enemy at 10.25-10.30 8.6, that is simultaneously with the enemy. In connection with this, in order to create favorable conditions for the initial strike by the 2d Tk Bn and to anticipate the enemy in deployment, it is necessary that the lead security element and the combat recon patrol and the artillery fire support disrupt and defeat the enemy as he enters the area North of Ponizove and that the deployment of the bn main force in the area Northeast of Ponizove be secured.

Considering the possible actions of the enemy in the direction, El 152.4-Samsonovo, and in the direction, Brickyard-El 158.0-Samsonovo, the deployment line for the 2d Tk Bn is Brickyard (1 km South of El 152.4)-Ponizove.

With the goal of creating a decisive superiority for the destruction of the enemy vanguard before the approach of the main force, it is necessary to include in the attack the maximum number of tanks. Correspondingly, the combat formation of 2d Tk Bn will be a single echelon, having 4 Tk Co on the right flank, in the center 5 Tk Co, and on the left flank 6 Tk Co(-). Reserve is a reinforced tk plt from 6 Tk Co.

Deployment lines for the companies into combat formation are:
5 Tk Co - Brickyard (1 km South of El 152.4)
   Barn (1 km Northeast of Ponizove).

6 Tk Co(-) - From the Barn (1 km Northeast of Ponizove)-Ponizove.

The immediate mission for 5 and 6 Tk Cos will be further defined upon entry into the assault position.

The mission of 4 Tk Co (lead security element) is to prevent a breakthrough by the enemy in an Eastern direction and having secured the deployment of the main force of the battalion on the line, Brickyard-Ponizove, to attack in the direction El 152.4-Petrovo, when the main force of the battalion begins its attack.

For expeditious movement to the assault position, the 2d Tk Bn will move in company columns. Each company will have a recon patrol leading. The patrol will be a tk plt.

Deployment to platoon and combat formations will be at the initiative of the company commander, depending on the enemy activity in front of the assault position.

Obviously considering the time allotted to the estimate, the commander, making the estimate outlined above, is depending on prior planning in connection with the march, unit SOP, and experience. Now is not the time to begin a detailed terrain analysis or invent a new tactic for the battalion. A simple concept executed by trained troops determined to win is needed. There is no time for a complicated concept and for detailed instruction. There is no time to figure how much time it usually takes to deploy or how best to organize that recon patrol in front of the tank company. The experience through practical training must already exist in not only the commander but the entire leadership chain.
The battalion commander made the following decision for the meeting engagement:

"1. Decision: Engage the enemy with the forces of the lead security element, 4 Tk Co, from the Western edge of the grove, which is North of El 158.0, to prevent a breakthrough by the enemy in the direction of Samsonovo. Under cover of 4 Tk Co, rapidly move the battalion to the line, Brickyard (1 km South of El 152.4)-Ponizove. Exploiting the results of arty fire support, the battalion attacks in the direction, El 158.0-Petrovo, to destroy the enemy vanguard moving into the area, El 152.4-Petrovo-El 162.4, before the approach of the enemy main force. 2d Tk Bn will seize the line, El 152.7-El 168.0, securing the deployment and entry into battle of the main force of 5 Tk Regt from the line, Saltykov-El 152.7.

Bn combat formation will be a single echelon, having 4 Tk Co on the right flank, 5 Tk Co in the center, 6 Tk Co(-) on the left flank, and in reserve a tk plt from 6 Tk Co.

2. 4 Tk Co, from the Western edge of the grove which is North of El 158.0, engages the enemy to prevent a breakthrough by the enemy in the direction of Samsonovo and secures the deployment of the battalion in the area Northeast of Ponizove. With the beginning of the attack by the battalion main force, 4 Tk Co strikes in the direction, El 152.4-Petrovo.

5 Tk Co, from the line, Brickyard (1 km South of El 152.4)-Barn (1 km Northeast of Ponizove), attacks in the direction, Barn (1 km Northeast of Ponizove) - El 150.6, in coordination with 4 Tk Co and 6 Tk Co, to destroy the enemy column approaching from the direction of Petrovo and to seize the line, El 152.7-Up to 168.0.

6 Tk Co(-), from the line, from the Barn (1 km Northeast of Ponizove)-Ponizove, attacks in the direction, Ponizove- El 162.4, in coordination with 5 Tk Co, to destroy the enemy column approaching from Petrovo and to seize El 168.0.

1 Arty Bn occupies firing positions south of Samsonovo, supports the battle of the lead security element, 4 Tk Co, to prevent an enemy breakthrough in the direction of Samsonovo and to
secure the deployment of the main force of the battalion in the area Northeast of Ponizove. At 10.25 8.6 be ready to deliver concentrated fire on the enemy formation in the area North of Ponizove. Assignments for supporting fires remain the same.

3. Order of coordination in the meeting engagement:

-the entry and deployment of the 2d Tk Bn in the assault position are secured by the lead security element, 4 Tk Co, and 1 Arty Bn.

-to forestall the deployment of the enemy force, 1 Arty bn fires on the enemy column upon enemy entry into the area of El 150.6; also to forestall the enemy in deployment, tank-ambushes are to be organized by 4 Tk Co in the area Northwest of El 152.4 and by the combat recon patrol in the area of El 162.4.

-for the most rapid entry to the assault position, bn uses company columns covered by recon patrols of a tk plt from each company.

-5 and 6 Tk Cos move out in combat formation in the assault position, Brickyard-Ponizove, by 10.30 8.6.

-in support of the bn attack, 1 Arty Bn fires on the main enemy formation North of Ponizove from 10.25 to 10.40 8.6, together with direct fire from tank companies.

-with the attack of the main force of the regt in the direction, Farm Vetrovo-Dobrodaevo, 2d Tk Bn attacks in the direction, El 168.0-Kosovo.

-upon moving up to the line, El 152.7-El 168.0, by fire from in place, prevent enemy reserves from breaking through in the direction, Petrovo-Samsonovo, and secure the deployment and attack of the main force of the regt from the line, Saltykov - El 152.7."

Again, such an amount of work in such a short period of time can only be accomplished by prior planning, established SOP, and experience. After the estimate of the situation and making the decision, the battalion commander issues the
battle order to subordinate commanders in order of their entry into battle. Considering the given situation, the order would be given first to Cdr, 4 Tk Co, and Cdr, 1 Arty Bn, then to Cdr, 5 Tk Co, to Cdr, 6 Tk Co(-), and the reserve force commander.

**Certain Specifics of the Tank Battalion in the Meeting Engagement:**

During the march the battalion commander will be at the head of the main force column. The commander of the van-guard battalion, upon the initiation of combat by the lead security element, quickly moves to it, determines more precisely the situation, assigns a mission to the supporting artillery in support of the lead security element, and makes his decision on deployment of the battalion. The battalion commander assigns missions by short frag orders, transmitted by radio, simultaneously making more exact the questions of coordination. This is the present practice. It is criticized by one Soviet military writer who contends that the commander doesn't have to recon personally in this situation. The commander will lose time. The lead security element needs the artillery support immediately not after the battalion commander has moved up to the lead security element and checked the situation. In that time the outcome of the battle of the lead security element may be decided and the enemy may deploy his main force before the battalion commander has decided on his deployment and artillery support. Variants suggested by the author are: make decision on the way to
lead security element, inform units by radio frag order; move up to the lead security element in anticipation of contact so that battalion commander will be there on contact; direct fixing forces by radio, battalion commander remaining with the main force to deploy and conduct them in the attack. The criticism is important. There should be no fixed practice on personal recon; the battalion commander should decide if such an action is mission essential. There is a tendency toward fixed practice regardless of the situation.

The meeting engagement of a tank battalion with the enemy begins with the contact of units conducting recon and of units acting as lead security elements. The combat recon patrol, coming into contact with the enemy, resolutely and decisively penetrates the enemy's advanced security and aims for the main force, determining its direction of movement, makeup of the column, and uninterruptedly observes its movement and the nature of its activities. It reports to the battalion commander and the commander of the lead security element. Collection of information will continue during the course of the meeting engagement.

By frag orders the battalion commander makes necessary adjustments based on the situation. For example he may have to advance the assault position, if the enemy has not yet moved into the area. The direction of the attack should bring the companies into the enemy flank. This may require adjustment as the situation develops.
The lead security element of the battalion, upon meeting enemy recon and enemy security elements, quickly destroys them and continues to fulfill its mission of moving to the line to be seized by the battalion. When a superior enemy force is encountered by the lead security element, the lead security element attacks determinedly, occupying an advantageous line on a wide front, with direct tank fire and supporting artillery fire, defeats the enemy, and together with its assigned motorized infantry element secures favorable conditions for the deployment and entry of the battalion into battle. When the enemy anticipates the battalion in deployment, the lead security element occupies the line designated for the deployment of the battalion and holds it for the arrival of the battalion. If the situation permits, the commander of the lead security element organizes tank ambushes to disrupt the organized deployment of the enemy into combat formations. Artillery, supporting the lead security element and the vanguard, occupies firing positions on the move and quickly opens fire on the enemy columns and its deploying units.

The battalion in accordance with the decision of the commander, under cover of the lead security element and the combat recon patrol, moves to the assault position, on the move deploys into combat formation, following nuclear or other supporting strikes, attacks the opposing enemy force and secures the deployment and entry into combat of the main
force of the regiment. Upon contact with superior enemy forces who have anticipated the vanguard in deployment and who are conducting an attack, the tank battalion, by decisive action pins down the enemy on a wide front; by tank, artillery, and other supporting fires, defeats him and secures the deployment of the main force of the regiment. In fulfilling this mission the battalion commander widely uses tank ambushes and maneuver in the direction that the enemy is attempting to break through or to seize a line of deployment. In these conditions, a new decision may be required which will differ greatly from the pre-planned order. The battalion may deploy on one or both flanks of the lead security element.

When the battalion is operating as part of the main force and receives a mission to deploy, the commander immediately dispatches a combat recon patrol in the direction of the assault position. The commander makes his estimate and decision and by radio issues a frag order indicating the line of deployment. With the deployment of the battalion into company columns, the companies dispatch patrols forward to cover the company advance to the assault positions. The move to the assault position is made at all possible speed, hidden, and by the shortest possible routes. Exploiting the situation on the battlefield, a battalion in the first echelon attacks decisively, either independently or in coordination with other units.
Contaminated areas are usually bypassed by the tank battalion, or, if necessary, rapidly crossed in the shortest direction. A partial decontamination is made after leaving the contaminated area. A complete decontamination is made after the battle or when the unit is in reserve. A mine field likewise is bypassed, or, if mission requires, it will be crossed with the aid of tanks equipped with mine destroying equipment and with the aid of combat engineers. 35

For the development of the offensive in the course of the meeting engagement, the commander first of all uses gaps in the enemy combat formation, open flanks and his own reserve. The reserve of the battalion moves, as the experience of the past war shows, at a distance of 1 1/2-2 km from the main force. The reserve follows the column on the threatened flank and enters the battle depending on the situation. In the course of the meeting engagement, the reserve is used to prevent a surprise enemy strike, especially on the flanks or in the rear. It is also used to exploit success, when the companies are engaged, and also for the seizure and destruction of the enemy's nuclear capability. The battalion commander generally provides the reserve commander the latest enemy situation, line of departure or line of contact, the combat mission, and artillery support.

In the course of the meeting engagement, it could happen that the tank battalion will have to deploy to one of the flanks. In this case the flank security element, upon contact with the enemy, by vigorous action on an advantageous
line, pins down the enemy on a wide front, securing the deployment of the tank battalion in that direction. In such a case the battalion effectively ends up in a vanguard role.

Should the enemy, in the course of the meeting engagement take up a defensive position, the commander directs his forces in an envelopment of the enemy in order to destroy him by attacks on the flanks and in the rear. Should the enemy attempt to withdraw, the commander will direct the destruction of the covering force, determinedly penetrate to the main enemy force and destroy them by coordinated action with neighboring units or units conducting a parallel pursuit. The end result of the meeting engagement is the complete destruction of the enemy.

TRAINING EXAMPLES

Available Soviet military writings in addition to those already discussed place great emphasis on the meeting engagement. Most of the writings concern the meeting engagement from the march. The writings are professional and well-written. All the writings emphasized speed and aggressiveness. They emphasize salient points in the Soviet concept of the meeting engagement.

In several articles the point emphasized was terrain analysis combined with organized aggressive recon. Commanders were defeated in tactical exercises for failure to conduct a thorough terrain analysis, a map recon and an
actual ground reconnaissance. The following briefly describes one of these exercises, which was not only a severe test for the commanders but also for the individual tank crews. In the development of an offensive, "South" forces were pressing their attack. 1st Tank Battalion was assigned the mission of forward detachment for the South forces. "North" forces in order to counter this offensive, were moving up sizable reserves. 2d Tank Battalion was assigned the mission of vanguard of this reserve force. The assigned missions brought the two battalions into a meeting engagement in difficult terrain. Both commanders made estimates, formed their decisions, and gave their orders to their subordinate commanders in accordance with the procedures that were just examined in detail. Both commanders from map recon recognized the difficulty of the terrain. The commander of the 1st Tank Battalion, however, believed that if there were even a remote possibility of exploiting what appeared to be an impassable approach to the most likely area of contact with the enemy, use of this approach by a portion of his force would permit a flanking strike against the enemy force. He ordered his recon patrol to check this area. The area was discovered to be passable with difficulty, but communication between the patrol and the battalion was lost. Not waiting further for the patrol's report, the battalion commander taking the risk employed this approach in his conduct of the meeting engagement and decisively
defeated the opposing force. The commander of the 2d Tank Battalion contributed to his own defeat by not checking the area for his own possible exploitation and by not at least considering the flank of his battalion threatened from this direction and dispatching a security element.

There were variations on ways to use time most efficiently and gain an advantage on the enemy force. In several cases, the commander, engaged in the exercise, shortened the gap between the lead security element and the main force in anticipation of the meeting engagement. Commanders are encouraged to do their estimating and decision-making "on the way" and use frag orders. In an exercise previously mentioned, the regiment commander entered a subordinate battalion command net and gave the combat order to the battalion commander. At the time the battalion, which had been pursuing retreating enemy forces, was being assigned the mission of forward detachment for the regiment as the regiment moved to attack enemy reserves approaching from deep in the enemy's rear area. The order was monitored at the same time by the subordinate company commanders. It took only a frag order on the way to complete the planning for the meeting engagement. Much time was saved. When the lead security element arrived at its designated target, the enemy had not yet arrived in the area. Rather than simply deploy and await the enemy as some commanders might have done, the commander of the lead security element determined the next advantageous position and with the permission of
the battalion commander moved to it. 39 As the meeting engagement began, the battalion commander rapidly closed the gap between the battalion main force and the lead security element. He thus ensured supporting distance and a quicker deployment of his main force in comparison with the enemy force. This proved decisive to the outcome of the engagement.

The possibility of attacking and defeating a superior enemy force in a meeting engagement, which is discussed in both Taktika and Tank Battalion in Combat, might be met with considerable skepticism considering the accepted view that Soviet forces by their doctrine must have a considerable superiority over the enemy in an offensive action. Not to accept the concept that in the meeting engagement, Soviet forces will attack even a superior enemy force, means to assume, possibly incorrectly, that should the Soviet forces attack, they must be superior to the enemy forces they are engaging. In the following tactical training exercise, a tank battalion, after a long march, deployed in combat formation and resolutely attacked and destroyed in a meeting engagement a superior enemy force. 40 The Soviet tank battalion, assigned the mission of vanguard, received the report that a strong enemy force is moving to contact. The commander made a rapid estimate and decided to fix the enemy force by employing his lead security element and then attack with the main force of the battalion into the enemy
flank. Movement to contact was possible on two routes. The commander chose the route which allowed for both speed and concealment. As contact was made, the combat recon patrol destroyed enemy recon elements. At that point the situation indicated contact by the lead security element in 10-15 minutes. The battalion commander decided to move to the lead security element to conduct the action personally and to give the final instruction based on the developing situation to the main force element. In the conduct of the meeting engagement, the commander used the combat recon patrol and artillery support to disrupt an attempted enemy envelopment as the battalion was deploying. The commander then executed his battle plan. The enemy force, fixed from the front, denied maneuver, and strongly attacked on the flank, was defeated.

Considerable emphasis is placed on the initiative which is a persistent problem. Positive and negative examples were plentiful. An interesting example was a tank battalion deployed in an attack, in the enemy defensive area, against light enemy elements. Thirty enemy tanks were reported 6 km away and moving toward the tank battalion's flank. The student officers were asked for their course of action. They either stuck to their original order or elected a waiting tactic; neither reckons with the enemy's potential to inflict losses by seizing key terrain. The instructor expected all students to complete the destruction of the enemy in contact and then move to defeat the approaching enemy force in
a meeting engagement, attacking the enemy on the move from an advantageous line. 41 So all is not yet perfect.

CONCLUSIONS

Both the US and Soviet concepts are attempting to define a unique combat action. The Soviet concept of the meeting engagement on the modern battlefield is an aggressive, rapid, and decisive combined arms battle, which ends in the defeat in detail of the enemy. Execution is not yet perfected but it is a professional concept, worked out in theory and practice, which poses a real threat to the survival and mission accomplishment of US forces on the modern battlefield. From the US and Soviet points of view, there is a significant disparity in the size of forces that could be involved. There is a disparity in the study and training to win this combat action which both US and Soviet doctrine accept as the most likely and frequent type of future combat action. There is a disparity in the respective views on the decisiveness of the meeting engagement.

This study has focused on the most threatening aspects of the Soviet concept. The approach has been to focus more on the best than on the worst examples in actual training exercises. Admittedly not every Soviet tank battalion commander will be the master of this concept on the battlefield and not every unit will be able to perform in combat in a thoroughly outstanding manner, but as important as it is to appreciate and exploit enemy weaknesses, it is the
best which must be surpassed and defeated. Differences in
the US and Soviet concepts are substantive and for the
present in favor of the Soviet forces.

There is presently an Army-wide effort to produce much
needed training materials which directly address Soviet
equipment and tactics. Efforts so far have produced the
troop-oriented "How to fight" manuals, various training
circulars on Soviet tactical organization and equipment
recognition, unit-oriented training circulars focusing on
US forces versus Soviet forces in offensive and defensive
tactical problems. However, the Soviet concept and training
for the meeting engagement and the challenge posed to US
forces is not completely grasped. The US concept must be
reexamined and verified by testing in a controlled environ-
ment to determine if US forces can defeat the best execution
of the Soviet concept, if US forces can engage in a number
of simultaneous meeting engagements without breakdown of
command, control and support at levels beyond brigade, and
also to determine what size forces and what varying mix of
forces can effectively be employed to defeat a reinforced
Soviet tank battalion or reinforced motorized rifle battalion.
US forces are expected to fight outnumbered and win. This
idea includes within it the requirement to fight multiple
engagements with possibly rapid shifting and mixing of
resources. This poses challenges at all levels of command
which would be better first met on the training ground than
on the battlefield.
GLOSSARY

Forward Detachment (peredovoy otryad), a detachment consisting of a tank or motorized rifle unit, reinforced by artillery units and specialized units (engineer, chemical), which is sent out from a combined arms force (regiment or higher) with the mission: --in the offensive and on the march, to seize and hold until the approach of the main force key positions, road junctions, mountain passes and the like; --in the defensive, to conduct defensive operations in the security zone. The organization of the forward detachment and its operating distance from the main force depend on the situation and the assigned missions. (Page 304, Dictionary of Military Terms)

Lead Security Element (golovnaya pohodnaya zastava), an element of march security of a unit (company through regimental size) on the march. The composition of the lead security element is from platoon to company size. In addition the lead security element can be reinforced with tanks, anti-tank guns, combat engineers, and chemical reconnaissance teams. The lead security element is sent out with the mission to secure the column from a surprise enemy attack and to secure the most advantageous conditions for the deployment and entry into combat by the column. For its own immediate security and for reconnaissance of the enemy and the area, the lead security element sends out patrol vehicles (Pages 119-120, Dictionary of Military Terms)
Author's Note: The Soviet term for lead security element is sometimes translated as "advance party". This term has not been used in this paper since it can apply to a forward detachment and to a vanguard. For the difference between lead security element and vanguard see author's note after vanguard.

**Meeting Engagement** (vstrechniy boi), that type of combat action, in which a force is attacking an enemy force which is simultaneously conducting a meeting attack in a given direction. A meeting engagement can occur in the course of a march or maneuver, in the course of the development of an offensive in repulsing an enemy counterattack, and also in the defensive during the moving up of reserves or 2d echelon forces to conduct a counterattack on the enemy. The meeting engagement is characterized by insufficient clarity and rapid changes in the situation, by the decisiveness and speed of combat, by an intense struggle to seize and retain the initiative, by rapid changes in the formations of units conducting the attack, by the presence of open flanks for both sides, by freedom of maneuver and a number of other factors. Success in the meeting engagement is achieved by the side which acts courageously and decisively, quickly seizes and retains the initiative in the course of action.

(Pages 104-105, Dictionary of Military Terms)

Author's Note: This definition in its entirety is discussed in the paper. The definition is a little
long and circuitous; therefore, the more succinct definition coined by Mr. Viktorov was preferred to open the paper.

Vanguard (avangard), element of march security (military unit), which on the march operates a certain distance ahead of the main force. The mission of the vanguard is to protect the main force, to prevent a surprise enemy attack on the main force, and to create by its actions favorable conditions for the entry into battle by the main force, and also to remove any obstacle in the direction of movement of the force. The composition of the vanguard and its distance in front of the main force depend on the situation and assigned missions. (Page 5, Dictionary of Military Terms)

Author's Note: The role of the tank battalion as vanguard for a reinforced regiment is the leading security element for the regiment. The vanguard itself will divide for march purposes into a lead security element and a main force element. The vanguard does not have its own vanguard. The mission of a vanguard and of a lead security element are the same but the units involved are at different levels.
FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of the Army, FM 61-100, The Division, Nov. 1968, Para 6-17a. (Also compared were definitions in FM 17-1, Armor Operations, FM 100-15, Larger Units: Theater Army-Corps, FM 100-5 Operations of Army Forces in the Field, to verify the definition.)

2. USARI Course Conspect, Taktika, sluzhba shtabov i tyla 1974/1975, Para 6a(1). (The course taught at USARI by Mr. Viktorov is a comprehensive course on Soviet Tactics, Staff Operations, and Rear Services. It is revised annually and is based only on Soviet military sources. The succinct definition of Meeting Engagement, coined by Mr. Viktorov, is pertinent to this paper. The official definition from the Dictionary of Military Terms is provided in the Glossary. It is lengthy and a little circuitious.)

3. Reznichenko (ed.), Taktika (Moskva: Voenizdat 1966), p. 201. (Taktika remains to the present time the basic authoritative text on Soviet tactics available in open publication. It is widely quoted in current military writing, often without proper attribution. As concerns the topic of this paper, Meeting Engagement, there has been no significant change in the Soviet concept up to the present time.)

4. COL V. Vinnikov, "O vstrechnom boe," Voennyi Vestnik, No. 1 (1973), p. 21. (This article, among more than 20 concerning Meeting Engagement in Voennyi Vestnik and Krasnaya Zvezda in recent years, is the most extreme in its statement of the importance of the Meeting Engagement. Its value lies in the analysis of likely circumstances of the meeting engagement and its emphasis on the speed and decisiveness of the action.)

5. Reznichenko, p. 202


7. COL Konoplya and COL Maikov, Tankovyi batalyon v boiu (Moskva: Voenizdat 1972), p. 123. (This text is the most recent available in open publication. It is a manual of armor battalion operations. The manual confirms the present day authority and importance of Taktika [see note 3].) This manual, Tankovyi batalyon v boiu, provides detailed guidance in the conduct of the meeting engagement. Recent articles on training exercises of the meeting engagement confirm the current value and authority of this text.)
9. Ibid., p. 211
10. Ibid., p. 205
12. Reznichenko, p. 207.
13. COL P. Kunitsky, "Vstrechnyi boe," Voennyi Vestnik, No. 8 (1974), p. 20. (This article is a partial criticism of COL Vinnikov's article [see note 4] for considering the meeting engagement separate from the offensive but it is also a strong endorsement of COL Vinnikov's basic analysis of the meeting engagement.)
17. Ibid., p. 218.
18. Ibid., p. 213
21. Ibid., p. 220.
22. Ibid., pp. 220-222
23. Ibid., p. 225.
24. Ibid., p. 228.
25. Ibid., p. 233
27. Ibid., p. 126.
28. LTC Melnikov, "Vstrechnyi boi tankovova bataljona," Voennyi Vestnik, No. 1 (1969), p. 33. (This article is important for its emphasis on methods to save time in the meeting engagement. It also emphasizes the requirement for an aggressive type of initiative.)
29. Konoplya and Maikov, p. 128
30. Ibid., p. 131.
31. Ibid., pp. 132-134.
32. Ibid., pp. 134.
34. Konoplya and Maikov, p. 138.
35. Ibid., p. 141.
36. Ibid.
38. COL Svitov, "Vstrechnyi boi v gorno-taehnoi mestnosti," Voennyi Vestnik, No. 4 (1973), p. 56. (In addition to the problem of "on the ground verification" of the map reconnaissance, this article emphasizes the calculated risk to achieve decisive results.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY


