CHAPLAINS DIRECT SUPPORT TO NONDIVISIONAL COMBAT SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY
TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE VIRGINIA 23651

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Chaplain Direct Support to Non-divisional Combat Support Organizations

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study has been approved by the Commanding General, TRADOC for publication and distribution. It does not necessarily have the approval of Headquarters, Department of the Army.

The conclusions and final results of this report are those of the Commandant, USACHCS. This report is based upon information gathered and analysis performed by the former Combat Development Command Chaplain Agency and the present Deputy Commandant for Training Development, USACHCS.

The individuals having a major area of responsibility in the preparation of this study are listed below:

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Approved for public release — distribution unlimited.
The purpose of this study is to develop information on the Chaplain's support of nondivisional combat support organizations and to formulate doctrine governing the modes of providing this support, basis of allocation, and the method of control of chaplains supporting these organizations. The scope of this study is primarily limited to "how" the chaplain support should be provided to nondivisional combat support organizations. Quantitative and subjective analysis is applied to an Army combat support force structure as developed in the scenario of the Command and General Staff College's SCIMITAR and correlated to chaplain support of those organizations. The findings are compared and synthesized. Conclusions are recorded and recommendations are formulated. This study contains no classified information.
SUMMARY

1. Introduction.
   a. The doctrine developed by the ROAD, CAAS-75, ASTRO, COSTAR and TASTA-70 concerning chaplain support was articulated in FM 16-5 and other appropriate FM’s. The TOE structure subsequently evolved to facilitate the doctrine. In nondivisional combat support organizations, chaplains are assigned by TOE units and control headquarters. There is no doctrine governing this situation. Consequently, the large number of small units in the nondivisional combat support organizations operating frequently in an isolated and independent environment have no or very minimum chaplain coverage. An urgent need exists to facilitate the closing of this gap.
   b. The army in the field has been affected by advances in technology, ADP capabilities and developments in the area of insurgent warfare. Improvements as a result of these advances have resulted in organizational modifications, and have refined the span of control for such combat support elements as ADA, field artillery, engineers, aviation and signal. The chaplain function within these elements has failed to evolve beyond a pre-Vietnam concept. The immediate impact upon the comparative force is represented in a possible loss of up to 25% efficiency in extending maximum chaplain support to all subject forces. A loss in efficiency of this magnitude cannot be accepted as the norm. This becomes even more critical when the Army of the 70’s and beyond is governed by rigid dollar constraints. Therefore, efficient use of the chaplain function has never been more critical than in the Army of the future.

2. Problem.
   To determine “how” the chaplain organization, function or method of operation can be changed, modified or arranged to provide effective chaplain support to nondivisional support organizations.

3. Discussion.
   a. Purpose. To develop information concerning chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations with the objective of developing doctrine and procedures defining the missions, functions and methods of operation.
   b. Objectives.
      (1) To examine a current force model in a changing combat situation to determine the characteristics of nondivisional combat support organizations as they would impact on chaplain coverage.
      (2) To isolate and categorize the functions performed by chaplains serving combat support organizations.
      (3) To conduct an analysis of various concepts of chaplain support as they relate to nondivisional combat support organizations.
      (4) Compare results of (1) through (3) to determine what modifications are required for development, method of operation and control of chaplain resources.
      (5) Recommend TOE modifications and allocation of chaplain resources as required to provide maximum effective chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations.
   c. Methodology.
      (1) Alternative methods of providing chaplain support were developed and objectively analyzed and gamed through the use of the scenario, “Scimitar”.

Quantitative information was procured by developing a computer program to manipulate input data obtained from the scenario.

A qualitative analysis based on the professional judgement of experienced chaplains and the author was used to assess the alternatives when objective quantitative information was not obtainable.

d. Analysis.

(1) Chapters 1-4 deal with several questions related to the chaplaincy which must be answered prior to discovering a solution to the problem of chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(a) An immediate question concerns a delineation of chaplain functions and a determination of their priorities. If the chaplain functions embraced a multitude of activities which were valuable to the organization but included many that are not specifically related to religion, which are basic or which should receive priority? Under many conditions, the chaplain is unable to perform but a few of the functions related to his mission due to time, distance and lack of personnel. Which should be attempt to perform for the organization he is covering? Chapter 2 evaluates and categorizes the chaplain functions.

(b) Another question concerns the amount of authority available to the supervisory chaplains to control and direct manpower and materiel. If the chaplain has no or very limited supervisory authority available to him, several alternatives would not be possible for analysis. The question of the limitations of chaplain authority must be answered prior to the continuation of any cogent evaluation of chaplain support. Chapter 3 analyzes the kind and extent of authority available to supervisory chaplains.

(c) Chapter 4 develops alternative models and measures of effectiveness. The technique for selection of alternatives was based on two organizational extremes, and models of varying degrees of organizational concepts were designed to fill the gap in between those extremes. Once selected, measures of effectiveness were developed by which each alternative was analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively.

(2) Chapter 5 analyzes and evaluates each of the alternatives by the measures of effectiveness developed in chapter 4. Although the primary intent of the overall study is to discover an alternative which will provide chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations without assigned chaplains, the alternative chosen should be capable of providing services for all support units. An alternative that is capable of providing chaplain functions to one organization to the exclusion of another must be rejected.

4. Findings/Conclusions.

a. The functions performed by chaplains involve more than the specifically religious. Included in these varied functions is involvement in counseling, personnel visitation, community activities and administration. The amount of time spent in each function depends on the echelon of assignment, the type of unit, the situation and the battlefield environment.

b. The higher the echelon of assignment the greater the administrative load imposed on the chaplain. Very little of his time is spent in the religious or pastoral functions.

c. The chaplain has rank without command, but possesses sufficient authority in his role as staff officer to direct and supervise chaplain and chaplain enlisted assistants and materiel resources to accomplish the mission.

d. Of the seven alternatives evaluated, alternative IV (unit assignment of chaplains where authorized and back up team support) provides the most effective means of providing chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

5. Recommendations.

a. That this study, Chaplains Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations, be approved and distributed as shown in Appendix G, distribution.
b. That in the next scheduled revision of FM 16-5, The Chaplain, appropriate paragraphs be added concerning doctrine in the use of chaplain team support, and revise the paragraph concerning the amount of authority available to supervisory chaplains to direct and supervise other chaplains.

c. That in the next scheduled revision of FM 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual, Staff Organization and Procedures, appropriate paragraphs be revised to clearly define the amount of authority available to staff chaplains to pursue their role as staff officers and supervisory chaplains.

d. That in the next scheduled revision of AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure, para 3-12e, the portion of sentence which reads “he has authority to exercise functions of operational supervision and control”, be changed to read “he has authority to exercise functions of management and staff supervision”.

e. That prior to the next scheduled revision of the manpower authorization criteria (MACRIT), a study be implemented to determine the feasibility of exempting chaplain personnel who are assigned to echelons above divisions from the 1:700 or 1:850 ratio or major fraction thereof provided in AR 570-2, C4, 25 August 1971.

f. That the US Army Chaplain Center and School program of instruction for the Chaplain Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the Army Wide Training Support Branch include a block of instruction on the use of chaplain teams.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. To develop information concerning chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations with the objective of developing doctrine and procedures defining the missions, functions and methods of operation. The information derived from this study will be formalized (a) in doctrine governing the basis of allocation and control of chaplains supporting these organizations; (b) in FM 16-5, The Chaplain; (c) in appropriate nonmission paragraphs of the families of field manuals pertaining to nondivisional combat support organizations; and (d) will be incorporated in instructional material to be used at the United States Army Chaplain Center and School.

2. Objectives. The objectives of this study are:
   a. To examine a current force model in a changing combat situation to determine the characteristics of nondivisional combat support organizations as they would impact on chaplain coverage.
   b. To isolate and categorize the functions performed by chaplains serving combat support organizations.
   c. To conduct an analysis of various concepts of chaplain support as they relate to nondivisional combat support organizations.
   d. Compare results of (1) through (3) to determine what modifications are required for deployment and methods of operation and control of chaplain resources.
   e. Recommend TOE modifications and allocation of chaplain resources as required to provide maximum effective chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

3. Problem Analysis.
   a. The ROAD, CAAS-75, and ASTRO studies developed and refined doctrine governing chaplain support to divisions and separate tactical organizations. The COSTAR and TASTA-70 studies developed doctrine governing chaplain support to FASCOM and TASCOM organizations and chaplain general support to force models. This doctrinal development was articulated in FM 16-5 and other appropriate FM's. The TOE structure subsequently evolved to facilitate doctrine. In nondivisional combat support organizations, chaplains are assigned by TOE to units and control headquarters. Numerous combat support organizations exist without assigned chaplains. There is no doctrine governing this situation. Functioning without benefit of appropriate doctrine and procedural guidance, chaplains assigned to nondivisional combat support units may fail to provide efficient chaplain support to all the organizations and attached personnel. An urgent need exists for information to facilitate the closing of this doctrinal gap.
   b. Advances in technology, evolution of base development concepts, a breakthrough in ADP capabilities, and insurgent aspects operative in conventional conflicts have impacted on the combat support structure of the Army in the field. Improvements in methods of operation have resulted in organizational modifications and have refined the span of control for such combat support structure of the Army in the field. Improvements in methods of operation have resulted in organizational modifications and have refined the span of control for such combat support elements as ADA, field artillery, engineers, aviation, and signal. The chaplain function within these elements has failed to evolve beyond a pre-Vietnam concept. The immediate impact upon the comparative force is represented in a possible loss of up to 25% efficiency in extending maximum chaplain support to subject forces. This estimated loss consists in needless duplication of services, loss of duty time through duplication of travel requirements, undue expenditure of coordinative staff workloads, and misdirected area religious coverage efforts. No yardstick exists for accurate measurement of pastoral workloads. However, when two priests are transported 10 miles by air from different organizational headquarters to conduct two Masses 1,000 yards apart, a loss of 50% efficiency results within this single incident. When this incident is multiplied within the nondivisional combat support structure of an 16-division force, the impact upon both the chaplain's functional capability and operational efficiency of the recipient organization is incalculable. This becomes even more critical when the Army of the 70's and beyond is governed by rigid dollar constraints. The chaplain represents the most valuable resource available to the commander for the purpose of providing for the religious and moral needs of his personnel and for inculcating the spirit of human relations within the command. Efficient use of the chaplain function has never been more critical than in the Army of the 70's and beyond.
4. Selection of Representative Type Force Model.

a. The initial tasks undertaken in formulating this study were: the selection of a scenario describing forces and operations selected as a basis for analysis; a scenario-related map of the area involved; and a computer program to manipulate input data obtained from the scenario, the map, and the TOEs of the force structure employed. During the development and conduct of the study, it became clear that all possible type force structures of nondivisional combat support organizations could not be evaluated separately without exceeding time and manpower limitations. Thus, it was determined that a representative type force structure would be evaluated in detail for the purpose of formulating broad doctrinal guidelines.

b. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College's scenario "Scimitar" was selected for the purpose of this study due to its inclusion of the nondivisional combat support organizations most desirable for evaluation. This school exercise is concerned with organizations in support of a large scale combat operation conducted by an allied field army in the Mediterranean theater of operations. The Systems Analysis Group (SAG) was tasked to furnish an analyst to design a computer model adopted to unique chaplain situations in a theater of operations. Using the Leavenworth "Scimitar" scenario, a "gaming" technique was employed and computerized as a management tool for evaluating quantitative data. Details of the computerized model are included in Appendix F.

c. Three situations or "snapshot" days were selected for analysis. The first "snapshot" situation was studied during the development of base facilities and the build-up of supplies in Thrace as plans were being made for an attack by the 1st (allied) Army to secure and defend an area sufficient to support future operations to the north. The second situation selected for study concerned the securing of the Stara Planina by the allied army. The third and final selected situation concerned defense and counterattack against the penetration by aggressor forces. This method of studying the development of the area from buildup through attack and final defense created a realistic force structure, mission, and physical location against which alternatives of chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations could be studied in detail.

d. The deployment of forces in accordance with each "snapshot" days was done with the assistance of military officers familiar with combat and combat support activities and with the operations covered by the scenario. In actual practice, a detailed wall map was used and unit locations were pin-pointed. Details of the computer programs and method of study used by SAG provided a technique for analysis which can be used in future studies. This method of analysis yielded an unexpected dividend in its applicability as a practical exercise for instruction of chaplain students at the United States Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS).
CHAPTER 2
FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY STAFF AND UNIT CHAPLAINS SERVING NONDIVISIONAL COMBAT SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS

1. Chaplain Functions Identified.

a. It is deceptive to speak of functions performed by staff and unit chaplains serving nondivisional combat support organizations, because it implies that there is a different function performed by those same chaplains assigned to combat or combat support organizations. In fact, the duties of all chaplains are basically the same and vary only in degree as the organization’s mission may vary. However, since there has been no attempt to systematically identify these functions in previous studies, and FM 16-5 provides only a limited definition, it is necessary to delineate them in a logical manner.

b. Army Regulation 310-25 defines “function” as the appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions or tasks of an individual, office or organization. As defined in the National Security Act of 1947 (amended) the term “function” includes functions, powers and duties. The chaplain’s mission is to provide for the religious and morale needs of military personnel, their dependents, and authorized civilians (para 1.3, FM 16-5).

c. The commander has responsibility for the religious life, morals, and morale of the command (AR 165-20). The chaplain acts as adviser and consultant to the commander on all matters of religion, morals and morale as affected by religion. He may be required to provide the commander or his staff with information about religion or formulate plans for implementing religious coverage within the command. He might often be required to provide instruction for specific classes to help integrate the principles of good moral conduct and citizenship into the training program and the total life of the command (AR 600-30). The chaplain is the commander’s adviser on customs and institutions of indigenous religions as they affect the mission of the unit.

d. There are also certain administrative duties incumbent with positions of leadership and responsibility and these are equally applicable to chaplains as well as other officers. There are statistical reports required by the church agencies which endorse the chaplains and continue to monitor their activities while on active duty. The church also serves as a repository of those records of religious rites performed by chaplains of the armed forces. The chaplain must comply with all requirements for reports to supervisory chaplains even though these reports may be submitted through technical channels from one chaplain to another. Finally, he must fulfill the requirements for command reports on activities, plans, budgetary matters, religious statistical data, evaluations of command programs, studies and any information pertinent to effective management of command resources.

e. An area of special interest in the administrative stratum of responsibility would be the placement and supervision of other chaplains where appropriate. Each chaplain must also give special attention to the problems of area and denominational coverage, and maintains liaison with religious groups and welfare agencies which can be of assistance in the fulfillment of his mission.

f. The religious functions which a chaplain performs must comply with the directives of his church and fulfill the ecclesiastical requirements established by his particular denominations. This is essential to insure continuing indorsement by his denomination. Any definition of religious functions must therefore be related to the rites, sacraments, and ordinances of the individual chaplain’s specific church affiliation. Some of the religious functions listed will be required of only a minority of the army chaplains while other functions are basic to almost all chaplains. The following rites and sacraments are basic and common to most chaplains: services of Divine worship, marriage service, burial service, Holy Communion (Christian only), baptism (Christian only), and holy day observance. Other denominational rites, sacraments and ordinances include but are not restricted to: confirmation, bar mitzvah (Jewish only), circumcision (Jewish only), penance and anointing of the sick.

g. Many less specific religious functions conveniently fit under the heading of pastoral functions but do not of necessity have a strictly spiritual or religious orientation. In many such instances the chaplain may be serving individual needs as an outreach of his compassion for human need, or he may be providing chaplain services to groups of people. Examples of such functions are: counseling of all kinds, including everything from spiritual guidance to mental hygiene; pastoral visitation (wounded, sick, confined, barracks, quarters, work areas, training areas, and recreational areas); individual instruction; premarital counseling; religious education; and religious retreats.
h. The special training and communicative skills of his staff or unit chaplain are often utilized by the commander in a variety of ways which promote the welfare and morale of his command. The chaplain acts in these roles when such involvement does not detract from his mission or violate his moral code. Examples of such functions are: civic action projects within the army community and the surrounding civilian community; participation on a drug abuse panel or rehabilitation team; affirmative action programs; membership on councils such as Junior Officers, NCO's, EM, Special Services, and various funds; education activities in the fields of human self development, libraries, arts and crafts; and the innumerable athletic programs. All of these contribute to the general well being of the whole community. However, commanders may not assign chaplains duties unrelated to their profession as clergymen except on a temporary basis in cases of military emergency (AR 27-10, para 8-3).

2. Categorization of Chaplain Functions. It is readily acknowledged that the above list of functions is not exhaustive, but it incorporates the major chaplain functions and will serve to provide data for mission evaluation. For purposes of this study the functions are categorized and divided into four areas: staff, religious, pastoral, and community functions. The entire listing is reproduced here under these categories for ease of identification and reference later in the study.

a. Staff Functions. Those duties pertinent to religion, morals and morale as affected by religion and related to the commander and the chain of command: advice, information, plans, operations, instruction, administration, assignment of chaplains (as appropriate), supervision of chaplains (as appropriate), and area denominational coverage.

b. Religious Functions. Those duties related to rites, sacraments, and ordinances of the church to fulfill religious obligations established by ecclesiastical authorities and insure maintenance of denominational indorsement: worship services, marriage services, burial services, Holy Communion (Christian only), baptism (Christian only), confirmation, bar mitzvah (Jewish), circumcision (Jewish only), penance, anointing of the sick, special holy days of obligation observance.

c. Pastoral Functions. Those activities which are performed by a chaplain for a parishioner as well as group relationships and normally have a religious connotation: counseling, mental health, visitation (wounded, sick, confined, barracks, quarters, work, training, and recreation areas), individual instruction, spiritual guidance, religious education, religious retreats.

d. Community Functions. Those activities which are performed by the chaplain for the good of the military community are not primarily related in nature: liaison with religious and welfare organizations; civic action projects in the Army and civilian communities; drug abuse panel rehabilitation teams; affirmative action program; council member of varied organizations and funds; educational activities in the field of human self-development, libraries; arts and crafts; athletic programs; and youth activity programs.

3. Findings.

a. By regulation the commander has been given the responsibility of the religious life, morals and morale of his command. By nature of his training, ordination, and assignment, the chaplain is given the duty of insuring that the command has a viable and effective religious program.

b. Although basically concerned with providing the required religious services and related pastoral functions, the chaplain is involved in activities only peripherally concerned with religion. Such functions make demands on the time of the chaplain. They are, however, related to the welfare of the command and, therefore, of extreme importance.

c. The chaplain is a staff officer, and is tasked with certain responsibilities by nature of that position. He must concern himself with administrative matters in the conduct of his role as a staff officer. Of special interest in the area of administration is the placement and supervision of chaplains where appropriate. Each chaplain must also give special attention to the problem of area and denominational coverage.

Any attempt to apply a value scale to the functions listed above would end in utter chaos. Even though each ecclesiastical body might agree on the enumeration of the varieties of functions performed by chaplains, they would disagree on the relative worth of each of them. Such disagreement would be caused by the different theological backgrounds of each church. For this reason no attempt is made to quantitatively weigh one function above another. However, the relative importance of a function or functions depends on the assignment and level of assignment of each chaplain. For instance, a supervisory chaplain with several chaplains and a large area of operations to cover, of necessity is involved in administration for a greater proportion of his time. It is generally true that the higher the echelon of assignment the greater the proportion of time spent on administration. Consequently, very little of his time is spent performing the specific religious functions.
CHAPTER 3

AUTHORITY LEGALLY AVAILABLE TO SUPERVISORY CHAPLAINS

1. Introduction. An analysis of the kind and extent of authority legally available to supervisory chaplains is essential to the development of this study, because new or innovative modes of providing chaplain support might require extensive use of authority which has heretofore not been utilized by chaplains in support of field units. The question of the limitations on chaplain authority must be answered prior to a continuation of any cogent evaluation.

2. Analysis of Authority in Terms of Command and Staff.

   a. The United States Army is a form of institutional life cast in a command environment. Command is defined as "the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces" (AR 310-25, p. 127). The commander, at every level of command is responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do. Command is not an end in itself but rests on a concept of responsibility for accomplishment of a definite mission. While responsibility is defined as "the obligation to carry forward an assigned task to a successful conclusion", a mission is "a duty assigned to an individual or a unit; a task" (AR 310-25, p. 335). Therefore, military units exist to accomplish missions in support of the national purpose and commanders exist to direct these units to that end.

   b. Each military commander may be vested with authority of two kinds: power to command, descending to him from the President as "Commander in Chief" of the armed forces; and power to discipline granted to him by Congress which makes "rules for the government and regulation" of the armed forces. Many commanders fail to appreciate the separate sources of their authority. They assume that the power to discipline is inherent in command. Such confusion is not surprising because congress has in the past been content to leave most of the details concerning discipline to regulations by the President and his subordinates.

   c. Without resort to powers stemming from congress, the authority to command carries with it considerable power to effectuate control and discipline and obedience to orders. Rules for exercise of authority differ depending on its source. In the exercise of command authority, the commander's guideline is what is reasonable under the circumstances to accomplish his mission and not forbidden by law. The test of reasonableness is largely subjective.

   d. Command is also defined as that "authority which an individual in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of his rank and assignment" (AR 310-25, p. 127). In addition to authority, the functions of command carry broad responsibility for planning, organizing, training, directing, coordinating and controlling military units to accomplish missions, together with the administrative responsibility for supply for the health, welfare, morale, discipline, assignment and relief of personnel.

   e. "The commander alone is responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do. He cannot delegate this responsibility" (FM 101-5 p. 1-2). He can however, delegate his authority to subordinate commanders or staff officers in order to reduce his span of control and utilize proper management procedures. In this manner he effectively discharges his responsibilities toward him. All orders from a higher command to a subordinate unit are issued by the commander of the higher unit to the commander of the next subordinate unit. Intermediate commanders are bypassed only in urgent situations. In such instances, both the commander issuing the order and the commander receiving the order should notify intermediate commanders of its context as soon as possible. Thus the integrity of the chain of command is preserved in spite of the urgent situation occasioning the violation of the chain of command (FM 101-5, p. 3-2). Violation of the chain of command usurps the prerogatives of the intermediate commanders concerned and abrogates his authority without a commensurate lessening of his responsibility.

   f. The commander may specifically delegate certain authority to his staff, or to a particular staff officer (FM 101-5, p. 14). The authority he delegates to individual staff officers varies with the echelon and mission of the command, the immediacy of operations, and the relationship of the respective staff officer's assigned functional area to the primary mission of the command. "When the commander authorizes staff officers to issue orders in his name, the commander retains responsibility for these orders" (ibid).
3. Analysis of Authority Available to Chaplains.

a. A chaplain may never assume command of an activity, an organization or an individual. In compliance with Army Regulations and the United States Code, chaplains may never be placed in command because they have "rank without command" (AR 165-20 and Title 10, para 3581, United States Code). No exception, however, has ever been granted. The chaplain is always assigned to the commander's staff, and acts in the capacity of a staff officer. The only exception to this is the position of the commandant of the United States Army Chaplain Center and School. Even in this exception, the commandant may not exercise command.

b. The chaplain is a staff officer. When he is required to act in his capacity as a member of the commander's staff and fulfill all the functions applicable to his duty as a chaplain, he is given not only the assigned duties, responsibilities, missions or tasks, but he is also given the proper degree of power or authority to accomplish the mission. The commander is never relieved of his overall responsibility for the religious program within his command, but he does delegate authority to his chaplain commensurate with the assigned tasks. The chaplain is always responsible to his commander for the success or failure of the program (AR 165-20, p. 4). The commander, however, may not by regulation assign the chaplains to duties unrelated to their profession as clergymen except on a temporary basis in case of military emergency (AR 27-10, p. 8-1). The crux of the problem lies in the need to identify the kind of authority which a commander can properly delegate to his chaplain in a section of several chaplains or an organization designed to provide an area-wide chaplain coverage program. It is pragmatically necessary in view of the above to provide or clarify an operational doctrine which permits chaplains to direct or control other chaplains to facilitate the accomplishment of their mission.

c. The senior chaplain of the headquarters is designated the staff chaplain. The staff chaplain is responsible to the commander for the leadership and direction of the religious program of the command. He will supervise and direct the activities of other chaplains assigned to the headquarters. He will also provide staff direction to the activities of chaplains in subordinate commands (AR 165-20). It is further stated in paragraph 3-12 (e), AR 600-20, that the chaplain "...has authority to exercise functions of operational supervision and control." Although no definition of "operational supervision" is listed in AR 310-25, a definition of "operational control" is listed. The term as defined is normally used in terms of command, and therefore, not entirely suitable for the chaplain. A better term to define the staff chaplain's role is that of "supervisor" or "director". Again AR 310-25 defines "director" as "supervisor ...or the director of an administrative or principal staff office or major activity". Since the terms "supervisor" implies "management" (Webster's Dictionary), an examination of this term is mandated. "Management" is defined in AR 310-25 as "A process of establishing and attaining objectives to carry out responsibilities. Management consists of those continuing actions of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling and evaluating the use of men, money, materials and facilities to accomplish missions and tasks". Since the terms "supervision" and "management" are closely related, it may be assumed that the definition of management in AR 310-25 is adequate for supervision. A further examination of the term supervision, however, is called for due to the status of the staff chaplain as a staff officer. He is a staff supervisor. Referring once again to AR 310-25, staff supervision is defined as "The process of advising other staff officers and individuals subordinate to the commander of the commander's plans and policies, assisting such subordinates in carrying them out, determining the extent to which they are followed, and advising the commander thereof".

d. It is apparent then that the terms "staff supervisor" and "management" are best suited for the staff chaplain's role. Regulations provide the necessary authority through these terms for him to supervise and direct chaplains and material resources toward the accomplishment of his mission. Therefore, in the matter of command and staff relationships, the staff chaplain supports and assists the commander in the exercise of his command functions. He extends this service through performance of detailed duties by way of administration, planning, directing and controlling resources and through coordination.
e. At this juncture, an important point must be reiterated. At all levels of command, the complete variety of chaplain functions is executed either directly or indirectly by every chaplain. These functions range across the vocational spectrum from religious services through staff activities. At higher levels of command, staff chaplains will, of necessity, perform more of the administrative functions. At battalion level, pastoral functions will require the major portion of the unit chaplain's effort.


In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the source of the chaplain's authority is expressed through his role as a staff officer. His military authority derives from the commander and is exercised in his name. Should any chaplain be placed in control of a chaplain organization formulated specifically to provide area wide chaplain coverage, he has the authority to direct, coordinate and control his organization. He would never have court martial authority nor authority to issue legal orders to subordinate unit commanders since such authority is purely the right of the commander and cannot be delegated to a chaplain staff officer.
CHAPTER 4
ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR CHAPLAIN SUPPORT TO NONDIVISIONAL
COMBAT SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS
AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

1. Introduction. Numerous chaplain support models have been proposed in previous studies by chaplains at the Chaplain Center and School Advance Course and the Command and General Staff College. They all have merit and are given consideration in the models formulated for this study. An attempt has been made to avoid undue emphasis on preconceived models or already existing organizations. The technique for selection of alternatives was based on two organizational extremes, and models of varying degrees of organizational concepts were designed to fill the gap in between those extremes. Theoretically a scale would have evolved with a model combining equal amounts of the two extreme organizational concepts appearing in the middle. Since this happened as predicted, the technique was validated. The following seven models were formulated for evaluation and comparison.


a. Unit Assignment. Pure TOE assignment of all chaplains. Command and control of chaplain functions and assigned duties would be retained by unit commanders. This model conveys with it no responsibility by the chaplain for other units which may have no assigned chaplain. This model becomes the base reference point and the concept is purified of any external influence or duty assignment through technical channels. Only the unit commander can assign additional duties. This model is termed the "Independent Family Concept". Each unit must be totally self sufficient in regards to its chaplain resources.

b. Unit assignment and Cross-Coverage. Pure TOE combat support unit assignment of all chaplains with additional missions assigned by a supervisory staff chaplain through a higher headquarters. This model is basically the same as model number I, Unit Assignment, but provision has been made for a means of providing chaplain support to those units which have no chaplain resources. This has been termed the "Interrelated Families Concept". Each unit is self-sufficient but the higher headquarters staff chaplain has the responsibility and the authority to correlate the chaplain activities so that every unit is provided with minimum essential chaplain support.

c. Unit assignment Modified by Area Religious Coverage. Staff Chaplains assigned to TOE combat support units attempt to cover adjacent and subordinate units who have no assigned chaplain resources. The method of doing this has been an actuality in our present system. The staff chaplain would utilize technical channels to coordinate all subordinate chaplain activities. This is accomplished without command authority, but depends on the concern of chaplains for all people in the combat zone as the common base for their working arrangement. The TOE unit commander would still command and control his chaplain but the chaplain would voluntarily accept additional duties for other units. Since this method is being used by chaplains today due to the lack of any other command or doctrinal guidelines, this has been labeled the "Real World Concept".

d. Unit Assignment with Back-up Team Support. Chaplains are provided to combat support units through TOE assignments but units without chaplains are given chaplain support through supplemental chaplain teams controlled by higher headquarters. This model varies from the model number III, Unit Assignment Modified by Area Religious Coverage, in the manner in which units without chaplains are supported. The back-up teams are provided for under TOE 16-500, and consists of one chaplain and one enlisted assistant with accompanying transportation and tentage. The teams would be assigned to echelons of command no lower than brigade, but ideally at the corps level and controlled by the corps staff chaplain. This is termed the "Hole Concept" since the idea is to identify the combat support units within the force structure which do not have chaplain resources and then requisition enough teams to fill the holes. This would in no way disrupt chaplain support activities in units with chaplains provided by TOE's.
e. Unit Attached Teams from Theater Support Organizations. All chaplain resources are withdrawn from TOE combat support organizations and pooled at the theater level support organizations. These assets are then broken down into a modular team concept and attached to or withdrawn from combat support organizations as the situation dictates. This is the first real break from the TOE concept. The total responsibility for the chaplain mission would fall upon the personnel command (PERSCOM), and the chaplain general support detachment (TOE 16-500) would direct and control the chaplain teams. This approach has been labeled the “Modular Ministry Concept”.

f. Regional Support. Chaplain resources are withdrawn from TOE combat support organizations and pooled in a regional headquarters such as the corps. These assets are not attached to units, as in Model No. V, unit attached teams, but are commanded by the corps commander and controlled by the corps staff chaplain. This has been termed the “Sliced Pie Concept” because the combat zone is approached from a geographical point of view and divided into regions for chaplain coverage. By accepting already existing geographical boundaries and controlling headquarters, the concept becomes immediately viable. Combat support organizations in the regions behind the corps rear boundary would receive support through chaplain teams from rear headquarters.

g. Theater of Operations Area Support. Chaplain resources are withdrawn from TOE combat support organizations and pooled at the theater level command headquarters or a theater level support headquarters. The total chaplain ministries and functions would be provided to combat support organizations from those centrally directed chaplain assets. This has been termed the “Whole Pie Concept” and would operate much as a PX truck run. Denominational and area coverage would be planned, coordinated and controlled by the general support detachment chaplain at PERSCOM.


a. According to the management theory taught in the Command and General Staff College there are three principle steps in developing a formal organization: (1) determine the tasks; (2) establish the structure; and (3) allocate resources (CGSC M1007-1). We have determined the tasks in our discussion of chaplain functions. The chaplain resources in the Army in the field are established numerically by Army Regulations and Department of the Army. The only remaining step is to establish a structure which most effectively applies the resources to the tasks.

b. The measures of effectiveness (MOE) to be applied in the analysis of all the alternative means of providing chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations are, of necessity, both quantitative and qualitative. That is, some aspects of performance cannot be quantified and measured yet they are often critical to the analysis of effectiveness. In such instances, the subjective judgment of the author of this study is applied. Many chaplain activities are not routine and measurable but their impact on the command is obvious to those trained in observing group phenomena. For a more complete discussion of the peculiarities of the problem of selection of measures of effectiveness see Appendix I.

(1) Ratio. The first MOE is the most obvious and easily quantifiable one. It is ratio. That is, a measure of how many chaplains are available in the field for full time service to how many nondivisional combat support troops. It is a problem of simple arithmetic, and the yardstick is provided by Army Regulation 570-2 as a ratio of 1:700 or major fraction thereof, for units of the Army in the field and 1:850 for all other units, or major fraction thereof. It is to be stressed that chaplain assignments are not limited to the above criterion. The Army Regulation 570-2 states that the 1:700 or 1:850 ratios are “for planning purposes only”. Other criteria such as mission, staff “and other special requirements” are equally important. The ratio is a guide by which planners use to provide the most effective chaplain support to Army units. The method of measuring this criteria will be to employ each alternative separately in the type force structure and check the results of each situation on the computer. The obvious deficiency here is that the force structure tested does not include all of the combat support organizations which might be utilized in a real life, real time situation. However, each of the alternatives are equally tested with the same criteria and the results are properly representative of the correct ratios.
Area and Denominational Coverage. The second MOE is established by the need to have area and denominational coverage throughout the war zone. This is a critical MOE since a supervisory chaplain must have the means and the ability to provide chaplain coverage to all the units of an organization. An alternative that is not capable of providing area and denominational coverage is not a suitable candidate. The need to have area and denominational coverage was established by taking an existing roster of chaplains of a comparable force structure and programming the computer to reflect the mix of chaplain locations and their religious denomination. The grade structure was programmed according to the requirements of the TOE's being tested. At any given point in time, with either of the alternatives being tested, the computer could indicate how many of each denomination is represented within the war zone and their location. It was also possible to locate units and clusters of units without assigned chaplains and the proximity of those units with assigned chaplains.

Span of Control.

(a) Span of control is an important measure of effectiveness in this study since the supervisory chaplain's ability to control his resources is the key and overriding issue of any centralized area support models. The number of individuals or levels of organization which one supervisor or supervisory headquarters can manage effectively is termed "span of control". This includes a multiplicity of factors and relationship which vary in each situation and they must be treated uniquely. The chaplain support model which does not optimize the factors of span of control will be the least likely candidate. This does not mean that a model which does optimize them will be the proper model for our study, but it will be among the only ones given consideration. There is no time or place for delayed decisions or distorted communications (chief of too many levels of supervision) in a combat zone. (Management Record, Vol. 24, no. 9 p. 121, Sept 62, Harold Stieglitz).

(b) Six factors have been selected and assigned numerical weight values in accordance with the purpose of alternative models. The assigned values are arbitrary and are designed to reflect a relationship between the several factors. Those factors which are most significant to the chaplain support mission are given the highest numerical value. Most of the factors are taken from the Lockheed approach to their span of control evaluation.

1. Similarity of function. The degree to which functions performed by chaplains are alike or different. This includes the denominational requirements which also vary. This factor is given a value of 25 because it is a significant determinant.

2. Geographic Contiguity. The physical location of the chaplains reporting to a supervisor or commander. A value of 20 is assigned this factor because the actual performance of duty time can be enhanced or hindered due to distance.

3. Complexity of Functions. The extent to which the functions performed by the chaplains are complicated or simplified by the alternative being evaluated. A value of 15 is given this factor.

4. Direction and Control. The degree of the supervisory chaplain's attention required for proper supervision of chaplain functions. The value of 15 has been assigned this factor. The less attention required by the supervisory chaplain the better the model. The more attention required by the supervisory chaplain then the more demand for additional staff chaplains to implement direction and control.

5. Coordination. The extent to which the supervisory chaplain must exert time and effort in keeping activities properly correlated with other activities of the command. This factor is given a value of 15.

6. Planning. The importance, complexity, and time required to review and establish future programs and objectives. A numerical value of 10 is assigned this factor.
(4) Time/Distance. The measurement of chaplain support effectiveness must consider the impact of time and distance on each mode or alternative examined. If a particular alternative requires that all chaplains be located geographically separated from the units being ministered to, then the travel time must be considered. This is not an automatic endorsement of alternatives which employ chaplains in a mode of immediate physical proximity, but it is to insist that whatever alternative is studied should measure effectiveness as related to time spent accomplishing the chaplain's mission versus time lost in transit and to determine at what distance it is infeasible to locate the chaplain.

There is no readily available means of measuring the exact time required to travel from any given point in the gaming technique since this would require on-site experimentation. An acceptable substitute might be found in the computations for tactical troop movements of FM 101-10-1. Exact ratios, however, are not the concern of this measure of effectiveness. The principle of physical location and availability of chaplain resources to nondivisional combat support units is the yardstick to be applied.

(5) Cost Benefits. Comparative costs of each alternative mode of chaplain support is the fifth measure of effectiveness. It sounds mundane to suggest that chaplain services can be equated with cost, but the measurement is applied in terms of material required to support the different concepts and the comparison of personnel costs. Basically, cost will simply be equated to the number of personnel and equipment required to support the alternative. Once it is determined that an alternative requires a certain number of chaplains and chaplain enlisted assistants, it is compared to the other alternative which have had the same procedure applied. Assuming that more personnel require more equipment and thus more cost, it is a simple matter to determine the most expensive alternative. When the alternatives are examined by the other MOE, cost however, may not be a determining factor. An alternative although costly, may be the most beneficial in solving the chaplain support voids. While it is true that the main concern is the mission, it would be folly to choose the most costly alternative if another alternative will accomplish the mission just as effectively.

(6) Staff and Referral Coordination. The amount of staff and referral coordination required to accomplish the chaplain's mission will be evaluated in each alternative mode. The ease or difficulty with which a chaplain can coordinate his activities provides another measure of the organization's effectiveness. Each element of the organization should be under one chief. If it is not so arranged, then there has been a violation of the unity of that organization. This must not be confused with span of control which is related to the problems of supervision. Staff and referral coordination measures factors from the functionaries point of view.

(7) Morale Impact. An evaluation of each chaplain support alternative's impact on morale would appear to be too difficult to manage at first glance, but the overwhelming significance of morale has been proven in every recorded battle. According to the leadership course taught at the Command and General Staff College, morale contributes directly to efficiency. Indicators of good morale are: the zeal given to a task over and beyond perfunctory obedience to commands; a basic sense of personal worth; satisfaction or pride in mission accomplishment; and courageous, determined conduct despite dangers and privations (USACGSC, RB 22-1, Leadership, p. 1-1). Since the chaplain assists the commander and his staff with development of the total life of the command he has traditionally had a great impact on morale. Even though some troops have regarded him as a "good luck charm", most have respected his witness for God in the midst of man's failures and the healing he offered. The chaplain who has been accepted by the American soldier as a fellow sufferer and not just a visiting dignitary has earned the respect of the men he serves and they, in turn, have benefited from his presence. One significant evidence of the soldiers impact in morale which a given chaplain support alternative might have, will be purely qualitative but will be used on the known facts about group dynamics.
4. Factors in Evaluating Alternatives by MOE

a. It became evident that in evaluating each alternative some method must be developed to determine the relative value of each MOE. If Alternative I (Unit Assignment) is evaluated by the selected MOE, for instance, it would score high in all except area and denominational coverage. Consequently, if all MOE were given equal weight Alternative I might emerge as the preferred Alternative without solving the problem of chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations. As a matter of fact Alternative I is the most effective means of providing chaplain support to units that have assigned chaplains, but within the present manpower authorization criteria and the Army organization it cannot provide adequate support for all personnel. Therefore, each MOE is given a numerical value corresponding to their relative importance to the stated task of this study. The total score possible for each Alternative is 100. If an alternative is evaluated to be unsatisfactory no score is given. A satisfactory rating results in the maximum points available to that MOE.

b. Ratio. It is evident that the better the ratio between assigned chaplains and the assigned personnel, the better the religious coverage. Although not the only criterion available to judge the merits of chaplain support, it is an important one. A value of 15 is assigned ratio.

c. Area and Denominational coverage. The stated purpose of this study is to find an acceptable solution to the problem of chaplain direct support to combat support units without assigned chaplains. Therefore, area and denominational coverage as an MOE is critical. A value of 25 is assigned this MOE.

d. Span of Control. As stated earlier span of control is an important MOE. A value of 15 is assigned to span of control.

e. Time/Distance. The alternative that provides a close proximity between the chaplain and his personnel is to be considered, but due to a multiple means of transportation occasionally available to the chaplain it is not critical. A value of 10 is assigned.

f. Cost Benefits. Cost, unless it is unreasonable, should not be a determining factor if the alternative accomplishes the mission effectively. However, the Army of today must achieve maximum efficiency at a minimum cost. Cost must be considered even for the chaplain mission. A value of 10 is assigned this MOE.

g. Staff Referral. Although a commander and staff will normally treat any chaplain with respect and courtesy, the chaplain will receive better support if he belongs to the unit he is serving. He should be a member of the team, and will perform more effectively in this environment. The MOE is not critical, but is important. A value of 10 is assigned this MOE.

h. Morale Impact. This MOE is related to area and denominational coverage in the sense that the alternative able to give total coverage to all personnel will have the greatest morale impact on both the chaplain and the assigned personnel. A value of 15 is assigned this MOE.

5. Conclusions.

a. This chapter provides a methodology which enables a critical examination to be made of the various concepts of the chaplain support to military organizations. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to determine the best method of providing chaplain support to nondivisional combat support units. However, the methodology conceived and utilized in this study is applicable to all organizations.
b. Not all chaplain support can be quantitatively measured, yet they are critical to judging its effectiveness. In such cases, the subjective judgment of the author is applied. It is recognized that even when the qualitative and quantitative measures are applied in the selection of the most effective alternative, not all the functions listed in chapter 2, will receive the same emphasis or attention. Since the chaplain's primary mission is in the area of religious functions, the alternative selected must give emphasis to this area.

c. The most desirable is that the organizations receive the benefit of all functions. However, under the present system, a sizeable portion of nondivisional combat units are not receiving even a minimum amount of chaplain resources. The purpose of these MOE then is to select the alternative that is the most effective in providing the required amount of chaplain functions to all nondivisional combat support organizations.
CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES MODELS IN TERMS OF MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

1. Introduction

a. The purpose of this chapter is to examine each of the alternatives listed in Chapter 4 against the measure of effectiveness (MOE) to determine the most effective means of providing adequate chaplain support to nondivisional combat organizations. Although the primary intent of the overall study is to discover an alternative which will provide chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations without assigned chaplains, the alternative chosen should be capable of providing services for all support units. Therefore, each alternative examined must be tested against this objective. An alternative that is capable of providing all chaplain functions to one organization to the exclusion of another must be rejected.

b. Alternatives examined in this chapter will be referred to by Roman numerals. The alternatives and their assigned Roman numerals are as follows:

(1) Alternative I; Unit Assignment
(2) Alternative II; Unit Assignment, Cross Coverage
(3) Alternative III; Unit Assignment, Area Coverage
(4) Alternative IV; Unit Assignment, Back-up Teams Support
(5) Alternative V; Theater Support, Unit Attached Teams
(6) Alternative VI; Regional Support
(7) Alternative VII; Theater of Operations Area Support

2. Evaluation in Terms of Ratio.

a. Problem Definition.

Upon examination of the computer programs to determine chaplain to troop ratio, one fact was surfaced which had not been discussed. The ratios in AR 570-2 are based upon the assumption that chaplains will perform all their functions in an equal manner. Thus a 1:700 ratio was determined to be satisfactory. As pointed out in previous discussions, the higher echelons of command require more and more of the supervisory staff chaplains effort to be expended in administrative matters. To include such TOE chaplains positions in an overall ratio analysis would be illogical. They are not available to TOE units of subordinate commands and, therefore, must not be considered as chaplain resources to offset the ratio discrepancies. Command and control headquarters such as corps should not be included in this evaluation but should be treated in the category of administrative staff chaplains. This is not to belittle their essential pastoral contribution to the whole command nor to invalidate the need for their administrative functions. They do perform religious and pastoral functions for personnel of the headquarters as required but they have less time and opportunity available to them for those functions than chaplains in subordinate units.

b. Analysis.

When considering the total strength of the nondivisional combat support organizations and their assigned chaplains, the ratio is ideal. The total strength of the support units in the scenario "Scimitar" is 80,762 with 114 chaplains, or a ratio of one per 708 persons. Since assignment is based on units with an assigned strength of 700 or major fraction thereof (AR 570.2), there are serious flaws in the system. Upon closer examination it was discovered that numerous organizations were receiving little or no chaplain support. The two most obvious problems are with the aviation and signal organizations. Using the aviation organization as an example, there are only two chaplains in the entire force structure of 6,047 assigned personnel. This results in a ratio of one chaplain per 3,023 persons. The problem is that those organizations considered separately do not have sufficient strength to warrant the assignment of a chaplain. Grouped together they show a deficit in terms of chaplain support. The alternative selected should provide adequate support to these organizations, but also permit flexibility to meet the various operational configurations.
c. Conclusions.

Ratio alone is not a definitive measure of the effectiveness of the alternatives. The guide was established by regulation and the criteria was met by all alternatives. It has already been established that there are flaws in this system. Alternative I met the objective of providing a ratio of one chaplain per 700 assigned personnel, but did not provide the necessary flexibility to provide chaplain coverage for all units. The necessary flexibility is provided in alternatives IV, VI, and VII but require additional command and control. The community and other organizational functions of the chaplain support in these alternatives is either modified or eliminated. Adding four chaplain teams in alternative IV as provided by TOE 16-500, results in an ideal ratio. However, alternatives I, II, and III fall into the same category when four chaplains are added. The difference is that alternative IV is much more flexible in meeting coverage requirements. Attempting to determine the most suitable alternative by ratio alone is inconclusive. However, since all alternatives met the requirement of ratio, a score of 25 is awarded to each.

3. Evaluation in Terms of Area and Denominational Coverage.

a. Problem Definition.

The unit commander has the responsibility of providing the individuals under his command with an opportunity to worship God in keeping with the dictates of their consciences and the ecclesiastical requirements of their church (AR 165-20, p 4, para 7). He can fulfill his responsibility only insofar as he has access to the various chaplains of each church. In the case of no assigned chaplain, the commander must rely upon the supervisory chaplain of a major headquarters to provide the religious services. An assigned chaplain is not able, himself, to provide for the religious requirements of the various denominations. Therefore, area and denominational coverage becomes a critical area for consideration. The problem therefore, is to determine the best method of providing the requisite area and denominational coverage.

b. Analysis.

(1) Should the chaplains all be placed in a circuit-riding role by withdrawing them from their assignment to TOE units, their efforts could be pooled and used throughout the entire war zone. Those chaplains who belong to religious denominations that place special or unusual religious requirements upon their membership could then be scheduled to give area denominational coverage. They would, however, be deprived of any opportunity to have a “total” ministry to individuals or groups because of the demands made upon their time to provide a PX type run unit to unit for religious services. There would be a complete lack of unit identity. The provision of materiel support, equipment maintenance and lodging while the chaplains are in this totally mobile role would have to be clarified through command directions.

(2) Should all chaplains be left in TOE units by assignment, as in the present system, they would have unit identity and the opportunity to have a complete ministry. However, units without assigned chaplains, and personnel requiring special religious ministrations would be devoid of chaplain support.

c. Conclusions.

(1) The best alternative incorporates a compromise between these two extremes. Alternatives I, VI and VII are not best suited to resolve these differences due to the limitation previously discussed in this chapter.

(2) The four remaining alternatives, II, III, IV and V meet the criteria of providing area coverage, while meeting denominational requirements. They also give opportunity for a total ministry to the assigned personnel. Alternatives II and III, however, limit the amount of time the chaplain can expend in the total ministry. To give area coverage while assigned to a unit with an authorized TOE space will cause a conflict between the two. Time taken away from his basic TOE assignment will jeopardize his efforts to conduct a full ministry to either. Therefore, alternatives IV and V emerge as the most suitable to provide area and denominational coverage. Alternative II and III are marginally acceptable. However, a score of 25 is awarded to each alternative.
4. Evaluation in Terms of Span of Control.

a. Problem Definition.

One of the important measures of effectiveness of any organizational structure is span of control. This is based on the recognition that there is a limit to the number of individuals one supervisor can manage effectively. The problem is to evaluate each of the seven alternative organizational models in terms of span of control in order to determine which ones offer an effective and workable span of control. Should either alternative grossly violate this measure of effectiveness it should be eliminated on the basis that it would be inefficient in accomplishing its mission due to tardy or unresponsiveness to the needs of the command, and an overextension of the supervisor’s capability to direct the functions.

b. Analysis.

(1) The six factors which the analyst used in evaluating the alternative modes in terms of span of control are defined in chapter 4, para 26 (3). Each factor was assigned a numerical weight in proportion to the degree it contributed to or was essential to the accomplishment of the chaplain’s mission. The results of this analysis are depicted in illustration no. 1.

(2) The total score of all factors equals 100. If an alternative was evaluated and obtained a total score of less than 75 it was considered to be an unacceptable alternative. Each factor which was acceptable in any alternative was equal to the maximum points available in that category (see illustration no 1).

(3) It was determined that the more centrally controlled chaplain alternatives were the least desirable. This is due to expanded numbers of personnel to supervise by one office, inability to properly plan religious coverage due to lack of information from the smaller units, problems in securing organizational support and finally, the loss of communications while chaplain teams are pursuing their duties in widely dispersed units or while traveling between units.

c. Conclusions.

(1) The proper administration of any large organization depends on some dispensation of responsibility and supervision. Central control does eliminate administrative offices at intermediate levels but it over-extends the span of control. Span of control strongly favors TOE unit assignments as the ideal model of organizational control. When the organizational structure departs from this model, it becomes increasingly less desirable. The only exception to this was found in Alternative III which was unsatisfactory due to loss of coordination of effort, direction and/or control, and inability to properly plan chaplain activities for nondivisional units which have no chaplain and depend on the principle of area coverage.

(2) The best alternatives were I, and IV and each receive a score of 15. Alternative II was found to be marginal. However, no score is given this alternative.

(3) Alternatives III, VI and VII should be rejected as unacceptable alternatives within the scope of this study. No score is given.

5. Evaluation in Terms of Time and Distance.

a. Problem Definition.

The mission of the chaplain is not one that can effectively be accomplished by long distance because he does not minister to statistics or to objects, but his mission is person-oriented. Even the sophisticated communication media of today cannot satisfactorily span the space gap. One basic reason is that the principle of privileged communication between chaplain and those he serves must be presented and this can be accomplished only by face to face confrontation. A second reason is that the ministry of the chaplain often encompasses the distribution of sacramental items. The doctrine of most denominations prohibits this being done by anyone other than an ordained clergyman.
# Factors in Span of Control, Illustration No. 1

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<th>Alternative</th>
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<th>Geographic Contiguity</th>
<th>Direction &amp; Control</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors in the span of control weighted on the following scale and each alternative scored. The best or most significant factor identified in each alternative must equal the maximum points available in that category.

- Similarity of functions: 25
- Geographic contiguity: 20
- Direction and control: 15
- Coordination: 15
- Planning: 10
- Complexity of functions: 15
- Total: 100
b. Analysis.

(1) Considering these requirements, the analyst must evaluate each alternative model in terms of chaplain proximity to those he serves. Should any alternative require that the chaplain spend more time in transit to unit sites than he does in mission accomplishment, it is to be considered an unacceptable model.

(2) All modes of transportation were considered because some modes are capable of spanning great distances in a brief time thus reducing the time factor. However, the normal mode provided to most nondivisional and divisional unit chaplains is a one-quarter ton truck. Terrain and driving conditions, therefore, become critical considerations for travel time. The exception to this circumstance is so rare that it was not introduced into the analysis. There is no provision in existing TOE's for any mode of travel, other than by land, which is totally dedicated for chaplain usage. The individual chaplain's ability to hitchhike on mail runs or staff visits by air transportation is indeed impressive, but should hardly be considered the norm.

(3) The rate of travel across land was evaluated to be not less than 25 miles per hour and not more than 35 miles per hour. The outer limits of this range were used as the guide and actual unit placement on the map were utilized as the basis of judgment. The applied rule determined that only distance which required the chaplain to spend three or more hours in transit each day in order to accomplish his mission was excessive, and therefore, that organizational alternative was unacceptable. The distance factor which became prohibitive was selected as 100 miles across open secure terrain, 50 miles across secure mountainous or broken terrain, and 25 miles across insecure cross-country terrain.

c. Conclusions.

(1) In each instance it was determined that chaplains assigned or attached to the unit served could accomplish their mission (alternative I-V). The two remaining alternatives, VI and VII, which deployed chaplains were immediately rejected. However, upon closer examination it was found that alternatives II and III would require careful planning for area coverage on the part of the supervisory chaplain. Since these chaplains are assigned to units and reside with these units, the area coverage responsibility would require them to travel in order to give chaplain area coverage. Although it was possible for TOE chaplains to reach their area coverage assignments within the criteria of this MOE in operation "Scimitar", it is doubtful that it would hold true for every case.

(2) Alternatives I, IV and V are acceptable. Alternatives II and III are marginally acceptable with VI and VII as unacceptable in terms of time/distance. Alternative number I however, has to be evaluated in terms of total mission accomplishment. It does not give area coverage and therefore the travel involved is to organic units. Evaluated purely in terms of unit assignment, however, it is acceptable. A score of 10 is given to alternative I, IV and V.


a. Problem Definition.

Each alternative tested in this study can achieve the ultimate goal of providing religious coverage and chaplain support to the army in the field. These alternatives are not equal in effectiveness. The purpose of using cost benefits as an evaluative measure is to determine which alternatives are the least costly in terms of logistical support and personnel costs.
b. Analysis.

Two major factors which require a qualitative evaluation of quantitative data are (1) the number of chaplains made available to nondivisional troops by the several alternatives, and (2) the difference in the amount of logistical support required by each alternative. Should a pure quantitative measure be used without reference to mission accomplishment in both of these factors, we are mandated to a reverse scale. That is, the objective is to provide more chaplains to nondivisional combat support organizations. On a purely quantitative analysis, the closer the alternative is to the objective, the least effective it is in terms of cost. Obviously the analyst had to evaluate each alternative on a qualitative scale which equated the degree of mission accomplishment with the overall cost factors. This equation was determined to be those alternatives which provided the most chaplain support to nondivisional combat support organizations with the least requirement for support personnel to accomplish that ratio, and/or the least additional logistic support required to make the alternative operable.

c. Conclusions.

(1) Alternative I offered the best cost benefits in terms of logistic support and back-up personnel but it did not improve mission accomplishment. In terms of cost benefits, the alternative is to be rejected. No score is given this alternative.

(2) Alternatives II, III, IV and V gave improvement in mission accomplishment at no additional logistic burden. They did require more support by supervisory chaplains and enlisted personnel. Score of 10 is given to each alternative.

(3) The least desireable alternatives in terms of cost benefits were alternatives VI and VII. They both required increased costs in logistic support occasioned by increased travel costs, and in personnel both supervisory and supportive, with no real corresponding improvement in the overall mission accomplishment. No score is given these alternatives.

7. Evaluation in Terms of Staff and Referral Consideration.

a. Problem Definition. The Chaplain does not work in a vacuum, but depends on daily contact with the other primary and special staff members. He must also have ready access to a variety of sources, such as psychiatric, medical, financial and communications, if he is to be able to assist the soldier in coping with personal problems and advise the command on unit problems. The chaplain has traditionally earned the trust of the troops which he serves and has been sought out by them as a change-agent for their problems. Therefore, the accessibility of the command, staff elements and referral agencies, is another measure of the effectiveness of each alternative model of chaplain support.

b. Analysis.

(1) As a special staff member the chaplain enjoys the privilege of instant identity with and acceptance by the other staff members as part of the family. Mutual coordination and assistance is the norm since each element of that organization is under one chief. Persons or agencies not part of the organization are considered as “outsiders” and take second place in coordination efforts. Unit identity is the reason for distinctive insignia. Even strangers may have instant rapport if they recognize that each serves under the same command.

(2) Chaplains depend on mutual good will and acceptance for the achievement of many objectives, especially when they may be serving individuals who have sought their assistance. Chaplains who are not assigned to or under the operational control of an organization must overcome the natural resistance to “interference” by members of that organization. The commander is responsible for the soldiers under his command, and attempts to intervene by agencies outside of that organization are a violation of the principle of unity of command.
(3) It is not improbable that Army Regulations could be written covering the special ministries of a chaplain in the same manner that regulations govern the activities of the American Red Cross. Such a situation, however, takes the initiative away from the chaplain and relegates him to a role of consultant who only responds when sought out, and then only at the behest of the organizational chain of command.

(4) This evaluation is based upon the categorization of chaplain functions outlined in chapter 2 paragraph 2 of this study.

(5) The “staff” functions performed by a chaplain pertain only to the echelon of command to which the chaplain is assigned or attached. If the chaplain is removed from the battalion sized organizational staff then he is not capable of continuing that function for those units.

(6) The “religious” functions transcend organizational structure and can be facilitated by any of the alternative models tested.

(7) The “pastoral” functions may transcend organizational structures in particular instances, but generally depend upon direct staff and referral coordination within the organization to which the chaplain is assigned, and therefore, is evaluated to be effective throughout the theater of operation only insofar as the chaplain is assigned or attached whenever feasible down to battalion sized organizations.

(8) The “community” functions performed by the chaplain are an extension of total unit effort, and are integrated with specialized civil affairs organizations to produce an overall coordinated effort within the theater of operations. The chaplain’s effectiveness is enhanced when he is assigned or attached to the organization which has responsibility for a particular community or region.

c. Conclusion:

(1) Alternatives I, II, and IV are evaluated as effective when measured by the staff and referral coordination yardstick described above. The most significant cause is the clear cut chain-of-command which already exists for all primary and special staff members when the alternative is based on unit assignment. A score of 10 is given to each alternative.

(2) Alternative III and V are evaluated as marginally effective, but the dual responsibilities to two headquarters complicates the coordination effort and could create divided loyalties in specific instances. This would require careful staffing on the part of the supervisory chaplain. No score is given.

(3) Alternatives VI and VII are evaluated as effective only in the higher echelons of command. The total rating given to these alternative models demands a rejection, because the bulk of the soldiers which the chaplain serves are at echelons of command below corps and divisions. No score is given these alternatives.


a. Problem Definition. Since the chaplain’s three basic areas of concern are religion, morals and morale as affected by religion, it naturally follows that any alternative which enhances unit morale is desirable. Conversely, any alternative which does not enhance morale is not desirable. It is possible also that some alternatives might even be detrimental to morale.

b. Analysis.

(1) The psychological factors which are variables in unit morale are beyond the scope of this study. It is possible to identify, however, certain physical circumstances which have, in the past, vastly improved morale. The analyst has used the general psychological principle of “belonging” or “identification” as the basis of this evaluation. There are no controls in this type of study which can be exercised over the qualitative value of the human element, even though this is extremely important. The only control which can logically be instituted deals with the physical and/or psychological identification of the chaplain with the organization he serves. That is, the chaplain must have a close relationship with those to whom he ministers in order that individual and unit morale might be enhanced. Therefore, those alternatives which impose a physical or psychological barrier between the chaplain and the people whom he serves is rated as unsatisfactory.
(2) Those alternatives in which the chaplain was more completely a member of the organizational "family" were determined to be the TOE assignments throughout the whole chain of the command. The alternatives in which the chaplain was attached to organizations throughout the chain of command were acceptable because there were definite positive psychological factors. Both of those alternatives have definite problems. The pure attachment alternative made the organization members somewhat uncertain of the chaplains' loyalties and thereby was less positive in impact.

(3) The alternatives which offered no physical or psychological bonds between the chaplain and the people he served were not acceptable by this measure of effectiveness.

c. Conclusion.

(1) Alternatives I, IV and V were rated as satisfactory and each received a score of 15. However, it must be stressed that alternative I makes no morale impact upon units that have no chaplains assigned. The majority of units within a major command do have assigned chaplains, and consequently, Alternative I results in a morale impact upon the majority of personnel assigned.

(2) Alternatives II and III are marginally satisfactory. These alternatives require that unit assigned chaplains give additional coverage to the units without assigned chaplains. However, experience has shown that the majority of chaplains do not have the necessary time to give adequate area coverage. Each unit assignment is a full time duty for a chaplain. To take time away from the basic assignment to give area coverage to other units results in a diminution of morale for all concerned. Although rated marginally satisfactory, no score is given these alternatives.

(3) Alternatives VI and VII were rated unsatisfactory. No score is given.

9. Conclusions to Chapter 5.

a. Findings.

(1) All alternatives meet the objective of ratio 1:700. However, when the other MOE are applied, significant differences between each become apparent. Ratio is inconclusive.

(2) The ideal alternative is No. I. All chaplain functions are performed efficiently and effectively. However, when viewed from the perspective of providing chaplain support to organizations having no chaplain assigned, it must be rejected.

(3) Alternatives II and III are more acceptable than Number I, with Number II being the preferred. Although both make provision for some support to organizations without assigned chaplains, alternative II provides for more direction and control in each case. However, some deterioration of chaplain support to the unit of assignment takes place. On the other hand, even in alternative II, the natural tendency is to give only part time coverage to the "extra duty" units without assigned chaplains.

(4) Alternatives VI and VII met the test of only one MOE with any significant results; that of ratio. When tested against the other MOE, the value score is very low. Neither of them provide for unit identification. The result is a loss of morale and incentive on the part of the chaplain and the unit served. They do provide for flexibility in meeting coverage requirements under the various operational requirements, but require an excessive amount of time and effort on the part of the supervisory chaplain to monitor and control. Some resemblance of a war room is required for the supervisory chaplain to monitor the operation in order to plan religious coverage. Alternatives VI and VII are too complex and too expensive to maintain. Therefore, they must be rejected.
(5) Alternatives IV and V scored high. However, alternative IV scored significantly higher than V. Therefore, alternative IV is preferred. It is capable of providing unit assignment for the majority of chaplains and organizations with the added feature of employing the chaplain teams to units without coverage. It is able to respond fairly rapidly to operational changes without the complex arrangements of alternatives VI and VII. In addition, unit identification is possible in the more static conditions by the attachment of the teams to organizations without assigned chaplains over a period of time. The only serious drawback is the fact that additional chaplains are necessary to provide the teams. When this fact is weighed against the mission accomplishment, the additional chaplains are justified. Alternative IV is the preferred alternative. (See illustration no 2).

b. Summary.

(1) This chapter has attempted to solve the problem of chaplain support to nondivisional combat support units through the selection of an alternative that provides the majority of chaplains functions to all units in the most effective and economical means. The use of MOE aids in the selection process by providing a method by which the most objective decision of an alternative can be made. Obviously, the subjective opinion of the author is necessary where quantitative data cannot be obtained or applied.

(2) It must be stressed that the most important goal in the selection of alternatives is to select the one which provides for the accomplishment of the chaplain mission to the total command. It goes without saying that if an organization or section is not able to fully perform the mission due to restraints within the system, the system must be modified or changed. The mission is always of paramount importance. The mission of the chaplain is to serve the religious and morale welfare of the Army's most important asset - the soldier. The selection of alternative No. IV provides a framework in which the chaplain can perform his mission to all nondivisional combat support units during the various operational conditions.
**Illustration No. 2**

Factors in Evaluating Alternatives by M&E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M&amp;E</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Area &amp; Denomination Coverage</th>
<th>Span of Control</th>
<th>Cost Benefits</th>
<th>Staff Referral</th>
<th>Morale Impact</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altern. I</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altern. II</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altern. III</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altern. IV</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altern. VI</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Altern. VII</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors in Evaluating alternatives by M&E are weighted on the following scale:

- Ratio: 15
- Area Coverage: 25
- Span of Control: 15
- Time/Distance: 10
- Cost Benefits: 10
- Staff Referral: 10
- Morale Impact: 15
- TOTAL: 100
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

1. General.

a. An attempt has been made in this study to clearly define the functions of chaplain support at both the higher and lower echelons of the support organizations, and to solve the problem of voids in chaplain support. A problem that is of particular interest to chaplains, especially when occupying positions as supervisors, is the amount of authority available to control other chaplains in providing religious coverage where and when necessary. This question had to be answered before any meaningful solution could be found to the problem of religious coverage. Limitations placed on the supervisory chaplain in the amount of authority he possessed also limited the number of alternatives available for consideration. Once answered the study then could be directed toward finding a method of operation that could provide chaplain direct support to all nondivisional combat support organizations.

b. The methodology used in this study was not only an invaluable means by which an effective solution to the problem of chaplain support could be determined, but can be applied generally for an analysis of the chaplain mission. The alternative selected as a result of the use of the methodology of this study also has application to the chaplaincy as a whole. This report in its entirety will, in the author's judgment, make it possible for the chaplaincy to increase its effectiveness by being more capable of responding to a rapidly changing and fluid battlefield condition.

2. Conclusions.

a. The functions of the chaplaincy range from the religious to include a variety of other related activities, i.e., community involvement, morale activities, administrative and staff duties, personnel counseling, troop and dependent visitation in both emergency and normal conditions, and participation in unit training.

b. The higher the echelon of assignment, the greater the administrative load imposed on the chaplain. The percentage of time expended on the religious functions at the higher echelons is a minimal amount. The chaplain assigned to headquarters in echelons above division fall into the above category. Therefore these chaplains should be excluded from the computation of the ratio of 1:700, or major fraction thereof.

c. The chaplain has rank without command, but possesses sufficient authority vested in him by regulation and his position as a staff officer to supervise and direct chaplain personnel and activities. The terms best suited to describe the authority available to the staff chaplain are "staff supervision" and "management."

d. Alternative IV (Unit Assignment, back up team support) provides the most effective method of chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

3. Recommendations.

a. That this study Chaplains Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations be approved.

b. That the study Chaplain Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations be distributed as shown in Appendix G, Distribution.

c. That in the next scheduled revision of FM 16-5, The Chaplain, appropriate paragraphs be added concerning doctrine in the use of chaplain team support, and revise the paragraph concerning the amount of authority available to supervisory chaplains to control other chaplains.
d. That in the next scheduled revision of AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure, paragraph 3-12e, the portion of sentence which reads "he has authority to exercise functions of operational supervision and control", be changed to read "he has authority to exercise functions of management and staff supervision".

e. That prior to the next scheduled revision of the Manpower Authorization Criteria (MACRIT), a study be implemented to determine the feasibility of exempting chaplain personnel who are assigned to echelons above division from computing the ratio 1:700 or major fraction thereof.

f. That the US Army Chaplain Center and School Program of Instruction for the Chaplain Officer Basic Course, the Chaplain Advanced Course and the Army Wide Training Support Branch include a block of instruction on the use of chaplain teams.
APPENDIX A

STUDY DIRECTIVE
SUBJECT: Combat Development Study Directive: Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. References:
   c. Letter, GDSC-SC, HQ CDC, 4 Jan 71, subject: Capability Objectives Approved for Study.

2. Purpose: To develop information concerning chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations with the objective of developing doctrine and procedures defining the missions, functions, and methods of operation and governing the basis of allocation and control of chaplains assigned to these organizations. The information derived from this study will be formalized in FM 16-5, The Chaplain, and in appropriate nonmission paragraphs of the families of field manuals pertaining to nondivisional combat support organizations.

3. Threat Considerations: Not applicable.

4. Study Sponsor: This study is sponsored by USACDC Doctrine Directorate. Sponsor's representative is LTC G. W. Miller, CDCCD-C2, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, Autovon 35-44428.

5. Study Monitor: Not applicable.

6. Terms of Reference:
a. Problem: The ROAD, CAAS-75, and ASTRO studies developed and refined doctrine governing chaplain direct support to division and separate tactical organizations. The COSTAR and TASTA-70 studies developed doctrine governing chaplain direct support to PASCOM and TASCOM organizations and chaplain general support to force models. This doctrinal development was articulated in FM 16-5 and other appropriate FMs. The TOE structure subsequently evolved to facilitate doctrine. In nondivisional combat support organizations, chaplains are assigned by TOE to units and control headquarters. There is, however, no doctrine governing this situation. Functioning without benefit of appropriate doctrine and procedural guidance, chaplains assigned to nondivisional combat support units may fail to provide efficient chaplain direct support services to the organizations and assigned personnel. An urgent need exists for information to facilitate the closing of this doctrinal gap.

b. Objectives: The objectives of this study are:

(1) To examine force models, both current and projected, to determine the changing functions and characteristics of nondivisional combat support organizations.

(2) To isolate and categorize the functions performed by chaplains serving combat support organizations.

(3) To conduct an analysis of the concepts of chaplain area coverage and chaplain area support to relate them to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(4) Compare results of (1) through (3) to determine what modifications are required for deployment and methods of operation of chaplain resources allocated to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(5) Recommend TOE modifications of chaplain resources required to provide maximum effective chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

c. Limits. Army in the field.

d. Scope.

(1) Aggregate and summarize available research findings to visualize the nondivisional combat support elements currently deployed and scheduled for future deployment in the U.S. Army force models.
CDGCD-C2

SUBJECT: Combat Development Study Directive: Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations

(2) Aggregate and summarize available research findings to conceptualize doctrine governing effective chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(3) Aggregate and summarize available research findings of TASCOM, FASCOM, and divisional organizations and assigned chaplain resources to determine their impact on chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(4) Compare results of (1) through (3) to determine what modifications are required for deployment and method of operation of chaplain resources allocated to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(5) Recommend TOE modifications of chaplain resources required to provide maximum effective chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

e. Time Frame: FY 73 through FY 80.

f. Assumptions: None. (If, in the conduct of this study, it is deemed necessary to make assumptions in the absence of facts, coordination will be effected with HQ, CDC.)

g. Essential Elements of Analysis: EEA, if appropriate, will be developed by the proponent in the study plan.

h. Environment. Current world environment. All conflict intensities.

i. Constraints. None.

j. Methodology. Qualitative and quantitative analyses designed to meet the objectives and answer the EEA.

k. Alternatives: If necessary, will be developed during the course of the study.

l. Measures of Effectiveness:

(1) Quantitative measures relating to the number and density of individuals and units ministered to will be included in the analysis. Additional quantitative measures as appropriate will be developed by the study agency.

(2) Qualitative analysis will be based upon a logical and systematic process for identifying, grouping, comparing, and evaluating the results of alternate ministries to nondivisional combat support organizations.
SUBJECT: Combat Development Study Directive: Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations

(3) The study agency has full latitude to develop such additional quantitative measures or qualitative procedures as may be required to fulfill the objectives of this study.

m. Related Studies:

(1) USACDC Study, The Engineer Construction Battalion, (ACN 17150 - completed).

(2) USACDC Study, Conceptual Design for the Army in the Field, (ACN 16870).

7. Support and Resource Requirements.

a. CG, USACDC PALS Group is designated proponent for the study.

b. Requests for support from CDC agencies other than those subordinate to PALS Group will be coordinated with the project officer, this headquarters.

c. Contractual support will not be used.

d. Other Support. USACHS should be consulted for systems engineering information.

e. Resource expenditure of up to 8 man months is authorized.

8. Administration.

a. Study Title. Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations.

b. Study Schedule:

(1) Proponent will develop and submit a study plan to this HQ NLT 60 days after publication of this directive.

(2) Study will be completed and submitted to HQ CDC NLT 16 months from the date of publication of the study directive.

c. Control Procedures. The study will include a study schedule and a minimum of two IPRs.

d. Study Format/Outline. The format prescribed by USACDC Pamphlet 71-16 will be followed.
SUBJECT: Combat Development Study Directive: Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations

e. Action Documents. This study will include a draft change to FM 16-5 (The Chaplain) showing the recommended changes resulting from this study.

f. Coordination and Other Communications: Will be accomplished as directed in CDC Regulation 71-1.

g. Distribution. Distribution of drafts and the completed study will be made in accordance with USACDC Regulation 71-3, 310-2 and USACDC Pamphlet 71-16.

h. Security Classification Guidance. None.

9. Combat Development Objectives Guide (CDOG). CDOG Ch 1, Sect 1, paragraph 114g.

10. Correlation. This action is assigned USACDC ACN 18199 and supports the following:

   a. Army Concept Program
   b. Army Tasks
   c. Phase
   d. Function

   Army 75
   High Intensity Conflict
   Mid Intensity Conflict
   Low Intensity Conflict, I & II
   Doctrine
   Service Support

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION: C. A. BARTOSAVAGE
"G"
Major, AGC
Asst AG

A-5
ANNEX I

SUBJECT: Combat Development Study Plan: Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations


2. Purpose: To develop information concerning chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations with the objective of developing doctrine and procedures defining the missions, functions and methods of operation and governing the basis of allocation and control of chaplains assigned to these organizations. The information derived from this study will be formalized in FM 16-5. The Chaplain, and in appropriate nonmission paragraphs of the families of field manuals pertaining to nondivisional combat support organizations.

3. Threat Considerations: Not applicable.

4. Terms of Reference:

   a. Problem. The ROAD, CAAS-75, and ASTRO studies developed and refined doctrine governing chaplain direct support to divisions and separate tactical organizations. The COSTAR and TASTA-70 studies developed doctrine governing chaplain direct support to FASCOM and TASCOM organizations and chaplain general support to force models. This doctrinal development was articulated in FM 16-5 and other appropriate FMs. The TOE structure subsequently evolved to facilitate doctrine. In nondivisional combat organizations, chaplains are assigned by TOE to units and control headquarters. There is, however, no doctrine governing this situation. Functioning without benefit of appropriate doctrine and procedural guidance, chaplains assigned to nondivisional combat support units may fail to provide efficient chaplain direct support services to the organizations and assigned personnel. An urgent need exists for information to facilitate the closing of this doctrinal gap.

   b. Impact of Problem. Advances in technology, evolution of base development concepts, a breakthrough in ADP capabilities, and insurgent aspects operative in conventional conflicts have impacted on the combat support structure of the Army in the field. Resultant improvements in methods of operation have resulted in organizational modification and have refined the span of control for such combat support elements as ADA, Artillery, Engineers, and Signal. The chaplain function within these elements has failed to evolve beyond a pre-Vietnam concept. The immediate impact upon the comparative force is represented in a possible loss of up to 25% efficiency in extending maximum efficient religious coverage to subject forces. This estimated loss consists in needless duplication of services, loss of duty time through duplication of travel requirements, undue expenditure of coordinative staff workloads, and misdirected area religious coverage efforts. No yardstick exists for accurate measurement of pastoral workloads. However, when two priests are transported 10 miles by air from different organizational headquarters to conduct two Masses 1,000 yards apart, a loss of 50% efficiency results within this single incident. When this incident is multiplied within the nondivisional combat support structure of an individual force, the impact upon both the chaplain functional capability and the operational efficiency of the recipient organizations is incalculable. Over a long period of time, the impact will reflect upon combat power and, therefore, upon the ratio of combat power between any comparative force and threat force. This is because combat power is relative. The moral means comprises an element of the intangible resources available to the commander as a component of combat power. This becomes even more critical when the Army of the 70's and beyond is governed by rigid dollar constraints. The attendant loss in physical elements of combat power can be compensated by an increase in the moral element. The chaplain represents the most valuable resource available to the commander for the purpose of stimulating the moral means at his disposal and for inculcating the spirit of human relations within the command. Efficient use of the chaplain function has never been more critical than in the Army of the 70's and beyond. It is even more critical to a large combat support structure which shares many of the dangers less the attendant combat prestige and tightly knit structure of the divisional forces.

   c. Objectives: The objectives of this study are:

      (1) To examine force models, both current and projected, to determine the changing functions and characteristics of nondivisional combat support organizations.

      (2) To isolate and categorize the functions performed by chaplains serving combat support organizations.
(3) To conduct an analysis of the concepts of chaplain area coverage and chaplain area support to relate them to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(4) Compare results of (1) through (3) to determine what modifications are required for deployment and methods of operation of chaplain resources allocated to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(5) Recommend TOE modifications of chaplain resources required to provide maximum effective chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

d. Limits. Army in the field.

e. Scope.

(1) Aggregate and summarize available research findings to visualize the nondivisional combat support elements currently deployed and scheduled for future deployment in the US Army force models.

(2) Aggregate and summarize available research findings to conceptualize doctrine governing effective chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(3) Aggregate and summarize available research findings of TASCOM, and divisional organizations and assigned chaplain resources to determine their impact on chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(4) Compare results of (1) through (3) to determine what modifications are required for deployment and methods of operation of chaplain resources allocated to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(5) Recommend TOE modifications of chaplain resources required to provide maximum effective chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations.

f. Assumptions. None. (If, in the conduct of this study, it is deemed necessary to make assumptions in the absence of facts, coordination will be effected with HQ, CDC.)

g. Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA).

(1) Is there a consistent or inconsistent quantitative ratio prevailing within current nondivisional combat support organizational force structures between assigned chaplains and troop or unit density?

(2) How will addition or deletion of control headquarters and operating units from nondivisional combat support structures impact on chaplain support as related to chains of commands, spans of control, and density of personnel and units ministered to?

(3) What functions must staff and unit chaplains execute to effectively accomplish the chaplain direct support mission to nondivisional combat support organizations?

(4) What is the nature of the concepts of area support and area coverage in relation to direct support chaplain activities?

(5) Is there a compatible relationship between the concepts of area support and area coverage when jointly operating in nondivisional combat support organizations?

(6) How will chaplain general support services impact on chaplain direct support functions extended to nondivisional combat support organizations?

(7) Will stability operations impact on the problem?

(8) Will organizational arrangements currently providing chaplain direct support services to nondivisional combat support organizations be adaptable to future force structures?

(9) What is the maximum degree and type of authority legally available to supervisory chaplains?

i. Constraints. None.

j. Methodology. Quantitative measures relating to the number and density of individuals and units ministered to will be analyzed. Subjective quantitative analysis will be based on existing type force structures and questionnaires submitted to appropriate field commands. A qualitative analysis based on field experience and professional judgment of experienced staff chaplains will be used to develop and assess alternatives.

k. Alternatives.

(1) Revise the current system of allocating chaplains to nondivisional units and control headquarters on a more equitable basis.

(2) Revise doctrine and methods of operation to allocate control and assign chaplains to all organizations within the theater of operations based on density and controlled by the chaplain general support activity or appropriate higher command headquarters.

(3) Develop a structure supportive of an area support concept.

(4) Combination of any of the above alternatives.

l. Measures of Effectiveness.

(1) Quantitative analysis criteria will include the following:

(a) Performance statistics.

(b) Area and denominational coverage.

(c) Density coverage.

(d) Job functions.

(e) Staff and referral coordination.

(2) Qualitative analysis will involve a logical and systematic process for identifying, grouping, comparing and evaluating the results of alternate ministries to nondivisional combat support organizations.

(3) Additional quantitative measures or qualitative procedures may be developed during the course of this study as needed to fulfill the study objective.

m. Related Studies.

(1) USACDC Study, The Engineer Construction Battalion, (ACN 17150 - completed).

(2) USACDC Study, Conceptual Design for the Army in the Field (ACN 16870).

n. Criterion of Choice. That which will most readily facilitate the function of chaplain direct support within the scope of competing requirements imposed on the Army in the 70's in the following order of importance:

(1) Responsiveness in terms of staff and functional efficiency to the needs of the command.

(2) Responsiveness to the spiritual needs of troops.

(3) Cost effectiveness of resource utilization.

5. Support and Resource Requirements.

a. Support Requirements.

(1) USACDCPALS Group is designated the proponent for the study. USACDCOCHA is designated the proponent agency.
(2) Coordination and assistance requests will be effected with CDC groups/agencies for support, resources, and data as follows:

(a) Direct contact, not resulting in programing of manpower resources is authorized between CHA and other CDC groups, and agencies.

(b) For coordination anticipated to result in the obligation of manpower resources, except in PALS Group or agencies subordinate thereto, approval by HQ, CDC is mandatory on an as required basis.

b. Coordination with organizations outside CDC for support, resources and data as follows:

(1) Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Department of the Army, will be consulted for branch technical advice.

(2) USACHCS will be consulted for systems engineering information.

(3) Direct coordination between CHA and CONARC service schools concerning availability of subcourse and other educational material is authorized.

6. Administration.


b. Study Outline: See Inclosure 3.

c. Study Project Officer: CH (LTC) Daniel T. Saylor, USACDC Chaplain Agency, extension 6001 or 5801.

7. Management Data. This task is programed as ACN 18199. It is a HQ USACDC approved action. Management of this action is the responsibility of CG, PALS Group.
REFERENCES


7. CDC Study, Army Strategic Tactical Reorganization Objective (ASTRO) ACN 17469, 1 December 1970.
SUBJECT: Final Draft, Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Support Organizations

Headquarters, US Army Administration Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 46216 MAY 14 1976

TO: Commandant, US Army Chaplain Center and School, ATTN: ATSC-SE, Fort Wadsworth, Staten Island, NY 10305

1. Comments on DA Form 2028 have been reviewed and considered in relation to the changes adopted as a result of previous coordination with HQDA, Office Chief of Chaplains and HQ TRADOC (Appendix J). Further revision and republication of this document is not warranted on the basis of cost and manpower requirements in relation to the marginal improvement that may accrue in the end product.

2. The Final Draft Report, subject as above, is approved for final publication and distribution in accordance with TRADOC Pamphlet 71-3. However, comments contained on DA Form 2028 (ATCD-SP-P), 24 March 1976 will be considered, to the extent that they apply, in the development of Chaplain Support to the Army Division.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

H. M. SCHOENBERG
CPT, GS
Asst AG

2 Incls
ATCP-CD-S

SUBJECT: Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations

Commandant
U. S. Army Chaplain School
ATTN: ATSC-CTD
Fort Hamilton, New York 11252

1. Reference letter, ATSC-CTD, 1 Oct 73, subject as above.

2. The request to extend the completion date for the above mentioned study to 15 January 1974 is approved.

3. Request that this organization be informed as to desired date for IPR.

4. Point of Contact: Chaplain (LTC) Berdon M. Bell, Doctrinal Studies Branch, Concepts and Doctrine Division.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
JOHN D. MCDONALD
MAJ, AGC
Adjutant

A-II-1
ATCLG-CD-S (15 Mar 73) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations

Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (Prov), US Army Logistics Center (Prov), Fort Lee, Virginia 23801 20 MAR 1973

TO: Director, US Army Combat Developments Command Chaplain Agency
    Fort Lee, Virginia 23801

1. Revised study schedule is approved and authority is granted to extend completion date of study from 31 January 1973 to 28 September 1973.

2. USACDC Form 87 will be submitted to this headquarters, ATTN: ATCLG-CD-S, not later than 30 March 1973.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JAMES J. BURKE
Administrative Assistant

1 Incl

nc
SUBJECT: Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations

Commander
USCONARC/TRADOC (Prov)
Logistics Center (Prov)
ATTN: ATCLG-CD
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801

1. Reference letter, CDCCHA, 3 Jan 72, w/1st indorsement, CDCPALS-CP, 6 Jan 72, subject as above.

2. The revised study schedule approved in above reference is out of phase with the progress of the study. The study has slipped for the following reasons: Personnel turbulence due to the transfer of the action officer in October 1972, implementation planning for REORG, and more time required by Systems Analysis Group to develop more data than anticipated.

3. Request permission to extend the critical date for this study from 31 January 1973 to 28 September 1973 as reflected in the proposed revision of the Study Schedule (Incl 1).

4. Evaluation of the significant elements of the analysis prepared by Systems Analysis Group warrants additional IPR's are also reflected in the proposed revision of the Study Schedule.

5. Correlation: USACDC Action Control Number 18199.

Incl

GORDON M. SCHWEITZER
Chaplain (COL), USA
Director

A-II-3
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS SYSTEMS GROUP
FORT LEE, VIRGINIA 23801

CDCPALS-CP

3 DEC 1971

SUBJECT: Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations

Director
US Army Combat Developments Command
Chaplain Agency
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801

1. Reference, letter, CDCCHA, USACDCCHA, 20 October 1971, subject: Final Draft, The Chaplain's Role as Related to Soldier Motivation, with two indorsements. (attached as Incl 1)

2. Per your request, reference 1 above, authority is granted to extend the completion date of subject study from 31 August 1972 to 31 January 1973. Request the revised study schedule, reflecting the new dates, be submitted to this headquarters not later than 15 January 1972.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES J. DURKIN
Administrative Assistant

1 Incl as
CF:
CG, USACDC

A-II-4
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS SYSTEMS GROUP
FORT LEE, VIRGINIA 23801

CDCPLSG-DA

SUBJECT: Combat Development Study Directive: Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations

7 MAY 1971

Director
US Army Combat Developments Command
Chaplain Agency
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801

1. Reference letter, CDCCD-C2, HQ, USACDC, 30 April 1971, subject as above (attached as Inclosure 1).

2. Subject study directive, which is attached as Inclosure 1, has been approved and is the authority for you, the proponent agency, to officially proceed with work on the study.

3. The base line date for development of the study plan and submission of the final report is 30 April 1971 which is the date of the study directive itself. In accordance with this base line date and the study schedule imposed on this headquarters in paragraph 8b of reference 1 above, the following study schedule is established for your agency:

   a. Submit study plan to this headquarters, ATTN: PLSG-DA by 11 June 1971.

   b. Submit completed study to this headquarters, ATTN: PLG-DA by 15 August 1972.

4. This study is sponsored by the USACDCPLSG Doctrine Directorate. Directorate representative is Major Gerald Lipka, PLSG-DA, Fort Lee, Virginia 23801, Autovon 687-6002 or 687-6309.

5. Correlation: USACDC ACN 18199 applies.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Dwight Fuller
Administrative Assistant

A-II-5
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Commander, USAPACDA

SUBJECT: IPR for Chaplain Study

1. An In Process Review (IPR) was conducted at PACDA at 1000 hours on 16 July 1974 on the study, Chaplain Support to Nondivisional Organizations, being conducted by the Chaplain School. CH (LTC) Arthur Bell presented the study for the Chaplain School. PACDA attendees included LTC Portteus, Chief, Concepts and Doctrine Division; LTC Enloe, Chief, Studies Branch; LTC Edwards, Studies Branch; CH (LTC) Bell, Studies Branch; DAC Bopp, Integrating Office; CPT Fontenot (JAG), Studies Branch.

2. Chaplain A. Bell presented a brief review of the background and content of the study. The primary purpose of the review was to consider comments from the field and to resolve any conflicting issues prior to study completion and forwarding to TRADOC.

3. It was noted that most comments coming from the field were favorable to the study. The following areas were considered during the IPR:

   a. There was a discussion as to the appropriate location of the proposed chaplain teams. It was finally decided that they would be best positioned under the Corps Staff Chaplain. Further consideration of these terms will be given during the development of the new NE 16-500.

   b. Discussion concerning the appropriate definitions of staff supervision concluded that the definition in AR 310-25 is adequate for purposes of the study.

   c. Comments from the Office of Chief of Chaplains were considered and agreed upon with one minor exception. Rather than saying that administrative chaplains would include "all chaplains assigned at division level or higher", the study would define administrative chaplains as those in headquarters in echelons above division.

   d. TRADOC (ATCD-CP) challenged the appropriateness of using ratio, cost effectiveness and mission effectiveness as measures of effectiveness (M&E). The board determined that ratio is an appropriate M&E and is cited as an example in USMDC Penphil 71-1, Jan 1973. Cost effectiveness was also considered a valid M&E; however, for clarification the term cost effectiveness was changed to cost benefit. It was agreed that mission effectiveness is not an M&E.

4. The final matter to be considered was the elimination of a response to six of the original nine M&E stated in the study plan. A past IPR conducted
subject: IPR for Chaplain Study

by CDC determined that due to the change in direction of the study since its inception, only three EE's continued appropriate. It was noted that only three EE's would be responded to in the completed study.

BERDON M. BELL
CH(LTC), USA
Doctrinal Studies Branch
APPENDIX B

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS
APPENDIX B

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS

1. Is there a consistent or inconsistent quantitative ratio prevailing within current nondivisional combat support organizations force structures between chaplains and troops or unit density?

Answer: Inconsistent.

The study addresses itself to the problem of voids in chaplain support to this type of organization. Had there been a possibility of consistent application of the provisions of ratio in AR 570-2, Organization and Equipment Authorization Tables, Personnel, voids would not have appeared. Indeed, a surface examination would reveal that the ratio of chaplain to overall troop strength is acceptable. However, as pointed out in chapters 1 and 5, ratio is not an adequate means of either meeting the objective of providing overall chaplain support or measuring its effectiveness.

Three problems surface when ratio is examined closely:

a. The ratios in AR 570-2 are based on the assumption that chaplains will or are able to perform all functions in an equal manner. Chapter 2 points out that the assumption is incorrect.

b. Chaplains assigned to the higher echelons are required to spend the majority of their time in administrative duties. Consequently, they are unable to provide chaplain support to subordinate units, and very little support to their own unit of assignment. To include such TOE chaplain positions in the overall ratio is illogical.

c. Organizations must have strengths sufficiently near the ratio of 1:700 or 1:850 to permit a chaplain to be assigned. Consequently, the multitude of independent company sized units existing in support organizations must operate without reliable chaplain coverage.

2. What functions must staff and unit chaplains execute to effectively accomplish the chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations?

Answer: The functions are basically the same as for other types of organizations. Chapter 2 systematically identifies each of the major functions of the chaplains. The list is not exhaustive, but does include the major functions. For ease of identification, the functions are categorized as follows:

a. Staff Functions. Those duties performed by chaplains in their role as a member of the commander’s staff. Generally the functions are administrative in nature.

b. Religious Functions. Duties related to the specific religious role: religious services, baptism (Christian), Holy Communion (Christian), burial services, marriage services, circumcision (Jewish) and other religious observances.

c. Pastoral Functions. Those activities performed for the members of the command which have to do with morale: Counseling, mental health, visitation, religious retreats, and religious education.

d. Community Functions. Those activities performed for the good of the total military and civilian community: liaison with religious and welfare organizations, civic action projects, member of the various funds, and youth activities programs.

The extent to which a chaplain is included in each of these functions depends on the nature of his assignment, the mission of the organization, and whether the organization is in a deployed or nondeployed status.
3. What is the maximum degree and type of authority legally available to supervisory chaplains?

Answer: Regulations provide sufficient authority for the supervisory chaplain to control and direct chaplains, chaplain assistants, money and materiel resources toward the accomplishment of the mission given to him by the commander. Chapter 3 points out that the terms best suited to describe the role of the supervisory chaplain are “manager” and “supervisor”. The preferred term is “staff supervisor”. Staff supervision is defined by AR 310-25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, as “the process of advising other staff officers and individuals subordinate to the commander of the commander’s plans, policies, interpreting those plans and policies, and assisting such subordinates in carrying them out, determining the extent to which they are being followed, and advising the commander thereof.” Neither the supervisory chaplain nor any other chaplain may exercise the function of command. Therefore, the maximum degree of authority stops short of command, but he does have authority to direct, organize, plan, control and coordinate other chaplains’ activities in matters of religious coverage and morale as touched by religion. The actual degree of authority exercised by the supervisory chaplain depends on the commander of the organization to which he is assigned (FM 16-5, C 1).
APPENDIX C

FOLLOW ON ACTIONS
APPENDIX C

FOLLOW ON ACTIONS

1. The Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command should recommend that the US Army Chaplain Center and School be tasked the following:

   a. Revise paragraph 2-5c, FM 16-5, The Chaplain, to read, “he has authority to exercise functions of staff supervision and management,” and para 8-2c (1) “the staff chaplain exercises staff supervision over the personnel in the division.”

   b. Include the following paragraph concerning the chaplain teams (TOE 16-500) in the next revision of FM 16-5, The Chaplain:

      (1) The chaplain teams authorized by TOE 16-500 provide chaplain area coverage to organizations without assigned chaplains or other special requirements. These teams will be supervised by the corps or major command staff chaplains. The teams are requisitioned through normal channels on the basis of 1:700, or major fraction thereof for combat or combat support units and 1:850 or major fraction thereof for all other units for which chaplain support is not otherwise provided.

      (2) Chaplain teams are not to be utilized in administrative or supervisory positions. They are strictly for chaplain coverage of Army units without TOE assigned chaplains or other special requirements, e.g., disaster teams, support of The Chaplain General Support Detachment, and drug/alcohol specialty teams.

      (3) A team consists of one chaplain and one chaplain enlisted assistant with all necessary supplies and equipment. A major command chaplain may requisition as many chaplain teams as is required under the 1:700, 1:850 or major fraction thereof criteria.

      (4) Logistical and maintenance support for these teams will be provided by the unit to which they are assigned or attached for support.

   c. Include a block of instruction on the use of chaplain teams in the Chaplain Officer Basic, the Chaplain Advance and Nonresident courses of the Chaplain Center and School.

2. The Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command should recommend to the Adjutant General the following:

   a. That AR 165-20, Duties of Chaplains and Commander’s Responsibility, para 6, be changed to read:

      “Exercise of command. A chaplain has rank without command (10 U.S.C. 3581). Although a chaplain may not exercise command, he has authority to exercise functions of staff supervision and management. The nature and extent of his supervisory authority over the chaplain activities in his section and in subordinate units will depend upon command policy.”

   b. That AR 600-20; Army Policy and Procedure, para 3, the portion of sentence which reads “. . . he has authority to exercise functions of operational supervision and control” be changed to read “. . . he has authority to exercise functions of management and staff supervision.”

3. That in the next scheduled revision of AR 570-2 the paragraph concerning chaplain authorizations be changed to exclude chaplains assigned to supervisory or administrative positions in echelons above division from the 1:700 or 1:850 ratio computation. Recommend the paragraph be revised as follows:

   Chaplain positions, General. (1) For overall planning purposes, chaplain positions will be authorized for units of the field Army in the ratio of 1 for 700 troops or major fraction thereof, and for all other units in the ratio of 1 for 850 troops or major fraction thereof. Above authorizations exclude chaplain positions for hospitals, convalescent centers ( (2) below) and chaplain supervisory and administrative positions in echelons above division ( (3) below).
(2) Excluded. No change.

(3) Echelons above division.

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APPENDIX D

REFERENCES

2. CORG. A Methodology For Wargaming. TASTA 70, 1966.
4. The President's Committee on Religions and Welfare in the Armed Forces. The Military Chaplany. 1951.
7. Conceptual Design for the Army in the Field (ACN16870).
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY

Alternative. One of the several different ways of achieving a desired goal or capability.

Analysis. A category of study; an examination of the components of a problem and their interrelationships.

Area Religious Coverage. The provision of religious services and related activities to the total command, at whatever level, for units which have inadequate or no authorized or assigned chaplains.

Area Religious Support. The activity of a functionalized chaplain organization to aid, assist, sustain or complement other chaplain sections or organizations in providing religious services or other chaplain functions to military units on an area basis.

Chaplain Activities. The pastoral, administrative, religious and community functions performed by chaplains in the accomplishment of their mission.

Chaplain Coverage. A term used to describe the chaplains activities provided by assigned, attached or designated chaplains for an organization, series of organizations or a geographical area.

Chaplain General Support Detachment. A chaplain organization assigned to a personnel command at theater army level, or to an independent corps support command when no personnel command exists, to perform chaplain general support activities for the total command. The support activities include but are not limited to the following:

1. Provides religious training for chaplains and lay personnel.
2. Operate religious retreat centers;
3. Monitors the assignment and replacement of chaplain personnel.

Chaplain Support. The activity of chaplains to aid, assist, sustain or complement other chaplains or military organizations in matters of religion and morals, and morale as affected by religion.

Criterion. A standard of judging; a rule or test by which anything is tried in forming a correct judgment.

Denominational Coverage. The provision of religious services or rites to individuals who are required or who desire to observe the particular requirements of their own religious body or organization. Denominational Coverage can be applied in a broad sense by dividing the religious body into Roman Catholic, Protestant or Jewish, or in strict sense by further subdividing the Protestant religious bodies into Baptist, Lutheran, Episcopal, Latter Day Saints and others.

Ecclesiastical Indorsement. A written document issued by a recognized religious body to the offices of the Chiefs of Chaplains of the various services authorizing a minister to seek appointment as a military chaplain.

Indigenous Religions. Any of the many religions which are native to a specific area, region or country.

Methodology. The accumulation of principles, procedures, and instructions used as a basis for orderly simulation of real world events which occur in military operations.

Model. A representation - actual or theoretical - of the structure of dynamics of a function or process, consisting of a collection of procedures.

MORALE. A mental and emotional state of the individual. Indicators of good morale are: a real in performing tasks beyond mere obedience to orders; a basic sense of personal worth; pride in mission accomplishment, and courageous and determined conduct to obtain objectives in spite of personal dangers or privations.
Proponent Agency. An organization, element or activity which has the responsibility to initiate and/or respond to directives from higher headquarters to plan, develop, evaluate, and revise doctrine concerning personnel, organization, or material resources of the army system.

Religious Denomination. A religious system with its own organization, set of doctrine, rules and practices.

Religious Program. A prepared schedule or plan of religious activities to provide religious or chaplain coverage on a systematic basis to an organization, unit, activity or area.

Scenario. The outline or manuscript portraying the general and special military situations at the outbreak of hostilities, posture of the opposing sides, deployment of forces, initial logistic situation, assumptions, and other guidance or instructions required.

Span of Control. The number of individuals or levels of organization which one supervisor or supervisory headquarters can manage effectively. Three major factors influencing span of control are tasks, distance and time.

Staff Chaplain. The senior chaplain assigned to a unit or headquarters. He is the responsible chaplain to the commander for all chaplain and religious activities within the command.

Supervisory Chaplain. Any chaplain who has the responsibility of supervising chaplains and/or religious activities.
APPENDIX F

METHODOLOGY
APPENDIX F

METHODOLOGY

Section 1

1. General. The overall methodology used for the conduct of this project is diagrammed at figure F-1. The initial tasks undertaken are shown at blocks 1 and 2 of figure F-1; the information learned from these tasks, which pertains to guidance and parameters, is covered in Section II. This Section explains the methodology or technique developed at block 3 of figure F-1. As shown by the diagram, it resulted in exploitation and cross play between the methodology and the tools determined to be necessary for technical development. Blocks 3, 4, and 5 are discussed in this Section; blocks 6-10 are discussed in Section II, which reports on typical results obtained from applying the methodology.

2. Methodology Overview. The methodology described in this section, can be applied generally for the analysis of chaplain support problems. As a whole, the methodology can be categorized as a type of gaming. Specifically, the methodology developed involves the use of three principal elements: a scenario describing forces and operations selected as a basis for analysis; a scenario-related map of the area involved; and a computer program to manipulate input data obtained from the scenario, the map, and TOEs of the forces employed. The treatment accorded the three principal elements is provided in general fashion in the paragraphs which follow.

3. The Scenario. To apply the methodology described herein, the analyst must select a scenario covering forces and operations judged appropriate to the required chaplain related support analysis. Having selected the appropriate scenario, he then should approach his problem on a “snapshot” basis; that is, he should select specific days covered by the scenario when the forces involved are in the operational postures he desires examined. Thus, for example, he may select D+6 day, when the forces are withdrawing; D+12, when forces are in a holding operation or defense; D+20, when forces are in attack, or any series and sequence of such days.

4. The Map. When scenario-related days have been selected, the chaplain analyst should obtain tactical assistance and position all forces on the map for each day selected in accordance with tactical judgment and scenario requirements. The chaplain-analyst then may look at the map and force display for each day and determine the region or regions of the theater he desires to examine and analyze for chaplain support. He may elect to examine the overall theater on any or all of the days selected, or he may elect to examine a precise region or a number of precise regions of any less than theater size on any or all of the days selected. It is important, at this point, to note certain constraints and flexibilities. They are:

a. Regions selected must be regular in shape; that is, square or rectangular, and with sides parallel to map longitudes and latitudes; or they may be circular.

b. Regions selected may be contiguous or separated from each other; or a region may overlap any one or several others. This latter feature has been built in to permit the analyst greater flexibility with modes of analysis, and is possible because separate sets of data are produced for each selected region.

c. Regions selected for any one selected “snapshot” day may be different regions than those selected for any other day selected for analysis.

5. Computer Inputs. With scenario-related days selected, with forces positioned for those days, and with regions identified, the chaplain-analyst prepares computer inputs for each “snapshot” day. Generally, they pertain to:

a. Unit identification, which is made for each unit in the theater by an identification number, strength, location, chain of command, and the numbers of assigned chaplains by rank.

b. Chaplain identification which is made in the theater by an identification number, rank, denomination, and unit assignment.
Figure F-1. Diagram of Study Methodology
6. **Computer Runs and Outputs.** A separate computer run is required for each selected “snapshot” day. For each run/day, the computer manipulates the input data and produces output data by region. This output data can be used for a variety of types of analysis. Generally, the output data pertains to:

a. A listing (s) of all units in the theater, all denominations considered, and all chaplains in the theater.

b. A listing of all units broken down by those with chaplains (including their number, denomination, and rank); those units without chaplains; and those chaplains unassigned to units.

c. A listing identical to b. broken down by designated regions (or areas). This listing also is extended to statistical and summary data such as troop-to-chaplain ratio and troop-strengths not receiving chaplain support.

7. **Application of the Methodology.** A typical application of the methodology discussed in the preceding paragraphs is covered in section II.
Section II

TYPICAL METHODOLOGY APPLICATION

1. General. Based upon, and coordinated with, the development of the methodology discussed in section I, the analyst desired to examine chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations in a theater of operations. This task not only entailed the development of the methodology previously described, but also the establishment of certain parameters for the analysis. These parameters included the establishment of alternative methods for providing chaplain support, measures of effectiveness and criteria of choice for the analysis, and the selection of a scenario and force to be examined. This section covers these parameters and exhibits results which are typical of the analysis as a whole. In essence, it covers blocks 6-10 of figure F-1.

2. Selection of Alternatives. Seven alternative methods for providing chaplain support to nondivisional combat units were proposed for analysis. These alternatives are discussed below.

a. Alternative I, Chaplain Unit-Assignment Support. Alternative I is the provision of chaplain support solely by assignment to specified TOE units and headquarters. In this alternative, assigned chaplains support only the TOE to which they are assigned. This is the current method of providing chaplain support.

b. Alternative II, Chaplain Unit-Assignment and Cross-Coverage. Alternative II which is a variation of alternative I, is the provision of chaplain support by assignment to specified TOE units; however, it varies from alternative I in that TOE-assigned chaplains also extend support to other units having no chaplain or without a representative major-faith chaplain. Provision has been made for the higher headquarters staff chaplain to have the authority to direct chaplain activities to insure adequate area coverage.

c. Alternative III, Unit Assignment, Area Coverage. Staff chaplains assigned to TOE combat support units attempt to cover adjacent and subordinate units who have no assigned chaplain resources. The method of doing this has been an actuality in our present system. The staff chaplain would utilize technical channels to coordinate all subordinate chaplain activities. This is accomplished without command authority, but depends on the concern of chaplains for all people in the combat zone as the common base for their working arrangement. The TOE unit commander would still command and control his chaplain but the chaplain would voluntarily accept additional duties for other units. This method is being used by chaplains today due to the lack of any other command or doctrinal guidelines.

d. Alternative IV, Chaplain Unit-Assignment with Back-Up Direct Supports (BUDS). Alternative IV is the provision of chaplain support by assignment to specified TOE units as for alternative I; however, back-up direct support is provided by a group of chaplains who are assigned to small mobile chaplain area support teams. In concept, these teams are controlled by a higher echelon headquarters, such as a corps. Chaplain teams will primarily serve those support units that have no assigned chaplain and are not receiving satisfactory chaplain support from chaplains assigned to other units. Chaplain teams may be collocated with their controlling headquarters in order to reduce administrative and logistical support requirements.

e. Alternative V, Unit Attached Teams from Theater Support Organizations. All chaplain resources are withdrawn from TOE combat support organizations and pooled at the theater level support organizations. These assets are then broken down in a modular team concept and attached to or withdrawn from combat support organizations as the situation dictates. This is the first real break from the TOE concept. The total responsibility for the chaplain mission would fall upon the personnel command (PERSCOM), and the Chaplain General Support Detachment (TOE 16-300) would direct and control the chaplain teams.

f. Alternative VI, Regional Support. Chaplain resources are withdrawn from TOE combat support organizations and pooled in a regional headquarters such as the corps. These assets are not attached to units, as in alternative V, but are commanded by the corps commander and controlled by the corps staff chaplain. By accepting already existing geographical boundaries and control headquarters, the concept becomes immediately viable. Combat support organizations in the regions behind the corps rear boundary would receive support through chaplain teams from rear headquarters.
g. Alternative VII, Theater of Operations Area Support. Chaplain resources are withdrawn from TOB combat support organizations and pooled at the theater level command headquarters or a theater level support headquarters. The total chaplain ministries and function would be provided to combat support organizations from those centrally directed chaplain assets. This alternative would operate much as a PX truck run. Denominational and area coverage would be planned, coordinated and controlled by the Chaplain General Support Detachment chaplain at PERSCOM.

3. Selection of Measures of Effectiveness. Initially, it was planned that the proposed alternatives would be evaluated on the basis of the number and density of individuals and units ministered, the required chaplain effort for travel and service, and the required command/control effort. During the development and conduct of the project, it became clear that, without effort exceeding allowable time and manpower limitations, some desired data could not be made available or collected. Thus, with advice and consent from the study sponsor, it was concluded that chaplain travel, the quality of chaplain service, and command/control would be analyzed and evaluated by the chaplains without attempts at measurement on the computer runs. The following measures of effectiveness were chosen to evaluate the seven alternatives:

a. Ratio. The measure of how many chaplains are available in the field or service to how many nondivisional combat troops.

b. Area and Denominational Coverage. The ability of an alternative to provide area and denominational religious coverage is critical to the study.

c. Span of Control. The staff chaplains ability to control and supervise resources is the key and overriding issue of any centralized area support mode.

d. Time/Distance. The amount of time and distance required by chaplains to reach a unit or combat support personnel to provide religious coverage.

e. Cost Benefits. The measurement in terms of mission benefits and cost of each alternative.

f. Staff and Referral. The ease or difficulty with which a chaplain is able to coordinate his activities with the command and other staff members.

g. Morale Impact. Each alternative is evaluated in terms of the morale impact of the personnel served and upon the chaplain who must work within the framework of the alternative.

4. Selection of Criteria of Choice. In addition to the judicious use of measures of effectiveness, it was determined that appropriate criteria for selecting the better alternative are——

a. Chaplain ratios that do not depart significantly from one chaplain per 700 troops or major fraction thereof as provided by AR 570-2. The “major fraction criterion” is interpreted as 351 and 1051.

b. The chaplains ability to identify with units and unit commanders when engaged in combat operations; i.e., a chaplain is responsible for specific units.

c. Chaplain usage for denominational worship in a reasonable manner at reasonable times and places for troops belonging to basic religious groups (Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish).

5. Selection of a Scenario. The sponsor, the Chaplain Agency, and the analyst for this project examined the literature in search of an operation or exercise that would afford an acceptable basis for the analysis of the Chaplain Agency problem. The decision was reached to use operation SCIMITAR, a U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) problem exercise.* This exercise is concerned with organizations in support of a large-scale combat operation conducted by an Allied Field Army in the Mediterranean theater of operations. Using this scenario, three situations or “snapshot” days were selected for analysis. The first “snapshot” situation was during the development of base facilities and the buildup of supplies in Thrace as plans were being made for an attack by the 1st (Allied) Army to secure and defend an area sufficient to support future operations to the north (Situation No. 1, Build-Up).

*This scenario was approved for use for this study prior to the use of real life scenarios.
The second selected situation concerned the securing of the Stara Planina by the Allied Army (Situation No. 2, Attack). The third and final selected situation concerned defense against a penetration by aggressor forces. (Situation No. 3, Defense).

6. Deployment of forces. Having selected operation SCIMITAR, with its related forces, and having selected the desired “snapshot” days for chaplain analysis, the next task undertaken was to deploy forces in accordance with each “snapshot” day. This was done with the assistance of military officers familiar with combat support activities and with the operations covered by the scenario. The result of force deployment for one of the 3 “snapshot” days, the Build-Up phase, is illustrated in abbreviated format at figure F-2. The position of each unit is indicated by assigned number, as shown on the figure. In actual practice, a detailed wall map was used and unit locations were pin-pointed. Other “snapshot” days were treated in this same fashion.

7. Identification of Regions. For each “snapshot” day, chaplain analysts selected and identified those regions of the map encompassing those forces to be examined for chaplain support. Regions may be selected in accordance with the constraints and flexibilities tabulated in paragraph 4. Figure F-3 illustrates how one such region was identified.

8. Data Preparation and Computer Runs. For each identified region, map coordinates for the 4 corners of each selected region become computer inputs, and along with other required data are fed to the computer.

An example of an input card deck setup, showing the order of deck assembly, is shown at figure F-4. The computer program is designed to address and assemble data separately for all regions identified for analysis during any one “snapshot” day. For each such region, the computer produces the data discussed in paragraphs 5 and 6. A typical computer printout for one region (identified as Area 5) is shown at figure F5.


a. Once computer runs have been made for each “snapshot” day, the computer printout for each region is examined and analyzed. Data is then tabulated, and further analysis is accomplished to determine if there is need to designate additional or different regions and make other computer runs. For the operation SCIMITAR exercise, three “snapshot” days and an overall total of 25 regions or areas were designated and examined. An example of assembled data for region (or area) 5 of the 1st “snapshot” day selected, during the build-up phase of the operation, is shown at figure F6. It should be noted that this assembled data represents but one of 25 regions examined and involves alternatives I, II and IV only. Examination of this regional analysis indicates that alternative IV provides the most favorable troop-to-chaplain ratio (444, as shown at line p, alt. 4, figure F-6); however, this is at the cost of assigning 4 additional chaplains in the region as supplementary detachment. Looking further at the tabulation, it can be observed that alternative I has 917 combat support troops that are totally unserviced by any chaplains (line a, alt 1, figure F-6). This unfavorable condition does not exist for alternative II; also, these alternatives have a troop/chaplain ratio of 641 (line p, alts 2 and 3).

10. Thus, it can be concluded that combat-support-troop/chaplain ratio for these alternates (lines o and p, figure F-6) is within the established criterion of 700 or major fraction thereof.

11. Findings.

a. A methodology has been developed that enables an examination to be made of various concepts of chaplain support to multi-divisional forces. This methodology allows consideration to be made regarding the interaction between tactical combat units and various concepts of chaplain support.

b. The modular form used to construct the computer model will permit it to be used in evaluating other scenarios and force structures of interest with minimal additional effort.

c. In the development of the three distinct tactical situations, the reorientation of the tactical units from situation one (Build-up) to situation two (Attack) and finally into situation three (enemy counterattack) had minimal disruption of the distribution of chaplains throughout the chain-of-command and the span of control was not altered significantly. Even though the chaplain ratio to troop strength did not vary significantly in the crisis situation the chaplain area support alternatives (Alt V, VI, VII) were disrupted because of problems associated with sudden unplanned shifting of troop strengths and the resulting confusion. The control elements of these alternatives are so far removed from the immediate region that efforts to restructure the detachment strengths to cope with the fluctuation would be slow in developing due to the need for precise information and the accompanying time/distance factors.
Operation SCIMITAR, 2d Corps Unit Deployment, Situation 1 (Build-Up Phase), with Region Identified for Analysis.
16 UNITS IN THIS AREA (5)
5770 TOTAL STRENGTH IN THIS AREA
9 ASSIGNED CHAPLAINS IN THIS AREA
0 ATTACHED CHAPLAINS IN THIS AREA
9 TOTAL CHAPLAINS IN THIS AREA

NO CHAPLAINS ASSIGNED TO THE FOLLOWING UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Assigned Chaplains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-185 520th Eng Bde (CBT) (CCP)</td>
<td>005-101</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195 5001st Eng Co (Topo) (CCP)</td>
<td>005-327</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202 5011th Eng Co (PTK)</td>
<td>005-124</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202 5056th Eng Co (FLTRG)</td>
<td>005-078</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207 5086th Eng Co (LE)</td>
<td>005-054</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207 5093th Eng Co (CAM)</td>
<td>005-097</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210 5526th Eng Plt (ADM)</td>
<td>005-570</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91: IS THE STRENGTH OF THE 7 UNITS IN THIS AREA (5) WITHOUT ASSIGNED CHAPLAIN COVERAGE
4833: IS THE STRENGTH OF THE 9 UNITS IN THIS AREA (5) WITH ASSIGNED CHAPLAIN COVERAGE
1 ASSIGNED CHAPLAIN FOR EACH 539.22 MEN IN UNITS HAVING ASSIGNED CHAPLAIN COVERAGE
1 ATTACHED CHAPLAIN FOR EACH 0.00 MEN IN UNITS HAVING ATTACHED CHAPLAIN COVERAGE

5770 IS THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE 16 UNITS IN THIS AREA (5) COVERED BY 9 ASSIGNED CHAPLAINS
1 ASSIGNED CHAPLAIN FOR EACH 641.11 MEN IN THIS AREA.
5770 IS THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE 16 UNITS IN THIS AREA (5) COVERED BY 9.0 ATTACHED AND AS

1 ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED CHAPLAIN FOR EACH 641.11 MEN IN THIS AREA.

LIST OF ASSIGNED CHAPLAINS (BY CHAPLAIN NUMBER) IN THIS AREA
1 69
2 163
3 155
4 134
5 279
6 263
7 33
8 200
9 192

LIST OF ATTACHED CHAPLAINS (BY CHAPLAIN NUMBER) IN THIS AREA

Figure 3-5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Type Data</th>
<th>Alt. I</th>
<th>Alt. II</th>
<th>Alt. IV</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>No. combat support units with assigned chaplains</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>No. combat support units without assigned chaplains</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Total number combat support units (a – b)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>No. units excluded from analysis (non-combat support)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Total No. units in region (area) 5 (a + b + d)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>Strength of combat support units with assigned chaplains (a above)</td>
<td>4,853</td>
<td>4,853</td>
<td>4,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Strength of combat support units without assigned chaplains (b above)</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>Strength of all combat support units (f + g)</td>
<td>5,770</td>
<td>5,770</td>
<td>5,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Strength of units excluded from analysis (d above)</td>
<td>5,444</td>
<td>5,444</td>
<td>5,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j</td>
<td>Strength of all units in region (f + g + i)</td>
<td>11,214</td>
<td>11,214</td>
<td>11,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k</td>
<td>No chaplain in combat support units with assigned chaplains (a above)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l</td>
<td>(Not used)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>No. chaplains assigned to units excluded from analysis (d above)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>Total No. chaplains in all units (k + m)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o</td>
<td>Troop/chaplain ratio for combat support units with assigned chaplains (f – k)</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>Troop/chaplain ratio for all combat support units (h – k)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q</td>
<td>Troop/chaplain ratio for units excluded from analysis (i – m)</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>Troop/chaplain ratio for all units in region (j – n)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s</td>
<td>Combat support unit troops unsupported by chaplain service</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**

NA: Entries pertain to data not pertinent to the alternative under consideration (e.g., in alt 2 troop/chaplain ratio pertains to all combat support units and is not limited to those units with assigned chaplains).

Figure F.6. Build-up Phase Snapshot-Day Data for Region 5

F-11-8
d. In all the situations programmed, it was found that the combat loss of troops did increase the percentage ratios of chaplains to troops without regard to the alternative mode of chaplain coverage being employed. When a random selection of chaplains was programmed as combat losses, then the percentage ratios of chaplains to troops decreased.

e. Certain combat support units (e.g., aviation and engineer) were found to have no chaplains assigned in the chaplain unit-support alternative and would be totally dependent on some form of area coverage by the chaplains in the supported or supporting units with which they had direct contact. This problem did not exist in the chaplain area support alternatives. The problem also disappeared in alternative IV. The air strips were consistently identified as regions needing more study because there were occasions when there was a dense concentration of troops and very few chaplains to provide proper coverage.

f. Several major problem areas were surfaced in the study of the area support alternatives (V, VI, VII) which could not be tested in the gaming situation. First, it was recognized that assignments centrally controlled would require that the Army chaplain maintain some semblance of a war room where he could monitor the maneuver units activities and plan chaplain coverage accordingly. Second, a secure means of communication must be available to all chaplains in the field for purposes of duty assignment. Workload and consequently manpower would be increased appreciably. Third, the chaplain’s chain-of-command must go directly to the office responsible for making assignments and thus bypass all intermediate commands. Finally, logistic support must be centrally controlled and this could require additional manpower.

g. It was observed that the three alternatives which allow manipulative procedures for responding to area denominational coverage needs were limited in effectiveness only by the number of chaplain resources from which to draw comprehensive coverage. The alternative least responsive to manipulation is the chaplain unit-support alternative (Alternative I). The lower the echelon of command at which the chaplain resources were monitored and/or manipulated then the fewer were those resources. The higher the echelon of command at which the chaplain resources were monitored and/or manipulated then the greater were the resources. The corps echelon of command was the lowest level at which most major faiths were represented.
Section III
DATA REQUIREMENTS

1. PURPOSE. To determine and document the data which is needed, available and relevant to:
   a. the design of computer programs,
   b. the determination of measures of effectiveness,
   c. the determination of the criteria of choice.

2. CONCLUSION. Those data listed under 3a below are needed, available, and relevant to the three needs listed above. Those data discussed in 3b are not available and the use of subjective judgment to provide data values could introduce an unnecessary bias into the analysis. Data discussed in 3c should be classified as "soft data", however, since it is needed and is relevant it can be used in the study by applying good judgment. Desired output data are listed in 3d.

3. DISCUSSION.
   a. Available Quantitative Information.
      (1) Unit related data.
         (a) An identification number, e.g., 57, 54, etc.
         (b) An organization designation, e.g., 1st (US) Corps, 552D (US) Engr Flot (ADM) (OP COMD), etc.
         (c) A TOE designation, e.g., 051-001, 005-570, etc.
         (d) A strength, e.g., 256, 27, 16640, etc.
         (e) An assigned chaplain rank structure, e.g., 1-06 (one Col), 2-05, 3-04, etc.
         (f) An x and y position or location, e.g., grid 0508 and 4743; 26 deg. and 42 min. of latitude and 105 deg. and 36 min. of longitude.
         (g) A chain-of-command, e.g., unit 57 reports directly to unit 1.
      (2) Chaplain related data.
         (a) An identification number for each chaplain, e.g., 4, 14, etc.
         (b) The chaplain’s rank, e.g., 06, 05, 04, etc.
         (c) The chaplain’s religion code, e.g., 92, 33, etc.
         (d) The chaplain’s denomination designation, e.g., Christian Scientist, Methodist, African, Episcopal, Zion, etc.
      (3) Scenario related data.
         (a) A general situation, e.g., a possible requirement for military assistance to resist aggressor moves to gain control of the Turkish straits.
         (b) Several special situations, e.g., on 1 March, without a formal declaration of War, aggressor forces launched a violent offensive along the Greek-Turkish-Bulgarian border, apparently aimed at...
(c) A plan of attack, e.g., the Supreme Allied Commander, ... recognized the favorable shift in balance of power... orders CINCAFME to secure and defend sufficient area...to provide a base for subsequent operations...

(d) Assumptions, e.g., allied air superiority. Major combat units available for...will be five infantry divisions, three mechanized divisions, and one armored division.

(e) Execution plan, e.g., initiate offensive operations on 20 July for the purpose of securing sufficient area in...to provide a base for tactical and logistic buildup to support future offensive operations...

(f) Troop list for the operation.

(g) Intelligence estimates.

(h) Analysis of area of operations.

(i) Operation estimates.

(j) Logistic estimates.

b. Unavailable or Subjective Data.

(1) Religious preference expressed by troop/units, e.g., 55% Protestant, 30% Catholic, 10% Jewish, etc.

(2) Percent attending religious services regularly, e.g., 33%, 19%, etc.

(3) Counseling requirements of a unit, e.g., marriages, divorce, deaths in family, etc.

(4) Transportation needs of chaplains, e.g., from unit 27 to unit 76, etc.

(5) Available transportation modes, e.g., helicopter, jeep, tank, etc.

(6) Waiting time for mode of transportation, e.g., 0 time of waiting for jeep, 2 hours time of waiting for helicopters.

(7) Travel distance for chaplain, e.g., from point A to point B.

(8) Travel time for chaplain, e.g., from point A to point B.

c. Soft or Partially Quantifiable Data.

(1) General.

Data regarding the following subjects will be discussed and then subjectively ranked with the "best" approach stated in the summarizing section of this paragraph:

(a) Effort required to command/control chaplain activities.

(b) Concept which best utilizes the principal of chain-of-command and span-of-control.

(c) Chaplain attrition rates under various combat conditions.

(d) Replacement rates of chaplains in various theaters of engagements.

(2) Discussion.

In carrying out his mission in the Army, the chaplain:

F-III-2
(a) Acts as advisor and consultant to the commander and his staff on all matters of religion, morals, and morale. He also advises on customs and institutions of indigenous religions as they affect the mission of the unit.

(b) Provides opportunities for worship, public and private, consistent with the religious beliefs, customs and practices of the military personnel, their dependents, and authorized civilians.

(c) Provides for the proper and appropriate administration of rites, sacraments and ordinances.

(d) Provides religious education and individual instruction upon request.

(e) Provides human self development instruction.

(f) Provides pastoral care such as counseling, spiritual guidance, visitation of the sick and the confined, and pastoral visits to barracks, quarters, training, and recreational areas.

(g) Maintains liaison with religious groups and welfare agencies in civilian communities upon whom he may call for assistance.

(h) Satisfies religious obligations established by ecclesiastical authorities to insure the continuous maintenance of denominational endorsement.

(3) Chaplains may not be assigned to nonchaplain spaces or duties.

(4) Army regulations make the commander responsible for the religious life, morals, and morale of his command (AR 165-20). Although the commander does not exercise the same amount of control over the details of divine services as he does over other aspects of the command, he does exercise complete authority and control over the chaplain as an officer.

(5) A chaplain has rank without command.

(6) A chaplain with primary responsibility for troops should spend a minimum of fifty percent of his duty time each week with the troops.

(7) The chaplain in the Army represents a recognized religious denomination. His ecclesiastical status obliges him to observe the rules and regulations of his denomination, to maintain an active and continuing membership in his church, and to sustain an effective, continuing relationship to his denomination and its leaders.

(8) It is the responsibility of the chaplain to make every effort to assist the soldier to perform a creditable service to the Army.

(9) The chaplain branch has no TOE organization(s) except the Chaplains General Support Detachment (TOE 16-500). Religious coverage is provided by chaplains assigned or attached to battalions, groups, brigades, commands and other command and control headquarters. When tailored forces of combat, combat support and combat service support elements are established, chaplains will be provided by the organizations which make up the tailored force and/or from available sources.

(10) Chaplain planning factors for chaplain coverage of a tailored force are:

(a) Chaplain position will be authorized for tailored units of the field Army in the ratio of 1 for 700 troops or major fraction thereof.

(b) Chaplain positions will be authorized for all other units in the ratio of 1 for 850 troops or major fraction thereof.

(c) The above authorizations exclude chaplain positions for hospitals and convalescent centers.

(d) One primary duty chaplain assistant position is authorized for each chaplain position.

(11) Personnel losses result from three general categories:
(a) **Battle losses.**

(b) **Nonbattle losses.**

(c) **Administrative losses.**

The rate of loss varies with the theater of operations, climate, terrain, conditions and state of training of troops, type of activity, the enemy, and numerous other factors. Loss rates for the chaplains within corps and division will vary with the amount of exposure to the various causes of losses.

(12) **Summary of Part C.**

(a) Assigning and attaching chaplains to a specific command enhances the commanders ability to comply with Army regulations.

(b) Only overall attrition factors can be applied to chaplains in a theater of operation.

(c) Replacement rates should be a sufficient rate to maintain the ratios expressed by a chaplain planning factor.

d. **Output Data Requirements.**

(1) **Overall troop density.**

(2) **Troop density by areas.**

(3) **Overall chaplain density.**

(4) **Chaplain density by areas.**

(5) **Span-of-control of units.**

(6) **Span-of-control of chaplains.**

(7) **Denominational density of chaplains.**

(8) **Ratio of troops to chaplains.**

(9) **Assigned and attached chaplain designation and summaries.**
APPENDIX G

DISTRIBUTION

Recommended distribution:

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<tr>
<td>Department of the Army DACH</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Study Documentation &amp; Information Retrieval System (ASDIRS)</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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APPENDIX H

CHAPLAIN PROFESSIONAL TEAMS
1. Introduction.

a. The problem of providing chaplain coverage to all organizations in the US Army is not new. Chaplains are assigned to units having sufficient strength to meet the criteria provided by Army regulations; however, there are often units which do not have that strength, yet whose religious coverage is just as important and always presents a problem. Chaplains and commanders try to provide such coverage by sharing authorized TOE/TDA chaplains, or by red-lining incoming chaplains to be responsible for these units. Neither method proves workable. The red-line method of holding a chaplain at higher echelons to give area coverage deprives some units of an authorized replacement. The sharing of chaplains with other units works to a degree, but may deprive the commander of his authorized chaplain at a critical time. A method is needed to provide adequate religious coverage to units that have no provision for assigned chaplains.

b. In addition to the unit coverage problem is the realization that chaplains are needed on an area basis to give coverage to disaster areas, to provide drug/alcohol counseling, and to conduct religious retreats for the total command. Because of heavy unit ministry commitments, TOE chaplains are unable to provide such services. Consequently, in 1961 the United States Continental Army Command directed the US Army Chaplain Board (USACHB) to undertake a study to develop organizational and operational guidance for chaplain support of the Communication Zone. That study, published 31 May 1962, recommends the use of chaplain teams.

2. Development.

a. The USACHB study, "Chaplain Support of the Communication Zone," envisioned several team configurations. Two types were played in LOGEX 61: A team consisting of one chaplain and one chaplain enlisted assistant; and a larger team consisting of three chaplains (one Major and 2 Captains) and four enlisted assistants (one E-6, one E-5, and two E-4's). The larger team was described as a "balanced religious team" and had a Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish Chaplain; for example, he could not be detailed from the team to provide coverage. The team had to displace as a group. That approach resulted in inefficient use of manpower and materiel. In view of such problems, attention was focused on the smaller team concept.

b. The smaller team has proven to be workable in the LOGEX context. The supervisory chaplain has the capability of organizing teams with a proper denominational spread and combining them, if necessary, to provide the "balanced team" characteristics of the larger team. The smaller team is thus more flexible, more economical, and operationally more sound. The smaller team has been approved for chaplain use and is provided for in TOE 16-500.

c. For a number of years the smaller teams have been played in LOGEX exercises. Though valuable information has been gained, the exercises reveal problems. Perhaps the most prominent one is that officers of other branches get the impression that chaplain teams are a substitute for TOE chaplains; therefore, why bother to include chaplains in TOE's when satisfactory coverage can be provided by a team? Why waste a space? However, the intent of the chaplain team is to provide supplemental coverage and not to replace TOE chaplains. Successive Army Chiefs of Chaplains consistently stress that chaplains be assigned to units insofar as possible.
3. The Chaplain Professional Team (TOE 16-500).

a. The following is an extract from TOE 16-500:

Para 01 - Team HA Chaplain Professional Team. Capability: Provide chaplain operational support for each 700 individuals or major fraction thereof in field Army units or for each 850 individuals or major fraction thereof in all other Army units for which chaplain support is not otherwise provided. The team cannot provide chaplain support for the administration, coordination and technical supervision required at higher echelons. Basis of Allocation: As required. Activated by theater Army for assignment to force troop lists of subordinate commands under conditions stated above. Mobility: One hundred percent mobile.

b. Before assignment to an area of responsibility the chaplain team should possess all the authorized equipment necessary for operation. Normally the corps chaplain will requisition the teams, and requisitions the necessary equipment at the same time. The source of maintenance, messing, administrative support, and resupply depends upon the method of employment of the teams. If the teams are itinerant and under the direct control of the corps chaplain, these services are provided by corps. If the teams are attached to a unit for area coverage, the unit to which they are attached provides the necessary services.

c. The TOE states that the basis of allocation is “as required.” There is no limit to the number of teams that may be requisitioned. They must be justified, however, on the basis of the criteria stated in the TOE (see extract 3a). If a corps chaplain determines that he has 1300 personnel in field units without chaplain coverage, then he has adequate justification to requisition two chaplain teams and the necessary equipment. The 1300 uncovered personnel constitute two TOE vacancies in the same manner as any other TOE vacancy in the command; however, TOE unit assignment of chaplains has priority.

d. Unless absolutely necessary, chaplains assigned to the teams are not to be withdrawn to fill a unit TOE vacancy. A requisition for the TOE vacancy ought to be submitted as soon as it is known that it will occur. The staff chaplain responsible for both unit and team chaplains should minimize the turbulence caused by reassignments. Whether a unit is large enough to authorize a chaplain or not, their personnel require chaplain coverage on an equal basis.

e. Staff chaplains responsible for the teams should make frequent contact with them and insure their inclusion in appropriate chaplain conferences. The team members may be isolated from other chaplains for long periods of time, and loss of contact with other chaplains, especially the supervisory chaplain, may cause morale problems. The staff chaplain ought to establish a procedure to preclude either possible omission of an efficiency report or a misunderstanding about the rating scheme.

f. The teams are utilized primarily for religious coverage of units without assigned chaplains. Except as prohibited by TOE 16-500 the teams may also be utilized in several other situations:

(1) The provision of additional support to tailored task forces. When contingency plan troop lists are being developed and it is apparent that TOE unit chaplain coverage is inadequate, the appropriate number of teams could be included in the plans, for activation with the task force.

(2) The furnishing of an immediately available group of chaplains to provide coverage to disaster areas.

(3) The performance of specialized chaplain functions (except those prohibited by TOE 16-500).
(4) The augmentation of the Chaplain General Support Detachment (TOE 16-500) when the workload exceeds the capability of its assigned personnel.

g. The key staff officer in any of the situations noted is the theater Army chaplain. TOE 16-500 states that the teams are activated by theater Army for assignment to force troop lists; The theater Army chaplain, acting on requisitions from subordinate commands, recommends to theater Army the appropriate number of teams to be activated for fill.
APPENDIX I

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS

ANNEX I

CHAPLAIN THEATER ORGANIZATION AND CHAPLAIN RELATIONSHIPS AND FUNCTIONS
THEATER ORGANIZATION AND CHAPLAIN RELATIONSHIPS AND FUNCTIONS

Section I

THE CHAPLAIN IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS

1. General.

a. Before studying the specific force structure which has been developed for analysis by this study, several general observations pertaining to theaters of operations will be presented. A significant portion of the material discussed, which pertains to the Mediterranean Command, or Operation SCIMITAR, is also applicable to scenarios for other theaters of operations. Thus, the methodology presented in this report will be applicable in general regardless of the location or size of the theater of operations.

b. A theater of operations is normally divided into a combat zone and a communications zone. The combat zone is that part of a theater of operations that combat troops require for conducting ground combat operations and associated combat support functions. Initially, a theater of operations may consist of the combat zone only, with support provided directly from CONUS bases or off-shore bases. Depth of the combat zone depends on the forces involved and the nature of planned operations.

c. The combat zone for Operation SCIMITAR was divided into field Army service areas, corps, and division areas. The field Army boundary was the rear boundary of the combat zone.

The territory between the division rear boundaries and the corps rear boundary is the corps rear area. Corps combat support units and forward corps combat service support units are normally located here. The area between the division rear boundary and its major combat unit areas is the division rear area. The division support command is located here, and some of the forward combat support units or corps operate in this area. Each area is under the control of the commander of the organization to which it pertains. In a large theater of operations, a field Army may be organized by the theater commander in the combat zone to direct the operations of two or more corps.

d. Chaplains are assigned to combat and support elements operating in the entire combat zone. They are normally authorized in the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) of headquarters and headquarters companies or detachments of elements of appropriate size at all echelons from corps headquarters down to division, brigades, and separate battalions. For the SCIMITAR scenario, the Army chaplain was the senior chaplain in the field Army and received counsel directly from the theater Army chaplain. Within the field Army, staff chaplains at corps, divisions, and brigades exercised supervision over chaplains assigned to subordinate units. All chaplains are members of the staffs of their respective units and are responsible to their commanders for the fulfillment of both professional and staff function; they maintain direct technical liaison with the staff chaplains at the next higher headquarters in the chain of command.


a. Corps.

(1) The modified corps is the largest self-contained U.S. Army organization that has both tactical and support functions. It consists of a headquarters, certain assigned troops, and a variable number of divisions, combat support, and combat service support elements, depending upon its mission.

(2) The mission of the corps chaplain varies with the mission of the corps. Normally the corps chaplain provides supervision for chaplains assigned to subordinate combat and support nondivisional units assigned or attached to the corps.

(3) The theater Army staff chaplain supervises the corps staff chaplain. The corps staff chaplain normally receives and implements theater Army policies and guidance on matters concerning chaplain personnel, chaplain training, and operations. The theater Army chaplain also provides staff planning and coordination, and implements such theater-wide support operations as the religious retreat house.

*As a result of the Echelons above Division study the Field Army has been eliminated.
b. Division.

(1) General.

(a) The division is the basic Army unit of the combined arms and services. It is tailored for the environment and the accomplishment of specific missions. It has both tactical and administrative functions. An Army division may be characterized as either infantry, mechanized infantry, armored, airborne, or airborne.

(b) Major subordinate units where chaplains are located include the brigades, division artillery, support command, and engineer battalion. The division chaplain section is assigned to the administration company but is normally located in the area of division headquarters main.

(2) Armored Division. Armored divisions are capable of covering extensive fronts, operating in dispersed formations, and making deep penetrations and wide envelopments into enemy territory. Their operations are characterized by speed, mobility, shock action, firepower, and the extensive use of radio communications. This method of operation places greater significance on prior planning for religious coverage, close coordination and continuous contact among the battalion chaplains and brigade staff chaplains, and reliance on well prepared contingency plans, SOPs, and administration/operations orders for command information regarding religious coverage.

(3) Mechanized Infantry Division. Although not possessing the same overpowering shock action and firepower as the armored division, the mechanized infantry division operates in a similar manner.

(4) Airborne Division. Airborne divisions require air transport for airborne assault and air-landed operations. They are not capable of sustained combat without reinforcement and normally plan a link-up with other forces within five to seven days. Chaplains assigned to airborne divisions should be parachute-qualified, physically tough, and mentally alert and flexible. These chaplains must learn the value of teamwork and be prepared for all contingencies. Since they carry their basic loads of religious equipment and supplies with them, they must learn to provide effective religious coverage with a minimum of equipment. The division chaplain must anticipate and prepare for special problems encountered by unit chaplains in the marshalling area, in flight, and in the airhead. Attention must be given to priorities and time of arrival of chaplains' vehicles and supplemental equipment, proper dispersal, and religious background, and customs of the population in the vicinity of the airhead.

(5) Airmobile Division. Airmobile divisions are capable of conducting operations in all types of terrain and are characterized by the ability to respond immediately and to maneuver rapidly over large areas. While problems of religious coverage are generally analogous to those of the airborne division, the airmobile division has some particular and important differences. The fact that the division is capable of recycling combat forces for immediate use in other areas by vertical entry, and the recovery of units into and from the battlefield places a premium on early planning for flexible religious coverage. The burden of planning detailed but flexible coverage falls to the division and brigade staff chaplains. The difficulty is compounded by limited transportation and load priorities that make a fixed schedule all but impossible.

c. Brigade.

(1) Division brigades consist of a headquarters and headquarters company to which are attached for command and control a variable number and type of maneuver battalions. The brigade commander is a major subordinate commander in the infantry, armored, mechanized, airborne, or airmobile division. Chaplains are not assigned to division maneuver battalions; they are assigned to brigades. Brigades are responsible for providing chaplain support to subordinate battalions.

(2) The separate infantry, armored, mechanized, or airborne brigade consists of a brigade base to which are attached a variable number and type of maneuver battalions. Since the separate brigade is employed in independent operations, its base consists of its own organic combat support and combat service support units. Chaplains in the separate brigade are all assigned to the headquarters and headquarters company of the separate brigade. However, they function in much the same manner as the division brigade chaplains.
(3) The maneuver battalions normally remain attached to the same brigades but, during combat operations, they may be detached and reattached to other brigades when the situation dictates. The normal employment of the battalion will be in the tailoring of its units with units of other battalions to form various type and size task forces and combat teams. This employment is also typical of the separate brigade maneuver battalions.

d. Battalion.

(1) The battalion may be part of a brigade and be charged with only tactical functions, or it may be a separate unit and be charged with both administrative and tactical functions. Troops of battalions are often dispersed over wide areas and units are separated from the parent organization.

(2) In general, the conditions that exist in the battalion make it difficult for chaplains to offer consistent and continuous religious and pastoral ministry. The battalion chaplain is the key to the religious program of the battalion. He must take the initiative in adapting his program to the changing needs and operations of his battalion.

e. Summary.

(1) Wide dispersion, greater maneuverability, increased vulnerability, and an accelerated tempo of operations are factors which affect all combat support and combat service support organizations. In future hostility, combat forces will tend to operate semi-independently under mission-type orders with direct support type fire units attached. Where nuclear weapons are employed, sudden, severe personnel losses must be anticipated at all echelons. These losses may be of such extent as to cause combat effectiveness to be temporarily destroyed. Units must be trained and indoctrinated in rapid reorganization and in the treatment of mass casualties with minimal professional medical assistance.

(2) The foregoing probably will be the operational environment of the chaplain in the combat zone under future hostile conditions. Individual chaplains must maintain continual communication with their headquarters. Careful staff planning must be performed by staff chaplains at all levels to coordinate and monitor chaplain efforts and mobility for rapid reaction to emergency demands for chaplain support and for adequate denominational and area religious coverage to dispersed, isolated units. More than ever, the chaplain must function as a part of the commander's team and, by staff coordination, integrate the chaplain support functions into the operations of his organization.
Section II
FUNCTIONS OF A CHAPLAIN

1. General Functions.
   a. Religious Activities.
      (1) Frequency of Religious Services. Frequent religious services are required in the combat zone. Chaplains recognize that the field is the normal environment for religious services both in training and in combat. Because the troops cannot come to a chapel, the chaplain must go to them, wherever they are. To the soldier on the front line, religion may be extremely important. If so, he looks forward to the chaplain's visits and the opportunity to talk about his faith. In addition to the ministration of worship services, rites, and sacraments, religious study classes are conducted. Participation of soldiers in correspondence-type courses is encouraged. When feasible, religious movies and film strips are shown, and religious literature is distributed. Although regular schedules are not normally possible, a long-range coordinated plan of religious coverage utilizes periods when troops are available, regardless of the day or hour. The religious program is planned to meet not only the soldier's needs during combat, but also to prepare him for life's problems and opportunities in the years ahead. Chaplains select, train, and organize lay leaders to assist them in providing a total coverage, particularly among those denominations whose chaplains or clergy are not available.

      (2) Pastoral Care. Frequent person-to-person visits, spiritual care of the wounded, counseling, sharing of privation, and spiritual support make the chaplain a symbol of concern for the soldier under the stress of combat.

   b. Counseling. The chaplain has a specific responsibility for counseling persons charged with a serious offense before a court-martial or a foreign court. Army regulations specifically define the official protection offered the chaplain regarding any privileged communication. Unless this privilege is expressly waived by the individual concerned, the chaplain cannot be required nor permitted to disclose information received in this manner to an investigating officer, court-martial, court of inquiry, or board of officers.

2. Staff Functions.
   a. General. The chaplain is a staff officer. He provides the commander and his staff with advice, information, and plans on matters pertaining to religion, morals, and morale. In addition to planning and coordinating religious activities, the staff functions discussed in the following subparagraphs are of particular significance in the combat zone.

   b. Human Self Development. Combat conditions generally discourage a formal program of Human Self Development instruction, but the need for such guidance is very urgent. False ideas on relaxation and recreation in a combat zone generate the temptation for men to accept lower moral standards than those that are characteristic of their social and religious backgrounds. Likewise, the stress and violence of combat leave men physically, emotionally, and spiritually exhausted. In such circumstances, the chaplain can advise his commander and assist his staff by planning and leading group discussions in positive aspects of moral courage, the spirit of sacrifice, and the sense of duty and integrity. During his daily contacts, the chaplain can, by his own example and spiritual ministry, strengthen the qualities of character that are demanded for success in combat.

   c. Civilian Religious Relations. A major concern of the combat commander is the welfare and attitude of the civilian population. One of the principal staff officers at appropriate headquarters who advises the commander and recommends civil affairs policies and operations as pertaining to religion & welfare is the chaplain. He can establish liaison with local and refugee religious leaders and aid them with their spiritual and welfare ministrations. He may be asked to lead drives for financial aid in some instances, or to organize movements for gift packages. An important function of the chaplain is to advise the civil affairs officer on theological considerations and the traditions and practices of local religious cultures, to include the degree of sanctity accorded their shrines, temples, and religious symbols. The adequate execution of this function requires that the chaplain be well versed in such matters. He encourages military personnel to have respectful attitudes toward other faiths, sacred rites, and places of worship.
3. Functions of the Corps Chaplain.
   
   a. General.

   The mission of the corps chaplain varies with the mission of the corps. Normally, the corps chaplain provides mentorship for chaplains assigned to subordinate combat and support nondivisional units assigned or attached to the corps. However, when the corps is operating as an independent corps, the corps chaplain will also provide mentorship for the division chaplains and chaplains with assigned support units. He has all the responsibilities, within command policy, normally performed by a theater Army chaplain.

   b. Responsibilities

   (1) Chaplain Personnel. The corps chaplain recommends chaplain assignments for all corps nondivisional units. He also performs the same mentorial functions for these chaplains as the division chaplain does for division chaplains. The corps chaplain takes no direct personnel staff action with respect to division chaplains unless the tactical situation so dictates or the corps is operating as an independent corps. However, the corps chaplain may be requested by the theater Army chaplain to make informal recommendations on the denominational and area religious coverage aspects of chaplain assignments to divisions within the corps.

   (2) Religious Coverage.

   (a) The corps chaplain is responsible for the religious coverage of all nondivisional units assigned or attached to corps. Where requested by the theater Army chaplain, he is responsible for coordinating denominational and area religious coverage of theater Army nondivisional units located and operating in the corps area.

   (b) The corps chaplain recommends appropriate chaplain coverage for those medical units operating in the corps area that do not have assigned chaplains. For those medical units that do have assigned chaplains, he arranges for denominational coverage. Since the division chaplain has primary interest in the patients being evacuated to the mobile army surgical hospital, the corps chaplain should coordinate with the division for assistance in the religious coverage of these hospitals.

   (c) Depending on theater policy, Jewish chaplains are generally assigned to corps in order to provide Jewish area religious coverage to all units in the corps area, including divisions. The corps chaplain should assist the Jewish chaplain in planning and coordinating his program in order to obtain maximum utilization of his time and efforts. When personnel status reports indicate a high enough percentage of Jewish personnel, the corps chaplain should take staff action to secure an additional Jewish chaplain.

   (3) Planning.

   The corps, being a tactical unit, is constantly engaged in the development of contingency plans. Since each contingency plan anticipates a different situation, and the size of the operating force varies with each plan, the corps chaplain must stay abreast of all plans and develop his own plan for chaplain operations in conjunction with other planners. He must insure that a sufficient number of chaplains are assigned to provide religious coverage for all major faiths. Similarly, supply needs to be anticipated in order to provide for those chaplains operating during implementation of contingency plans.

   c. Field Relationships.

   (1) The theater Army chaplain is the immediate monitoring chaplain of the corps chaplain. He may request the corps chaplain to assume increased responsibilities in the interest of more effective and responsive chaplain support. Such requests, however, should be staffed through command channels.

   (2) Normally, division chaplains receive directions from the corps chaplain only in matters having professional and tactical implications, such as morale and combat support proficiency. As the senior chaplain in the corps area, however, the corps chaplain should offer his professional assistance informally in such matters as religious coverage, training conferences, and retreats.
(3) When the corps is operating as an independent corps, the corps chaplain normally receives directions from the staff chaplain of theater Army or of the task force under which the corps is operating. At such time, the corps chaplain also provides monitorship for all chaplains assigned or attached to corps units, including divisions.

4. Functions of the Division Chaplain.

   a. General.

   (1) The division achieves flexibility through the tailoring of its components to meet tactical and strategic requirements and through its capability to vary its organization for combat. This flexibility of organization and operations imposes a critical responsibility on the division chaplain to keep abreast of the situation and to ensure that chaplain services are available to all personnel assigned or attached to the division.

   (2) In general, the discussion in the remainder of this paragraph is applicable to chaplains assigned to all types of divisions. As explained in Section I of this Annex, there are a number of significant differences in the method of operation of these divisions. These differences affect the responsibilities of the assigned chaplains.

   b. Responsibilities.

   (1) Chaplain Personnel.

   (a) The majority of the chaplains authorized a division are assigned to and normally operate in subordinate units. Their collective efforts, however, are monitored and coordinated by the division chaplain to provide denominational and area religious coverage as required.

   (b) The division chaplain makes recommendations on the assignment of chaplains within the division. Proper denominational representation should be maintained throughout the division. Careful professional liaison is maintained with the theater Army chaplain, and the corps chaplain, and staff coordination is maintained with the division ACoS/G1. The division chaplain arranges an orientation for newly assigned chaplains, escorts and introduces them to their new commanders.

   (2) Religious Coverage.

   The division chaplain has staff responsibility for providing religious coverage to units, assigned and attached to the division, that do not have assigned chaplains, and to the division clearing stations. He provides the planning and coordination necessary for rapid chaplain response to emergency or disaster areas. The division chaplain section plans and conducts a proportionate share of the chaplain support program to troops and units in the area of the division headquarters. Through coordination with major subordinate unit staff chaplains, he makes provision for chaplain support to other division units, attached units, and clearing stations operating in the area of these major subordinate units. The division chaplain furnishes and keeps the chaplain portion of division contingency plans current to provide for chaplain coverage under all emergency conditions. Under certain emergency conditions, and with the commander's consent, these plans may grant the division chaplain temporary operational control of division chaplain personnel. Routine policies and procedures must be coordinated with the division staff and incorporated into the division SOP. Changes to routine procedures must be included in administrative/operations orders.

   c. Field Relationships.

   (1) Normally the division chaplain receives directions from the theater Army chaplain. However, depending on command policy, the corps chaplain may be given staff responsibilities in the monitorship of division chaplains. Although the division chaplain receives technical information and guidance from the theater Army and the corps chaplains, he is primarily responsible to his commander. He should consult with the commander and the division staff and secure approval on all technical matters prior to initiating any staff action affecting the division chaplain support program.
(2) The division chaplain monitors and coordinates the activities of all chaplains assigned to the division through the senior chaplains at brigades, division artillery, and the division support command. He is the monitor of these senior chaplains and the engineer battalion chaplain. He is the staff monitor of the assistant division chaplain. Battalion chaplains in the brigades, division artillery, and the support command are monitored by the appropriate staff chaplain in the commands.

(3) The division chaplain should maintain close contact with unit chaplains. New chaplains, particularly, need his mature guidance and supervision. Visits should be made frequently to subordinate chaplains in the field. Discussions with them and with their commanders, observation of their conduct, and evaluation of their work often indicate problem areas. These visits also furnish the division chaplain an opportunity to guide the young chaplains into ministries in keeping with the high standards of the Army chaplaincy. The division chaplain recommends recognition for outstanding chaplain performance and is concerned with the morale of the chaplains and other members of the command.

5. Functions of the Brigade Chaplain.

a. General.

(1) This section describes the responsibilities and relationships of chaplains assigned to division brigades and to separate combat brigades. Staff chaplains assigned to headquarters of combat support brigades function often as division chaplains in their relationships with chaplains in subordinate elements.

(2) The senior chaplain is the brigade staff chaplain and the other chaplains are known as the assistant brigade chaplains. The assistant brigade chaplains may be considered as battalion chaplains inasmuch as they are normally located with the subordinate battalions of the brigade. The assistant brigade chaplains are monitored and operationally supervised by the brigade staff chaplain to the degree desired by the brigade commander.

b. Responsibilities.

(1) The brigade staff chaplain formulates plans to insure complete overall brigade religious coverage. He coordinates and monitors the activities of assistant brigade chaplains and carries on a proportionate share of religious coverage. Normally, he should be located at or near brigade headquarters in order to perform properly the staff functions, particularly the coordination of the denominational and area religious coverage. He is responsible for providing chaplain coverage at the brigade clearing station. He schedules the activities of the assistant brigade chaplains in accordance with approved plans and maintains contact with them.

(2) Assistant brigade chaplains provide coverage to the attached battalions and are assigned to and located with those battalions. They provide professional advice to the commander and staff of the unit. Habitual attachment to the same battalion enables the chaplain to fulfill the whole spectrum of pastoral functions. He will be able to achieve the identity and rapport with the unit which is so necessary to the successful accomplishment of the chaplain mission. During periods of training or noncombat, he will spiritually and morally prepare his men for the ordeals of the battlefield. Once the battalion goes into combat, however, the chaplain's "parish" may vanish as its unit "building blocks" become merged with comparable "building blocks" from other infantry, mechanized, and armor battalions into task forces and combat teams. If he has performed his ministry of preparation properly, his men will respond in combat under a new chaplain as fervently as they did in garrison during training or in non-combat periods. Brigade staff chaplains should insure that assistant brigade chaplains are trained to accept this situation. The rapid shifting of chaplains is just as necessary as is the rapid shifting, attaching, detaching, and tailoring of maneuver battalions. Chaplains are assigned to brigades instead of battalions to insure flexibility in providing denominational and area religious coverage during combat.

(3) Chaplains in separate combat brigades are employed in much the same manner except that they have the additional coverage responsibility of support units of the brigade base.
c. Field Relationships.

(1) The division brigade staff chaplains receive monitorship from the division chaplain and coordinate with him in the overall division chaplain coverage plan. The staff chaplain of the separate brigade normally receives direction from the staff chaplain of the task force headquarters under which the brigade is operating. This may be the corps or some type of joint or independent task force.

(2) The battalion chaplains are monitored and operationally controlled by the brigade staff chaplain to the degree desired by the commander.

6. Functions of the Battalion Chaplain.

a. General.

(1) The battalion is normally the smallest unit to which a chaplain is assigned or attached. Chaplains are not assigned to divisional maneuver battalions, but they may be assigned to nondivisional combat support battalions.

(2) Chaplains may be assigned to a battalion which is directly subordinate to a larger force. Examples are corps, artillery and engineer battalions. Generally there is a staff and monitor chaplain assigned to a group. Groups, however, are not fixed organizations, and battalions may be freely attached or detached from one group to another. In some instances, there may be no chaplain at group headquarters; the monitoring chaplain may then be the corps or even the theater Army chaplain, as in corps signal and some combat support battalions.

(3) Chaplains may be assigned to a separate battalion. The separate battalion may be either a combat or combat support unit which operates independently in the field and normally is assigned directly to corps or theater Army. In almost every instance, the monitoring chaplain for the separate battalion chaplain is the theater Army support command, or corps chaplain.

b. Responsibilities.

(1) The battalion chaplain is the key to the religious program of the battalion. He must take the initiative in adapting his program to the changing needs and operations of his battalion. The battalion chaplain is on the commander’s staff and his primary responsibilities are to his battalion.

(2) The location of the chaplain within the battalion during operations will depend on the type of unit and mission. Generally, in combat support battalions, the chaplain is located in the vicinity of the company aid station, the battalion aid station, or the evacuation point so that he can rapidly respond to the need for ministering to the wounded and dying. Even so, he must continue to serve the needs of men who carry the battle. The chaplain should, with the concurrence of his commander, locate himself where he can best accomplish his mission. This may or may not be at the battalion headquarters.

(3) The battalion chaplain is responsible for providing denominational coverage for his unit. This can be accomplished by coordination with chaplains of adjacent units. Denominational and area religious coverage involving adjacent units should never be undertaken by the battalion chaplain without prior coordination with and the full support of his commander and the immediate supervisory chaplain. In addition, the chaplain has the staff responsibility for providing and coordinating the denominational and area religious coverage plan for all units attached to the battalion. Chaplains assigned to a separate battalion should follow established corps, theater Army, or theater Army support command chaplain policies and plans. They should keep their monitoring chaplain informed of their activities and problems of a professional or technical nature.

(4) Troops of separate battalions are sometimes dispersed over wide areas and with units separated from the parent organization. These conditions make a consistent and continuous religious and pastoral ministry difficult. It is sometimes necessary to provide religious services for scattered elements of the battalion by coordinating with a chaplain in the area of the separated elements; however, responsibility for all chaplain support, and specifically the pastoral and counseling functions, remains with the battalion chaplain.
c. Field Relationships.

Battalion chaplains are monitored and operationally supervised by the brigade staff chaplain to the degree desired by the commander.
ANALYSIS OF MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) AND CRITERIA OF CHOICE.

1. INTRODUCTION. The purpose of this section is to perform an analysis of various factors related to the measures of effectiveness and criteria of choice considered for this study. Exactly how to identify measures of effectiveness and criteria for this type study is difficult to discuss. At best, one can usually identify only those factors which are important and explore several potential measures of effectiveness and criteria. Data which are needed to support measures of effectiveness and criteria are discussed in Section II. The discussion in this annex attempts to explore several aspects of measures of effectiveness and criteria of choice in general and then point out the factors which were given consideration in deciding on the criteria used to measure the effectiveness of the chaplain's ministry to combat support units. A choice between alternatives should be made using the following criteria:

a. Chaplain ratios which do not depart significantly from ratio values of one chaplain per 700 troops or major fraction thereof as provided in AR 570-2.

b. Ability of chaplains to identify with units and commanders when engaged in combat operations, i.e., a chaplain is responsible for specific units.

c. Denominational coverage which allows soldiers belonging to one of the basic religious groups - Protestant, Catholic, Jewish - to worship at an acceptable time and place.

2. DISCUSSION.

a. General.

(1) A measure of effectiveness (MOE) is an indicator against which a standard of judgment can be applied. It might be considered as a yardstick of measurement for reporting actual performance in relation to required performance. The criteria is a point on the indicator scale which indicates a test of preference. Thus, we see that a measure of effectiveness is a type of indicator which measures some aspect of performance, (e.g., the number of units receiving religious services per unit of time) or resource required, (e.g., dollars or number of miles traveled per week). The criterion might be expressed as some satisfactory value of the measure, (e.g., 30 percent of the troops located within an area receive religious services, or it might be some desired relationship among the combinations of measures (e.g., largest number of units receiving religious services per mile of travel by a chaplain, or at least 75 percent of the units receive religious coverage every 30 days).

(2) The proper development of measures of effectiveness is extremely important to the overall analysis effort. However, the choice will depend on the level of detail explored by the study. Identification of all relevant factors is difficult in the formulation phases of a study, however, an attempt should be made to define major items of interest because they indicate the data which are needed in the search phase.

(3) Exactly how to develop the right MOE and criteria for a study is not easily discussed because the right MOE and criteria for one study may well be completely wrong for another study which is very similar. Not only is it difficult to determine the right MOE, but it is even more difficult to develop one which is near the approximate MOE but is, in fact, the exact MOE.

b. Activities of Chaplains.

(1) Any experienced chaplain will testify to the fact that chaplain-religious activities are, in general, very diverse in nature, not routine and repetitive. It is likely that there will be wide variations in the ratio of work produced to time expended. The latter is especially true in the area of counseling, interviewing, and instructing.
(2) Not only are the duties of a chaplain diverse in nature, the term "ministry of a chaplain" has different meanings to different people. Some rather strictly define the term to encompass only the ecclesiastical duties of the chaplain. In other cases the term is used, more broadly, to include the chaplain's role in encouraging the soldier to render greater combat power.

(3) In the 1951 "Report to the President - The Military Chaplaincy" we see that "More than any other official, the chaplain depends upon his personal ability to be effective. He alone, lacks military authority to enforce his orders. He cannot compel men to attend religious services; he cannot order them to take his advice on any matters; in short, an incapable chaplain will accomplish little. On the other hand, a capable chaplain potentially has so much to offer his military unit, that if he takes full advantage of his opportunities, there is practically no limit to the good that he can do". The report has taken cognizance of the traditional cry of the military, with its "tell it to the chaplain", and sees him as the counselor who "advises the puzzled, comforts the troubled, and aids the distressed". Thus, as a constant and constructive advisor and counselor, he is "usually the best informed man in the unit on the state of morale". The report is keenly aware that the chaplain, "...in his service as counselor has the opportunity to deal with the practical and crucial issues of life to a degree which rarely occurs for the civilian clergyman in a parish."

(4) By Army regulation the commander is responsible for the religious life and for the efficiency of chaplainry under his command. Further, the regulations specifically state that the commander will exercise supervision over the military activities of their chaplains without trespassing upon the ecclesiastical field. Thus, the parochial program of the chaplain and the many functions which have been detailed in this chapter are possible only with the cooperation of the commander. It is the commander's responsibility to provide a suitable place for the chaplain which will enhance him in performing his duties. Not only must the commander provide the place but he must supply the chaplain with the equipment, assistance, and other facilities to further the religious program.

(5) The purpose of the discussion above is to determine a way to measure the productivity of chaplains in a given work situation. Once the productivity is measured, a standard may be established by applying the standard as a yardstick, it follows that judgment may be made on the effectiveness of performance in the measured work situation. Thus, in turn, will aid the analyst and project officer to propose improved methods of providing chaplain direct support to nondivisional combat support organizations. In short, the goal is to get the most work accomplished with the least amount of effort and expense.

Performance Analysis.

(1) Today there is increasing emphasis being placed on measures of effectiveness (MOE) and criteria of success throughout the Army. With the consequent emphasis which is placed on the effective use of manpower and resources, it seems logical that some methods might be developed whereby both manpower and resources can be measured. The following discussion, or analysis of MOE and criteria, will attempt to relate the chaplain and his role in a theater of operation to the methodology established in Army Regulation 1-50, Administration Performance Analysis.

(2) A basic understanding of performance analysis is necessary before attempting to relate it to the functions covered by the study entitled "Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations". While it is difficult to describe and define the methodology and terminology used in performance analysis, it is felt that a careful scrutiny of performance analysis from the chaplain's point of view might clear up some misconceptions which tend to be confusing.

(3) Performance is one of the most important elements which influence the total cost of Army systems. Methods for evaluating the performance and utilization of chaplains in a theater of operations must be made through the use of the best practical methods and procedures for accomplishing the work. Statistical data pertaining to schooling, controlling, and the programming of chaplain resources can be used effectively to reduce or control the cost of said manpower. Having established this, it is necessary to determine the procedure governing the use of the results of this analysis.

(4) After a careful scrutiny of the factors relating to most studies, certain factors stand out:

(a) All areas of work are to be measured when they are susceptible to measurement.

(b) Measurement should be used whenever practicable.
(c) All areas of work should be measured whenever it is profitable to measure them.

(d) Nonroutine work, which is variable in nature and frequency, is not considered susceptible to measurement.

(e) Measures of effectiveness and criteria analysis cannot be satisfactorily utilized in areas where the benefits are overshadowed by the time and expense of maintaining the data.

These are the guidelines for use in an analysis of measures of effectiveness and criteria which must be considered prior to any application to a study. Briefly, these guidelines could be stated thus: "measure only routine work, when it is practicable and profitable, and when the work lends itself to measurement".

(5) In the endeavor to implement the principles of performance analysis, distinct terms peculiar to the system are often used. These terms have their own definitions which restrict their application to the performance system alone. Such terms as "man-hours expended", "work units produced", "nonproductive man-hours", "productive man-hours", "performance ratio", etc., are all part of the technical vocabulary of performance analysis.

(6) The terminology becomes understandable as the system unfolds. The basic data used in performance analysis are "man-hours expended" and "work units produced"—certain productive man-hours result in so many work units. However, not all of the hours spent at work are productive. Thus, it becomes necessary to categorize man-hours into productive and nonproductive. The productive hours are those man-hours which are susceptible to measurement; nonproductive man-hours are not. Examples of nonproductive man-hours are... those military and civilian hours, such as annual and sick leave, special orientation and training, military leave, V00C. Also included are the hours during which military personnel are engaged in physical training, target practice, troop information, and officers' call performed during the normal work week.

(7) Productive man-hours are those expended on the job. Once the productive man-hours are determined, the next step is to define what a standard man-hour is. In performance analysis standard man-hours are: the computed man-hours which should be, or should have been, expended to produce a given number of work units based upon an established standard. This standard is arrived at by use of management engineering techniques. Performance analysis is assessed by only one of these techniques, called Time Standards, but uses three types of time standards. Reference here is made to the one type which establishes the amount of time required to perform an established unit of work. The amount of time may be established by: (1) engineering standards based on work effort (pace), methods, operations, equipment, layout... specifically prescribed for performing an established unit of work in accordance with an accepted quality standard.; (2) statistical standards developed from statistical analysis of past performance data. For performance analysis purposes, statistical standards may be expressed as man-hours per work unit. After the man-hours have been determined, it becomes necessary to establish definite areas of work, to make the functions upon which the man-hours are expended explicit. Accordingly, a work area is a category of work for which quantitative measurement is desired. Usually a work area identifies a single operation, such as typing a letter, or a function such as mail and records. Once the work area is established, the next procedure is to determine whether it can be measured. Certain work areas lend themselves to measurement, while others do not.

(8) A measured work area is a work area in which a unit of work can be established which quantifies the accomplishment of man-hours expended accurately and readily.

(9) An unmeasured work area is a work area in which no work unit can be or has been established which will quantify the accomplishment of man-hours expended accurately and readily. Thus, a work unit becomes the important deciding factor between measured and unmeasured work areas, it is nothing more than an item of work or unit of measurement selected to express the work in a given work area quantitatively.
There are twelve steps involved in the development of performance analysis. Of the twelve, two are of importance to this discussion: (1) the selection and definition of work areas, and, (2) the selection and definition of work units. The criteria to be used when determining the practicability of dividing work areas into measured and unmeasured work areas are: measured work is work which is generally routine and repetitive in nature. In this type of work area, there is a reasonably constant relationship between the amount of work produced and the time expended. Unmeasured work is generally diverse in nature. It is neither routine, repetitive, or recurring. There is likely to be wide variations in the ratio of work produced to time expended. Work which is measurable may also be temporarily unmeasured during the development of performance analysis.

Examples of the relationship between the routine and the material include the handling of fabricated pieces and printed messages (measurable work). Examples of the relationship between the nonroutine and the conceptual include the staff officer advice, the directing of the unmaterial staff officer, and court martial procedure at trials (unmeasurable work).

In the selection and definition of work units, certain criteria are also to be used. For each measured work area, a work unit which represents the quantity of work performed must be selected and defined. Selection of work units should be made where feasible with the following criteria in mind:

(a) Work units should be representative of the work effort in the work area. A work unit which is expressed in terms of total responsibility and which does not necessarily represent accomplishment is not the most suitable for performance analysis.

(b) Work units should be expressed in terms which simplify the recording, compiling, and use of performance data.

(c) Performance analysis work units should be correlated with work units used for man-power yardsticks and staff guides wherever possible.

Certainly it is true that every chaplain activity cannot be measured quantitatively when its prime factor is qualitative and such things must be recognized. One of the most difficult problems is to find a formula for fitting the work of the chaplain into the performance analysis. The idea of using the number of hours expended against the accomplishment certainly has not worked out satisfactorily.

In summary, the reasoning behind performance analysis is to discover a way to measure the productivity of man-power in a given work situation. Once the productivity is measured a standard may be established. By applying the standard as a yardstick, it follows that judgment may be passed on the effectiveness of performance in the measured work situation. This in turn, aids in the improvement of work methods, the identification of bottlenecks, and in short, to get more accomplished with less effort or expense.

d. Troop/Chaplain Ratio Analysis. An analysis of troop/chaplain ratio values for the force structure of operation SCIMITAR was conducted. This analysis consisted of calculating troop/chaplain (R) values for various individual and aggregated troop strength units as shown on figure 1-1. The "R" values were plotted and lines drawn to illustrate constant "R" values for a range of troop strengths and chaplains. The line showing a ratio of 700 troops/chaplain illustrates the value stated in AR 570-2 and the 350 and 1150 values illustrate the "major fraction thereof" statement in the AR. By fitting various troop/chaplain ratio values over the plotted date, we see that in general the ratios bracket a range between one chaplain for each 500 to 900 personnel. Thus, one measure of effectiveness to be used for this study will be the troop to chaplain ratio, and the criteria will be chaplain ratio values which do not depart significantly from ratio values of one chaplain per 700 troops or major fraction thereof.

e. Summary.

It is clear that the majority of the factors associated with the direct chaplain support study cannot be expressed in the terminology of performance analysis. For this study the following guidelines will be used when assigning chaplains to combat support organizations by the various concepts of assignments:
(1) Staff responsibility for denominational coverage will rest with the staff chaplain assigned to the organization covered. If the organization has no chaplain assigned, then the staff responsibility rests with the organization's liaison officer for religious coverage who will act as liaison between his organization and the staff chaplain assigned to the headquarters at the next higher echelon.

(2) Chaplains should provide denominational coverage to units other than those for whom they have staff responsibility. Denominational coverage will be limited to that which is available within the resources of time and transportation available for this purpose and with the approval of the commander.

(3) Commanders should provide religious coverage for their personnel on the following priorities:

(a) Wounded, dying, or seriously ill personnel should receive the ministration of a chaplain of his basic religious group or denomination.

(b) A weekly opportunity to worship in a service of a basic religious group, i.e., Protestant, Catholic, Jewish. Personnel should be provided the opportunity to worship at a convenient time and place and in a manner in keeping with their denomination.

(c) Provision should be made for the religious services, rites, and obligations which are required by some denominations for the faith and life of its members. The fulfillment of such observances of holy days, rites, ordinances, and sacraments, should be limited only by the resources available to the command and the existing military situation.

(d) Provision should be made for basic religious group activities which serve the needs of all members of a basic religious group, but are not essentially religious activities, and are not denominationally oriented. Examples include Sunday/sabbath schools; men and women's and youth groups.

(4) Various staff chaplains should recommend to the commanders the assignment, attachment, transfer, and replacement of chaplains in order to achieve the best possible religious coverage during combat operations.

(5) Commanders who do not have adequate chaplain resources to provide denominational coverage should obtain the coverage through direct coordination with other commanders, staff coordination, or religious liaison officers.

(6) Commanders should make their chaplains available to assist units without assigned chaplains whenever possible and especially to adjacent units.

(7) Unit chaplains should provide essential religious coverage, workday religious services, and professional chaplain support by frequent and regularly scheduled visits. Responsibility for religious coverage does not cease when the unit is attached or in direct support of other organizations. If the chaplain cannot meet the requirements, he should obtain religious coverage from the chaplains assigned to the organization to which the unit is attached or in whose area the unit is located.

(8) Religious services and areas of professional support not considered to be required should be provided as resources of chaplain time and transportation are made available in excess of those required to accomplish minimum and essential religious coverage.

(9) Religious coverage will be provided during all combat operations, insofar as possible.

(10) Unit chaplains will accompany unit in combat operations, insofar as possible.

(11) Religious coverage will be provided by chaplains at those locations to which casualties are being evacuated during operations.

(12) In disaster areas, chaplain teams will normally operate with the medical or casualty assessment teams.

(13) The assignment of chaplains to units will be made on the basis of one chaplain per 700 troops or major fraction thereof.
ANNEX III
HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY AVAILABLE TO CHAPLAINS

The supervisory authority of chaplains in the early days of the chaplaincy was virtually nonexistent, if by this we mean the power of a chaplain to control the activities of another chaplain. In Colonial America preachers often led the men of their congregation off to battle. The first clergy to serve as chaplains did so as civilian pastors ministering to a local body of troops who had come from the same geographical area of the country. There were many reasons for this, not the least of which was that our military structure then in no way resembled the highly echeloned, sophisticated, and complex organization that we have today. Revolutionary chaplains served regiments and had no supervisory responsibilities. The amount of supervisory authority that chaplains possess has been steadily on the increase.

This evolution of increasing supervisory authority parallels the struggle in the chaplaincy over chaplain uniforms, rank, and pay. The practice of wearing the military uniform and rank has fluctuated through the years. In general the evolution has been from one of clerical garb, or other civilian attire, with no rank in the early days of the Republic to the present standardization of a military uniform with officer rank and chaplain branch insignia. Rank was conferred upon chaplains shortly before the start of the 20th century and has continued except for a brief period from 1918 to 1926. Initially pay was tied to a relative rank system, but today all three branches of the military pay a chaplain according to the rank standardized for all officers.

During the Civil War regimental and hospital chaplains served as individual pastors, sometimes in uniform. Some of the regimental chaplains had “strikers” whom they supervised minimally. Chaplain John Eaton was given the rank of colonel and put in charge of the black freedmen, but in this capacity he served as an administrator of what eventually became the Freedmen’s Bureau. Some talked about appointing a chaplain general during the Civil War, but nothing ever came of it.

During the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and the China Relief Expedition, chaplains had “strikers”, but these operated as regimental chaplains without supervision. This same pattern was followed on Pershing’s Punitive Expedition into Mexico and both Russian expeditions in 1918-1920.

It was not until General John J. Pershing appointed Bishop Charles H. Brent as Staff Chaplain, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, France, that chaplains supervised other chaplains. As the Y.M.C.A. (usually Protestant clergymen), Salvation Army workers, Red Cross chaplains, Knights of Columbus workers (usually priests), and Jewish Welfare Board workers (some rabbis) were duplicating each other’s efforts, sometimes not reaching any troops in isolated areas. These well-meaning civilians often competed against one another, and they required logistical support. Neither Pershing nor his staff really knew how many chaplains were in France or where all of them were located. As a result, when Bishop Brent, Pershing’s old friend who had baptized him in the Philippines about ten years earlier, visited France as a Y.M.C.A. representative, Pershing asked him to remain, accept a commission, serve as chief A.E.F. chaplain, and organize and administer the religious activities and personnel.

Bishop Brent accepted the position but wanted to retain his civilian status. Pershing and his staff, however, believed Brent could serve more effectively with a commission, and Brent eventually accepted a commission in the rank of major. Pershing attempted to get Bishop Brent a lieutenant colonel’s rank, but Federal law only authorized the rank of major for chaplains. When Brent was commissioned in June 1918, he had already been in the job as a civilian since late December 1917. The War Department cablegram commissioned him for “general supervision over the duties and instruction of chaplains throughout this command.”

As Senior G.H.Q. Chaplain, Chaplain Brent had two chaplains assisting him, a Catholic and a Protestant (The Protestant was the son of Dwight L. Moody, the famous evangelist). Brent’s office arranged for the position in the divisions of Senior Division Chaplain who coordinated the religious activities within the division. Brent’s office also created a Chaplain School in France which served several purposes. The school assigned chaplains to units when the chaplains entered the country. In a short course chaplains learned how to function with combat units. Also, the Chaplain School served as a chaplain rest center. Chaplain John Randolph was the Commandant of the school.
In the U.S. no chaplain exercised general supervision over the duties and instruction of other chaplains, except at the Chaplain School beginning in April 1918. Chaplain Al Pruden was the School Commandant. At many of the posts and camps, however, ranking chaplain often coordinated the religious activities among the chaplains and the various religious and quasi-religious organizations.

When World War I ended, the move for a chaplain corps and a chief of chaplains picked up steam. Chaplain Orville J. Nave actually started this move in 1887, but it never received serious attention from the War Department. Some of the chaplains preferred working under the direction of the Adjutant General’s Office rather than for a chief of chaplains who might be from another major faith group. Chaplain Cephas C. Bateman was the most outspoken against the chief of chaplain concept. Through the efforts of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Jewish Welfare Board, Congress created a chief of chaplains and a chaplain corps in June 1920.

The Chief was to serve in the rank of colonel for a period of 4 years. The rank was raised to temporary brigadier general during WW II and in 1944 to temporary major general. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 provided for the Chief to be a permanent major general.

From 1920 to 1945, as the number of chaplains on active duty greatly increased (though the role of the chaplain remained essentially unchanged), more chaplains found themselves in administrative and supervisory roles. To administer the burgeoning structure of the corps, some type of hierarchy, it was felt, was needed. This followed the chain of command in the echelonment of higher headquarters.

The big increase in supervisory and administrative duties really came with WW II. Even in the late 1930’s few “supervisory” or “administrative” chaplains existed in the Army. Their scarcity is suggested by The Chaplain Training Manual of 1937 which stated, “Occasionally chaplains of sufficient age, experience, and attainments will be called upon to supervise and coordinate the activities of other chaplains.” After citing the activities of tactical unit chaplains the manual stated: “Corps area, department, and division chaplains and senior chaplains in larger tactical units will have the responsibility of such activities in their realm.” In the main, the supervisory responsibility of corps area chaplains involved the extension courses of the Chaplain School and the courses of instruction at summer camps for Reserve Component chaplains. Chaplain activities not involving religious doctrine were under the supervision of senior chaplains. Concerning the extent of supervisory authority available to chaplains the manual states:

In matters touching upon methods of work and professional policy which do not involve church doctrine, supervisory authority over chaplains is vested in the Chief of Chaplains. He is charged with the duty of coordinating and supervising all religious work within the Army and, from time to time, making recommendations for such actions as he deems advisable to promote the moral and spiritual welfare and contentment of the Army (TM 2270.5, par 20, 1937).

Chaplain (COL) Wallace M. Hale deals with the growth of staff supervision during WW II in his unpublished theses and states:

The most extensive expansion of the mission of the military chaplain came during World War II when chaplains were assigned to the special staff of divisions and larger units. Staff supervision of religious activities, analysis of the total influence of religion, and the impact of religion on military operations—all these became aspects of the staff chaplain’s role. At the higher levels of command the supervisory chaplain spent as much as 90% of his time in administrative duties (Wallace M. Hale, ‘The Collection and Evaluation of Religious Information’, unpublished thesis, Army War College, 1960, pp. 32, 33).

The evolution of the role of the chaplain from pastor only to that of a staff chaplain responsible to the commander for the total religious program was a slow process, which picked up steam after World War II. To live within the military milieu, the chaplain needed to develop leadership and management skills. To be an effective staff officer he must understand the military, speak its language, and follow correct command and staff procedures. Chaplains would not dilute or compromise their religious mission in order to function as staff officers.
Although by law (Sec 3581, Title 10 U.S. Code) the chaplain may never exercise command, the senior chaplain of an organization or installation was given the staff responsibility for the supervision and coordination of the entire religious program. This responsibility involved working with chaplains junior in grade within the same command. Some degree of supervisory authority, it was felt, had to be assumed by the senior chaplain if he were to produce an effective religious program for the commander. The growth of this supervisory authority can be detected in the various chaplain field manuals produced after World War II.

The chaplain field manuals produced before the current FM 16-5, The Chaplain, December 1967, stated that the Chief of Chaplains, The Commandant of the Chaplain School and supervisory chaplains could exercise operational control and supervision over their own section, branch or division (emphasis mine). Presumably, supervisory chaplains could not exercise operational control and supervision over the other chaplains assigned to the same organization or installation. In this case the chaplain "should not use rank or solely depend on command channels in accomplishing their mutual tasks, but should endeavor to exercise the ideal form of leadership which inherently elicits respect and cordial cooperation (FM 16-5, The Chaplain, April 1958, p 8, para 12)." The FM's produced in this period do state, however, that the subordinate chaplain came under the supervisory chaplain's technical supervision. Technical supervision normally refers to supervision over the chaplain activities only. Exactly what technical supervision means so far as application is concerned is not stated.

The current FM 16-5 dated December 1967, eliminated the limited clause on operational control and merely stated, "he has authority to exercise function of operational control and supervision (FM 16-5, The Chaplain, Dec 67, p 6, para 2-50)." It does go on to state, however, that the amount of authority possessed by the supervisory chaplain is dependent upon "...The desires of the commander, the situation and number and denomination of chaplains available (ibid)." It appears that supervisory chaplains may have operational control and supervision over other chaplains or personnel rather than those assigned to their own particular section, branch, or division. The installation chaplain, depending on the desire of the commander, may have operational control over all the chaplains assigned to that installation. Lodge unit chaplains residing on an installation are an exception to the rule; they are not under the operational control of the installation chaplain, but do come under his technical supervision.

Subsequent to World War II, therefore, chaplains assumed more and more administrative responsibilities and the amount of supervisory authority available correspondingly grew. At first only the Chief of Chaplains, The Commandant of the Chaplain School and supervisory chaplains had operational control over their own section, branch or division. Presently, however, the current AR 600.20, AR 165-20 and FM 16-5, The Chaplain, extend that authority to chaplains serving in the capacity as a staff or supervisory chaplain to have operational supervision and control over subordinate chaplains. At this juncture, an important point must be reiterated. A chaplain may never assume command of an activity, an organization or an individual. No exception to this rule has ever been granted; he always acts for the commander as a staff officer, and must not assume the position of a commander in any situation.
APPENDIX I

Discussion/Analysis

Annex IV

Evaluation of Alternatives in Terms of Measures of Effectiveness
1. EVALUATION IN TERMS OF RATIO

Upon examination of the computer programs to determine chaplain to troop ratio, one fact surfaced which had not been discussed. The ratios in AR 570-2 are based upon the assumption that chaplains will perform all their functions in an equal manner. Thus a 1:700 ratio was determined to be satisfactory. The higher echelons of command require more and more of the supervisory staff chaplains effort to be expended in administrative matters; to include such TOE chaplain positions in an overall ratio analysis would be illogical. They are not available to TOE units of subordinate commands and, therefore, must not be considered as chaplain resources to offset the ratio discrepancies. Command and control headquarters such as corps should not be included in this evaluation but should be treated in the category of administrative staff chaplains. This is not to belittle their essential pastoral contribution to the whole command nor to invalidate the need for their administrative functions. They do perform religious and pastoral functions for personnel of the headquarters as required, but they have less time and opportunity available to them for those functions than chaplains in subordinate units.

a. Alternative I - Unit Assignment. Chaplain strengths by TOE assignments were charted against the force structure of the Leavenworth scenario. It was computed as if each unit was at 100% strength for all personnel, including chaplains.

In the entire air defense artillery support structure allocated within an Army in the field, the Leavenworth troop list indicates 21,477 personnel covered by 33 chaplains with a ratio of 1 chaplain for each 650 persons. The air defense artillery chaplains are allocated so as to provide battalion-based coverage and headquarters staff coordination and coverage. AR 570-2 indicates allocation of chaplains as 1 chaplain per each 700 persons or major fraction thereof. This unit-oriented ratio is achieved for nondivisional air defense artillery battalions as required.

The nondivisional field artillery units reflect 48 chaplains to some 24,271 personnel with a ratio of 1 chaplain for each 505 persons. This is an acceptable ratio considering the unit fragmentation and dispersion which makes face to face coverage more difficult. Any ratio less than 1:500 is considered by this analyst to be a misuse of chaplain resources when restricted to Alternative I.

There were only 2 chaplains in the force structure for 6,047 nondivisional combat support aviation personnel. This gives a ratio of 1 chaplain for each 3,023 persons. This is a significant variation from the recommended ratio. Aviation personnel are constantly exposed to danger and this emotional stress creates a situation whereby the chaplain’s services should be readily available. Within this alternative the provision for more chaplains in aviation unit TOE’s is recommended.

The nondivisional combat support engineer units reflect 30 chaplains to serve 27,691 personnel with a ratio of 1 chaplain for each 923 persons. This is an acceptable ratio and does not grossly exceed the ratio yardstick provided by AR 570-2. Placement within the engineer brigades and separate battalions is satisfactory.

Of all the signal units employed in the Leavenworth force model only one battalion had a chaplain. Considering all of the nondivisional combat support signal units a total of 1,276 personnel and 1 chaplain were computed giving a ratio of 1 chaplain for 1,276 persons. Since most of the signal units were separate companies attached to larger organizations, the one signal battalion chaplain provided no support to the majority of the signal personnel. There are 950 signal personnel in combat support roles who had no TOE unit chaplain. This is an unacceptable ratio.

When considering the total strength of nondivisional combat support organizations and their assigned chaplains, the ratio is ideal. For the 80,762 personnel there are 114 chaplains or 1 for each 708 persons. Since Alternative I requires that chaplain coverage be provided on a unit basis and not just total strengths, there are some serious flaws in the ratio. The two most obvious problems are with the aviation and signal organizations. The chaplain’s functions are not adequately provided them under existing TOE’s and a minimum of four chaplain positions would be required to provide for the additional personnel.
b. Alternative II - Unit Assignment/Cross-Coverage. The strength totals and chaplain positions are exactly the same as in Alternative I; therefore, the ratios would be the same. The only difference between Alternative I and Alternative II is the mode of providing chaplain support to those combat support organizations which are identified by the study as not having adequate TOE chaplain support. This alternative provides no means of chaplain ratios but proposes a flexible approach to the utilization of the TOE unit commander’s chaplain resources. Cross-coverge simply defined means that subordinate commanders would receive a directive from a superior commander to take responsibility for extending chaplain coverage to certain specified adjacent or subordinate units which do not have assigned chaplains. This is accomplished by giving the superior headquarters staff chaplain the responsibility and the authority to coordinate chaplain activities.

In the unit assignment/cross-coverage alternative the unacceptable unit ratios would indeed be alleviated of their destitute situation but at the cost of degrading the adjacent units’ chaplain to troop ratios. With careful management of resources, the degrading impact could be diminished. Since the overall combat TOE support organizations chaplain to troop ratios are already ideal, then it is reasonable that the impact of this alternative would be a vast improvement over Alternative I.

c. Alternative III - Unit Assignment Modified by Area Religious Coverage. The ratio measure of effectiveness would be exactly as depicted in Alternatives I and II because no changes are made in chaplain or troop strengths. The overall ratio would remain at 1 chaplain for each 708 persons while individual organization ratios remain as computed in Alternative I. The only difference is found in the mode of supplying chaplain coverage to those nondivisional combat support organizations which have unacceptable chaplain to troop ratios. The distinct difference between this alternative and Alternative II is that there is no command authority given with Alternative III and the responsibility for oversight of the total program of chaplain activities is voluntarily assumed by chaplains of superior headquarters and technical channels are used to attempt to coordinate and actualize chaplain coverage. Each individual chaplain’s desire to serve and the opportunity to extend those services is the key to effectuating this alternative. In terms of overall coverage ratios this alternative is rated adequate in terms of specific organizations ratios. There are several deficiencies in terms of resource management.

d. Alternative IV - Unit Assignment with Back-Up Team Support. A significant difference is introduced with this alternative because chaplain teams are added to the chaplains already serving the nondivisional combat support troops. This reduces the ratio to a more favorable level while making use of the modular team concept. Each team consists of 1 chaplain, 1 enlisted assistant and adequate team transportation with accompanying mission essential supplies. Though the teams are not assigned to organizations without chaplains, they are attached for maintenance and subsistence support. The senior unit staff chaplains directs and controls their activities or mission assignments. The teams are commanded by the superior unit commander at appropriate levels such as corps. A minimum of four back-up chaplain teams were used with this scenario giving an overall ratio of 1 chaplain for each 684 persons. The ratio is still well within the yardstick provided by AR 570-2. This alternative is rated outstanding in terms of ratio.

e. Alternative V - Unit Attached Teams. All TOE chaplain assignments were eliminated from combat support organizations in this alternative. The total strength of the combat support forces within the theater were used as the basis of allocation of chaplain teams. One team for each 700 troops was assigned to the army chaplain for redistribution by attachment to combat support units of his choice. The team supported the unit which it was attached but was under the command and control of the Army chaplain and could be attached to other units as the situation changed. The overall ratio was found to be excellent but the problem of some units not having any chaplain support appeared again the same as in Alternative I. There was a slight improvement in overall chaplain to troop ratios.

f. Alternative VI - Regional Support. This alternative provided chaplains which were utilized almost totally in terms of religious and pastoral functions and no subordinate chaplain to the corps were given staff or community functions since both of them required a command relationship. The chaplains assigned to combat and divisional organizations were not considered. It was impossible to consider chaplaincy/trouor ratios in units since the chaplain coverage was provided on a regional basis. The overall ratio was ideal and almost all the chaplains were more effective in performance of the two functions listed above.
g. Alternative VII - Theater of Operations Support. Every chaplain within the theater except the theater Army chaplain and his staff were relieved of staff and community functions while giving exclusive attention to the religious and pastoral functions. As in Alternative VI it was impossible to quantify unit chaplain troop ratios since coverage was provided on a regional basis. The overall ratio was again ideal when measured by the selected numerical criteria.

h. Conclusions.

Ratios alone are not a definitive measure of the effectiveness of these alternatives. The standard was established by regulation, and the criteria were met. There is more flexibility in Alternatives VI and VII but this was accomplished by sacrificing staff and community functions. The rigidity of Alternative I provided an environment in which all chaplain functions could be fulfilled, but units without TOE chaplains were excluded from any chaplain coverage. Ratios were inconclusive.

2. EVALUATION IN TERMS OF AREA AND DENOMINATIONAL COVERAGE.

a. Problem Definition.

The unit commander has the responsibility of providing the individuals under his command with an opportunity to worship God in keeping with the dictates of their own consciences and the ecclesiastical requirements of their own church (AR 165-20). Normally, the commander is able to fulfill this responsibility through an assigned chaplain. If no chaplain is assigned to his immediate command, the commander will designate an officer to maintain liaison with the staff chaplain of the next higher headquarters to provide the necessary area and denominational coverage (ibid). In most situations, especially in the case of nondivisional combat support units, chaplains are not available or are insufficient in number or denomination to care for the religious needs of the command. In this case commanders are authorized to secure the services of civilian clergy to provide the coverage (ibid). However, when engaged in combat the services of English speaking clergymen may not be available. In recent conflicts units were assigned to areas where indigenous religions do not meet the needs of the US Army servicemen who are of the Judaeo-Christian religious background. Area and denominational coverage, therefore is a critical issue.

A question that must be answered before the alternatives are evaluated by this MOE, is whether or not denominational coverage is different from area coverage and if so which is to take priority? Area coverage, strictly speaking, is the provision of religious services and other chaplain functions to the total command. Religious coverage is normally to the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish personnel. A unit may be considered to have had area coverage if any of the chaplains of the three major faiths have recently visited a unit and conducted religious services. However, a religious service conducted by a Protestant chaplain does not meet the religious needs of all three faiths. The chaplain of each major faith is able to conduct services for his respective faith only. He cannot meet the religious needs of all assigned personnel. A chaplain of either faith can conduct chaplain functions in the staff and personal counseling areas for the total command, but he is unable to provide religious or pastoral ministrations for any but of his own faith. Area coverage is incomplete without denominational coverage of these three major faiths.

As stated above denominational coverage is basically to the three major faiths, Catholic, Protestant and Jewish. The goal of full area and denominational coverage however, is complicated by the numerous religious groups within Protestantism that require the services of their own clergy, and the growth of non Judaeo-Christian religious groups within the military service. Within Protestantism the Episcopal, Lutheran, Christian Scientist, Latter Day Saints (Mormon) and others require the services of their own clergymen. The non Judaeo-Christian religions cannot be ministered to by either of the three major faiths chaplains. Their role is limited to providing either civilian clergymen, qualified lay leaders, or transportation to their respective religious services.

Area and denominational coverage cannot be separated if the commander attempts to fulfill his religious responsibility of providing an opportunity for all his personnel to worship God as each desires. The goal is practically impossible, due to the complications mentioned in the previous paragraphs.

The conflict of individual denominational services with the provision of a total ministry to the whole command is impossible to resolve on an individual basis. The solution must not forever penalize those ecclesiastical representatives who must provide peculiar denominational services by a wholly transient ministry, nor should it deprive commanders of their counsel and advice at the small unit level of command. The needs of the members of each denomination must be met as completely as is possible under the conditions imposed on the battlefield.
b. Evaluation.

(1) Alternative I, Unit Assignment. All chaplains are assigned to TOE authorized spaces. Command and control of chaplain functions and assigned duties would be retained by unit commander. This alternative conveys with it no responsibility by the chaplain for coverage of other units that have no assigned chaplain. Chaplains assigned to TOE units are able to give effective coverage to all units within that TOE organization. Under normal circumstances the chain of command is such that both the higher and lower echelons have chaplains of the three major faiths assigned. The controlling headquarters of several units may also have more than one chaplain assigned. Therefore area and denominational coverage within this TOE organization is possible. However, Alternative I, unit assignment must be rejected insofar as providing area and denominational coverage to nondivisional combat support organizations without assigned chaplains.

(2) Alternative II, Unit Assignment Cross Coverage and Alternative III, Unit Assignment Modified by Area Coverage. These alternatives provide for unit assignment but also provide coverage to adjacent units without assigned chaplains. The essential modus operandi of each are the same, but Alternative II, cross coverage gives more authority to the supervisory chaplain to control chaplains to effect area and denominational coverage. Alternative II is preferred to Alternative III. Alternative III places a difficult task on the supervisory chaplain; he must depend upon the cooperation of the assigned chaplains and their commanders to provide the coverage. If an operation is being conducted by the unit to which the chaplain is assigned, the commander is justifiably reluctant to release his chaplain for coverage of other units. If he did release his chaplain, he might be without coverage at a time he may have a crucial need for him. Alternative III cannot guarantee area or denominational coverage on a continuing basis.

Both alternatives share the following weakness: they limit the amount of time the chaplain is able to give to either his unit of assignment or his area coverage responsibility. The basic unit responsibilities, especially in a theater of operations in time of war, places a severe burden upon the chaplain assigned. To increase his responsibilities by assigning additional units to cover taxes his ability to serve either adequately. Alternatives II and III are marginally acceptable.

(3) Alternatives IV, Unit Assignment with Back up Team Support. This alternative model is able to provide the advantages of Alternatives I, II, III, unit assignment with the additional capability of providing area coverage without their disadvantages. The chaplain team's basic responsibility is to provide area coverage. Each team as provided by TOE 16-500 consists of one chaplain, one enlisted assistant with all necessary equipment. The number of teams necessary to a theater of operations depends on the number of assigned personnel without TOE chaplains. The ratio criteria for the assignment of teams is the same as for TOE chaplains (1:700 combat troops or major fraction thereof). The supervisory chaplain who has an area responsibility has the capability of providing area and denominational coverage without disrupting the basic assignment of his TOE chaplains. He possesses the capability of providing teams that have a denominational mix, and the necessary authority to shift the teams according to need. In terms of area and denominational coverage, Alternative VI is a feasible solution.

(4) Alternative V unit attached teams (controlled at Theater level) Alternative VI Regional Support (unattached teams controlled at corps level) and Alternative VII, Theater level Support (teams unattached). In all three of these alternatives the chaplains are withdrawn from TOE combat support organizations and pooled at higher echelons. These assets are then broken down in a modular team concept and are utilized as the situation dictates. Alternative V differs from Alternatives VI and VII in that the teams are attached to the various combat organizations. The chaplains in Alternatives VI and VII are utilized on an itinerant basis. They would operate much as a P.X. run. All denominational and area coverage would be planned, coordinated and controlled by the appropriate supervisory chaplain. Several major problem areas were surfaced in the study of the area support models which could not be tested in the gaming situation. First, it was recognized that assignments centrally controlled would require that the supervisory chaplain maintain some semblance of a war room where he could monitor the maneuver units activities and plan chaplain coverage accordingly. Second, a secure means of communication must be available to all chaplains in the field for purposes of duty assignment. Finally, logistic support must be centrally and carefully controlled.
All three alternatives meet the criteria of providing area and denominational coverage. Alternative V also gives the opportunity for a total ministry to the assigned personnel. It is assumed that in an attached status the chaplain would remain with one area of responsibility for a period of time lengthy enough to permit a total ministry. It is also assumed that the units hosting the chaplain teams would provide the necessary administrative and logistical support. Alternative V emerges as suitable to provide area and denominational coverage. Due to the limitation of providing a total ministry to personnel, Alternatives VI and VII are marginally acceptable.

3. EVALUATION IN TERMS OF SPAN-OF-CONTROL.

a. One of the important areas for consideration in evaluating an alternative models is span-of-control. This is based on the recognition that there is a limit to the number of individuals one supervisor can manage effectively. The problem is to evaluate each of the seven alternative organizational models in terms of span-of-control. Should either grossly violate this measure of effectiveness it should be eliminated on the basis that it would be inefficient in accomplishing its mission due to tardy or unresponsiveness to the needs of the command and an overextension of the supervisors capability to direct the functions.

b. Six factors have been selected and assigned numerical weight values in accordance with the purpose of alternative models. Those factors which are most significant to the chaplain support mission are given the highest numerical value.

1. Similarity of Function. This factor is given a value of 25.
2. Geographic Contiguity. A value of 20 is assigned this factor.
3. Complexity of Functions. This factor is given a value of 20.
4. Direction and Control. A value of 15 is given this factor.
5. Coordination. A value of 10 is given this factor.
6. Planning. A numerical value of 10 is assigned this factor.

The total score for all factors equals 100. If an alternative was evaluated and obtained a total score of less than 75, it was considered to be an unacceptable alternative.

The criteria for measuring each factor against the alternatives are found in figure 1-2. If an alternative rated lower than the second column of the span-of-control matrix, no score is given that alternative. The total score for that factor is awarded the Alternative that can meet the criteria of either the second or first column of the matrix. Figures 1-3 through 1-8 are the worksheets for each alternative.

Alternative I and IV were found to be acceptable alternatives. Alternative II is marginal, but Alternatives III, VI and VII are unacceptable.

4. COST BENEFITS

a. Discussion

(1) Comparative costs of each alternative mode of chaplain support in relation to the benefits received from the alternatives is the fifth measure of effectiveness. It sounds mundane to suggest that chaplain services can be equated with cost, but the measurement is applied in terms of material and personnel costs required to support the different concepts. While it is true that the main concern is the mission, it would be folly to choose the most costly alternative if another will accomplish the mission of chaplain support to nondonvitional combat support organizations just as effectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divergent and non-programmed decisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programmed decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex, moderate, and simple decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine, frequent, and infrequent decisions</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
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<td>Moderate</td>
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<th>Information</th>
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<td>Moderate</td>
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<td>Complex</td>
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<tr>
<th>Conflict and Complexity Matrix</th>
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<td>Routine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Routine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complex</td>
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<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Complex</td>
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<td>Complex</td>
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<td>Moderate</td>
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<td>Complex</td>
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<th>Priority</th>
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<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex</td>
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### PAN OF CONTROL MOE WORKSHEET

**UNIT TITLE** Alternative I

**Unit Assignment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>NUMERICAL VALUE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIMILARITY OF FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>All chaplains perform the same functions with varying degrees of involvement in each. The supervisory chaplain spends more time in the staff functions; the battalion chaplain more time in the religious and pastoral functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC CONTIGUITY</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Chaplains assigned to the units are always in close proximity of their personnel. Supervisory Chaplains in the same command channels are located usually 5-10 miles of their chaplains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLEXITY OF FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Rather routine for chaplains assigned to units. The supervisor and subordinate chaplains have clear lines of authority and job functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTION AND CONTROL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Unit assignment of chaplains require the least amount of supervision of any of the alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COORDINATION</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Chaplains stress coordination between chaplains because of the changing religious coverage requirements of the battlefield. Regular visits by the supervisor are possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Routine planning is normal in a static situation. Intra-staff coordination required in a fluid battlefield situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL NUMERICAL VALUE** 100

*Figure 1-3*
**SPAN-OF-CONTROL MOE WORKSHEET**

**UNIT:** Alternative II  
**Title:** Unit Assignment Cross Coverage

<table>
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<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>NUMERICAL VALUE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similarity of Functions</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Chaplains perform same functions. The amount of time spent on community and pastoral functions limited because of area coverage responsibility. Additional staff responsibilities must be assumed by supervisory chaplain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Contiguity</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Depends entirely on the amount of area coverage necessary. Normally unit assigned chaplains can cover most units without chaplains in a 5-10 mile radius.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of Functions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Routine, if the area coverage responsibilities and priority of functions are clearly spelled out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direction and Control</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Cross-Coverage will require frequent continuous supervision to insure proper area and denomination coverage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Frequent relationships requiring some command attention. Although this alternative provides the supervisory chaplain with necessary authority, he will need to make continuous coordination with all commanders concerned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Moderate scope and complexity. Coordination and planning with all echelons required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL NUMERICAL VALUE 65**

Figure 1-4
### SPAN-OF-CONTROL MOE WORKSHEET

**UNIT TITLE**: Alternative III  
**Unit Assignment, Area Coverage**

<table>
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<th>FACTOR</th>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIMILARITY OF FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Identical, except for varying degrees of involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC CONTIGUITY</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>In normal situations unit area coverage can be accomplished within 5-10 mile radius.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLEXITY OF FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Routine, but responsibilities and priority of functions must be clearly spelled out. The staff function for the supervisor become more complex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTION AND CONTROL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Requires frequent continuous supervision. Coverage depends on cooperation of commanders and chaplains to effect coverage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COORDINATION</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Routine daily relations and occasional command decisions. The fluid battlefield conditions can change the unit alignment and there-by require daily coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Considerable effort required, and the priority of coverage to unit of assignment and area coverage units will need to be carefully balanced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL NUMERICAL VALUE**: 65

Figure 1-5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>NUMERICAL VALUE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIMILARITY OF FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Functions of all chaplains alike, except varying degrees of involvement in each.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC CONTIGUITY</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>The majority of chaplains will be unit assigned and are always in close proximity. However, the teams may be located anywhere from 5-75 miles of one another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLEXITY OF FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Functions of both teams and TOE chaplains will be routine. Some additional administrative load will be placed on the supervisory chaplain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTION AND CONTROL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Control of unit assigned chaplain will be minimal. Control of chaplain teams will require limited supervision once the area coverage assignments are made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COORDINATION</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Coordination with unit chaplains will require minimal effort. Relationships with the teams satisfied by regular liaison visits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Limited scope. Some initial staff coordination is required to plan area coverage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL NUMERICAL VALUE 100

Figure 1-6
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIMILARITY OF FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>All chaplains perform some basic functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC CONTIGUITY</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Chaplain attached teams will be located wherever units are located. The scope of the area of operations will determine the spread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLEXITY OF FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>The chaplain attached teams will perform repetitive functions. However, the administrative and staff function of the supervisory chaplain becomes more complex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTION AND CONTROL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Moderate periodic supervision, the teams are attached to and withdrawn from units as the situation dictates. In a static situation very little direction will be necessary, but in a changing battlefield situation, chaplain teams will be shifted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COORDINATION</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Frequent relationships and command attention. Shifting chaplain teams within the total command will require a great amount of coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Considerable effort required. Guided by mission type orders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL NUMERICAL VALUE** 65

Figure I-7
### SPAN-OF-CONTROL MOE WORKSHEET

**UNIT:** Alternative VI, VII  
Regional Support, Unattached teams and Theater Area Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>NUMERICAL VALUE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIMILARITY OF FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Chaplain functions the same, but with increased staff load and supervisory chaplain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC CONTIGUITY</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>At corps level the geographic contiguity is acceptable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLEXITY OF FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Functions are generally routine for the chaplain teams. The staff function for the supervisor becomes highly complex as teams are regularly shifted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTION AND CONTROL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Direction and control of these unattached teams will require constant close supervision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COORDINATION</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Extensive detailed daily relationship between staff and various Hq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Considerable effort required. Guided by mission type orders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL NUMERICAL VALUE** 45  

Figure 1-8
b. Analysis

(1) Costs, however, must always be measured against the benefits received from an alternative model. A costly alternative may accomplish the full objective of providing complete and continuous chaplain support, but a less costly alternative may provide adequate support in most of the chaplains' functions. To state it another way, an alternative may cost x number of dollars but give 100% chaplain coverage. Another alternative may cost 20% less in x dollars, but gives 90% chaplain coverage. Is a 90% fulfillment of the objective acceptable especially if a significant cost reduction is attained? If this is true how is chaplain coverage provided for the remaining 10%? If an alternative is capable of providing 100% coverage, it should be seriously considered in spite of the fact that it may be the most costly of the alternatives. The objective is to provide maximum chaplain coverage to the nondivisional combat support units. A purely quantitative analysis, the closer the alternative is to this objective, the more the cost. In making the final choice, the subjective judgment of the analyst is applied.

(2) Comparison of costs for each alternative is a difficult task, for it assumes that all dollar costs involving transportation, equipment, administration, maintenance, travel and personnel have been computed. However, actual dollar costs are beyond the ability of this agency to compute.

(3) Some rational, logical and single basis must be devised to arrive at a conclusion reference the costs. The most easily quantitative method is simply to determine the number of chaplains, chaplain enlisted assistants, equipment, and a general subjective statement concerning the additional amount of staff work required by one alternative over another. The assumption is that more chaplains cost more money and require additional costly logistical support; additional chaplains and logistical support require additional administration and supervision. Additional administration and supervision costs more money in terms of time and effort. Therefore, cost will be determined on the basis of which alternative, comparatively speaking, requires more manpower and materiel support.

(4) Alternative I is the least costly of the seven alternatives. Each chaplain is assigned to a TOE position, and receives his logistical support from his own organization. In terms of mission accomplishment TOE positions in operation SCIMITAR were provided to give coverage to nearly 90% of the combat support personnel. The remaining 10% numbered over 7,000 personnel. This alternative gives no coverage to these personnel. Within the objective of this study, this alternative gives no improvement in mission accomplishment.

(5) Alternative II, III costs no more than Alternative I in terms of chaplain personnel or equipment. It does require additional administration to plan the area and denominational coverage. Travel time is necessary to reach the units to be covered, and involves additional fuel costs and maintenance on the vehicles. Alternatives II and III give improvement in mission accomplishment, but the statement, "improvement in mission accomplishment" needs to be qualified. In order to provide time to area and denominational coverage the chaplains must be taken away from their basic assignment. Consequently, a reduction in the number of functions performed takes place.

(6) Alternative IV gave 100% mission accomplishment, but requires additional manpower and logistics cost. The 7,000 combat support personnel in operation SCIMITAR who have no chaplain coverage require an additional 10 chaplain teams (AR 570-2, 1,700 or major fraction thereof) to give the proper area and denominational coverage. The availability of these teams to give area coverage permits TOE chaplains to perform their functions without disruption. The teams' sole purpose is to give area coverage. The number of teams required will vary with the number of personnel without chaplain coverage. In spite of the additional cost this alternative is an effective means of giving area coverage while permitting the majority of chaplains to be assigned to TOE units.
(7) Alternative V requires no additional chaplains or chaplain vehicles, but does require additional administrative direction, planning and logistical support. A considerable amount of travel is involved to give continual and frequent area coverage for the units to which they are attached. The chaplains are limited as to the number of functions they may perform. Some mission improvement is possible at only a moderate increase in cost.

(8) Alternative VI, VII are the least desirable in terms of cost benefits. They both require increased costs in logistical support occasioned by increased travel costs, and in personnel both supervisory and supportive with no real corresponding improvement in the overall mission accomplishment.

c. Conclusion

(1) Alternative I is the least costly of the alternatives, but gives no improvement in the mission. In terms of cost benefits it must be rejected. On the other end of the scale Alternatives VI and VII were both costly and ineffective. They too must be rejected. Alternatives II and III gave improvement in mission accomplishment at very little increase in costs. Alternative II is preferred over Alternative III because the supervisory chaplain is better able to plan and control his assets to accomplish the mission. Alternative IV is costly because it requires additional manpower. However, the manpower costs are offset by decreased transportation and administration costs. This alternative must be seriously considered, for a 100% mission accomplishment is possible. Alternative V gave improvement in mission accomplishment at little increase in costs.

(2) Alternatives II, IV and V emerge as the choice alternatives in terms of cost benefits. In the authors judgment, Alternatives II and IV are the most effective in terms of this MOE with Alternative IV the preferred.

5. EVALUATION IN TERMS OF TIME AND DISTANCE.

a. Discussion.

(1) The amount of time spent traveling to visit a unit definitely affects the mission effectiveness of chaplain support. Due to the number of troops requiring coverage and their widespread employment, the chaplain must budget his time wisely. Effective chaplain coverage is not possible if the chaplain must spend an inordinate amount of his time in transit.

(2) All modes of transportation were considered in this evaluation. However, the normal and most frequently available mode of transportation provided to the chaplain is a one-quarter ton truck. Therefore, terrain and driving conditions become critical considerations for travel time. The most recent conflict (the Vietnam) indicated that chaplains were able to hitchhike on supply runs or staff visits by air transportation. This ability to hitchhike was indeed impressive but could hardly be considered the norm. The one-quarter ton vehicles are the only authorized transportation available to the chaplain.

(3) The rate of travel across land was evaluated to be not less than 25 miles per hour and not more than 35 miles per hour. The outer limits of this range were used as the guide and actual unit placement of the map were utilized as the basis for judgment. The applied rule determined that only distance which required the chaplain to spend three or more hours in transit each day in order to accomplish his mission was excessive, and therefore, that organizational alternative was unacceptable. The round distance factor which became prohibitive was selected as 100 miles (50 miles one way) across open secure terrain, 50 miles (25 miles one way) across secure mountainous or broken terrain, and 25 miles (12.5 miles one way) across insecure cross-country terrain.

(4) The average distance traveled by the chaplain under each alternative was computed by locating the units on an overlay for each snapshot situation. (Figures 1-9 thru 1-11) It was then a simple matter to measure the distance, analyze the road conditions and relief to conduct the evaluation.
Figure I-9  2nd Corps Unit Positions for Situation 1 (Build-up Phase)
IIV-15
Figure I-10  2d Corps Unit Positions for
Situation 2 (Attack Phase)

2-IV-16
Figure I-11  2d Corps Unit Positions for Situation 2
(Counter-attack Phase).
b. Analysis of terrain, operation SCIMITAR.

1) The area of operation under consideration in SCIMITAR is divided into east-west corridors by the Carpathian mountains north of Bucuresti, the Rhodope mountains south of Plovdiv, and the Stara Planina mountains in central Bulgaria. Drainage of the larger rivers in the area is generally from west to east. The Stara Planina, which will figure predominantly in any north-south operation rises from an altitude of about 1,300 meters at the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border to an altitude of over 2,200 meters north of Plovdiv and then declines to about 400 meters in the area adjacent to the Black Sea. The Rhodope mountains in southern Bulgaria vary in height from about 1,500 meters along the border with Greece to about 2,000 meters south of Plovdiv.

2) The surface materials in the area are of three general types:
   a) In the mountains, beds of limestone, sandstone, shale, lime, clay and some granite. All are overlaid by a thin layer of sandy soil.
   b) In the Danube Valley, clay and sandy-clay soils predominate for about 30 kilometers on each side of the river.
   c) Clay, sand, gravel, and silt occur in alluvial soil belts in the other river valleys.

3) Manmade features. Principal roads and railroads are shown on the reference map (Europe Balkans 1:500:00 Bucuresti - Istanbul, USAGCS 500- Y2). The best transportation net runs east and west. Numerous secondary roads and tracks exist in the area.

4) Obstacles. The Rhodope mountains, together with the Stara Planina and the Sredna Gora, are formidable obstacles. The few routes through these areas frequently traverse narrow gorges that are easily defended or are easily converted into obstacles by the judicious use of demolitions. Movement of mechanized, motorized or armored forces through these mountains is extremely hazardous and vulnerable to enemy operations.

5) Conclusion. Chaplain travel in the area of operation will be limited by the lack of a good road system and the mountainous terrain. The distance factor by which the alternatives will be evaluated will be on the basis of 50 miles (round trip) across secure mountainous terrain. The majority of chaplain travel to reach the nondivisional combat support organizations will be in secure areas behind the FEBA.

c. Evaluation

1) Introduction. The size of the area of operations for the corps remained practically the same, but as the operation progressed the rear area and COMMZ increased in depth. In the first situation (build up) the terrain favored the use of vehicles, but in situation 2 (attack) and (counter attack) the area of operations was mountainous and the road conditions deteriorated. Consequently, when chaplain coverage became critical (increased casualties), the amount of time required to reach the unit increased.

2) Alternative I, Unit Assignment. All chaplains were able to give adequate coverage for their units. The nature of unit assignment permits the chaplain to be in close proximity of his unit. No further evaluation is necessary.

3) Alternative II, Unit Assignment Cross Coverage and Alternative III, Unit Assignment, Area Coverage. Since the area of operations of the corps averaged about 50 miles across and 50 miles in depth, all area coverage is performed by the chaplains within this area. Through careful planning by the corps or COSCOM, the chaplains should have no difficulty reaching all the units even in mountainous terrain, within the prescribed travel limit.

4) Alternative IV, Unit Assignment, Back-Up Team Support. The majority of chaplains are assigned to TOE positions, and chaplain coverage presents no problem. The teams may be given an area responsibility (within the prescribed travel limits) operating directly under the supervision of a supervisory chaplain or attached to a unit that is located in the center of a cluster of various units. An airfield is an excellent example of a locale containing a cluster of units requiring chaplain coverage. Once attached the team remains in the area of responsibility until the situation changes. Alternative IV is rated satisfactory.
(5) Alternative V, Theater Support, Unit Attached Teams. This alternative is similar to Alternatives II and III in terms of time/distance. These teams are attached to a unit with area coverage responsibilities. Through proper planning by the supervisory chaplain, the teams would be given only the area coverage that they could conveniently reach within the time/distance criteria to provide effective coverage. Sufficient teams would be available in an operation the size of SCIMITAR to preclude larger area coverage responsibilities. Alternative V is rated satisfactory in terms of time/distance.

(6) Alternative VI, Regional Support and VII, Theater Operations Area Support. These alternatives provide teams for religious support on a pure area basis and are employed much as a P.K. run. The primary difference between these alternatives is the level in which they are controlled. It is possible for the chaplain teams in Alternative VI and VII to reach any unit within the corps slice of operation SCIMITAR, but they would be operating beyond the limits of the criteria. Except for units located in the general vicinity of the corps rear area, the teams would need to travel more than 25 miles (one way) to reach the majority of units. During the build up phase the teams were operating in open secure terrain, and were able to provide daily chaplain coverage. As the operation progressed into the attack and post attack phases the controlling headquarters were located in excess of 50 miles to the rear of the FEBA. Alternatives VI and VII are not satisfactory in terms of time/distance.