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7 December 1976

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE

BY

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Logistical Support of the United States Army Reserve

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Logistical Support of the United States Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC), consistent with the changing doctrine in the employment of Combat Service Support, and improved readiness in the event of mobilization is the basic problem. Recommendations developed in this paper are the result of a review of previous and ongoing studies of the Army Reserve, with emphasis on the role of Army Reserve Combat Service Support units in the event of mobilization, and the impact that proposed changes in organization and employment on Combat Service Support forces will have on the Command and Control Structure of the
Army Reserve. Key ARCOM personnel, members of the United States Army Logistics Center, and representatives of the Directorate of Reserve Components at Support Installations were interviewed, and in addition, comparisons were made with the function of the United States Property and Fiscal Officers (USP & FO) of the Army National Guard. Conclusions reached point out that the logistical self-sufficiency of MUSARCs can be improved by better alignment of required support functions, consistent with command relationships and the changing organization of the major part of the Army Reserve (the Combat Service Support units). Recommendations are focused on a plan to develop a dedicated logistical support organization, similar to the Army National Guard USP & FO, which would provide needed peacetime support and provide the nucleus of a mobilization post garrison in wartime.
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Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. V./Fries III
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Student essays

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The need for the improved logistical support of Major United States Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC), consistent with the changing doctrine in the employment of Combat Service Support, and improved readiness in the event of mobilization is the basic problem. Recommendations developed in this paper are the result of a review of previous and ongoing studies of the Army Reserve, with emphasis on the role of Army Reserve Combat Service Support units in the event of mobilization, and the impact that proposed changes in organization and employment on Combat Service Support forces will have on the Command and Control Structure of the Army Reserve. Key ARCOM personnel, members of the United States Army Logistics Center, and representatives of the Directorate of Reserve Components at Support Installations were interviewed, and in addition, comparisons were made with the function of the United States Property and Fiscal Officers (USP & FO) of the Army National Guard. Conclusions reached, point out that the logistical self-sufficiency of MUSARCs can be improved by better alignment of required support functions, consistent with command relationships and the changing organization of the major part of the Army Reserve (the Combat Service Support units). Recommendations are focused on a plan to develop a dedicated logistical support organization, similar to the Army National Guard USP & FO, which would provide needed peacetime support and provide the nucleus of a mobilization post garrison in wartime.
CHAPTER I - THE NEED

As recently stated by General Kirwin, Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army, when referring to the possibility of a future conflict involving US Forces -- "It will be a come as you are war." Considered in the light of the new lethality of the modern battlefield, the Active Component will be fully committed in the first battle, making rapid mobilization of the Reserve Components (RC) a necessity. "The logistics posture of the Active Component is too weak to support war; for example, the two Corps Support Commands (COSCOM) in Europe now have only twenty-five percent of what is needed to support war -- requiring mobilization of the Reserve Components."

When we consider that approximately eighty percent of the US Army Reserve (USAR) is comprised of Combat Service Support (CSS) units, the need for improved readiness of these Army Reserve units weighs heavily on their ability to respond to a call for mobilization. Given the environment of "a war characterized by short, lethal battles, equipment and manpower shortages, and with little time to mobilize and no time for the twelve to eighteen months needed to manufacture new equipment," mobilization of the Reserve Components pale by comparison. "In the recent eighteen day war, Israel took forty-eight hours to mobilize -- and considered it too long! On 18 June 1976, the Republic of South Korea took thirty-six hours." Certainly the improved logistical support of the US Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM), Support Brigades and other General Officer Commands (GOCOMS) is critical to their ability to mobilize their CSS units.
which are required by the four Active Component COSCOMs in event of war.

There is little disagreement among officers of both components that the commitment of Reserve Component units is to be expected in the next conflict, although few Army Reserve Officers anticipated a call to active duty even during the period when the peak 1969 Vietnam War active duty strength was 1,570,000.  

The reorganization of the Continental Army Command in 1973 and the creation of the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to command both Active Army and Army Reserve Units, and to supervise the training of the Army National Guard, clearly focused attention on the Army's commitment to a Total Force. Simultaneously, the change of the mission of three remaining Continental Armies (CONUSA) to a total commitment to Reserve Component support emphasized the need for the improved readiness of the Reserve Components.

However, greater logistical self-sufficiency of the USAR was not addressed, since the mission of the Army installation charged with the responsibility to provide intraservice support, by functional type, to Active Army and Reserve Component units within assigned geographic areas was virtually unchanged. It should be noted, that the Army National Guard (ARNG) does not rely on an Active Army supporting installation for management and other logistical assistance except when ARNG Inactive Duty Training (IDT) or Annual Training (AT) is conducted on an Active Army installation or assistance is provided by a Mobile Training Team (MTT) or Maintenance Assistance and Inspect-
tion Team (MALT). In fact, the previously clearly aligned management relationship has become somewhat divergent now that the supporting installations either report directly to FORSCOM or the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), while the USAR units are commanded by the respective CONUSA.

In fact, the need for greater logistical self-sufficiency of the USAR has not surfaced in the pressing drive for improved training readiness, better recruiting and retention and Command Logistics Evaluation (COLET) gains. During Fiscal Year 1976, twenty-six percent of the Major US Army Reserve Command (MUSARC) units failed their COLET inspections in the US Sixth Army, although the equipment status and equipment readiness of individual units are closely monitored by the Readiness Regions and the CONUSA, since they do impact on training readiness. Here again, it is not possible to make a quantified comparison between Army National Guard units and Army Reserve units, since the individual states conduct their own logistics evaluations against their own criterion.

At every level, competent authority recognizes the need for improved logistical readiness of the USAR, but the present support structure has not demonstrated the capability to provide this essential ingredient, necessary to meet a realistic mobilization requirement. It is understood that low on-hand strength figures have great impact on the Reserve Component's ability to maintain their authorized equipment, which is not contained at an Equipment Concentration Site (ECS) where it is maintained by the Area Maintenance Shop Activity
(AMSA). In addition, the poor COLET results, which have run at a failure rate as high as seventy-seven percent over a ten day period, have become a training distractor and adversely affect morale.

CHAPTER II - PRESENT APPROACH

The statement that "throughout the years since World War II, there has been a general belief that USAR units generally do not achieve the same standards of readiness as do National Guard units," has never been more true today -- after three years of Steadfast. There has been, to be sure, significant improvement in equipment readiness through increased distribution of Procurement Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA) items to the Reserve Components. In addition, many of the shortcomings noted by the author of the above statement, Colonel Ray M. Carson, have either been corrected or are being addressed. For example, the number of Army Reserve Technicians has been steadily strengthened. The budget for Fiscal Year 1977 provides for an authorized funded USAR strength of 212,400 and 8,550 Army Reserve Technicians, or one technician for each twenty-five USAR personnel, while the ratio was one technician for each forty USAR members in 1974. By comparison, the ARNG, with an average budget troop strength of 371,200 has 29,558 technicians, or one technician for each thirteen ARNG members in FY 1977.

Improvements in receipt of new major items of equipment and a stronger ratio of technicians to perform unit supply and maintenance functions do improve logistical readiness, but tend to give a false assurance of improved logistical self-sufficiency. The comparison
between the greater number of Army National Guard Technicians and Army Reserve Technicians does not reflect two key points:

(1) The ARNG is completely self-sufficient, while the USAR must rely heavily on the Active Army supporting installation for personnel, fiscal, general support maintenance and supply assistance. The self-sufficiency of the ARNG is made possible through the United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USP & FO) within each state. This Federal Officer, serving as a Colonel, is supported by a staff of fifty or more (Exhibit A, USP & FO organization chart for Colorado, dated 1 April 1975) that cannot be duplicated in a MUSARC. Perhaps the closest parallel to the USAR is the Directorate of Reserve Affairs (DRA) at an Active Army supporting installation, with a staff approximating thirty-five (Exhibit B, the new DRA organization for Fort Carson.) It must be recognized that this directorate for Reserve Component support is structured differently in each supporting installation, and often the personnel who have a RC function are located in other departments. For example, the Director, Facilities and Engineering at Fort Carson has a Reserve Branch of seven.

(2) The new Army Reserve Technicians are like ARNG technicians, hired today in a dual status. That is, they must belong to an Army Reserve unit. However, there is one critical difference. Since the first of January, 1969, the ARNG technician is classified as a Federal Employee but is subject to dismissal for not performing his military duties satisfactorily. The National Guard
Technician Act of 1968, which provided for the conversion of all National Guard technicians to Federal employees provides that (ARNG) technicians:

Must be members of the National Guard as a condition of civilian employment; (and) must be promptly separated from technician employment upon loss of such membership in the National Guard;... (and) positions are designed to relate to specific military functions.

On the other hand, the Army Reserve Technician is governed solely by civil service regulations and is measured entirely on the performance of his civilian work. He is not compelled to wear a uniform, and often the senior Army Reserve Technician in a unit is junior to his civilian subordinate (his military boss) on drill night. How can you mobilize an organization like that?

Consider the impact of mobilization on the Reserve Components for a moment. If the mobilization site is a division sized Active Army post, there is a directorate staff which is fully capable of provisions of logistical assistance. In addition, a DRA organization, like the one at Fort Carson (Exhibit B) is in the best position to accommodate Reserve Component units reporting for mobilization. If an Army National Guard unit is activated, the USP & FO has the organization necessary (Exhibit A) to provide pre-mobilization assistance in order to get the unit to the mobilization station.
GUARD

1-Civ

SECRETARY GS-5

4-Civ

LOGISTICS DIVISION

SUP MGT OFFICER GS-12
ASST SUP MGT OFF GS-10

GS-11
SUPVR COMPUTER SPECL
COMPUTER SPECL GS-9
COMPUTER OPERATOR GS-6
COMPUTER OPERATOR GS-5
ADMIN SPECL GS-5
CARD FUNCH OPERATOR GS-4

GS-7
COMMUNICATIONS OPNS TECH

3-Civ

P & O OFFICE

PROCUREMENT OFFICER GS-10
PROCUREMENT AGENT GS-8
PROCUREMENT CLERK GS-5

1-Civ

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER GS-7

COMMERICAL OFFICER (0)  1

DUAL STATUS
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES (CIV)  52
TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL  53
| HEADQUARTERS, FORT CARSON AND |
| HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) |

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<td>CHIEF, RESERVE BRANCH GS-10</td>
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<td>ENGINEER TECHNICIAN GS-9</td>
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<td>DEPUTY DIRECTOR 0-4</td>
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However, when an Army Reserve unit is activated, the logistical support must come from the supporting installation during both pre-mobilization and upon reporting to that post. The difficulty arises when an Army Reserve unit is activated at a mobilization station which has only a caretaker staff. If we look back to the early days of World War II, we can recall many examples.

This points to a further need to alter the present approach, in order to improve the logistical self-sufficiency of the Army Reserve in a way that is consistent with a viable mobilization role.

Let us pursue the premise that greater self-sufficiency of the USAR is really the key to improved readiness and develop further comparisons between the day-to-day support of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. For the purpose of this comparison, the minuscule differences contained in both National Guard Regulations and those Army Regulations which apply to the Army Reserve should be overlooked. For example, the method of accounting for cash reimbursement of meals for officers differs among the Active Army, Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Also, differences in sheer numbers of technicians between the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve can be disregarded since manpower studies provide for strength authorization based on equipment density as well as missions and roles. However, minor improvements in the receipt of new major items, better alignment of applicable regulations, and increased funding for additional
support personnel can lead only to temporary solutions to minor problem areas and yet not be cost effective, since the major issue of improved self-sufficiency is disregarded.

The key problem area -- Command and Control -- was intensified, rather than improved under Steadfast. With the greater focus of the CONUSA on the Reserve Components, the supporting installations, or division sized posts, no longer report to the CONUSA, but now, like the CONUSA, are directly under the command of FORSCOM. How does this affect the readiness posture of the Reserve Components? First, it can only benefit the readiness of the Army National Guard, and, for that matter, the training readiness of the Army Reserve, since we now have a CONUSA with the sole mission of Reserve Component support. To be sure, this change is also reflected through command emphasis in improved support of Reserve Component training by the supporting installations, especially among Reserve Component units which roundout, or are affiliated with, an Active Army unit. Here again, the majority of the Reserve Component units which are classified as roundout or affiliated are Army National Guard units.

The second consideration is how does Steadfast and the affiliation program affect the logistical support of the Army National Guard? Why not at all, since the Governor of each State commands his units and through his USP & FO has a dedicated logistical support operation which does not rely on the supporting installation. However, we now have MJSARCs commanded by the CONUSA, which still rely
on the supporting installation for personnel, fiscal, supply and maintenance support. Only at the FORSCOM level does the command relationship come together. Again, this is not to say that the amelioration of the logistical support has not occurred during the last three years. With the increased emphasis on improvement of the Reserve Components we have seen a realignment of the area responsibility of the supporting installation so that, in most cases, a MUSARC need only look to one Active Army post for assistance.10 In this regard, the 89th Army Reserve Command (ARCOM), beginning with Fiscal Year 1977, is receiving its Civilian Personnel Officer (CPO) support from Fort Riley, Kansas as well as assistance in the preparation of its financial budget for Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) fund to pay their Army Reserve Technicians. In addition, a budget analyst (GS-9) has been added to the ARCOM staff to assist the commander in the administration of his OMAR budget, which is developed by the ARCOM staff with budget guidance from FORSCOM through both the CONUSA and the supporting installation, where historical data is applied. At first glance this is fairly clear cut, considering that in prior years we asked this ARCOM commander to secure his CPO servicing from Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, his OMAR funding through the Director of Reserve Affairs and the comptroller of Fort Carson and his logistical support through the Director of Reserve Components at Fort Riley. Of course, his Major Construction Army Reserve (MCAR) and Minor Construction Army Reserve (MMCAR) funds are still programmed by the US Sixth Army with input from his newly added
Facilities Technician (GS-9)\textsuperscript{11} and engineer support from the Director, Facilities and Engineering (DFAE) at Fort Riley. It should be mentioned that while these improvements in functional alignment are more than cosmetic, still minor problem areas in the support relationship remain. For example, in the case of the 89th ARCOM, the portion of the OMAR fund allocated to Temporary Duty Pay and the Army Reserve Technician payroll are still handled by Fort Carson. No wonder this system is confusing to knowledgeable Active Army officers without prior Army Reserve exposure!

While the present approach places all support functions for the Army Reserve, but not the Army National Guard, on the Active Army supporting installation, we should examine more closely those responsibilities which impact on improving logistical support of the USAR. As discussed earlier, an annual twenty-six percent fail rate, which has risen as high as seventy-seven percent during a recent ten day period, by the Command Logistics Evaluation Teams of the US Sixth Army for the USAR units, should tell us that something is wrong with the present system. Here a direct comparison with the Army National Guard is not possible, since the ARNG is only subject to Annual Inspector General inspections (which have a different criterion) and substitute their own maintenance evaluation in lieu of COLETS.

The present system places the responsibility on the MUSARC Commander, but does not give him all the tools necessary to get the job done. And merely to add Army Reserve Technicians or
Active Army augmentation personnel to the MUSARC staff is neither cost effective nor practical. For example, as stated by the 124th ARCOM in response to requests for comments to the CARR study:

> It is expected that an ARCOM will be able to manage money; However, only the most elementary tools are given to do so. The accounting for funds committed for supplies is a stubby pencil operation. The ARCOM is not in the document flow to be made aware of rejection or cancellation of requisitions until well after the fact. To be able to use this information and to make maximum use of allotted funds, modern (ADP) must be placed at ARCOM headquarters.\(^\text{12}\)

To examine this further, let's look at where the Automatic Data Processing (ADP) is located to logistically support the ARCOM commander. It's not in the Combat Service Support units subordinate to an ARCOM, since ADP is presently zeroed out of the Table of Organization and Equipment, and even if authorized, the computers would be of an earlier generation than the present ADP systems used by the Active Component. This alone is sufficient to make the training of ADP personnel in the Supply and Service Battalions of the Army Reserve difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, if outmoded computers were authorized, the incompatibility with the Standard Army Data Systems in the event of mobilization would be catastrophic.

The present approach requires that the requisition flow referred to by the 124th ARCOM, above, be submitted from the unit to ARCOM headquarters and then to the supporting installation for the commitment of funds. This is normally done by logistics and
financial personnel at the GS-9 to GS-12 level in the Director-
ate of Reserve Affairs, although on some installations this func-
tion is performed by the Directorate of Industrial Operations.
In any event, the computer at the supporting installation
processes the requisition using the Standard Army Intermediate
Level Subsystem (SAILS), forming the link with the national
inventory control point handling the particular commodity. In
the Army National Guard this function is performed by the USP & FO,
and, although uniform among the states, these systems are also
not compatible with those utilized by the Active Component.

For example, let us assume that a stock funded item could
be supplied from excesses within the ARCOM. This would have to
be done by "stubby pencil" at ARCOM headquarters -- while the
USP & FO of each state can cross level supplies with his computer
assets. Once entered into the supporting installation's ADP
system, the item becomes a loss for the ARCOM with the excess,
which is entitled to a credit of from only ten to sixty percent,
(which varies each quarter of the year), while the gaining unit
is charged in full against its own stock fund. In practice, how-
ever, it isn't that clear, since the SAILS doesn't recognize the
difference between a requisition for a USAR unit and an Active
Component unit. The system does, however, look at the priority
of the unit, and since most USAR units (except roundout units)
have a lower priority than their Active Component counterpart, the
item is issued to the Active Component. The integration of Army
Reserve requisitions with those of the Active Component appears to
be more effective than the "stubby pencil" approach, but when the cross leveling example is applied, the action may result in the loss of the item.

It should be noted that the subject of cross leveling within and between MUSARCs has been looked at closely by other studies and that this example merely serves to highlight differences in supply management among the three components -- the Army National Guard, the Active Component and the Army Reserve.

CHAPTER III - ALTERNATIVES

The alternatives suggested for improving logistical support of the Major US Army Reserve Commands range from the continued fine tuning and increased emphasis by FORSCOM of the present system to placing the Army Reserve under the command of the Chief, Army Reserve in a manner similar to the Air Force Reserve.\(^\text{13}\)

A realistic appraisal must recognize the new doctrine -- Echelons Above Division, Extended (EADX)\(^\text{14}\) and the turbulence which changes in Combat Service Support doctrine will have in the Army Reserve. As Major General Henry Mohr points out, 91% of USAR units here changed or reorganized in the 1971-1973 time frame.\(^\text{15}\)

It is further understood that implementation of Combat Oriented General Support (COGS), or by its new name, Restructured General Support, as conceived under EADX "will tend to weaken the USAR command and control structure by enlarging CSS units while reducing the officer structure."\(^\text{16}\) The point of contention here, is that many Reserve Component units still reflect COSTAR and TASTA-70
doctrine while the Active Component has been reorganized under EADX to eliminate the Field Army and its support structure — establishing the Corps, formerly a tactical-only headquarters, as the focal point for administrative and logistical support to the divisions. As an extension of this decision, the build up of the "fix it" capability of the COSCOM under Restructured General Support did not identify needed command and control headquarters in the Theater Army Area Command.

Consistent with the changes under EADX is a proposal for COSCOM Roundout, which would roundout the four Active Component COSCOMs with Reserve Component Combat Service Support units and provide a fifth full COSCOM in the Reserve Components.

Implementation of the changes in organization under EADX, however phased, will continue to place greater stress on the Command and Control requirement of the Army Reserve. This realignment of Combat Service Support, which is designed to:

1. Arm the Systems (Ammunition)
2. Fuel the Systems (POL)
3. Fix the Systems (Maintenance and Repair Parts)
4. Man the Systems (Troop Support) was born in the eighteen day Israel War — "Where Israel canabilized 2,800 pieces of artillery, tanks and armored personnel carriers, and returned them to battle without a maintenance float."

As developed by the US Army Logistics Center, Reorganized General Support calls for essentially the same functions as provided by a state USP & FO in its peacetime support of the Army National Guard.
This, coupled with the need to improve the command and control of the Army Reserve in peacetime and provide a mobilization mission of establishing a garrison directorate staff for opening additional training centers in event of war, is the preferred alternative to the present method. It would also free the supporting installation commander to direct all of his energy towards the readiness of his Active Component Divisional units and the Annual Training of Reserve Component units.

There exists, however, a multitude of alternative approaches to the implementation of a dedicated organization which would provide the logistical support that MUSARCs now receive from the support installation. These approaches vary from the establishment of a USP & FO type organization within each MUSARC headquarters to the addition of full-time mobilization garrison headquarters, staffed by Active Component personnel. Doesn't that sound like the old Army Reserve Corps? The recommended alternative must maximize cost effectiveness, not violate the chain of command, offer more responsive support and satisfy a viable seventy-two hour capability mobilization under the new doctrine, while the guidance criterion must be the improved logistical support of the MUSARCs through greater self-sufficiency.

CHAPTER IV - RECOMMENDATION

The alternative recommended to improve the logistical support of the Army Reserve adheres strongly to a doctrine of greater self-sufficiency of the MUSARCs, through a realignment of the logistical
support functions. It is envisioned that this can best be achieved by more closely trying control of the assets to the mission of the MUSARC. At the same time, the mission of the Combat Service Support units and the proposed dedicated logistical support organization (if not the ARCOM headquarters as well) must support rapid mobilization in wartime.

The real question to be answered is how can the greatest cost effectiveness be obtained? And this cost comparison should not be limited to simply beefing up the present staffing, facilities and equipment. Certainly the real cost is concerned with the ability to commit Army Reserve units that are fully capable to support the Active Component within thirty days after mobilization. This presumes that the initial mobilization stations for these (CSS) units are not limited to the supporting installations, and that the commanders of these posts will have their hands full preparing their divisional, roundout and affiliated units for deployment. Furthermore, it recognized that our many wartime federal camps (except now we call them forts) may require an instant directorate staff to achieve a running start towards their mobilization mission. Fortunately, this already exists at many state installations -- isn't the Pennsylvania Army National Guard USP & FO located on Fort Indiantown Gap, along with a Readiness Group from Army Readiness Region II?

Since all eyes are focused on the mystique of cost-effectiveness, let's sharpen the budget knife a bit. It is unrealistic to suggest that a USP & FO type organization (Exhibit A) be established for each of the eighty-three MUSARCs of the Army Reserve -- nor is it even
necessary. It is just as unrealistic to presume that thirty-four military and civilian spaces assigned to a supporting installation Directorate of Reserve Affairs (Exhibit B) would be transferred in its entirety to staff a dedicated Army Reserve management center. Under the growing affiliation program, we can expect more units with greater numbers of Guardsmen and Reservists to receive Annual Training at these posts — as well as the continuing support of ROTC, recruiting and other area responsibilities. Following this rationale, we can effectively limit the number of these Army Reserve management centers to nine — or one within each Readiness Region.

Effective managerial control of a proposed Army Reserve management center would suggest that it be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the Army Readiness Region Commander. This approach has proven successful over the past three years with the Maneuver Training Commands, which are ARCOM assets. Furthermore, it would provide better alignment among the Resource Management, Personnel and Administration, and Logistics staffs of the CONUSA. Now that the major effort of the CONUSA is directed to the support of the Army Reserve, one of these proposed management centers may be required to support several MUSARCs. By giving OPCON to the Readiness Region Commander, who is knowledgeable of the requirements and priorities of all supported units, we have injected a counter balance.

Of paramount importance is the need to align the fiscal management with the operational requirements of the MUSARCs. While the Readiness Regions are in the best position to balance the require-
ments for logistical support against priorities, there is little justification to deviate from a workable model in logistics management. Here, the example of the USP & FO is a resounding call for a direct interface between these nine proposed management centers and the National Inventory Control Points. A critical analysis will show that an automatic digital network connection with access to a computer at each of the management centers, is required to perform this function -- but isn't this what the National Guard Bureau is installing at each USP & FO? In today's sophisticated technology, an additional large-scale computer at each management center isn't required, since remote job entry to existing computers located at the supporting installation or a mini-computer could handle the necessary functions whether the center is co-located with the support installation, Readiness Region or at a mobilization station. The important point is that the computer software (e.g. SAILS) be compatible with the standard army data systems.

To complete the parallel, greater logistical self-sufficiency of the Army Reserve can be best achieved by staffing these proposed centers with a mixture of Active Army personnel, statutory tour Army Reservists, and Department of the Army civilians who must serve in a dual status capacity with Army Reserve units in an excepted service role. It is further proposed that an Active Army brigadier General, a logicitian, be added to the staff of the Chief, Army Reserve, to exercise line authority over the Colonels commanding these nine Army Reserve management centers.
1. Remarks by Walter T. Kirwin, Jr. GEN, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, with reference to readiness of the Reserve Components.


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.


7. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 5-9, p. 1.


9. US Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau Fact Sheet Number 110-76, p. 2.


12. US Department of the Army, Headquarters FORSCOM, CARR Study, p 1. and comments thereto by Commander 124th ARCOM.


16. Ibid.


18. US Department of the Army, Coordinating Draft, FM 54-6, Theater Army Area Command, p. 2-3.1.
19. Presentation by Charles LeCraw, MG, MOBDES to Department of Army, DCSLOG.


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