NEUTRALITY, UNILATERALISM, AND COALITION:
THE US STRATEGIC EXPERIENCE, 1865-1918

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NEUTRALITY, UNILATERALISM, AND COALITION: THE US STRATEGIC EXPERIENCE, 1865-1918

by

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FOREWORD

The evolution of US strategic policy has involved a succession of transitional periods from the founding of the Republic to the present. The most profound change, from virtual isolation to total international involvement, occurred between 1865 and 1918. This memorandum analyzes the factors which influenced America's shift from neutrality through unilateralism into multinational alliances including the impact of economics and technology, the character of American society and politics, and the contributions of military strategic innovators. Events in China, Japan, the Pacific, and the Caribbean also drew the United States toward greater foreign involvement.

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Neutrality in principle, if not in practice, has been a guiding theory of the Republic since the winning of independence. Together with “isolationism,” as another shibboleth of national policy, the United States has been viewed by its citizens and leaders as a herald of moralism, detachment, and special favor in the community of nations. More realistically, American foreign policy has been a blend of force and diplomacy. Its spokesmen have preached neutrality and nonentanglement. But they have pursued a sometimes confusing, yet concurrent, trilogy. This trilogy has included: expansion and the concept of manifest destiny; security and the Monroe Doctrine; and neutrality and isolation.

The concept of expansion and destiny is as old as European colonization of the New World—a sequel to the footholds secured from Massachusetts to Georgia by the first English colonists, which formed a philosophical raison d’être for much of the overall European expansion movement to this hemisphere. But, the primary requisite of American foreign policy after the founding Fathers had declared independence was to maintain it. Later, neutrality (as the youngest of the triad), developed only as a result of the Anglo-French wars beginning in 1793. Yet, it too became a convenient cloak beneath which an emerging
nation could secure its own territory, consolidate and organize its society, and pursue its destiny of populating and governing a continent.¹

The young American nation worried about freedom of commerce, European incursion, and movement toward the Pacific slope. Forces often beyond American control kept the nation isolated from the rest of the world. This isolation was more illusory than real. American clipper ships plied the oceans from the Mediterranean to the Orient. Still, John Bull's Royal Navy, not American ships, deterred other European nations from transatlantic adventures. Uncle Sam might pursue domestic concerns with relative peace. As a result, the ultimate event of the entire period was a domestic one. A bloody civil war was necessary to decide the issue of national unity. At the end of that era, however, new complexities confronted the American nation as it reached maturity.²

A PERIOD OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-90

Americans emerged from the Civil War with a confused view of their place in world affairs. Prewar concepts of the future, as spawned by the Revolution, had conditioned their relations with other powers. The manifest destiny of the Republic would spread across the hemisphere and ultimately prove a model for other peoples. Progress would clear the way. But the war had subjected American institutions to severe stress. Secession had undermined confidence in the superiority of the US Government. The politics of the Gilded Age—the 1870's and 1880's—would do little to restore the old faith.

True, Americans had proven capable of mounting a massive military effort indicative of war in the industrial age. "For a moment in 1865," contends Dr. Russell F. Weigley, "before the Armies and fleets dispersed, the United States was the strongest military power on the planet."³ Still, the sages of Europe generally held that the American Civil War was fought by two large, armed mobs, ignoring the facts that mobilization of manpower, industry, supply, and services symbolized untapped potential. A Navy of over 900 warships, including ironclad and steam-propelled vessels, as well as an Army numbering in the millions provided a deterrent to war with Europe. This reassuring reserve of power and potential permitted returning veterans and their families to focus upon the exciting tasks at home. Impatiently, they felt that foreign affairs would only divert national energies from more important challenges.
The isolationism of that era preoccupied Americans for nearly two decades after the Civil War. Some foreign issues surfaced periodically. The Alabama claims as well as the sensitive Canadian border question plagued Anglo-American relations. The legacy of the Monroe Doctrine prompted President Andrew Johnson and Secretary of State William Seward to rattle sabres against French imperialism in Mexico. European commercial interest in a transisthmian canal in Central America as well as the bright jewels of the Antilles generated the spirit of Pan Americanism and American paternalism in the thought and action of Benjamin Harrison's Secretary of State, James G. Blaine. Elsewhere, Seward had purchased Alaska largely because of fear of Russian hemispheric incursion, and trading and missionary involvement from Hawaii to China promised future concern for Washington policymakers. Yet, basically, growing European imperialism seemed on some distant horizon and did not directly affect most Americans.4

For one thing, by the 1880's, the great European powers considered the United States only comparable to such second-rank states as Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, or Spain. America was weak, lacking formidable armed power and formal alliances—the trappings of greatness. It might be a refuge of revolutionaries; a wellspring for republican contagion. It was a land of promise for common folk, but the little man's opinions carried sparse clout in most European chancelleries. Great Britain's interest was mainly to suppress a nuisance, and Bismarck remarked revealingly that a special Providence took care of fools, drunkards, and the United States.5

Neither preparation for war nor overseas expansion seemed important to the average American at the time. Occasional shock waves rippled through the public press at Indian massacres such as Little Big Horn, but the business of America was business—the development of a new productive system. Energies and attention were focused on restoration of a war-torn South, accommodation of an expanding population, spread of settlement in the West, development of the sinews of communication, and establishment of industrial and financial institutions. The prudent politician and citizen alike avoided external distractions as far as possible. True, the promoters of commercial and missionary ventures, as well as ambitious younger officers of the Navy seeking new commands, encouraged their fellow citizens to look abroad. But, there was neither substance nor organization to the gentle, irregular zephyrs of expansionism which wafted across America prior to 1890.6
The United States returned to the traditional scheme of national defense inherited from the time of George Washington. Improved fortifications were designed to protect seaboard cities from naval raids and channel foreign invasion until citizen militia could join the skeleton forces of regulars. The Navy was to cooperate in coastal defense and conduct protection of American commerce as well as the traditional guerre de course, against their enemy's merchant marine. What other defense policy was necessary for an isolationist nation? American military leaders like Commanding General William T. Sherman, in 1884, correctly judged the nation's international security to be even more complete than before the Civil War:

Excepting for our ocean commerce and our seaboard cities, I do not think we should be much alarmed about the probability of wars with foreign powers, since it would require more than a million and a half men to make a campaign upon land against us. To transport from beyond the ocean that number of soldiers, with all their munitions of war, their cavalry, artillery, and infantry, even if not molested by us in transit, would demand a large part of the shipping of all Europe.7

So the Grand Army's tents were struck, and the US regulars went back to policing the captured south and the Indian frontier. The Navy drydocked its ironclads and sent the skippers of its wooden steam frigates back to consular duties of showing the flag on station with orders against using coal except in extreme emergency. Interestingly enough, most bureaucrats in Washington failed to notice some basic anomalies.

Technology had now outdistanced defense policy. The rifled shell cannon and ironclad, steam—propelled navies which emerged by the late 19th century had rendered obsolete the harbor fortifications behind which America retired in her isolationism. Similarly, at one stroke those new tools of war had shattered the insurmountable supremacy of Britain's walls of oak—her Royal Navy (and by implication America's defensive wooden fleets of the Civil War). On the other hand, steam power and dependence upon coal so limited the range of warships that no great power could have maintained a close blockage of the War of 1812 type or risked a large—scale invasion of America.8 The difference between real and implied national threat, the perceptions of national strategy and attainable military force were all boisterously mixed as America moved deeper into events of the late Victorian age.
NATIONAL REARMAMENT, 1880-90

The subtle nuances of strategy and policy certainly escaped notice by most Americans of the time, and were but dimly perceived by military planners. Nevertheless, the isolationism of that moment permitted certain significant developments. It provided time for professional growth within the military, carefully nurtured by intellectually-disenchanted officers such as Emory Upton, Stephen B. Luce, Alfred Thayer Mahan and others. Their philosophies stressed the need for strong, standing military institutions as instruments of power and symbols of national greatness. The outward expression of such doctrines, for the Navy at least, found refuge in the notion of seapower and a strong battlefleet deterrent.

Similarly, detachment from the world and concentration upon industrialization gave impetus to development of real national power, i.e., the products of field, factory, and countinghouse. Without such power, the theories of Upton, Luce, and Mahan were hollow. By the early 1880's the United States had begun a radical alteration in its economic relations with the external world. On the one hand, the gathering of wealth and rapid growth of industrial production of the country led to the "repatriation" of foreign investments in the United States and to the declining dependence of the nation upon foreign supply of manufactured goods. On the other hand, American capital itself began to seek foreign investment. Certain branches of American industry and agriculture sought more extensive markets than could be found domestically. These changes were strongly felt by the generation between 1880 and 1914; they were enormously accelerated by World War I.

The country moved upward in nearly every category during the take-off period. In addition to population growth, the United States had achieved top rank in international production of coal, iron, steel, wheat and other foodstuffs by 1900. Its financial institutions rivaled those of England. Moreover, its national philosophy became a blustery blend of the New Manifest Destiny and Social Darwinism. The new doctrine applied the fitness of the species theories of Charles Darwin to the traditional American notion of democratic mission. These thoughts were then tinged with a racism which declared Anglo-Saxon or Aryan superiority. America should not be merely the modest and quiet witness for democratic ideals. It should turn to proselytizing, and if backward people did not desire to learn about democracy, then those theories and principles should be thrust upon them.9
Part of this new climate was grounded in the larger European imperialism which Americans could see taking place around the world. But the White Man's Burden required the instruments of power. The real tools for "civilizing with a Krag" could always be more handily acquired if rationalized as necessary for endorsing the Monroe Doctrine, keeping the British Lion honest north of the border, or serving as impartial power broker for maintenance of an "Open Door" in China. In other words, a national military rearmament which began in the 1880's under the guise of protecting America's homeland, was designed in part to provide the instruments for the New Manifest Destiny abroad. Like the later rearmament which accompanied the Korean conflict, a threat in one sector was carefully orchestrated to strengthen the potential for accomplishment of national purpose elsewhere.

The national rearmament in the 1880's was moral and military. It was Christian and naval. Its spokesmen, like the Reverend Josiah Strong, proclaimed in 1885 that the future expansion of America was not merely destiny already made manifest, but the desire of the Almighty Providence, under the banner "Prepare ye the way of the Lord!" The greatest exponent of the New Manifest Destiny was Theodore Roosevelt, the individual most closely associated with American territorial expansion. He advanced that the "timid man, the lazy man, the man who distrusts his country, the over-civilized man, who has lost the great fighting, masterful virtues, the ignorant man, and the man of dull mind, whose soul is incapable of feeling the mighty lift that thrills 'stern men with empire in their brains'—all these, of course, shrink from seeing the nation undertake its new duties."10 And Roosevelt was first and foremost a navalist. So, the rejuvenation of the American Navy formed a keystone in the nation's rearmament.

Examples of the low state of the US Navy between 1865 and 1880 were not hard to find. Brushes with Chile and Spain led even American naval professionals to poke fun at the "heterogeneous collection of naval trash" which styled the American fleet, and the eternal British bogeyman re-emerged as a threat. The Royal Navy might operate with impunity from Halifax or Jamaica, to capture the Panamanian isthmus or threaten commercial centers of the Atlantic and Pacific coastlines. This combination of humiliation, fear, and internal pressure within the service led to construction of the new steel and steam Navy. In 1883, Congress provided for three small "protected" or unarmored cruisers and a dispatch boat.

These new ships hardly compared with the more numerous, heavily
armed and armored squadrons emerging from British and French shipyards. They were anachronistic throwbacks to an outdated American naval strategy of commerce raiding. But they were the vanguard of a long line of new and stronger vessels. Warships like the Maine, Oregon, and Olympia, constructed of domestic steel, forged and fabricated by domestic labor and domestic industry, and mounting American-made ordnance, slid into the waters, symbolizing the spirit of expansion both to Americans and foreigners. Great Britain was building battleships, ergo so should the United States.

In the forefront of the battleship movement lay militarized, bipartisan civilian politicians, including Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy, Congressman Hilary Herbert, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and President Benjamin Harrison. The ubiquitous Roosevelt was also present. Together in 1890 they rammed the first legislation, which made appropriation for high seas battleships, past a reluctant Congress. The strategy behind the move was simple. If America's potential enemies were building a battlefleet, then so should America. Of course it was all purely defensive—even the ships themselves were styled “seagoing coastline battleships.” But it was a short step from defensive to offensive strategy once the intellectual underpinnings were established.

Intellectual godfathers for these developments in large part came from the naval professionals. Rear Admiral Luce, a professor at the already established Naval War College, and his protege, Captain Mahan, argued persuasively before Tracy and the other civilians. Then, at the very moment when the navy was building and the appropriation bill of 1890 was moving torturously through congressional hearings, Mahan's book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, appeared. As diplomatic historian Robert H. Ferrell has observed, “...its effect upon history was as that other fateful nineteenth-century opus, On the Origin of Species.”

Mahan's message was clear. Naval power was the key to national greatness. Relying upon English history with a copious blend of social Darwinism, Mahan taught that without command of the seas, no nation could attain the greatest measures of domestic well-being or international influence. Nations could never stand still. Expansion was essential. To support expansion a government had to accumulate capital; a large and prosperous foreign commerce was the best means of accumulating wealth for which a navy was essential. Here was a new national military strategy, or at least a fine codification of thoughts
already abroad in the world. Mahan was hardly an original thinker, but he was fortunate enough to appear in print at a time when strong men with selfish motives around the world were looking for a convenient rationale for their courses of action. Accepted even more readily in admiralties in London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Tokyo than in America, Mahan threw a ripe apple into the international community of imperialist nations looking for reasons for action. America was becoming one of those.

Mahan and his theories were the handmaiden of national and naval rearmament. Still, such “navalism” was hardly the result of those writings, no matter how convincing, nor of other naval, commercial or political tendencies of the period. Like the impetus for the industrial progress, settlement which ended the frontier officially in 1890, and the establishment of the whole cultural fabric of late Victorian society, navalism sprang from the fateful philosophy of the time. Darwinism, as applied to social man, stressed life as a race and that the rewards belonged to the fittest. If the New Manifest Destiny of the United States now had its intellectual underpinnings, its industrial and social base, and its instruments of power in battlefleets, it still required outlets.

The outward expression of an inwardly held feeling began to seek unilateral national expression by the 1880’s and 1890’s. Increasingly, American leaders began to seize opportunities to exercise American power. The bumptious, adolescent policy and strategy of the United States was appropriately encapsulated in Secretary of State Richard Olney’s comment to the British in 1865: “Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its inter-position.” Of course it was not, but, importantly, Americans believed it!

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNILATERAL ACTION, 1890-98

The younger naval historian Kenneth P. Hagen postulates that it is “a popular belief in the United States that intervention by American military or naval forces in other countries has been a rare occurrence in the last hundred years.” He suggests, however, that the historical record of the period shows a number of unilateral applications of American force diplomacy, culminating with the major war against Spain in 1898.

Sometimes successful, subsequently controversial, these episodes
shaped not only foreign diplomacy but also public opinion. Americans became accustomed and receptive to real application of the New Manifest Destiny through employment of the New Navy, administration bluster, and bargaining from a position of strength. The sequence of major displays of unilateral action between the end of the Civil War and 1900 includes:

- Mexican Border 1865-66
- Korea 1871
- Panama 1885
- China Coast 1884-85
- Samoa 1889
- Haiti 1890-91
- Santo Domingo 1891
- Chile 1891
- Bering Sea 1890-92
- Hawaii 1892-93
- Venezuela 1895

The motives for each intervention depended upon both the nature of the crisis and the operatives involved. Diplomats and statesmen from Seward and Blaine to Olney and Cleveland preferred expostulation of American commercial and hemispheric rights. More jingoistic figures such as naval secretaries William C. Whitney, Tracy, and Herbert, as well as Lodge, Roosevelt, Harrison, and Mahan, saw the opportunities to test the New Navy, push commercial expansion through acquisition of coaling stations and colonies, and forcefully proclaim American ascendancy in world affairs.

The episodes in Mexico and Venezuela integrated concepts of the Monroe Doctrine with the full spectrum of the New Manifest Destiny as held by different Americans and were popular with rank and file Americans. The other crises were a confusing mixture. Sometimes naval protection of American commercial interest or citizens (Korea, Panama, China, Samoa, Haiti, Santo Domingo, Bering Sea, Hawaii) were covers to display raw American power (especially Haiti, Santo Domingo, Chile, and Hawaii). There was no question of annexation of Chile in 1891. But American leaders regarded that revolution-prone nation as the only real hemispheric threat to American hegemony. After all, her navy was equipped with European-built warships thought to be the equal of the American fleet. So, when American sailors were assaulted in Valparaiso
in 1891, Harrison and Tracy used that pretext for teaching the inferior Chileans a lesson in power. Or, as the icy Harrison quipped to Secretary of State Blaine, the trouble with the Chileans was that they knew nothing of dignity and moderation, "...and sometime it may be necessary to instruct them." 14

Real threats to American interests could be discerned only in Mexico at the end of the Civil War, possibly Samoa in 1889 (where a tripartite agreement already existed between Britain, Germany, and the United States), and Venezuela, which seemed suitably intimidated by an all-powerful Britannia. The French surrogate regime in Mexico, the presence of English and German warships at Pago-Pago seeking each nation's complete sovereignty over that potential coaling station, and the distinct threat to the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuelan boundary dispute led Washington to view the strategic threat as imminent, not distant. But the specter of British, German, French, or some other nation's fleet bombarding New York City or San Francisco was raised annually in order to secure more naval appropriations.

Similarly, in an age of intense nationalism and European imperialism, there was little thought of coalition operations on behalf of all. Each nation chose to look out first for its own interests. The United States was an ardent practitioner of that school.

Admittedly, a combined operation such as the Bering Sea patrol against seal poaching might be arranged periodically by American, British, and Canadian authorities. It was sporadic, came only after intense haggling and heated negotiation, and in no way symbolized Anglo-American rapprochement in 1890-92. Two years later, American naval officers in Far Eastern waters effected some measure of international cooperation during the French occupation of Indochina. Anglo-American joint operation plans for landing at Shanghai were formulated in case Chinese rioters threatened westerners in that port city. Everything was quite ad hoc in nature and based entirely on contingencies. 15

Nevertheless, the traditional enmity between England and America did seem on the wane by the last decade of the century. The Venezuelan episode usually stands as the watershed. But discerning scholars also have sensed a longer process of accommodation. One English student of Americana has declared: "An unnoticed landmark in American history was the defeat of France by Prussia in 1871." 16

Indeed, the European balance of power began to disintegrate with the rise of Imperial Germany. This new nation had nothing to lose from
a breakup of the established system, and she almost immediately chose to challenge British naval supremacy with ultimate fatal consequences for world peace. But, in the 1880's and 1890's, this rivalry impacted mainly upon a reshuffling of potential enemies, internal accommodations within the imperialist community, and sharply increased defense budgets. Moreover, England could no longer regard France as her greatest rival, for new upstarts in the arena—Germany, Japan, the United States—forced new choices. Slowly Britain made overtures to Japan and the United States in order to secure detente abroad so that she might concentrate upon European affairs closer to home. For America, the Venezuelan dispute was the first sign of this reordering of British priorities.17

American intervention on behalf of its South American neighbors almost led to Anglo-American conflict. Great Britain was initially disinclined to entertain American arbitration of the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana in 1895. American bluster and bluff were met with characteristic British stiffness and condescension. As President Cleveland and Secretary Olney gruffly pushed for arbitration, winning favor with the American press and public, soberer minds in London and Washington settled their differences. Britain could not neglect her "American flank." As events in South Africa threatened the empire at that point (carefully fanned by German mischief-making), the British backed away from confrontation with the United States. Of course, American leaders and the people felt the strong stand of American diplomacy had gained the day. They had stared down the British lion. Ahead lay a new era in which the symbol of the screaming American eagle would be a reckoning force in the community of nations.

THE ADVENTURE WITH SPAIN

The end of the century found America physically, morally and, to a considerable extent, mentally poised for a giant step into full blown internationalism. Perhaps Washington's admonition against "entangling alliances" still guided some statesmen who looked askance at the evolving patterns in Europe and found solace in the Monroe Doctrine as the cornerstone of foreign policy vis-a-vis Europe, but, as one pundit announced, Washington had been dead for a hundred years. The growing isolation of Great Britain across the Atlantic made her much more conciliatory in terms of the long-standing Anglo-American Caribbean problems.18
In 1897 the Cuban issue began to materialize as a leading contender for public attention. The moral and economic overtones of a persistent insurgency in the Antilles acquired the ultimate dimensions of an American national security issue. Following a truce between Spain and Cuban insurrectionists in 1878, US capital had flowed freely into the islands from US entrepreneurs seeking to endow Cuba and Puerto Rico with "the resources of modern invention and advanced technological progress, long submerged in the common ruin."19 While the motivations for such investments were thus described at least partially in humanitarian terms, commercialism cannot be ignored, as a casus belli. Further, that timeless guide, the Monroe Doctrine, was resurrected for vigorous application despite Spain's presence in the islands for 400 years. In the instructions to the newly-appointed American Minister to the Spanish Court, Steward L. Woodford, Secretary of State John Sherman described Cuba as the site "of grave disorder and sanguinary conflict" and emphasized that in July 1897 it was time for the US Government to soberly consider courses of action consistent with its duty "to its neighbors and itself."20 Sherman did not amplify on the range of courses available but implied that armed intervention could not be ruled out. Woodford communicated such implications to the Spanish Court.

The Democrat, Grover Cleveland, had in his last term, finessed the Cuban issue away from public attention; however, a new breed of congressional "Warhawks" abetted by the sensational journalistic opportunism of William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal and Joseph Pulitzer's New York World began to close that option to Cleveland's successor "Major" William McKinley, the venerable but honest Civil War veteran. The presence of a Cuban exile Junta on the eastern seaboard and the fulminations of the American consul in Havana, the colorful Fitzhugh Lee, kept the issue vividly before the American electorate and provided abundant grist for the journalistic mills. The alleged egregious horrors perpetrated by the Spanish Military Governor of Cuba, General Valeriano ("Butcher") Weyler, in his policies of starvation and reconcentration became common fare for headline scanners of the American east. As one historian remarked: "The power of the press in fomenting American intervention in 1898 was indefinable."21

McKinley's diplomacy with the Spanish Court was no less heavy-handed. A series of opprobrious notes approaching ultimata were showered on the Spanish Government by the energetic Woodford until,
in December 1897, the Queen reluctantly agreed to Yankee demands for reform—relief of Weyler, extension of the franchise, bestowal of modest degrees of local autonomy in the Cuban provinces—but never the granting of full independence, the underlying theme of the US imperatives.

The US Congress returning to the capital in 1898 was restless to address the Cuban problem and its membership found champions in such saber-rattlers as Alabama's Senator John T. Morgan and Massachusetts' Henry Cabot Lodge. Assuming that McKinley's diplomacy was not amounting to much, Congress insisted that the executive branch bring about a favorable conclusion to the Cuban issue. Within weeks, three incidents occurred which placed McKinley in an untenable position with respect to prolonging negotiations: on January 12th, the Cubans reacted violently to the Queen's proposal for modest autonomy by taking Havana apart in a spasm of violent riots; the Spanish Minister to the United States, Depuy DeLone, carelessly posted a personal letter, critical of McKinley, to an associate in Cuba. The letter was intercepted by a Junta member who saw that it found its way onto the front page of the New York Journal. This forced Spain to recall the Minister from Washington. Finally, Captain Charles D. Sigsbee's battleship, USS Maine, exploded in Havana Harbor on February 15th due to causes unknown, but attributed ultimately, if not conclusively, to insidious Spanish Government agents.

This last episode eroded the vestiges of any base of McKinley's antiwar support which might have existed and on April 11th he asked a sympathetic Congress for the power to use force against Spain. It was speedily granted. An invasion force was painfully mustered which arrived off Siboney, Cuba, on June 20, 1898. Miraculously, that body blundered its way ashore and by July 17th had conquered the weary, hungry, but yet proud Spanish defenders.

Of greater moment was the opportunistic decision made by Under Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt to broaden American vistas in the Pacific during the conflict with Spain. Cabling China Squadron Commander George Dewey in Hong Kong on April 24th, Roosevelt ordered the fleet to occupy Manila Bay as soon as possible. Dewey complied and proceeded to Manila, arriving on April 30th, where he surprised the Spanish squadron at anchor and sent it to the bottom. Nevertheless, while the administration was grappling with the vagaries of an amphibious operation a hundred miles from Florida, the responsive Dewey became an instant national hero and gained for his
country a toehold of empire in the farthest reaches of the Western Pacific. Even McKinley, formerly the reluctant advocate of war with Spain, found a moral justification for holding the Islands, at least until the issue of independence could be resolved. His rationale reflected the enthusiasm of many national figures whose appetites were being whetted by the tasty morsels of expansionism. To quote Congressman William P. Frye whose views reflected a growing public and private sentiment:

The fear I have about this war is that peace will be declared before we can get full occupation of the Philippines and Porto Rico.23

The seizure of the Antilles and the Philippines (and McKinley found the war emergency justifiable in concluding the formal annexation of Hawaii) accomplished several things. First, the defeat of an historic European power disclosed to other nations that the United States was no longer the prisoner of its self-imposed isolation. Next, it exhibited to the world for the first time the latent technological and military prowess of the United States, capable of winning, unilaterally, a major naval victory and effecting a land force occupation halfway around the world. Finally, it demonstrated to Americans themselves that a new age of power and global responsibility had arrived—an age that would require US policymakers to turn from the familiar strictures of morality and the Monroe Doctrine and seek new bases for national strategy.

AN “OPEN DOOR” TO AMERICA’S FIRST COALITION VENTURE

America’s interests in China dated back decades; during the 1860’s formal commercial intercourse was negotiated by treaty. However, the Arrow and Opium Wars presaged great-power partition of China. German, Russian, French, and Japanese inroads threatened to destroy the ancient cultural empire to the detriment of the commercial interests of Britain and America, who, as in the Caribbean, were finding common cause against other imperial incursions.24

The appointment of the Anglophile John M. Hay as the American Secretary of State in 1898 proved to be a timely move by McKinley. Sympathetic to the concern of the British over the possibility of a mutual trade disaster, Hay held a neat diplomatic trump card—the new American naval base in the Philippines, an insular citadel from which American power might be rapidly projected to the Asian mainland. Hay finessed the statesmen of Europe and Japan with a swift deal—the so-called “Open Door Policy.” Hay drafted a series of notes calling
upon the commercial powers with Chinese concessions to respect the
treaty and trade rights of all other powers and, incidentally, to
strengthen the Chinese Imperial Government irrespective of separate
spheres of influence. Hay circulated his notes to the foreign
ministries of the commercial contenders and received divergent veiled
responses. Nevertheless, he publicly announced on March 20, 1900 that
all foreign responses were "satisfactory," "final and definitive," and
that by US diplomatic intervention, chaos in China had been averted. The
treaty powers were stunned but could not publicly disclaim Hay's
international declaration. Although he misled the American public and
confounded the foreign powers by his brazen public statement, Hay
provided the first clear enunciation of American interest in the integrity
of China and, furthermore, he did so in clearly commercial and
administrative terms rather than moralistic ones. The Open Door notes
represented the genesis of a national strategy for the Far East—a
strategy which would persist for half a century. Interestingly, the first
test of this policy was not conducted unilaterally to uphold the Open
Door against European or Asian predators, but in conjunction with the
forces of those foreign powers which Hay had so neatly impaled upon
his diplomatic rapier only months before.

An unhappy and crisis-laden situation was developing in Eastern
China as the century turned. A series of bloody incidents had taken
place during the 1890's, largely involving foreign Christian missionaries,
their Chinese converts, and the secret Chinese antiforeign military
societies such as the Boxers and Big Swords. Those elements had
persecuted the religious orders and assaulted the foreign commercial
entrepreneurs although there was blame on both sides. To make matters
worse, the Imperial Government covertly sanctioned the violence
perpetrated against the Europeans and it appeared likely that unless the
powers took strong action, their commercial and diplomatic legations
and religious orders would be forced from China. The US Minister,
Edwin Conger, advised Secretary Hay as early as March 1900 that
unless the Imperial Government moved to suppress the movement, a
naval demonstration in Chinese waters would be in order, and that the
diplomatic representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy had
made similar overtures to their respective governments.

After reproving his Minister to keep his options open, vis-a-vis the
actions of the other powers, Hay nevertheless began to consider the
ramifications of US military intervention not unilaterally, but in
conjunction with the other representative powers in China. The Boxers
laid siege to the international legation quarters in Peking and Tientsin in early June and severed all rail and telegraph communications to the coast.

What followed was a masterpiece of neat coalition military surgery. McKinley and Secretary of War Elihu Root gave Major General Adna R. Chaffee and Admiral Louis Kempff, the Army and Naval Commanders, their heads with respect to the fashion of American participation in a multipower expedition to relieve the legations. The relief effort was a cooperative venture involving troops of eight nations and accomplished its purpose despite differences of opinion about tactics, sovereignty and the like. In exchanges with the allied foreign offices, Hay lost his previous fears for a coalition venture and caught up in the excitement of internationalism, agreed that the expedition should have a combined flavor.

The Boxer episode, which followed so soon on the heels of the war with Spain, was further testament to a growing American capability to project its power far from the domestic boundaries in satisfaction of what might be perceived as a “vital interest.” The affair set another strategic precedent. For the first time since the Revolution, the policymakers found validity in the premise that alliances with foreign powers need not necessarily be as “entangling” as suggested by George Washington. In terms of sheer aggregation of power, coalition warfare might prove to be an extremely promising strategic concept for the future in situations where US and foreign interests coincided. The China experience also reinforced the conclusions drawn from Dewey’s Philippine venture of 1898: the United States at the turn of the century was rapidly accruing the power and stature that made it a state to be reckoned with by the traditional “great powers.” Mahan’s and Roosevelt’s premises were being validated, for the Pacific, as well as the Caribbean, were becoming American “ponds.”

TEDDY ROOSEVELT AND THE “PROPHETS OF POWER”

Following the untimely assassination of William McKinley on September 14, 1901, Theodore Roosevelt hastily executed the oath of office. Already a public hero by virtue of his exploits in Cuba, Roosevelt arrived as an evangelist of national power; a motivator who would strive to convince the American people to adopt a visionary, but pragmatic, view of the world and America’s rightful place in it. For two terms, he would exhort his countrymen on the utility of naval strength,
military preparedness, and the necessity to press forward in a world where weak states found themselves not counting for much. According to the President, isolation for the United States was not only anachronistic, but fatal.

Roosevelt, said one historian, was “contemptuous and pitying” of nations who could not maintain internal order and meet their international obligations. He measured national power in terms of armies and navies, commerce and colonies, and set out to demonstrate the validity of his views. He achieved a track record seldom equaled by any administration:

* In 1903, his influence enabled the long-standing Alaskan boundary dispute to be resolved amicably for America and Britain despite consternation in Canadian circles.
* Recognizing England’s growing concern with Kaiser Wilhelm II’s naval aspirations and desire for closer ties with another expanding and potentially friendly naval power, Roosevelt and John Hay manipulated the Hay–Pauncefote Treaty in 1901, clearing away a lingering 50-year-old British obstacle to an American owned-and-operated canal in the Isthmus of Panama.
* Another Venezuelan crisis of 1902 led Roosevelt to formulate his famous “Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine with which he pulled German teeth in the Caribbean. When the President mobilized the US fleet in Puerto Rican waters, the Germans adroitly acceded to negotiation and withdrew their warships on station to compel debt payment.
* Invited by the government of the Dominican Republic in 1904 to take charge of its customs collections and foreign debt repayment, Teddy accepted the responsibility for the United States, irrespective of Senate opposition. The President sent in US Marines who performed their collection duties most efficiently. Belatedly, the Senate confirmed a treaty in 1907, validating the Executive Order promulgated by Roosevelt to take action three years earlier.
* For his adroit negotiation between Russia and Japan following the 1904-05 war between those countries, the President was awarded the Nobel Prize. By his efforts, he engineered the Treaty of Portsmouth in September of 1905 and made the United States a de facto partner, if not signatory, to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. And there were other successes which bore the Roosevelt stamp: Morocco, Japanese and Chinese immigration, the voyage of the Great White Fleet, the Root-Takahira Agreement.
When American interests were threatened, his forthright action seemed designed to accomplish what his predecessors considered undesirable or importune. Also, Teddy judiciously selected able subordinates as his agents—Hay, William Howard Taft, Elihu Root—men who shared the same dynamic concepts of an America ever-growing in global influence. There was no room for the hesitant, reluctant or feeble in his Administration. His team forecast an evolving newer strategy for the country which clearly reflected the passage of classical isolationism. Roosevelt’s policies assumed offensive dimensions. His actions characterized those of the vigorous leader of a vigorous state, new to the international power scene but fully confident of its ability to control events to suit its purposes.

Roosevelt was not alone in the enunciation of the requirements for a national strategy based on national preparedness. A coherent and articulate body of Uptonians and Mahanists who moved into positions of influence during and following Teddy’s tenure were “prophets of power” as vocal as Roosevelt in sounding the toxins to an attentive American public and Congress.

Root warned Americans that the acquisition of possessions in the Far East, Panama, Hawaii, and Alaska dictated a quantum jump in the size of the regular army and reserves. In a statement remarkably similar to those now being heard in the 1970’s, Root affirmed in his report of 1899 that the war with Spain was the clearest argument for national preparedness; that never again would the United States have time to prepare for a war with a major power. He clamored for institutional reform of the military strategy-making process by the establishment of an Army War College as the principal “arm” of a larger “brain”—an Army General Staff within which there could be systematic study of plans for all contingencies and intrinsic analysis of innovations in the national security question—force development, training, facilities location, logistics, deployments. The Congress approved his General Staff concept in 1903. To the screams of “militarism” in the executive branch, Roosevelt defended Root by claiming the dissenters were crying “against a non-existent evil.”

The call for security policy based upon increased preparedness was echoed from other forums. The Navy and Army found common cause in the establishment of a joint consultative board regarding all matters calling for the cooperation of the two services. The Joint Army-Navy Board was established in 1903 with uniformed representatives of the two services conferring regularly on numerous diverse subjects of
common interest. One of the first orders of business was development of the “Rainbow Series”—plans for hypothetical wars against Japan, Germany, and Britain.40

Leonard Wood was another advocate of a strategy based on preparedness. Launching his campaign in 1908, Wood cautioned against an “unsound” policy inherent in degraded military forces, which inevitably occurred following America’s wars. While his recommendations for a large standing Army and Reserve and a behemothic capital fleet were at the time premature, his report entitled “Organization of Land Forces of the United States,” published in 1912, contained a unique and far-reaching recommendation—that of the creation of a “Council of National Defense.” This body was proposed as an early version of the National Security Council. Recognizing the direction and velocity of the policymaking winds, Wood advocated inclusion of key Congressional Committee Chairmen on the Council, as well as the Chief Executive, military chiefs of services and the Secretaries of War, Navy and State.41 He precisely defined its main function: to “develop national defense policy.” Wood’s report became the basic document for mobilization planning as the United States drifted toward conflict in 1916.42

The Roosevelt era affirmed the achievement of a new milestone in the strategic posture and thinking of the United States. The old-timely view of morality as the rationale for foreign involvement was being replaced by new concepts such as “international responsibility,” “key national interests,” and the “balance of trade.” The Roots, Deweys, and Woods of the first decade of the 20th century were unrelenting in expressing the need for a realistic strategy based upon national power. If the apostles of power were, per se, not entirely convincing, other events lent credibility to their warnings—the Anglo-German naval race, the Agadir crisis, Austro-Russian friction, the Balkan Wars. Europe’s maelstrom was forming. America, despite its shift from isolation toward unilateralism, could not much longer ignore the complexities of total world involvement.

WOODROW WILSON AND THE GREAT DEPARTURE

The Sarajevo crisis of June 1914 seemed far removed from America’s interests. But Sarajevo was the last linchpin that held back the bloody cascade of global war of a magnitude never before experienced. Woodrow Wilson, 28th President of the United States, former historian,
law professor, university president, and state governor, had campaigned on a platform of domestic reform and only barely squeezed past his adversaries, the Populist Bryan and Champ Clark, by the 46th ballot at the Democratic Convention and carried less than half the popular vote in the national election. 43

Wilson is often characterized as an idealist, but he was quite practical with respect to many of the duties of office. Attuned by education and domestic political experience to internal affairs, he lacked the broader understanding of foreign relations during his first term which had come naturally to his earlier predecessor, Roosevelt. He had to learn fast.

At the onset of war, despite the admonitions of Roosevelt and the prophets of power, a phenomenon of neo-isolation became evident. An attitude of a “plague on both your houses” was prevalent although the economy vaulted upwards as orders poured in from the warring nations. Wilson’s domestic program required tranquility to become a reality, so public sentiment in 1914 largely accored with his plans. But Wilson was not to be left to his pacifistic pursuits. British Orders in Council in late 1914 broadly interpreted maritime contraband of war and the Brits began to intercept US vessels on the high seas destined for neutral ports. 44 The Germans, who had plenty of shells, countered by endeavoring to impose a munitions embargo on US trade abroad. Wilson objected on the grounds that to prevent arms exports would be an infringement on the US policy of neutrality. 45

The plot thickened. In February 1915, the German Government proclaimed the waters about the British Isles to be a “War Zone” and threatened destruction by submarine of any merchant vessel found in those seas. Wilson’s response was that such a course would be an “indefensible violation of neutral rights” and that if such attacks occurred, the German Government would be held to “strict accountability.” 46

Seeking a modus vivendi for neutrality, the President sent his personal advisor, “Colonel” Edward M. House, to Europe in the winter of 1914-15. The affable, skillful House garnered very little for his efforts except to improve communications with the British, for the Germans were largely deaf to his overtures regarding the rights of neutrals. This attitude was reinforced during the spring with a rash of German sub attacks on British and American vessels, culminating in the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915, with a loss of 124 US citizens. 47

Wilson posted a strong note of protest to Berlin but the Germans did
not respond until September when the German Foreign Office finally pledged to Wilson that henceforth no liners would be sunk without warning and without arrangements being made for the safety of noncombatant passengers. There were violations in 1916, but by and large the Germans honored their commitment. Wilson was re-elected in 1916 as the man who kept the country out of war.

By mid-war, Germany found itself in an interesting but unhappy strategic dilemma centering about technology. Despite its prewar capital ship competition with Britain, all of the German surface dreadnoughts on the seas around the world at war’s beginning were soon chased down and sunk by the British Navy. The British strategy of “distant blockade” (the Orkneys to Norway) kept the German High Seas fleet penned up in the harbors of north Germany, unable to project its power to affect events in the Atlantic and North Sea. The location of the British Isles enabled the English to receive cargoes vessels from the United States without fear of German surface interception, but British naval control of Scapa Flow could deny access of neutral shipping to the ports of Holland and Germany. Therefore, German naval endeavors were largely restricted after January 1915 to its excellent submarine fleet which could slip through the surface blockade. The alternative of submarine warfare as practiced by the Germans was also largely outside the scope of international law. There were few if any rules that pertained, so both sides tended to make their own. There was a psychological dimension to undersea warfare that worked against the Germans and for the Allies. The sub’s method of attack imparted to the craft a sinister mystique. It did not accord with Americans’ concept of “fair play” and went far toward swaying American public opinion away from Germany. The Germans were in a difficult strategic position. If they pledged not to use subs to attack neutral vessels, then they forfeited the employment of their primary naval weapons system, given that the High Seas Fleet could not escape its harborage. On the other hand, if the Germans agreed to surface the submarine in order to warn its victims of impending surface attack, then the thin-hulled boats were extremely vulnerable to ramming or attack by armed merchantmen. Technology had stacked the deck in favor of the Allies.

Despite the German pledges of 1915 and 1916 restricting its subs, the British found sufficient other propaganda with which to bombard US neutralistic and humanitarian sensibilities—Belgian neutrality violation, Turkish atrocities, strategic bombing of the English homeland
by dirigibles, poison gas, all designed to amplify on the brutality and ruthlessness of the Central Powers. As a result, Wilson became more realistic about US interests and could not ignore the fact that the United States was becoming each year more of a "silent partner" in the Allied camp, as trade with the Entente rose from $500 million in 1914 to $3.5 billion in 1917. Nevertheless, the President was unceasing in his efforts to induce the belligerents to negotiate a peaceful settlement, but by 1916 issues had so hardened that this was largely a fruitless endeavor.

By December 1916, the German Admiralty and General Staff were reaching the end of their respective ropes. The third year of war had been most unrewarding for the Central Powers except for the success achieved in the lightning invasion of Rumania. Falkenhayn's Verdun offensive had fizzled; the Russian Galician Campaign had further disheartened alliance partner, Austria, and the Somme Campaign had resulted in severe attrition of veteran German troops in France. Jutland had been a tactical draw but had sealed the fate of the bottled-up High Seas Fleet. Worst of all, the British blockade was unremitting and its effects were being felt domestically and militarily. Critically in need of a new strategy to break the deadlock on the Western Front, the Kaiser's military advisors recommended the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in early 1917, a course of action which Wilhelm accepted, despite the probability that such a move would invoke American intervention. The Germans, underestimating the American mobilization potential, gambled that their submarines could destroy enough Atlantic shipping before the US Army could become a force to be reckoned with in France and that by 1918 a major German offensive could be mounted to achieve what had failed in 1914—destruction of the British and French armies in the field and a negotiated peace on German terms. Accordingly, on January 16, 1917, Germany resumed unrestricted warfare against neutral vessels not only in "War Zone" but on the high seas, after so advising the United States. By March 18th, three US ships had been sunk.

This action and the publication of the opprobrious Zimmerman telegram convinced Wilson that it was indeed the Entente which was fighting to keep the "World Safe for Democracy" (Wilson had begun to formulate his ideas for a League of Nations as early as May 1916). He asked the Congress for a Declaration of War and was granted his request on April 6, 1917.

With respect to strategy and method, entrance into the Entente
coalition as a full partner was America's only alternative. Thus, the United States mobilized and joined its allies in France, providing the fresh troops which ultimately tipped the scales against Germany in 1918. Coalition warfare became the order of the day.

American strategy was essentially Wilsonian. The President, since 1914, had perceptibly shifted from a position of neutrality to the conclusion that German militarism must be swept away for the creation of a world built not on the "balance of power" but on the "community of power," open diplomacy and free sovereign choices for all people. Thus, the President's strategy envisioned the use of American power (1) to end the war as an interim step, and (2) to build a higher world order on the Democratic model—the ultima in security, national and international. Morality had crept back into the picture. But step (1) required accommodation of, and cooperation with, a European coalition, a posture which would draw America full blown onto the European scene at last and which would set the precedent for American strategic formulation for the next half century.

CONCLUSIONS

The trilogy which determined American diplomatic and strategic policy between 1865 and 1918 lived on past the signing of the Versailles Treaties. But, advancing ideas of collective security, fermenting since the Boxer period and reaching full bloom in the Great War, rendered neutrality and isolation anachronistic. World War I passed such phenomena into obsolescence although it was not until 1940-41, perhaps, that American statesmen (with the exception of the prophetic Teddy) realized that fact. Similarly, concepts of expansion and manifest destiny scarcely survived the first years of the 20th century. American territorial ambitions burnt themselves out, leaving strategists with the unhappy task of defending overseas possessions until political freedom could occur ultimately. Still, other facets of manifest destiny such as commercial imperialism, the desire for command of the seas, and the taste for asserting moral leadership over the world lived on. But they tended to retreat into the ideology of security.

Indeed, the sole survivor of the Age of Nationalism among the American trilogy was security. This one strand which seemingly runs throughout the spectrum of American history acquired new dimensions. But, the period under discussion in this paper witnessed a
progression from bluff and bluster, as well as unilateral force diplomacy, as benchmarks of American policy, to the recognition of value in collective security.

The period of transition during the half century analyzed in this paper is largely coincident with the growth of American economic power and the passing of successive technological frontiers. Like a self-perpetuating chain with apparent endless numbers of links, the American pattern was thus: internal national wealth bred power which in turn garnered prestige and a desire for more wealth and prestige and hence more power to achieve. Raw national wealth in 1875 had by 1918 been transmuted into all the trappings of a vigorous and ambitious nationstate by the Blacksmiths of the period—Mahan, Luce, Roosevelt, Blaine, Lodge and to his probable consternation, Wilson. The forge, of course, was “security,” fanned by the bellows of vaulting national ambitions. The chief hope of American security after 1918 was world peace and the existence of a permanent alliance of great powers whose clashing policies in the past had only produced great wars. So, without truly realizing it, America like most of the nations of the world had passed from neutrality to unilateralism to coalition from 1865 through 1918. But discernment of such facts basically escaped not only Americans of that era. It absolutely escaped notice among the Victors of Versailles. History is never clear to the generation who lives it!

The transition periods from 1865 suggest a dynamism in the American international political ethic. As has been concluded, security underlay all the strategic postures adopted by the United States in the past. Shifts accommodating the international forces of the present and future may well be in order if historical perspective is indicative. Coalitions have risen, had their day and waned. The events since 1950 show that the Americans have not been reluctant to exercise unilateralism when vital interests dictated. Neutralism has had its proponents and still does. If the strategic experience from 1865-1918 represents a nonlinear continuum, more excursions from persistency can be expected. The eternal quest for security will dictate their magnitude and direction.
ENDNOTES


4. General diplomatic history for this period may be followed in Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy; A History, chapters 12 and 13; and Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898, especially chapters 1-3.


8. Ibid., pp. 168-169.


10. Quoted in Ibid., p. 338. See also LaFeber, chapter 2.


17. In addition to Ibid., see Ferrell, pp. 369-377; LaFeber, pp. 242-283.

18. H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire, p. 3.

20. Ibid.
23. Morgan, pp. 74-75.
26. Kennan, p. 32.
32. Ibid., p. 43.
33. Ibid., p. 4.
34. Fred W. Melbom, *Diplomatic History of the United States*, pp. 243, 244.
35. Ibid., pp. 245-246.
36. Ibid., p. 62.
38. Ibid., p. 259.
39. Ibid., p. 269.
41. Millis, pp. 302, 303.
42. Ibid., p. 281.
44. Ibid., p. 42.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 46.
47. Ibid., p. 49.
48. Ibid., p. 56.
50. Ibid., p. 6.
52. Seymour, pp. 105-106.
53. Ibid., p. 95.
54. Kennan, p. 60.
55. Ibid., p. 60.
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The evolution of US strategic policy has involved a succession of transitory periods from the founding of the Republic to the present. The most profound change, from virtual isolation to total international involvement, occurred between 1865 and 1918. This memorandum analyzes the factors which influenced America's shift from neutrality through unilateralism into multinational alliances including the impact of economics and technology, the character of American society and politics, and the contributions of military strategic innovators. Events in China, Japan, the Pacific, and the Caribbean also

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draw the United States toward greater foreign involvement.