THE CHANGING ROLES FOR THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. (U)

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

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The Changing Roles for Theater Nuclear Forces

by

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FOREWORD

This memorandum addresses the impact of strategic parity on the deterrence and defense roles for NATO's theater nuclear forces. The danger of mutual annihilation requires that deterrence based on the threat of escalation be de-emphasized and that direct defense capabilities be improved. The author contends that NATO will be forced to rely to a greater degree than in the past on its conventional forces to deter conventional aggression, and to depend more than previously upon its theater nuclear forces to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons in Europe. He believes that the direct relationship between deterrence and defense means that the major defense role for theater nuclear forces in the future will be to retaliate to the enemy's use of nuclear weapons. The implications of these changes in the deterrence and defense roles for NATO's theater nuclear forces are discussed, and suggestions as to future posture and force structure are offered.

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DeWitt C. Smith, Jr.
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THE CHANGING ROLES FOR THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

The deterrence and defense roles for NATO's theater nuclear forces have changed over the past 20 years and can be expected to undergo additional changes in the future. Past changes were necessary to adjust to the strategy of flexible response and the growing nuclear power of the Soviet Union. The impact of strategic parity and the need to deter escalation of a theater conflict are likely to require further changes in the deterrence and defense roles for NATO's theater nuclear forces in the future. US officials should anticipate the necessity for these changes and implement appropriate actions gradually over the next 5 to 15 years. The end result should be perceived within the Alliance and by the Soviet Union as an evolutionary process designed to preserve stability in Europe and not as a sudden shift in US defense policy.

WATERSHEDS

Tactical nuclear weapons were first deployed to the central region of NATO in the mid-1950's to compensate for the disparity in conventional force levels that favored the Warsaw Pact. At that time the United States enjoyed unquestioned nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, and aggression in Europe was deterred by the threat of massive
retaliation. The deployed tactical nuclear weapons were considered to be an instrument of the US policy of extended deterrence and an inextricable element of the total nuclear power of the United States. Conventional forces in Europe had no deterrence role, and their defense role was to serve as a "tripwire," proving aggression had occurred and justifying the use of nuclear weapons. Theater nuclear forces had no deterrence role independent of US strategic nuclear forces, and their defense role was to support the commitment of US strategic nuclear forces in strikes against targets in Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union reacted to the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to Europe by concentrating its efforts on development of missiles to support an opposing theater nuclear capability. The success of the Soviet Union in space technology in the late 1950's and the evidence of sizable Soviet theater nuclear forces opposite Western Europe in the early 1960's prompted US officials to advocate that NATO adopt the strategy of flexible response. Under this new strategy, the threat of an immediate and exclusive nuclear response to aggression was to be replaced by the concept of graduated deterrence: response to aggression would be in the form and at the level appropriate for the situation. Theater nuclear forces were to retain a supporting role in general war, but the threat represented by Soviet tactical nuclear capabilities required that NATO's theater nuclear forces be assigned additional deterrence and defense roles, independent of US strategic nuclear forces. The new strategy of flexible response would also increase the deterrence and defense responsibilities of NATO's conventional forces.

According to Harlan Cleveland, former US Ambassador to NATO, the strategy of flexible response confronted "the enemy with a credible threat of escalation in response to any type of aggression below the level of a major nuclear attack." Thus, the new strategy established a relationship between that element of military power representing a direct response to the type of aggression selected by the enemy and that element of military power constituting an escalatory response. NATO's conventional forces shared the deterrence of conventional aggression with NATO's theater nuclear forces; NATO's theater nuclear forces were linked to US strategic nuclear forces to deter the enemy's use of nuclear weapons in Europe. If deterrence of conventional aggression failed, NATO's conventional forces were required to conduct a conventional defense rather than merely serve in a tripwire role. If the efforts of NATO's conventional forces proved to be inadequate,
NATO's theater nuclear forces were to carry out the threat of escalation. If the enemy responded with nuclear weapons or initiated their use, NATO's theater nuclear forces were to defend, and NATO leaders were to threaten general war, in which, at that time, the Soviet Union would have been at a disadvantage.

Although the strategy of flexible response was not formally adopted by NATO until 1967, conceptual studies of the strategy began much earlier in the United States. In the vast majority of these studies it was assumed that the Warsaw Pact invaded Europe for some reason or other and that aggression was initiated with conventional forces. These scenarios usually portrayed the rapid failure of NATO's conventional defense and the early use of tactical nuclear weapons to destroy Warsaw Pact forces. Some of these studies considered the possibility of nuclear retaliation by the Warsaw Pact forces but dismissed such a response as unlikely because of the strategic superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union. Other studies suggested that a bilateral nuclear war could be confined geographically to Europe without escalating, despite the widespread destruction and the possibility that NATO might lose such a war. US officials in decisionmaking positions discounted these conceptual studies as lacking rigorous strategic rationale and as politically unacceptable to European NATO. Instead, they adhered to the "firebreak" theory that any use of nuclear weapons would quickly and inevitably lead to general war, refused to modernize the theater nuclear capability in Europe, and urged the strengthening of the Alliance's conventional forces.

STRATEGIC PARITY

By the late 1960's it was apparent that the Soviet Union was approaching rough parity in strategic forces with the United States and that concepts for the use of tactical nuclear weapons which relied upon US strategic superiority would lack the degree of credibility they had enjoyed previously. President Nixon reacted to this fundamental shift in the strategic balance by questioning the single option for the use of US strategic forces under the concept of assured destruction. He recognized also that the growth of Soviet strategic forces had implications for the "relative role of strategic nuclear forces, conventional forces, and tactical nuclear weapons" and that the conflicting views in the conceptual studies of the 1960's on the use of tactical nuclear weapons needed to be resolved.
Following the SALT I agreement of 1972, which tacitly acknowledged that the Soviet Union had achieved parity in strategic forces with the United States, changes in the deterrence and defense roles for US strategic forces in support of NATO were made public. Aside from continued responsibilities to deter and defend in general war, which could evolve from a European conflict, US strategic forces were to deter further escalation of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and reinforce theater nuclear forces if needed. This reinforcement role could involve the execution of limited strategic options by US strategic forces in the defense of Europe. These limited strategic options were described by the US Secretary of Defense in March 1974 as part of the doctrine of flexible strategic response and as “measured responses to aggression which bear some relation to the provocation, have prospects of terminating hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out, and leave some possibility for restoring deterrence.”

The effect of strategic parity on the deterrence and defense roles for NATO’s theater nuclear forces became evident in April 1975 in a report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense on The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe. This report acknowledged that “the threat of mutual annihilation limits the range of hostile actions which can be deterred by strategic forces and places more emphasis on the deterrent roles of theater nuclear and conventional forces.” Although strategic nuclear forces would continue to be coupled to the deterrence of attacks on Europe, strategic parity would require NATO’s theater nuclear and conventional forces to shoulder more of the deterrence burden than in the past. Deterrence for NATO could no longer be based solely on the threat of escalation but must rely also on the military capabilities within the theater which a prudent enemy would perceive as sufficient to deny him his expectation of success. Because of strategic parity, the emphasis within NATO’s strategy of flexible response would be on direct defense rather than on deliberate escalation.

The report on The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe is important also because it specifies the objective for the use of nuclear weapons and provides policy guidance on first and retaliatory uses of nuclear weapons by NATO forces. “The primary objective for the use of nuclear weapons [is] the termination of war on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies at the lowest feasible level of conflict.” This statement represents a major shift from the thinking of the 1950’s
and 1960's, when the objective for the use of nuclear weapons in Europe was to destroy or defeat the invading Warsaw Pact forces. If NATO should initiate the use of nuclear weapons, "first use should be clearly limited and defensive in nature, so as to reduce the risks of escalation." This exercise of restraint, too, is far different from most of the conceptual studies and war games of the past, when first use of nuclear weapons by NATO forces was postulated as an all-out, theater-wide nuclear barrage. If the Warsaw Pact should be the first to use nuclear weapons or respond to NATO's restrained first use, "efforts would be made to control escalation . . . by a combination of clearly perceivable limits on the NATO nuclear response and the threat of more extensive strikes with theater and strategic forces . . . ."8

Before strategic parity, the primary deterrence role for NATO's theater nuclear forces was to threaten to escalate a conventional conflict. Now, however, the danger of mutual annihilation requires that deterrence based on the threat of escalation be de-emphasized and that direct defense capabilities be improved. Thus, strategic parity will tend to weaken the relationship established initially by the strategy of flexible response in which deterrence was shared between those elements of military power representing direct defense and escalatory responses. NATO will be forced to rely to a greater degree than in the past on its conventional forces to deter conventional aggression and to depend more upon its theater nuclear forces to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons in Europe. This change in the primary deterrence role for NATO's theater nuclear forces is implied by the order of presentation in the report on The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe: "theater nuclear forces deter WP use of nuclear weapons by providing a capability for credible retaliatory responses . . . Theater nuclear forces also help deter conventional attacks by posing a threat of nuclear use should the conventional situation warrant."9

The future defense roles for NATO's theater nuclear forces must be derived directly from their deterrence roles if deterrence is to be credible. This relationship means that the major defense role for theater nuclear forces in the future will be to retaliate to the enemy's use of nuclear weapons in Europe, regardless of which side uses them first. The change in the primary deterrence role from contributing to the dissuasion of conventional aggression to discouraging the enemy from using nuclear weapons in Europe would not eliminate the possibility that NATO might use nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional force deficiencies, but US policy requires such use to be restrained. This
policy on first use would not deny NATO forces the use of nuclear weapons at a high level of intensity, but it would require that the large number of nuclear weapons needed for such use be reserved for retaliatory strikes. An additional defense role for NATO’s theater nuclear forces specified in the report on The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe is to execute highly discriminating interdiction strikes “against enemy line of communication or forces” outside the immediate battle area.10

These changes in the deterrence and defense roles for NATO’s theater nuclear forces may appear to be merely shifts in emphasis from their current roles. On the contrary, strategic parity will require NATO to be more self-reliant than in the past, and its theater nuclear forces will have to assume deterrence and defense responsibilities that were formerly held by strategic nuclear forces. The new primary deterrence role for NATO’s theater nuclear forces, to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons in Europe, had been shared with strategic nuclear forces in the past, but in the future strategic nuclear forces will reinforce NATO’s theater nuclear forces as needed. This is a reversal of their respective roles in the 1950’s and 1960’s. The trend away from reliance on strategic nuclear forces to deter and defend against aggression in Europe, which began when the strategy was changed from massive retaliation to flexible response, will continue in the future.

IMPLICATIONS

The changes in the deterrence and defense roles suggest that the principal mission for NATO’s theater nuclear forces should change in the future from maintaining a war-fighting capability to establishing a second-strike capability. It may have been logical in the past to have a war-fighting posture, when the primary objective for using nuclear weapons was to complement NATO’s conventional forces in destroying or defeating Warsaw Pact forces and when the strategic superiority of the United States was a credible deterrent to further escalation of the conflict. Now, with strategic parity and the primary objective for using nuclear weapons being termination of the conflict, the posture of NATO’s theater nuclear forces should not challenge the Warsaw Pact to a nuclear war. The need for NATO to have a second-strike theater nuclear capability is consistent also with the new policy on restrained first-use options.

For over 20 years NATO has threatened to use nuclear weapons in
response to an overwhelming conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces. The Soviet Union reacted with counter-threats to respond or preempt such use with massive nuclear strikes on a theater-wide scale. If the posture of NATO's theater nuclear forces were changed in the future so that it is primarily a second-strike capability, the enemy's perception of how NATO might use nuclear weapons initially should change also, thereby reducing the risk of a preemptive nuclear attack. If it should prove necessary for NATO to execute a restrained first-use option, the Soviet Union would be less likely to respond on a massive scale if NATO's theater nuclear forces could not be effectively neutralized by such a response. The unused second-strike capability of NATO's theater nuclear forces should constitute a threat to the enemy that would discourage a nuclear response, help deter further escalation if the enemy should decide on a nuclear response, and induce the enemy to terminate hostilities.

The essential requirement for NATO to have a second-strike theater nuclear capability in the future means that NATO's theater nuclear forces must be more survivable than they are in their present configuration. Currently, most of NATO's theater nuclear forces are dual-capable in that the same target acquisition, command and control, and delivery systems are used to support both conventional and nuclear operations. If conventional conflict precedes the use of nuclear weapons, some of the dual-capable systems will be damaged or destroyed, degrading the theater nuclear capability. In the future, the vulnerability of dual-capable systems can be expected to increase in a conventional conflict because the enemy will be using precision-guided munitions and other advanced conventional weapons. If the direct defense capabilities of NATO's conventional forces can be improved, they should delay the need for NATO to use nuclear weapons, and the span of time during which NATO's dual-capable systems must survive conventional and perhaps nuclear attack would increase, compounding the vulnerability problem.

The essential requirement for NATO to have a survivable second-strike theater nuclear capability is independent of progress in improving the direct defense capabilities of NATO's conventional forces. If NATO's conventional war-fighting capabilities are improved in the future, the nuclear threshold would be raised for NATO, but it might be lowered for the Warsaw Pact. The leaders of the Soviet Union might choose to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in Europe rather than be denied their objectives by a successful conventional defense by
NATO forces. A survivable second-strike theater nuclear capability might deter such attacks or, failing that, permit NATO to retaliate effectively. If NATO’s conventional war-fighting capabilities are not improved in the future, NATO might need to initiate the use of nuclear weapons relatively early in the conflict as a hedge against conventional force failure. A survivable second-strike theater nuclear capability should minimize the incentives for the enemy to respond with nuclear weapons or to respond on a massive scale.

Perhaps there are other ways to provide the central region of NATO with a survivable second-strike theater nuclear capability, but the most direct method appears to be the addition of separate, overwatching, nuclear-only units. This means of reducing the vulnerability of NATO’s theater nuclear forces was suggested in the *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 1977*: “the vulnerability of these forces... should be reduced,... which may imply the organization of new units with more specialized nuclear missions.”11 In the mid-1950’s, the concept for supplying land forces with a nuclear capability involved the organization of US Army Atomic Support Commands, which were redesignated in 1957 as US Army Missile Commands. Currently, one of these commands still exists: the 4th US Army Missile Command in Korea. If missile commands were available in the central region of NATO, a nuclear capability would still be retained with NATO’s tactical units, primarily to execute restrained first-use options, but also to support the missile commands in high-intensity retaliatory strikes, if necessary.

Two missile commands, one deployed in the rear areas of CENTAG and the other in the rear areas of NORTAG, would tend to balance the nuclear support within AFCENT. The missile commands could be under the direct command of SACEUR, and they could be charged with the custody of all US nuclear weapons deployed to the central region of NATO. This arrangement would centralize the command and control of nuclear weapons, but the current procedures for requesting the authority to use nuclear weapons would be unchanged. If a NATO corps is authorized to execute a restrained first-use option to compensate for conventional force deficiencies, SACEUR would direct the appropriate missile command to release the nuclear weapons to the designated corps for expenditure. At the same time, both missile commands would prepare to retaliate if the enemy should respond with nuclear weapons. It might be necessary for a missile command to execute a restrained first-use option, in the form of a
highly-discriminating interdiction strike, if conventional aggression by
the Warsaw Pact progressed so far or so fast that NATO’s dual-capable
forces are unable to use nuclear weapons with control and constraint.

Although the two missile commands could provide the central region
of NATO with a survivable second-strike capability, equalize the
nuclear support within AFCENT, and centralize the command and
control of nuclear weapons, their formation would be expensive.
Because of their location and range requirements, the missile commands
should be equipped with medium- and long-range missiles and
supported by tactical aircraft. Lance and Pershing units might be
suitable as an interim measure, but the nuclear-only mission and the
need to avoid detection indicate a requirement for more efficient
missiles with less identifiable launchers and support equipment.
Personnel resources will be a problem also because there would have to
be trade-offs within the manpower ceiling authorized for this area.

Withholding the firepower potential of these missile commands during
nonnuclear operations, to decrease their vulnerability to enemy action,
would add to the expense.

As expensive as these two missile commands might be, the cost
should be viewed as necessary not only to provide AFCENT with a
survivable second-strike capability but also to achieve a nuclear balance
within Europe that will correspond to the mutual deterrence of
strategic parity. Currently, the Soviet Union has about 600 IR/MRBM
deployed near its western border which, in the European view,
constitute a strategic nuclear capability.12 These missiles, and aircraft
capable of striking targets in the central region of NATO from air bases
within the Soviet Union, are offset somewhat by strategic nuclear
forces located in and near Europe (e.g., SLBM’s) and the provision for
limited strategic options to support NATO’s theater forces, if needed.

Immediately opposite the AFCENT area, however, Warsaw Pact forces
have an advantage over NATO forces in numbers and types of medium-
and long-range dual-capable tactical missiles and rockets.13 Two
nuclear-only missile commands deployed in the AFCENT area would
tend to balance the theater nuclear capabilities within Europe and
enhance nuclear deterrence.

The cost of forming special nuclear organizations, such as two new
missile commands, should be compared also with the risks associated
with alternative solutions to the problem. One alternative might be to
rely on the strategic nuclear forces located in and near Europe to
provide AFCENT with a second-strike capability. The report of The
Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe includes an example of the use of these forces: "SLBM's provide highly survivable means for striking WP air bases in response to WP nuclear attacks on NATO air bases." 14 This use of strategic nuclear forces might be appropriate in this particular situation, but insufficient details are presented. Certainly there is a direct relation to the provocation, but if the nuclear attacks on NATO air bases had been carried out with dual-capable tactical missiles and rockets located in the battle area, a NATO response with strategic nuclear systems would represent excessive escalation. Then, too, SACEUR would be using strategic nuclear assets intended to deter the IR/MRBM threat to Europe. Although strategic nuclear forces have utility in limited attacks to support theater forces, they lack the flexibility needed for wide application in a variety of circumstances. It might be necessary, for example, for NATO's second-strike nuclear forces to execute a restrained first-use option in the form of a highly-discriminating interdiction strike because of large-scale destruction of dual-capable systems. The use of strategic nuclear forces in this role would be highly escalatory, increasing the risk of an enemy response with strategic attacks against Europe or even general war.

Finally, the cost of the missile commands should be considered with respect to their contribution to the coupling of US strategic nuclear forces to the defense of Europe. In the past, the concern of US Allies that a bilateral nuclear war might be confined geographically to Europe was alleviated by the commitment to use US strategic nuclear forces in homeland attacks on the enemy. Strategic parity raised doubts as to whether the United States would carry out that commitment because of the danger of mutual annihilation, and US Allies needed to be reassured that US strategic nuclear forces remain coupled to the defense of Europe. The US doctrine of flexible strategic response helps to preserve coupling because the doctrine includes the provision for limited strategic options which could be used to reinforce NATO's theater nuclear forces, if necessary. A second-strike theater nuclear capability would help preserve coupling, too, because it also threatens other than battlefield targets. Thus, the threat of the combination of limited strategic options and a retaliatory theater capability should convince US Allies that a nuclear war will not be confined to their territory.

SUMMARY

Since the SALT I agreement of 1972, which tacitly acknowledged
that the Soviet Union has achieved parity in strategic forces with the
United States, defense planners have realized that deterrence in Europe
can no longer be based solely on the threat of escalation but must be
based also on the prospect of direct defense and denial by
countervailing force within the theater. Strategic parity means that
NATO must rely more on its theater nuclear forces and less on strategic
forces to deter the threat represented by the enemy’s tactical nuclear
capabilities. Thus, the effect of strategic parity will be to change the
primary deterrence role of conventional aggression to discouraging the
enemy from using nuclear weapons in Europe.

The direct relationship between deterrence and defense and the new
policy guidance on first use of nuclear weapons indicate that the major
defense role for NATO’s theater nuclear forces in the future will be to
retaliate to the enemy’s use of nuclear weapons, regardless of which
side uses them first. This priority would not eliminate the possibility
that NATO might initiate the use of nuclear weapons as a hedge against
conventional force failure or as a highly-discriminating interdiction
strike, but the new policy on first-use options requires that such use be
clearly limited and defensive in nature. The policy of restraint on
first-use options would not deny NATO the use of nuclear weapons at a
high level of intensity, but it would require that the large number of
weapons needed for such use be reserved for retaliatory strikes.

The changes in the deterrence and defense roles suggest that the
principal mission for NATO’s theater nuclear forces should change in
the future from maintaining a war-fighting capability to establishing a
second-strike capability. This change in posture would require that
NATO’s theater nuclear forces be more survivable than they are in their
current configuration, so that the retaliatory capability is credible to
the enemy. A credible second-strike capability should change the
enemy’s perception of how NATO might use nuclear weapons initially,
thereby reducing the risk of a preemptive nuclear attack. If it should
prove necessary for NATO to execute a restrained first-use option, the
unused second-strike capability should constitute a threat to the enemy
that would discourage a nuclear response, help deter further escalation
if the enemy should respond with nuclear weapons, and induce the
enemy to terminate hostilities.

The essential requirement for NATO to have a credible second-strike
theater nuclear capability in the future could be satisfied by the
formation of separate, overwatching units, such as the 4th US Army
Missile Command now stationed in Korea. If two of these missile
commands were formed, with one deployed and dispersed in the rear areas of CENTAG and the other in the rear areas of NORTHAG, they could provide balanced nuclear support within the central region of NATO. The missile commands could be under the direct command of SACEUR, and they could be charged with the custody of all US nuclear weapons deployed within AFCENT. If a NATO corps is authorized to execute a restrained first-use option with its dual-capable systems to compensate for conventional force deficiencies, SACEUR would direct the appropriate missile command to release the nuclear weapons to the designated corps for expenditure. It might be necessary for a missile command to execute a first-use option in the form of a highly-discriminating interdiction strike, if conventional aggression by Warsaw Pact forces progressed so far or so fast that NATO's dual-capable forces are unable to use nuclear weapons with control and constraint.

Forming two missile commands to provide the central region of NATO with a survivable second-strike theater nuclear capability would be expensive in terms of personnel and materiel resources. The expense, however, should be considered with respect to the need to improve the deterrent posture of NATO's theater nuclear forces because of strategic parity. Currently, Warsaw Pact forces have an advantage over NATO forces in the AFCENT area in medium- and long-range dual-capable tactical missiles, and the organization of two missile commands within AFCENT would tend to balance the theater nuclear capabilities in this area. The cost of the missile commands should be compared also with the risks associated with alternative solutions, such as relying on strategic nuclear forces located in and near Europe to provide AFCENT with a second-strike capability. The use of strategic nuclear forces for this purpose not only would be less flexible than forming nuclear commands but also would be more escalatory than nuclear strikes originating from within the AFCENT area.

Whatever means are chosen to provide the central region of NATO with a survivable second-strike theater nuclear capability, the decision should be implemented gradually over the next 5 to 15 years. The end result should be perceived within the Alliance and by the Soviet Union as an evolutionary process designed to preserve stability in Europe and not as a sudden shift in US defense policy or an attempt to provide NATO with an invulnerable first-strike nuclear capability.
ENDNOTES

1. Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain, p. 81.
3. Ibid., p. 33.
6. Ibid., p. 8.
7. Ibid., p. 15.
9. Ibid., p. 12.
10. Ibid., p. 27.
13. Ibid., Table 1, pp. 71 and 74. These tactical missiles are categorized in the table as "SRBM" (short range ballistic missiles), but they are short range only in comparison with ICBM, IRBM, and MRBM. As tactical missiles, they are medium- and long-range ("under 500 miles") systems.
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The changing roles for theater nuclear forces

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Strategic parity required NATO to rely to a greater degree than in the past on its conventional forces to deter and defend against conventional aggression and to depend more than previously upon its theater nuclear forces to deter and defend against the enemy's use of nuclear weapons in Europe. The implications of strategic parity suggest that the principal mission for NATO's theater nuclear forces should change in the future from maintaining a war-fighting capability to establishing a second-strike capability. This fundamental shift in posture can be achieved only if NATO's theater nuclear forces...
become less vulnerable than they are in their present configuration. The need for NATO to have a survivable second-strike nuclear capability might be satisfied with the formation of separate, overwatching, nuclear-only units, such as US Army Missile Commands.