After Action Report:

OPERATIONS NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS

US ARMY SUPPORT TO THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE PROGRAM

1 APRIL 1975 - 1 JUNE 1976

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FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS:

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After Action Report:
OPERATIONS NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS
US ARMY SUPPORT TO THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE PROGRAM
1 APRIL 1975 - 1 JUNE 1976
This Department of the Army after action report deals with US Army involvement in and support of the Indochinese refugee program. Covering the period from 1 April 1975 to 1 June 1976, it focuses on the role of the Army Staff in crisis management and other aspects of Operations NEW LIFE and NEW ARRIVALS as well as a brief account of Army support of Operation BABYLIFT. Included in the report are sections dealing with the preparation, operation and termination of the refugee reception centers at Orote Point Guam; Ft Chaffee, Arkansas; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. Sections treating the

### Key Words
- Indochinese refugees and evacuees
- Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS
- Vietnam

**Abstract**

This Department of the Army after action report deals with US Army involvement in and support of the Indochinese refugee program. Covering the period from 1 April 1975 to 1 June 1976, it focuses on the role of the Army Staff in crisis management and other aspects of Operations NEW LIFE and NEW ARRIVALS as well as a brief account of Army support of Operation BABYLIFT. Included in the report are sections dealing with the preparation, operation and termination of the refugee reception centers at Orote Point Guam; Ft Chaffee, Arkansas; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. Sections treating the
20. Abstract (continued):

participation of Army Staff agencies and special areas of concern - re-
resources and environmental concerns, winterization, legal considerations
and repatriation, refugee employment and enlistment, and Congressional
oversight - also appear. A separate section on lessons learned that
includes planning factors, problems, recommendations, and suggested
principles for future operations concludes the report. Appendixes con-
taining relevant messages and documents, tables, illustrations and a
bibliography, plus a pictorial annex, are attached.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Report Documentation Page (DD Form 1473) v
Executive Summary ix
Glossary of Terms xiii

PART I - THE US ARMY ROLE IN OPERATIONS NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS
   A. Introduction: The General Situation
      -- Chronology of Significant Events
   B. Preparation and Planning of Refugee Operations
   C. Operation of the Army Supported Centers
   D. Termination of Army Supported Facilities

PART II - DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PARTICIPATION

PART III - SPECIAL AREAS OF CONCERN

PART IV - LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART V - APPENDIXES
   A. Messages/Documents
   B. Tables
   C. Illustrations
   D. Bibliography

PICTORIAL ANNEX
   Guam - Orote Point/Fort Chaffee/Fort Indiantown Gap/Repatriation

vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the Spring of 1975 the fall of the Governments of Vietnam and Cambodina was a catastrophe of major proportions which was accompanied by the exodus of refugees escaping the Communist take-over of Indochina. During the period from 1 April to 28 April 1975, Operation BABYLIFT - an effort undertaken by international adoption agencies and under the sponsorship of the Department of State - evacuated approximately twenty-seven hundred Vietnamese and Cambodian children. Some eighteen hundred of the children who entered the United States were provided temporary shelter and medical care by the US Army at the Presidio of San Francisco, California; Fort Lewis, Washington; and Fort Benning, Georgia. Those children were among the first wave of new arrivals in what would be an evacuation of more than one hundred and thirty thousand men, women, and children. The Indochinese refugee program initiated by President Ford and administered by the Interagency Task Force for Indochina (IATF) addressed the needs of receiving and resettling these evacuees. This program, which allowed the refugees to be admitted into the United States under the parole authority of the Attorney General, was funded by a $405 million Congressional appropriation under Public Law 94-23.

To coordinate and manage the refugee program at national level, President Ford created IATF on 18 April 1975 under the direction of the Department of State and chaired by Ambassador L. Dean Brown and later under the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with Mrs. Julia V.
Taft serving as the Director. The Department of Defense, functioning as a member of IATF, was tasked to provide transportation, operate refugee reception centers in the Pacific and the United States, and assist civilian agencies in the resettlement program as required. In the execution of its mission, DOD turned to the Military Services to implement the support mission for this program. In the Pacific, CINCPAC was charged with operating refugee reception and staging areas - Operation NEW LIFE. The role of the Army began on Guam with the operation of the Orote Point reception center under CINCPAC. Army support for Guam was drawn from Hawaii, Korea, Japan, and CONUS. US Army CINCPAC Support Group coordinated Army personnel and logistical support for Operation NEW LIFE. Concurrently, the Department of Defense, acting through JCS, commenced military support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS by tasking the Services to operate refugee reception centers in CONUS: the Army at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; the Marine Corps at Camp Pendleton, California; and the Air Force at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Shortly thereafter, the refugee population on Guam reached capacity and as facilities became overloaded in the wake of the approaching typhoon season, the decision was made that the Army should open a fourth CONUS refugee reception center located at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.

Support to the Indochinese refugee program by Headquarters, Department of the Army, was under the staff management of the Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Commander, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), was the primary operator in the field.
with responsibility for the two Army refugee reception centers in CONUS. Both of the Army centers were staffed by a task force with military and civilian components. The military was responsible for billeting, messing, medical support, and the security of the refugees, while the civilian agencies managed processing and resettlement.

Of the more than one hundred and thirty thousand refugees who passed through the reception facilities on Guam, the Army-run Orote Point center processed most of them during the period 23 April to 24 June 1975. In CONUS, Fort Chaffee received and processed over fifty thousand refugees during its operation from 2 May through 20 December 1975 while over twenty-two thousand refugees were received and processed at Fort Indiantown Gap from 28 May through 15 December 1975.

In summary, more than eight thousand members of the Total Army participated in Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, supporting the reception and resettlement of fifty-five percent of the refugees who entered the United States after caring for more than one hundred and twelve thousand evacuees on Guam. The total incremental costs for Army refugee support were approximately $61.9 million; full reimbursement for this amount was received from IATF. The Army mission in these operations was performed in a highly professional and compassionate manner which was acknowledged by all levels of the US Government. This extensive role in the Indochinese refugee program constituted a unique yet highly challenging chapter in US Army history.
## Glossary of Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAFES</td>
<td>Army and Air Force Exchange Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADT</td>
<td>Active Duty for Training: active duty service by members of the Army Reserve or Army National Guard for specified periods of time</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(ISA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BABYLIFT</td>
<td>Operation BABYLIFT: the joint civilian/military effort that evacuated approximately twenty-seven hundred children from Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP Guam</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative for Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>US Army CINCPAC Support Group: the Army interface with CINCPAC headquarters</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)</td>
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<td>DAO</td>
<td>Defense Attache Office</td>
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<td>DARCOM</td>
<td>US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOMS</td>
<td>Director of Military Support</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Defense Supply Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRV</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)</td>
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<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>US Army Forces Command</td>
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<td>FRC</td>
<td>Federal Regional Council</td>
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<td>FSI</td>
<td>Foreign Service Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>General Services Administration</td>
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<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEW</td>
<td>Department of Health, Education, and Welfare</td>
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<td>IATF</td>
<td>Interagency Task Force for Indochina</td>
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<td>ICEM</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Immigration and Naturalization Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)</td>
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<td>JRICO</td>
<td>Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khmer</td>
<td>Cambodian: name of the ethnic group comprising the Cambodian people or Cambodians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>Logistics Control Center, JCS (J-4)</td>
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<td>LOI</td>
<td>Letter of Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACOM(s)</td>
<td>Major Command(s) of the US Army directly subordinate to Headquarters, Department of the Army</td>
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<td>NEW ARRIVALS</td>
<td>Operation NEW ARRIVALS: the CONUS portion of the Indochinese refugee program</td>
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<td>NEW LIFE</td>
<td>Operation NEW LIFE: the Pacific portion of the Indochinese refugee program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODCSOPS</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN(s)</td>
<td>Operation Plan(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORM/State</td>
<td>Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office, Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command; also the Pacific region in general</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDASD(C)</td>
<td>Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)</td>
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<td>PRG</td>
<td>Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>SAAM</td>
<td>Special Assignment Aircraft Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>SecArmy</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>US Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFNA</td>
<td>Task Force NEW ARRIVALS: the joint civilian/military organization at the refugee reception centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>USofA</td>
<td>Under Secretary of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMS</td>
<td>United States Marshal Service</td>
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<td>VOLAG(s)</td>
<td>Voluntary Agency(-ies)</td>
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PART I - THE US ARMY ROLE IN OPERATIONS NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS
A. INTRODUCTION: THE GENERAL SITUATION

The political and military difficulties which beset the Governments of the Republic of Vietnam and the Khmer Republic during the first few months of 1975 were the cause of grave concern to those in the United States who had been charged with the planning and execution of sustained support to those two nations. Stemming from this pervading anxiousness about the stability of our allies in Indochina, the President dispatched the Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Fred C. Weyand, on a mission to Vietnam in the latter part of March in order to assess the situation. Upon his return, General Weyand reported to the President and, later, testified extensively before both Houses of Congress, warning that events in the immediate future could dictate the complete reversal of the nature of the US commitment to Vietnam and Cambodia. In essence, the balance of US support might have to be shifted radically from military assistance and economic aid to humanitarian relief and the support of the evacuation of a significant segment of the local population.

As reports and descriptions of the deteriorating state of affairs in Indochina continued to filter out of that beleaguered region, they began to trigger thoughts in the minds of many observers that there was a very real possibility of a refugee problem of undetermined dimensions: an exodus dependent on the ultimate outcome of the struggle and the suddenness of its conclusion. Sensitized by a chain of extremely dra-
matic and visible events -- particularly the fall of Ban Me Thout, the
loss of the key province of Darlac, and the disarray and tragedy of the
evacuation of Danang, all of which happened within a few weeks -- the
likely consequences of a military defeat and a political capitulation
for the Republic of Vietnam presented a pressing moral question and an
obligation for the United States in regard to the evacuation of those
Vietnamese who had been closely associated with our efforts in Indochi-
na. The awareness of earlier movements of Vietnamese from areas threat-
ened by Communist control in 1945 and 1954, the latter involving almost
one million people, as well as the periodic chaos of refugee relocation
in Indochina throughout the course of military operations over two de-
cades, provided the vivid historical precedents from which perspective
could be drawn on the implications posed by an evacuation. Already by
the early part of April, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), re-
cognizing the magnitude of the incountry flight of refugees by sea,
directed the establishment in Saigon of the Refugee Evacuation Center
under the auspices of the Defense Attache Office (DAO) to assist in the
management of US support in the southward flow of refugees from the nor-
thern and central coastal provinces. Later, it was this Refugee Evacua-
tion Center which would provide the cadre for the operational staff that
planned and coordinated the evacuation of tens of thousands of US, Viet-
namese, and third country nationals from Saigon to safe havens in the
Pacific. As these things were transpiring, Operation BABYLIFT -- the
effort managed by private voluntary agencies, which was supported by the
Agency for International Development (AID), designed to evacuate Viet-
namese and Cambodian orphans to the United States and other countries
where their continued care and safety could be guaranteed -- was in full
swing with the Army and the other Services lending support. By the time
Operation BABYLIFT was completed, just prior to the fall of Saigon, some
twenty-seven hundred infants and children had been flown to various points
of refuge in the United States or cared for while en route to destinations
abroad.

Recognition of the fact that the orphan airlift could just be the first
phase of a general evacuation effort, US Government officials within the
Department of State and Defense were occupied with the task of preparing
contingency plans. On 12 April Operation EAGLE PULL was executed at the
direction of National Command Authority; this operation required the evac-
uation of the US Mission staff from Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Concurrently, a
large number of people from Vietnam and Cambodia had taken to the sea in
order to escape by whatever means at their disposal. Sampans, fishing
boats, inland watercraft, and seagoing vessels -- literally anything afloat
-- were pressed into service by those fleeing from the fear of an imminent
"bloodbath" when the Communists took over. US Navy ships on station off
the coast of Vietnam and Cambodia began the task of picking up refugees
and escorting them to safe havens, which initially meant US installations
in the Philippines.

On 18 April President Ford appointed Ambassador L. Dean Brown as his
Special Representative for Indochinese Refugees and as the Director of
I-A-3
of the Interagency Task Force for Indochina (IATF) in order to coordinate all US Government activities concerned with the evacuation from Southeast Asia, including those of the Military Departments and Services. Ambassador Brown immediately established a small staff of officers from various Federal agencies who began at once to operate on a twenty-four hour basis from the Operations Center of the Department of State. A larger body was also assembled from senior officials of the Departments of State; Defense; Justice; Health, Education, and Welfare; Transportation; Treasury; Labor; Interior; and Housing and Urban Development, plus representatives of the US Agency for International Development; US Information Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Office of Management and Budget; and Immigration and Naturalization Service; which met daily to plan, execute, and manage the short- and long-range interests of the refugee program. IATF was given the mandate to coordinate at the national level the myriad of actions and programs undertaken by this ad hoc group of US Government agencies charged with the various tasks required to support Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS in the Pacific and in the continental United States: the reception and processing of evacuees from Indochina and subsequent actions taken to relocate and resettle them. Ambassador Brown was replaced on 27 May 1975 by Mrs. Julia V. Taft of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare who served as the Director, IATF, until its termination on 31 December 1975.

At the time that the organizational framework required to manage and support the refugee effort was being shaped, the admission into the United States of some 150,000 Indochinese refugees was granted by the Attorney
General under his normal parole authority. This provision for refugee asylum is contained in the US Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, which authorizes the Attorney General, at his discretion, to parole into the US any alien on a temporary basis because of an emergency or other reasons that are in the public interest. Previous applications of the law allowed the entry of tens of thousands of Hungarians, Cubans, and others seeking refuge from persecution in their homelands. Extension of parole status to Vietnamese and Cambodian evacuees, and later in 1975 to refugees from Laos, permitted them to enter and reside in the United States without fear of expulsion or deportation, although they remained nonresident aliens. Only a change of their legal status through legislation could cause these parolees to be classified as aliens admitted for permanent residence -- the first requirement toward attaining citizenship and full integration into American society. As of the end of 1976, that initial step has as yet to be taken.

Added reception and processing centers were opened on Guam and Wake Island as the end of April 1975 approached, and upwards of 100,000 refugees arrived in the western Pacific by ship or were flown in from Vietnam via the Philippines aboard US military and chartered aircraft. Then, on 28, 29, and 30 April, Operation FREQUENT WIND evacuated US Mission personnel, designated local national employees, and others from Saigon, thereby terminating the presence of the United States of America within the Republic of Vietnam. As a member of the Interagency Task Force for Indochina (IATF), the Secretary of Defense was tasked to provide military personnel and logistical
support for the refugee program through making transport and selected military installations available to relocate, house, feed and otherwise care for the physical needs of the evacuees, while civilian members of the IATF concentrated on the administration of refugee processing and the sponsorship program. To accomplish this mission, the Secretary of Defense created a Departmental level task force in April 1975 to oversee, monitor, and coordinate DOD activities in support of the Indochina refugee program. Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, initially headed this task force which gave direction and guidance to the Military Services. All major decisions affecting support of the Services to the refugee program were cleared through and approved by this DOD task force. Additionally, Mr. Abramowitz served as the DOD representative to the IATF. In May 1975, Mr. Erich von Marbod, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), succeeded Mr. Abramowitz. In September 1975, Dr. Roger Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for POW/MIA Affairs, assumed responsibility for monitoring the overall DOD refugee effort and served as the representative to the IATF.

The Department of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tasked the Services to nominate military facilities as potential refugee reception centers. From those installations recommended by the Services, three locations were chosen: Camp Pendleton, California; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. This process of selection provided a practical and politically acceptable geographical distribution of sites.
across the country and divided the housekeeping chores of refugee operations among the three Services. A fourth CONUS site was selected in the latter part of May 1975 at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, to be operated by the Army. Therefore, in addition to operating the largest evacuee center at Orote Point, Guam, the Army expanded its role in providing support to Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS by opening and sustaining two refugee reception centers in CONUS at Forts Chaffee, Arkansas, and Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. [See pages V-C-5 to V-C-8 for military command and staff relationships throughout operation of the refugee reception centers].

By the end of 1975, the Army had received and administered to 112,000 evacuees at Orote Point, Guam. Of the approximately 133,000 refugees who eventually entered the United States under Operation NEW ARRIVALS, the Army processed 72,843 (55%) of the refugees for resettlement at two CONUS installations - Forts Indiantown Gap and Chaffee, which functioned through 15 and 20 December 1975, respectively.
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1975

1 April  Department of State requests US Army assistance in the temporary care of Vietnamese and Cambodian orphans scheduled to arrive in the United States; approval is granted by the Secretary of the Army on 2 April

3 April  First orphans in Operation BABYLIFT arrive at the Presidio of San Francisco, California

4 April  Secretary of Defense tasks Logistics Directorate (J-4), JCS, to coordinate DOD support for Operation BABYLIFT and refugee movement within Indochina

8 April to 15 April  Department of State officials consult with Congress in regard to the use of the Attorney General's parole authority to admit Indochinese refugees to the United States

12 April  JCS tasks CINCPAC to provide assistance in evacuating US nationals, their dependents, and refugees from Indochina

US Embassy, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, closes as official US presence terminates; Operation EAGLE PULL is executed to evacuate US Mission personnel and their dependents

18 April  President Ford establishes an Interagency Task Force for Indochina (IATF) to coordinate all US Government activities concerning evacuation, movement, processing and resettlement of the Indochinese refugees

CINCPAC tasks military commands to plan for refugee movement to and reception of evacuees on Guam

22 April  JCS directs the establishment of refugee centers on Guam: Operation NEW LIFE; CINCPAC establishes an Army run tent city capable of supporting up to fifty thousand evacuees at Orote Point, Guam

23 April  The first group of evacuees arrives at Andersen Air Force Base, commencing support of Operation NEW LIFE on Guam

24 April  DA tasks FORSCOM to plan for possible support of as many as two hundred thousand refugees in CONUS and to identify potential sites for reception centers to accommodate them
25 April  Augmentation of the Army Operations Center (AOC) at DA coordinates the Army refugee support mission.

FORSOM identifies Fort Pickett, Virginia; Camp Roberts, California; and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; as the potential CONUS refugee reception center sites.

DA directs FORSCOM to deploy Army support units to Guam.

26 April  Wake Island refugee center opens; airlifts to Guam are temporarily suspended but then resumed on 27 April.

27 April  JCS tasks the Army, Navy, and Air Force to identify two sites each in CONUS for refugee reception centers.

DA nominates Camp Roberts, California, and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, as possible Army refugee center locations.

28 April  JCS selects Camp Pendleton, California; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; as the CONUS refugee reception centers.

Brigadier General James W. Cannon is designated the Commander of Task Force NEW ARRIVALS, Fort Chaffee.

Guam and Wake Island are saturated with evacuees; JCS alerts Camp Pendleton to be prepared to accommodate up to eighteen thousand incoming refugees.

Elements of 45th Support Group arrive on Guam to support CINCPAC directed refugee reception operations.

29 April  Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) heads Defense Task Force for Vietnamese Refugees, a Departmental level task force to oversee, monitor, and coordinate DOD activities in support of the Indochinese refugee program.

The first group of Indochinese refugees arrives in CONUS at Camp Pendleton, California.

46th Support Group, Fort Bragg, and 47th Field Hospital, Fort Sill, arrive at Fort Chaffee for refugee support.

US Embassy, Saigon, is closed; Operation FREQUENT WIND evacuates remaining Americans, their dependents, selected Vietnamese, and other third country nationals.

30 April  Mr. Dc .ld G. MacDonald arrives at Fort Chaffee to serve as the Senior Civil Coordinator of the reception center.

I-A-9
JCS directs that Fort Chaffee be prepared to receive the first refugees on 2 May 1975. DA tasks FORSCOM to execute the operation plan for Fort Chaffee to receive up to twenty thousand refugees - later expanded to twenty-five thousand.

1 May
96th Civil Affairs Bn (-), 1st PSYOP Bn (-), and 720th MP Bn arrive at Fort Chaffee; active Army support troop strength at Fort Chaffee exceeds two thousand personnel.

2 May
First refugee airlift arrives at the Fort Smith, Arkansas, airport; Operation NEW ARRIVALS officially begins at Fort Chaffee refugee reception center.

4 May
First group of refugees arrives at Eglin Air Force Base; the facility is prepared to receive up to twenty-five hundred refugees (later increased to six thousand).

13 May
The 100,000th evacuee from Indochina arrives on Guam.

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) [PDASD(C)] assumes leadership of Defense Task Force for Vietnamese Refugees replacing the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA).

14 May
Total refugee population on Guam peaks at 50,430 evacuees.

PDASD(C) inspects Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, as a potential site for the fourth reception center in CONUS.

18 May
Secretary of the Army, Hon. Howard H. Calloway, visits Fort Chaffee to observe Army refugee center operations.

19 May
DA is directed to establish Fort Indiantown Gap as a refugee reception center with a capacity for fifteen thousand refugees, which is later raised to seventeen thousand.

20 May
BG Cannon is designated as Commander, Task Force New ARRIVALS, Fort Indiantown Gap, and deploys with staff members.

22 May
46th Support Group redeploy from Fort Chaffee to open the Fort Indiantown Gap refugee reception center.

24 May
President signs the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 (PL 94-23), appropriating $405 million for the Indochinese refugee evacuation and resettlement program administered by IATF.

27 May
Mrs. Julia Vadala Taft, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

I-A-10
Health, Education, and Welfare is appointed as Acting Director of the Interagency Task Force for Indochina

28 May  
First group of refugees arrives at Fort Indiantown Gap

4 June  
Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office (JRICO), staffed by Reserve Component personnel, becomes operational to assist service members in refugee location and sponsorship

14 June  
DA directs increases in refugee center capacities - 25,000 at Fort Chaffee and 17,000 at Fort Indiantown Gap - to rapidly reduce the refugee population on Guam

17 June  
Peaceful demonstrations conducted on Guam by Vietnamese desiring to be repatriated; repatriates protest the proposal to transfer them to Wake Island

24 June  
Fort Chaffee reaches its peak refugee population: 25,055 Vietnamese repatriates from Fort Chaffee are moved to Camp Pendleton in an effort to consolidate all the repatriates

25 June  
Army support for Operation BABYLIFT officially terminates; Army assistance to 1,853 (68%) of the 2,715 orphans evacuated to CONUS is successfully accomplished

26 June  
Fort Indiantown Gap maximum program refugee population is reached with 16,809 persons receiving Army support

Eglin Air Force Base refugee population peaks at 5,997

5 July  
Repatriates are airlifted from CONUS to Guam for consolidation and control purposes at Camp Asan

21 July  
General Fred C. Weyand, CSA, visits Fort Chaffee refugee reception center accompanied by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer

Principal operational responsibility for IATF is shifted from the Department of State to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare as Mrs. Julia V. Taft is designated Director of the Interagency Task Force for Indochina

30 July  
IATF announces the decision to keep Fort Indiantown Gap open until 1 December 1975 and to continue to operate Fort Chaffee for an indefinite period of time
10 Aug  President Ford visits Fort Chaffee reception center

31 Aug  Several hundred repatriates on Guam conduct a violent demonstration which results in the burning of two buildings and the injuring of four US Marshals

3 Sep  Repatriates set fire to a third building on Guam

7 Sep  Repatriates oust their radical leaders and elect a group of moderates who promise a policy of non-violence

8 Sep  Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) designated as Director of Defense Task Force for Vietnamese Refugees which coordinates DOD support to the IATF resettlement program

15 Sep  Eglin Air Force Base closes as a reception center after processing over ten thousand refugees in twenty weeks

17 Sep  Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Corporation informs Army officials that it can not fulfill natural gas contract requirements during peak demand periods at Fort Chaffee without reducing or curtailing deliveries to local industrial customers

25 Sep  City of Fort Smith threatens to cut off the water supply to Fort Chaffee unless the Army agrees to pay contested water rates and alleged delinquent bills for services

27 Sep  Army agrees to pay contested water bills at Fort Chaffee under protest pending the result of an appeal of the case

29 Sep  Vietnamese repatriates on Guam once again become restive

30 Sep  DA, acting as DOD Executive Agent for Civil Disturbance, tasks CINCPAC to activate a civil disturbance task force on Guam in the event of violence by repatriates

Repatriates on Guam are offered the option of using a Vietnamese vessel, Thuong Tin I, to return to Vietnam

16 Oct  Thuong Tin I, after refitting and provisioning, sets off from Guam for Vietnam with 1,546 repatriates on board

25 Oct  Thuong Tin I, is reported to have reached Vietnamese waters

31 Oct  Camp Pendleton closes as a refugee reception center after processing and releasing over fifty thousand refugees

I-A-12
1 Nov    Military support of Operation NEW LIFE on Guam terminates

3 Nov    Secretary of the Army is designated DOD Executive Agent for administrative, operational, and logistical support of the Indochinese refugee program; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is to retain his position as the senior DOD member on the Interagency Task Force

3 Nov    Mrs. Taft and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees visit Fort Indiantown Gap to address the unresolved Cambodian repatriate issue

15 Dec   Fort Indiantown Gap closes as a refugee reception center after processing more than twenty-two thousand refugees

30 Dec   Fort Chaffee closes as a refugee reception center having processed over fifty thousand refugees

31 Dec   IATF suspends its activities and is disestablished; residual IATF financial management office remains operational

1976

1 Jan    Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Task Force for Indochina Refugees is established to support the resettlement program for an initial period of six months

2 Jan to 31 Jan Plans for the restoration of installation facilities at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap are prepared in order to return the posts to their pre-refugee condition

9 Feb    FORSCOM submits refugee installation restoration plans to DA

17 Mar   Restoration briefing is conducted jointly by DA and FORSCOM for members of the residual IATF financial management office

15 April Residual IATF financial management office approves restoration plans and projects that will be fully reimbursed
19 April  Restoration of former Operation NEW ARRIVALS facilities is begun at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap

1 June  Secretary of the Army's role as the DOD Executive Agent for the Indochinese refugee program terminates, thereby concluding fifteen months of US Army support to the evacuation and resettlement effort
B. PREPARATION AND PLANNING OF REFUGEE OPERATIONS

The ensuing discussion of those actions undertaken in the planning, operations, and termination phases of the Indochinese refugee program focuses on the role of the Department of the Army Staff. Within the Army Staff, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCS-OPS) served as the overall coordinating agency. In practice, the Director of Operations, ODCSOPS, Major General Charles R. Sniffin, assisted by the US Army Military Support Agency, ODCSOPS, and selected members of the Army Staff, acted as the single manager for all phases of Army support of refugee operations beginning with an intensive effort during April and May 1975. This activity was initiated by oral tasking and later confirmed by a Chief of Staff Memorandum outlining DA Staff responsibilities in support of the refugee program on 23 June [see pp. V-A-51/52]. As orphans were being evacuated from Cambodian and Vietnam, prior to the massive surge of refugees from Indochina, those actions which would eventually serve as the points of departure for Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS began to take shape at the national level against the backdrop of preparatory planning and a wide range of international and domestic activities.

On 1 April 1975 the Department of State requested that the Department of the Army assist in providing temporary care for the Vietnamese and Cambodian orphans scheduled to arrive in the continental United States. The following day authority was granted by the Secretary of the Army to utilize Army facilities at the Presidio of San Francisco for that purpose. Subsequently, Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort Benning, Georgia, were selected as addition-
al installations for receiving the evacuated orphans. The US Army Military Support Agency -- later redesignated the Military Support Division, Operations Directorate, ODCSOPS -- was identified as the Department of the Army point of contact for this humanitarian effort, which became known as Operation BABYLIFT. The first flight of orphans destined for the Presidio of San Francisco arrived on 3 April. Both Forts Benning and Lewis had initiated contingency planning for the support of several hundred orphans at each installation, and liaison with adoption agencies was effected immediately. In all, the Army supported 1,853 orphans of the 2,715 who were evacuated to CONUS; of the remainder, 409 were under the sponsorship of the Holt Foundation and the balance was cared for by the US Navy.

In the early part of April the orphan evacuation was beginning to be recognized as only the forerunner of what was in fact readily developing into an operation of much greater magnitude. While some members of ODCSOPS were engaged in crisis management of Army involvement in Operation BABYLIFT, others were simultaneously monitoring the emergency evacuation of US nationals from Vietnam. These actions were on-going at the same time as thousands of Vietnamese were exiting their country by their own efforts or by accompanying the orphan airlift, and there was every indication that many more would follow them. Furthermore, although at that time the Services had not received any formal tasking regarding the evacuation of Indochinese, the conclusion that a large refugee exodus eventually would cause the US to grant some sort of asylum requir-
ing military support became more obvious.

Out of a sense of urgency created by this situation, preparations were set in motion by the Operations Directorate (OD). With other Army Staff agencies and in conjunction with the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and other Major Army Commands (MACOM's), OD developed a contingency plan to serve as a point of departure when and if the requirement to support large numbers of refugees materialized. This plan, tentatively called Operation COMPASSION, envisioned that the refugees would at first be evacuated to predesignated safe haven centers in the Pacific where they would be medically screened and given necessary care, where families would be reunited if possible, and where administrative processing for movement to the continental United States would be accomplished. The second phase would involve one or more Army installations whose role would be to receive refugees and support them logistically while the appropriate US Government agencies arranged for their eventual resettlement. Copies of this concept plan were distributed to Commander, FORSCOM, and concerned DA Staff agencies for assistance in the development of requisite contingency plans.

With the formation of the President's special Interagency Task Force for Indochina (IATF) on 18 April 1975 [see pp. V-A-1/2], Department of Defense planning for the reception of an estimated 200,000 refugees began in earnest. The Deputy Secretary of Defense also established a task force within DOD to oversee and coordinate participation of the Services in support of refugee operations and to conduct liaison with
IATF [see p. V-A-16]. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) was selected to head this effort and to serve as the representative of the Secretary of Defense on the Interagency Task Force for Indochina.

Guam and Wake Island were identified as safe havens in the Pacific. CINCPAC, which had been ordered to establish the sites on Guam on 23 April 1975, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that additional military manpower and logistical support would be needed if Guam was to be used as a safe haven. Subsequently, the Army was tasked to provide a control element and the necessary forces for the most enterprising refugee support effort at any single site on Guam in what was called Operation NEW LIFE. The Wake Island refugee facility was operated by a civilian contractor under the mission management of Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force.

The Army headquarters in the Pacific that interfaced with CINCPAC was the US Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG), then commanded by Major General Donnelly P. Bolton. As such, USACSG served as the coordinating agency for all Army support to CINCPAC refugee operations. In addition to logistic support for Operation NEW LIFE on Guam, CINCPAC also called upon the Army to staff and administer the largest refugee center on Guam, the Orote Point camp, through which an estimated 112,000 refugees were eventually processed [see p. V-C-4]. On Guam, refugee centers were also operated by the Air Force at Andersen AFB and by the Navy at several sites. With approximately forty thousand refugees at its peak, the Orote Point facility, under control of the CINCPAC Representative, Guam, was operated by the Commander, 45th Sup-
port Group [see p. V-C-3]. Approximately two thousand Army personnel provided support, including one hundred members of the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) attached to the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, the first such deployment of women personnel in the history of the US Army.

The dimensions of the mission facing USACSG can best be grasped when it is realized that the decision to accommodate large numbers of refugees at locations in the Pacific was not made until the evacuation from Indochina was underway. Nonetheless, USACSG had been alerted by CINCPAC on 20 April, for planning purposes, of the potential support requirement. On 22 April, CINCPAC informed USACSG of the directive issued by JCS to establish what was referred to as a refugee support center on Guam. A liaison officer was dispatched by USACSG to Guam on 23 April together with representation from the 25th Infantry Division in order to coordinate support requirements with the CINCPAC Representative, Guam. The 1st Medical Group (-) deployed from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to Guam and arrived on 26 April, followed on the next day by the 25th Infantry Division Task Force, 45th Support Group Command Element, and the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (-). It was this group that erected the tents, the mess halls, the aid stations, and the hospitals, and other support facilities at what was to become the Orote Point refugee center. Refugees were received immediately, and as the population increased, additional support troops were needed. Individual members of the 411th Engineer Battalion (USAR), located on Guam, volunteer-
ed for Active Duty for Training (ADT) and became a welcomed asset. As was to be the case in the management of the CONUS centers, Federal agencies were charged with the actual task of processing the refugees, with the Military Services performing the housekeeping support. Since operations on Guam progressed at a rapid pace, one eye had to be kept on the current refugee population as the other was trained on the imminently approaching typhoon season. By 5 June the declining number of refugees in the PACOM area permitted redeployment of certain Army support elements, and finally on 3 July 1975, the Army completed its mission on Guam in Operation NEW LIFE. The only remaining US Army personnel were a small number of food service personnel who remained to assist the continuing US Navy support of the repatriates at Asan Camp, Guam. [A troop list and an inventory of supplies provided during the operation on Guam are shown on page V-B-1 and page V-B-5, respectively.]

While refugee operations were progressing in the Pacific, FORSCOM and other MACOM's concerned received tasking and planning guidance on 24 April from the Department of the Army for possible support of Indochinese evacuees in CONUS [see pp. V-A-3/9]. This message confirmed previous discussions and planning between DA and the MACOM's and permitted immediate development of contingency plans. The message stated that the current situation in the Republic of Vietnam dictated that contingency planning be initiated to receive, process, billet, and support evacuees at military facilities within CONUS in the event that safe havens outside CONUS became saturated. The message defined the specific areas of responsibility that would apply: the Department of State was to exercise overall control
of the Indochinese refugee program and organize an Interagency Task Force to coordinate the operation; JCS (J-4 Logistics) would coordinate and direct movement of Indochinese evacuees to processing centers in CONUS; CINCPAC/MAC would move designated evacuees from Southeast Asia to CONUS ports of entry; and the Military Departments were to develop plans and procedures to accommodate the evacuees in CONUS. The incremental costs of each of these military requirements, if levied, would be funded by the Department of State with OSD directing the actual operational effort. FORSCOM was designated by DA to bear responsibility for the planning and execution of Army support of the refugees in CONUS. Other Major Commands were to provide FORSCOM with support as required and, furthermore, FORSCOM was to identify those installations suited for use as refugee reception centers and to submit concept plans for their utilization to Headquarters, Department of the Army, no later than 25 April 1975. Previously a preliminary survey of sites had been compiled by the DA Staff [see p. V-B-4].

As the momentum of Operations BABYLIFT and NEW LIFE and the commitment of the Military Services in support of CONUS operations increased, a DA response cell headed by MG Sniffin was formed on 25 April 1975 and situated in the Army Operations Center at the Pentagon [see p. V-A-10]. The function of this response cell was to provide the Army Staff with the capability to respond rapidly to the requirements which were beginning to be generated at an accelerated rate and which necessitated clear, definitive guidance and decisions by DA. The Director of Operations

I-B-7
acted in the name of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army in all matters pertaining to Army support of refugees. Judicious use of this authority, coupled with the ODCSOPS designation as the Army single manager on refugee matters, greatly facilitated the responsiveness of DA in reacting to a rapidly changing situation. The major commander actually charged with establishing and supporting the Army refugee reception centers was General Bernard W. Rogers, Commander, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).

Less than twenty-four hours after notification, FORSCOM submitted three plans to DA, one of which identified Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, as a possible site for a refugee reception center with Fort Sill identified as the installation to serve as the support base. The other two sites considered were Camp Roberts, California, and Fort Pickett, Virginia. It should be noted that until this time, despite discussions and contingency planning on the subject, neither JCS nor DA had been given definite authority to actually establish refugee reception centers. The decision on such matters was being made at the highest national levels with all information channeled through Ambassador L. Dean Brown, then IATF Director, to the US Government agencies involved, including the Department of Defense.

When the National decision came on 26 April directing the Department of Defense to establish refugee reception centers in CONUS, the Army was prepared to respond in a timely manner. The message dispatched on the above date to the Services from JCS stated that "higher authority has determined that shelter for refugees will be provided by military installations in CONUS, while volunteer agencies can arrange sponsors and then

I-B-8
move refugees on" [see pp. V-A-12/13]. Further, the Services were each instructed to nominate two installations as reception centers with capacities suitable to hold up to 20,000 refugees per site. The selections were to be submitted to JCS Logistics Directorate (J-4) by 27 April. The contingency plans that had been developed by FORSCOM in conjunction with other MACOM's and submitted to DA on 25 April were thoroughly reviewed at Army Staff level by the response cell in the Army Operations Center and approved within twelve hours of their receipt, subject to continued refinement. No time was lost in notifying JCS of the nomination of Camp Roberts, California, and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, as the two Army sites selected for refugee reception centers [see pp. V-A-14/15]. On 28 April JCS selected Camp Pendleton, California; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, to be the three CONUS refugee reception centers. Travis Air Force Base was designated as a transit facility with a capacity to accommodate as many as one thousand refugees for twenty-four hours.

The openings of the CONUS reception centers were all carefully phased. Camp Pendleton was designated to be the first military installation to open with a capacity of 18,000 refugees. This selection was due to the location of Camp Pendleton on the West Coast and the fact that it could accommodate refugees initially under hard cover (barracks and Quonset huts). Additionally, it was an active Marine Corps installation demanding a minimum buildup of support troops; it also had support facilities in place and operational, such as a hospital, commissary, etc. However, this was not the case at Fort Chaffee, a semi-active installation, whose normal
post complement was made up of sixty-two military and civilian personnel; a total of 1800 support troops of all types were required, including medics, cooks, clerks, military policemen, and other specialists. Also support facilities had to be opened, the hospital taken "out of mothballs," and food service facilities activated. An effective command structure and operational staff capable of assuming the mission of administering to an anticipated population of twenty thousand refugees also had to be organized. [A troop list of units which supported operations at Fort Chaffee will be found on page V-B-2]. Eglin Air Force Base was the third CONUS reception center opened, with a tent city having an initial capacity of 2,500. In consonance with this plan, Camp Pendleton was scheduled to receive refugees on 29 April, Fort Chaffee on 2 May, and Eglin Air Force Base on 4 May, a timetable to which the centers adhered, thereby commencing the CONUS segment of the resettlement phase of the Indochinese refugee program: Operation NEW ARRIVALS.

Leaving aside the discussion of the two refugee centers operated by the Marine Corps and the Air Force, the sequence of events at Fort Chaffee warrants detailed consideration. As alluded to above, close and continuous coordination existed between the Army response cell and the JCS (J-4) Logistics Control Center. After the Service nominations had been made and JCS selections announced, a hold was placed on preliminary actions being taken by FORSCOM to begin to implement the troop buildup at Fort Chaffee, where Brigadier General James W. Cannon had been designated as the Commander of Task Force NEW ARRIVALS. He was on station by 28 April with about three hundred support troops preparing the instal-
lation for the initial receipt of refugees. The delay in the FORSCOM execution of troop deployment orders was due to certain problems which had emerged at the national level. The selection of military installations as refugee reception centers was a sensitive political issue which required coordination with the Congressional delegations representing those States concerned. However, by late afternoon on 29 April, the difficulties had been resolved and, at 1624 hours EDT the same day, Commander, FORSCOM, was given the oral order to execute OPLAN NEW ARRIVALS for Fort Chaffee and to be prepared to receive the first refugees NLT 0900 hours CDT on 2 May. This decision was issued in a JCS message [see p. V-A-17] and the order was confirmed by a message from the Department of the Army [see pp. V-A-22/24] while the Department of State released a message outlining interagency relationships to be established at Fort Chaffee [see pp. V-A-18/21].

As the tempo of the refugee operations picked up on all fronts in the early part of May, it became apparent to the planners at the national level that the Pacific area refugee centers would soon reach a saturation point while the flow into and out of CONUS centers was not proceeding at the anticipated rate. Guam was a critical stage in regard to capacity with more refugees continuing to arrive each day and its outflow determined by the fixed capacities of CONUS facilities. It had been expected that the refugees would move through the reception and resettlement system much faster than the actual state of affairs demonstrated, a situation which was compounded by various administrative problems that surfaced as delays in refugee out-processing.
Limited relief was forthcoming when some refugees elected to be relocated to third countries that offered to resettle them.

The total refugee situation on Guam and in CONUS centers, aggravated by the approaching typhoon season in the Pacific, dictated that some action be taken immediately. One interim measure contemplated was an increase in the capacities of each of the three CONUS reception centers through the opening of additional buildings, the erecting of more tents, and the provision of similar type facilities. However, this measure did not suffice, and the need for a fourth CONUS refugee reception center was inescapable. On 13 May 1975 the Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed Mr. Erich von Marbod, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), as head of the Defense Task Force, replacing the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) [see p. V-A-30]. Mr. von Marbod was very acutely aware of the situation in PACOM and readily became familiar with CONUS center sites through orientation visits shortly after his appointment. Discussions on the efficacy of a fourth refugee center were ongoing at this time and several locations were under consideration. When Mr. von Marbod visited Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, on 14 May, he was impressed by what was described as an exceptionally well maintained post, conveniently located near a highway, with transportation to Eastern population centers. Additionally, it was judged to be suited for occupancy by at least fifteen thousand refugees. The Department of the Army was then informally advised on 19 May that Fort Indiantown Gap would be identified as the fourth reception center, and DA directed FORSCOM to develop an OPLAN pending the actual JCS notification that later came on 21 May [see I-B-12]
One advantage the Army had in the selection of Fort Indiantown Gap was the experience from having already opened and operated Fort Chaffee as a reception center. To capitalize on this experience in that situation, BG Cannon, Commander of Task Force NEW ARRIVALS at Fort Chaffee, was chosen to assume command of the military task force at Fort Indiantown Gap refugee reception center. This tasking, confirmed by a message on 22 May, stated that the Army should be prepared to accept refugees by the week of 26 May [see pp. V-A-36/38]. BG Cannon was accompanied from Fort Chaffee by the Commander, 46th Support Group, and selected members of Task Force NEW ARRIVALS staff at Fort Chaffee. This group arrived at Fort Indiantown Gap on 20 May with support troops drawn from several of the East coast installations [see p. V-B-3]. All command and support elements were on station at Fort Indiantown Gap and were operational by 22 May. The first plane load of refugees arrived on 28 May -- first of approximately twenty-two thousand refugees to be processed through that facility. Among those greeting the new arrivals at the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, airport was Mrs. Julia V. Taft, the newly appointed acting Director of the Interagency Task Force for Indochina [see p. V-A-39].

Army operations on Guam were running as well as could be expected under the prevailing circumstances when the Army began operating centers in CONUS. The impressive element in this situation is the minimum lead time between when the order to execute the OPLANS was given and when the facilities became operational. The chart on page V-C-1 illustrates the

1-B-13
the short time frame required to activate refugee facilities during that "crisis management" phase. In each instance involving the commencement of US Army support to Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, the preparatory phase ranged from twenty-four to seventy-two hours. In fulfilling this mission, the short lead time caused many soldiers to work long hours and perform duties well outside their normal military specialties, but they still functioned with a high degree of efficiency. Also assisting in a variety of ways were a number of dependent wives and local civilian volunteers; and all those involved generously contributed their time and energy which greatly aided the accomplishment of the Army's mission.
C. OPERATION OF THE ARMY SUPPORTED CENTERS

Commander, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), was charged with the overall responsibility for the planning and execution of the Army support mission, in the field, to the Indochinese refugee program. As such, FORSCOM was responsible for two Army refugee reception centers in CONUS, while the facility at Orote Point, Guam, was under the direction of the local US Navy commander who represented CINCPAC. The following discussion deals only with the two Army refugee reception centers in CONUS--Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.

Fort Chaffee, a sub-installation of Fort Sill, Oklahoma, a TRADOC installation, is located just outside the town of Fort Smith, Arkansas. A World War II post with the current mission to support Reserve Component training, Fort Chaffee, prior to becoming a refugee reception center, had only a normal military and civilian complement of sixty-two personnel during most of the year. Buildings on the post are mainly closed, and the hospital is in mothballs as part of the war reserve stocks. This was the status of the installation in late April 1975 when the order was given to use Fort Chaffee as a refugee reception center with an initial capacity of 20,000 refugees. As contingency planning began, DA and FORSCON were able to identify those areas where preparation of the post would be required in order to accomplish the refugee mission. One of the earliest actions was an evaluation to determine the environmental impact of the center if added sewage was introduced into the sanitary disposal system.
This question was of immediate concern because of the threat of pollution in the streams that run through and border on Fort Chaffee. The first major project undertaken by the Corps of Engineers was the upgrading of the sewage system. [This subject is treated in detail in Part III, pages III-A-1 and III-A-2.] Next, preparation of the barracks for habitation by families was undertaken through the installation of movable partitions and rearrangement of the furnishings. A typical World War II style two-story barracks was suitable for housing eighty to ninety people when re-configured into family or group living spaces. Washing machines and driers were installed in some of the barracks buildings, and several small company sized mess halls were converted into laundries equipped with washers and driers. The feeding of the refugees did not present a major problem, but a definite challenge was presented in ensuring that everyone was fed during the mess hours. Consolidated messes serving larger groups went a long way toward alleviating this problem; while some company-size messes were used, the majority of the approximately sixty-six thousand meals prepared daily at peak capacity were served in the consolidated messes. During the start-up phase of center operations, Army cooks and mess supervisors were used to staff the mess facilities. However, due to the Army-wide shortage of personnel with these occupational specialties, a manpower problem materialized. As soon as contractual food service could be negotiated, mess operations were awarded to a civilian firm that provided cooks, kitchen helpers, and supervisors, thereby alleviating the problem. Rations were distributed and accounted for through the standard Army channels on post, and tail-gate deliveries were made.
directly to the mess halls under a strict system of accountability. Senior military food service personnel remained available at the command level for supervision and inspection of the contract services. Assistance was also provided by refugees who volunteered to advise on means of adapting menus and preparing food in a fashion suited to the diet and tastes of the evacuees.

Together with the requirement to provide shelter and food was the need to administer health care to the refugees located at Fort Chaffee. This was done at an Army hospital of World War II design with seemingly endless corridors connecting long one-story buildings that comprised the complex. The hospital, designated for wartime use, was fully maintained in mothball status. That is, the building remained boarded up while the interior was arranged and prepared to become operational on short notice with equipment placed in long-term storage within plastic containers. Taken out of mothballs, the hospital quickly became functional, attending to such normal duties as recording births and deaths among the refugees. Staffing for the hospital was initially provided by Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and later by US Army medical units moved to Fort Chaffee from other CONUS stations.

As in the case of most natural disasters or human calamities, the need to clothe survivors exists, and in this respect refugee operations are no different. The majority of the Indochinese evacuees had fled their home country with only the clothes on their backs or, at most, a suit-
case with a few personal effects. Donations of clothing poured into all the CONUS centers in addition to disaster relief stocks which the Salvation Army and Red Cross had on hand. These clothes were suitable for spring and summer, but autumn and winter would prove to be another matter. To remedy this problem IATF decided to buy winter clothing for the refugee population which estimates indicated would still remain at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap when winter began. The Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) acted as the purchasing agent and point of contact with clothing merchandizers and suppliers. Procurement and distribution included winter shoes as well as other wearing apparel, all of which proved to be an indispensible investment in providing for the well-being of the refugees.

In addition to the responsibility to house, feed, clothe, and medically treat the refugees, the Army also had the mission to physically secure those areas where the refugees were located. The intention was not to constrain the refugees but rather to keep others out, thereby protecting the refugees from those who could possibly exploit them or jeopardize their safety. A very workable system of area control was innovated and implemented at each center, and no serious incident involving public safety occurred at either reception center. Crime among the refugees was almost nonexistent, and the actual altercations were few in number considering population density and circumstances.

Initial plans did not envision the Army playing a part in the resettle-
ment processing of the refugees since this was an operation to be run by designated civilian agencies of the US Government with their own officials and field workers, aided by voluntary agencies, engaged in the resettlement activities at the reception centers. However, the sheer volume of refugees and the lack of time to prepare for the situation made it impossible for the civilian agencies alone to handle the processing and as a result the Army filled the gap with military personnel. This processing support ranged from meeting incoming aircraft and tagging individuals with identification to screening refugees regarding their job experience in order to determine their employment opportunities. It is not inaccurate to characterize the work of the Army processors as the saving factor that kept the system from faltering during the most critical processing periods. The military organization of the Task Force NEW ARRIVALS at each center indicates how the Army organized to perform its support mission [see p. V-C-11]. In the initial stages of the operation a Brigadier General commanded Task Force NEW ARRIVALS [TFNA]. [The mission statement of TFNA is included at page V-C-9 and the military and civilian functions of TFNA are to be found at pages V-C-10 and V-C-12, respectively.] Support personnel were drawn as individuals from the Army throughout CONUS -- including a number of USAR Civil Affairs and other Reserve personnel on special tours of Active Duty for Training (ADT) -- with the exception of those units that moved completely intact, such as Military Police companies and Engineer units. Including the post complement, approximately two thousand personnel were required to staff and run each of the two refugee reception centers operated by the Army.

I-C-5
The composition of the civilian component of Task Force NEW ARRIVALS, the counterpart to the military organization, comprising the US Government agencies and voluntary agencies (VOLAG's) which assisted in the resettlement and sponsorship effort is shown at page V-C-13. These civilian groups established procedures that were designed and frequently revamped to expedite the movement of refugees from reception and screening stations through sponsorship/resettlement stages of the processing chain with maximum efficiency. When it is recalled that this system was literally put together in a few days under very difficult circumstances and when the exact duties of each component were not fully defined, the successful accomplishment of the reception center mission is even more appreciated.

The interaction of the military and civilian agencies in operating the processing chain can best be illustrated by the following abstract adapted from the draft after action report prepared by the Senior Civilian Coordinator at Fort Chaffee. A representative story of a fictitious refugee family, it places in context the functioning of the reception center as it operated on a day-to-day basis.

"Nguyen van Thanh and his family of six arrived at the Fort Smith airport in the late afternoon in mid-May. His family and other refugees were welcomed by Red Cross volunteers and ushered to the Army bus waiting to take them to Fort Chaffee.

"After the trip to the center, Mr. Thanh and his family were taken to the in-processing center where they were welcomed by Vietnamese-speaking Americans offering refreshments. As the head of the family, Mr. Thanh was asked by an Army offi-
cer to identify each member of his group by name. This inform-
information was registered by the Army for the Department of Jus-
tice Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), to be
used in all their later processing. Each member of Mr.
Thanh's family received an ID card with a number indicating
the date of arrival at Fort Chaffee and the sequence of
their arrival among that day's refugees. Mr. Thanh's
number, for example, was 51690, to show he was the 90th
person processed on the 16th day of the fifth month.

"After in-processing, the family was next housed in tempo-
rary accommodations for the one night and issued temporary meal
cards until permanent meal tickets and quarters could be
assigned.

"The next morning, Mr. Thanh and his family were escorted
back to the in-processing center and a more thorough inter-
view was begun. Although his English was fairly good, Mr.
Thanh requested an interpreter's assistance for a clearer
understanding. The purpose of the interview was to collect
information for his family data form. Questions asked
concerned their date of departure from Vietnam, job
abilities of family members, dates of birth, and the rela-
tionship of each person in the group to Mr. Thanh. After
this initial interview, the family was transported to
their assigned permanent barracks, most of which housed
eighty to ninety people. There, they were supplied with
linen and personal items such as soap, toothbrushes, combs,
razors, etc.

"After moving into their new quarters, the family returned
to the NEW ARRIVALS processing center for ID photographs.
For further identification, each member of the family had
fingerprints taken. By this time, Mr. Thanh and his family
had been at Fort Chaffee for almost 24 hours.

"Their second day in the center began at the US Army Field
Hospital where everyone was given medical examinations.
Through the combined efforts of Army and HEW's Center
for Disease Control (CDC) representatives, a medical his-
tory was prepared for each individual.

"Mr. Thanh, his wife and two sisters were all over 14 years
of age, so chest X-rays were required for each of them.
Tuberculin skin tests were given to all other members
of the family. If results were positive, X-rays were
taken. Since all of Mr. Thanh's children were under 15
years of age, they were required to receive vaccines and
inoculations necessary for children. An oral polio vac-
cine was administered along with the first series of diphtheria, whooping cough, and typhoid inoculations. The CDC representative issued an International Vaccination Certificate to Mr. Thanh and explained the follow-up required for the additional shots in the series. He was told to give the card to his doctor in the community in which he later resettled and that arrangements would be made by CDC for follow-up.

"Following a rest period that afternoon, Mr. Thanh took his family to INS to receive their Immigration I-94 forms (Arrival and Departure Documents). An interpreter explained the importance of this form; that it must be retained until the owner became a permanent resident of the United States. Also contained on the I-94 form was the alien number assigned to each refugee. Mr. Thanh's alien number, along with his wife's and sisters', was then sent to Washington with biographical information for a security clearance check. (This clearance would have to be approved by the Department of State, CIA, FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Drug Enforcement Administration.) INS officials with the interpreter's assistance, asked Mr. Thanh and the members of his family over 17 years old to sign a sworn statement as to their financial assets. It was explained that this statement was needed for two reasons: (1) to determine ability to pay for his own and his family's transportation to his sponsor, and (2) to determine if he could be considered financially self-sufficient.

"May 18 was their third day at the center and they reported to the HEW complex for further processing. When Mr. Thanh's name was called, he was given a sheet of paper explaining in Vietnamese that he was about to receive his Social Security number and card from the Social Security Administration (SSA). The purpose of and importance of obtaining the card were also explained. After the SSA interviewer had collected all the information needed, Mr. Thanh was sent to get the rest of his family to sign the cards and forms. (Before leaving the area, his wife was given additional supplies of diapers and baby food for their youngest daughter.) Additional information for the family data file was obtained at that time concerning friends or relatives he might know in America or the possibilities of family reunification if some of his family was located in another center.

"At this time, also, a detailed explanation was given to him about the role of voluntary agencies and sponsorship requirements. The Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS) interviewer handed Mr. Thanh a list of the voluntary agencies.
(VOLAG's) with which the US Government had contracted to resettle refugees. He was to choose one of the following:

1. Christian Missionary Alliance
2. Church World Service
3. Hebrew Immigration Aid Service
4. International Rescue Committee
5. Latter Day Saints Social Services
6. Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
7. Tolstoy Foundation
8. United States Catholic Conference

"Mr. Thanh decided to register his family with the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS). He was then told that the in-processing stage was completed and that his file information would be sent to LIRS for the beginning of casework to find him a sponsor. He returned to his barracks to wait for LIRS to contact him.

"Three days later, on May 21, a note was delivered to him, at his barracks, asking him to report to LIRS at 1600 that afternoon. Mr. Thanh was interviewed that day by a LIRS caseworker where a system of matching was used to provide sponsor and refugee with the best possible matching. Mr. Thanh accepted the arrangements for the sponsorship, and the out-processing system began.

"LIRS issued their letter on 31 May to INS certifying the commitment of sponsorship. Upon receipt of the letter, INS verified that all the necessary security clearances were completed and stamped the LIRS letter "VI-CAMP SPECIAL" indicating security clearance had been received. Three copies of this letter were also stamped and sent to different areas involved in the processing. One copy of the letter was sent HEW for retention in the master file for monitoring out-processing. This filing system, which was created in the early days of the center, contained the family data forms, medical clearances, and data processing information of all refugees located at Fort Chaffee. Mr. Thanh's file was pulled from the master file and checked to verify that the medical clearances had been received and that the security clearances had been obtained. It was then sent by HEW courier to the SRS desk at INS.

"While this checking procedure was carried out by HEW, LIRS received its copy of the INS-stamped VOLAG letter and sent a message telling Mr. Thanh and his family to report to HEW's SRS desk at INS where a caseworker would have their file. Upon arrival at INS, he and his family were directed
to an INS official who stamped their Immigration I-94 forms 'Employment Authorized' to be used as working permits.

"The Task Force's travel office received the third copy of the LIRS letter and made airline reservations for the family. The travel office prepared an itinerary card and sent it to LIRS where they finally confirmed with the sponsor the refugees' arrival date and authorized incidental travel money for the Thanh family.

"This itinerary card was then sent to the Joint Operations Center which distributed it to the appropriate American area coordinator. An employee from the area center personally handed Mr. Thanh his itinerary schedule and made sure they members of his family would be prepared to leave on the departure date.

"Mr. Thanh reported his departure date and flight schedule to the Red Cross/Traveler's Aid in the travel office several days before leaving Fort Chaffee. This was done to assure his family of assistance from Red Cross representatives at the intermediate flight stops and the final destination.

"On the morning of 5 June, 21 days after arriving at Fort Chaffee, Mr. Thanh and his family prepared to leave. Area coordinators assisted them in returning their bed linens, with other final pre-departure arrangements and helped them to the Travel Office with their baggage. An HEW employee at the travel office made a final check to confirm that everyone had a ticket and that all luggage was loaded on the Army bus. At the Fort Chaffee main gate, all the ID cards were collected for departure data records and the family was driven to the airport where Red Cross workers were waiting to offer assistance to the refugees. Boarding the plane, the Thanh family completed the reception center phase of their life in the United States and entered America to journey to their sponsor."

The account basically outlines how the average refugee moved through the reception center system, from arrival to resettlement [see p. V-C-14].

A great deal of dedication and hard work was displayed by the civilians of the US Government and various voluntary agencies. The description of center activities at Fort Chaffee also applies to the conduct of the operation at Fort Indiantown Gap. The experience gained at Fort Chaffee
passed to Fort Indiantown Gap since many of those who had established the Fort Chaffee reception center were sent to Fort Indiantown Gap to activate and operate that latter center.

Both internal and external public affairs played an important role in the successful operation of the two Army supported reception centers. It was critical to keep the nation and the world informed of the situation of the refugees relocated to the United States and equally important to provide the refugees with information of what was being done to resettle them. The external public affairs was a standard operation conducted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs (OASD (PA)), responsible for media relations and providing the press with current information as the program progressed. The Army supported centers attracted a good deal of media interest from both national and international correspondents covering center activities. Internal dissemination of information was handled through different channels. At both centers, as well as on Guam and at Eglin Air Force Base, detachments of the Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group from Fort Bragg printed leaflets, signs, and menus for the benefit of the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees and, most importantly, prepared daily newspapers for the evacuees in their vernacular. This action enabled the refugees to be kept current on events in the outside world and supplemented their information within the center. It is fair to say that many reporters came to the centers expecting to find the worst, in terms of living conditions and human suffering, but found little to exploit in that regard. Other reporters and observers adopted a more positive note and relayed
many of the constructive aspects of the operation. Good media relations were attributable to early decisions to be open and candid about what was being done and to allow access to the refugees for interviews. In the final analysis, the public affairs program at both installations was successful in all respects, both internally and externally.

Daily Vietnamese/English newspapers were one means to prepare the refugees for what was to come by introducing them to information about their new life in the United States and American customs. In fact, the newspapers were just part of a large educational effort conducted at both Army reception centers. The initial conception of what might be needed by way of instructional programs assumed that the refugees would not be in the centers very long and that only rudimentary English for the head of the household was required. This first estimate was proven somewhat shortsighted and caused revisions as the actual situation emerged. At both installations the need was quickly realized for a more formalized, long-term educational program that embraced the entire refugee population, from the youngest to the oldest, who were capable of learning. Spoken and written English was the core of the curriculum in this program. Reading, mathematics, and history were subjects related to the fundamental objective of getting as many refugees as possible acquainted with speaking and comprehending English. Military personnel at the Army centers taught English along with civilian instructors in both formal settings and informal settings that were conducive to learning. In sum, an extensive and successful educational program for all age groups
was conducted in order to prepare the refugees for the life they were
to face upon leaving the reception centers.

While these efforts were going on at the installation level, a look was
being taken at what the Army and other Services could do in the area of
assisting in refugee sponsorship. Mr. Eric von Marbod, PDASD(C), re-
quested that each Service endeavor to promote the sponsorship and resettlement of former military counterparts and their families through individual and group efforts or by means of related organizations such as
commands, social clubs, etc. [see pp. V-A-40/41]. As a result, the
Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office (JRICO) was established under
ODCSPER auspices and staffed jointly by Reservists, with the Army Ele-
ment of JRICO comprised of members of the USAR on special tours of Ac-
tive Duty for Training (ADT). JRICO provided all service members with
a single clearinghouse for information on the location, sponsorship,
and resettlement of former allies from the Armed Forces of the Republic
of Vietnam and the Khmer Republic, and other Vietnamese and Cambodian
relatives, associates, and friends [see pp. V-A-44/46].

Of the approximately one hundred and thirty-three thousand refugees
who entered the United States before the termination of the program,
some indicated their desire to return to Indochina while still in the
refugee reception centers which posed a special problem. Repatria-
tion was an alternative open to all refugees from the outset of the
evacuation and resettlement program which had been articulated and
publicized throughout each refugee reception center. No evacuee was compelled to remain in the United States. Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were invited to Orote Point, Guam, and Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap, and refugees were made aware of the administrative steps to be taken toward repatriation. The total number of evacuees desiring repatriation who were located at the four CONUS centers amounted to approximately four hundred, divided almost equally between Vietnamese and Khmer. Just over 1,400 refugees on Guam stated their intention to return to Vietnam. After a few demonstrations at Fort Chaffee and Camp Pendleton, it was decided by IATF to consolidate all those electing to be repatriated in one area within the Camp Pendleton reception center. From there they were transferred to Guam, where Asan Camp was designated as the holding point for the repatriates until an agreement could be negotiated by the UNHCR for their reentry into Vietnam. During July and August 1975, the repatriates on the island of Guam became increasingly restive and began to agitate for their speedy return to Vietnam. This agitation resulted in several confrontations by the repatriates with the force of US Marshals and culminated in the burning of two buildings at Asan Camp during a demonstration in September 1975. The situation on Guam became politically volatile when threats were made by the repatriates; the US Marshals, attempting to keep the peace, were drawn into the exchange. Earlier, the suggestion had been made by the repatriates and others to use one of the Vietnamese evacuation ships -- there were nine in the harbor at Guam -- and let the repatriates take charge of the problem.
themselves. A demand for their own vessel became the theme of the repatriates' discontent. Meanwhile, the US Government was attempting to work through the established international channels of the UNHCR, which was engaged in discussions with North Vietnamese authorities that were progressing at a slow and laborious pace.

The situation among the repatriates became so tense during the latter part of September that the Department of Defense took action to prepare to control it under the provisions of GARDEN PLOT, the Department of the Army civil disturbance plan. The senior naval officer on Guam was appointed as the civil disturbance control task force commander, and two civil disturbance advisers were sent by the Army Staff to assist him in planning for the quelling of the repatriates if they caused a disturbance which the US Marshals were unable to control. Presidential approval would be needed if military forces were committed to cope with a civil disturbance. Fortunately, on 30 September 1975, what had become known as the "ship option" was approved by the US Government as a solution to the problem, and the potential for a violent civil disturbance was defused. The US Navy was given the mission of preparing the ship, Thuong Tin I, for the voyage to Vietnam. The refitted ship sailed on 16 October 1975 with a total of 1,546 repatriates and full provisions of food, medical supplies, and fuel plus a crew drawn from former naval and merchant seamen among the repatriates. It was reported that the ship arrived safely in South Vietnamese waters and that the repatriates disembarked with the permission of the North Vietnamese

I-C-15
While the repatriate problem monopolized a good deal of the time and effort of the Department of the Army's Indochinese refugee response cell, another problem loomed on the horizon. Action had to be taken to prepare the Army reception centers for continued operation during the winter months. The primary missions of the centers had been to provide support to Reserve Components of the US Army. Most US Army Reserve and Army National Guard training takes place at these locations during the summer months, and as a result there is a limited requirement for heated barracks space suitable for winter use. For winter occupancy by refugees, both installations needed modernized heating systems in addition to other modifications that would ensure a healthy and comfortable atmosphere. Planning for the winterization of Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap began in August, and approval for the expenditure of the necessary funds to accomplish the task was granted by IATF in September 1975.

In summary, the successful execution of the refugee support mission both at DA and in the field by FORSCOM was a result of the good working relationships between the two staffs. It was recognized at DA that CDR FORSCOM had the difficult mission of translating support requirements into actions on the ground that would create an atmosphere conducive to making the refugees feel welcome and secure. FORSCOM did just that and received high praise for the operation of the refugee reception centers at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap.
D. TERMINATION OF ARMY SUPPORTED REFUGEE FACILITIES

Much in the same manner as comprehensive prior planning had saved DA and FORSCOM a great deal of trouble in commencing operations at the centers, the planning of the phase-out and closedown of the Army supported reception facilities proved to be advantageous. In July 1975 the Director of IATF forecast that all of the refugee reception centers would be closed by 31 December 1975. The plan called for the center at Eglin Air Force Base to close in September, followed by the phase-out of operations at Camp Pendleton in October. Fort Indiantown Gap was slated to close by late November or early December, with the final reception facility, Fort Chaffee, scheduled to release its last refugees in late December.

This forecasting constituted the basis for the IATF plan contained in a message released on 30 July 1975 [see pp. V-A-57/58]. Eglin Air Force Base refugee reception center was scheduled to close first because of the threat of the severe weather conditions that are prevalent throughout that section of Florida during the autumn. If unsponsored refugees remained at the center by the closing date, they would be transferred to Fort Chaffee. Camp Pendleton would be phased out by a process of attrition as the evacuee input to the program tapered off; on the closing date any remaining refugees would also be relocated to Fort Chaffee. The expectation that the Army would be operating Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap at least through the early part of winter required that
plans be finalized to prepare those two reception centers for the winter season. Consequently, on 5 August DA notified the Commander, FORSCOM, to proceed with winterization preparations [see pp. V-A-59/61].

The schedule for the phased closure of the centers furnished those connected with the program target dates in managing support for the operation. It also provided a very effective motivating factor in promoting sponsorship by encouraging civic and institutional groups interested in sponsoring to make final commitments and, most critically, by giving voluntary agencies specific objectives for the resettlement of the refugees. The termination of center operations would not complete the entire task of resettlement, but it would mark the end of the initial processing and relocation phases of the effort. The months of September, October, and November of 1975 were a period of high output in terms of refugee sponsorships and departures from the centers. Furthermore, it was disclosed that no additional refugees would be admitted to the United States under the resettlement program administered by IATF after 31 October 1975. Thus, for the first time a fixed population figure could become the focal point of sponsorship and resettlement activities.

The procurement of winter clothing for the refugees became a matter of importance. Orders for clothing were placed in August based on projected residual refugee strengths. But the resettlement rate increased in early autumn. Therefore, when the clothing was delivered during
late September and October, the reduced refugee population at the centers contrasted considerably with the original projection. To resolve this situation, IATF entered into a contractual arrangement with the Salvation Army to undertake distribution of winter clothing, through a mail order system based at Fort Chaffee, to those refugees previously released. The refugees were made aware of clothing issue through the IATF newspaper New Life and the local offices of the voluntary agencies or other refugee-related organizations. By using a simple order form, refugees already resettled in communities across the country were able to request clothing for men, women, and children by size, sex, etc. This highly successful operation by the Salvation Army served to get the clothing to those for whom it was originally intended.

With the closing of Eglin Air Force Base and Camp Pendleton on 15 September and 31 October, respectively, the only remaining reception centers still functioning were operated by the Army. At the Department of Defense level, this ended the participation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Operation NEW ARRIVALS, and on 3 November the Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the Department of Defense in matters pertaining to military support of the Indochinese refugee program [see p. V-A-62]. This arrangement allowed the Army to deal more directly with officials of both the Department of Defense and IATF regarding the refugee operations.
At Fort Indiantown Gap during the month of November, a small group of Cambodians, approximately one hundred and twenty, refused to accept sponsorship arrangements and requested that they be repatriated. As in the case of the Vietnamese, representatives of the UNHCR, working under their mandate to aid those desiring repatriation, visited Fort Indiantown Gap and attempted to establish communication with officials of Cambodia. The Cambodian Government at that time would not discuss repatriation or indicate when it would entertain such a request. The repatriates were then relocated to a halfway house in Philadelphia under the auspices of the UNHCR to await word of their fate. Finally, in late Spring of 1976, it was reported that this group had departed for France where they hoped to increase the chances of negotiating for their repatriation through direct contact with Cambodian officials in Paris.

Another facet of this phase-out and closedown period was the process of determining the disposition of the property on hand that had been purchased, leased, or received on loan for the operation. In the case of military property, Army supply regulations provided adequate procedures for necessary actions to be taken, but the IATF property had to be handled under special instructions. Administering the latter task was resolved when the IATF property expert dispatched special guidance to the field on the subject [see pp. V-A-63/65].

Fort Indiantown Gap refugee reception center was closed on 15 December, having received and processed some 22,000 refugees. Five days later on
20 December Fort Chaffee reception center terminated operations, having received and processed over 50,000 evacuees. The two Army centers were responsible for the reception and resettlement processing of approximately 55 percent of the total of more than 133,000 refugees who entered the United States under Operation NEW ARRIVALS [see p. V-C-15]. With the departure of the last refugees from the centers, all efforts were concentrated on the disposition of IATF property and the creation of a system to handle the unclaimed baggage that had been left behind, lost in transit, or forwarded to Fort Chaffee from other centers. IATF requested the Army to resolve the problem under existing Department of Defense disposal instructions [see p. V-A-67].

As part of the termination of Army involvement in the refugee program, plans were requested from the Commander, FORSCOM, specifying the work to be done in order to restore the two Army installations to their pre-refugee condition. It had been agreed that IATF would fund restoring the facilities as an incremental cost of the refugee program. Plans were refined and then presented to IATF representatives. After a visit to both installations, the IATF comptroller approved the projects and funds required to complete the restoration. Restoration encompassed fixing the damage to building interiors, painting both the exterior and the interior surfaces of selected buildings, and repairing the road network within Fort Chaffee.

The participation of the US Army in Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS I-D-5
was duly noted by the Chief of Staff, General Weyand, in a message on 9 January 1976 when he stated: "With the resettlement of the last group of refugees and the closing of Fort Chaffee as a refugee reception center, I wish to commend all personnel involved in the planning and execution of Operations NEW LIFE, NEW ARRIVALS, and BABYLIFT for their exemplary performance" [see p. V-A-66].

On 1 June 1976 the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. William P. Clements, Jr., issued a memorandum effective that date which notified the Secretary of the Army of the termination of the Army's role as the executive agent for DOD in matters pertaining to the administrative, operational, and logistical support for the Indochinese refugee program. Mr. Clements further conveyed the congratulations of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, to all those civilians and military who contributed to the success of the refugee operations through their dedicated performance of duty [see p. V-A-68]. Thus ended the official participation of the Department of the Army in a most unique humanitarian endeavor of gigantic proportions.
PART II - DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PARTICIPATION
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THE ARMY STAFF - GENERAL STAFF

A. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans II-A-1
B. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel II-B-1
   Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office II-B-3
C. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics II-C-1
   US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command II-C-3
   Military Traffic Management Command II-C-4
D. Comptroller of the Army II-D-1
E. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence II-E-1

THE ARMY STAFF - SPECIAL STAFF

F. The Adjutant General II-F-1
   Army and Air Force Exchange Service II-F-2
G. Chief of Engineers II-G-1
H. The Surgeon General II-H-1
   US Army Health Services Command II-H-4
   US Army Medical Materiel Agency II-H-5
   Armed Services Medical Regulating Office II-H-5
I. Chief of Chaplains II-I-1
J. The Judge Advocate General II-J-1
K. Chief, National Guard Bureau II-K-1
L. Chief, Army Reserve II-K-1

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

M. Chief of Legislative Liaison II-K-1
N. Chief of Public Affairs II-L-1
A. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS (ODCSOPS)

The role of ODCSOPS throughout the Indochinese refugee program was significant. Beginning with Operation BABY LIFT and, subsequently, Operations NEW LIFE and NEW ARRIVALS, ODCSOPS personnel were deeply involved in the planning and execution of Army support to the total refugee effort. Operation BABYLIFT, a civilian endeavor which brought Southeast Asian orphans to the United States, was the beginning of ODCSOPS activity. The US Military Support Agency, ODCSOPS, was the DA focal point of operations during the early stages of this evacuation of orphans. Early and total involvement in Operation BABYLIFT presented ODCSOPS with a natural transition into planning subsequent Army support for Operations NEW LIFE and NEW ARRIVALS. The refugee reception center concept which the operations at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap were predicated had its origin in contingency planning conducted by ODCSOPS. Planning and crisis management, in addition to day-to-day actions and coordination following the period of crisis, were the crux of the contributions of ODCSOPS to the refugee operations.

Concomitant with Operation BABYLIFT, it became apparent to ODCSOPS that a larger operation involving thousands of Vietnamese refugees could materialize. Elements of ODCSOPS were already engaged in monitoring the emergency evacuation of US nationals and their dependents from Vietnam. Although no formal tasking had been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), it seemed certain that many of the refugees ultimately would arrive in the United States. Recognizing that a period of intensive DA
management and decision making, which would require prompt and full staff coordination, was about to commence, ODCSOPS (specifically the Director of Operations) was directed to act as the single manager for the Army Staff for the forthcoming operation. As a matter of prudence, and with limited guidance, the Operations Directorate assisted by the US Army Military Support Agency, ODCSOPS, developed a concept plan and tasking message directing that contingency planning be initiated by US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) with appropriate support from other Major Commands (MACOM's). On 24 April, Commander, FORSCOM, was directed to identify three Army installations that would be suitable as refugee reception centers. A plan for each installation was to be prepared and submitted to Department of the Army no later than the close of business on the following day, 25 April. FORSCOM was able to respond rapidly due to the advance planning that had been ongoing between ODCSOPS, HQDA, and ODCSOPS, FORSCOM.

Increasing actions generated by Operations BABYLIFT, NEW LIFE, and NEW ARRIVALS, and the rapidly expanding Army involvement required that a crisis management team response cell be established on 25 April in the Army Operations Center (AOC) to function in such a manner as to allow the Army Staff to respond quickly to new requirements. These requirements surfaced at an increased rate and demanded clear and detailed guidance from DA. The Director of Operations was delegated the authority to act in the name of the Chief of Staff for all matters pertaining to refugee operations, thereby greatly facilitating rapid responses to changing situations and enabling approval and initiation of unit deploy-
ment to PACOM and in CONUS within a matter of hours. An illustration of this expeditious handling of refugee operation actions was demonstrated in the process of site selection. In less than twenty-four hours after notification, FORSCOM submitted plans that identified Camp Roberts, California; Fort Pickett, Virginia; and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, as potential refugee reception centers. Within twelve hours of receipt, all plans had been reviewed by the DA Staff and comments provided to Commander, FORSCOM. Shortly thereafter, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, was selected by JCS for use as a refugee reception center. When in May 1975 Fort Indiantown Gap was selected as the second Army-operated center, the ODCSOPS-directed response cell was again deeply involved. These timely responses were attributable to the effectiveness of the DA response cell as well as the full support it received from the DA Staff and the MACOM’s.

As the pace began to slacken and staff management returned to a more normal pace of operations, the response cell was dissolved on 28 May and refugee activities in the Army Operations Center were discontinued. The response cell concept, coupled with single manager authority, proved to be an effective organizational tool for the coordination of overall Department of the Army management for unique crises such as the refugee program and lends itself to tailoring as the situation dictates. The disestablishment of the response cell did not end ODCSOPS management of the refugee support mission. On a daily basis, the Operations Directorate, ODCSOPS, was the DA point of contact for all actions pertaining to continued Army support to the refugee operations. This encompassed dealing with OSD, IATF, the Joint Staff, and supporting the Commander, FORSCOM, who was
responsible for the efficient operation of the two Army refugee centers. Subsequently, the potential civil disturbance by the Vietnamese repatriates on Guam introduced another situation when ODCSOPS and the Director of Military Support* (DOMS) in particular were called upon to exercise crisis management procedures. Once again a small team was brought together to manage the problem from beginning to end. In addition, ODCSOPS provided two officers at the request of CINCPACREP, Guam, to augment his staff and assist in civil disturbance control planning. The repatriate situation is discussed beginning on page III-C-1. The Director of Operations, ODCSOPS, issued a situation summary during the course of the refugee operation—initially daily and subsequently weekly. This summary apprised OSD, the Joint Staff, the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff of the current status of Army support to the program.

The net result, upon termination of the formal Army role in the Indochina evacuation effort, was the ODCSOPS-managed Army support of more than eighteen hundred and fifty orphans from Vietnam and Cambodia, of approximately one hundred and twelve thousand evacuees at staging areas in the Pacific, of some seventy-two thousand Indochinese in CONUS, and of the repatriation of over fifteen hundred Vietnamese refugees through civil disturbance planning and advisory activities—all within the period of eight months.

*At HQ DA, the Director of Operations, ODCSOPS, also serves as the Director of Military Support as an additional primary duty.
B. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL (ODCSPER)

The range of activities undertaken by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS consisted of the following concerns: personnel requirements for augmentation of deployed units, replacement of units, and the provision of special skills; support for Guam and CONUS refugee reception centers; extension of TDY personnel beyond 180 days (extensions beyond 90 days can be authorized by FORSCOM); temporary hire of civilians through installation Civilian Personnel Offices (CPO's); and tasking MACOM's to furnish fill for TDY personnel requirements when FORSCOM had exhausted resources in addition to filling some specific MOS's by use of USAR volunteer personnel.

The problems related to refugee operations which arose and were addressed by ODCSPER guidance fell in the following areas: restrictions on deploying station of choice (SOC) enlistees in support of the refugee operations, who have a twelve month stabilization guarantee of maximum 30-day deployment unless Army worldwide requirements necessitate under DA determination that enlistees be deployed for longer periods of time; cases involving refugees who were relatives of service members requiring individual consideration over questions related to the refugees joining their military sponsors stationed overseas; dependency status; the prohibition on Federal employment of paroled refugees in the fifty States and territories of the United States; the ineligibility of evacuees for enlistment because of the requirement of being admitted for permanent residency; and the issue of law enforcement as exer-
cised at the refugee reception centers by Federal or State authorities in matters concerning criminal jurisdiction on the military installation or stations involved.
The Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office (JRICO) was established in response to an appeal by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for support by the Military Services in the effort to sponsor and resettle the refugees from Indochina. The principal role of JRICO was to expedite the refugee sponsorship process for service members by facilitating the location of Indochinese evacuees and to disseminate refugee sponsorship and resettlement information to the US military community. Initially, JRICO was instituted as a means of assisting service members who desired to offer sponsorship and other forms of aid to former counterparts, allies, and friends from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam and the Khmer Republic. As a result, JRICO was responsive to a wide range of concerns and inquiries raised by military and service-related individuals and groups seeking to help a broad cross section of the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian refugee population.

Operational from 4 June 1975 to 30 January 1976, JRICO had as its mission the following tasks: to provide information on the requirements and the procedures for becoming a sponsor; to provide information on the location and status of specific evacuees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; to conduct direct liaison with the Interagency Task Force for Indochina (IATF) and to maintain access to the IATF computer data files on refugees; to coordinate with OSD, refugee reception centers, Voluntary Agencies (VOLAG's), and other organizations on refugee affairs as
deemed appropriate; and to respond as required to OSD, the Army Staff, and other agencies on matters pertaining to refugee location, sponsorship, resettlement, and related concerns in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS.

Organized and coordinated as a joint activity, JRICO was composed of Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force Elements and maintained liaison with the Navy Indochina Clearing Office (NICO). All elements of JRICO, as well as NICO, were staffed by members of the Reserve Components of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER), Headquarters, Department of the Army, acted as host for this operation, providing facilities and administrative support and negotiating with IATF for on-line computer access to refugee records for JRICO use.

JRICO handled thousands of sponsorship and location cases and responded to numerous requests for information and assistance. The Army Element of JRICO received and processed 1,020 sponsorship or location cases involving queries on more than 3,500 refugees, refugee heads of household, or family groups. Members of the Army community made almost 500 offers to sponsor refugees, including more than 100 general sponsorship offers for 245 refugees. About 10 per cent of the total number of Army location and sponsorship cases involved searches for some 600 individuals who were related to service members or reported to be their dependents. Of the total 1,020 Army sponsorship cases, 123 originated from inquirers stationed outside of CONUS. In many instances service members sought to
locate refugees and to sponsor evacuees without recourse to JRICO for assistance. Accordingly, the figures mentioned only present a profile of JRICO activities and are by no means intended to project the overall impact of assistance rendered by Army personnel in this humanitarian effort to sponsor and resettle Indochinese refugees.

In many other areas, JRICO provided an important informational function by making available policy and guidance that affected military sponsors by virtue of their status as service members. Such information included refugee benefits and entitlements (post exchange, theater, and health care), and extended to questions concerning the dependency status for related refugees.
C. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS (ODCSLOG)

This discussion of ODCSLOG participation in refugee operations deals exclusively with those logistical activities in support of Operation NEW LIFE performed in the Pacific, except for the Army Food Service Program provided at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap for Operation NEW ARRIVALS. [See the FORSCOM after action report for other logistic matters concerning CONUS operations.]

Support for the refugee operation on Guam was provided in the following manner: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) - medical support, subsistence, sealift capabilities, and reception center construction; Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force (CINCPACAF) - ground transportation, supplies, food, and immediate airlift; US Army Major Commands - field kitchens and Quartermaster bath, clothing, laundry, etc.; and US Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG) - units and equipment, with inabilities to provide support reported in turn to CINCPAC, JCS (J-4), and Department of the Army. Logistic support requirements were identified by CINCPAC, which requested that the Department of the Army prepare to provide PACOM shortfall. ODCSLOG advised the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) and General Services Administration (GSA) of tentative billeting, messing, and construction requirements and also alerted airlift activities. The Department of State/US Agency for International Development (USAID) guaranteed reimbursement for this support under Foreign Disaster Relief authority. CINCPAC validated USACSG requirements and advised
the JCS Logistics Coordination Center (LCC), which in turn directed DA (ODCSLOG) to ship the items identified by Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) flights. Examples of the kinds of items airlifted to Guam follow: 100,000 sets of tee shirts and shorts; 45,000 folding cots; 100,000 bath towels; 100 field ranges; 2,300 tents; 100,000 yards of black and white cloth; 12,000 needles and over 160,000 yards of thread, and 1,000 scissors - plus loudspeaker systems, Vietnamese language typewriters, tools, utensils, kitchen equipment, etc. ODCSLOG arranged for fifty-six SAAM flights to move 4,436 passengers and 2,292 tons of cargo, in support of which the Military Airlift Command (MAC) flew 110 C-141 sorties and 15 C-5 sorties between 22 April and 30 June 1975 at a cost of $4 million.

The Army Food Service program at the refugee reception centers encompassed thirty dining facilities at Fort Chaffee for 25,000 persons, supported by 315 Army mess personnel who were later replaced through contractual food service, thereby easing the strain on Army personnel. Fifteen contractor-operated dining facilities provided for 16,000 refugees at Fort Indiantown Gap. A special fifteen-day menu was developed for use at the CONUS centers. The Army operated eight messing facilities at Orote Point, Guam, each one serving an average of 10,000 meals daily. Approximately 350 Army mess personnel were required to support this operation. A master menu was jointly developed by the Army and Navy which, in turn, was supported by the Navy commissary on Guam.
DARCOM, formerly the Army Materiel Command (AMC), had been involved in an extensive ongoing military assistance program for Vietnam (Defense Assistance to Vietnam-Expedite or DAV-E). After the suspension of DAV-E, the DARCOM Deputy Commander subsequently reopened the DARCOM Operations Center on 24 April in order to meet any potential refugee support requirements levied by DA. DARCOM coordinated all Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) flights involving Defense Supply Agency (DSA) materiel - nine flights containing 1700 short tons. It supplied the following equipment for support of refugee operations in the Pacific: twenty lighting sets, nine public-address systems, four refrigerator vans, one delousing machine, five sprayer/fogger machines, and locking plates for M-16 rifles to be used for training and civil disturbance readiness on Guam incident to the repatriate situation discussed at III-C-1/5.

After the initial surge of activity when refugees were located in the Philippines and on Guam, the subsequent movement of evacuees to CONUS reduced the role of DARCOM to one of accounting for stock issued, examining and refurbishing equipment, and returning materiel to stock at the conclusion of the refugee operation.
The major participation of the Military Traffic Management Command involved the planning and phase-out/closedown stages of the refugee operations, with some support provided during the implementation phase. MTMC supported Installation Transportation Officers (ITO's) in preparing for refugee arrivals at Airports of Debarkation (APOD's) by alerting the commercial airline transportation industry. Group movement required arranging twenty-one charter flights, including fourteen for refugees moved from Eglin Air Force Base to Fort Chaffee. Identifiable costs were absorbed under the normal operating budget, including the detailing of a systems analyst to the staff of the Interagency Task Force for Indochina (IATF).
D. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY (OCA)

In order to provide a concise summary of funding, reimbursement, and accounting procedures for Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, certain assumptions concerning contingency type operations which are unprogrammed requirements must be noted and appreciated.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense tasked Headquarters, Department of the Army, for an emergency cost estimate at the outset of the refugee operations by appropriation and element of expense for the purpose of initial planning. An initial cost estimate of $60 - $65 million was consequently provided to OSD. The actual expense of the operation at each facility is reflected in the chart of incremental costs incurred by the Army [see p. II-D-4].

The Department of the Army does not include reserve funds for contingency operations in its normal budget, neither does DA nor MACOM's retain funds for such operations. These operations are undertaken on the assumption that expenses beyond normal operating costs, i.e., incremental costs, will be reimbursed by the Federal agency outside of the Department of Defense making the request for military participation. Commands that provide assistance will absorb the costs initially from existing available funds utilizing automatic reimbursement procedures. Department of the Army funds are used temporarily to defray costs which accrue beyond normal Army operating expenses and which are directly
chargeable to or caused by the contingency operations. Instructions on implementation of this policy were disseminated to all concerned Army comptrollers for Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS [see p. V-A-11 and pp. V-A-42/43].

Reimbursement requests (billings) were submitted to the organization whose directive caused the incremental cost of the assistance to be incurred with an indication of the location, code name, etc., of the expenses. An addendum sheet that specified an element of expense breakout by appropriation was attached to each bill. In the refugee program, expenses regarded as incremental costs encompassed the following expenses: temporary civilian help, overtime, travel and per diem of military and civilian Army personnel, consumable items issued, transportation (personnel, supplies, and equipment), port loading/offloading, handling (air, ocean, and inland waterway), repair/reconditioning of returned nonconsumable items, nonreturned supplies or equipment), repair parts for operating areas, packing of supplies and equipment, and POL (including aviation POL). A breakout of incremental costs by object class is shown in the accompanying illustration [see p. II-D-2]. The prompt validation of all questionable charges must be determined for reimbursement purposes with outside agencies prior to the incurrence of any costs.

Procedures for installation accounting were established for contingencies in accordance with Army Regulations 37-108, 37-110, and 37-111.
The total value of charges was separately accumulated for each agency outside DOD. Charges and collections were recorded and reported in the normal manner as prescribed by regulations. Returned supplies and equipment were credited toward the applicable account of all returns to the Army Stock Fund. Billing was submitted on Standard Form 1080 with supporting documents to respective MACOM's who in turn consolidated bills for submission to Headquarters, Department of the Army.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Army maintained, managed, and sought reimbursement for all costs incurred by the Army in support of Operations BABYLIFT, NEW LIFE, and NEW ARRIVALS. Policies and guidance were established by OCA for financial management systems which handled estimated total obligations amounting to $61.9 million [see p. V-C-2].
US Army Support: Incremental Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Chaffee Center Operations</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Indiantown Gap Center Operations</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Support</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam (Orote Point) Logistic Support</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam (Orote Point) General Supply Support</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 61.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recapitulation by Facility:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Chaffee</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Indiantown Gap</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam (Orote Point)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 61.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\[a\] Subsistence costs are included in figures for center operations.

\[b\] Department of Air Force billed the Department of State for the cost of US Army Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) flights which totaled $11.4 million.
### Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS
#### US Army Support: Incremental Costs by Object Class ($ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECT CLASS</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>FORT CHAFFEE</th>
<th>INDIANTOWN GAP</th>
<th>GUAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Personnel Compensation (includes civilian hire and overtime)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Personnel Travel and Transportation</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Transportation of Supplies and Material</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Rent, Communications, and Utilities</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Printing and Reproduction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Other Contract Services (includes food service)</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Supplies and Materials (includes refugee subsistence and other supplies)</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>37.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE (OACSI)

The US Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA) at the request of FORSCOM and direction of OACSI provided counterintelligence support to refugee operations by establishing temporary Resident Offices at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap in order to carry on liaison with military and civilian agencies at each location. The mission was to develop any information where a reasonable basis existed to indicate a threat to Army personnel, facilities, or equipment. Maintenance of liaison, routine monitoring of demonstrations, interpreter assistance where possible, and coordination with investigative agencies were primary activities of the Resident Offices.

Units providing support to Operation NEW ARRIVALS were the 525th Military Intelligence Group at Fort Chaffee and 902d Military Intelligence Group at Fort Indiantown Gap, with the former organization also establishing liaison with the refugee center at Camp Pendleton. A variety of diverse actions was accomplished, including the location of specific refugees for interviews or debriefings, supply of information on illegal activities to civilian law enforcement authorities, assistance to the Secret Service during President Ford's visit to Fort Chaffee, intelligence liaison and briefings for Task Force NEW ARRIVALS, physical and document security for center Task Force headquarters, service as a military intelligence point of contact for civilian investigative agencies, and briefings on intelligence aspects of OPLANS. The Fort Chaffee Resi-
dent Office functioned between 29 April and 20 December 1975 employing nine special agents on a rotational basis, and the Fort Indiantown Gap Resident Office was operational from 20 May to 15 December 1975 utilizing a total of six special agents.
F. OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (OTAG)

In a matter that was of significance to those service members who were sponsoring Indochinese refugees, the Adjutant General Center dispatched a message outlining both Post Exchange (PX) and theater privileges as they affected militarily sponsored evacuees. This guidance addressed the issue of both individual and group or unit sponsorships and provided policy for installation commanders in administering authorization of these privileges. A separate discussion of the actual Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) operations in support of the special requirements posed by the Indochinese refugee program follows.
ARMY AND AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE (AAFES)

In the Pacific, the Philippines Regional Exchange (PRE) rendered the first major AAFES assistance to the Indochina evacuees at Clark Air Force Base when cafeteria services were used to serve 6,000 to 7,000 meals per day for refugees who were overtaxing the base dining facilities. Bakery and dairy plants operated 24 hours a day to support 71,000 refugees processed through Subic Bay. The Hawaii Regional Exchange (HRE) provided merchandise from its stocks for evacuee requirements (e.g. personal items and accessories). The Guam Exchange (GE) supplied basic merchandise such as toothbrushes, toothpaste, baby bottles and nipples, towels, diapers, and washcloths. Fifty thousand packages of chopsticks were shipped to Guam. The GE supported the Air Force and the Navy refugee activities with bakery products including, "nutri-buns." Wake Island received merchandise from HRE to support its refugee operations.

In the United States, exchange support was provided in order for refugees to purchase basic items of convenience and necessity not supplied by the US Government through facilities at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap (as well as Eglin AFB). AAFES menus were altered in an attempt to accommodate food preferences of the refugees. AAFES procurement channels were utilized to purchase $3 million worth of winter clothing for Fort Chaffee. The Oklahoma Area Exchange (OKAX) served Fort Chaffee through the activation of a total of 8 retail, 6 food, 1 service station, 8 concessions, and 63 vending facilities to accommodate refugees and center personnel in addition to supporting USAR and ARNG troops performing Annual Training (AT) and the
supporting USAR and ARNG troops performing Annual Training (AT) and the normal retired and dependent community. Fort Indiantown Gap required renovation of facilities and modification of military buildings for retail operations, installation of a small snack bar, and operation of a "meals-on-wheels" program as well as barber, laundry, dry cleaning, and alteration services.

Attendance at free showings of 16-millimeter movies totalled almost one million patrons with IATF reimbursing AAFES for the service ($40,000). IATF also reimbursed AAFES a total of $43,000 for incremental costs incurred in providing exchange facilities at the installations concerned. The short lead time for ordering items, lack of personnel, and language problems - other than those overcome by improvised signs in Vietnamese - presented some difficulties in providing service.
G. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS (OCE)

The Office of the Chief of Engineers provided substantial assistance in the selection of suitable installation sites for US Army supported refugee reception centers. For this purpose information was developed by OCE on the following: location, acreage, troop and family housing, medical facilities, military and commercial airfield facilities, climatic conditions, and other pertinent data including problems related to the environmental impact of the center on site selection. Actual OCE representation was provided for several on-site review visitations.

In the area of logistics, the Corps of Engineers - through Facilities Engineers - provided base operations support for utilities, sanitation services, and in the upkeep of facilities.

The Fort Chaffee sewage system was increased from a maximum population capacity of 9,000 to 28,000 by construction of two sewer lagoons comprising 56 acres with the necessary aeration equipment also added. This work was accomplished in part by the Corps of Engineers and completed before the arrival of refugees en masse. At Fort Chaffee the natural gas supply contract for uninterrupted service was threatened by the prospect of prolonged use of the installation in cold weather. The Contract Office of the Office of the Chief of Engineers played a role in resolving this problem.
At Fort Indiantown Gap (FIG), OCE provided invaluable assistance and advice in repair and upgrading of the sewage system to preclude sanitation problems for the incoming refugees. When the decision was announced to extend the refugee operations beyond early fall, OCE immediately conducted extensive studies on the rehabilitation and/or conversion of the heating systems at both Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap relative to expediency and economy.

During the phaseout/closedown of center operations, OCE provided technical assistance on the restoration of facilities to pre-refugee conditions. This encompassed estimates on road repair, external and internal repair of buildings (including painting), and reconversion of buildings to their original status. Restoration activities of both installations also necessitated complex and extensive contractual negotiations, most of which were awarded and monitored by OCE.
H. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (OTSG)

Initial OJCS planning guidance called for 200,000 evacuees to be concentrated in two 100,000-person safe havens each having four subcenters of 25,000 refugees. Medical planning called for one divisional medical company or one separate medical clearing company per 25,000 refugees. Since the use of in-place hospitals was not anticipated, one 400-bed evacuation hospital or its equivalent was recommended in the planning guidance for each 100,000 refugees. Preventive medicine teams were also visualized as necessary during the initial planning phase. At a tri-service meeting on 25 April 1976, Guam was identified as a refugee safe haven with the Navy agreeing to provide inpatient care and preventive medicine support but requiring assistance in furnishing outpatient facilities and treatment. The Air Force would provide aerospace staging facilities at departure and entry points.

Army Staff plans were developed as a result of discussions among the Office of the Surgeon General, Forces Command, and Health Services Command. The need was identified to augment medical units on deployment with specially designed packages to meet the requirements of outpatient care for refugees, especially nursing care and preventive medicine, by adding personnel and special medical equipment to handle infants, children, and females. The following types of units from Forts Sam Houston, Ord, Jackson, Bragg, Meade, and Lewis were deployed: one medical group

II-H-1
headquarters and headquarters company (command and control), six medical detachments (veterinary support, environmental sanitation, ambulance support, epidemiology service, entomology service, and medical maintenance), and two medical clearing companies (outpatient medical care). These units were supported by a specifically organized Army medical laboratory. Each medical company was also augmented by medical/surgical care nurses, pediatric nurses, pediatricians, and OB/GYN specialists, with community health nurses added to the epidemiology detachments. Tasking by a Department of the Army message (2510502 Apr 75, subject: Operation NEW ARRIVALS: Army Medical Support Requirement) caused the deployment of units to Guam within forty-eight hours of notification and identified key augmentation personnel.

Support by the Military Services of CONUS refugee centers included, but was not limited to, billeting, messing, essential medical treatment, transportation, installation security, and center administration. At both Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap inpatient/outpatient services, selected preventive medicine and veterinary support, plus the assignment of a social worker at Fort Indiantown Gap, were provided in addition to 100-bed field hospitals. For total health care, additional pediatrics, OB/GYN, laboratory, screening team, and preventive medicine specialists were included.

In summary, the two Army supported refugee centers provided total inpatient/outpatient services to the refugees. The only benefits not pro-
vided were artificial limbs, orthopedic aids, and special optical lenses. Dental support was limited to the screening of patients and emergency care. The Office of the Surgeon General dispatched messages which provided guidance on refugee eligibility for health care [see p. V-A-25 and pp. V-A-31/32], use of refugee medical and paramedical personnel in centers [see p. V-A-27], etc., with the Department of State and Office of the Secretary of Defense defining other areas of medical policy [see pp. V-A-28/29 and pp. V-A-47/48]. The total number of personnel of the Army Medical Department, including assets from both Forces Command and Health Services Command, participating in Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS consisted of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MC</th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>AMC</th>
<th>Other OFF</th>
<th>ENL</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaffee</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIG</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A ninety-day rotation policy allowed FORSOOM, in coordination with the Office of the Surgeon General, to alleviate personnel problems and to replace total medical units and/or required personnel with the development of TDA's instead of TOE's which allowed flexibility applicable to refugee center reduction and drawdown.

II-H-3
Four hundred and twenty-three HSC personnel (279 officers/144 enlisted) performed an average of 71 days TDY on Guam or at Forts Chaffee or Indiantown Gap in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS for a total of 30,541 man-days exclusive of travel. Personnel came from every subordinate Medical Center (MEDCEN) and Medical Department Activity (MEDDAC) except Panama, Alaska, and Fort Stewart and represented a wide range of professional specialties. HSC support on Guam ran from 25 April to 15 July 1975, at Fort Chaffee from 29 April to 22 December 1975, and at Fort Indiantown Gap from 22 May to 15 December 1975. Medical material and back-up maintenance support were provided by Fort Sill in the case of Fort Chaffee and by Carlisle Barracks MEDDAC for Fort Indiantown Gap. The cost of medical supplies and equipment for Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS (not including credit for amounts returned at end of program) was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guam</th>
<th>Fort Chaffee</th>
<th>Fort Indiantown Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$ 78,281</td>
<td>660,789</td>
<td>810,621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health Care Costs</th>
<th>Guam</th>
<th>Chaffee</th>
<th>FIG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outpatient visits</td>
<td>$255,849</td>
<td>$262,818</td>
<td>$124,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immunizations</td>
<td>32,736</td>
<td>30,564</td>
<td>1,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inpatient charges</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>193,365</td>
<td>142,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II-H-4
US ARMY MEDICAL MATERIAL AGENCY (USAMMA)

As a field operating agency of the Office of The Surgeon General, USAMMA supported refugee operations on Guam by issuing a laboratory set from prepositioned war reserve stocks. Additionally, USAMMA monitored requisitions for line item shortages from medical clearing companies administering health care for the Indochinese refugees.

ARMED SERVICES MEDICAL REGULATING OFFICE (ASMRO)

Identification of destination hospitals and cite numbers were provided by ASMRO for refugees requiring immediate medical treatment on arrival in the United States. Of the 352 refugee cases regulated, Fort Chaffee received 98, Fort Indiantown Gap 56, Camp Pendleton 112, Eglin AFB 85, and 1 case to the Public Health Service. Destination points for incoming patients were the refugee reception centers, with Public Health Service Hospitals used in cases where patients required long-term hospitalization.
I. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS (OCCH)

Agency participation included planning chaplain coverage and religious ministries in refugee center operations and related activities in order to meet the special spiritual needs of the Indochinese evacuees. Chaplains and enlisted assistants were sent to Guam, Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap, served on staffs of the Army commanders, and provided ministries to the refugees as well as US personnel. This urgent and important task was in recognition of the value of sustaining the religious fiber of the refugee population in view of their immediate need for stability and coherence.

The Chief of Chaplains inaugurated the Chapel Indochinese Refugee Sponsorship Program whereby local chapel communities sponsored and assisted refugees, designated offerings of money and goods, and aided in other spiritual and material ways. This effort was undertaken in the spirit of the appeal by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for total support by the military community of the Indochinese refugee sponsorship and resettlement program.

The major tasks which were faced consisted of identifying refugee clergy, securing Vietnamese or Vietnamese-speaking clergy, crisis intervention, dealing with interfaith and intercultural issues, and providing information from the Department of the Army on evacuee religious groups. Of these major tasks, securing Buddhist clergy posed a special
problem. Protestant and Catholic clergy could be found among the refugee population or provided from civilian or military sources. However, Buddhist monks of the proper sect were not available here in the United States and this affected a large portion of the refugee population. A partial solution was to contract for the services of four Buddhist clergy of different sects and this alleviated the situation to some degree. A similar problem had existed at Orote Point, Guam and was resolved in a like manner.
J. OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL (OTJAG)

The Office of The Judge Advocate General provided legal advice to other Army Staff agencies in support of refugee operations. OTJAG was primarily involved with the crisis management team dealing with the disturbances on Guam by those evacuees seeking to return to Indochina; with assuring a continued natural gas supply to Fort Chaffee; with questions of military authority over the refugees; with the authority of Federal agencies and non-appropriated fund instrumentalities to hire refugees; and with the eligibility of refugees to enter the US Armed Forces. Of these legal issues, military authority over the refugees and the eligibility of refugees for non-appropriated fund hire or enlistment in the Services were subjects of frequent attention and general interest.

The degree to which the military could exercise police functions in regard to refugees housed on military installations was limited to the following areas: the authority to protect US Government property and personnel; the authority to exclude refugees from certain portions of installations unrelated to refugee processing; and the authority of the commander to maintain peace and order by suppressing riots or other disturbances. The Department of State did not initially recognize the limitations of military authority over civilians while they were present within the reception centers.

The authority of Federal agencies and non-appropriated fund instrumen-
talities to hire refugees as well as their eligibility for military service was affected by their immigration status. As parolees and, therefore, non-resident aliens, the refugees by law were ineligible to enlist in the Regular or Reserve Components of the Army. The same restriction applies to appointments as commissioned officers. Except for certain special jobs such as language instructors or intelligence consultants, parolees are ineligible for Civil Service employment. Parolees are, however, eligible to compete with citizens for jobs with nonappropriated fund instrumentalities. To adjust this situation and to allow for greater employment opportunities, statutory changes are required. A bill (S. 2239, 94th Cong.) was introduced to waive the restriction on the enlistment of parolees for a limited time, but did not pass.
K. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU (NGB)

The participation of the Army National Guard was primarily restricted to the initial phase of planning the refugee operations. National Guard Bureau personnel augmented the Army Operations Center and assisted in determining the impact of the location of refugee reception centers at those installations normally used for National Guard annual training.

L. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE (OCAR)

Participation by the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, in refugee affairs involved staff coordination by the Personnel Division, OCAR, in selecting volunteer members of the Army Reserve for duty with the Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office (JRICO), which was under the staff supervision of ODCSPER. Additionally, support of the requirement to provide selected USAR Civil Affairs personnel for utilization at the refugee reception centers was addressed by OCAR. Details of the implementation of these two actions are to be found in the JRICO and FORSCOM after action reports, respectively. Both requirements, illustrating USAR involvement in the humanitarian effort to aid Indochinese evacuees, commanded public affairs attention and attained media coverage through OCAR information channels.

M. OFFICE, CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, OSA (OCLL)

The Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of
the Army, was involved primarily in maintaining relations with the Congressional Delegations of those States (Arkansas and Pennsylvania) where refugee centers were located and coordinating Army Staff input for responses to Congressional inquiries.
N. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OCPA)

The Office of the Chief of Public Affairs was engaged in a full spectrum of activities in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. Planning, public information, community relations, and command information were conducted in conjunction with two programs: the demand to keep the general public informed on the status of the refugee program and the effort by the Services to assist the military community in matters pertaining to refugee location and sponsorship undertaken by the Army through participation in the Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office (JRICO) which was under ODCSPER auspices.

Planning and execution followed the basic guidance of the Departments of State and Defense with external programs accomplished by the major command concerned; FORSCOM, in the case of Army, prepared detailed plans and assigned Public Affairs Officers (PAO) in the grade of Colonel to each site. An annex to FORSCOM OPLAN NEW ARRIVALS provided instructions for the FORSCOM Information Officer (IO) and on-site DOD public affairs spokesman (a FORSCOM IO) while installation and reception center commanders outlined basic public affairs policy and guidance. This mission required providing maximum information to the public and internal audiences concerning the evacuation of refugees from Southeast Asia. Public affairs detachments issued press releases, conducted community relations, and carried out extensive internal information programs for the refugees (daily newspapers, loudspeaker, radio, etc.).
Command and control were exercised by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs [OASD(PA)], which established a special project team in coordination with the Department of State. This team issued guidance to Public Affairs Officers at each site and answered queries, with only peripheral Service involvement.

A specific issue that required an intensive information campaign was the one raised by the Army Reserve and Army National Guard that they might be displaced from their annual training sites at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap because of refugee operations. Commander, FORSCOM, quickly solved this matter by erecting a tent city at Fort Chaffee that accommodated five of the six brigades scheduled for Annual Training 1975. One brigade chose to train elsewhere. At Fort Indiantown Gap, the problem was one of changing billets and opening up areas not previously used. Some military schooling normally conducted at Fort Indiantown Gap was temporarily moved to Fort Meade, Maryland, with minimum turmoil. The information program developed to inform the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard of the situation at the training sites was every effective.
PART III - SPECIAL AREAS OF CONCERN
PART III - SPECIAL AREAS OF CONCERN

A. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

Sewage Disposal III-A-1
Natural Gas III-A-2
Water Supply III-A-3

B. PREPARATIONS FOR WINTER OPERATION OF CENTERS

Facility Modifications III-B-1
Winter Clothing and Physical Welfare III-B-1

C. LEGAL JURISDICTION AND REPATRIATION

Law and Order at the Centers III-C-1
Potential Civil disturbance On Guam III-C-1

D. EMPLOYMENT AND ENLISTMENT OF PAROLED REFUGEES

US Government Hire III-D-1
Military Service III-D-2

E. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE / CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT III-E-1

F. MILITARY AWARDS AND RECOGNITION OF CIVILIANS III-F-1
A. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the process of selecting the two Army installations in CONUS to be utilized as refugee reception centers, one of the first undertakings in evaluating the suitability of a site was the drafting of an environmental impact statement. The task of drawing up this type of statement compels the commander to critically examine and analyze the effect of the proposed action or mission on the environment. At both Forts Chaffe and Indiantown Gap it was found that the sewage systems were inadequate in light of the number of refugees that were anticipated to be located there under Operation NEW ARRIVALS. The problem at Fort Chaffe was that the sewage treatment facility had primary treatment lagoons that would be inadequate. It was determined that the outflow and seepage would pollute the receiving streams and local waterways. A two-cell lagoon covering an area of fifty-six acres was constructed using a military labor force at a cost of $250,000. This expense was not reimbursed by the Interagency Task Force for Indochina (IATF) but rather funded by DOD as a needed improvement to the total utility system of the installation. The situation at Fort Indiantown Gap was of a different nature and presented a more difficult engineering task: that of replacing the sewage line system. This was an improvement that had been included on the post list of projects to be funded during fiscal year 1976, and the Commander, FORSCOM, lacked the necessary means to undertake it during fiscal year 1975. In order to start this needed work, IATF in early June 1975 made the required funds available to the
Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis. The project was completed at a cost of over $350,000 and IATF was reimbursed in fiscal year 1976. These two projects represent the type of upgrading or modernization of existing facilities that may need to be done to get a program operational, depending on the status of the installation sites selected and number of people to be accommodated.

Any type of contingency program tends to place unusual demands on other systems such as the natural resources available to any given area or facility. At Fort Chaffee the supply of both natural gas and water presented a problem. The maximum amount of gas allocated under contract for Army consumption was predicated on the full operation of the post for year-round training. The Army had not used or demanded that much natural gas for several years, and in the meantime, the suppliers, faced with an increased demand, extended service to additional customers. During the refugee operations at Fort Chaffee, as it became apparent that a number of refugees would remain there through the heating season, the gas supplier alerted the Army that it would be unable to fulfill the terms of the contract because of "transmission difficulties." This meant that the natural gas supplier apparently did not have the capability to put the requisite amount of gas through the existing pipeline system in order to accommodate all of the customers who used the system. The terms of the contract were stated in such a way that the Army demand for gas had to be satisfied even if some other customers suffered reductions or suspension in service. This situation contained the ingredients of a
potentially controversial issue in that the customers most likely to be
affected were the large industrial firms which employed many people in
the area of Fort Smith, Arkansas. The Army proceeded on two tacks: first,
continued discussions with the supplier in an attempt to bring about com-
pliance with the original agreement without renegotiating the contract or
constructing a new pipeline to improve the flow of gas and, second, an
attempt to identify other sources of natural gas that could satisfy the
requirement. Pursuing the latter option, a number of natural gas wells
at Fort Chaffee had been leased by civilian firms under conditions which
provided for the US Government to receive royalties in cash or in kind.
An effort to have these payments made in natural gas for use at Fort Chaf-
fee proved to be unacceptable to the Department of Interior, which served
as the administrator of the lease. In the meantime, those facilities at
Fort Chaffee that could be heated by other kinds of fuel were converted
accordingly, and the overall need for natural gas diminished. As time
passed and the refugee population at Fort Chaffee was reduced, the issue
of the natural gas resolved itself. The relatively small number of days
during October and November when heat was required also abated the anxiety
over this situation, and by December, when the refugee population had be-
come relatively small, the supply of gas was more than adequate.

Difficulty arose over the price rather than the supply of water to Fort
Chaffee when the city of Fort Smith, Arkansas, as the water supplier,
made it known that increased rates which had been in effect for all wa-

III-A-3
ter customers would also apply to Fort Chaffee. As the Army contract
negotiators took longer deliberating the situation than desired by the
local officials, the area press carried publicity which reflected unfa-
vorably on the Army position. The situation was rectified through the
payment by the Army of the new water rates while negotiations were be-
ing continued to determine the obligations of the agreement between the
city and the US Government.

The problems with natural gas and water at Fort Chaffee illustrate
that nothing can be taken for granted in such cases and that a current,
detailed evaluation of existing contracts and agreements must be made
when planning and preparation for contingency operations such as the
Indochinese refugee program are undertaken.
The need for the continued operation of the Army supported refugee centers into the winter months, once recognized, caused certain actions, including the improvement of the housing facilities at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap, to be undertaken. Commander, FORSCOM, had been advised earlier of the possibility that operations would go on into the winter and both of the Army refugee reception centers had submitted their recommendations for winterization as directed. The Department of the Army forwarded these recommendations in a memorandum to Mr. von Marbod, PDASD(C), who subsequently obtained IATF approval to expend funds to execute the proposed winterization plans. On 5 August US Army Forces Command was directed to proceed with those actions necessary to prepare the two centers for sustained support of operations during the winter season. These preparations included installing or modifying heating systems, providing smoke detectors and alarms, hiring boiler firemen, and making arrangements for continued troop support.

The procurement of winter clothing for the refugees stemmed from a proposal which was advanced by the Army in July 1975. IATF agreed to the proposal, and estimates of the anticipated center population during the fall and winter were made. The Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) was requested to serve as the agent for IATF in developing clothing requirements for infants, children, and adult refugees.
through contact with suppliers and in generally overseeing procurement activities. Toward this end, clothing was ordered in August 1975 for delivery to Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap as soon as possible. However, from the time that population estimates were made and the order placed for the clothing to the actual arrival of the clothes at the centers in October and early November 1975, the refugee population had decreased significantly. The voluntary agencies (VOLAG's) matched sponsors and refugees for resettlement at a far faster rate than anticipated, which was beneficial to the program but left IATF with a great deal of winter clothing on its books. The late delivery of some of the clothing compounded the problem. To redress the situation, IATF contracted with the Salvation Army to operate a mail-order service from three warehouses at Fort Chaffee to process orders for clothing from those refugees already sponsored and relocated. Through the medium of the HEW refugee newspaper, New Life, and the voluntary agencies, plus other channels, the resettled refugees were informed of the availability of this clothing and instructed on how to order it. This mail-order procedure proved an efficient method of ensuring proper distribution of the clothing, guaranteeing that it reached those for whom it was intended. The Salvation Army distributed all of the winter clothing on hand in this manner and concluded the effort at Fort Chaffee in June 1976. In summary, procurement and distribution of clothing did present a problem at one stage, but the effort was managed in such a way that it offered all the refugees the opportunity to obtain proper clothing for the winter while simultaneously alleviating the financial burden of purchasing

III-B-2
clothing which thousands of sponsors faced during the first few months of resettlement.

In another critical area, increasing the diet of the refugees in order to fortify them for the cold weather of an American winter was an essential planning factor considered in providing for the physical welfare of the refugees. Supplemental rations and other adjustments to the food services at the centers were consequently implemented to meet dietary requirements.
C. LEGAL JURISDICTION AND REPATRIATION

The legal status of the refugees from an immigration standpoint and the extent to which the military could exercise jurisdiction over them in the reception centers were two issues that surfaced early in Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS. Evacuees admitted to the United States under the terms of the Indochinese refugee program had been paroled into this country and consequently were both protected by and subject to its law. At the outset of Operation NEW LIFE on Guam, control was maintained by the military over the arriving refugees, but once the reception system was organized, Immigration and Naturalization Service officials and US Marshal Service personnel assumed the law enforcement role. The military controlled access to the installations, insuring that the refugee reception centers were secure from unauthorized entries [see p. V-A-26]. The US Magistrates or the local civilian courts located at or near the sites of the military facilities concerned heard cases that involved violations of Federal or local laws, respectively. It should be noted, however, that the actual number of incidents necessitating court attention were few in proportion to the refugee population and its predicament [see pp. V-A-49/50].

Repatriation was an issue that attracted a good deal of international attention during the course of the Indochina refugee effort. Repatriation -- return to the country of origin -- remained a viable alternative available to the evacuees at all times and remains an option to
those refugees resettled in the United States. The refugees who desired repatriation made their decision known at various stages of processing; 1,400 refugees never went beyond the reception facilities on Guam because they declared their desire to return to Vietnam. From the outset, all repatriate matters were handled by representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The US Government had no direct diplomatic channels with the Communist authorities in Vietnam and sought to use the established international avenue of approach offered by the United Nations in matters pertaining to the repatriates. In addition to the 1,400 potential repatriates situated on Guam, approximately two hundred evacuees at the four CONUS refugee reception centers expressed a desire to return to Vietnam. The repatriates at both Camp Pendleton and Fort Chaffee demonstrated in order to draw attention to their situation in an effort to expedite the repatriation process. North Vietnamese authorities and their provisional Communist government to the south conveyed via UNHCR representatives detailed questionnaires to be completed by the repatriates and forwarded to Vietnam where a decision would be reached regarding each individual's eligibility to return. It should be noted that the officials representing North and South Vietnam displayed neither enthusiasm nor any sense of urgency publically over the fate of the repatriates except in exploiting their plight for propaganda value.

During the months of July and August 1975, the repatriates on Guam agitated for a speedy return to Vietnam and blamed the US Government
for the delay in action. At one point the repatriates burned two U. S. Navy buildings to the ground in their compound at Asan Camp and injured Federal Marshals. The growing seriousness of these incidents was reflected in the detailed guidelines on legal and security matters issued to the refugee reception center authorities [see pp. V-A-53/56]. The repatriates also launched a campaign aimed at gaining support for the proposal that they be allowed to sail one of the nine Vietnamese registered vessels back to Vietnam. These ships were located in the harbor at Guam and had served as the means of escape for many of the fleeing Vietnamese refugees.

September saw the relocation and consolidation of all identified repatriates on the island of Guam; those coming from the US mainland and those already on Guam totaled approximately sixteen hundred. This group was very restive and a constant source of concern for both civil and military officials and the US Marshals responsible for maintaining law and order. During this period of time the US Government requested UNHCR representatives to step up the effort to determine when the Vietnam authorities would permit repatriation to begin. In late September an UNHCR representative visited North Vietnam in an attempt to elicit Hanoi's position on the status of the repatriates. Simultaneously, the situation on Guam became potentially explosive and plans were made to cope with a major civil disturbance if the repatriates should riot as they threatened. The force of US Marshals on Guam received loans of equipment under the provisions of the Department of the Army Civil Dis-
turbance Plan known as GARDEN PLOT, and the number of military personnel who could be called upon to support the US Marshals was increased in the event approval was granted by the President of the United States for their use. When US Government attempts to accomplish repatriation through established channels did not appear to gain any headway, consideration was given to what became known as the ship option, or allowing the repatriates to sail one of the ships anchored in the harbor back to Vietnam under their own control. Sufficient personnel to comprise a suitable ship’s company could be formed from among the assembled repatriates.

Early on 30 September 1975, the UNHCR representative stopped at Guam on his return from North Vietnam and indicated that no final decision had been reached regarding the repatriates’ situation and that no further developments on allowing them to return appeared to be forthcoming. By this time the repatriation crisis was such that a military task force had been activated to control any potential civil disturbance and Rear Admiral K. J. Carroll, Commander in Chief, Pacific Representative (CINCPACREP) Guam, was appointed task force commander. The staff of CINCPACREP Guam was augmented at his request by two officers from the Department of the Army Staff who were experts in civil disturbance policy, planning, and operations. Late in the same day, 30 September, word was received on Guam that the so-called ship option had been approved as US Government policy at national level. When this information was relayed to the repatriates, it served to defuse the critical situation.
The Department of Defense provided guidance on preparation of the ship Thuong Tin I for the voyage to Vietnam, and needed repairs and refitting began almost immediately. When repairs and outfitting had been completed and after satisfactory sea trials, a final certification of the ship's seaworthiness was issued by an independent ship surveyor from Lloyds of London. Fifteen hundred and forty-six repatriates sailed for their homeland from Guam at 1247 hours on 16 October 1975 on board the Vietnamese ship Thuong Tin I which was reported to have arrived in South Vietnamese waters on 31 October, thereby formally ending an unusual episode in the refugee operations.
One of the major concerns confronting the Indochinese refugees following their processing, sponsorship, and release from the reception centers was employment. Unfortunately, the United States was experiencing economic difficulties to the extent that the labor market, affected by the high rate of unemployment, failed to offer Vietnamese and Cambodians resettling in this country the full range of opportunities that utilized their skills or satisfied their desire to be gainfully employed. This issue as it impacted on the Army had two perspectives: first, there existed within the refugee population a sizable number of evacuees, previously associated with the US Government in Southeast Asia as local national employees, contract workers, etc., who sought to secure similar positions or related jobs with Federal agencies including the Department of the Army. Second, among the Indochinese evacuees were many who formerly had been members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam or the Khmer Republic and who aspired to serve in the US Armed Forces, particularly the US Army, with which many had fought side-by-side, been trained, or held close associations for a number of years in Indochina.

As far as civilian employment was concerned, Federal statutes and Civil Service Commission regulations governing the recruitment and employment of aliens precluded US Government agencies from hiring those Indochinese admitted to the US in parole status, save for a limited number of excepted positions. Attempts by concerned members of Congress to introduce
legislation to change existing laws or waive regulations to favor the Indochinese were not forthcoming and, to this date, these refugees still are barred from Federal employment as long as they remain non-resident aliens in a parole status.

Paralleling the situation of those refugees desiring to be employed by the Federal Government was the circumstance which faced those Vietnamese and Cambodians who sought to enlist or be commissioned in the US Army or other Services. As in the case of US Government civil employment with Federal agencies, enlistment or commissioning is contingent upon an immigration status not enjoyed by those refugees who were paroled into this country. Admission to the United States as a permanent resident alien is a prerequisite for enlistment in the Regular or Reserve Components or for appointment as an officer in the Regular Army. Consequently, many refugees of varying ages and degrees of military experience were thwarted in their effort to be integrated into the US Armed Forces.

Therefore, until such time as the Indochinese refugees are granted the status of resident aliens en masse or unless special legislation is introduced and passed by the US Congress, save for a limited number of exceptions, none of the over one hundred and thirty thousand refugees admitted to the United States will be permitted to work for the Federal Government or allowed to enlist in the Armed Forces.
Based on periodic examinations of the Indochina refugee program, the General Accounting Office (GAO) prepared a series of reports for Congress [see Bibliography]. The areas of concern on which GAO primarily focused were the management of resources dedicated to Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, interagency billing and reimbursement procedures for refugee support, and compliance with the intent of Congress by all agencies of the Federal Government vis-a-vis the expenditure of funds appropriated for the evacuation and resettlement effort. Within the overall context of these investigations, GAO was specifically critical of some aspects of Army participation in the total Department of Defense effort to support this humanitarian undertaking. Appropriate corrective measures were taken, although in some cases the Departments of Defense and/or Army were satisfied with both the methods and results of the action which had been pursued. It was to be expected that operations of this magnitude would come under close scrutiny and be monitored by Congressional watchdogs; therefore policy guidance was enunciated early in order to maintain control over all expenditures and the financial conduct of the operations. Fiscal planning and proper auditing resulted in accomplishment of the mission with the maximum conservation of personnel, material, and other resources.

The reports and hearings generated by the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the US Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary contain numerous references to the participation of the Military Services in the Indochinese refugee program. One representative Congressional comment from among many in a similar vein states: "Special commendation should go to the particular military commanders who set up refugee [reception centers] in such a short time for so many people and to the members of our volunteer Armed Forces who toiled so diligently for so many hours to make the [centers] ready to receive these unfortunate Indochina refugees and to feed and care for them." In general, comments such as the one cited and the recognition accorded the roles played by the Army and the other Services in accomplishing Operations NEW LIFE and NEW ARRIVALS reflected a dominant attitude expressed in many quarters of the US Government and characterized the complimentary remarks from Congressional sources. Numerous hearings before various committees of both Houses of Congress provide historical information and evaluations of the efficiency and efficacy of the support and special assistance rendered the Indochinese refugees by the military. Documentation on this subject can be found in the legislative entries listed in the Bibliography for further reference.
F. MILITARY AWARDS AND RECOGNITION OF CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION:

In order to duly recognize the unique and important nature of the Indo-Chinese evacuation and resettlement effort and the fact that it was for the most part a joint operation, the Department of Defense authorized the award of the Joint Service Commendation Medal (JSCM) to particularly deserving individual members of the United States Armed Forces who participated in Operations LABYLIFT, NEW LIFE, and NEW ARRIVALS. Approximately six hundred recommendations for the JSCM were submitted by US Army Major Commands of which 320 were approved. Another six hundred awards, including a limited number of the Legion of Merit as well as the Meritorious Service Medal and Army Commendation Medal, were presented to deserving Army personnel. Also, appropriate use was made of the Department of the Army Certificate of Appreciation for presentation to those soldiers whose individual performance, though exemplary, did not merit a higher award.

With the end of the refugee resettlement effort in sight, the Director of the Interagency Task Force (IATF), Mrs. Julia V. Taft, recommended to the President that a series of awards be approved in order to properly recognize those who had participated in the refugee evacuation and resettlement program. Among those awards mentioned by Mrs. Taft were a joint civilian and military (IATF and DOD) certificate of appreciation and a military humanitarian service ribbon. Approximately thirty-five hundred Department of the Army civilians, military dependents, and civilian volunteers who worked in conjunction with the Army

III-F-1
were recipients of the joint Interagency Task Force for Indochina/Department of Defense certificate of appreciation. The award of a humanitarian service ribbon would recognize service in the refugee operations by members of all Components of the Armed Forces. After thorough consideration and a complete review of its merits, the recommendation by IATF for the creation of a humanitarian service ribbon was endorsed by the Department of Defense in response to the interest displayed by the White House, and retitled the Humanitarian Service Medal (HSM). In concept, this service medal for humanitarian action would be authorized for service members participating in support of major contingency operations directed from national level and having international dimensions, such as the Indochinese refugee program. The HSM was established by President Ford in an Executive Order signed on 19 January 1977. Department of Defense implementing instructions on the award of this service medal will follow.
PART IV - LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
[Note: The comments incorporated in the ensuing analysis are divided into two general categories: a specification of significant planning factors and a discussion of problems accompanied by recommendations. Further, principles suggested by the Director, IATF, for coordinating refugee resettlement programs are included. Operations NEW LIFE and NEW ARRIVALS marshalled many of the same resources common to the support of military operations and were unprecedented undertakings for the Army as well as the other Services. The significant planning factors which are offered for future consideration in the management of similar operations have as their bases a number of assumptions: to wit, that the Army would be called upon to provide support in the form of personnel, material, and facilities, to receive and care for a large group of foreign nationals evacuated to within the territorial limits of the United States. The section dealing with specific problems and correlative recommendations encompasses broad, general points which have application to Department of the Army and Major Commands rather than to either subordinate command or unit levels of consideration.]

A. Significant Planning Factors
   IV-A-1

B. Problems and Recommendations
   IV-B-1

C. IATF: Suggested Principles
   IV-C-1
A. SIGNIFICANT PLANNING FACTORS

The Indochinese refugee program dramatically illustrated that specific planning factors are essential to their successful execution. Recognizing the fact that all of the points discussed below would not be operative in every future situation, it is important that they be considered on a selective basis in view of unique requirements which potential operations may present.

(1) Organization

-- A national level organization must be established at the outset of a refugee program to coordinate relations and activities among all involved civilian and military agencies of the US Government.

-- Coordination among civilian and military task force elements, local government officials, civic and business leaders and with the news media should be achieved in order to facilitate productive public relations at refugee reception center level.

-- Refugee programs require the assignment of full-time Department of State, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and other Federal agency representatives. Although the Military Departments may be tasked with reception center management and support, it is the Federal agencies which ultimately must make all policy decisions that affect the refugees. On-site civilian liaison officers are indispensible in obtaining and disseminating guidance from US Government agencies.
(2) Refugee Welfare

-- It is essential that current data on the culture and the customs of the refugees be available for program planning and the orientation of US personnel.

-- Appropriate language instruction and an orientation on life in the United States should be commenced as soon as possible for all refugees.

-- Extensive recreational programs are important since they form an integral part of reception center activities.

(3) Refugee Health Care

-- Vector control, a necessity when there is an influx of large numbers of refugees, and the requirement for the commitment of military entomologists prior to the arrival of refugees are crucial in order to control and minimize potential health hazards.

-- Procedures for medical screening and determining the disposition of ill and injured refugees prior to their arrival in the United States should be established.

-- Establishment during early processing of a system of priority for onward movement of infants, pregnant women, the aged, and other high medical risk refugees should be compulsory.

-- Early identification of immunization requirements is critical in order to preclude the possibility of serious diseases or epidemics.

-- Medical specialties should be provided on the basis of age.
distribution of the refugees. A large proportion of the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees were children which resulted in the requirement for pediatricians and general medical officers in excess of those available.

(4) Refugee Legal Status

-- Both Federal and local jurisdiction over refugees must be determined and appropriate guidance issued prior to their arrival.

-- The immigration status of the refugees should be ascertained by the Department of Justice (Immigration and Naturalization Service) and disseminated to all agencies as soon as possible.

(5) Military Personnel

-- Every effort should be made to arrange for contract services in lieu of utilizing military personnel to support mess operations and refuse collection.

-- When assignment to a refugee operation of qualified linguists with current proficiency cannot be met by the military, arrangement for such services should be contracted immediately.

-- Use of qualified volunteer Reserve component personnel is encouraged once the refugee centers are in operation and operating procedures are established.

(6) Facilities

-- The impact of proposed refugee reception facilities on the
environment should be promptly and fully evaluated.

-- Assessment of the condition of installation facilities should be rapidly completed in order that repairs and renovations can be made by the military and/or civilian contractors.

-- That a procurement team, the chief of which should have the authority of a head of a procurement activity, be detailed or assigned to each refugee reception center with sole responsibility for responding on procurement matters related to the refugee operation.
B. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Areas of civilian and military responsibility

-- Discussion: Delineation of the official role of each senior civil coordinator and the scope of his authority was not announced in the early stages of the operation which caused some confusion in civilian and military chains of command over approval for projects.

-- Recommendation: Upon activation of a joint civilian and military task force, areas of responsibility and authority should be immediately ascertained and delineated for the benefit of all officials concerned.

(2) Population control and collection of demographic data

-- Discussion: Throughout the Indochinese refugee program, a number of methods for ascertaining statistical information and other data on the refugees was used. Simultaneous arrivals and departures of refugees from staging areas and centers kept population figures in a constant state of flux thereby hampering the development of an accurate program census. Complicating the problem were the periodic reports submitted by many of the agencies - both civilian and military - that utilized various formats and were compiled for differing purposes.

-- Recommendation: That a single agency, military or civilian, collect and disseminate refugee population and other data for use by all agencies in planning operations and resettlement efforts.
(3) Department of the Army Staff

-- Discussion: Army Staff activity for the Indochinese refugee program was managed and coordinated by ODCSOPS. A response cell under the direction of the Director of Operations, ODCSOPS, was formed in the Army Operations Center (AOC) at the outset of the operation with ODCSLOG establishing a supporting Logistics Operations Center in the AOC.

-- Recommendation: The response cell proved to be an effective crisis management tool and a similar concept should be employed in all future operations when rapid, coordinated staff responses are required.

(4) Continuity of civilian task force staffing

-- Discussion: The practice of civilian agencies which rotated key personnel on a thirty-day basis caused disruptions in directing the program activities. This lack of continuity was offset by the military in some instances but did not totally compensate for the problem.

-- Recommendation: Civilian agencies must determine personnel requirements for the duration and recognize the value of continuity in such operations.

(5) Congressional liaison and public affairs

-- Discussion: In commencing the operation of refugee reception centers, the Army experienced initial resistance from State and local political leaders who expressed concern over the impact of Operation NEW ARRIVALS on their communities. Although Congressional delegations had been briefed, the information had not filtered down to
local level. To alleviate existing and potential misunderstanding and apprehension, Task Force NEW ARRIVALS personnel met with civic leaders and businessmen to explain the political, social, and economic ramifications of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. This flow of accurate information from knowledgeable official sources resulted in a general abatement of undue anxiety over the presence of refugee reception centers.

-- Recommendation: That in future operations, affecting any civilian community, appropriate public affairs emphasis be placed on the concerns of local leaders and groups in a timely manner which coincides with the pace of refugee planning and operations and that representatives of the news media be included in the coordination process as early as possible.

(6) Legal jurisdiction at refugee reception facilities

-- Discussion: The limitations of Military Police authority and jurisdiction over the refugees were never clearly established. Although the US Marshals Service had complete authority and jurisdiction over refugees, they were seldom present to exercise it because of other requirements. This void hampered the execution of routine Military Police duties. Indeed, the lack of clear-cut authority and jurisdiction was significant in that it could have been exploited by restive refugees or those seeking repatriation.

-- Recommendation: Authority and jurisdiction over refugee personnel must be clearly defined and thoroughly coordinated with all involved military and civilian agencies prior to the arrival of the refugees. A permanent contingent of the US Marshals should be assigned to the refugee reception center throughout its operation.
(7) Concessions for conversion of valuables

-- Discussion: Circumstances made it necessary to provide the refugees with facilities where gold could be converted to US currency. Guidance was not immediately available on this matter and considerable effort was expended formulating concession agreements for approving gold exchange operations on military installations.

-- Recommendation: That future operations provide specific guidance to installation commanders on conversion of valuables to US currency by refugees evacuated into the country.

(8) Qualified civil/military affairs personnel for internal control

-- Discussion: The shortage of trained civil/military affairs specialists developed as reception center population ceilings were increased and the average stay of refugees lengthened. The limited pool of active Army assets made the use of Reserve Component personnel essential in this area. Entire Reserve units could not be activated because of the lack of a declared emergency; therefore, individual Reservists who volunteered for Active Duty for Training (ADT) were assigned to Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap on a selected basis.

-- Recommendation: That authorization for the call-up of selected Reservists be considered in order to support humanitarian operations with requisite civil/military affairs specialties.

(9) Qualified linguists for refugee operation support

-- Discussion: The requirement exists for qualified linguists to
support a refugee operation from its inception. A large percentage of personnel identified as linguists for use in Operation NEW ARRIVALS by specific levels of language proficiency in military personnel records were unable to speak or comprehend the languages. Since Federal law precluded the hire of refugees to act as interpreters, the problem was resolved by drawing on the world-wide assets of the Army to fill some of the requirements. With the number of linguists needed at the centers below strength, delays in processing were experienced.

-- Recommendation: Records of Army linguists should be reviewed to determine that proficiency ratings of all linguists listed are correct. Additionally, Federal hire of aliens should be authorized in emergency situations such as refugee operations.

(10) Use of refugee volunteers for support services

-- Discussion: DA guidance permitted refugees to perform self-help type work at the reception centers on a voluntary basis "in order to ameliorate their situation, maintain conditions essential to their health, safety, and morale, or related tasks considered essential for their well-being." However, attention had to be given to the manner and conditions under which refugees were utilized in order to comply with Federal labor standards, contractual agreements for services, etc.

-- Recommendation: Prior to engaging refugees in volunteer efforts, insure that all work projects: meet safety and working-condition requirements; receive labor standard exceptions from Department of Labor if necessary; preclude unauthorized use of refugees by contractors; fall
under proper supervision; and maintain public relations images which accurately reflect the purpose and scope of the work to the local community.

(11) Natural resources at installations supporting refugee operations

-- Discussion: In the preparation of a selected Army installation for winterization, a review of requirements indicated that the existing contract for delivery of natural gas to the heating system was sufficient. However, the utility company informed the Army that it would be unable to supply the amount specified in the contract without interrupting service to industrial customers. Although the contract called for an uninterrupted supply of gas up to the required amount, the gas company initially refused to honor the terms of the contract.

-- Recommendation: That review of contracts for the continuance of essential services and resources be considered as part of the installation nomination process; that seasonal requirements for natural resources and their availability be considered as one of the determining factors for installation selection; and that judicial injunctions be pursued to preclude discontinuation or degradation of service during renegotiation of contracts.

(12) Planning for winter operation of reception centers

-- Discussion: The original concept of a short-term operation became obsolete once the magnitude of the refugee population was realized. However, IATF planning for winter operations, once the duration
of the program was determined, did not begin until sometime later. This delay affected a number of decisions that should have been made earlier.

-- Recommendation: National level authorities must be advised that timely decisions are essential in planning the continuation of such on-going actions. Plans must be formulated and approved as soon as changes in the situation become apparent.

(13) Accountability of US Government property

-- Discussion: Many of the refugees departed the centers without turning in the personal documentation, bedding, blankets, etc.

-- Recommendation: Proper clearance procedures must be established and enforced to prevent the loss of government property and to insure the accountability of all departing individuals.

(14) Termination of reception center operations

-- Discussion: Planning for the closure of the refugee reception centers was not begun until late in the operation. Furthermore, the rotation of civilian personnel by Federal agencies resulted in conflicting views on requirements and responsibilities for the termination phase of the operation. This caused delay in the approval and the execution of restoration and termination projects.

-- Recommendation: Planning for the termination of operations should be initiated as soon as possible. Termination contingency plans should include basic guidelines on the scope of actions, agency responsibilities, and the type of projects authorized. These contingency

IV-B-7
plans should be coordinated with and approved by the agency charged with overall responsibility for the operation.
C. SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR COORDINATING LARGE REFUGEE RECEPTION AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS

[Note: The following observations are based on a series of comments prepared by Mrs. Julia V. Taft, Director, Interagency Task Force for Indochina (IATF), and reproduced with her permission. Within the context of this discussion, Mrs. Taft defines a large refugee movement as any program which encompasses more than 50,000 refugees. Attached to these recommended principles is a schema delineating Federal agency roles for future refugee operations.]

A. Organization:

(1) A Presidential Task Force should be established, directed by a high level Government official. The Director should be appointed by and report to the President. Agency representatives to the Task Force should be senior officials who will be responsible for coordinating their respective agency's participation. Suggested member agencies should include at a minimum the following:

- Department of State
- US Agency for International Development (USAID)
- United States Information Agency (USIA)
- Department of Defense (DOD)/Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
- Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
- Department of Justice (DOJ)
- Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
- Department of Labor (DOL)
- Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
- National Security Council (NSC)
- Intelligence Community

(2) A mission order (Executive Order) should be issued immediately citing respective roles and memoranda of agreement should be promulgated immediately to flesh out the mission order.

(3) Task Forces should be temporary in nature, not long term operations. The Task Force duration should extend as long as interagency resources are required, i.e., for duration of...
of centers.

(4) One agency (State) should be designated as the Executive Agent to provide management support.

(5) Task Force Director must have control over all staffing in support of the operations at Headquarters and centers. This can be done either through outside hire, retired annuitants, or reimbursable details. Personnel should be selected and assigned for the duration of the effort, and once assigned, should be released only with the approval of the Task Force Director. A statement regarding staff resources should be included in the Executive Order to ensure top priority.

(6) Senior White House contacts are required for the NSC and domestic side.

(7) Broad policy decisions relating to the refugee program must be coordinated through the Task Force Director.

B. Legislative Authorization:

(1) Broad legislation should be promulgated to give the Executive Branch permanent authority to implement a refugee program. The Department of State and INS should propose such legislation now. Should a large scale refugee program subsequently need to be implemented, only appropriations legislation would be required.

(2) Funds should be appropriated to President to provide operational flexibility.

(3) Have early briefings with Congress and have a Congressional liaison office be an immediate component of the Task Force staff.

(4) Encourage regular reporting to and oversight by Congress.

(5) Senior center civilian should report to Task Force routinely on Congressional contacts.

C. International Aspects:

(1) People from the Department of State assigned to the Task Force should go out to key Embassies (in countries in which refugees are stranded) to brief mission personnel on the program and their responsibilities.

(2) Establish early focal point for discussions with other countries. Appoint a "prestige person" to stimulate foreign government
interest in aiding refugees.

(3) A Presidential or Secretarial directive should be issued to Chiefs of Mission citing guidelines for refugee disposition and directing them to encourage host governments to accept refugees.

(4) To the extent they are willing (which was not the case with Indochinese refugees) deal with international VOLAGs in Geneva if we want to internationalize refugee movements.

(5) Explore with ICEM and UNHCR mechanisms whereby international skill banks can be established and used for matching refugees with potential countries of refuge which have skill shortages. ORM/State should initiate discussions now.

(6) Use ICEM for international movements of refugees unless crisis evacuation situation exists; then use DOD.

(7) Work through UNHCR on the issue of repatriation. This problem will be less difficult if staging areas or reception centers are not on US territory.

(8) Expose future foreign service officers to refugee matters through FSI training and management experience.

D. Media and Public Awareness:

(1) The Federal Government should not solicit sponsors through its own resources i.e., toll free line, FRCs, as it is not possible for VOLAGs to verify such offers quickly. The Federal Government should not sponsor or resettle refugees without VOLAGs.

(2) While a national media campaign to solicit sponsors is inadvisable, there must be sufficient information flow to the public regarding who the refugees are and how citizens can help. All offers of sponsorship should be referred to VOLAGs. A toll free line for information purposes is recommended as well as information packets to be mailed to each interested caller.

(3) A national advisory committee to provide advice to the President and/or Task Force is not recommended, as the time frame is too short and the pace too quick. A national committee of eminent citizens, however, can reinforce the "national" effort aspects of the program and result in better acceptance. The function, however, should be to serve as an information link to national organizations and interest groups and to serve as a catalyst with those groups to provide services to the refugees. Members should be key representatives from labor, the
professions (legal, health, education, etc.), civil rights, industry, who will generate interest and assistance from those sectors. The committee, if established, should report to the Task Force.

(4) Receptivity on the part of State and local officials is essential. Early information from HEW regarding Federal funding of refugee support systems should be implemented. Governors should be encouraged to establish a State focal point for information and assistance; however, States should not be encouraged to assume direct sponsorship responsibilities if, by doing so, they detract from sponsor-generating efforts of VOLAGs. (In this matter, HEW non-concurs. With adequate technical assistance HEW believes State and local governments not only can mobilize supportive resources, but also can provide a challenge to the traditional VOLAGs. Consideration should be given to modest State grants for governments who wish to establish a coordinating body.)

(5) Federal Regional Councils (FRCs) can provide an excellent vehicle for briefing State and local government officials. FRCs should not be asked to generate sponsorships. They should not provide technical assistance unless personnel are assigned full time to the effort and report frequently to the Task Force.

To ensure post-center resettlement coordination, FRCs should assign one person from each key agency to work at the HEW regional office to plan and implement coordinated support systems.

(6) Media and publications services for the centers and Task Force should be contracted from outside Government. The essential factor is speedy information dissemination for which GPO has a less than perfect record. Newspapers and refugee orientation materials should cover at a minimum:

- News items about the country from which refugees escaped
- The sponsorship program and VOLAGs
- Center rules and procedures
- Cross-cultural awareness
- Domestic benefits program
- Orientation to society, i.e., taxes, business practices, schools, job procurement, driving, housing, recreation, health hygiene, and geography

E. Resettlement Agencies:

(1) If possible, to keep refugee program internationalized, work
with international resettlement agencies.

(2) Make VOLAGs part of the team immediately. This could be done through regular meetings, a representative on the Task Force and/or on the staff, or a combination of both.

(3) The Task Force should provide administrative and executive officers to each VOLAG at each center for data and file management.

(4) If there is special VOLAG funding ensure VOLAGs not duplicate existing support systems. Special aides needed in medical care, job training and placement, E.S.L.

(5) VOLAGs should be assigned quotas based on capability. Criteria minimal for sponsorship (and verification) should be spelled out in contract with minimum specified duration of sponsorship responsibility.

(6) If Federal funds are given to VOLAGs to be passed on directly to refugees, a standard level of cash per refugee should be adopted and so stipulated in the contracts and in Congressional budget justifications.

(7) Call VOLAGs "resettlement agencies."

(8) VOLAG contracts should stipulate resettlement of people from centers; if there are "pick-ups" they should be covered by separate contract with the agencies. Also, the policy and procedures covering "pick-ups" should be developed and promulgated to give the widest publicity possible.

(9) Be selective (if possible) on which resettlement agencies should participate.

(10) Centers should monitor and control registration process from central distribution point.

3. Center Operations:

Each reception center completed after action reports outlining procedures and problems associated with center management. These are on file with ORM/Department of State, National Archives, HEW, and the former Director, IATF.

Some key points include --

(1) Use the military for logistical support if rapid mobilization is essential. If overseas long-term staging centers are used and a processing center (not hastily developed) is envisioned
for stateside logistical support can be contracted out.

(2) A table of organization is essential.

(3) There must be a clear delineation of roles between civilians and military at the centers. The Director, IATF Headquarters, must be the final decision authority, should a conflict of roles arise.

(4) Specific guidance should be issued to civilians and military on key areas such as:

- Physical layout of center
- Public affairs
- Repatriation
- Comptroller functions
- Intelligence
- Unaccompanied children
- Abortions
- Movement to third countries
- VOLAG management
- Personnel hiring
- Use of refugees as volunteers
- Admission to center of volunteers, researchers, etc.
- Law enforcement
- Consular services
- Computer operations

(5) Center management structures will depend on the type of military reservation used. Therefore, there should be definitive guidelines spelling out civilian/military responsibilities in each of the above areas.

(6) Counseling services are essential at the centers. An effective technique is to use refugees themselves who have a professional talent for evaluation, social work and/or counseling -- perhaps former US Government local national employees. Counseling should be provided for sponsorship assistance, family problems, orientation to new culture, explaining the resettlement process, etc.

(7) Qualified management and controller type civilian personnel should be assigned to each center, and the center coordinators should be given full responsibility for the financial management of their operations. This should be done by giving each coordinator operating allowances or other financial guidelines as well as accountability for inventories, operational records, etc. These personnel should remain with the Task Force or the

IV-C-6
residual headquarters activity until all claims, disposition of resources, and other management aspects of the program are finalized.

(8) Complete records of refugees in centers should be kept. No refugees should be released from the centers until they have been assigned Social Security Account Numbers, Alien Registration numbers, and I-94 forms. (Note: This would relieve us of the problem we now have of trying to clear up the status of the several thousand refugees who reportedly left centers without proper identification.)

(9) Short term but intensive "survival English" should be required for all adults if the expected center stay will exceed 30 days. It is not advised that vocational training be offered; however, job counseling is important and each sponsor should consider employment for the refugee as the critical feature of resettlement.

G. Budget Preparations:

In building a total budget, the following factors should be taken into account --

(1) The principle that the refugee influx should have no cost impact on the States. HEW should budget for 100% reimbursement for welfare, social services, and incremental educational costs. Separate medical coverage is advisable. The use of Medicaid poses problems because of varying State standards. Also, once refugees get Medicaid they are thrust into the midst of the welfare programs which encourage dependency.

(2) Estimated stay in centers should realistically reflect the capacity of the Federal and Voluntary Agencies to gear up. (IATF experience showed an average center stay of 100 days.)

(3) Multiple centers are preferable to one large center although cost factors do rise with multiple sites.

(4) Military airlifts are more expensive than ICEM charters.

(5) All senior members of the Task Force should be involved in the development of budget estimates with assistance from OMB. Reimbursement guidelines should be developed in writing as soon as possible with fund citations for each appropriate agency.

(6) Stringent post-center reporting requirements should be made a part of each resettlement contract.
A special effort should be made to include in the appropriation authorization to hire refugees to assist in the various areas of the program, especially those who are former employees of the US Government overseas. (IATF experience showed former Vietnamese employees to be valuable assets to the program and they were victimized to the extent that they were hired on contract or other "pick-up" types of appointment and did not receive any retirement credit for this service.)

FEDERAL AGENCY ROLES

(1) Department of State:
   -- To serve as the "institutional memory" and to develop standard operating procedures and contingency plans.

   Get standby authority for greater fiscal flexibility, Executive Agent support - i.e., space, communications. linguists, personnel and contracting system, filing, and contracted data processing.

(2) US Agency for International Development:
   -- Assist in preparation of initial budget, provide language and area specialists.

(3) United States Information Agency:
   -- Staff public information offices, provide linguists and personnel who are specialists in cross-cultural communication.

(4) Department of Defense:
   -- The only Federal agency capable of mass refugee movement and maintenance quickly. Should be tasked to perform evacuation mobilization. Center maintenance and setting up of logistical support should be done by DOD if time is critical.

(5) Department of Health, Education, and Welfare:
   -- Public Health Service. Provide immunizations and disease surveillance at centers and with VOLAGS in order to make sponsors
aware of Class I and II diseases. Be sure each refugee has a personal copy of health records upon release.

-- Social and Rehabilitative Services. Handle problems of destitute repatriated Americans. Assist center and VOLAGs on special placement problems, i.e., unaccompanied children, physically or mentally handicapped.

-- Social Security Administration. Issue Social Security cards using block numbers.


(6) Department of Justice:

-- Provide legal counsel at headquarters and centers. Seek parole authority if it is beyond current statutory authority. Provide US Marshals for law enforcement beyond what DOD would provide. Establish protocol between DOD and Justice regarding law enforcement jurisdiction at centers. Delineate respective responsibilities for each center. Provide legal advice to refugees re: legal issues impeding their ability to leave centers but not general legal advice.

(7) Immigration and Naturalization Service:

-- Coordinate the nine agency computerized security clearances (DEA, FBI, CIA, DOD, State, INS, etc.).
-- Determine admissibility to the US.
-- Issue "A" numbers to all refugees; fingerprint and photograph.
-- Authorize employment.
-- Get affidavits (re: "never persecuting others") and the assets and liabilities certificates.
-- Issue refugee travel documents.
-- Adjust status.

(Great concern has been expressed about the term "parolee" and its negative connotations. INS should consider revising the terminology to describe the refugee status.)

(8) Office of Management and Budget:

-- Secure formal detailees from Federal agencies to work on Task Force. Assist in budget and legislative preparations. Serve as White House "domestic affairs" point of contact.

IV-C-9
Key link to get Federal Regional Councils involved as information conduits with State and local governments.

(9) Department of Labor:
-- Provide job coding for each refugee. Analyze labor market needs and assist VOLAGs at centers. Ensure participation in budget preparation for refugee skill training and employment during post center resettlement.

(10) Department of Housing and Urban Development:
-- Handle problems related to housing shortages and provide advice to VOLAGs on available housing programs for refugees.

(11) National Security Council:
-- To be used as a lever to assign DOD specific logistical support tasks. Each assignment should be in writing.
-- Serve as White House "foreign affairs" point of contact.

(12) Intelligence Community:
-- To assist in security clearance processes. Provide information prior to and during evacuation if there is a US evacuation.

(13) Department of Transportation:
-- To assist in coordinating air transit services from center to final destinations.

(14) Department of Interior:
-- If staging areas are in Pacific territories, Interior can provide on-site support and coordination. Otherwise, minimal involvement.

(15) Department of Treasury:
-- Handle issues such as foreign currency exchange; IRS responsibilities and benefits to refugees and sponsors; foreign assets controls.

IV-C-10
PART V - APPENDIXES
THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

April 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service

The President has today appointed Ambassador Dean Brown as his Special Representative and Director of a Special Inter-Agency Task Force to coordinate for the President all U.S. Government activities concerning evacuation of United States citizens, Vietnamese citizens, and third country nationals from Vietnam, as well as humanitarian assistance to Vietnam and refugee and resettlement problems relating to the Vietnam conflict. Ambassador Brown will work under the direction of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. All decisions and activities on these matters will be coordinated through Ambassador Brown and his Task Force.

The President expects that Ambassador Brown will receive full cooperation and support from all elements of the United States Government.
You should immediately appoint a senior official as your representative on the Task Force and as the official responsible within your agency for all matters relating to these subjects and contact with Ambassador Brown.

/s/ Henry A. Kissinger  
Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, JCS

V-A-2
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE ARMY SUPPORT OF RVN EVACUEES IN CONUS

A. MSG: DA (DALO-PLO) DTG 240445Z APR 75.

1. {U} PURPOSE: THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE PLANNING GUIDANCE TO MAJOR ARMY COMMANDS (MACOMS) IN ORDER TO PERMIT IMMEDIATE CONTINGENCY PLANNING REPEAT CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE TASKING IN SUPPORT OF RVN EVACUEES WITHIN CONUS.

2. {U} GENERAL:

   A. SITUATION: CURRENT SITUATION IN RVN Dictates that CONTINGENCY PLANNING BE INITIATED ON AN EXIGENT BASIS TO RECEIVE, PROCESS, BILLET, SUPPORT RVN EVACUees AT MILITARY FACILITIES WITHIN CONUS IN THE EVENT THAT SAFE HAVENS OUTSIDE CONUS BECOME SATURATED.
B. RESPONSIBILITIES:

[1] STATE DEPARTMENT HAS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROL OF RVN EVACUEE PROGRAM AND HAS ORGANIZED AN INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE TO COORDINATE THE OPERATION.

[2] JCS {J4} WILL COORDINATE AND DIRECT MOVEMENT OF RVN EVACUEES TO PROCESSING CENTERS IN CONUS IF REQUESTED AND FUNDED BY STATE DEPARTMENT AND DIRECTED BY OSD.

[3] CINCPAC/MAC WILL MOVE DESIGNATED EVACUEES FROM RVN TO CONUS PORTS OF ENTRY IF REQUESTED AND FUNDED BY STATE DEPARTMENT AND DIRECTED BY OSD.

[4] THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DEVELOP PLANS AND PROCEDURES TO ACCOMMODATE RVN EVACUEES IN CONUS IF REQUESTED AND FUNDED BY STATE DEPARTMENT AND DIRECTED BY OSD.

C. ASSUMPTIONS.

[1] THE ARMY WILL BE TASKED TO RECEIVE, PROCESS, BILLET AND SUPPORT 50,000 TO 200,000 RVN EVACUEES FOR A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS OR MORE.

[2] STATE DEPARTMENT WILL REIMBURSE DOD FOR ALL EXPENSES INCURRED IN SUPPORT OF THE RVN EVACUEE PROGRAM.


[4] JCS AS REQUESTED AND FUNDED BY STATE DEPARTMENT AND DIRECTED BY OSD WILL ARRANGE FOR TRANSPORTATION OF RVN EVACUEES FROM OVERSEAS TO CONUS AERIAL/SEA PORTS OF ENTRY AND FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT TO DESIGNATED ARMY PROCESSING CENTERS.

[5] DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE {FBI} AND/OR APPROPRIATE STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY WILL EXERCISE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES COMMITTED BY EVACUEES ACCORDING TO TYPE JURISDICTION EXERCISED BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OVER THE POST, CAMP OR STATION CONCERNED.
3. {U} MISSION: IDENTIFY AND BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH AND OPERATE PROCESSING CENTERS FOR SUPPORT OF 50,000 TO 200,000 RVN EVACUEES FOR A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS OR MORE WITHIN CONUS.

4. {U} CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: FORSCOM, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER MACOMS, WILL IDENTIFY POSTS, CAMPS OR STATIONS IN THE STANDBY MOBILIZATION BASE, OR THOSE USED FOR SUPPORT OF RESERVE AND/OR SPECIAL TRAINING FOR USE AS RVN EVACUEE PROCESSING CENTERS AND WILL DEVELOP CONCEPT PLANS FOR THEIR ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION USING THE FOLLOWING PLANNING GUIDANCE:

   A. MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF EXISTING FACILITIES AND USE FORTY SQUARE FEET PER INDIVIDUAL AS SPACE PLANNING FACTOR.

   B. CONSIDER CAMP CAPACITY OF 20,000 - 25,000 INDIVIDUALS. KEEP NUMBER OF CAMPS TO MINIMUM.

   C. ASSUME RVN EVACUEES TO BE RELATIVELY HEALTHY, PRIMARILY FROM MIDDLE STRATA OF RVN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ACCOMPANIED BY FAMILIES.

   D. MAINTAIN FAMILY INTEGRITY; AVERAGE FAMILY CONSISTS OF 8 INDIVIDUALS.

   E. REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR LOCATIONS OF PROCESSING CENTERS ARE: WEST, SOUTHWEST, SOUTH AND REMAINDER OF CONUS IN THAT ORDER.

   F. SUPPORT TO BE RENDERED WILL INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO BILLETING, MESSING, ESSENTIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT, TRANSPORTATION, INSTALLATION SECURITY AND CAMP ADMINISTRATION.

   G. UTILIZE EVACUEES TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE FOR ESSENTIAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS.

5. {U} TASK:

   A. FORSCOM:

   {U} IDENTIFY POSTS, CAMPS OR STATIONS IN THE STANDBY MOBILIZATION BASE OR THOSE USED IN SUPPORT OF RESERVE AND/OR SPECIAL TRAINING WHICH ARE SUITABLE FOR RVN EVACUEE PROCESSING.

   V-A-5
CENTERS. INDICATE IMPACT ON RESERVE TRAINING FOR EACH INSTALLATION SELECTED; AND ESTIMATE COSTS AND MANPOWER RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MAKE FACILITIES HABITABLE AT EACH INSTALLATION ON AN AUSTERE AND MINIMAL BASIS.

{2} DEVELOP CONCEPT PLAN FOR ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF REQUIRED PROCESSING CENTERS TO INCLUDE SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED; EG, TRANSPORTATION; MEDICAL; MESSING; HOUSEKEEPING; ACCESS CONTROL.

{3} IDENTIFY STAFFING REQUIREMENTS BY UNIT AND/OR MOS; AVAILABLE MANPOWER RESOURCES; SHORTFALL; IF ANY.

{4} DEVELOP AND REFINE PROPOSED RELATIONSHIPS AT EACH PROCESSING CENTER BETWEEN ARMY ELEMENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO INCLUDE CIVILIAN RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS.

{5} DEVELOP LOGISTICAL PLAN FOR SUPPORT OF EVACUEE CENTERS AND IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS FOR AMC AND DSA.

{6} DEVELOP DAILY REPORTING FORMAT. INCLUDE AS A MINIMUM: NR OF SUPPORT PERSONNEL ON SITE; NR OF EVACUEE ARRIVALS; NR OF EVACUEES RELOCATED; NR OF EVACUEES ON HAND; NR OF EVACUEES HOSPITALIZED; COSTS BY BUDGET PROGRAM (DAILY AND CUMULATIVE); NR OF RATIONS CONSUMED BY EVACUEES; AND DAILY SUMMARY OF EVENTS, CUT OFF AS OF 2400 HRS LOCAL TIMES. EVACUEES SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED BY SEX; ADULTS AND CHILDREN UNDER 15 YEARS OF AGE. SUBMIT TO DA (DAMO-0) BY 1000Z.

{7} DEVELOP AND COORDINATE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES WITH APPROPRIATE FEDERAL AND/OR STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES FOR REPORTING AND INVESTIGATING CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY EVACUEES.

B. TRADOC:

{11} BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE RESOURCES UNDER YOUR CONTROL FOR SUPPORT OF RVN EVACUEE PROGRAM.

{12} PROVIDE SUPPORT TO FORSCOM AS MUTUALLY AGREED UPON.

C. AMC: (IN COORDINATION WITH DSA)

***************
* UNCLASSIFIED *
***************
IDENTIFY REQUIRED RESOURCES ON HAND TO SUPPORT THE
OPERATION.

BE PREPARED TO PROCURE ON SHORT NOTICE THOSE ITEMS
REQUIRED TO MEET SHORTFALL.

PROVIDE SUPPORT AS REQUESTED BY FORSCOM.

USACC:

PROVIDE SUPPORT TO FORSCOM FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATION OF TELEPHONIC/TELETYPING COMMUNICATIONS AT EACH PRO-
CESSING CENTER IDENTIFIED BY FORSCOM; INDICATE COMMAND RESOURCES
AVAILABLE AND SHORTFALL, IF ANY.

USAHSC:

. PROVIDE INPUT TO FORSCOM FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATION OF ADEQUATE MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES AT EACH
PROCESSING CENTER IDENTIFIED BY FORSCOM.

IDENTIFY REQUIRED UNITS BY TYPE AND PERSONNEL BY
MOS; COMMAND RESOURCES AVAILABLE AND SHORTFALL IF ANY.

IDENTIFY COMMUNITY MEDICAL SUPPORT WHICH COULD BE
MADE AVAILABLE IN SUPPORT OF THIS OPERATION.

DEVELOP HEALTH GUIDANCE FOR USE BY US ARMY ELEMENTS
IN SUPPORT OF PROCESSING CENTERS TO INCLUDE PREVENTIVE MEDICA-
L OPERATIONS.

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

THIS MESSAGE IS EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT.
DEVELOP AND SUBMIT CONCEPT PLAN ASAP BUT NLT COB 25 APRIL 1975.

FORSOM HAS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLANNING
AND EXECUTION OF ARMY SUPPORT OF RVN EVACUEES IN CONUS.
DIRECT COORDINATION BETWEEN MACOMS IS AUTHORIZED AND ESSENTIAL. COORDINATE WITH NGB PRIOR TO DIRECT CONTACT WITH STATE AG'S.

IDENTIFY AND BE PREPARED TO FURNISH PERSONNEL WITH VIETNAMESE LINGUISTIC CAPABILITY FOR USE AS INTERPRETERS.

FURNISH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE OF RVN EVACUEES AS TEMPORARY HIRE TO FILL SELECTED CAMP COMPLEMENT POSITIONS.

ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO DESIGNATED RVN EVACUEE PROCESSING CENTERS MUST BE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE MISSION AND FUNCTIONS; AND PARAMETERS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND CAUTIONED TO PERFORM THEIR DUTIES IN A TACTFUL AND COMPASSIONATE MANNER TO AVOID ANY UNTOWARD INCIDENTS.

LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION:

A. MEDICAL SERVICE. REF A.

B. BASE DEVELOPMENT. MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF EXISTING FACILITIES AND PLAN FOR MINIMAL EXPENDITURE TO MAKE FACILITIES HABITABLE. TENTAGE MAY BE USED IF REQUIRED. NEW CONSTRUCTION WILL BE LIMITED TO SITE PREPARATION AND UTILITY SUPPORT TYPE ITEMS WITHIN THE COMMANDERS APPROVAL AUTHORITY UNDER AR 415-35.

C. FUNDING. EXPENSES INCURRED IN SUPPORT OF RVN EVACUEES ARE REIMBURSABLE. CAPTURE ALL COST INCURRED. FINANCIAL PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED WILL BE FURNISHED BY COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY BY SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS.

D. MORALE AND WELFARE. INCLUDE ADEQUATE PROVISIONS FOR CULTURALLY ORIENTED MORALE AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND APPROPRIATE RELIGIOUS SERVICES.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS:

A. DCSOPS-OD (DOMS) WILL MANAGE ARMY SUPPORT OF RVN EVACUEES IN CONUS. AUTOVON 225-4089; 225-4475.

B. FORSCOM WILL BE THE ACTION AGENCY FOR ARMY SUPPORT OF RVN EVACUEES IN CONUS AND WILL HAVE OPCON OF ALL ARMY
C. MACOMS will support FORSCOM to the fullest extent possible. Unresolved issues will be submitted to this HQ for resolution.

B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE:

A. If a decision is made to support RVN evacuees, other than orphans, in CONUS, and the Army is tasked to provide such support, the initial public announcement within DOD will be made by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

B. Media inquiries should be referred to OASD(PA) AV 227-5131 or commercial 202-697-5131. Inform DAIO of referral, AV 227-2351.

C. In the event that actual preparations are initiated prior to public announcement, specific public affairs guidance will be provided.

9. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT TO AOC, AUTOVON 227-0218.

BT
251504Z APR 75
FM DA WASH DC //DAMO-MS//
TO DA WASH DC //DCSOPS//
DA WASH DC //DAMO-OD//
DA WASH DC //DAMO-FD//
DA WASH DC //DCSLOG//
DA WASH DC //TSG//
DA WASH DC //DCSPER//
DA WASH DC //CINFO//
DA WASH DC //OCLL//
DA WASH DC //NGB//
INFO FORSCOM-LO
DA WASH DC //ACSI//
COMPTROLLER

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DA MEMORANDUM 1-4-4, DATED 20 MAY 1974, A RESPONSE CELL WILL BECOME OPERATIONAL AT 251200 EDT APR 1975, IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION NEWLIFE, IN THE ARMY OPERATION CENTER (AOC). ADDRESSES WILL PROVIDE FOR 24 HOUR COVERAGE FOR THEIR AGENCY.hifts WILL BE 1200 - 2400 AND 0001 - 1200 DAILY UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

2. THERE WILL BE AN INFORMATION BRIEFING AT 251300 EDT APR 75 IN THE AOC CONFERENCE ROOM. INVITEES: DCSLOG, ACSI, DCSOPS COMPTROLLER, OCLL, CINFO, FORSCOM-LO, NGB (RESERVE AND GUARD REP). EFFECTIVE 26 APR 75 A DAILY-0900 BRIEFING WILL BE PRESENTED IN THE AOC CONFERENCE ROOM.

BT

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V-A-10
SUBJECT: FUNDING OF ARMY SUPPORT OF OPERATION NEULIFE

1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE RELATED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR TASKS PERFORMED IN SUPPORT OF SUBJECT OPERATION.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL REIMBURSE DOD FOR ALL INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPPORT OF THIS OPERATION.

3. INCREMENTAL COSTS ARE DEFINED AS THOSE ACTUAL/ESTIMATED COSTS BEING INCURRED OVER AND ABOVE THE NORMAL OPERATING COSTS OF THE PERSONNEL AND FORCES INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION.

4. COST/ESTIMATED EXPENSES WILL BE ACCUMULATED AND REIMBURSEMENT MADE TO THE FINANCING OPERATING APPROPRIATIONS UNDER AUTOMATIC REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER IV, AR 37-10B.

5. BILLING AND REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE FURNISHED BY SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS AT A LATER DATE.

6. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE EFFECTIVE FOR SUPPORT ENVISIONED UNDER REFERENCE A, IF EXECUTED.

BT
SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF REFUGEES - OPERATION NEW LIFE

1. HIGHER AUTHORITY HAS DETERMINED SHELTER FOR REFUGEES WILL BE PROVIDED BY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN CONUS WHILE VOLUNTEER AGENCIES ARRANGE SPONSORS AND CAN MOVE REFUGEES ON.

2. PLAN IS FOR REFUGEES TO MOVE TO THESE REFUGEE CENTERS DIRECT FROM CLARK/GUAM/WAKE ASAP AFTER RECEIVING ESSENTIAL MEDICAL/ IMMIGRATION CHECK AT PACIFIC CENTERS. ANTICIPATE USING MAC AND COMMERCIAL CHARTER FOR LIFT. IF NECESSARY, MAC LIFTS WILL TRANSPANE TO COMMERCIAL AT CONUS ENTRY POINTS.

3. REFUGEE CENTERS SELECTED SHOULD PROVIDE REFUGEE FACILITIES SEPARATED FROM NORMAL BASE ACTIVITY IF PRACTICABLE. FACILITIES FOR VOLAGS WILL BE ESSENTIAL. TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES - AIR, RAIL AND AUTO - ARE ESSENTIAL. CENTERS SELECTED ARE TO SPAN COUNTRY AND TO HAVE MILD CLIMATE.

4. ARMY, AIR FORCE AND NAVY/MARINES CORPS EACH NOMINATE TWO REFUGEE CENTERS CAPABLE OF HANDLING UP TO 20,000 PERSONNEL EACH. IN NOMINATION INDICATE HOW MANY PERSONNEL CAN BE ACCOMMODATED IMMEDIATELY AND TIME-PHASING OF BUILDUP TO MAXIMUM. ANTICIPATE FIRST PERSONNEL TO CONUS UNDER THIS PLAN AFTERNOON MONDAY 28 APRIL OR TUESDAY 29 APRIL.

5. IN EVENT ENTRY POINTS ARE REQUIRED WITH ANY NECESSARY ACTIVITY BEYOND TRANSPANTING FROM MAC TO COMMERCIAL CHARTER, EACH SERVICE LESS ARMY DESIGNATE ONE WEST COAST ENTRY POINT.
THIS MIGHT INVOLVE OVERNIGHT HOUSING FOR UP TO 500 TRANSIENT PERSONNEL.

6. SUBMIT NOMINATIONS TO JCS/J4 BY 1600R SUNDAY 27 APRIL 75.

7. FUNDING WILL BE GUARANTEED BY STATE TO DEFENSE WITH FUNDING CITE TO FOLLOW AS FOR ONGOING NEW LIFE OPERATIONS.

8. NO PUBLIC COMMENT TILL ANNOUNCED BY STATE DEPT INTERAGENCY TASK GROUP AFTER NECESSARY POLITICAL CLEARANCE. REFER ANY QUESTIONS TO ASD (PA).

BT
SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF REFUGEES - OPERATION NEW LIFE

1. {U} THE FOLLOWING CONUS ARMY INSTALLATIONS ARE NOMINATED AS REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH TASKING AT REFERENCE B- ABOVE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>EXT CAPACITY</th>
<th>NEAREST AFLD</th>
<th>DATE &amp; PHASING</th>
<th>1,000 REFUGEES PER DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAMP ROBERTS</td>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>LAMOORE NAS</td>
<td>HR PLUS 48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT CHAFFEE</td>
<td>ARKANSAS</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>LITTLE ROCK AFB</td>
<td>HR PLUS 48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E HOUR IS EXECUTE HOUR

2. {U} ABOVE CAPABILITY IS CONTINGENT UPON EARLY DECISION AS TO SPECIFIC INSTALLATIONS TO BE USED WITHIN TOTAL DOD PLAN.

3. {U} LEAD TIME INDICATED ABOVE IS TO PROVIDE FOR NECESSARY CLEARANCE WITH THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR USE OF CAMP ROBERTS WHICH IS UNDER STATE CONTROL {NATIONAL GUARD} AT THIS TIME AND MOVEMENT OF ACTIVE ARMY SUPPORT INTO PLACE INCIDENT TO THE UTILIZATION OF THIS CAMP. SIMILARLY, LEAD TIME INCIDENT TO THE USE OF FT CHAFFEE ALLOWS FOR ESSENTIAL POSITIONING OF ACTIVE ARMY SUPPORT FOLLOWING DECISION. FUND CITES MUST BE PROVIDED TO THE SERVICES CONCURRENT WITH THE DECISION TO EXECUTE.
4. [U] DA IS PREPARED TO ADDRESS THIS OVERALL MATTER NOW AND RECOMMENDS A CONFERENCE BE ARRANGED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER SERVICE INPUT RESPONSE TO REF B IS RECEIVED BY OJCS. FOR REASONS CITED ABOVE, APPROPRIATE ADJUSTMENTS IN REQUIRED AVAILABILITY DATES SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

BT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (H&E)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (I&L)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LA)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (M&RA)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PA)
GENERAL COUNSEL
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Defense Task Force for Vietnamese Refugees

I wish to establish a policy level task force to oversee and help coordinate DOD's activities concerning the evacuation of refugees from Vietnam. This task force will interface directly with the President's Special Inter-Agency Task Force established by the attached memorandum.

I am asking the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) to lead this effort. Representatives of addressed agencies to the task force should have the proper authority to speak for their respective agencies and to obtain rapid implementation of action as required. The first meeting of the task force will be at 1130 hours on 29 April 1975 in Room 4C839.

/s/ William P. Clements, Jr.

Attachment [Withdrawn]
300302Z APR 75
FM JCS WASH DC
TO CSA WASH DC
CSAF WASH DC
CNO WASH DC
CMC WASH DC
MAC SCOTT AFB IL
SECDEF WASH DC
SECESTATE WASH DC
22AF TRAVIS AFB CA
CG MCAS EL TORO CA
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
13AF CLARK AB PHILIPPINES
CINCPACREP GUAM TTPI
USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL

SUBJECT: REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER - FORT CHAFFEE
REF: JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MSG 290210Z APR 75

THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. PART ONE FOR CSA.
1. FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS, IS DESIGNATED AS A CONUS RECEPTION
CENTER FOR PROCESSING INDOCHINA IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES. INITIATE
NECESSARY ACTION TO RECEIVE FIRST REFUGEES NOT EARLIER THAN
0900 HOURS, 2 MAY 75. EXPECT TO CARE FOR 15,000 WITH PEAK LOAD
OF 20,000 REFUGEES AT ANY ONE TIME. BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE 1,000
REFUGEES FIRST DAY AND 2,000 EACH DAY THEREAFTER. INSTALLATION
COMMANDER FORT CHAFFEE WILL FOLLOW GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFERENCE
WHICH OUTLINES SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BOTH MILITARY INSTALL-
ATION COMMANDER AND CIVILIAN COORDINATOR.

PART TWO FOR CSAF.

2. USE FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS, AS POINT OF ENTRY FOR REFUGEES
ENROUTE FORT CHAFFEE WHERE POSSIBLE. PUBLICITY PLANNED FIRST
REFUGEE ARRIVAL REQUIRES CONTROLLED TIME FIRST FLIGHT. COORDINATE
WITH CAMP COMMANDER.

3. REQUEST NECESSARY OFFLOADING AND GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BE
POSITIONED AT FORT SMITH. DIRECT COORDINATION ALCON AUTHORIZED.

BT
300400Z APR 75
FM SECSTATE WASH DC
TO ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
SECDEF
JCS
INS
INTERIOR
HEW
CIA
TRANSPORTATION
COMMERC
TREASURY
ATTORNEY GEN
CINCPAC
CINCPACREP
GUAM/TTPI
CINCSAC
CDR THIRD AIR DIV ANDERSEN AFB
CSA
CNO
CSAF
CMC
MAC SCOTT AFB
CDR FORT CHAFFEE ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF ARMY
FORCES COMMAND FT MCPHERSON GA
USLO PEKING

SUBJECT: OPERATION "NEW ARRIVALS" INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

A. WHITE HOUSE MEMO OF 18 APRIL 1975
B. STATE 091721 [NODAL]
C. STATE 092891 [NODAL]
D. STATE 097636 [NODAL]

1. THE PRIMARY GOAL OF THE PROGRAM IS TO MOVE INDOCHINA IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES TO RECEPTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES AS SWIFTLY AS POSSIBLE; THIS MESSAGE DESIGNATES FORT CHAFFEE AS A CONUS RECEPTION CENTER AND PROVIDES ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE. ACTION REQUESTED: APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND COMMANDS INITIATE ALL ACTIONS NECESSARY TO BEGIN PROCESSING PERSONNEL AT RECEPTION CENTER ON 2 MAY 75 AT 0900 L HOURS.
2. REF A ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE HEADED BY AMBASSADOR DEAN BROWN TO COORDINATE ALL ASPECTS OF THE EVACUATION OF US CITIZENS AND CERTAIN ALIENS FROM VIETNAM. REF B ASKED DOD UNDER THE OVERALL COOPERATION OF THE AMBASSADOR TO BE PREPARED TO HOLD, WITH OTHER AGENCIES SUPPORT, UP TO 50,000 EVACUEES FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO 90 DAYS, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A LONGER PERIOD UNTIL SUCH TIME STATE AND JUSTICE PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR FINAL DISPOSITION. REF C PROVIDED INITIAL CONCEPT FOR THE GUAM SAFEHAVEN AND OPERATION "NEW ARRIVALS" AND INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS ON GUAM WERE PRESCRIBED IN REF D.

3. THE NEXT OBJECTIVE IS THE EXPEDITIOUS MOVEMENT OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES TO THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES. IT IS ENVISIONED THAT MOVEMENT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY US MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CONTRACT AIRCRAFT FROM OVERSEAS SAFEHAVENS TO CONUS RECEPTION CENTERS DESIGNATED BY THE US GOVERNMENT. EARLY ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE WILL:

-- RELIEVE PROMPTLY SOME PRESSURE ON OVERSEAS SAFEHAVEN SITES

-- DISPERSE THE WORKLOAD INVOLVED IN ARRANGING FOR ONWARD TRANSPORTATION AND RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE.

-- UNITE THE PERSONNEL WITH THEIR SPONSORS AND/OR VOLAGS AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES SO THAT THE MAJOR WORK ON RESETTLEMENT CAN BEGIN.

4. IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES WILL BE MOVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRIORITIES SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF REF D. OTHER CATEGORIES WILL BE MOVED AS THEY ARE CLEARED FOR MOVEMENT BY IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. PROCESSING PERSONNEL WILL BE RELEASED TO THEIR SPONSORS OR BE TRANSPORTED THROUGH VOLUNTEER AGENCIES' EFFORTS TO THEIR SPONSORS LOCATION.

5. COMMANDER FORT CHAFFEE WILL BE PREPARED 2 MAY 75 0900 HOURS 1975 TO:

-- HOUSE AND PROVIDE FOR THE IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES DURING THEIR PROCESSING BY FEDERAL AND VOLUNTEER AGENCIES;

-- PROVIDE WORKING SPACE AND RELATED SUPPORT FOR PERSONNEL OF FEDERAL AND VOLUNTEER AGENCIES (AND INTER-NATIONAL AGENCIES IF REQUIRED) WHO WILL PROCESS AND LOOK AFTER THE NEEDS

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V-A-19
OF THE REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS (E.G. FACILITIES AND TELEPHONES FOR PRESS AND FOR PUBLIC INQUIRY CENTERS).

- AVOID ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES OR READINESS THAT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE JCS.

6. THE MILITARY INSTALLATION COMMANDER WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENERAL SUPPORT, SECURITY AND SAFETY OF THE RECEPTION CENTER. A SENIOR CIVIL OFFICIAL DESIGNATED BY ITAF AND DESIGNATED THE CIVIL COORDINATOR, WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING ALL CIVIL ACTIVITIES RELATING TO RECEPTION, CARE, PROCESSING AND RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY THE RECEPTION CENTER. BROAD TASKS OF EACH INCLUDE:

MILITARY INSTALLATION COMMANDER:

- RETAIN ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVISION OF ALL LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND SERVICES REQUIRED FOR THE OPERATIONS OF THE RECEPTION CENTER.

- PROVIDE FEDERAL AND VOLUNTARY AGENCY PERSONNEL WITH APPROPRIATE SUPPORT AND SERVICE NECESSARY TO THE PROPER PERFORMANCE OF THEIR RESETTLEMENT FUNCTIONS.

- COOPERATE WITH AND ASSIST THE CIVIL COORDINATOR TO ACHIEVE EXPEDIENT PROCESSING OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES. SUCH ASSISTANCE DOES NOT IMPLY SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES AT THE DESIGNATED FACILITY WITHOUT SPECIFIC DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROVAL.

- MAINTAIN DETAIL FUNDING RECORDS IN ORDER TO INSURE DOCUMENTATION FOR DOD REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS FROM DEPT. OF STATE.

CIVIL COORDINATOR, RECEPTION CENTER:

- HAS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF ALL FEDERAL CIVIL AND VOLUNTARY AGENCIES' ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE SUPPORT AND PROCESSING OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES.

- ASSUME OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY RELATING TO THE SUPPORT FOR PROCESSING OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES FROM THEIR ARRIVAL AT THE RECEPTION CENTER UNTIL THEIR DEPARTURE AT THE COMPLETION OF PROCESSING.
-- FORWARD TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH INFO COPY TO DEPT. OF DEFENSE FOR DECISION THOSE PROBLEMS WHICH CANNOT OTHERWISE BE RESOLVED IN A TIMELY MANNER.

7. A COORDINATED JOINT DAILY SITUATION REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED THROUGH APPROPRIATE DEPT. CHANNELS BY THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER AND THE CIVIL COORDINATOR. THE DAILY SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0001 EDT MUST REACH WASHINGTON BY 0600. AN UPDATE REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO REACH WASHINGTON AGENCIES BY 0900 EDT.

8. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS AT THE SELECTED SITES WAS PROVIDED TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY BY SECDEF 290444Z APR 75.

9. PENDING ARRIVAL OF CIVIL COORDINATOR AND HIS STAFF AT FORT CHAFFEE, REQUEST DOD AUTHORIZE DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN MR. JAMES WILSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR RESETTLEMENT, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, AND A DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER, FOR PURPOSES OF COORDINATING DETAILS SUCH AS PHYSICAL SETUP OF THE RECEPTION CENTER, ARRIVAL OF STAFF PERSONNEL, ETC. REQUEST MR. WILSON TO PHONE STATE ATTN: MR. WILSON. AMBASSADOR BROWN'S INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE BE PROVIDED INFO SOONEST CONCERNING POINT OF CONTACT AT FORT CHAFFEE.

10. THE CIVIL COORDINATOR, MR. DONALD MACDONALD, ANTICIPATES ARRIVAL FORT CHAFFEE MID-DAY THURSDAY, 1 MAY 75, VIA POV. FIRM TRAVEL PLANS WILL BE FURNISHED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. KISSINGER

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3007132Z APR 75 {CORRECTION IN REF F AND PARA 8}
FM DA WASHDC //DAMO-AOC//
TO CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
CDRTRADOC FT MONROE VA
CDRAMC ALEX VA
CDRHSC FT SAM HOUSTON TX
CDRUSACC FT HUACHUCA AZ
CDRMTMC WASHDC
JCS WASHDC //J4//
CSAF WASH DC
CNO WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
DEPT OF STATE WASHDC
DIR SPECIAL INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE WASHDC
USCINCRFD MACDILL AFB FL
MAC SCOTT AFB IL
DSA CAMERON STA VA
CDRTAGCEN WASHDC
CDRUSACSG FT SHAFTER HI
CDRUSAFIVE TF SAM HOUSTON TX
CDRUSAFACFS FT SILL OK
CDR FT CHAFFEE FT CHAFFEE AR
CDR TF CANNON FT CHAFFEE AR

SUBJ: OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS

REF:
A. FORSCOM OPLAN NEW LIFE - CHAFFEE {DATED 25 APR 75}
B. FORSCOM MSG DTG 271924Z APR 75 {CHANGE 1 TO OPLAN NEW LIFE}
C. DA MSG DTG 240124Z APR 75
D. DA MSG DTG 271817Z APR 75
E. DA MSG DTG 261452Z APR 75
F. JCS MSG DTG 300302Z APR 75 NOTAL

1. THIS IS AN EXECUTE REPEAT EXECUTE MESSAGE TO ESTABLISH A REFUGE RECEPTION CENTER AT FT CHAFFEE AR AND SUPERSEDES GUIDANCE TO HOLD CONTAINED IN PARA 1, REF D. REPEAT THIS IS AN EXECUTE MESSAGE.
2. THIS CONFIRMS TELECON: MG SNIFFIN, DA AND BG TODD, FORSCOM, AT 292024Z APR 75.

3. FYI "OPERATION NEWLIFE" HAS BEEN CHANGED TO "OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS".

4. BE PREPARED TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS AT FT CHAFFEE REPEAT CHAFFEE IAW REF A, B, AND C IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS ASAP BUT NOT LATER THAN 0500Z 2 MAY 75. ANTICIPATED RATE OF INPUT WILL BE 1000 ON 2 MAY AND 2000 PER DAY THEREAFTER. CURRENT PLANS ARE TO USE FORT SMITH ARKANSAS MUNICIPAL AIRFIELD AS ENTRY POINT TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. USAF AIRLIFT CONTROL CENTER (ALCC) IS BEING TASKED BY OJCS (J4). LITTLE ROCK AFB REMAINS ALTERNATE ENTRY POINT.

5. CDR FORSCOM IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENERAL SUPPORT, SECURITY AND SAFETY OF THE RECEPTION CENTER IAW GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REF C AND RETAINS ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVISION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND SERVICES REQUIRED FOR THE OPERATION OF THE RECEPTION CENTER. IN ADDITION:

A. HOUSE AND PROVIDE FOR THE IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES DURING THEIR PROCESSING BY FEDERAL VOLUNTEER AGENCIES.
B. ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE OFFICE FACILITIES TO INCLUDE ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS FOR USE BY FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND VOLUNTEER AGENCIES SUPPORTING "OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS". SPECIFIC GUIDANCE REGARDING FUNDING AND REIMBURSEMENT FOR THIS SUPPORT WILL FOLLOW.
C. REPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES OR READINESS OCCURRING AS A RESULT OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS.
D. IDENTIFY LOGISTICAL SHORTFALLS TO AMC OR DSA AS APPROPRIATE AND OTHER SHORTFALLS TO DA.
E. TAKE NECESSARY ACTION TO COORDINATE WITH CNGB AND CAR TO REPROGRAM/ADJUST AS NECESSARY ANNUAL SUMMER TRAINING OF RESERVE COMPONENTS.

6. COMMANDERS CONCERNED WILL ASSIST TO THE FULLEST THE CIVIL COORDINATOR TO ACHIEVE EXPEDITIOUS PROCESSING OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES, HOWEVER, PRESENT COMMAND CHANNELS REMAIN IN EFFECT.

7. A SENIOR CIVIL OFFICIAL WILL BE DESIGNATED THE CIVIL COORDINATOR AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING RECEPTION, CARE, PROCESSING AND RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY THE FT CHAFFEE RECEPTION CENTER. HIS SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:

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A. HAS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT
OF ALL FEDERAL AND VOLUNTARY AGENCIES ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE
PROCESSING OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES.
B. ASSUMES OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY RELATING TO THE RESETTLEMENT
OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES FROM THEIR ARRIVAL AT THE RECEPTION
CENTER UNTIL THEIR DEPARTURE AT THE COMPLETION OF PROCESSING.
C. FORWARDS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR DECISION WITH INFORMATION COPY TO DOD; THOSE PROBLEMS WHICH CANNOT OTHERWISE BE RESOLVED IN A TIMELY MANNER.

A. PARA 5A(B) OF REF C, IS CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:
A COORDINATED JOINT DAILY SITUATION REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED
THROUGH APPROPRIATE DEPT CHANNELS BY THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER
AND THE CIVIL COORDINATOR. THE DAILY SITUATION REPORT MUST
REACH WASHINGTON BY 0900. REPORT WILL BE AS OF DDD1 WASHINGTON
TIME. AN UPDATE REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO REACH WASHINGTON
AGENCIES BY 0900 WASHINGTON TIME.

9. FUNDING GUIDANCE PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY COA IN REF E IS
EFFECTIVE FOR EXECUTION IN SUPPORT OF FT CHAFFEE ONLY. NO EX-
PENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR OTHER POSSIBLE REFUGEE CENTERS IS AU-
THORIZED.

10. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: COLONEL FYOCK, FORSCOM IO, IS
DESIGNATED AS DOD SPOKESMAN AT FT CHAFFEE AND IS AUTHORIZED DI-
RECT COORDINATION WITH OASD (PA) AUTOVON 227-5131/2. SPOKES-
MAN WILL NOTIFY OASD (PA) OF PHONE NUMBERS AT PRESS CENTER.
FURTHER PA GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED BY OASD (PA). LOCAL CDRS
ARE AUTHORIZED, IAW PARA 24C, AR 360-5, TO MAKE APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MOVEMENT OF UNITS AND PERSONNEL
IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS IN CONUS. QUERIES REGARDING
ALTERNATE RECEPTION CENTERS WILL BE REFERRED TO OASD (PA) WITHOUT
COMMENT.

11. PENDING ARRIVAL OF THE CIVIL COORDINATOR AND HIS STAFF AT
FT CHAFFEE, CDR TF CANNON IS AUTHORIZED DIRECT COORDINATION WITH
MR. JAMES WILSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR RESETTLEMENT, INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE, FOR THE PURPOSES OF COORDINATING SUCH DETAILS AS
PHYSICAL SETUP OF THE RECEPTION CENTER, ARRIVAL OF STAFF PERSONNEL
ETC. MR. WILSON (PHONES) 202-432-3174/3173/3840/3841, (MESSAGE
ADDRESS) STATE, ATTN: MR. WILSON, AMBASSADOR BROWN’S INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE.

12. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT TO AOC, AUTOVON 227-0218.

BT
SUBJ: OPERATION MED ARRIVALS

1. ALL EVACUEES FROM SEA WHO ARE HOUSED AT DESIGNATED ARMY INSTALLATIONS ARE AUTHORIZED ALL MEDICAL TREATMENT DETERMINED NECESSARY. WHEN REQUIRED, MOVEMENT TO OTHER ARMY MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES IS AUTHORIZED.

2. ELIGIBILITY FOR TREATMENT IN ARMY MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES WILL CONTINUE FOR THESE DISPLACED PERSONS UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY ARE NO LONGER HOUSED AT DESIGNATED ARMY INSTALLATION.

3. REIMBURSEMENT FOR TREATMENT UNDER THIS PROGRAM WILL BE SOUGHT FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE AS FOLLOWS:
   A. FOR CARE PROVIDED IN MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES OTHER THAN THOSE ESTABLISHED SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING CARE TO SEA EVACUEES: NORMAL INTRAGENCY RATE.
   B. FOR CARE PROVIDED IN FEDERAL MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES: CHARGES WILL NOT BE ESTABLISHED PER PATIENT DAY OR VISIT BUT RATHER AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE UNIT'S OPERATING COST.

BT
SUBJ: EVACUATION OF REFUGEES - NEW ARRIVALS [U]

REF:  A. CSAF 35343/282353Z APR 75
     B. SECSTATE 290523Z APR 75 [NOTAL]

1. IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY AS DESCRIBED IN PARA b, REF B, THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLG:

   A. YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE INSTALLATION AND MAY TAKE SUCH ACTION AS IS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO PROTECT GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND PERSONNEL LOCATED THEREON.

   B. YOU MAY EXCLUDE "NEW ARRIVALS" PERSONNEL FROM THOSE PORTIONS OF THE INSTALLATION WHERE THEIR PRESENCE IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR DESIRABLE.

   C. YOU MAY EXCLUDE OTHER INDIVIDUALS FROM THOSE PORTIONS OF THE INSTALLATIONS DEDICATED TO PERFORMANCE OF THE "NEW ARRIVALS" MISSION.

   D. THERE IS NO AUTHORITY VESTED IN THE ARMED FORCES TO RESTRAIN OR CONFINEMENT NEW ARRIVALS PERSONNEL. IN THE EVENT SUCH RESTRAINT OR CONFINEMENT IS REQUIRED, THE ASSISTANCE OF APPROPRIATE CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES SHOULD BE SOUGHT AS WOULD BE THE CASE WITH ANY OTHER CIVILIAN VISITOR TO THE INSTALLATION.

   E. MAJOR INCIDENTS SHOULD BE REPORTED TO THE NMCC.

2. CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE CIVIL COORDINATORS SHOULD KEEP SUCH PROBLEMS TO A MINIMUM.

BT

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* UNCLASSIFIED *
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V-A-26
SUBJ: UTILIZATION OF VIETNAMESE MEDICAL AND PARAMEDICAL PERSONS

A. FONECON BTW BG PIXLEY DASG AND COL GAULD FORSCOM 2 MAY 75.

1. AMONG REFUGEE PERSONNEL ARRIVING FT CHAFFEE AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER WILL HAVE USEFUL PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL SKILLS FOR CARE DELIVERY.

2. AFTER APPROPRIATE IDENTIFICATION OF SUCH REFUGEES, AND WITH KNOWLEDGE OF AND AT THE DISCRETION OF THE SENIOR ARMY MEDICAL OFFICER, FT CHAFFEE, THESE IDENTIFIED VIETNAMESE REFUGEES MEDICAL PARAMEDICAL PERSONNEL MAY ASSIST IN CARING FOR THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEE POPULATION IN CONSONANCE WITH THEIR CAPABILITIES.

3. THE SENIOR ARMY MEDICAL OFFICER, FT CHAFFEE, WILL DETERMINE WHAT MEDICAL ASSISTANCE WILL BE PERMITTED/PROVIDED BY REFUGEES AND ASSURE THAT SUCH REFUGEES DO SO SOLELY ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS.

BT
SUBJECT: MEDICAL POLICY FOR PROCESSING INDOCHINA REFUGEES

1. MEDICAL PROBLEMS ARE ANTICIPATED IN THE INDOCHINA REFUGEE POPULATION WHICH EITHER CANNOT BE HANDLED BY THE MEDICAL FACILITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE CAMP OR STAGING AREA, OR ONWARD MOVEMENT TO CONUS IS OTHERWISE INDICATED. THE FOLLOWING POLICY GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST IN REGULATING THESE PATIENTS TO THE NEXT APPROPRIATE HOSPITAL.
A. ALL INDOCHINA REFUGEE PATIENTS REQUIRING ONWARD MOVEMENT TO CONUS WILL BE REPORTED DIRECTLY TO THE ARMED SERVICES MEDICAL REGULATING OFFICE (ASMRO). BASED ON BED AVAILABILITY AND REQUIRED MEDICAL CAPABILITY ASMRO WILL REGULATE TO THE MILITARY HOSPITAL PROVIDING PRIMARY SUPPORT TO THE CONUS RECEPTION CENTER TO WHICH THE PATIENT AND HIS FAMILY IS SCHEDULED FOR MOVEMENT. URGENT CASES REQUIRING INTRA-THEATER EVACUATION WILL BE REPORTED TO PACOM JOINT MEDICAL REGULATING OFFICE (JMR1). IN THESE LATTER CASES PACOM WILL REGULATE TO THE NEAREST MILITARY HOSPITAL HAVING THE REQUIRED MEDICAL CAPABILITY.
B. EVERY EFFORT IS TO BE MADE TO MAINTAIN FAMILY INTEGRITY WHEN FEASIBLE. ANY PATIENT 15 YEARS OF AGE AND UNDER WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A FAMILY MEMBER, PREFERABLY THE MOTHER. THE MOVEMENT OF FAMILY MEMBERS ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER PATIENTS
EVACUATED TO CONUS WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

1. THE AVAILABILITY OF SPACE ON AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION AIRCRAFT AS NON-MEDICAL ATTENDANTS OR BEING ABLE TO MANIFEST THE FAMILY ON THE NEXT SCHEDULED FLIGHT TO THE CONUS RECEPTION CENTER.

2. THE ABILITY OF THE RECEIVING LOCATION TO HANDLE REFUGEES WHO ARE IN NON-PATIENT STATUS.

3. WHETHER THE ASSOCIATED FAMILY MEMBERS HAVE BEEN CLEARED FOR MOVEMENT.

* IN THE EVENT PATIENTS LOCATED IN CONUS REQUIRE CARE BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF THE LOCAL FACILITY, ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE TO TRANSFER THE PATIENT TO THE NEAREST FEDERAL HOSPITAL HAVING THE REQUIRED CAPABILITY. IF THE FAMILY HAS BEEN PROCESSED FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT THEN CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO TRANSFERRING THE PATIENT TO A FEDERAL HOSPITAL OR OTHER APPROPRIATE HOSPITAL NEAR THE DESIGNATED RESettlement AREA. THE PATIENT IS ENTITLED TO CARE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE FOR THIS TERM OF HOSPITALIZATION IN FEDERAL HOSPITALS ONLY.

D. AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED EVERY EFFORT IS TO BE MADE TO INSURE FAMILY INTEGRITY. SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY TO TRANSFER A PATIENT WITHOUT THE FAMILY IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE RECEPTION CENTER ADMINISTRATION TO KEEP THE PATIENT AND FAMILY ADVISED OF EACH OTHER'S CONDITION AND LOCATION. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE FAMILY BE REUNITED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

2. OTHER AGENCY COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE ACTIONS WILL BE REIMBURSED BY STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD INTERAGENCY REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES.

* [See paragraph correction on page V-A-33.]
MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
General Counsel
Director, Defense Security Assistant Agency

SUBJECT: Defense Task Force for Vietnamese Refugees

Reference is made to my memo of 29 April 1975, subject as above.

Effective immediately, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Comptroller, Mr. Erich von Marbod, will assume leadership of the Defense Task Force in lieu of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA).

I expect all tasked agencies to give Mr. von Marbod their full cooperation and support as the Secretary and I will look to him for overall management leadership of the Defense portion of the refugee program.

/s/ William P. Clements, Jr.

V-A-30
SUBJ: OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS

A. DASG-HCO, MSG 022035Z MAY 75, SUBJ AS ABOVE.
B. DASG-HCO, MSG 121656Z APR 75, SUBJECT: ARMY SUPPORT FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA ORPHAN EVACUEES.
C. DASG-HCO, MSG 112050Z APR 75, SUBJECT: FUNDING OF ARMY SUPPORT FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA ORPHAN EVACUEES.

A. SEA EVACUEES ENROUTE UNDER DEPT OF STATE AUSPICES TO DESIGNATED CONUS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ARE AUTHORIZED MEDICAL TREATMENT IN ARMY MTF. TREATMENT WILL NOT BE INTERRUPTED EXCEPT WHEN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE HEALTH OF THE TRAVELER OR OTHERS ABOARD THE CARRIER. CHARGES FOR TREATMENT WILL BE COMPUTED AS PRESCRIBED IN REFERENCE A.

B. MEDICAL TREATMENT WILL NOT NORMALLY BE OBTAINED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS. IN THE EVENT TREATMENT MUST BE OBTAINED FOR EVACUEES FROM CIVILIAN FACILITIES AS COULD BE SITUATION IN EMERGENCY AT FORT CHAFFEE WHERE CAPABILITY DOES NOT EXIST OR TIME DOES NOT ALLOW MOVEMENT TO ARMY MTF, CARE WILL BE OBTAINED AND PAID FOR IN SAME MANNER AS PRESCRIBED IN REFERENCE B AND C. IF THE INDIVIDUALS DECISION TO OBTAIN CARE FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES THEY WILL BE INSTRUCTED THAT SUCH WILL BE AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE.

C. ALL EVACUEES RECEIVING TREATMENT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF DEPT OF STATE IN ARMY MTF ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS DESIGNEES OF THE SEC OF ARMY (PAR 4-57. PAR 2, REF A IS CHANGED TO READ: ELIGIBILITY FOR TREATMENT IN ARMY MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES WILL CONTINUE FOR THESE DISPLACED PERSONS UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY ARE NO LONGER HOUSED AT DESIGNATED ARMY INSTALLATIONS OR CUSTODY IS RELINQUISHED TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL, AGENCY, OR ACTIVITY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR RESETTLEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A HOSPITALIZED EVACUÉE IS BEING RESETTLED IN SEATTLE, WA, AND REQUIRES CONTINUED HOSPITALIZATION UPON DEPARTING FT CHAFFEE, HE WOULD BE
AUTHORIZED TREATMENT SUBJECT TO ITS AVAILABILITY (AFTER ALL OTHER ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES), AT MADIGAN ARMY MEDICAL CENTER UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HE CAN BE FOLLOWED FOR HIS MEDICAL CONDITION ON AN OUTPATIENT BASIS. AT THAT POINT HE WOULD NO LONGER BE ELIGIBLE FOR CARE FROM ARMY MTF. AS EVACUEES ARE ELIGIBLE FOR TREATMENT IN ALL FEDERAL FACILITIES INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VA AND PHS UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM FEDERAL CUSTODY FOR RESETTLEMENT, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT CIVIL COORDINATORS AT RECEPTION CENTERS BE ADVISED WHEN PATIENT MOVEMENT IS NECESSARY SO THAT RESETTLEMENT CAN BE CARRIED OUT EXPEDITIOUSLY. NORMALLY PATIENTS AND THEIR FAMILY WILL BE MOVED TO THE FEDERAL FACILITY CLOSEST TO THEIR RESETTLEMENT AREA AS IN THE EXAMPLE ABOVE. WHEN TRANSFER TO ANOTHER MILITARY SERVICES MTF IS DESIRED, NORMAL PATIENT REGULATING PROCEDURE SHOULD APPLY. WHEN MOVEMENT TO OTHER THAN A MILITARY SERVICES MTF IS CONTEMPLATED THE CIVIL COORDINATOR WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING ACCEPTANCE AT THE RECEIVING FACILITY. THEY WILL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR FURTHER TREATMENT, EXCEPT WHERE AUTHORIZED UNDER OTHER PROVISION OF AR 40-3, EXAMPLE: ADOPTED CHILDREN.

D. SF 180, DD FORM 7 AND 7A PREPARED TO SUPPORT REIMBURSEMENT FOR SERVICES PROVIDED IN AMEDD FACILITIES WILL BE SUBMITTED IN SAME MANNER AS PRESCRIBED IN PAR 4 REF B, AND PAR 5 REF C.
SUBJECT: MEDICAL POLICY FOR PROCESSING INDOCHINA REFUGEES

REF: (A) STATE 109627; (B) STATE 117083

1. REVISED PARA 1C REFTEL A IS AS FOLLOWS:

2. IN THE EVENT PATIENTS LOCATED IN CONUS REQUIRE CARE BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF THE LOCAL FACILITY, ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THE LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE OFFICER TO TRANSFER THE PATIENT TO THE NEAREST PHS HOSPITAL HAVING THE REQUIRED CAPABILITY. IF THIS IS IMPractical THE PHS OFFICER MAY ARRANGE FOR HOSPITALIZATION BY A HOSPITAL IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS FROM HEW FUNDS. IF THE FAMILY HAS BEEN CLEARED FOR FINAL RESettlement AND HAS NOT YET BEEN RELEASED FROM THE REFUGEE CAMP, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO TRANSFERRING THE PATIENT TO A HOSPITAL NEAR THE DESIGNATED RESETTLEMENT AREA. ONCE REFUGEES ARE RELEASED FROM RECEPTION CENTERS ALL DOD/PHS HEALTH SERVICES ARE TERMINATED. AFTER RELEASE REFUGEES WILL RECEIVE HEALTH CARE FROM LOCAL MEDICAID PROGRAMS, IF THEY MEET ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA.

BT
212337 MAY 75  
FM JCS WASH DC  
TO CSA WASH DC  
CSAF WASH DC  
CNO WASH DC  
CMC WASH DC  
MAC SCOTT AFC IL  
SECDEF WASH DC  
SESTATE WASH DC  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
CINCPACFLT MAKALAPA HI  
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI  
13AF CLARK AB PHILIPPINES  
CINCPACREP GUAM TTPi  
COMNAV MARIANAS MARIANA ISLANDS  
USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL  
CDRFORSOM FORT MCPHERSON GA  

SUBJECT: REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTER FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA  

1. THIS IS AN EXECUTE MESSAGE.  

2. FOR CSA: REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION ASAP TO OPEN A CONUS REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTER AT FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA. PLANS SHOULD BE MADE TO ACCEPT 500 INDOCHINESE REFUGEES PER DAY STARTING DURING WEEK OF 26 MAY WITH TIME OF ARRIVAL OF FIRST ACFT TO BE ANNOUNCED BY J-4. PLAN TO INCREASE TO 1000 PER DAY ABOUT 21 MAY. INITIAL PLANNING SHOULD PROVIDE FOR TOTAL OF 15,000 REFUGEES. REQUEST ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF POSSIBLE EXPANSION TO 20,000 AND DETERMINATION IF A SEPARATE AREA FOR UP TO 500 CAMBODIANS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED.  

3. FOR CSAF: REQUEST TAKE ACTION ASAP TO ESTABLISH ALCE AT HARRISBURG-OLMSTEAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.  

4. TO INSURE EFFICIENT AND ORDERLY FLOW AND BEDDOWN OF REFUGEES, DIRECT COORDINATION IS AUTHORIZED ALCON.  

5. FUNDING GUIDELINES APPLICABLE ARE CONTAINED IN MEMO FROM ASD: COMP TO ASST SECRETARIES FOR MIL DEPS (FM) SUBJ: STATE DEPT REIMBURSEMENT FOR DOD COSTS INCURRED FOR MVNT AND SUPPORT OF
INDOCHINA REFUGEES, ORPHANS, AND EVACUEES DATED 8 MAY 1975. FUND CITE IS APPROPRIATION 72-1150130, ALLOT 530-50-730-00-67-51-A, FOR REFUGEES/EVACUEES.
SUBJ: OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS

A. FORSCOM OPLAN NEW ARRIVALS - FT INDIANTOWN GAP {16 MAY 75
B. DA MSG 261452Z APR 75, SUBJ: FUNDING OF ARMY SUPPORT OF
OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS.
C. DA MSG, 240124Z APR 75, SUBJ: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR
POSSIBLE ARMY SUPPORT OF RVN EVACUEES IN CONUS
D. JCS MSG, 240000Z MAY 75, SUBJ: REFUGEE REPORTING
E. DA MSG, 192200Z MAY 75, SUBJ: REFUGEE REPORTING
F. DA MSG, 192315Z MAY 75, SUBJ: TASK FORCE NEW ARRIVALS
FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA.
G. DA MSG, 200040 MAY 75, SUBJ: FORSCOM OPLAN NEW ARRIVALS
FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA.
H. JCS MSG 212333Z MAY 75, SUBJ: REF REC CEN FT INDIANTOWN GAP PA.
1. This confirms execute message REF H to establish a refugee reception center at Ft Indiantown Gap Pa.

2. Be prepared to commence operation at Ft Indiantown Gap IAW REF A and C in support of operation new arrivals IAW instructions contained in REF F. Anticipated rate of input will be 500 per day beginning the week of 26 May, increasing as rapidly as possible to 1,000 per day 0/A 29 May. Initial planning should provide for a total of 15,000 refugees. Current plans are to use Harrisburg International Airport as an entry point to maximum extent possible.

3. CDR FORSCOM is responsible for the general support, security, and safety of the reception center IAW guidance contained in REF A and retains administrative responsibility for provision of logistical support and services required for the operation of the reception center. In addition:

   A. House and provide for the immigrants and refugees during their processing by federal and volunteer agencies.
   B. Establish appropriate office facilities to include adequate communications for use by federal, state, local and volunteer agencies supporting "Operation New Arrivals".
   C. Report any significant degradation of military capabilities or readiness occurring as a result of these instructions.
   D. Identify logistical shortfalls to AMC or DSA as appropriate and other shortfalls to DA.
   E. Take necessary action to coordinate with CMGB and CAR to reprogram/adjust as necessary annual summer training of army reserve components; however, guidance in REF F applies. Every effort will be made to continue scheduled RC summer and IDT training at FTG.

4. Other MACOMs support CDR FORSCOM as required IAW guidance, REF C.

5. Commanders concerned will assist to the fullest the civil coordinator to achieve expeditious processing of immigrants and refugees; however, present command channels remain in effect.

6. Mr. Richard E. Friedman has been designated senior civilian coordinator and is responsible for coordinating reception, care, processing and resettlement activities performed by the Indiantown
GAP RECEPTION CENTER. HIS SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:

A. HAS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT
   OF ALL FEDERAL AND VOLUNTARY AGENCIES/ACTIVITIES RELATED TO
   THE PROCESSING OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES.

B. ASSUMES OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY RELATING TO THE RESETTLEMENT
   OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES FROM THEIR ARRIVAL AT THE RECEPTION
   CENTER UNTIL THEIR DEPARTURE AT THE COMPLETION OF PROCESSING.

C. FORWARDS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR DECISION WITH IN-
   FORMATION COPY TO DOD, THOSE PROBLEMS WHICH CANNOT OTHERWISE BE
   RESOLVED IN A TIMELY MANNER.

7. REFUGEE STATUS REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO HQDA {DAMO-AOC}
   IN FORMAT AND AT TIMES, CURRENTLY SPECIFIED FOR FT CHAFFEE.

8. FUNDING GUIDANCE PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY COA IN REFERENCE B,
   IS EFFECTIVE FOR EXECUTION IN SUPPORT OF FT INDIANTOWN GAP.

9. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: COL PAUL TEHAN IS DESIGNATED AS
   DOD SPOKESMAN AT FT INDIANTOWN GAP AND IS AUTHORIZED DIRECT CO-
   ORDINATION WITH OASD {PA} AUTOVON 227-5131/2. SPOKESMAN WILL
   NOTIFY OASD {PA} BY PHONE NUMBERS AT PRESS CENTER. FURTHER PA
   GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED BY OASD {PA}. LOCAL CDRS ARE AUTHORIZED
   IAW PARA 24C, AR 360-5 TO MAKE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
   OF THE MOVEMENT OF UNITS AND PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION
   NEW ARRIVALS IN CONUS. QUERIES REGARDING ALTERNATE RECEPTION
   CENTERS WILL BE REFERRED TO OASD {PA} WITHOUT COMMENT.

10. BG CANNON IS AUTHORIZED DIRECT COORDINATION WITH MR. JAMES
    WILSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR RESETTLEMENT, INTERAGENCY TASK
    FORCE, FOR THE PURPOSES OF COORDINATING SUCH DETAILS AS PHYSICAL
    SET-UP OF THE RECEPTION CENTER, ARRIVAL OF STAFF PERSONNEL, ETC.
    MR. WILSON {PHONES} 202-692-3174/3173/3840/3041; {MESSAGE ADDRESS}
    STATE ATTN: MR. WILSON, AMBASSADOR BROWN’S INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.

11. REQUEST ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF POSSIBLE EXPANSION TO 20,000
    AND DETERMINATION IF A SEPARATE AREA FOR UP TO 500 CAMBODIANS CAN
    BE ACCOMMODATED. REQUEST RESPONSE 72 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS
    MSG.

12. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT TO AOC, AUTOVON 227-5064/5030.

BT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

May 27, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
The Secretary of Transportation
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator of the Agency for
International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
The Director of United States Information Agency

With the departure of Ambassador L. Dean Brown, Mrs. Julia Vadala Taft of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare will act as Director of the Special Inter-Agency Task Force that is coordinating for the President all U.S. Government activities concerning the resettlement of refugees evacuated from Indochina as a result of the Vietnam conflict. Mrs. Taft will work under the direction of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. She will serve in this capacity until arrangements are completed for organizing the Government's efforts for the longer term. All decisions and activities on these matters will be cleared through Mrs. Taft and the Task Force.

All existing arrangements remain in force, including the participation of a senior official as your personal representative on the Task Force and as the official responsible within your agency for all matters relating to these subjects and contact with Mrs. Taft.

/s/ Brent Scowcroft
(for) Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, JCS

V-A-39
272222Z MAY 75
FM SECDEF WASHDC
TO CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CSAF WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY WASHDC
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WASHDC
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE WASHDC
CJCS WASHDC
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL FRED WEYAND, CSA
ADMIRAL JAMES L. HOLLOWAY, III, CNO
GENERAL DAVID JONES, CSAF
GENERAL ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, JR., CMC
INFO PERSONAL FOR SECRETARIES CALLAWAY, MIDDENDORF, MCLUCAS,
AND GENERAL BROWN

FROM ERICH F. VON MARBOD, PDASD(C)
SUBJ: SPONSORSHIP OF VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

REF SECDEF (3057) 2718012Z MAY 75

1. I WISH TO ENLIST YOUR PERSONAL SUPPORT IN ORGANIZING AN EF-
FORT TO ENCOURAGE SPONSORSHIP OF VIETNAMESE (OR KHMER) FAMILIES
ON THE PART OF OUR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, INCLUDING
COMMANDS AND SOCIAL GROUPS (E.G., WIVES’ CLUBS). THE NAVY IS,
I KNOW, ALREADY UNDERWAY WITH WHAT APPEARS TO BE A FINE PROGRAM.
I WOULD LIKE TO UNDERSCORE THAT EFFORT AND OBTAIN A SIMILARLY
COORDINATED EFFORT FROM ARMY, AIR FORCE, AND MARINES.

2. I AM PROUDLY AWARE OF THE MANY PERSONAL EFFORTS BEING MADE
BY INDIVIDUALS IN THE SERVICES. BUT MANY MORE, WHO MAY EVEN HAVE
VIETNAMESE FRIENDS, MAY SIMPLY BE UNAWARE OF WHETHER THEIR FRIENDS
ESCAPED, WHERE THEY MIGHT BE, WHAT SPONSORSHIP ENTAILS, AND HOW
TO GO ABOUT BEING A SPONSOR. FOR THESE PEOPLE AND GROUPS, I
RECOMMEND ESTABLISHMENT EITHER COLLECTIVELY FOR SEVERAL OR ALL
SERVICES, OR INDIVIDUALLY, REFUGEE INFORMATION CENTERS OR CLEAR-
ING OFFICES. THROUGH THESE CLEARING OFFICES INTERESTED MILITARY
AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL COULD INDICATE INTEREST, AND INITIATE
SPONSORSHIP REQUESTS THROUGH THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE DATA
SYSTEMS, INTERESTED PERSONNEL COULD ALSO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON

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* UNCLASSIFIED *
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V-A-40
THE LOCATION AND STATUS OF FRIENDS AND COMRADES IN ARMS. MOREOVER, THESE CENTERS COULD COORDINATE MAXIMUM INTERNAL INFORMATON COVERAGE.

3. I HOPE YOU SEE FIT TO ASSIST THIS HUMANITARIAN VOLUNTEER EFFORT. PLEASE HAVE YOUR POINT OF CONTACT, WHO WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH MY STAFF AND WITH THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE FOR VIETNAMESE REFUGEES RELIEF, CONTACT MY OFFICE 697-7673 OR 6954845, TO ENSURE COORDINATION.

4. WARM REGARDS. ERIC

BT
SUBJECT: ARMY BILLING INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATION NEW ARRIVAL

A. DACA-BU MSG DTG 241451Z APR 75, SUBJECT: FUNDING OF ARMY SUPPORT OF OPERATION NEW LIFE {TOTAL}.
B. DACA-BUE MSG DTG 112050Z APR 75, SUBJECT: FUNDING OF ARMY SUPPORT FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA ORPHAN EVACUEES {TOTAL}.

1. REF A PROVIDED FUNDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBJECT OPERATION AND ADVISED COMMAND TO CAPTURE INCREMENTAL COSTS FOR REIMBURSEMENT.

2. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE RELATED TO BILLING INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBJECT OPERATION. THESE INSTRUCTIONS IMPLEMENT SECDEF POLICY GUIDANCE INSTRUCTIONS.

3. EACH COMMAND WILL SUBMIT ONE CONSOLIDATED SF-1040 BILLING FOR REIMBURSEMENT ON A CHECK ISSUE BASIS SHOWING EACH ACCOUNT CLASSIFICATION AND STATION TO BE CREDITED TO THE DAB, ATTN: DACA-BUE, ROOM 3B607, THE PENTAGON, WASH, DC 20310. MONTHLY BILLINGS (SF1040) SHOULD BE PREPARED AND SUBMITTED NOT LATER THAN THE 15TH OF THE FOLLOWING MONTH, EXCEPT FOR BILLS APPLICABLE FOR APRIL WHICH ARE DUE ON OR BEFORE 10 JUN AND BILLS FOR JUNE WHICH ARE DUE BY 25 JUL 75.

4. THE ARTICLE AND SERVICES COLUMN OF THE SF 1040 SHOULD BE USED TO PROVIDE A BRIEF NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEMS OR SERVICES FOR WHICH REIMBURSEMENT IS REQUESTED, TO INCLUDE A
BREAKOUT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT BY ELEMENT OF EXPENSE/OBJECT CLASS, AS APPLICABLE. ADDITIONALLY, THE BILLING SHOULD CITE THE LOCATION(S) WHERE THE MATERIAL WAS ISSUED OR SERVICE RENDERED (E.G. FORT CHAFFEE, FORT INDIANTON GAP, GUAM, ETC).  

5. EACH COMMAND SHOULD HAVE AVAILABLE SUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION TO SUPPORT THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE EXPENDITURES CLAIMED. COMMANDS MUST BE PREPARED TO FURNISH DA COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENTATION UPON REQUEST.  

6. REFERENCES A AND B DEFINED INCREMENTAL COSTS AS THOSE ACTUAL/ESTIMATED COSTS BEING INCURRED OVER AND ABOVE THE NORMAL OPERATING COSTS OF THE PERSONNEL AND FORCES INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED: 
   A. NO REGULAR PAY AND ALLOWANCES FOR ON-BOARD MILITARY OR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL TO ASSIST IN THE EFFORT ON A TEMPORARY BASIS. SUCH COST IS A PROPER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REIMBURSEMENT. 
   B. THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS WILL BE FULLY REIMBURSED FOR COSTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUCH AS TENTS, MESS GEAR, KITCHEN EQUIPMENT, BUNKS, BLANKETS, ETC. PURCHASED FROM SERVICES STOCK FUND OR ITEMS ISSUED DIRECTLY FROM THE STOCK FUND. THE NORMAL CREDIT POLICY WILL BE APPLICABLE UPON TURN-IN OF THIS MATERIAL. 
   C. ONLY COSTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OVER AND ABOVE THE NORMAL TEMPO OF OPERATIONS FOR WHICH FUNDS WERE ALREADY AVAILABLE SHOULD BE REQUESTED (E.G., AN ARMY HELICOPTER WHICH FLEW A TOTAL OF 100 FLYING HOURS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION IN MAY. SINCE ONLY 25 FLYING HOURS WERE NORMALLY PLANNED FOR MAY, THE DIFFERENCE OF 75 FLYING HOURS IS A PROPER COST FOR REIMBURSEMENT). 
   D. INCREMENTAL MEDICAL COSTS AT MILITARY FACILITIES WILL BE REIMBURSABLE AS FOLLOWS: INPATIENT CARE $23.89 PER DAY; OUT-PATIENT CARE $2.76 PER VISIT. THE INPATIENT CARE RATE WILL BE ADDED TO THE AEROMEDICAL TRANSPORTATION COST COMPUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE. MEDICAL CARE AT NONMILITARY FACILITIES WILL BE ACTUAL CHARGES. 
   E. INCREMENTAL COSTS WILL INCLUDE MATERIAL PRICED AT STANDARD RATES AND CHARGES FOR ACCESSORIAL COSTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOD INSTRUCTION 7510.4, "UNIFORM POLICY FOR CHARGING ACCESSORIAL AND/OR ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS INCIDENT TO ISSUES, SALES, AND TRANSFERS OF MATERIALS, SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT." 

7. POC FOR THIS OPERATION IS LTC MARSHALL, AV 227-6029 OR 227-5915.
SUBJ: SPONSORSHIP OF REFUGEES

REFS
A. SECDEF MSG 271802Z MAY 75
B. SECSTATE MSG 180251Z MAY 75
C. DA WASHDC/DAPE-PBP/MSG 301816Z MAY 75

1. THOUSANDS OF VIETNAMESE MILITARY REFUGEES ARE NOW IN RESSETTLEMENT CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES OR IN THE PROCESS OF BEING MOVED TO THE UNITED STATES FROM OVERSEAS STAGING AREAS. THERE IS A DIRE NEED TO ESTABLISH A VOLUNTEER SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM TO ASSIST THESE REFUGEES IN THEIR RESSETTLEMENT INTO OUR SOCIETY.

2. THE PERSONAL EFFORTS OF MANY INDIVIDUALS ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY; HOWEVER, THERE ARE MANY INDIVIDUALS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES THAT ARE UNAWARE OF THE PROCEDURES FOR SPONSORSHIP. IT IS EVIDENT THAT SOME DO NOT KNOW WHERE THEIR FRIENDS ARE AND IF THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR ESCAPE.

3. SECDEF HAS ENCOURAGED SPONSORSHIP ON THE PART OF INDIVIDUALS, SOCIAL GROUPS SUCH AS WIVES' CLUBS, AND COMMANDS AS REFLECTED IN REFERENCE A. HISTORICALLY THE ARMY FAMILY HAS RESPONDED TO HUMANITARIAN APPEALS OF THIS TYPE. A SPIRITED RESPONSE AT THIS TIME WILL EXPEDITE THE SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM AND HELP GET OUR FRIENDS OUT OF THE REFUGEE CENTERS AND RESSETTLED IN THE UNITED STATES. THE ACTIVE DIVISIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, NG, USAR, AUSA, ROA, AND NCOA ARE ONLY A FEW THAT COULD LEND ASSISTANCE.
4. In order to implement the sponsorship program, a Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office (JRICO) is being established in the Pentagon. This office will be able to provide current information on the status and location of all refugees as well as the procedures to be followed to enter the sponsorship program. With such information available, sponsorship would expedite departure from refugee centers.

5. The JRICO is tasked to:
   A. Respond to queries as to the status of refugees and assist in establishing contact between commands/individuals.
   B. Assist those desiring to sponsor refugees and their families.
   C. Maintain liaison with OSI, Interagency Task Force (IATF), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Refugee Centers and voluntary agencies (VOLAGS) in order to determine status of refugees.

   B. The Army element of JRICO will operate from Pentagon Room BF762. Telephone numbers are: AutoVon 227-5190/5191/5192/5110, Commercial (202) 697-5190/5191/5192/5110, and will be manned during normal work week. It is expected JRICO will be operational for about 120 days.

7. Reference B discusses efforts by IATF in conjunction with VOLAGS in resettlement of refugees and outlines requirements for sponsorship. Although sponsorship is not a formal, legal commitment, there is, however, a moral commitment to assist the refugee to the best of the sponsor's ability. Some of the less tangible aspects of resettlement include adjustment to a new culture and acquainting the refugee with U.S. laws and requirements.

8. Specifically, a sponsor, in conjunction with one of the VOLAGS, will be expected to:
   A. Receive the refugee and his family.
   B. Provide shelter and food, until the refugee becomes self-sufficient. Shelter need not be in the residence of the sponsor, but must be adequate.
   C. Provide clothing and pocket money.
   D. Provide assistance in finding employment and in school enrollment for children.

BT
E. COVER ORDINARY MEDICAL COSTS OR MEDICAL INSURANCE.
F. ONCE EMPLOYMENT IS OBTAINED, ASSIST THE REFUGEE TO LOCATE PERMANENT HOUSING, ACQUIRE MINIMAL FURNITURE AND ARRANGE FOR UTILITIES.

9. SPONSORSHIP BY AN INDIVIDUAL COULD BE DIFFICULT WHEN LARGE FAMILIES ARE INVOLVED; HOWEVER, IF ASSUMED ON A BROADER BASE, I.E., ALL PERSONNEL IN A COMMAND, CHURCH GROUP, WIVES' CLUB OR DIVISIONAL ASSOCIATION, THE BURDEN COULD BE EASED. CONCEIVABLY, A LARGER ORGANIZATION COULD SPONSOR MORE THAN ONE FAMILY.

10. SPONSORSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR RELATIVES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND PERMANENT ALIENS ARE MORE SIMPLIFIED. HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE DEPARTMENT (HEW) ASSISTED BY THE RED CROSS, WILL VERIFY WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY OF THE NAMED RELATIVE TO SPONSOR AND RE-SETTLE REFUGEES. ONCE CONFIRMED, INS WILL RELEASE THOSE REFUGEES WITHOUT ADDITIONAL SPONSORSHIP REQUIREMENTS. IF HEW DECIDES SPONSOR IS UNABLE TO CARE FOR REFUGEES, CASE WILL BE PASSED TO AN ACCREDITED VOLAG FOR PROCESSING. RELATIVES OF US CITIZENS INCLUDE SPOUSE, PARENTS, GRANDPARENTS, CHILDREN, GRANDCHILDREN, UNMARRIED SIBLINGS AND HANDICAPPED DEPENDENTS.

11. REFUGEES WITH INDEPENDENT MEANS ARE THOSE WITH AVERAGE PER CAPITA RESOURCES OF FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS, EXCLUSIVE OF TRANSPORTATION. THESE INDIVIDUALS/FAMILIES MAY BE DIRECTED TO RE-SETTLEMENT LOCATIONS WITH ONLY BRIEF COUNSELING; PROVIDED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL OR AT LEAST ONE ADULT IN A FAMILY HAS A FACILITY IN ENGLISH, VOCATIONAL SKILLS AND A GENERAL IDEA OF RESETTLEMENT LOCATION.

12. THE ARMY FAMILY IS ENCOURAGED TO GET BEHIND THIS HUMANITARIAN EFFORT AND SUPPORT THE SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM. HOWEVER, SPONSORSHIP IS VOLUNTARY AND INDIVIDUALS, COMMANDS OR ORGANIZATIONS WILL NOT BE PRESSURED TO SPONSOR REFUGEES.

13. REQUEST WIDEST DISSEMINATION.

BT
1Q2045Z JUN 75
FM SECDEF WASH DC
TO ZEN/CJCS WASH DC
INFO MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON CA
CDR JTF NEW ARRIVALS FT INDIANTOWN GAP PA
CDR EGLIN AFB FL
CDR TF NEW ARRIVALS FT CHAFFEE AR
CSA WASH DC
CSAF WASH DC
CNO WASH DC
CMC WASH DC
CDRFORSCOM FORT MCPHERSON GA
SECSTATE WASH DC

SUBJ: SCOPE OF MEDICAL CARE TO INDOCHINA REFUGEES/EVACUEES

REFS: A. JOINT REGULATION UNIFORMED SERVICES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM (AR 40-121), SECNAVINST 6320.80, AFR 168-9, PHS GEN CIR NO. 61, SEPTEMBER 1970,
B. MESSAGE: 212209Z MAY- UNCLAS. STATE 119022 NOTAL,
SUBJ: MEDICAL POLICY FOR PROCESSING INDOCHINA REFUGEES.

1. FOLLOWING GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE PROVISION OF MEDICAL CARE TO THE INDOCHINA REFUGEES/EVACUEES IS PROVIDED FOR ACTIVITIES WITH REFUGEE/EVACUEE MEDICAL CARE RESPONSIBILITY.

2. THE SCOPE OF HEALTH BENEFITS PROVIDED INDOCHINA REFUGEES/EVACUEES IN MILITARY MEDICAL FACILITIES WILL BE THOSE SPECIFIED IN REFERENCE A PARAGRAPH 4-6A THROUGH K. CHAMPUS WILL NOT BE UTILIZED FOR PROVIDING CARE TO THE REFUGEES/EVACUEES.

3. IF CERTAIN HEALTH BENEFITS FOR REFUGEES/EVACUEES ARE BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF, OR NOT AVAILABLE FROM THE MILITARY MEDICAL FACILITIES, THE POLICY OF REFERENCE B WILL BE FOLLOWED TO OBTAIN THESE SPECIFIC HEALTH BENEFITS. THAT POLICY IS AS FOLLOWS (QUOTING PARA 2 OF REFERENCE [B]):

"IN THE EVENT PATIENTS LOCATED IN CONUS REQUIRE CARE BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF THE LOCAL FACILITY, ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE
THROUGH LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE OFFICERS TO TRANSFER THE PATIENT TO THE NEAREST PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE HOSPITAL HAVING THE REQUIRED CAPABILITY. IF THIS IS IMPRACTICAL, THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE OFFICER MAY ARRANGE FOR HOSPITALIZATION BY A HOSPITAL IF THE FAMILY HAS BEEN CLEARED FOR FINAL RESETTLEMENT AND HAS NOT YET BEEN RELEASED FROM REFUGEE CAMPS. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE DESIGNATED RESETTLEMENT AREA. ONCE REFUGEES ARE RELEASED FROM RECEPTION CENTERS, ALL DOD/PHS HEALTH SERVICES ARE TERMINATED AFTER RELEASE, REFUGEES WILL RECEIVE HEALTH CARE FROM LOCAL MEDICAID PROGRAMS IF THEY MEET ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA."

V-A-48
172254Z JUN 75
FM Hq DA WASH DC //DAMO-OD {DOMS}//
TO CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
CDR TASK FORCE NEW ARRIVALS FT CHAFFEE AR
CDR JTF NEW ARRIVALS FT IGMR
JCS WASH DC

SUBJ: RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY FOR REFUGEE CENTER OPERATIONS

A. DA MSG 261452Z APR 75.
B. DA MSG 300713Z APR 75
C. FORSCOM OP PLAN, NEW ARRIVALS FT IGMR
D. AR 190-3, PHYSICAL SECURITY
E. JCS MSG 022243Z MAY 75

1. REFERENCE A DIRECTED FORSCOM TO DEVELOP PLAN FOR RECEIVING, PROCESSING AND SUPPORTING VN REFUGEES AT SELECTED REFUGEE CENTERS ON ARMY INSTALLATIONS IN CONUS. SUPPORT INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO BILLETING, MESSING, ESSENTIAL MEDICAL SERVICES, TRANSPORTATION, INSTALLATION SECURITY AND CAMP ADMINISTRATION. THE CONCEPT ASSUMED THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (FBI) AND/OR APPROPRIATE STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WOULD EXERCISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY REFUGEES. VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL LAW (E.G. LARCENY OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY) ARE WITHIN THE INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FBI AND WILL BE PROSECUTED BEFORE A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE OR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT. VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF A STATE ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS AND THE STATE COURTS. IN THE EVENT RESTRAINT OF A REFUGEE IS REQUIRED WHILE ON AN ARMY INSTALLATION, THE ASSISTANCE OF APPROPRIATE CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES SHOULD BE SOUGHT IAW THE PROVISIONS OF PARA 4D, ANNEX C, REF C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT PATROLS WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IS ENCOURAGED WHEN APPROPRIATE. IF DIFFICULTY IS EXPERIENCED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LIAISON WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, CONTACT HQ, DA, ATTN: DAPE-IRE FOR ASSISTANCE.
2. REFERENCE B FURTHER CHARGED CDR FORSCOM FOR GENERAL SUPPORT, SECURITY, AND SAFETY OF RECEPTION CENTERS.

3. IN THE EXERCISE OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING:

   A. YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE INSTALLATION AND MAY TAKE SUCH ACTION AS IS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO PROTECT GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND PERSONNEL LOCATED THEREON.

   B. THERE IS NO AUTHORITY VESTED IN THE ARMED FORCES TO RESTRAIN OR CONFINE "NEW ARRIVALS" PERSONNEL; HOWEVER, YOU MAY TAKE REASONABLE MEASURES TO LIMIT THE ENTRY OF "NEW ARRIVALS" PERSONNEL ONTO THOSE PORTIONS OF THE INSTALLATION WHERE THEIR PRESENCE IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR DESIRABLE, OR WOULD CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO PEACE AND ORDER.

   C. YOU MAY EXCLUDE OTHER INDIVIDUALS FROM THOSE PORTIONS OF THE INSTALLATION DEDICATED TO PERFORMANCE OF THE "NEW ARRIVALS" MISSION.

4. NOTHING IN THE FOREGOING LIMITS THE AUTHORITY OF ANY COMMANDER TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND ORDER; TO INCLUDE THE SUPPRESSION OF RIOTS OR OTHER MAJOR DISTURBANCES. HOWEVER, IN SUCH INSTANCES IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE FROM CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS SHOULD BE SOUGHT AND ANY CIVILIAN TAKEN INTO CUSTODY IMMEDIATELY TURNED OVER TO CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS.

5. IN DISCHARGING THE AUTHORITY OUTLINED IN PARA 3A, THE RESTRANTS IMPOSED ON THE USE OF FORCE AS SPECIFIED IN AR 190-2B APPLY.

BT
MEMORANDUM FOR: HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES

1. PURPOSE. This memorandum provides guidance and assigns responsibilities within the Army Staff for all actions pertaining to Army Support of SE Asia Refugee Operations within CONUS and PACOM.

2. GENERAL. The United States Government has elected to permit immigration of refugees from Southeast Asia into the United States in parole status. Department of State was assigned primary responsibility for overseeing and managing this operation at national level. All other Federal agencies were directed to support the State Department as required on a reimbursable basis. Within the Department of Defense, Mr. von Marbod, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, was appointed DOD Coordinator for Support of Refugee Operations. J-4, within OJCS, has primary responsibility for all matters pertaining to military support of Refugee Operations. DA was tasked to activate, organize, and support, on a reimbursable basis, designated SE Asia Refugee Centers in CONUS and PACOM with billets, food service, medical support and administration; and as required, to support other Services similarly engaged.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES.

   a. DCSOPS is assigned overall coordinating responsibility for DA support of SE Asia Refugee Operations and will—

      (1) Maintain liaison with and respond to tasking as appropriate of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller; J-4, OJCS and other Services.

      (2) Serve as DA single point of contact for all major commands and Army Staff agencies on all matters pertaining to support of SE Asia Refugee Operations.

      (3) Monitor and coordinate all DA actions pertaining to SE Asia Refugee Operations.

      (4) Task major Army commands as required for support of SE Asia Refugee Operations.

      (5) Keep the CSA, VCSA, and DAS informed of all significant activities pertaining to Army support of SE Asia Refugees.
SUBJECT: DA Staff Responsibilities in Support of SE Asia Refugees

b. DCSPER will--

(1) Exercise single management responsibilities to include direct coordination with State Department, OSD and the Services on all matters pertaining to DA support of Army personnel seeking sponsorship of SE Asia Refugees and the operation of Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office (JRICO).

(2) Keep CSA, VCSA, DAS, and DCSOPS informed of all significant activities pertaining to the operation of the JRICO.

(3) Conduct normal staff functions in support of SE Asia Refugee Operations and coordinate with DCSOPS.

c. COA will--

(1) In direct coordination with OSD, maintain, manage and seek reimbursement for all costs incurred by the Army in support of SE Asia Refugees.

(2) Coordinate all matters pertaining to costing in support of SE Asia Refugees with DCSOPS.

d. DCSLOG, ACSI, COE, TSG, TJAG, CCH, CNGB, CINFO and CAR, will conduct normal staff functions as required in support of SE Asia Refugee Operations and coordinate with DCSOPS.

e. All Staff agencies will be prepared to respond on a 24-hour basis.
Names of agency POCs to be provided to ODCSOPS (LTC Anderson, 695-4110) NLT 25 June 1975.

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

[Signature]
Ralph Doster
Lieutenant General, GS
Director of the Army Staff

SUSPENSE:
Army Staff agencies--POCs--25 Jun 75
SUBJECT: LEGAL GUIDELINES AT REFUGEE CENTERS
FOR SENIOR CIVILIAN COORDINATOR AND CHIEF U.S. MARSHAL

1. THIS MESSAGE OUTLINES THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED CONCERNING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND THE COORDINATION THEREOF; SPECIFICALLY AT THE REFUGEE/REPATRIATION CENTERS ON GUAM AND THE REFUGEE CENTER AT CAMP PENDLETON. ALTHOUGH NOT APPLICABLE AT THIS TIME TO THE OTHER REFUGEE CENTERS THEY ARE INFO IN ORDER TO BE MADE AWARE OF WHAT ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE IN EFFECT SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM TO THE IATF FROM THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING THE DIVISION OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTROL INDOCHINESE CIVILIANS PRIOR TO THEIR LEGAL ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES:

QUOTE: GUIDELINES FOR POLICE RESPONSIBILITY REGARDING INDOCHINESE CIVILIANS CURRENTLY HELD IN INS PROCESSING AREAS.

A. THE UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE SHALL ACT AS THE PRIMARY LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINESE CIVILIANS CURRENTLY IN STAGING AREAS ON MILITARY BASES. THE SERVICE WILL HAVE THE FOLLOWING BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES:

1. MINOR POLICE PROBLEMS, INVOLVING FORCE OR DETENTION, WILL BE HANDLED BY A LIMITED NUMBER OF UNITED STATES MARSHALS STATIONED ON THE SCENE.
2. In the event of major civil disturbances, marshals on the scene may summon a United States Marshal Special Operations Unit. Such units will be held available for that duty. (The marshals service advises that its Special Operations Unit could have a working force of 25 men at the refugee camps within four hours' notice. A force capable of containing a disruptive crowd of 200 and 350 people at the camp within eight hours).  

3. Unauthorized attempts to leave the processing areas will be dealt with by regular INS or United States Marshal personnel on the scene who may, if necessary, seek the aid of local authorities. (Such aid may be sought for both the restraining and the return of aliens illegally departing the camps. See 28 U.S.C. 570). In the event of large numbers of unauthorized persons attempting to leave, United States Marshal Special Operations Units will be available.  

4. Informal defusing of minor disruptions by marshals, regular INS personnel or military personnel will, of course, be appropriate.  

5. Felonies or "other serious matters" involving civilians will be reported by the military, the marshals, and/or the INS to the applicable U.S. attorney or state or local authorities (if no federal violation is involved) for investigation by the FBI or such other federal or state investigative agencies as may be appropriate. U.S. attorneys will coordinate their activity and cooperate with the Department of State and the INS in any matter involving these civilians.  

6. The U.S. Marshals Service in conjunction with the U.S. attorney will coordinate with appropriate state and local authorities for the disposition of civilians whose actions may violate only state or local laws or for whom state or local disposition is more appropriate than action under such federal law as may be applicable.  

7. The military shall make available such facilities for use by the marshals as the marshals shall deem necessary. Use of such facilities is not prohibited by the posse comitatus act (18 U.S.C. 1385) as long as those facilities are manned by U.S. Marshal personnel.
8. Contingency plans shall be worked out with local U.S. attorneys to provide the capability of bringing a magistrate into the camps quickly should the need for such action arise.

9. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs is intended to alter or impinge upon the normal investigative responsibilities of the FBI or other federal agencies having authority to investigate federal crimes or of state or local authorities as to crimes under their jurisdiction.

B. Nothing in paragraph A is intended to alter or impinge upon the military's independent authority to protect and safeguard its personnel, material, and ability to perform its mission.

1. The commanding officer of a military installation may, for security reasons, designate certain areas off limits to civilians and use military personnel to enforce this restriction.

2. A military commander may use necessary force to protect against civilian conduct threatening personnel, equipment, or facilities under his command.

C. The military has primary authority for the care of the Indochinese civilians while they are housed on military installations, but it shall rely on United States marshals to protect the delivery of that care against any disruption to the maximum extent possible.

D. Regular Immigration and Naturalization Service personnel at the bases shall assist the United States marshals as called upon.

End of quote.

3. Any questions pertaining to these guidelines should be cabled to the IATF, attention: General Counsel.

4. This message does not relieve the Department of Defense from its policing responsibilities as currently exercised at any of the refugee/repatriation centers.
REQUESTS FOR MODIFICATION OF PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE USE OF U.S. MILITARY MANPOWER IN A POLICING ROLE SHOULD BE DIRECTED THROUGH THE SENIOR DOD COORDINATOR ON REFUGEES, MR. ERICH VON MARBOD, PDASD/C TO THE DIRECTOR, IATF.

5. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL ORDER NO. 611-75:

QUOTE: AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES MARSHALS ON DUTY AT REFUGEE CENTERS TO EXERCISE POWERS OF IMMIGRATION OFFICERS. PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME UNDER SECTION 103 OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, 8 U.S.C. 1103, I HEREBY CONFER UPON U.S. MARSHALS ON DUTY AT CENTERS FOR PROCESSING OR REPATRIATING INDOCHINESE REFUGEES, IN ADDITION TO THE POWERS ALREADY VESTED IN THEM, THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF IMMIGRATION OFFICERS AS PROVIDED BY THAT ACT TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED DEPARTURES FROM THOSE CENTERS AND TO RETURN THERE TO REFUGEES WHO DEPART THEM WITHOUT HAVING BEEN AUTHORIZED TO DO SO.

THIS ORDER SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT SO LONG AS THOSE CENTERS SHALL REMAIN IN USE OR UNTIL THIS ORDER IS REVOKED, WHICHEVER IS SOONER. SIGNED EDWARD H. LEVI ATTORNEY GENERAL JULY 18, 1975. END OF QUOTE. KISSINGER

BT
SUBJ: DOD SUPPORT FOR INDOCHINA REFUGEE CENTER OPERATIONS FOR FALL AND WINTER MONTHS

1. A REVIEW OF THE MAJOR CONSIDERATION INHERENT IN SUPPORTING REFUGEE CENTER OPERATIONS FOR FORTHCOMING FALL AND WINTER MONTHS WAS CONDUCTED WITH THE DIRECTOR, IATF ON 29 JUL 75. THE FOLLOWING DECISION AND ACTIONS WERE COORDINATED:

A. WINTER CLOTHING: THE CONCEPT SUBMITTED BY CDR FORCE COM {MSG DTG 231902Z JUL 75} AND INDORSED BY DEPT OF THE ARMY {MSG DTG 251402Z JUL 75} IN WHICH FULL OR PARTIAL ISSUES OF CLOTHING WILL BE PURCHASED THROUGH AAFES FOR REFUGEES PROJECTED TO BE IN THE SYSTEM BEYOND 1 SEP 75 IS APPROVED. REQUEST DA PROVIDE THIS OFFICE WITH FINAL ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FULL AND PARTIAL ISSUES AND DETAIL COST PRIOR TO OBLIGATION OF FUNDS.

B. FORT INDIANTOWN GAP: FIG WILL REMAIN IN OPERATION UNTIL 1 DEC 75. ACTION WILL BE INITIATED IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL HEATING AND OTHER COLD WEATHER MODIFICATIONS TO ACCOMMODATE A MAXIMUM OF 6,000 REFUGEES DURING PERIOD 15 SEP - 1 DEC 75.

C. FORT CHAFFEE: FORT CHAFFEE WILL REMAIN IN OPERATION UNTIL THE CONCLUSION OF THE REFUGEE PROGRAM. ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO WINTERIZE FORT CHAFFEE AS REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE A MAXIMUM OF 17,000 REFUGEES FROM 1 OCT 75 UNTIL THE PROGRAM IS CONCLUDED.

D. CAMP PENDLETON: PLAN TO DISCONTINUE INPUT OF REFUGEES TO
PENDLETON O/A 31 AUG. TENT FACILITIES SHOULD BE DISMANTLED AS CAMP PENDLETON POPULATION DECREASES AND USE OF TENTS WILL BE TERMINATED BY 15 OCT 75. REFUGEES REMAINING BEYOND 15 OCT, ESTIMATED TO BE LESS THAN 2,500, WILL BE HOUSED IN QUONSET BUILDINGS. CAMP WILL BE CLOSED NLT 1 NOV 75.

3. EGLIN AUX FLD 2. EGLIN WILL BE CLOSED NLT 1 SEP 75. TENTS AND FACILITIES SHOULD BE DISMANTLED AS CAMP POPULATION DIMINISHES. REFUGEES WITHOUT SPONSORS AS OF 20 AUG 75 WILL BE MOVED TO FORT CHAFFEE PRIOR TO 1 SEP. FACILITIES SHOULD BE PROVIDED IN THE EGLIN AREA TO ACCOMMODATE THOSE REFUGEES WITH FIRM SPONSORSHIP AND TRAVEL PLANS WITHIN PERIOD 1 SEP - 15 SEP.

F. GUAM: GUAM WILL CONTINUE AS PRIMARY HOLDING AREA FOR REFUGEES DESIRING REPATRIATION AND THOSE AWAITING MOVEMENT TO THIRD COUNTRIES. A CAPABILITY WILL BE RETAINED TO PROCESS SMALL GROUPS OF REFUGEES FROM THE PACIFIC AREA IN THE EVENT MOVEMENT FROM THIRD COUNTRIES IS URGENT AND DIRECT MOVEMENT TO CONUS IS NOT POSSIBLE.

G. WAKE ISLAND: WAKE WILL BE MAINTAINED IN STANDBY STATUS WITH CAPABILITY OF ACCEPTING UP TO 6,000 REFUGEES WITHIN 15 DAYS AFTER NOTIFICATION.

2. FOR CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC: REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION AS APPROPRIATE TO IMPLEMENT THE FOREGOING.

3. FOR ALL: PUBLIC RELEASE OF FOREGOING IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL NOTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE OFFICIALS IS COMPLETED. ESTIMATE NOTIFICATIONS WILL BE COMPLETE AND PRESS RELEASE WILL BE MADE BY IATF BY 31 JUL 75.

BT

V-A-58
SUBJ: FALL AND WINTER OPERATIONS US ARMY REFUGEE CENTERS

REF: A. DOD MSG 3022382 JUL 75, DOD SUPPORT FOR INDOCHINA REFUGEE CENTER OPERATIONS FOR FALL AND WINTER MONTHS.
B. FORSCOM MSG DTG 231410Z JUL 75, PROCUREMENT OF WINTER CLOTHING-OPERATION NEU ARRIVALS.

1. THIS MSG CONFIRMS DECISIONS ANNOUNCED IN DOD MSG REF A AND PROVIDES AUTHORITY AND GUIDANCE FOR THE CONTINUED USE AND WINTERIZATION OF REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTERS AT FT INDIANTOWN GAP (FIG) PA, AND FT CHAFFEE, AR.

2. CDR FORSCOM IS AUTHORIZED TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION IN COMPLIANCE WITH PARA 1B AND 1C OF REF A TO IMMEDIATELY INITIATE ACTION TO WINTERIZE FIG AND FT CHAFFEE ON AN AUSTERE BASIS FOR THEIR CONTINUED USE AS REFUGEE CENTERS. FIG SHOULD BE WINTERIZED FOR A MAXIMUM OF 6,000 REFUGEES EFFECTIVE 15 SEP 75. FT CHAFFEE SHOULD BE WINTERIZED FOR A MAXIMUM OF 17,000 REFUGEES EFFECTIVE 1 OCT 75. SPACE ALLOCATION WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF 50 SQ FT PER INDIVIDUAL. DESIRED POPULATION LEVELS WILL BE ACHIEVED THROUGH ATTRITION; BACK HAUL FROM FIG IS NOT CONTEMPLATED AT THIS TIME. LISTED BELOW, IN ADDITION TO OTHER MINOR EXPENSES AND THE CONTINUATION OF EXISTING CONTRACTS, ARE WINTERIZATION REQUIREMENTS WHICH ARE SPECIFICALLY APPROVED FOR EXECUTION. ANY SIGNIFICANT UPWARD DEVIATION FROM REQUIREMENTS OR EXPENDITURES LISTED BELOW OR FROM PLANNING CONCEPTS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED WILL BE REFERRED TO THIS HQ FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL PRIOR TO PROCEEDING:

A. FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

(* IN 1,000s)

***************
* UNCLASSIFIED *
***************

V-A-59
1. HEATING SYSTEM INSTALLATION AND MODIFICATION 73.2
2. INSTALL SMOKE DETECTORS/ALARMS 17.6
3. PERSONNEL HIRING (INCLUDES 75 BOILER FIREMEN; 5 BOILER FIREMECHANICS; SUPERVISORS) 8600
4. FUEL (COAL AND OIL) 8265.9
5. TDY/TRANS (ROTTING SUPPORT TRPS) 15 SEP-15 DEC 75 612.7
6. INCREASED BASIC DIET (PLUS 9 CENTS PER DAY) 40.5
7. WASHERS AND DRYERS 20.0
B. FT CHAFFEE, AR
1. BUILDING WINTERIZATION (HEATING, HOSP BOILER, THERMOSTATS) 101.
2. TDY/TRANS (ROTTING SUPPORT TRPS) 1 OCT 75-1 MAY 76 1203
3. INCREASED BASIC DIET (PLUS 8 CENTS PER DAY) 244.8

ESTIMATES BASED ON 1 OCT TO 1 MAY HEATING SEASON - ACTUAL COSTS TO BE APPROXIMATELY 1/3.

3. DOD HAS APPROVED THE CONCEPT SUBMITTED BY CDR FORSCOM IN REF B FOR THE PROCUREMENT FROM AAFES OF WINTER CLOTHING FOR THE REFUGEES. THE FOLLOWING REFUGEE POPULATION PROJECTIONS HAVE BEEN FURNISHED BY DOD IN COORDINATION WITH THE IATF FOR PLANNING PURPOSES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>FIG</th>
<th>CHAFFEE</th>
<th>PENDLETON</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 AUG</td>
<td>8865</td>
<td>23059</td>
<td>15409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 SEP</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>19524</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 SEP</td>
<td>1638</td>
<td>15285</td>
<td>6803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. CDR FORSCOM WILL USE THE ABOVE DATA TO DEVELOP THE NUMBER AND COST OF PLANNED PARTIAL AND FULL ISSUES OF WINTER CLOTHING. FURNISH THIS DATA ALONG WITH THE PLANNED DATES OF ISSUE AND THE COMPOSITION OF A PARTIAL AND FULL ISSUE OF WINTER CLOTHING TO THIS HQ ASAP FOR APPROVAL BY DOD PRIOR TO THE OBLIGATION OF FUNDS.
B. CDR FORSCOM IS AUTHORIZED DIRECT COORDINATION WITH ALL CONCERNED TO DEVELOP REFUGEE WINTER CLOTHING REQUIREMENTS TO INCLUDE
TYPE, SIZES, QUANTITY, ETC. FOR USE IN ORDERING FROM AAFES. CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS COORDINATION WILL BE MAINTAINED WITH AAFES TO INSURE PROMPT DELIVERY OF CLOTHING AT ALL REFUGEE CENTERS OPERATING AT TIME OF ISSUE. CAREFUL PLANNING IS REQUIRED TO HOLD BACK HAUL OF CLOTHING TO A MINIMUM.

4. PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE "INTERIZATION OF FIG AND FT CHAFFEE OR THE PROCUREMENT OF WINTER CLOTHING FOR THE RESIDUAL REFUGEE POPULATION WHICH CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT HQ FORSCOM WILL BE REPORTED ASAP TO DA FOR RESOLUTION.

BT
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
GENERAL COUNSEL
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Defense Task Force for Indochina Refugees

References: a. DEPSECDEF Memo* of 29 April 1975, subject as above
b. PDASD(C) Memo* of 8 September 1975, subject: Transfer of Functions/Personnel

Effective on 3 November 1975, the Secretary of the Army will become the DOD Executive Agent for administrative, operational and logistical support for the Indochina Refugee Program.

Dr. Roger Shields, DASD(POW/MIA Affairs) will continue to monitor the overall defense activities and retain his position as the senior DOD member on the Interagency Task Force on Indochina Refugees (IATF).

/s/ William P. Clements, Jr.

*Attached [Withdrawn]
132347Z NOV 75
FM SECSTATE WASH DC
TO DA PRIORITY
SECDEF PRIORITY
INFO JCS
FT CHAFFEE
INDIANTOWN
FT SILL
GSA
DSA
FT MCPHERSON
FT SLM HOUSTON
FT MONROE VA

SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT ACQUIRED FOR OPERATION NEW ARRIVAL

1. THIS MSG CONFIRMS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MR. DUANE {IATF} AND REPS OF EACH OF THE ADDREES. THE POLICY GUIDELINES IN THIS MESSAGE APPLY TO IATF MATERIAL AT FT CHAFFEE AND INDIANTOWN GAP. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL REFS TO CHAFFEE INCLUDE FT SILL SINCE FT CHAFFEE IS SATELLITE ACTIVITY OF FT SILL.

2. FOLLOWING GUIDELINES APPLY TO MATERIAL ACQUIRED BY DA FOR IATF:
   A. DISPOSITION OF IATF MATERIAL WILL BE MADE ONLY AFTER RELEASE BY THE SENIOR CIVIL COORDINATOR. SENIOR CIVIL COORDINATOR REPS SHALL PARTICIPATE, AS REQUIRED, IN SERVICEABILITY INSPECTIONS.
   B. DA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR REHABILITATING MATERIAL ON LOAN TO THE IATF. THIS MATERIAL WILL BE RETURNED TO ITS ORIGINAL CONDITION AT THE TIME OF LOAN TO THE IATF. IATF WILL REIMBURSE DA FOR REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT WHEN LOSS IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO OPERATION NEW ARRIVAL. IATF SHALL ALSO ASSUME COST OF RETURNING MATERIAL TO ORIGINAL PACK. WHEN MATERIAL IS PLACED IN A STATE OF PACKAGING ABOVE ORIGINAL PACK, DA SHALL ABSORB COST DIFFERENCE.
   C. OPERATION NEW ARRIVAL MATERIALS WERE PURCHASED UNDER A DEPARTMENT OF STATE APPROPRIATION. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S LEGAL OFFICE HAS DETERMINED--IN ACCORDANCE WITH FPMR 101-43.100 WHICH STATES THAT EACH EXECUTIVE AGENCY SHALL TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT REASSIGN PROPERTY WITHIN THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR AGENCY WHEN SUCH PROPERTY IS DETERMINED TO BE NO LONGER REQUIRED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE APPROPRIATION FROM WHICH IT WAS PURCHASED--
THAT PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER DISPOSITION PROCEDURES, SECSTATE MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE GIVEN FIRST PRIORITY.

Packing, handling and transportation costs to move material selected by SECSTATE will be paid by SECSTATE.

D. After SECSTATE requirements are satisfied, FT CHAFFEE/Fig as the logistics agents for IATF will interrogate DOD/GSA inventory managers to determine if material is creditable return. Normal DOD/GSA credit return policies/procedures will be followed.

DSA/GSA has agreed to provide inspectors on-site to assist in determining serviceable material. Arrangements for the visits should be made with DSA/GSA regional reps.

E. Material that can be returned (credit or non-credit) will be packaged/shipped in accord with normal DOD/GSA return program policy. Any incremental cost associated with such returns (e.g., packaging and transportation) will be billed to IATF in accord with normal IATF billing procedures.

F. Material obtained through local purchase that can be cross-referenced to an NSN will be screened in accord with appropriate credit policies even though material was not obtained from DOD/GSA.

G. Material not designated as a creditable return by DSA/GSA be offered to Chaffee/Fig to meet local or other base requirements. IATF shall be reimbursed for all material accepted (see Para 2L below). New material shall be reimbursed at 100 percent credit. Used but serviceable material shall be at less than full credit but not less than 20 percent of acquisition value.

H. All non-military material that is not a return (credit or non-credit) to DSA, GSA, FT CHAFFEE or FIG be turned over to the GSA Utilization Rep for disposition. Military peculiar items shall be turned over to DPDD.

I. Because of the unique nature of operation, new arrivals and the necessity to phase out IATF as quickly as possible, IATF approves of local screening/expedited processing procedures. GSA-FSS wash concurs and GSA on-site should develop necessary procedures in conjunction with senior civilian coordinator reps. Both DOD and civilian agencies will be included in the screening process.

J. Residual expendable material (e.g., lumber) should be made available to FT CHAFFEE/Fig as excess property.

K. SCC FT CHAFFEE/Fig should maintain adequate staff necessary to material phase-down operations. A rep should remain until all material has been removed from the refugee camps.
L. Normal DA material accountability procedures will be followed with the exception that where DA procedures call for approval of survey or inventory adjustment by higher authority such as FORSCOM, the review and approval level for IATF material will be the senior civil coordinator or his designated rep.

M. IATF cannot accept a direct credit for material returned to either a local or national supply system. Thus, material credits will be accepted by FT Chaffee/FIG and the value of those credits will be used to off-set material billings submitted to IATF.

3. Discussions are being conducted with the Army-Air Force Exchange service to determine if the excess winter clothing can be returned to the Exchange service for credit. No disposition is to be taken on that clothing pending the conclusion of those discussions.

4. Non-expendable equipment purchased by the Volags or other volunteer service organizations under contract with the Federal government is subject to subpart of the general control provisions. However, the government can waive any rights to such equipment. Therefore, any nonexpendable equipment valued at more than $500.00 should be handled in same manner as outlined in Para 2.
On 1 Jan 76
FM DA WASH DC //DAC//
TO CDR FORSCOM FT McPHERSON GA
CDR TRADOC FT MONROE VA
CDR HSC FT SAN HOUSTON TX
CDR AMC ALEXANDRIA VA
CDR USACC FT HUACHUCA AZ
CDR USACINCPAC SPT GP FT SHAFTER HI
ARSTAFF

SUBJECT: INDOCHINA REFUGEE PROGRAM AND ORPHAN EVACUATION

1. WITH THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE LAST GROUP OF REFUGEES AND
THE CLOSING OF FT CHAFFEE AS A REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTER, I
WISH TO COMMEND ALL PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING AND EX-
ECUTION OF OPERATIONS NEW LIFE, NEW ARRIVALS, AND BABYLIFT
FOR THEIR EXEMPLARY PERFORMANCE.

2. ARMY PERSONNEL SELECTED TO SUPPORT THESE HUMANITARIAN OP-
ERATIONS REacted in a MOST PROFESSIONAL AND ENTHUSIASTIC MANNER.
THE PROGRAM OF PROCESSING OVER 1,800 ORPHANS AT FT BENNING, FT
LEWIS, AND THE PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO AND NEARLY 73,000
REFUGEES AT FT CHAFFEE AND FT INDIANTOWN GAP WAS ACCOMPLISHED
WITH COMPASSION AND EFFICIENCY BY THE ARMY TEAMS. ADDITIONALLY,
THE ORDERLY PHASE-DOWN OF OPERATIONS AT ALL INSTALLATIONS IS
NOTEWORTHY.

3. PLEASE CONVEY MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS TO THOSE IN-
DIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF
THESE MOST URGENT AND UNUSUAL UNDERTAKINGS. THEIR RESPONSIVE-
NESS AND EFFICIENCY HAVE BROUGHT CREDIT TO THE US ARMY AND
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

BT
R 182027Z FEB 7b
FM HQDA WASH DC //DAMO-ODM//
TO CDR FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA //AFOP-RO//
INFO CDR FT SILL OK
CDR FT CHAFFEE AR
CDR FT INDIANTOWN GAP PA

SUBJECT: DISPOSAL OF UNCLAIMED PERSONAL PROPERTY {OPERATION NEU ARRIVALS}

REFERENCE FONECON: CPT HAAS //AFOP-RO//, HQ FORSCOM AND LTC ANDERSON, DAMO-ODM, HQDA, 15 JAN 7b.

1. THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/INSTRUCTIONS PER REFERENCE AND CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY FOR CDR FORSCOM TO TAKE ACTION IMMEDIATELY TO PROPERLY DISPOSE OF THE UNCLAIMED REFUGEE PERSONAL PROPERTY PRESENTLY STORED AT FT CHAFFEE. THIS ACTION IS BEING TAKEN AT THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF THE DIRECTOR, NEU, REFUGEE TASK FORCE, THE SUCCESSOR TO THE IATF.

2. THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN DISPOSING OF LOST, ABANDONED, OR UNCLAIMED PRIVATELY OWNED PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE INDOCHINA REFUGEES ARE SPECIFIED IN PARA 52A, CHAPTER VI, DEFENSE DISPOSAL MANUAL {DOD NO 4160-21-M3}. ADDITIONALLY, THE PROVISIONS OF 10 USC 4712, 4713, 6522, 9722, 9723 AND SUBSECTION (C) OF SECTION 2575 CITED IN PARA 52A[C] DOD 4160-21-M ARE CONSIDERED NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS INSTANCE.

3. ALL COSTS INCIDENT TO THE SHIPPING OF THIS PROPERTY SHOULD BE BILLED TO OPERATION NEU ARRIVALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT BILLING PROCEDURES.

4. BY SEPARATE MEANS A COPY OF THE NEU REQUEST FOR AND AUTHORITY TO DISPOSE OF THE UNCLAIMED PERSONAL PROPERTY HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO CDR FORSCOM.

BT
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington, D.C. 20301

June 1, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
GENERAL COUNSEL
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Defense Task Force for Indochina Refugees

REFERENCES: a. DepSecDef Memo of 29 April 1975, subject as above.
   b. PDASD(C), Memo of 8 September 1975, subject: Transfer of Functions/Personnel
   c. DepSecDef Memo of 7 November 1975, subject as above.

Effective 1 June 1976, the Secretary of the Army's role as the DOD Executive Agent for administrative, operational and logistical support for the Indochina Refugee Program will terminate. The program has been completed, and therefore the requirement for an executive agent no longer exists. In the future, actions relating to this program will be the responsibility of the respective military department concerned.

On behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld and myself, I wish to congratulate all those individuals, both civilian and military, who contributed to the success of this effort and thank you for your dedicated performance of duty.

/s/ William P. Clements, Jr.

V-A-68
### Units Represented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units Represented</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Med Grp HHD</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Fort Sam Houston</td>
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<tr>
<td>423d Med Co</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>Fort Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>702d Med Co</td>
<td>104</td>
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<td>Fort Ord</td>
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<td>714th Med Det</td>
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<td>Fort Jackson</td>
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<td>1st Bn, 5th Inf, 25th Inf Div</td>
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<td>Tripler Army Med Cen</td>
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<tr>
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**TOTAL:** 2135
### Operation NEW ARRIVALS

**US Army Support Units: Fort Chaffee, Arkansas**

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<td>96th CA Bn</td>
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<td>46th Sup Grp HHC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th PI Det Fld Svc</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fort Bragg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>330th TC Movt Ctrl Tm</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Fort Bragg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th PSYOP Grp</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Fort Bragg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th AG Det Repl</td>
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<td>Fort Campbell</td>
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<tr>
<td>28th PI Det Fld Svc</td>
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<td>Fort Carson</td>
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<tr>
<td>411th MP Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>62d CS Co (S&amp;S)</td>
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<td>Fort Hood</td>
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<td>3, 9 Arty Bn</td>
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<td>546th MP Co</td>
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<td>Fort Sill</td>
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<td>714th Med Det</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAAMS, Staff &amp; Faculty</td>
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<td>Fort Sill</td>
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<td>Linguist Grp</td>
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<td>Fort Hood</td>
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<td>44th Mil Hist Det</td>
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<td>Fort McPherson</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSO Det</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fort Hood</td>
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<tr>
<td>226th Maint Plt</td>
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<td>Fort Sill</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAR personnel</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>CONUS-wide</td>
</tr>
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**Total:** 1861

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V-B-2
### Operation NEW ARRIVALS

**US Army Support Units: Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units Represented</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46th Svc Sup Gep</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Fort Chaffee</td>
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<tr>
<td>401st Pers Svc Co</td>
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<td>Fort Knox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>553d Army Postal Unit</td>
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<td>Fort Devens</td>
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<td>96th CA Bn</td>
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<td>76th Engr Bn</td>
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<td>Fort Meade</td>
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<tr>
<td>57th Lt Trk Co</td>
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<td>Fort Lee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>278th Cbt Sup Co (GS)</td>
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<td>Fort Devens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>519th MP Co</td>
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<td>Fort Meade</td>
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<tr>
<td>209th MP Co</td>
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<td>Fort Meade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>437th MP Co</td>
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<td>Fort Belvoir</td>
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<tr>
<td>40th Cbt Sup Co (S&amp;S)</td>
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<td>Fort Carson</td>
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<td>581st Maint Co</td>
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<td>Fort Meade</td>
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<td>13th Public Info Det</td>
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<td>Fort Benning</td>
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<tr>
<td>23d Repl Det</td>
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<td>Fort Benning</td>
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<td>42d Fld Hosp</td>
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<td>Fort Knox</td>
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<td>926th Med Det</td>
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<td>330th Trans Mvmt Tm</td>
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<td>4th PSYOP Grp</td>
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<td>Fort Bragg</td>
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<td>257th Med Det</td>
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<td>Fort Jackson</td>
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<td>Army Spec Opns Photo Det</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B, 1st Bn, 501st Inf</td>
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<td>Fort Campbell</td>
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<tr>
<td>Augmentation Sup</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>Army-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR personnel</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>CONUS-wide</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**TOTAL:** 1890
SITE SELECTION

[Facilities suitable for housing refugees if required.]^a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installation</th>
<th>Potential Spaces b</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort McCoy [Sparta, WI]</td>
<td>46,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Roberts [Paso Robles, CA]</td>
<td>40,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Pickett [Blackstone, VA]</td>
<td>36,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Chaffee [Fort Smith, AR]</td>
<td>37,463^c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Lewis [Tacoma, WA]</td>
<td>29,650^d</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amarillo AFB [Amarillo, TX]</td>
<td>23,625^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Indiantown Gap [Annville, PA]</td>
<td>21,600^c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Drum [Watertown, WI]</td>
<td>21,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Knox [Fort Knox, KY]</td>
<td>14,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Leonard Wood [Waynesville, MO]</td>
<td>12,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Riley [Junction City, KS]</td>
<td>12,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Dix [Wrightstown, NJ]</td>
<td>11,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Meade [Odenton, MD]</td>
<td>11,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fort Hood [Killeen, TX]</td>
<td>10,000^d</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fort Wolters [Mineral Wells, TX]</td>
<td>8,046^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Irwin [Barstow, CA]</td>
<td>8,010^d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort AP Hill [Bowling Green, VA]</td>
<td>7,000^d</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forbes AFB [Topeka, KS]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laredo AFB [Laredo, TX]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clinton-Sherman AFB [Burns Flat, OK]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walker AFB [Rosewell, NM]</td>
<td>2,190</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>369,573</strong></td>
</tr>
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^a Based on a preliminary assessment of emergency facilities prepared by the Department of Army Staff on 21 April 1975.

^b Individual space is normally computed on the basis of 90 square feet per person except under mobilization conditions when it is reduced to 40 square feet per person. The barracks and dormitory facilities listed were surveyed applying the 40 square feet factor and the yardstick for family housing units was based on six occupants per unit when calculated.

^c Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap, the two US Army sites utilized as reception centers for Indochinese evacuees, had peak refugee populations of 25,055 and 16,809, respectively.

^d Available spaces at Fort Lewis include 9,400 site facilities (tents and hutments) and all spaces at both Fort Hood and Fort AP Hill consist of site facilities exclusively.

^e Fort Wolters and Amarillo AFB have been turned over to the control of local authorities and their utilization would consequently be subject to negotiation. Prior to its transfer, Amarillo AFB had 10,500 dormitory spaces computed on the criteria of 90 square feet per person.
## Nomenclature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Lifted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reefer, 854 cubic feet</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriter, Vietnamese type</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mimeograph</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cot, Folding</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can, Water, 5 gallon</td>
<td>44,622</td>
<td>44,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towel, Bath</td>
<td>97,104</td>
<td>97,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mess Kit</td>
<td>34,677</td>
<td>11,480*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tent, GP, MED</td>
<td>2,279</td>
<td>2,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, Field</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heater, Immersion</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen, Latrine</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tent, Kitchen</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag, Water</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loudspeaker System</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails, (5, 8, 10, 12 P Mix)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shorts, Athletic (S, XS)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirts, Tee (S,XS)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloth, (Black, White) yards</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needles</td>
<td>12,000*</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread, Cone, 1060 yards</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can, Garbage</td>
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<td>4,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammer, Claw</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw, Hand, Wood</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rope, Manila</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can, Gas, 5 gallon</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scissors</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cook Set</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Radio</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixing, Machines</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loudspeakers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Remaining quantity cancelled by USACSG*
# Phased Establishment and Operation of Refugee Centers

**April - December 1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installations</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Orote Pt) Guam</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td></td>
<td>24 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subic</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wake</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pendleton</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaffee</td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eglin</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Town Gap</td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Dec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Preparation**: 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 2, 3
- **Operation**: 19, 22
- **Date Ops Terminated**
ARMY INCREMENTAL COSTS BY RECEPTION CENTERS

($ DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Costs (Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FT CHAFFEE</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT INDIANTOWN GAP</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUAM</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS
OPERATION NEW LIFE

JCS

CINCPAC

CINCPAC REP GUAM

DA

CSG

USAEIGHT

USARJ

FORSCOM

USASCH

25TH INF

NRMC

45TH SPT GP

515TH ORD CO

1ST MED GP

CO D 411TH ENGR BN

1ST BN 5TH INF

1ST BN 27TH INF

MESS PERSONNEL
(KOREA)
(USARJ)
(CONUS)
(HAWAII)

COMMAND
COMMAND LESS OPCON
OPCON/OPCOM
TASKING

V-C-3
OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS
COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS
AS OF 12 MAY 1975

AMB BROWN

IATF

MR ABRAMOWITZ
ASD (ISA)

DOD

VADM WESCHLER
MG CASEY

JCS (J-4)

DA

MG SNIFFIN

FORSCOM

MG DUQUEMIN
BG TODD

FT SILL

MG OTT

FT CHAFFEE

TF NEW ARRIVALS

BG CANNON

CIVILIAN
COORDINATORS

SUPPORT

COORDINATION

COMMAND

* ON CHARTS V - C - 5/8 THE NAMES INDICATED ARE THOSE OF THE PRINCIPALS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION
OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS
COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS
AS OF 22 MAY 1975

DOD

JCS (J-4)

DA

FORSOM

AMF BROWN

IATF

MR von MARBOD
PDASD(C)

VADM WESCHLER
MG CASEY

MG SNIFFIN

BG TODD

FT SILL

MG OTT

FT CHAFFEE
TF NEW ARRIVALS

BG MACKMULL

BG CANNON

FT INDIANTOWN GAP
TF NEW ARRIVALS

CIVILIAN
COORDINATORS

SUPPORT

COORDINATION

COMMAND

MR MacDonald

MR Friedman
TASK FORCE NEW ARRIVALS (TFNA) MISSIONS

MILITARY ELEMENT

-- PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR REFUGEE BILLETING, SUBSISTENCE, HEALTH CARE, AND SECURITY

-- RESPOND TO CIVIC ACTION REQUIREMENTS OF THE CIVILIAN COORDINATOR

-- EXTEND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO TFNA CIVILIAN AGENCIES

CIVILIAN ELEMENT

-- ORGANIZE AND ADMINISTER REFUGEE CENTER COMMUNITY AFFAIRS AND CIVIC OPERATIONS

-- PROCESS REFUGEES FOR SPONSORSHIP AND RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

V-C-9
TASK FORCE NEW ARRIVALS (TFNA)

MILITARY FUNCTIONS

-- COORDINATE THE FREQUENCY OF REFUGEE ARRIVALS

-- TRANSPORT REFUGEES FROM THE ARRIVAL AIRFIELD TO THE RECEPTION CENTER AND TO WITHIN THE CENTER PROCESSING STATIONS

-- PROVIDE REFUGEE ORIENTATION BRIEFING

-- ASCERTAIN THE INITIAL IDENTITY OF REFUGEE ARRIVALS AND PREPARE IDENTIFICATION CARDS

-- DEVELOP INITIAL PERSONAL INFORMATION FOR THE REFUGEE DATA BASE

-- PROVIDE BILLETING, SUBSISTENCE, HEALTH CARE, AND SECURITY

-- CONDUCT COORDINATED CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

-- CONDUCT MEDICAL SCREENING AS PRESCRIBED BY TFNA

-- PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO TFNA AS REQUIRED
TASK FORCE NEW ARRIVALS (TFNA)

CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS

PERFORM INITIAL REFUGEE PROCESSING:
-- DETERMINE PROPER IMMIGRATION STATUS
-- PROVIDE SOCIAL SECURITY DOCUMENTATION
-- MATCH OCCUPATIONAL SKILLS WITH EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
-- SUPERVISE CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS WITHIN THE RECEPTION CENTER
-- MAINTAIN THE REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTER LOCATOR SYSTEM
-- INPUT DATA INTO THE CENTRALIZED FILES OF REFUGEE INFORMATION

PROVIDE ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION:
-- SUPPORT THE REFUGEE COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE
-- CONDUCT INSTRUCTIONAL AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES, INFORMATION PROGRAMS, AND OTHER COMMUNITY SERVICES
-- MANAGE THE ALLOCATION OF VOLUNTEER ASSISTANCE
-- ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH LOCAL, STATE, AND PRIVATE AGENCIES

ARRANGE FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD:
-- EVALUATE IDENTIFIED SPONSORS AND OBTAIN VOLUNTARY AGENCY ENDORSEMENT
-- APPROVE THE CLEARANCE AND RELEASE OF SPONSORED REFUGEES
-- PROVIDE TRAVEL AND OTHER RELOCATION SERVICES
OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS -- WEEKLY REFUGEE REG
REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTER POPULATIONS

- TOTAL -- CONUS REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTERS
  (CAMP PENDLETON, FORT CHAFFEE, EGLIN AIR
  FORCE BASE, AND FORT INDIANTOWN GAP)

- TOTAL -- US ARMY REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTERS
  (FORT CHAFFEE AND FORT INDIANTOWN GAP)

1975
D. BIBLIOGRAPHY

US ARMY REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS


V-D-1


INDOCHINESE REFUGEE PROGRAM: GENERAL REFERENCES


OPERATIONS NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS: BACKGROUND SOURCES


V-D-5
PICTORIAL ANNEX
Guam | Orote Point
1. Entrance to Orote Point Evacuation Camp
2. Checking cots for incoming refugees
3. Constructing administration buildings
4. Enclosing the refugee area
5. Section of tent city in the background
6. Tent city capable of accommodating 50,000 refugees
7. Comforting a young arrival
8. Refugees arriving by ship
9. Clothing issue
10. In-processing
11. Medical screening
12. Awaiting to be processed
13. Carrying supplies to key locations
14. Medical checkup
15. Major General D. P. Bolton Commander of US Army CINCPAC Support Group, meets with Service representatives

16. Major General H. W. Brooks, Jr., Commander of the 25th Infantry Division, visiting an aid station
17. Exhausted tot

18. Eagerly awaiting onward movement to the United States

19. Army troops with their mascot

20. One of the twenty baby centers on Guam
21. Time out for recreation
22. Field mess operations for refugees
23. Will she accept?
24. Teaching the alphabet
25. Wondering what the future holds
26. Mess sergeant with baby food
27. Introducing American comics to Vietnamese children
1. Barracks used to house refugees
2. Main entrance to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
3. Engineers begin work on the sewage lagoon
4. Refugees departing plane at Fort Smith, Arkansas, airport

5. Constructing temporary latrines in a tent city for Army National Guard troops who ordinarily would have occupied the barracks which housed the refugees

6. MPs coordinating with the local police

7. Supplies for the incoming refugees
8. Processing refugees
9. Refugees awaiting billeting
10. Hon. Howard H. Callaway, Secretary of the Army, at Fort Chaffee
11. Aeration pumps for the sewage lagoon
12. Treating a sick Vietnamese child
13. Food preparation
14. Shot time
15. President Ford at Fort Chaffee

16. Vietnamese family being sponsored
16a. President Ford and Mrs. Julia V. Taft, Director Interagency Task Force
17. US Army Reserve arrives to assist in the refugee program.
18. Religious services for the Vietnamese.
Pennsylvania | Fort Indiantown Gap
1. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
2. Expanding the parking lot in the refugee area
3. Uncrating cots for the refugees
4. Refugees arriving at Harrisburg, PA, airport
5. Welcoming the refugees
6. Issuing clothing
7. Medical treatment  
8. Elderly Vietnamese woman
9. MPs deployed for the refugee operation
10. Skills unlimited
12. Mr. R. E. Friedman, Senior Civilian Coordinator, and Brigadier General J. W. Cannon, Task Force Commander, bid farewell to the first two refugees sponsored and on their way to a new life.


Guam Repatriates at Asan Camp
1. Asan Camp, Guam
2. One of the buildings destroyed by the repatriates
3. Mock model of Thuong Tin 1 built by repatriates
3a. Repatriates listen intently to Rear Admiral Kent J. Carroll, CINCPACREP Guam, as Mr. William E. Paupe, Deputy Senior Civilian Coordinator, looks on
4. Leaders of the repatriates
5. Repatriates boarding the Thuong Tin 1
6. Peaceful demonstration by repatriates
7. US Marshals at gate of Asan Camp
8. Thuong Tin 1 departing Guam for Vietnam

9. Supplies being loaded aboard for the 10-day voyage to Vietnam

10. Sailing home under a new flag