Social Psychological Exchange of Interpersonal Power and Obligation between U.S. Army Infantry Superordinates and Subordinates

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A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
An exhaustive review of over 200 academic and military sources indicates that decentralized authority and responsibility to competent subordinates improves the upward flow of communications within an organization, thereby contributing to organizational effectiveness. This can be viewed as an interpersonal exchange of power and obligation between leader and follower. The tendency toward such exchange can be identified as adaptive leadership and
20. ABSTRACT. (Continued)

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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Chapter 1

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

If you take a flat map
And move wooden blocks upon it strategically,
The thing looks well, the blocks behave as they should.
The science of war is moving live men like blocks.
And getting the blocks into place at a fixed moment.
But it takes time to mold your men into blocks,
And flat maps turn into country where creeks and gullies
Hamper your wooden squares.
They straggle after ripe blackberries,
And you cannot lift them up in your hand and
Move them.

-Stephen Vincent Benet

Introduction

The best made plan, the most sophisticated weapon,
the most elaborate scenario in a wargame, the most inte-
grated intelligence system, and the best computerized
information available do not guarantee success on today's
lethal battlefield. They all depend upon a small effective
unit -- integrated with other units -- composed of profi-
cient, disciplined soldiers of diverse backgrounds led by
competent, fair-minded sergeants, lieutenants, and captains.
This thesis is directed toward how infantry noncommissioned
and commissioned officers lead and follow. It is an
examination of their styles of leadership and followership.

The United States Army is unique from all other
organizations. It has a solemn 200 year-old mission to
defend the United States of America, to be prepared to

1
engage successfully in active, armed combat on today's technological battlefield. It is, and must remain, responsive to missions and directives passed from civilian authority through the chain of command to capable volunteer soldiers. But missions and directives can be passed in a manner peculiar to the style of a given commander, and, when passed, can be perceived in a manner peculiar to the style of a given follower.

Conceptual Statement of the Problem

Department of Army Pamphlet 600-3 (Officer Professional Development and Utilization, March 1974, p. 5-5) and Army Regulation 623-105 (Officer Evaluation Reporting System, May 1974, p. 1-2) indicate that a superior should evaluate the leadership style of a subordinate. Nowhere does any army pamphlet or regulation indicate what the preferred army style is, what the standards of leadership style are, against what leadership techniques a style should be compared, or whether there are situations which require different styles. In fact, the terms "leadership," "authority," "discipline," "morale," "esprit de corps," and many others - essential to an understanding of leadership and leadership style - are not even included in the Army Dictionary (AR 310-25, 1974). These terms connote different meanings to different people. And yet many professional officers regularly use these terms when establishing standards for subordinates and describing
subordinates' proficiency on evaluation reports.

In addition to the importance of leadership style, an equally important aspect of effectiveness is followership style.

It is suggested that as an individual matures, he develops patterned responses of behavior. He behaves in a similar fashion under similar conditions. Some call this his personality; others, his style. In this thesis a man's leader/follower style is equated to role and perception behaviors. How does he perceive he should lead, follow?

Research to be cited in this thesis will demonstrate that a leader's style has a significant impact on whether followers achieve the goals of an organization.

The ability of the superordinate to develop his subordinates should impact on whether followers achieve the goals of an organization. Subordinates achieving the goals of the organization would depend upon where the superordinate is on a continuum between the extremes of authoritarian and permissive styles of leadership. The research will document that either extreme is undesirable. A flexible, objective, and equalitarian leadership style which establishes a climate within which subordinates feel free to communicate with their leaders is more desirable. Subordinates perceive authoritarians as leaders who are not receptive to recommendations for change or to upward communications, and are usually not accessible.
Certain followers are recalcitrant and some are "yes-men." Both are reluctant to communicate. Yet, somewhere between the above followers' styles is the competent, proficient, and objective subordinate trying to do his duty the best way he can. He is perceived by his leader as a subordinate who effectively makes recommendations and insures the boss is not surprised with something unexpected.

The styles will be described in chapter two to provide the reader with conceptual standards for leadership and followership. Associated with those styles are certain psychological instruments which identify an individual's preferred leader and follower style. The instruments will be described in chapter three. Chapter four will contain a discussion of those leader and follower styles as measured by the instruments against the background variables of age, education, source of commission, component, months of command, and months of staff.

In essence, the data will permit examination of preferred leadership and followership styles at various levels of experience and seniority within the Army. By inference, it will permit conclusions to be drawn about how infantry personnel prefer to lead and follow, as measured by the psychological instruments and categorized by discrete variables.
Shrewd critics have assigned military success to all manner of things -- tactics, shape of frontiers, speed, happily placed rivers, mountains or woods, intellectual ability, or the use of artillery. All in a measure true, but none vital. The secret lies in the inspiring spirit which lifted weary, footsore men out of themselves . . . with an army it is the result of . . . leadership.

Major George S. Patton, Jr., 1931
Chapter 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

I deplore the chain of... commanders sitting at telephones... talking, talking, talking; instead of leading, leading, leading.

J. F. G. Fuller

Introduction

Though it may be true, as one writer has claimed, that in 1896 the Congressional Library had no book on leadership, it is not true that interest in this aspect of society is a recent phenomenon (Gibb, 1969, p. 205).

From the philosophers of ancient Greece to the political scientists of the Renaissance, numerous assumptions were made about the nature of man, his strengths and weaknesses. Historians document numerous instances of great men who have changed the course of history. Primitive hunting bands rallied around the most powerful men; the great generals fielded substantial armies; and formal organizations developed. The organizations began to exhibit structure, attempted to accomplish a mission or task, and satisfied the basic needs of their soldiers. Leaders influenced soldiers. The art of leadership emerged.

Definition of Leadership

There is a "lack of precision in the term [leadership] and possibly even in what constitutes the concept,"
(Jacobs, 1971, p. 230). To use the term meaningfully it must be defined in a context which fits its intended use.

Early research attributed leadership to a specific trait or a constellation of traits. Disproven by Gibb (1947), Stogdill (1948), and Mann (1959, p. 246), leadership was thereafter attributed to a role interaction theory wherein some kind of influence takes place. "Leadership is a function of the situation and its requirements and of the followers and their expectations as well as of qualities of the leader" (Marks, 1959, p. 23). Sherif (1961) identified a perceptual interrelationship of leader personality, follower personality, and situation. Olmstead (1968) maintains that we should not try to change personality, but rather, ought to force role compliance.

Biddle and Thomas (1966) reported on the sociological interest in social role as espoused by Durkheim, Pareto, Max Weber, Tarde, Cooley, and George Herbert Mead.

As the psychological and sociological approaches began to merge (Cartwright and Zander, 1968), the literature affirmed that leadership was a role ascribed to one who influences, and was a function of interacting roles in situations oriented toward accomplishing a goal (Gibb, 1969). Stogdill (1974, p. 15) attested that "the role conception of leadership is most firmly buttressed by research findings."

Social exchange theorists emphasized the interaction
between leader and led as an economic cost and rewards proposition (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). Jacobs (1971) in his extensive analysis of leadership in formal organizations viewed the interaction between leader and follower as a bargaining situation -- though not necessarily consciously so -- wherein the mission was accomplished and the subordinate's needs were satisfied.

Consequently, in this study leadership will be viewed as an interaction between leader and follower roles within a situation in which interpersonal power and obligation are willingly exchanged in order to accomplish an organizational task and satisfy the needs of organizational members.

Military Leadership Background

Leadership problems were initially limited to perceptual differences between officers and enlisted men (Stouffer, 1949). The Army provided guidelines for leaders' actions and orders. These guidelines were institutionalized as the eleven principles of leadership (Carter, 1952). Further emphasis was provided in the '60's as military personnel specialists were often quoted as saying "put the person back into personnel." But deployment to Vietnam, the nuances of an unconventional war, and the development of new weapons and tactics redirected military efforts toward the battlefield and the accomplishment of the mission. With the instability of the situation,
the brief duration of command by commanders, and unfavor-
able public opinion, there was an increasing frequency of
"fragging," drug abuse, and disobedience to orders. The
growing awareness of U.S. casualties and the inactivation
of units, coincident to their withdrawal from Vietnam during
the early seventies, provided some soldiers with non-mis-
sion related time to spend and non-meaningful work.
Commanders, who had been professionally developed and were
tactically competent, began to experience a growing amount
of human relations problems. Battalion commanders who did
not have the prerequisite interpersonal skills (Holmes,
1974) sought simple solutions to complex problems and
often attacked symptoms rather than problems.

In recognition of these problems, a number of dif-
ferent thrusts developed to seek solutions. The U.S. Army
War College (1971) conducted a study of leadership behavior
in relation to expectations of others, identifying not
only behavioral shortfalls, but also perceptual short-
falls concerning the adequacy of leadership among officers
and noncommissioned officers. During approximately the
same period, there was a massive increase in human rela-
tions, drug abuse, and race relations programs which were
designed to enhance communications and understanding be-
tween superiors and subordinates.

In February 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird announced that the decision making process in
Defense had changed to emphasize participative management
This indeed was a fundamental departure from the unquestioned loyalty so often, albeit incorrectly, expected from subordinates within a regimented, formal organization. Essentially, the Secretary focused on people, the prime component of the military. His emphasis was timely. For Toffler's (1970) alarming analysis of society served as a warning to alert the people in power as to the American citizens' growing inability to cope with rapid technological change and transience. It is safe to assume that the inabilities to cope evident within the American public were also present within the military and that to assist soldiers in coping, certain leader behaviors were better than others.

Further evidence of the need for changes in military leader behavior came from the 1973 Middle East War, which shockingly alerted the U.S. military into realizing that while the U.S. was involved in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union had budgeted and produced sufficient military weaponry to not only challenge U.S. military might, but also export an enormous amount of war materiel to Egypt and Syria.

Quickly, the U.S. military responded with new weapons systems, new tactics for the employment of those systems, new technology, increased use of computers, and a reaffirmation of the basic soldierly skills, such as concealment and the proper use of terrain. Tactical responsibility was divided to require generals to "see the
"battle" and identify the enemy's main axis of advance, colonels to maneuver and concentrate firepower against the enemy, and captains and lieutenants to fight the battle.

However, the electronic technology which provided a general with the capability to communicate with a lieutenant on the battlefield created a requirement for more and more specialists. In some respects the general now must rely on the knowledge, expertise, and professionalism of those specialists, his subordinates, who are more knowledgeable about their specialties than he.

As further evidence, field manuals now outline tactical procedures for employing dispersed units. Company strong points, blocking positions, and lateral shifts on the battlefield argue in favor of decentralized execution. Disrupted communications due to electronic countermeasures or electromagnetic pulse impede command and control and require instant, independent judgment and initiative by junior subordinates. Corps artillery units are increasingly employed by subordinate headquarters. Nuclear weapons control will be "decentralized to brigades and battalions" once nuclear war begins (U.S.A. CGSC, 1975). The Army's command policy cautions commanders not to "rely on coercion when persuasive methods can effect the desired end" (U.S.A. AR 600-20, 1974). These and many more doctrinal shifts indicate a growing trend toward decentralization of authority and responsibility to competent subordinates within an organization which communicates effectively and
has confidence in its members.

The preceding does not suggest anything other than all professional members of the army agree on desiring high standards, mission accomplishment, esprit de corps, and high morale. However, leaders do not agree on how those goals are to be achieved. The "how to" of leadership is a person's style. The brief preceding discussion strongly suggests that expected communications, decentralized execution, and the degree of technology involved are all relevant to the style of leadership or followership which will be effective in a given situation.

Military Leadership Terminology

There is a definite requirement to operationalize the terms associated with leadership such as command, authority, responsibility, accountability, discipline, morale, esprit de corps, power, and obligation. Some of these terms are defined in the Army Dictionary. Command is the "authority which a commander . . . exercises over his subordinates by virtue of his rank and assignment" (AR 310-25, p. 127). It includes the responsibility for morale and discipline. Responsibility is "the obligation to carry forward an assigned task to a successful conclusion" (Ibid., p. 448). Accountability is an "obligation imposed by law or lawful order or regulation" which is concerned with records (Ibid., p. 6). Discipline only pertains to correctional facilities (Ibid., p. 185) and
obligation pertains to reserved dollars (Ibid., p. 360).

In its manual on military leadership the Army (FM 22-100, 1973, pp. 1-3) defines leadership as the "process of influencing men in such a manner as to accomplish the mission." Morale is an individual's state of mind. Esprit de corps is the enthusiasm shown for a unit by its members. Discipline is an "attitude that insures prompt obedience to orders and initiation of appropriate action in the absence of orders" (Ibid., pp. 13-5, 6).

The term power, as it is applied to the leader-follower interaction, is found nowhere in the military literature. Since the willingness to use and seek power is a kind of glue which holds the roles of leader and follower together within a situation, it is imperative to review the literature about power.

The Intervening Variable of Power

In 1935 (Schjelderup-Ebbe), a "pecking order" among chickens was recorded as an illustration of dominance or power over others. Maslow and Flanzbaum (1936) observed a similar pattern in monkeys. Merei (1949) made the leap up the phylogenetic scale and observed power interplay in a children's nursery.

Whyte (1943) also observed power in a youth group. Likert (1967) identified a leader as a "linking pin," one who is influenced by power and who in turn influences two or three others by power. His concept also served as an
inverted funnel which processes the thoughts and recommendations of subordinates up through the hierarchy.

Parkinson's Law (Parkinson, 1957) postulated that power within a formal organization drives leaders to build empires and to increase the number of subordinates, thereby increasing power satisfaction of the leader.

Freud (1922) and the psychoanalytic school maintained that power relationships existed without the conscious awareness of those involved. They hypothesized that seeking or avoiding power were ego defense mechanisms of an individual unable to cope objectively with his surroundings. Zalesnik (1965a), too, categorized extreme individual personality styles as somewhat defensive when a leader constantly seeks or avoids power.

Field theory proponents maintained that both leader and follower related with power (Cartwright, 1965) and with perceptions of who had the power (Festinger, 1950), the control, the influence over others. Indeed, power is a most important variable in determining an effective leadership style (Bass, 1973). French and Raven (1959) categorized power bases. They apply to the military as follows:

'Legitimate Power derives from statutory provisions of the public laws which govern the Armed Forces. If subordinates recognize the legitimate right of a leader appointed over them to direct them, then that leader has legitimate power in the eyes of the subordinates. In
addition to statutory provisions, Goldman and Fraas (1965) demonstrated how the group itself could be a "legitimizing agent."

'By virtue of his legitimacy, a leader has reward and coercive powers. These are viewed by soldiers as the leader's right to reward or punish them for conformity to or noncompliance with standards, respectively. There is "less need for [punishment] in a well-disciplined organization than in a lax one" (Pennington, 1943, p. 156).

'Expert power is equated with technical and tactical competence, proficiency in job knowledge, the leader's ability to contribute to the group's accomplishment of the mission. The leader is viewed as a valued resource to the group.

'Referent power was initially viewed as charismatic appeal. However, more appropriately it categorizes interpersonal competence, persuasive influence over others, the ability to establish a climate of motivation and to develop subordinates. It's a leader's reputation, his coolness, his consistency, and his objectivity that earn the subordinate's respect. It is essentially a subordinate's faith that the leader will not let him down. Stouffer et al (1949) observed this category in the inexperienced combat soldier who looked to his squad leader after his first battle and said "Did I do alright, Sarge?"

It should be noted that power exists in both the perceptions of leaders and followers. It is a reciprocal
interactive relationship (Festinger, 1950).

Consequently, if power is the source of influence between interacting personalities in leader and follower roles, both the leader and follower must somehow share in that power. It would be safe to assume that the more they objectively interact, the less relevant personal power will be to the outcome of that interaction. Jacobs (1971) suggests that sharing of power has two primary purposes. The first is to increase the self-esteem of the follower, and thereby his commitment to the organization since it is a source of that self-esteem. The second is to decrease the power differential between two people interacting in a hierarchy, thereby increasing the flow of information and effective communication between them. This second purpose is not just limited to the eyeball-to-eyeball relationships between leader and follower in a rifle squad (DePuy, 1958). It is also observed in the customary communications pattern between leader and follower at more senior levels of command (Olmstead, 1968).

An example of sharing power was seen after World War I. The Prussian Military hierarchy believed their Army was defeated because of a strict authoritarian retention of power by leaders (Ansbacker, 1941). As a result, officers were trained in techniques to encourage the unit to accept responsibility. Missions were given to units. Each member internalized the mission and esprit de corps...
Consequently, during World War II individual soldiers continued to defend their unit's position even after their leaders became battlefield casualties. Power, then, is somewhat shared by leaders and followers. It is balanced by each. For, as Voltaire has said: "I am a leader; therefore, I must follow." (Aldington, 1934).

The outcome of that interaction. Jacobs (1971) suggests that sharing of power has two primary purposes. The Informal Contract first is to increase the self-esteem of the follower, and Every leader in a chain of command within a formal organization is also a follower. Likert's (1967) linking pin concept alludes to the man in the middle, between his superiors and between his subordinates. Gibb (1969, hierarchy, thereby increasing the flow of information and p. 237), also, maintains that intermediate level leaders need a dual role to play.

He must accept the norms and values of superior authority, thus serving as an agent of the organization of which he is a part. To the extent that he does this effectively, his superiors regard him highly. At the same time, he must win the willing followership of the men under him, to the extent that he mingles freely with them and represents them against the over-all organization.

The Army (U.S. Army War College, 1971) has popularized the "Informal Contract" wherein the leader is a mediator who must balance the expectations of superiors and subordinates, mission and men. Superiors expect the
subordinates to be proficient and disciplined. Subordinates expect superiors to provide meaningful, worthwhile work and treat them fairly.

The leader's role is that of a middleman in an organization, both a leader and a follower who has both power and obligation to others. Perhaps Voltaire's quote could be altered to say "I have power; therefore, I have obligations."

Power and Obligation Matrix

Wolman (1956) established leadership as a general function of power and acceptance of requirements. As was noted earlier, the military terms of accountability and responsibility concern obligations. So too, within any organization there is a differentiation of roles. Those roles can be formal or informal (Gibb, 1969), (Bass, 1970). The formal is traditional, observable, and related to superordinates; the informal consists of social control, peer pressure, and is related to other than superordinates. The latter involves specific social situations and personalities which cannot be anticipated. Sweney (1970) graphically portrayed a power and obligation matrix bounded by formal and informal role expectations as shown in figure one. Weigand (1974) described the cells in the matrix as they applied to a military leader, a middle manager, exhibiting both a leadership and followership role.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POWER (as leader)</th>
<th>OBLIGATION (as follower)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTHORITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>ACCOUNTABILITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Right to act as Commander/Leader.&quot;</td>
<td>Does what he is supposed to do. &quot;Has to comply with regulations, SOP, suspense dates.&quot; Accountable for mission accomplishment and subordinates' performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate, Reward &amp; Coercive Power. &quot;Headship or Command.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INFLUENCE</strong></td>
<td><strong>RESPONSIBILITY</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1**

Power and Obligation Matrix

Although it is difficult to discretely describe where authority ends and influence begins, it has been confirmed that military leaders use both authority and influence. In a bureaucracy, authority is not delegated to individuals, but to positions (Rice and Bishoprick, 1971). It is certain that the mere holding of a position of authority does not insure leadership (Olmstead, 1971). And, therefore, authority is only part of the power spectrum within which leaders operate.
Authority is a right to command (Koontz, 1955) by virtue of rank, assignment, and signature under the statement: "I, the undersigned assume command." Authority provides the appointed leader with the right to use legitimate, reward, and coercive powers. Authority is the right to expect obedience, to control the outward behavior of others (Webster, 1966). So too, leaders have certain obligations.

The obligations which leaders have as followers could be grouped in the upper right quadrant. They are accountable for the equipment for which they have signed; must comply with Army regulations, unit SOP's, and their commander's policies; maintain standards; and meet suspense dates. Accountability is essentially an obligation by subordinates to properly discharge their duties (Davis, 1951).

The formal spectrum is immediate, easy to observe and inspect, and short range in nature. The informal spectrum is long range and evident only after a leader has been stabilized and knows his superiors and his subordinates. Only then does he begin to see the fruits of his time-consuming, deliberate efforts.

True leadership enters stage front in the lower left quadrant which treats the psychological, emergent, referent, and charismatic aspects of power. That power is the crux of effective leadership which needs to be developed in order for leaders to exhibit interpersonal skill and proficiency.
General Aubrey Newman, in the November 1972 issue of ARMY Magazine, ably described the lower right portion of the matrix as follows:

All too often I have heard . . . officers complain, 'They don't give me enough to do, not enough responsibility.' These . . . officers never seem to realize that in saying this they have confessed their failure to meet the one responsibility of any officer that cannot be delegated: the responsibility to be a self-starter.

Simply stated, formal power is what Gibb (1954) has called "headship." It is attributed to a leader formally appointed by an organization. Informal power is more closely associated with "intended influence" (Moment and Zaleznik, 1963, p. 414) or "leadership." Formal obligation is responsibility initiated from within in the form of anticipating a superior's problems, making suggestions for improvement, forwarding recommendations not solicited, and identifying with and developing the high esprit de corps of the organization.

Earlier in this chapter the army's definition of discipline was provided. It could be equated to the accountability and responsibility segments of obligation. The reader will recall that discipline is an "attitude that insures prompt obedience to orders [accountability] and the initiation of appropriate action in the absence of orders" [responsibility].

Response to Power Model (RFM)

Sweney (1971) operationalized some of the foregoing
concepts and synthesized the constructs into an interactive leader and follower model. The model provides a means to analyze power structures within organizations. It focuses on roles and perceptual behaviors, assuming that personality is relatively stable. He hypothesized that problems in power and communications are within the realm of change. He synthesized the literature into three superordinate and three subordinate styles.

![Response to Power Model](image)

**Figure 2**

Response to Power Model (RPM) Developed by A. B. Sweney

These organizational roles are discriminated from each other in terms of implied assumptions, communication styles, dominant personality characteristics, responses to frustration, goals, values, exchanges sought, and sociometric behaviors. The horizontal continuum in figure two ranges from possession of all power on the left to
avoidance of all power on the right. The imaginary vertical continuum is pure objectivity and effective communication.

As leaders interact with followers it is impossible for the former not to become involved with the latter (Olmstead, 1968). And as they interact each individual's self-concept is influenced by the behavior of the other toward him (Manis, 1955, pp. 367-369). The interaction provides the forum for the exchange of power and obligation previously discussed. In fact, the senior-subordinate relation rests on who has the knowledge, the skill, and the information required for the successful accomplishment of the task (Rice, 1971, p. 98) and the increase in rewards available (Heinicke and Bales, 1953, pp. 30-38). Effective unit performance implies that individuals are able to establish and maintain relationships with others (Ginzberg, 1959, p. 273).

Fiedler and others would probably add diverse situations to the model. Fiedler (1969) identified three major factors which influence the situation: position power of leader, task structure, and leader-member relationships.

Position power, which has been described as formal power assigned by the Army to a specific position, is assumed to be the same in all equal positions within a hierarchy, for example: all company commanders, all battalion commanders. However, lower level managers are more
constrained by the situation than are upper level managers (Franklin, 1973, p. 112). The styles of leadership and followership at various levels thus should be different; the extent to which they are will be identified later in this study.

Leadership Styles

Figure 3

Authoritarian Leader

Sweney's description of the authoritarian leader equates closely with the description of other named styles found throughout the literature. These similarities are noted throughout the description of the Authoritarian style. The authoritarian leader is highly structured and directive (Dalton, 1970, p. 284), exploitive (System 1) and paternalistic (System 2) (Likert, 1967), coercive, autocratic, subjective, and a problem seeker. He blames
others, accepts few, and prefers theory X (McGregor, 1944) in that he believes people are bad, lazy, stupid and need to be forced to work. He is unable to organize functionally, is personally competent, and desires to be intimately involved in all the activities of his unit. He is a 9-1 leader (Blake and Mouton, 1969), with high emphasis on production and low concern for people. Mission occupies most of his time; subordinates, very little (Weigand, 1975). He works longer (Lippet and White, 1958, p. 510), is an "order giver" (Merei, 1949, p. 157), "boss-centered" (Tannenbaum, 1958), retains resources, provides specific guidance, centralizes his organization, and controls the organization by withholding information (Adams, 1965), thereby requiring subordinates to "ask the boss." He invariably controls his subordinates using the military "direction of attack," maintains close control, and is highly restrictive.

He, like Frederick Taylor's scientific school of management, is obsessed with increasing worker efficiency while viewing the worker as an adjunct to the organization's equipment (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1973, p. 3). He believes his patterned style (A) of leadership is supreme (Argyris, 1971, p. 155) as he continually seeks power and holds subordinates accountable for failure (Swaney, 1971).

The Authoritarian, often unnecessarily, generates conflicts which are not really necessitated by the situation. As Lukert (1974, p. 34) has written: "Authority is such a
common way to instill discipline that it is often used with
too little thought." He usually and rightfully prides
himself on his ability to grapple with a problem directly
but probably, incorrectly, perceives that his antagonists
are the workers rather than the procedures and systems
(Weigand, 1975). Interestingly French and Snyder (1959)
ote that some authoritarian military officers perceive
themselves as competent, maintain that their subordinates
have judgment problems, and hence are cautious to share
their power, their expert information. This is true espe-
cially in difficult, complex, and ambiguous task situations.

Argyris (1957) foretold future problems by warning
managers about too much structure, too many administrative
controls, and false human relations programs. The auth-
oritarian leader "will not realize the full potential of
his human resources" (Yonke, 1969, p. 36). He will inhibit
subordinate participation (Fleishman, 1961; Lewin, 1951;
and McGregor, 1944). The more he withholds power from good
junior officers, the more the Army can expect to lose them
to responsible jobs on the "outside" (Appling, 1975, p. 42).
The "unapproachable and superior attitude of officials is
fatal" (Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack, 1949, p. 265). In fact, the more auth-
oritarian a leader is, the more unable he is to deal ef-
fectively with the needs of others and the more he tends
to be rejected by his followers (Hollander, 1954, p. 370).

What causes a leader to be authoritarian is
questionable. Perhaps he lacks the expert power (French and Raven, 1959) and information needed to make qualitative decisions. Perhaps he is very ego defensive as Freud (1922) and Moment and Zaleznik (1963) suggested and is defending himself from an area of behavior in which he does not feel competent. Or, perhaps he acts that way because he believes that is his expected role (Goffman, 1973, p. 251), the mask he must wear.

Regardless of the cause, the authoritarian leader is a black-and-white personality who prefers high power differentials between hierarchical positions. Unfortunately, high power differentials produce a reluctance on the part of a subordinate to approach his boss and communicate. As a result upward information flow is restricted, and without this information the organization is less effective.

The fundamental cause of any breakdown of morale and discipline within the armed forces usually comes from a commander ... [who] transgresses by treating [his] men as if they were children or serfs instead of showing respect for their adulthood.

S. L. A. Marshall, 1966
The other extreme leadership style is the permissive. The permissive leader is unstructured, nondirective, subjective, seductive, indulgent, kind, and dependent. He accepts many, blames self and believes people are good and need love. He repays work with kindness. He is a 1-9 leader (Blake and Mouton, 1969) with low emphasis on production and high emphasis on people. He views his role as a harmonizer in the work situation but falls short of Likert’s (1967) integrated approach.

A close parallel can be established between Sweney’s permissive leader and Fiedler’s High LPC. In highly uncertain situations faced with complex, unpleasant tasks (Fiedler, 1963) and little information, he will provide a climate within which high achievers will function effectively (Dalton, Lawrence, and Lorsch, 1970, p. 284). The same group of authors believe the permissive leader provides
an effective means of coordination which permits specialists with diverse knowledge and orientations to work together (Ibid., p. 295).

Subordinate centered management styles (Tannenbaum and Schmidt, 1958) coincide with more task effectiveness and satisfaction with supervision "in the eyes of the subordinate" (Bass, 1975, p. 728).

He tactically controls his subordinates using the military "zone of action."

To him, anything that anyone wants to do is fine because they all want to do the best they can. He has the utmost trust in everyone and rarely disciplines. He readily delegates authority, decentralizes organization, assigns accountability, and gives away resources to subordinates. His avoidance of power may also be defensive as was suggested earlier.

![Equalitarian!](image)

**Figure 5**

Equalitarian Leader
The equalitarian is the most balanced leadership role. The term democratic (Lewin et al., 1939) as found in FM 22-100 (U.S. Army, 1973) has a negative connotation in that it implies that soldiers "take a vote" in the assembly area to decide whether or not they should cross the line of departure. Consequently, the term "equalitarian" is used to indicate that there must be an equitable balance between mission and the welfare of subordinates, and that the leader believes that there is equal worth among men. The equalitarian leader is flexible, participative, rational, objective, knowledgeable, and seeks solutions. He accepts and rejects others moderately and prefers theory Y (McGregor, 1960) in that he believes people are intelligent, motivated, and know their own job best. He is a 9-9 leader (Blake and Mouton, 1969) with high emphasis on production and people.

Since he attempts to fulfill the expectations of his superiors and his subordinates, he shares authority and accountability with his subordinates. Subordinates are encouraged to assume responsibilities and recommend more effective means to accomplish the task.

In an address to the American Psychological Association, Bennis (1964) cautioned the leaders of the future about a rapidly changing, far more complex, turbulent environment which would require more adaptive, innovative, and equalitarian behavior. Argyris (1966), too, has stated that "executive decision making has become so complex that
group participation is essential."

Likert's (1967, pp. 14-24) systems three (consultative) and four (participative) equate closely to Sweny's equalitarian style of leadership. Likert's research indicates that "system four" organizations exhibit favorable attitudes, low cost, and long-range improvement in productivity. This interactive system breeds high trust and confidence between members, allows genuine participation, encourages the free and valid flow of communications throughout the organization, and distributes responsibility at all levels (Ibid., p. 46). This system is the style which Secretary Laird set as the model for the Department of Defense (1972).

Greater productivity by means of the equalitarian leadership style was suggested by Lewin (1951) and validated by House (1975), Jay (1971), Jones (1975), Kolominskiy (1971), Nelson (1962), and Ziller (1963).

Peter Drucker (1954) has encouraged the shift to management by objectives through mutual trust with subordinates. When General Motors decentralized authority, the weak managers became readily apparent (Drucker, 1946, p. 8).

Montagu (1962) agreed with biologist W. C. Allee who said "the principle of cooperation is the most dominant and biologically the most important" human behavior in nature. The equalitarian does cooperate. He also creates situations within which learning can occur. He keeps his subordinates constantly challenged, learning, and
experiencing (Schein, 1965 and Berlew, 1966) so that they are able to assume his leadership role in the future. He sets and enforces the standards and insures the effective involvement of his subordinates to produce quality output. He grows and develops subordinates while demanding proficiency and discipline from them. He accomplishes his mission through his subordinates.

Based on his analysis of the situation, he delegates authority, assigns accountability as appropriate, and tends to control his subordinates using the military "axis of advance."

"Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity."

General George S. Patton, Jr., 1941

Military research also supports the equalitarian style. The United States Army War College (1971) recommended a program to enhance communications and understanding within the army. The Combat Developments Command (U.S. Army, 1971, p. 64) stated,

Commanders at all levels must be made aware of the fact that punishment alone does not produce a disciplined army but rather a fearful group of men ... the unit commander must be skilled in dealing with people.

Daniel (1974, p. 37) suggested that participative management will produce discipline, willing obedience, and the acceptance of personal responsibility for organizational goals and standards.

And finally, an air defense battalion commander who
practiced equalitarian leadership, published a report of his unit which stated that participative management produced no breakdown in discipline (Fry, 1974). Similar findings were verified in the United States Air Force (Daniel, 1974).

In summary, only the leader who is able to combine mission and social maintenance orientations in a flexible manner is able to react with undefensive, objective role behaviors (Jacobs, 1971, p. 192). A proper balance between mission and men, centralization and decentralization, and power and obligation is essential to an effective leadership style. It is suggested that the literature supports an equalitarian style of leadership, a style which emphasizes the accomplishment of the mission through subordinates.

Competent leadership must establish a climate wherein most interactions within the organization will be viewed by the follower, in light of his background and expectations, as meaningful work, supportive, and "one which builds and maintains his sense of personal worth and importance" (Likert, 1961, p. 103).

"The leader must himself believe that willing obedience always beats forced obedience."

Xenophon, 430-350 B.C., Cyropaedia

**Followership Styles**

A review of the literature revealed that not very much research about followers has been conducted.
Sanford (1950) suggested that more could be learned about the leader by studying the follower. In their classic study on leadership climate, Lippitt and White (1958) identified certain follower phenomena. The amount of work output in an autocratic (authoritarian) group atmosphere dropped drastically within a few minutes after the leader left the room. The work output in a democratic (equalitarian) group remained unchanged when the leader left. In another study, certain employees appeared to alienate themselves from their jobs (Seeman, 1959) and experienced normlessness and indifference. Goldthorpe (1968) reported employees were unable to seek self-esteem and self-actualization in their work environment. Tannenbaum (1968) observed that some employees wanted more control over their work. Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) found that some employees did the job for the job's sake.

These findings suggest that in the interactions, subordinates also are acting in accordance with certain expectations. In fact, they exhibit styles of their own. Cattell (1953) stated that a large part of group behavior variance was due to the personalities of followers. Sweney (1971) postulated three subordinate styles which allow conceptualizing. They are as follows:
The first follower style is the rebel. The rebel is competent and knowledgeable but also a troublemaker, complainer, protester, and mutineer. He seeks authority, but refuses to accept accountability. He blames others (Rosenzweig, 1951) rejects many, is sadistic, and believes his superiors are greedy, unintelligent, wrong, and cause problems. He believes there is no situation so minute that a crisis can't be developed.
The other extreme followership style is the ingratiator. The ingratiator is the true "organization man," submissive, masochistic, and blames himself (Rosenzweig, 1951). He believes superiors are threatening and must be humored, that they have a right to avoid personal blame, and that might makes right.

When the boss tells him to do something, whether appropriate or inappropriate, ethical or unethical, he replies: "Yes, sir, yes sir, three bags full."

He never does more than the boss requires and doesn't qualitatively or selectively analyze hierarchical requirements. When confronted, he reverts to a strictly literal interpretation of the manual or regulation. He is the true bureaucrat. If followers are people frightened of authority and of accepting accountability, they will probably substitute conformity for thinking (Leavitt, 1958, p. 231).

"The enemy is the 'yes man'."

old Russian Proverb
The third and most interactive follower role is the cooperator, who is honestly critical, an idea man, not pre-programed, creative (Rogers, 1961), imaginative, and seeks solutions (Rosenzweig, 1951). He assumes his superiors are reasonable, want the truth, and will reward their subordinates according to their real contributions.

He tolerates the authoritarian, works with the equalitarian, and pities the permissive boss. He wants to contribute as much as possible to the mission. He recognizes the resources his commander has and those he needs to accomplish the mission (Tannenbaum and Schmidt, 1958).

Interaction oriented subordinates saw less conflict when led by permissive leaders (Bass, 1965).

Subordinates will work hard under difficult
conditions if they think the objective is worth it (Mayo, 1933). Larson (1953) observed those who were attracted to a group accepted more responsibilities. Horwitz (1953) observed they also persisted longer in working toward difficult objectives.

The Command and General Staff College (U.S. Army, 1975) declared the college wanted to develop each officer's sense of responsibility and to increase his willingness to accept responsibility. The army (AR 350-1, 1975, p. 2) maintains that individuals share the responsibility for their training with their superiors. But a subordinate's responsibilities are not limited to training. HumRRO (1970) concluded "the American rifleman ... on a night ambush is a leader insofar as his duties and responsibilities encompass human maintenance." These examples appear to suggest that the cooperator subordinate is the style which the army prefers. The Peter Principle (Peter, 1969) popularized the belief that all leaders eventually were promoted out of their level of competency and were hence eventually incompetent. Perhaps a corollary exists among subordinates: that competent subordinates are so numerous that they are relegated to positions beneath their level of competence. If the latter is so, it would be difficult to provide meaningful work for overcompetent subordinates. Leaders must be able to effectively interact and communicate with these subordinates so as not to waste valuable human resources.
Role Relationships Between Styles

The personality orientations (Sweney, 1970) as they are related to the six roles are explained as follows:

The authoritarian and rebel combination is confrontive in nature because while the authoritarian wants to retain authority (power) the rebel seeks authority. Each has his own way of doing the same thing and hardheadedly remains fixed in his closed-mindedness. This relationship is confrontive.

The more they are at odds with each other, the more detrimental and debilitating they are to the organization. Although both are creative and capable, little is accomplished. Hence, the rebel is transferred, fired, or placed in a job created for just him as a special projects officer. On the other hand the authoritarian leader can try to develop his rebel subordinates. One technique the leader can use . . . which allows the subordinate to get a piece of the power pie . . . is to assign the rebel a task consistent with his potential and the mission, allocate sufficient resources, give general guidance, and establish a reasonable suspense.

The equalitarian and cooperator complement each other with a relationship which is very objective. The relationship is based on the assumption that self-discipline is better than imposed discipline.

The permissive and ingratiator types spend all their time avoiding power but active in establishing rapport.
Each believes each other is a great fellow and constantly pats the other on the back - to the detriment of the organization. Very little is actually accomplished. This relationship is overly supportive, people-oriented, and power-avoidant.

Sweney also sees symbiotic relationships within preferred organizational climates. The best relationship that can occur within an organization between leader and led is equalitarian and cooperator, because both of these individuals share the power and the obligation, are turned on by the mission, and mutually contribute toward high quantity and quality output. Stabilized relationships in the chain of command are essential for this relationship to flower.

The relationship between the authoritarian and ingratiator produces quick fix, low quality solutions, because only the authoritarian is creatively contributing to the accomplishment of the mission. The ingratiator follows orders—nothing more. There is much short-term success and little long range accomplishment. It is a controlled climate, overly centralized to the detriment of subordinates. Ten years ago in ARMY Magazine, General Melvin Zais (January 1966) said:

"Centralization is an insidious, debilitating, erosive disease that eats away the bone, muscle, and fiber of our officer corps."

In the permissive and rebel relationship, results
are similar in that only one, the rebel, contributes. The rebel seeks authority, but doesn't accept accountability or responsibility for his actions. Since only the rebel contributes, organizational output may not reflect policy guidance from higher organizational levels. This is an open, liberal environment.

Summary

The secret of organizational success is the creative power of teamwork (Servan-Schreiber, 1968). For it is only by working together, by facing and surmounting challenges that have some meaning in the realm of military competence, that units can develop esprit de corps (Seigle, 1973). Organizational development and organizational effectiveness training appear to be building effective relationships through encouraging leaders and followers to communicate effectively and share their power and obligations.

Leadership is not a simple process. It is an influence process resulting from an interaction between leader and follower roles within a situation in which interpersonal power and obligation are willingly exchanged in order to accomplish organizational tasks and satisfy the needs of organizational members. The remainder of this thesis will be directed toward discovering more about the leadership and followership styles of army infantry officers, officer candidates, and noncommissioned officers.
Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

"There is nothing so practical as a good theory."

Kurt Lewin

Subjects (Ss)

One thousand one hundred and seven experimentally naive male subjects enrolled in Army professional development courses participated in this study. Of the total Ss, 289 were noncommissioned officers, 232 were officer candidates, and 586 were commissioned officers. The noncommissioned officers were enrolled in either the Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) -- sergeants preparing to be fire team leaders -- or the Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) -- staff sergeants and sergeants first class preparing to be platoon sergeants. The officer candidates were enrolled in either the Branch Immaterial Officer Candidate Course (BIOMIC) or the Officer Candidate Reserve Components Course (OC/RC) and were preparing to become rifle platoon leaders. The commissioned officers were enrolled in either the Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC) -- captains preparing to become rifle company commanders -- or the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) -- majors and lieutenant colonels preparing to become infantry battalion commanders. Active
reservists and national guard officers attending IOAC and CGSC were not tested. Mean ages of Ss were as follows: BNOC, 20.11 years of age; BIOCC, 21.91; OC/RC, 22.05; IOAC, 29.29; ANCOC, 30.59; and CGSC, 35.10. Only infantry NCO's and officers participated.

Procedure for Administering Psychological Instruments

The Supervise Ability Scale (SAS) and Responsibility Index (RI) were administered to all Ss during the first month of their professional development course. All but the CGSC sample were obtained at Fort Benning, Georgia. The CGSC sample was obtained at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Although tests were given from June through October 1975, all Ss within a given professional development course completed the test at the same point in the course and in the same classroom location.

Verbal instructions preceded each administration. Ss were assured that no specific score would be provided to the school authorities or to the Department of Army Military Personnel Center. They were encouraged not to try and out guess the answer. They were assured there were no right or wrong answers, that the tests were descriptive of their past experience and not evaluative, and that the tests provided them with a unique means of self-assessment, introspection, and insight into their leadership and followership styles. Subjects were asked to record their age, years of education, component (Regular
Army, United States Army Reserve, National Guard), source of commission (Officer Candidate School, Reserve Officers Training Corps, United States Military Academy), months of command, and months of staff as appropriate.

Both instruments analyze role styles which are perceived by the Ss to be most appropriate for effective leadership or followership. The SAS identified the Ss preferred leadership style. It consists of 30 forced choice items each of which involves three possible responses. The subjects were asked to rank the three responses in terms of their perceived preference in each of the 30 specific situations. In so doing, each subject preferred an authoritarian, equalitarian, or permissive response.

For each situation the subject was asked to identify his most preferred (1) and least preferred (3) response. For example: I like __ a. Easy jobs; __ b. Tough jobs; __ c. To get out of work.

The subject entered his most preferred (1) and least preferred (3) response to all forced choice situations. For ease of addition, he then entered a "2" in each blank for each question. Carbon inserts recorded the numbers 1, 2, or 3 as appropriate within the booklet in geometric figures which represented each of the three leadership styles. The subject added all of the numbers within each geometric figure to arrive at a total raw score for each particular style. He recorded the raw scores in his test booklet and totalled the raw score.
The raw score total was verified against the figure 180 (30 questions x a score of 6 for each question). If his raw score was different than 180, he added again. View graph transparencies containing raw score conversion tables (military sample, Sweney, 1972) were displayed to allow private scoring on a scale of one through ten (stanine) with ten being the highest preference and one being the lowest preference scores on each leadership style. Four through six were considered median range and indicated the ability to use that style as the situation dictated. A converted score of seven or above indicated a definite preference with that style.

The RI, using a format identical to the SAS, identified the preferred follower style. It consists of 34 forced choice situations. In each situation the subordinate ranked his rebel, cooperator, and ingratiator responses. Scoring was identical to that described above for the SAS. However, 240 (34 questions x a score of 6 for each question) was used to verify total raw score additions.

Ss were provided as much time as they needed to complete each instrument. Nevertheless, most Ss completed each form within 15 minutes. The author was present to check the completeness and accuracy of the responses. He provided general interpretation of scores to all Ss and was available for private, immediate feedback to each S. When feedback was provided, subjects were asked whether
they viewed their preferred style of leadership or follow-
ership as that which was expected by the army. Diverse
answers were given by all tested groups except the senior
NCO group. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

Reliability and Validity of SAS and RI

Reliability and validity were evaluated in accordance with Cronbach and Gleser (1959). Results of the
evaluation as reported in Elsass and Sweney (1972) are shown in table one.
Table 1

Reliability and validity tests for various middle managers on the 
Supervise Ability Scale and the Responsibility Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Supervise Ability Scale</th>
<th>Responsibility Index</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Authoritarian</td>
<td>Equalitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Reliability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Consistency</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability Coefficient</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equivalency</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Validity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictive</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Equivalency testing compared forms A and B for the SAS and forms B and C for the RI.

Concurrent validity was established by comparing the SAS and RI against the Response to Power Measure, a leadership/followership preference test designed by Sweney and used since 1970. Construct validity was established through factor analysis of superordinate and subordinate role behaviors. Predictive validity was established by subordinates' ratings of superiors for the SAS and superiors' ratings of subordinates for the RI. For example, a subordinate would take the RI. His superior would then rate him in accordance with role behaviors descriptive of follower styles. Agreement ranged from .41 to .53.

Variables

The authoritarian, equalitarian, and permissive leadership styles and the rebel, cooperator, and ingratiator followership styles were utilized in all samples. Additionally, the IOAC and CGSC samples included the background variables of age, years of education, source of commission, component, months of command, and months of staff. The NCO sample included age and years of education.

Statistics

All data files were identified by number and entered on punched cards. Each punched card contained an identifying number, the group (IOAC, CGSC, etc.), subgroups by source
of commission (OCS, ROTC, USMA) and component (RA, USAR, NG), years of age and education, and months of command and staff, and a score for each leader and follower style as appropriate to the subject.

Computer tabulation using the statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) provided means, standard deviations, and Pearson Product Moment correlations of all variables. A calculator was used for Student's t and Analysis of Variance.

Parametric statistics suited for interval scale data were used. BNCOC, ANCOC, BIOCC, OC/RC, and IOAC classes were randomly selected. All infantry students therein completed the instruments. The CGSC sample was from the only class in process during the June-October, 1975 time frame.

Variance was assumed to be similar in groups. An alpha level of less than .05 was identified for significance.

Hypotheses

Franklin (1973, p. 112) demonstrated that "lower level managers are more constrained by social psychological aspects of the situation than are upper level managers." Further, in the same work, he stated that "organizational climate becomes a more potent determiner of . . . leadership behaviors with movement down the hierarchy."

Franklin's contention, then, is that there is a difference between lower and higher level leaders in a
hierarchy. If so, is there a level where situational constraints and an organizational climate are conducive to more equalitarian and cooperation styles?

The range of levels within the infantry hierarchy from low to high arrays the tested sample as follows: BNCOC, ANCOC, OC/RC and BIOCC, IOAC, and CGSC. To verify Franklin's finding the samples were arranged by NCO, officer candidates, and commissioned officer categories. An independent hypothesis was written for each category.

1. There are differences in the means of leadership styles of BNCOC and ANCOC noncommissioned officers.

2. There are no differences in the means of BIOCC and OC/RC leadership styles. The candidates are selected from low level ranks to attend a course which prepares them for work at the same level (platoon leaders) within the hierarchy.

3. There are differences in the means of leadership styles of IOAC and CGSC commissioned officers.

Since OC/RC is a course for reserve components, a further analysis was deemed appropriate to test only active army and all officer personnel.

4. There are differences in the means of BIOCC, IOAC, and CGSC leadership styles. Theoretically BIOCC should be more authoritarian and CGSC more equalitarian with the former being more constrained by the situation and the latter less constrained.

Testing these hypotheses also permits verification
of Ghiselli's (1968, p. 22) findings. He maintained that as one progresses up the hierarchy the less authoritarian one would be. Ghiselli further contended that one would desire less power. The review of literature documented two power seeking styles (authoritarian leader, rebel follower) and two power avoidant styles (permissive leader, ingratia

tor follower). Since the leader styles already have hypotheses, follower styles will be examined by the following hypotheses.

5. There are differences in the means of followership styles of BNCOC and ANCOC noncommissioned officers.

6. There are no differences in the means of BIOCC and OC/RC followership styles because the candidates are selected from low levels of the hierarchy.

7. There are differences in the means of followership styles of IOAC and CGSC commissioned officers.

Analysis of the ingratia

tor followership means could also corroborate Milgram (1965, p. 75). "People do what they are told to do . . . so long as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority." If his quote is valid within the infantry, ingratia

tor mean scores will be quite high throughout all levels.

Precommission training might also impact on an officer's leadership/followership style. Differences between OCS, ROTC, and USMA probably would only exist until IOAC level. Organizational conditioning and similar experiences should balance any leader/follower style
difference by the time one reaches CGSC. Therefore:

8. Leadership and followership styles will vary with source of commission between IOAC and CGSC students.

Argyris (1972, p. 51) contended that leaders would “move toward the maturity end of the continuum with age.” This could be equated to the objectivity relationship of equalitarian and cooperator in the Response to Power Model.

9. Leadership and followership styles will vary with age.

The question was then posed whether additional education would affect one’s leader/follower style. The army has begun the Non Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). Officers are attending “bootstrap” and advanced civil schooling programs in an attempt to raise the officer education level. An appropriate hypothesis then is:

10. Leadership and followership styles will vary with years of education.

The last dimension to be analyzed will be months of command and staff. Traditionally, infantry officers have desired command assignments. The Army (March, 1974) recently proclaimed that there are insufficient command positions for all infantry officers. Officers, therefore, were encouraged to develop an alternate specialty - a staff orientation. Two hypotheses were believed necessary.

11. Leadership and followership styles will vary with months of command.
12. Leadership and followership styles will vary with months of staff.
Chapter 4

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Academic, business, and military research supports the equalitarian style of leadership and the cooperator style of followership. The equalitarian-cooperator interaction appears to be the most effective organizational relationship.

As defined in chapter two, the equalitarian-cooperator relationship is a mature, objective, and professional relationship wherein interpersonal communication is highly effective, a positive climate of motivation is operant, and authority and responsibility are shared. Some may argue that this relationship is an ideal, never to be achieved but always to be pursued. The literature, however, posits that this relationship is a professional fulcrum upon which the two basic responsibilities of an effective unit (mission and men) are balanced, a "via media" between two subjective extremes of leadership and followership styles.

The effective organization then is based on mutual trust and confidence wherein leaders are proficient in diagnosing the situation and providing guidance, and followers are proficient in performing their duty and providing information to their leaders. Both leaders and
followers internalize the mission and apply their resources to the accomplishment of that mission.

Accordingly, leaders and followers must be technically proficient to relate in the equalitarian-cooperator mode. If the follower is not proficient, for example in basic combat training, a leader would probably prefer an authoritarian approach. But as followers become more proficient, leaders should begin to provide more general guidance and direction, and begin to coach the subordinate into accepting more and more responsibility. So, too, the organization itself somehow acclimates the member to what is expected of him — the standards of conduct, training, and proficiency. If so, then the higher one goes in the hierarchy, the more of an equalitarian and cooperator he would become.

With this in mind a descriptive snapshot was taken by means of leadership and followership instruments to provide a picture of prospective infantry squad leaders, platoon sergeants, platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion commanders.

Relative scores of these prospective leaders were recorded for each of the three leadership and followership styles.

Leadership Styles

Table two provides the means and standard deviations of the leadership styles for each of the sample groups.
Table 2

Mean scores\(^a\) and standard deviations for samples tested by the Supervise
Ability Scale, Form A, for leadership style.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Authoritarian Mean</th>
<th>Authoritarian SD</th>
<th>Equalitarian Mean</th>
<th>Equalitarian SD</th>
<th>Permissive Mean</th>
<th>Permissive SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) (Squad Leaders)</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) (Platoon Sergeants)</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Branch Immaterial Officer Candidate Course (BIOCC) (Platoon Leaders)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Officer Candidate/Reserve Component Course (OC/RC) (Platoon Leaders)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC) (Company Commanders)</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Command and General Staff College (CGSC) (Battalion Commanders)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Maximum mean score = 10; Normative mean = 5.

\(^b\)Each subject had a score for each of three leadership styles.
A visual comparison of the means reveals that non-commissioned officers (BNCOC, ANCOC) and officer candidates (BIOCC, OC/RC) had authoritarian and permissive mean scores which were higher than their respective equalitarian mean score. Visual analysis of table two also reveals that the CGSC officer has the lowest authoritarian, highest equalitarian, and lowest permissive leadership mean score. The OC/RC sample had the highest authoritarian and lowest equalitarian mean score. The BNCOC sample had the highest permissive mean score.

In the first statistical analysis BNCOC and ANCOC means were compared using Student's t. The same statistic was also used to compare BIOCC and OC/RC means and those of IOAC and CGSC samples.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Equalitarian</th>
<th>Permissive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BNCOC compared to ANCOC</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BIOCC compared to OC/RC</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>3.08*</td>
<td>3.42*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. IOAC compared to CGSC</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>5.18*</td>
<td>6.61*</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p < .002
As shown in table three, no significant differences were found between the BNCOC and ANCOC samples. The first hypothesis, therefore, must be rejected.

An analysis of leadership mean scores between BIOCC and OC/RC indicates a significant difference between groups. As noted in table two the BIOCC student exhibited a higher equalitarian and a lower permissive score than the OC/RC student. The differences in these two styles between the two groups were significant enough ($p < .002$) to reject that null hypothesis.

Continuing with Student's t, IOAC mean scores were compared to CGSC mean scores. Differences for authoritarian and equalitarian styles were quite significant ($p < .002$). As was noted in table two the IOAC sample had a higher authoritarian mean, and the CGSC sample a higher equalitarian mean. Therefore, the third hypothesis cannot be rejected.

Since significant differences were found between officer candidates and officer samples, analyses of variance (Appendix B) were conducted to determine if there were leadership style differences between BIOCC, IOAC, and CGSC samples. Conceivably, this would demonstrate whether leadership style is different between active army prospective platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion commanders.

The analyses of variance (Appendix B, Tables 17, 18, 19) extend the t test findings and confirm the fourth
hypothesis. They show that the differences observed in table two are significant. With one exception, there are clear monotonic trends across the three levels tested (BIOCC, IOAC, CGSC) in the three leadership style means. For the authoritarian scale, BIOCC and IOAC subjects had essentially the same mean score. Both were more authoritarian than the CGSC sample. On the other hand, there was a clear progression for equalitarian and permissive scales. As the level increased from BIOCC to IOAC to CGSC, equalitarian scores were progressively higher and permissive scores were progressively lower. In all three comparisons, the differences were quite significant (p < .01).

These findings, therefore, bear out the contentions of Franklin (1973, p. 112) and Ghiselli (1968, p. 22) as stated in chapter three. Leadership styles in fact differ between lower and higher levels within the hierarchy. However, certain interpretations about the three subgroup levels may be inferred.

The similarities in means of infantry NCO's and officer candidates might suggest that they share similar experiences and are somewhat situationally conditioned to fulfill the roles expected of them within rifle platoons. However, the institutionally expected equalitarian style of leadership is lower than the mean scores of the non-preferred authoritarian and permissive styles of leadership. Therefore, a perceptual disparity exists.
It could well be that these noncommissioned officers and officer candidates are not being developed effectively, that individuals who want to work in rifle platoons are authoritarian or permissive, or that they have not had the prior education and/or other experiences necessary to elicit equalitarian behaviors.

High mean scores on the extreme leader styles may also imply inconsistent behavior - authoritarian in one situation, permissive in another. Evidence from the literature suggests, that when such a relationship with subordinates exists, subordinates are likely to develop apathy or ingratiator response patterns because they, the subordinates, are not sure what to expect from situation to situation. As a result, the subordinates will wait to be told what to do and then do precisely what they are told.

Post test interviews, as described in chapter two, indicated these NCO's and officer candidates really preferred the authoritarian style, but they perceived that the system and senior officers expected them to be permissive leaders. The latter was explained by repeated emphasis on "people programs," equal opportunity, mandatory racial awareness programs, rehabilitation of drug abusers, extensive counseling, etc. These were also viewed by the subjects as deleterious to good order, discipline, and proficiency in units, and provides further evidence for their "real" preference for authoritarian styles.

Thus, it appears that for these subjects there is a
tendency toward the malappropiate and inconsistent leadership styles discussed above. This probably will have negative effects on subordinate follower styles and initiative as suggested by the literature.

As was noted earlier, the CGSC sample scores were more qualitarian and less authoritarian and permissive than the IOAC sample scores. This could indicate that the experiences between IOAC and CGSC produce a more equalitarian leader. Then too, it may suggest that the army somehow selects for CGSC those officers who have been more equalitarian up to the point of selection to CGSC. If that is so then the army must be using some sort of selection criteria. As was mentioned in chapter one, standards for evaluation of leadership style do not exist.

Since all of the subjects were infantry and have had platoon or company command time, it is safe to assume that their success is measured by the extent to which they have led effectively. These differences in leader effectiveness probably exist at the IOAC level but may not be visible because of the fact that IOAC attendance is not selective. However, visible differences do appear at CGSC, probably as a consequence of selection for attendance.

The rationale for this reference is straightforward. Since the review of literature suggests that leadership style makes a difference and because the army offers no explicit standards for leadership style, then the various
measures of unit effectiveness, used by the commander who assesses his subordinate leaders, should be an outcome of leadership style. If more effective leadership styles produce more effective units, then the superordinate does in fact assess leadership style. And, finally, the officer efficiency report contained in a man's personnel file is used for selection to CGSC. More effective leadership styles produce more effective units. Consequently, the commanders of more effective units are rated more highly and eventually are selected for CGSC where there more adaptive leadership styles have been measured in contrast to the unselected attendees at IOAC.

**Followership Styles**

Table four provides the means and standard deviations of the followership styles for each of the sample groups.
Table 4

Mean scores and standard deviations for samples tested by the Responsibility Index, Form E, for followership style.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Rebel Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Cooperator Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Ingratiator Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BNCOC</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ANGOC</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. BIOCC</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>6.68</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. OC/RC</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. IOAC</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. CGSC</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Maximum mean score = 10; Normative mean = 5.*

*Each subject had a score for each of the three followership styles.*

A visual comparison of the means reveals striking similarities among all sample means for each of the three follower styles.

Nevertheless, statistical analysis, using Student's t, compared BNCOC to ANGOC, BIOCC to OC/RC, and IOAC to CGSC sample groups. The results are shown in table five.
Table 5

Student's t for differences in followership styles of noncommissioned officers, officer candidates, and commissioned officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Rebel</th>
<th>Cooperator</th>
<th>Ingratiator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BNCOC compared to ANCOC</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BIOCC compared to OC/RC</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. IOAC compared to CGSC</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>2.15*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=p < .05

No significant differences were noted between the BNCOC and ANCOC followership mean scores and, therefore, the fifth hypothesis must be rejected.

Similarly, there are no differences between the followership mean scores of the BIOCC and OC/RC samples and, consequently, the sixth hypothesis cannot be rejected.

However, a significant difference (p < .05) does exist between the IOAC and CGSC groups. The CGSC student is identified as less of an ingratiator, "yes-man."

The seventh hypothesis must be confirmed in part. Given that this was the only difference found to be significant in the comparison of followership styles,
it is possible that this one difference occurred by chance.

Although not part of the original test design, visual analysis of table 4 indicates a large difference between the cooperator mean scores of ANCOC and BIOCC. Consequently, statistical testing verified that the difference was quite significant (t=4.68, p<.02). A definite distinction, therefore, exists between the cooperator styles of the NCO and officer candidate samples. This implies that the NCO, rather than the officer candidate or officer, is less likely to effectively communicate up the chain of command. Since officer candidates and officers have more formal education - military and civilian - than the NCO's, more education for the former might be a reason for the difference in cooperator follower style between NCO and officer subgroups.

Apparently, it may be suggested that infantry followers, ranging from E-5 (sergeant) to O-5 (lieutenant colonel) are somewhat institutionally conditioned or trained to follow in a similar manner. What is most interesting is that the capability to follow exists similarly across styles in NCO, officer candidate, and officer groups. That is to say, the follower is most flexible - able to be a rebel, cooperator, or ingratia tor subordinate, appropriately - as he relates to any leader within any given situation.

Background Variables

Preceding findings suggest strongly that quite significant differences between preferences in leadership
style and slight difference between preferences in follower-
ship style exist across the levels of infantry personnel
sampled. In an effort to identify possible background
variables influencing these differences, data were col-
lected on a number of such variables. Their analysis is
reported in the following paragraphs.

Source of Commission

An officer's source of commission (Officer Candidate
School, Reserve Officer Training Corps, or United States
Military Academy) was the first background variable to be
analyzed. Discrete subfiles were established for each
source of commission to allow for statistical comparison
of means and standard deviations among officer samples.
Table six presents those results for leadership styles.
Table 6

Mean scores and standard deviations for OCS, ROTC, and USMA sources of commission as tested by the SAS, Form A, for leadership styles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Equalitarian</th>
<th>Permissive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Candidate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>5.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>5.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>5.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>5.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Military Academy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7.39</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 Maximum mean score = 10.

 Total CGSC N=114; Total IOAC N=467.

A visual comparison of the means reveals that the West Point graduate has higher authoritarian and lower permissive scores than the ROTC or OCS graduate. Much of the differences in means occurs among the CGSC sample.

Analysis of variance confirm the eighth hypothesis in part. Although leadership styles did not vary by source of commission for IOAC students, significant differences were recorded for CGSC students.

The analysis of variance recorded in table 20 (Appendix B) indicates a significant (p<.01) difference in
source of commission. The USMA graduate was identified as more authoritarian and the ROTC graduate as less authoritarian with the OCS commissioned officer falling between.

A similar analysis of variance recorded in table 21 (Appendix B) revealed that the differences across permissive means is also quite significant ($p < .01$). Herein the USMA graduate was the least permissive and the ROTC graduate the most permissive.

Differences in the equalitarian scale were not significant as was expected from visual examination of table six which shows these three means to be quite similar.

Since leadership styles do not vary with source of commission for the IOAC sample, but do vary for the CGSC sample, it is again suggested that some experience, or the selection that occurs, between IOAC and CGSC affects leadership style.

Table seven presents means and standard deviations for the followership styles of each officer sample by source of commission.
Table 7

Mean scores and standard deviations for OCS, ROTC, and USMA sources of commission as tested by the RI, Form B, for followership style.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Rebel Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Cooperator Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Ingratiator Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total CGSC N=114; Total IOAC N=467.

A visual comparison of the means reveals a wider range of means among the IOAC source of commission groups for rebel and ingratiator scores. In comparison, striking similarities exist among the CGSC sample.

Analyses of variance (Appendix B) were again conducted and showed that the differences observed in table seven were significant and confirm the eighth hypothesis in part.

Previously (Table 5), it was noted that the only significant difference (p < .05) between the IOAC and CGSC samples was in the ingratiator style. Analysis of variance recorded in table 22 (Appendix B) confirms a further
ingratiator distinction \( (p < .025) \) among IOAC captains by source of commission. Table seven shows the OCS graduate is more of an ingratiator and the USMA graduate is less so.

Analysis of variance recorded in table 23 (Appendix B) identifies that preference for the rebel followership style varies by source of commission among the IOAC sample. Herein the OCS graduate is less of a rebel and the USMA graduate is more so \( (p < .01) \).

Only one significant difference was found among the CGSC sample when followership styles were compared by source of commission. A fair difference appeared (Table 24, Appendix B) in the cooperator style and was significant \( (p < .02) \). The ROTC graduate was less of a cooperator and the USMA graduate more of a cooperator follower with the OCS graduate’s mean score falling in between.

One might conjecture that after one has been in the army for over ten years, his experiences would be similar to another’s. And, therefore, there should be no disparity between members commissioned from different sources. This contention is upheld by the findings which indicate that there is minimal difference among followership styles when compared to source of commission at the CGSC level. We could infer that, although follower differences are present at IOAC, they may dissipate by the time one reaches CGSC. Only further longitudinal analysis would resolve this contention.
However, the findings on leadership styles confuse this issue. Conclusively, no difference was found at IOAC. Only CGSC leadership styles varied by source of commission. Therefore, between IOAC and CGSC other variables, or again the selection factor, must be operative in influencing one's leadership style.

Component of Service

Mean scores and standard deviations for National Guard, Army Reserve, and Regular Army components by leadership style are shown in table eight.

Table 8

Mean scores and standard deviations for NG, USAR, and RA components as tested by the SAS, Form A, for leadership styles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component of Service</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th></th>
<th>Equalitarian</th>
<th></th>
<th>Permissive</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Total CGSC N=114; Total IOAC N=467.

b No National Guard infantry officers were tested at CGSC.

c Small N of USAR subjects precluded comparative analysis.
No significant differences were found between NG, USAR, and RA components on leadership style for either the CGSC or IOAC sample.

Table nine presents mean scores and standard deviations for NG, USAR, and RA components by followership style.

Table 9

Mean scores and standard deviations for NG, USAR, and RA components as tested by the RI, Form B, for followership styles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>N^a</th>
<th>Rebel</th>
<th>Cooperator</th>
<th>Ingratiator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean SD</td>
<td>Mean SD</td>
<td>Mean SD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.35 6.71</td>
<td>1.72 5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>1.39 6.23</td>
<td>1.79 6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>1.32 6.67</td>
<td>1.50 6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>1.32 6.67</td>
<td>1.50 6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>1.39 6.23</td>
<td>1.79 6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>1.75 6.24</td>
<td>1.74 5.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>1.75 6.24</td>
<td>1.74 5.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>1.57 6.44</td>
<td>1.79 5.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^aTotal CGSC N=114; Total IOAC N=467.

While means and standard deviations were computed for the CGSC USAR sample, the number of cases was insufficient for reliable analysis. Among the means for the IOAC sample, however, differences were noted on ingratiator followership style, and these differences were found significant (p<.01) as is shown in Table 25 (Appendix B).
The USAR captain was most ingratiating and the RA officer was the least. All other analyses of component with follower styles yielded insignificant results.

Age

Table 10 presents Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between age and leadership and follower-ship styles, both for total sample and for subsamples according to source of commission.
Table 10

Age by total sample and source of commission correlated with leadership and followership styles of 471 IOAC and 115 CGSC infantry officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Style by Sample</th>
<th>Source of Commission</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>OCS⁵</th>
<th>ROTC⁶</th>
<th>USMA⁷</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OCS⁵</td>
<td>ROTC⁶</td>
<td>USMA⁷</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.25⁸</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.21⁸</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalitarian</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.48⁹</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.37⁹</td>
<td>-.28⁸</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>-.09⁹</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperator</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingratiator</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.39⁹</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁵OCS N for CGSC = 301; for IOAC = 299.
⁶ROTC N for CGSC = 61; for IOAC = 122.
⁷USMA N for CGSC = 23; for IOAC = 46.
⁸Correlation significant at the .05 level.
⁹Correlation significant at the .01 level.
For the total IOAC sample, age correlated significantly \((r= -.09, p<.05)\) with rebel followership style. The older the IOAC student, the less likely he would be a rebel follower. However this is not a strong correlation. It barely achieves significance at the .05 level of confidence and accounts for less than one percent of the variance. It consequently is of little practical significance.

Equalitarian leadership and cooperator followership, preferred in the literature, resemble Argyris' "move to maturity." To the extent this is so, one would have expected the older subjects to show more "mature" preferences. And, in general, such "more mature" preferences were found in the tests between levels reported earlier. It seems likely that the failure to find significant relationships within levels is the result of severely restricted range on age within levels.

Age by source of commission was then correlated to leadership and followership styles. In general, the relationships noted in table ten are weak with few exceptions.

The older the OCS graduate at CGSC, the more likely he is to be a rebel follower and the less likely he is an ingratiator follower or a permissive leader. The older ROTC graduate is less likely to be authoritarian. At CGSC, the older ROTC graduate is also less likely to be a rebel subordinate. Age appears to be unrelated to the leadership or followership styles of USMA graduates, at
least within the sample levels shown.

With the exception of the correlation noted for the rebel followership style among OCS graduates at CGSC, all of the relationships between age and style are in the correct direction. That one lone discrepant relationship may be the result of education or some other variable. Alternatively, it could be a chance result.

Age was then correlated with the leadership and followership styles of 172 ANCOC subjects as shown in table 11.

Table 11

Age and years of education correlated with leadership and followership styles of 172 ANCOC subjects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Style</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Years of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalitarian</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.16(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>.18(^a)</td>
<td>-.16(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperator</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingratiator</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Correlation significant at the .01 level.

\(^b\)Correlation significant at the .05 level.
Contrary to the biased cartoons and diatribes about the "old sarge," it appears that as he grows older, he becomes more permissive \( (r=0.18, p<0.01) \). Alternately, ANCOC subjects may all have had similar duty positions during a specified age range.

Nevertheless, the ninth hypothesis must be confirmed in part because age is marginally related to certain leader and follower styles.

**Years of Education**

Years of education was then correlated with the leadership and followership styles of the same ANCOC sample shown in Table 11. These relationships were weak also. Taken together with the correlations involving age, they were also to some extent inconsistent. While two of the values of years of education reached significance, they were only marginally so and account for very little of the total variance. Thus, years of education for the ANCOC sample is only marginally related to leadership and followership styles.
Table 12

Years of education by total sample and source of commission correlated with leadership and followership styles of 471 IOAC and 115 CGSC infantry officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Style by Sample</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>OCS^a</th>
<th>ROTC^b</th>
<th>USMA^c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalitarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.26^d</td>
<td>.61^d</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.61^d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.66^d</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.37^d</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.39^d</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingratiator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>-.33^d</td>
<td>-.41^e</td>
<td>-.29^e</td>
<td>-.51^d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>-.19^d</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a OCS N for CGSC = 301; for IOAC = 299.
b ROTC N for CGSC = 61; for IOAC = 122.
c USMA N for CGSC = 23; for IOAC = 46.
d Correlation significant at the .01 level.
e Correlation significant at the .05 level.
However, the picture shown in table 12, dealing with commissioned subjects (IOAC, CGSC) is somewhat different. Significant correlations of substantial magnitude do appear for the CGSC sample.

Examination of the correlationships based on the IOAC sample shows only small and generally insignificant relationships between years of education and either leadership or followership style. As a minor exception, two significant negative relationships appeared between education and a tendency toward ingratiator followership style. Although these are fairly low relationships ($r=-.19,-.33$), the tendency for the same directional relationship at CGSC suggests reliability. An officer in either sample is less likely to prefer an ingratiator followership style if he has relatively more education.

When the total sample is broken down by source of commission, some relatively strong relationships emerged within the CGSC sample, though not within the IOAC sample. There is a strong and consistent tendency for years of education to correlate positively with preference for equalitarian style as leader, and negatively with preference for ingratiator style as follower. A trend can also be seen toward a correlation between years of education and preference for rebel followership style in the CGSC sample. When correlations are examined over the total table for the source of commission breakout, it seems possible to conclude further that the strongest relationships between style
variables and education occur for OCS and USMA subsamples. It is unclear why this should be so, except for the possibility that the decision to pursue additional education may act as a stronger self-selection variable for these two subgroups than for the ROTC subgroup.

Therefore, the tenth hypothesis must be confirmed because education is significantly related to selected officer and NCO leader and follower styles.

However the key variable might not be the added education but, rather, the decision by the individual to pursue higher education and his effort to achieve it, which in turn reflects the individual's value structure.

**Months of Command**

Months of command was then correlated with the leadership and followership styles of officers, as shown in table 13.
Table 13

Months of command by total sample and source of commission, correlated with leadership and followership styles of 471 IOAC and 115 CGSC infantry officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Style by Sample</th>
<th>Months of Command</th>
<th>Source of Commission</th>
<th>OCS^a</th>
<th>ROTC^b</th>
<th>USMA^c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>USMA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalitarian</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.27^d</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.18^d</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>.27^d</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperator</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingratiator</td>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^aOCS N for CGSC = 301; for IOAC = 299.

^bROT N for CGSC = 61; for IOAC = 122.

^cUSMA N for CGSC = 23; for IOAC = 46.

^dCorrelation significant at the .05 level.
In general, the relationships that emerged were weak. While three of the values in the table reached significance, they were only marginally so and accounted for very little of the total variance. It is interesting to note that the more months of command the ROTC graduates have, the more they prefer equalitarian or permissive leadership styles.

The eleventh hypothesis was rejected as only one of numerous analyses - ROTC graduates and leadership styles - confirmed that leader and follower styles varied with months of command.

**Months of Staff**

Months of staff was then correlated with the leadership and followership styles of officers, as shown in table 14.
Table 14

Months of staff by total sample and source of commission correlated with leadership and followership styles of 471 IOAC and 115 CGSC infantry officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Style by Sample</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>OCS(^a)</th>
<th>ROTC(^b)</th>
<th>USMA(^c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.21(^e)</td>
<td>.44(^d)</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.72(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalitarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.53(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOAC</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.27</td>
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<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperator</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.26</td>
</tr>
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<td>IOAC</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.19</td>
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<td>Ingratiorator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.37</td>
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<td>IOAC</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)OCS N for CGSC = 30; for IOAC = 299.  
\(^b\)ROTC N for CGSC = 61; for IOAC = 122.  
\(^c\)USMA N for CGSC = 23; for IOAC = 46.  
\(^d\)Correlation significant at the .01 level.  
\(^e\)Correlation significant at the .05 level.
For the total sample only one value was significant \( r = .21, p < .05 \). It indicated that the more months of staff a CGSC graduate had the more he would prefer authoritarian leadership. Although this relationship was weak, stronger relationships were evident when the same correlation was computed for source of commission subfiles.

Positive correlations between months of staff and authoritarian leadership are seen in table 14 for OCS and USMA graduates.

Surprisingly, months of staff, for the USMA graduates attending CGSC, negatively correlated with the equalitarian leadership style.

It is unknown whether months of staff produces authoritarian USMA leaders or whether authoritarian USMA graduates are assigned into staff positions. The same comment would pertain to the OCS graduate.

Nevertheless, months of staff is related to leadership style preference and, therefore, the twelfth hypothesis must be confirmed.

**Command and Staff**

Since months of command was a significant variable primarily for ROTC graduates and months of staff primarily for OCS and USMA graduates, it was decided to analyze months of command and staff together.

Table 15 provides the means and standard deviations of the leadership and followership styles for 112 CGSC
infantry officers.

Table 15

Mean scores and standard deviations of leadership and followership scores for subgroups defined by months of command and staff of 112 CGSC infantry officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Months of Command</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High Months of Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalitarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperator</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingratiator</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Months of Staff</td>
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<td>5.69</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>2.25</td>
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<td>6.21</td>
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<td>4.21</td>
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<td>2.01</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>1.62</td>
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<td>1.88</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>1.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ingratiator</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aMedian months of command = 26.

bMedian months of staff = 48.

N in each cell = 28.

A high and low subfile was created through splitting the total sample at the median for each of the two variables, yielding four subfiles. Visual inspection of Table 15
reveals substantial differences between cells for the two power-avoidant styles, permissive and ingratiator. Analysis of variance (Tables 26 and 27, Appendix B) indicate that the noted differences on these two styles were statistically significant. Significant differences were not found for the other styles. For the permissive style, greater preference for the style was associated with more months of command. Further, there was a significant interaction between months of command and months of staff. With increasing command time, preference for the permissive style was disproportionately higher for officers in the lower months of staff groups. A similar finding was obtained for the ingratiator style.

No significance was found in any other styles. Similarly, a command and staff comparison was made for the IOAC sample.
Table 16

Mean scores and standard deviations of leadership and followership scores for subgroups defined by months of command and staff for 440 IOAC infantry officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Months of Command&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Months of Staff&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalitarian</td>
<td>5.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
<td>5.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperator</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5.82</td>
</tr>
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<td>Low Months of Staff</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Equalitarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Permissive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperator</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingratiator</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Median months of command = 12.

<sup>b</sup>Median months of staff = 15.

N in each cell = 110.

Table 16 provides the means and standard deviations of the leadership and followership styles for 440 infantry officers.

A visual comparison of the means shows similarities
in all leader and follower styles across months of command and staff. In fact, analysis of variance generally produced insignificant results (Table 28, Appendix B).

A significant difference was found only for the cooperator style of followership ($p < 0.05$).
Chapter 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

While we are never sure that change makes things better, we do know that if things are going to get better, they will have to change.

Soren Kierkegaard

Rapidly growing technology, change, and the increasing educational level of the volunteer soldier place unique demands upon today's leaders. They, who have sworn to uphold the solemn 200 year old mission to defend the United States of America, lead and follow the best way they know how. All agree on desiring mission accomplishment, high standards, esprit de corps, and high morale. However, leaders do not agree on how those goals are to be achieved. The "how to" of leadership is a person's style.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 (1974, pp. 5-5) and Army Regulation 623-105 (1974, p. 1-5) indicate that a superior should evaluate the leadership style of a subordinate on the officer evaluation report. Yet, nowhere does any pamphlet or regulation indicate what the preferred style is or what the standards of leadership style are.

An extensive review of literature encompassing over 200 references provides ample guidance for the student of leadership. It also establishes that leadership and
followership styles do make a difference in the effectiveness with which organizations operate. Some leaders are better than others.

This thesis describes research which measured preferred leadership and followership styles of army infantry noncommissioned officers, officer candidates, and commissioned officers. It permitted conclusions to be drawn about how infantry personnel prefer to lead and follow, as measured by psychological instruments associated with the Response to Power Model (RPM). The RPM stresses the utility of objective, interactive, and balanced relationships between "equalitarian" leaders and "cooperator" followers who are able to communicate easier and accomplish the mission better than those who prefer other leadership and followership styles.

The mean scores of each leadership and followership style for infantry NCO's, officer candidates, and officer samples were measured by the Supervise Ability Scale and the Responsibility Index respectively.
Leadership Styles

Followership Styles

*Maximum mean score = 10; Normative mean = 5.

Figure 9

Leadership and Followership Means for Sample Groups
Presented as a synopsis, figure nine depicts differences in leadership and followership styles among levels of tested subjects.

Visual inspection of the profiles of preference for leadership in figure nine shows that NCO's prefer two extreme leadership styles which theoretically tend to compound perception and communication problems with subordinates. However, the figure also shows that a clear (and statistically significant), progression in preference for equalitarian leadership style occurs across the levels of subjects tested. This is associated with significant decrease in preference for the less adaptive leadership styles.

As the sample progresses from officer candidate through IOAC to CGSC, permissive leadership style preference decreases. Authoritarian preference particularly decreases between IOAC and CGSC, and may reflect institutional conditioning or selection of CGSC students by the army.

Followership styles with one exception reflect scores almost identical throughout the tested samples. However, the ingratiaitor is the most preferred style for NCO's and the cooperator is the most preferred style for officer candidates and commissioned officers.

Leadership and followership styles were also analyzed with respect to source of commission (Officer Candidate School, Reserve Officer Training Corps, United
States Military Academy), component (Army Reserve, National Guard, Regular Army), age, years of education, months of command, and months of staff variables as appropriate to the tested group. The background variables were investigated to provide a more definitive basis for interpreting the main results.

CGSC leadership styles varied with source of commission. The USMA graduate tended to prefer authoritarian leadership more than the OCS and the ROTC graduate respectively. No significant difference was noted at the IOAC level. CGSC followership styles were only moderately related to source of commission.

No significant difference was noted when leadership and followership styles were compared to component.

Leadership and followership styles also varied with age. All correlations were in the preferred direction, with older subjects generally preferring "more mature" and adaptive styles.

Years of education only marginally related to the styles of the ANCOC and IOAC samples, but did so quite significantly for the CGSC sample. A positive correlation of substantial magnitude was observed between years of education and CGSC preference to equalitarian leader style. A high negative correlation was found with the ingratiator follower style.

Months of command was associated with a high equalitarian leadership score among ROTC graduates attending
Months of staff was associated with high authoritarian leadership style preference among OCS and USMA graduates.

When months of command and staff were analyzed together, months of command was significantly important and months of staff was a moderator in producing preferred leader and follower styles.

In summary, the leader and follower somehow define and create the situation within which a climate of motivation, effective communication, objectivity, esprit de corps, and proficiency are established. Proficient leaders correctly diagnose the situation and provide general guidance and coaching to their subordinates, thereby contributing toward the creation of that climate. In theory, the leader's proficiency is at least in part based on his preference for the adaptive leadership styles identified by Sweney.

Company strong points, extended frontages, decentralized execution, a lethal battlefield, and the review of literature all militate toward equalitarian leader and cooperator follower styles as described in the RPM.

Officer leadership style preference improved as higher levels were analyzed. This major positive finding indicates that the officer corps, to the extent that the infantry officers tested in this study are representative,
may indeed be able to lead and develop subordinates in an environment of increasing technology, change, and volunteer soldiers. It also confirms whatever procedures are used to select personnel for CGSC, because the CGSC group is by far the most adaptive.

The major negative finding is that a similar developmental trend is not happening at the NCO level.

Perhaps equalitarian leadership is not the optimum style at the NCO level. But, if the soldier today is more qualified than before, as has been cited, the only reason remaining, for the NCO's authoritarian and permissive leadership style preference, is current systemic constraints and the NCO's misperceptions of organizational expectations related thereto.

An ancillary finding indicates the NCO groups' preference to the ingratiate followership style - doing only what they are told - as opposed to officer candidates' and commissioned officers' preference to the cooperator followership style - using their initiative and seeking responsibility.

It may very well be that NCO's do not exercise their initiative in order to insure predictability in the organization. That is to say that the use of initiative may produce surprises. And, some bosses do not like to be surprised.

Another means of rationale for the above findings
may be years of education. Officers with more education tended to prefer the most adaptive leadership (equalitarian) and followership (cooperator) styles. Mean scores of NCO's and officer candidates were lower on the equalitarian style. Neither group had as much education as the officer sample. However, the Non Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) designed to assist the NCO's and the bootstrap program designed to allow for college completion may improve their leadership and followership preferences.

The challenge remains with the officer corps to assist service schools in professionally developing junior leaders. Only then will the effective leader be able to decentralize authority and responsibility to competent subordinates within a unit which communicates effectively and has confidence in its members.

Leadership is an interaction between leader and follower roles within a situation in which interpersonal power and obligation are willingly exchanged in order to accomplish an organizational task and satisfy the needs of organizational members.
TO

Infantry Officers
attending CGSC

1. References available in CGSC Library:

   

2. In accordance with requirements to fulfill my MMAS proposal, I am administering a psychological evaluation of infantry officers to determine their preferred leadership and followership styles. Authorized tests, which have been administered at the USA Infantry School for the past three years, will be used to identify conflicts within infantry chains of command among CGSC, IOAC, and IOBC graduates.

3. Each of two multiple choice instruments will require 15 minutes of your time. They will be self-scored and will not be identified by name to insure anonymity. I'll use sanitized results. You may keep the instruments. Subsequent to scoring, I will provide immediate feedback to all individuals desiring interpretation of results. There are no right or wrong answers. Rather the instruments are designed to identify your preferred leadership (authoritarian, equalitarian, permissive) and followership (rebel, cooperator, ingratiate) styles.

4. Administration will occur in Classroom 18 on 29 October 1975 at 1500 hours. If other arrangements are necessary, contact the undersigned in Section 19 or call 4560 after duty hours.

5. Thank you for your assistance. I hope I may assist you in knowing yourself a little bit better.

GERALD L. WEIGAND
MAJ, IN
Section 19, Work Group D
### Table 17

Analysis of variance of authoritarian leadership styles of active Army personnel attending BIOCC, IOAC, and CGSC

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<thead>
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<td>2980.66</td>
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</table>
Table 18

Analysis of variance of equalitarian leadership styles of active Army personnel attending BIOCC, IOAC, and CGSC

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Table 19

Analysis of variance of permissive leadership styles of active Army personnel attending BIOCC, IOAC, and CGSC

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Table 20

Analysis of variance of authoritarian leadership styles of officers attending CGSC who were commissioned from OCS, ROTC, or USMA

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TOTAL 113 446.56 -- --
Table 21

Analysis of variance of permissive leadership styles of officers attending CGSC who were commissioned from OCS, ROTC, or USMA

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Table 22

Analysis of variance of ingratlator followership styles of captains attending IOAC who were commissioned from OCS, ROTC, or USMA

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Table 23

Analysis of variance of rebel followership styles of captains attending IOAC who were commissioned from OCS, ROTC, or USMA

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<td>(p&lt;.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>980.35</td>
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Table 24

Analysis of variance of cooperator followership styles of officers attending CGSC who were commissioned from OCS, ROTC, or USMA.

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Table 25

Analysis of variance of ingratior follower-
ship styles of captains attending IOAC from
RA, USAR, and NG components

<table>
<thead>
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Table 26

Analysis of variance of permissive leadership style with subgroups defined by months of staff and command for 112 CGSC infantry officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<td>3.05</td>
<td>.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Months of Command</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.19</td>
<td>23.19</td>
<td>5.30 (p&lt;.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26.64</td>
<td>26.64</td>
<td>6.09 (p&lt;.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>472.13</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>525.01</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 27

Analysis of variance of ingratiator followership style score with subgroups defined by months of staff and command for 112 CGSC infantry officers

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Months of Staff</td>
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<td>.37</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Months of Command</td>
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<td>21.08</td>
<td>21.08</td>
<td>6.95</td>
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<td>21.55</td>
<td>7.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>339.47</td>
<td>3.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>543.38</td>
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</table>
Table 28
Analysis of variance of cooperator followership style score with subgroups defined by months of staff and command for 440 IOAC infantry officers

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>P</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.51</td>
<td>.16</td>
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<td>10.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
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<td>15.16</td>
<td>15.16</td>
<td>4.78 (p&lt;.05)</td>
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<td>3.17</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>1408.99</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Machiavelli. *Prince*. Chapter XII.


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Gerald L. Weigand was born [redacted]. He is a 1960 graduate [redacted] and a 1962 graduate of Canisius College with a B.S. in Sociology and Philosophy. He graduated with honors from the University of Missouri in 1971 with an M.A. degree in Social Psychology. Through ROTC, he was designated a Distinguished Military Graduate and entered the Regular Army as an Infantry Second Lieutenant in 1962. He completed military schooling in the Airborne, Ranger, Infantry Officer Basic, and Infantry Officer Advanced Courses. He is a 1976 graduate of the Command and General Staff College where he was awarded the degree Master of Military Arts and Science. Service in Germany and Vietnam, as commander of both mechanized and rifle companies, resulted in Major Weigand being awarded the Silver Star and fourteen other decorations for gallantry and meritorious service. His most recent assignment was at Fort Benning, Georgia where he was the Chief of the Leadership Subcommittee, United States Army Infantry School. He is a resident [redacted].