A COMPARISON OF THE BROOKINGS AND CNA INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS PROJECT

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INTRODUCTION

This paper compares the preliminary findings of the Brookings Institution and CNA international incidents projects. Since both projects share the goal of identifying the crisis management responses of the Navy and Marine Corps (their employment by the National Command Authorities in response to international incidents and crises), their aggregate findings can be validated against one another.

This is an important comparison. It appears likely that the Brookings study (relying as it does upon open sources) will become the standard work on this subject in the academic community. The Navy has a vital interest in this research because it will greatly affect the informed public's consideration of the roles played by the Navy in support of national policy.

Furthermore the comparison is valuable from a methodological perspective. Confidence in the findings of both studies will increase to the extent that they present similar profiles for the responses.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE TWO PROJECTS
CNA's International Incidents Project

CNA's project was undertaken at the request of OPNAV. Its immediate focus is upon the operations of the Navy and Marine Corps, with the longer term aim of introducing the activities of the other two services into the analysis. Up to this point its primary task
has been to trace out the anatomy of U.S. responses to international incidents and crises which involved the use of naval forces.

The International Incidents project has identified 99 instances in which the USN and USMC were employed to respond to events abroad over the period 1955-1975. The criterion for identifying cases was that mention of the responses appear in documents which are part of (or significant commentaries upon) the military policy process. Sources include the Operational Summary of the National Military Command Center and the annual histories produced by the Unified Commands in addition to Navy documentation.

Certain categories of events are excluded from the analysis, e.g., humanitarian relief efforts and actions which were part of the Vietnam/Indochina War. The focus is upon responses involving 'traditional' military roles (show of force/presence, projection, evacuation, etc.) carried out below the threshold of limited war.

No attempt is made to analyze reconnaissance and other intelligence operations even though these often have considerable political-military import (e.g., those associated with certain U.S. initiatives in the Middle East). Such operations are not covered systematically in the sources available to the project (which go through the Top Secret level of classification but do not include compartmentalized intelligence information).

Similarly, certain instances in which the armed forces were employed to achieve political-military goals other than in the
context of a response to a specific international incident or crisis were excluded (for example, the Suez Canal mineclearing operation).

A major emphasis in the project has been the production of an authoritative list of major responses. These are 'major' operations insofar as they were specifically focused upon at the Washington level in the policy process. This set of cases makes up the basis for subsequent analyses of the Navy's peacetime roles. In doing this, advantage has been taken of the project's access to classified information. For example, the role played by carrier and amphibious forces in the Navy's responses has been charted, employing information that is not available in other sources (such as those which are available to the Brookings project).

The Brookings Institution Project

The Brookings project has more general aims. It attempts to provide a broad examination of the political-military roles played by the American armed forces since WWII, with a special emphasis on the assessment (where possible) of the extent to which U.S. decision makers achieved their goals when they employed the armed forces as policy instruments.

In its coverage of the activities of the armed forces since 1946, the Brookings project resembles CNA's effort in its exclusion of humanitarian relief operations and events which were part of the Indochina War. While it includes U.S. military responses to international incidents and crises in its data base (in fact, such
operations make up a majority of the 'cases' it reports), it differs from CNA's International Incidents project in a number of key respects.

(1) In contrast to CNA's project, the Brookings study relies solely upon open sources. As a result, the Brookings list of responses includes some minor responses that were not focused upon at the level of policy represented in CNA's sources. An example is the U.S. response (of little more than two days' duration) to the Haitian Coast Guard disturbance of April 1970.

(2) The use of open sources leads the Brookings project to subdivide responses which are carried as one unit in CNA's list. Examples include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brookings</th>
<th>CNA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus 1/1964</td>
<td>Cyprus 1-10/1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus 6/1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus 8/1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laos 4/1963</td>
<td>Laos 4-6/1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laos 5/1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama 1/1964</td>
<td>Panama 1-4/1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama 4/1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Open sources tend to be oriented towards the political and military events to which the U.S. responds. Within a crisis of any duration the media are likely to present a number of such critical events and to 'divide' the American response in terms of them. While this ebb and flow of action is contained in CNA's sources.
there is also a strong tendency to 'count' a single continuous response as a single unit for reporting purposes.

(3) Brookings includes a number of intelligence operations that were discovered by the media; for example, reconnaissance flights in the Middle East undertaken in conjunction with the Rogers Peace Plan initiative of 1970. As noted, such operations are not covered systematically in the sources available to the CNA project.

(4) Brookings includes a number of military events which were not responses to specific incidents and crises; e.g., the Sea of Japan standdown (5/1971) and the clearing of the Suez Canal (4/1974). By definition, there are no counterpart operations for these 'cases' on CNA's list.

(5) The Brookings list includes responses that did not involve the USN or USMC. Perhaps the best known example of this sort is the series of small scale operations conducted by the Army in the Congo (Zaire) in the early and middle 1960's.

The net effect of these five differences between the two projects is that the Brookings effort identifies more 'cases' of U.S. military action (see below).

Another difference between the two projects will become more notable in the future. As noted previously, the Brookings researchers intend (where their materials permit) to assess the 'success' of American military responses in terms of the goals set by national policy makers in making particular responses and the extent to which they were achieved by the use of military policy instruments.
This will be a difficult task to accomplish. It will require information concerning the intentions of high level U.S. policy makers (in order that their goals may be identified in each of the responses). It will also require information concerning the other (non-military) policy instruments that were employed in each of the responses, since the U.S. often relies upon a broad set of policy means to achieve its political-military ends (e.g., the use of economic tactics in conjunction with military responses).

The Brookings researchers realize that they have elected to undertake a very demanding task. Given the importance that this question has for their audiences, they have elected to devote considerable amounts of their resources to this course, to the extent that their materials permit them to follow it.

While recognizing the importance of these issues, the CNA project has chosen another path for its initial emphasis, one which involves exploiting its 'comparative advantage' (access to official sources) to produce a more detailed profile of the way in which the Navy's assets have been employed as instruments of crisis management by the National Command Authorities.

COMPARING THE TWO PROJECTS

Why are there two projects which examine crisis management? Essentially because they serve different ends for different clients. CNA's work was undertaken at the request of OPNAV. It is designed to meet the Navy's need for an authoritative account of its crisis
management operations since the mid-1950's which takes advantage of the unique opportunities provided by the project's sources. Preliminary information from the project has already been utilized in Navy studies and planning.

The Brookings effort is funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. One of DARPA's goals is to improve the quality of the public debate concerning the roles played by the armed forces during peacetime. Another is to have the general issue of the efficacy of U.S. military responses addressed. It is not an attempt to provide an authoritative account (based on policy documents) of U.S. military operations over the period nor an attempt to classify U.S. responses in terms of their importance (by observing whether they were noted at given levels in the policy process). It deals with a broad range of concerns (in terms of the range of political-military applications considered) at the cost of a trade-off in depth (by not having access to official sources). It performs the quite valuable function of summarizing what is available in the open literature.

Given the differences between the projects in focus and content, what ends are served by a comparison of the two? Three replies can be given.

First, there is a common core to the two. The modal case in the Brookings study is a U.S. military response to an incident or crisis. Given the flexible nature of seapower (and the extensive
employment of the Navy by the National Command Authorities in making these responses), there should be common patterns in the two data sets. If there aren't, the Navy needs to know about it.

Secondly, the differences between the two projects makes the comparison a tougher test. Confidence in the findings of both will be increased if the same pattern emerges in both data sets, despite the differences between them in focus and content.

Finally, the Navy needs to see what picture of military operations is being painted by the Brookings project. The best way to identify a single scene is by comparing it to other images; the best background context for this purpose is provided by the CNA project.

Both projects cover the period 1955-1975. Over this span Brookings identifies 169 actions involving the four services while CNA finds 99 responses to international incidents and crises involving the Navy and Marine Corps.

This finding was expected, given the five key differences between the two projects outlined previously. The important point is the pattern taken by each set of responses, as given in Table 1 and Figure 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>BROOKINGS</th>
<th>CNA</th>
<th>(Units are the number of responses)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total 1955-1975)</td>
<td>(169) (99)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Both data sets trace out quite similar patterns over time. The correlation between the two patterns is a quite respectable .89. The fit between the two data sets is particularly strong since the middle 1960's -- the period of greatest interest for policy purposes.

CONCLUSION

Despite their differences in purpose, focus, and detail, the Brookings and CNA projects lend support to one another. The overall patterns in the data are sufficiently similar that aggregate analyses can be safely performed with either data set. Obviously this conclusion would not automatically extend to more detailed analyses, where differences between the two in terms of sources and coverage could be critical. An important point for the Navy is that the overall picture of its responses (and those of the other services) that has been painted by the Brookings project is substantially correct.
REFERENCES


2. This is one of the basic problems encountered by studies of this type: how does one identify the set of military responses? In a sense, any action by any member of the US military in reaction to events abroad might be a separate response, e.g., insults exchanged between MP's at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin might qualify. Obviously no one wants to include events of this sort and hence some other criteria have to be specified.

3. Unfortunately there is no "given" definition for the Indochina War. Blechman and Kaplan have the war beginning in 1965 (CNA's project has it initiate with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964). The Brookings study has the war terminate with the end of large scale US involvement in the ground combat phase of the war; CNA's project has it end with the final evacuation from Saigon.
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*Research supported in part under Office of Naval Research Contract N00014-80-C-0723-007.

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PP 123

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PP 137

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