PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE ARMY SENIOR ROTC PROGRAM

Army War College

20 October 1975
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TO THE ARMY SENIOR ROTC
PROGRAM

BY

COLONEL HOWARD R. ROCKHOLD, JR.
INFANTRY

CORRESPONDING COURSE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

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**Proposed Improvements to the Army ROTC Program**

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Item 20 continued.

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INTRODUCTION

The Army program for obtaining the majority of its college educated officers, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps Senior Program, has been changed in many respects over the years. This study summarizes historic changes and problems with the program and discusses changes which might improve enrollment and retention, thereby eliminating projected shortfall in officer accessions. Although the scope of this study, except for comparative illustrations and background, is limited to a relatively small part of the total program--Third ROTC Region Senior ROTC--it is not possible to consider ROTC in a vacuum. Some background on the program and actions taken, or lack thereof, is necessary to appreciate affects. At the risk of boring those who know and understand the program already, the program as it exists now is also outlined. Junior ROTC (JROTC) was intentionally left out of this study because it deserves separate study and it does not directly produce officers for the Army. JROTC is an important part of the total JROTC Program operating in high schools. It significantly influences not only high school students, but also the entire community in areas where the program exists. This study is limited further in that it discusses primarily enrollment and retention of students in the Senior ROTC Program and how these might be affected by cross enrollments and extension centers.
BACKGROUND - HISTORY OF CHANGE

What is now titled the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps and is normally referred to by its initials “ROTC” has been changed in most facets of its operation since its forerunner (without a military curriculum being prescribed by the Army) was established in 1819. (Three years earlier, Prussia had adopted conscription.¹) "The teaching of military science in civilian educational institutions was advocated as a means of strengthening our military might soon after the constitution was signed."² The initial programs worked and were important for that reason. During the Civil War military science in colleges was expanded significantly by the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 which gave land and financial support to colleges offering military training. Congress authorized materiel with which to conduct realistic weapons training in 1870, but did not establish the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps as such until they passed the National Defense Act in 1916.² Army ROTC was established to give military instruction in colleges and universities to future officers of our citizen Army.

There was no standardization of ROTC curriculum until 1920.³ In 1952 a General Military Science (GMS) ROTC curriculum was adopted because branch oriented courses were blamed for high attrition. By school year (SY) 1954-55, 165 units had adopted the GMS curriculum; however, as late as SY 1975-76 some were still teaching branch courses.
An Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs was established in 1952 to provide a dialog between civilian educators and Department of the Army to improve the program. Most of the all civilian panel members represent national educational associations and institutions hosting Army Senior ROTC, but some are "nationally prominent individuals not necessarily connected with education." This panel meets from one to three times annually.

From 1952 to 1959 college curriculum workloads increased. Academicians desired an ROTC curriculum which allowed substitution of other subjects for appropriate ones in the 480 hours of GHS. The Secretary of the Army approved a new curriculum which included academic substitution in 1960, over Continental Army Command's (CUNARC) objections, on the recommendations of the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs. This Modified Curriculum, which reduced military contact hours by 90 hours of academic substitution, was reduced by another 30 hours of academic substitution in 1960 as a result of the Air Force having done so and the Army being forced to compromise in order to be competitive with them where both were on the same campus. Curriculum modification and coordination problems still exist.

Academic credit for ROTC courses, particularly advanced ROTC, was perceived to be a problem in 1958. The Education Committee of the Engineering Council for Professional Development (ECPD) specifically excluded advanced ROTC from courses acceptable to ECPD in engineering curriculum. Since accreditation of engineering colleges in universities is largely judged on ECPD criteria, many
engineering schools withdrew all academic credit toward graduation for advanced ROTC. The impact of this was felt to be severe. It was then, and still is, unfair to expect PHS by themselves "to bargain for credit" with institutions which "are bound by joint rules and regulations." This situation still exists.

Although not passed into law, further federal assistance to institutions offering ROTC was recommended by a Department of Defense (DOD) ad hoc group in 1959. The need for such support had been recognized as early as 1945. The capability of ROTC to satisfy requirements was questioned and was believed to hinge around military service attractiveness as a career, support the host institutions provided the program, and support the Federal Government provided the institution. That ad hoc group recommended institutions be reimbursed on a per capita basis for each graduate commissioned. This was to help "attract qualified applicants in sufficient numbers" which was expected to fall short in the 1960 to 1970 time frame due to "increased requirements for students' time from the academic departments . . ." and "... increased competition by industry for the better students." These conditions and recommendations are still valid.

Drastic modifications to the ROTC curriculum were recommended in response to efforts by CONARC to develop a curriculum for a two-year program, an authorizing bill for which was introduced in Congress in 1963. The resultant ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 (further modified in 1971) gave ROTC access to junior college transferees and students who had not taken the basic course (first
two years) by allowing substitution of a six-week training program for entry into MS III. The need still exists to provide greater flexibility in availability of the program to students and providing more entry points to them.

Virtually unchanged from 1916 to 1964, ROTC as a program to procure "quality college graduates as commissioned Army officers in the required numbers from educational institutions all over the country" was not as effective as required. The shortfall foreseen in 1959 occurred. In the words of Congress, "Perhaps the most dramatic shortcoming of the existing ROTC program is its inability to attract and retain adequate numbers of students in the advanced ROTC course." Some of the problems or shortcomings mentioned in Congress when formulating the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 are still pertinent. It is still difficult for some students to add ROTC to heavy curriculum loads. The requirement for two years basic ROTC, ROTC Basic Camp, or equivalent military service for admission into advanced ROTC, combined with the fact that ROTC is offered in less than one-third of the colleges, still creates the situation that perhaps two-thirds of college students in the country cannot enter advanced ROTC. Costs of living and of education have continued to increase. In order to make the program more responsive to needs of students, educational institutions, and the Army; major changes incorporated in the 1964 law provided scholarships, a two-year program which included a Basic Camp, a subsistence allowance for advanced course cadets, and a requirement for scholarship students to enlist in the Reserves. We need more
scholarships and a reduced commitment requirement, greater input to Basic Camp, and perhaps a subsistence allowance for MS II cadets.

A study by the Comptroller of the Army on Organization for Management of Army ROTC in 1965 found "a general lack of understanding and appreciation of the significance of ROTC graduates to the active army; . . . association and identification of ROTC with the Army Reserve has caused the ROTC to receive a lower priority and less emphasis than it deserves; . . . and lack of civilian appreciation for ROTC may be attributed to several intangible factors that have a psychological effect tending to discourage advanced ROTC participation." That study recommended dedicated staff and headquarters to administer the program. The 1973 "Steadfast" reorganization of the Army provided significant gains in this area, but organization for management of the program is still a problem.

From 1964 to 1967 numerous proposals to change the curriculum and objections to those changes resulted in three (optional!) curriculums being approved by the Secretary of the Army, one of which was developed for two years before it was implemented in 1968. Dissident activities on ROTC host institution campuses in 1968, 1969, and 1970 surfaced many issues concerning ROTC. Studies by institutional groups indicated many contentious areas—most of which are still in contention, but to a lesser degree now. Almost immediately after the optional curriculums were developed in 1968, revision of the ROTC curriculum was begun again because DA did not have qualified instructors to teach prescribed
The new curriculum added the concept of a core or minimum program of 360 hours, only 180 of which were military instructor-student contact hours. The current Program of Instruction (POI), called the Green Book because of its green colored cover, was developed and issued in 1970. The curriculum is again (still) being analyzed for revision.

ROTC was opened to women in a pilot project at ten institutions in school year (SY) 1972-73. It was opened to women at all coed universities and colleges hosting Army ROTC in SY 1973-74. In SY 1974-75 women represented 16.1 percent of the total ROTC enrollment.20 The first women will be commissioned through ROTC 7 May 1976.21 Estimates of retention of women ROTC cadets until they complete the program are: FY 77 (SY 75-76) - 270, FY 78 - 785, FY 79 - 1320, and FY 80 - 1090.20

In 1973 the contractual obligation for programs to produce 25 officers per year was reduced to 15 per year without coordination with universities hosting programs or ROTC Regions. In 1974 new criteria for disestablishment of ROTC programs were abruptly announced. Newspapers published a press release citing Dr. M. Richard Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Education, as stating that the 140 institutions (of the 291 colleges offering Army ROTC) which had 17 or fewer juniors enrolled in Army ROTC would be notified that they did "not have enough military students to make the Army program economically worthwhile" and that they would be given "a year to increase their Army ROTC enrollments, followed by another year of probation before the Army program is canceled."22
This announcement was not coordinated in advance with either TRADOC or ROTC Regions. Third ROTC Region's CG accurately predicted reactions when he stated, "If I were a college president, I would be very upset to find my university in a 'concerned' category from a newspaper article." Implementation of the Department of Defense Directive through TPADOC resulted in 167 letters of concern or evaluation being delivered to university heads. Thirty-five of the sixty-five schools in Third ROTC Region received letters. Two of the thirty-five were placed in evaluation status. After enrollment reports were in for SY 1974-75, TRADOC determined that only 99 of the 291 programs met the DA criterion of 20 MS III. Since it was "not feasible nor prudent to place 65 percent of the institutions hosting ROTC in an evaluation status," additional criteria narrowed the field to 35 to be placed in evaluation status. Of the two in Third ROTC Region that had been in evaluation status in SY 1973-74, one was disestablished (with their concurrence); the other was removed from concerned status. This process of reviewing enrollment statistics each fall and determining whether a program is viable, of concern, to be evaluated, or to be disestablished on an annual basis has caused considerable concern among institutional authorities. Reevaluation of support schools provide ROTC is being made by both them and the Army. Disestablishment is a politically sensitive area. It is doubtful any program can be disestablished without the institution's concurrence. Phasing out a program being disestablished will tie up manpower assets. It appears that during the early 1970's some programs were
established in schools which were then, and still are, too small or which have other problems too severe to meet the criteria of 20 MS III each year or production of 15 officers per year. Reduction of Army assets available to ROTC, particularly manpower, has been effected and is continuing. Flexibility to reallocate manpower assets within a Region is needed, but the inflexibility of TAADS and reaction time of requisition and fill processes is not adequate to fill the need. The management of the program itself and the assets of manpower and money needs comment.

ORGANIZATION FOR MANAGEMENT OF ROTC

As with any military program, control of Army Senior ROTC is delegated from the President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army who has general responsibility for organizing, training and preparing land forces, to include reserves, for effective prosecution of war.26 The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), as a part of his responsibilities, procures personnel, then trains and manages the manpower. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) manages precommissioning training, procurement, and retention as pertains to ROTC in addition to other tasks.27 The "Steadfast" reorganization of the Army, which began to be implemented 1 July 1973, assigned the newly established Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) responsibility for management of the program,28 a function which Continental Army Command (CONARC) had
prior to that time. Down to that level the staffs and commanders had and still have many responsibilities and functions which vie against the others for priorities, resources, and time. The "Steadfast" reorganization created new elements at TRADOC and below which apparently had been needed for a long time. These elements were solely dedicated--responsible for and responsive--to the ROTC Program. At TRADOC a Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC (DCSROTC) was established as a general officer position with a staff to function strictly for ROTC. Below TRADOC four geographic regional commands were established. These have general officer commanders, several colonel deputies (or area commanders) to assist in covering the huge areas, and small staffs at each Region headquarters. The ROTC Regions were assigned responsibility for from 45 to 110 senior ROTC units which at that time had from 7845 to 17,805 senior ROTC cadets enrolled in their programs (see Incl 1). These new command and management organizational arrangements for ROTC were designed to, and do in fact, provide a highly visible and responsive system.

The new headquarters, as with any newly established organization, had problems getting organized and functioning effectively. After two years in operation, the current management structure is better than that in existence before the "Steadfast" reorganization. Under the old command structure CONARC and numbered Army headquarters had staff elements with many responsibilities of which ROTC was a relatively minor part. Now ROTC is the sole mission and function of a major staff element at TRADOC and of the four Region
headquarters. The fact that five general officers and their entire staffs devote their entire time and attention to ROTC makes it more competitive with other missions and functions for the resources to do a better job with and for ROTC. However, at TRADOC and above, ROTC still competes, not very successfully, with other missions for manpower assets.

The Region headquarters internal organizations varied due to size of area and number of assigned schools when they were established. Third ROTC Region (Incl 2) is subdivided essentially by states into areas for coverage by the staff and area commanders. Third ROTC Region's (3ROTCR) current organizational structure is depicted at Inclosure 3. A horizontal and vertical look at the following trend of the Region's manpower, enrollment, and monetary assets reveals that, while enrollment is going up, assets with which to manage the program are declining.

**MANPOWER, ENROLLMENT & BUDGET TREND**

Number of Senior ROTC Programs Reaching Lowest Enrollment for any one School Year (SY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Senior ROTC Cadet Enrollment Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (SY)</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>18,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>11,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>10,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>8,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>9,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>12,209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Preliminary report

Officer Assets for Senior Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year (FY)</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>404</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11
Funds Administered by Third ROTC Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 74</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76 (Budgeted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$10,304,400</td>
<td>$10,295,700</td>
<td>$10,700,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Army funds expended to support ROTC in 3ROTCR are budgeted by 3ROTCR (about $25 million per year in three categories: OMA (P8) ROTC activities; RPA (3300) Reserve Officer candidates, and MPE (Military payroll A/A); NTRADOC: (N.W. Ayer national advertising contract and funding to installations supporting detachments), and by installations: (unit fund/nonappropriated fund support of detachments and assigned support requirements to detachments). The amount of money has declined, in fact, and its beneficial effect further deteriorated by inflation. Funding has proven to be adequate except during FY 75 when Congressional restrictions reduced the ability to travel significantly. Current funding is adequate except for RPA which, based on projected cadet participation, reflects a minor shortage. Fort Riley Finance and Accounting Office (F&AO) has responsibility for recordation of ROTC obligations, disbursements, payments, settlements, and official financial records. ROTC procurement actions are assigned to Fort Riley procurement office except advertising and information items and flight training contracts which are handled by 11 different installations. This creates administrative problems. Finance regulations (AR 37 series) do not address financial administration of Commutation of Uniform funds and AR 710-2 does not adequately explain financial administration intent. This situation leads to differing interpretation
and possibly poor management or misuse of government funds. The Region is not authorized an Installation accountant nor auditors. Therefore, the Region is dependent on the Fort Riley Comptroller for financial policy and procedures (within his scope) and TRADOC for auditing expertise. Budgeting, funding, and operational responsibilities within the Region involve all elements of the Region staff and all detachments in the universities and colleges.

**ARMY SENIOR ROTC - WHAT IT CONSISTS OF NOW**

The Army Senior ROTC Program is a program to procure officers for the Army. It is offered at colleges, universities, community junior colleges, and military junior colleges in all 50 states and Puerto Rico. Four-year programs are offered in a basic course (freshmen and sophomores) and an advanced course (junior and senior years). Two-year programs are offered for students who did not or could not take ROTC during their first two years of college. To qualify for the two-year program, students attend a six-week basic camp of training during the summer, for which the student is paid.

"The mission of the Army ROTC Program is to obtain well-educated commissioned officers in sufficient numbers to meet Army requirements. For the foreseeable future, the ROTC will continue to be the major source of newly commissioned officers for the active army, both Regular Army and Reserve Forces. Additionally, it provides a mutually advantageous arrangement between the Army and institutions of higher learning which will assist in the education of future officer personnel and provide a channel of communication between our military leadership and our developing educated manpower."
The Senior ROTC Program provides military education through courses offered to students on college campuses. Academic credit is awarded in most instances, but varies between institutions and between academic departments or colleges within the colleges and universities. Student extracurricular activities are sponsored by ROTC detachment personnel. Some programs offer flight training through contractual arrangements with civilian companies to qualified seniors at no extra cost. The first two years (basic course) of the four-year program are "free" in that no commitment, other than fees charged by the institution for credit hours taken, is made on the part of the student. Upon entry into the last two years of the program (advanced course), normally in a student's junior year, a contract must be signed by academically and medically qualified students.

This contract commits the student to from three months to two years active duty and they must join the reserves which commits them to up to six years service, depending upon how much active duty is served. The student is paid a "retainer fee" (subsistence allowance) of $100 per month for up to ten months each year of the last two years of the program.

The two-year program, as such, was set up by Congress to allow the Army (all three services) to get more students into the program at the Military Science III (junior) level (advanced course). Entry into that level of the program may also be achieved by advanced placement of high school graduates who had junior ROTC while in high school and by veterans who meet
prescribed criteria of service or training. Between the junior and senior year (normally), advanced course students must attend an ROTC Advanced Camp (for which they are paid) as a part of the course. Some volunteers are attached to Army units for Army Orientation Training (AOT) after Advanced Camp for a short time.

Scholarships are available through application and competitive selection to high school seniors (four-year scholarships), college freshmen (three-year scholarships), college sophomores (two-year scholarships), and college juniors (one-year scholarships). Scholarship winners must commit themselves and sign contracts as mentioned above. They are paid $100 per month for up to 10 months a year for the duration of the scholarship. The scholarship also pays for books, fees, tuition, and laboratory expenses.

**THE PROBLEM**

The recurring basic problem with ROTC, insofar as the Army is concerned, is production of enough officers to meet the needs of the Army—the whole Army including Reserve and National Guard units. Continuous fluctuations, sometimes major and rapid, exacerbate the basic problem. These fluctuations occur in the size, organization, and structure of the Army, resources to man and equip the Army (money and manpower decisions) in educational systems and philosophy, and in attitudes of the entire country. As projected shortfall in officer accessions from all sources is determined, emphasis is placed on the ROTC program to increase production. West Point produces relatively stable but too few numbers of officers each year and is more costly than other sources. Officer candidate school (OCS)
programs are more expensive than ROTC. (The cost to the Government of obtaining an officer through ROTC in FY 63 was $3950 each, compared to $9336 through OCS and $46,650 through the United States Military Academy.12,13) The capability of other sources, such as direct commissions and National Guard Officer Candidate Schools, to fill the gap is questionable.31

A Department of the Army study of total force officer requirements and projected accessions from current programs for the period FY 75-80 indicates a shortfall each fiscal year ranging from almost 2000 to over 4000 officers. Increasing the current mileage limitation for mandatorily assigning Reserve Component officers to units still leaves a net shortfall in officer accessions.32 The study "relies heavily on the assumption that Congress will authorize the additional 3500 Army ROTC scholarships. Projected shortfalls significantly increase should we fail to obtain the scholarship legislation."34 (The proposal for the 3500 scholarships has not yet gotten to Congress.) Recommendations of the study, approved by Secretary of the Army Calloway, 16 November 1974, included implementing six ROTC management improvement actions beginning SY 1974-75 as follows:33,34

a. Improve recruiting.
b. Improve retention of cadets.
c. Improve attendance at Basic Camp.
d. Expand cross enrollment from 413 schools to 600 schools.
e. Expand the extension center program from 2 schools to 30 schools.
f. Initiation of an ROTC cadet option for duty with a Reserve unit after ADT (dependent upon enrollment). (DA will implement this at the proper time by issuing a letter of instruction.)

The DA study's "officer production estimates . . . became requirements" on 15 November 1974--the day the Secretary of the Army approved the study. "The zero officer shortfall projected by the study leans . . . to a high degree on ROTC production."

TRADOC had already begun to meet the first five of the six ROTC management actions. Among other efforts, TRADOC established a goal of 2500 Basic Camp cadets for the summer of 1975 with female participation limited to 200 of that number. As of the opening of SY 1974-75, there were 532 cross-enrolled schools (compared to 413 in SY 1973-74 and the DA goal of 600 by SY 1979-80). Resource limitations will curtail expanding extension centers. These three areas: Basic Camp, cross enrollments, and extension centers significantly affect our main area of concern--enrollment and retention.

ENROLLMENT AND RETENTION

Five of the six ROTC management improvement actions involve increasing ROTC enrollment and retaining a higher number of those enrolled. Improvement of recruiting is aimed at getting more students to enroll. Retention of students will increase the number of officers produced. Improved attendance at Basic Camp (and retention of higher numbers of those attending) will also increase the number of officers commissioned through ROTC. Expanding cross enrollments and extension centers should increase the total number of students enrolled, thus increasing officer accessions.
Literally, reams of paper have been produced after extensive brainstorming by many highly educated and experienced people--civilian and military--over a long period of time seeking the answer to recruiting and enrollment. The keys are elusive. There is no single key or button to push which will activate a flood of new students (or cadets) or retain them. A lot of hard work on the part of everyone involved with or interested in our nation's security and the benefits derived is necessary. As LTG Orwin C. Talbott (then MG) stated, "ROTC cadets need to be made more aware of Army interest in them and what military service is like." Surveys indicate advertising programs are getting the message across and that face-to-face recruiting is the most successful.38,39

The ability to effect extensive face-to-face recruiting is contingent upon having well qualified, highly motivated people to do it and having the funds to cover their travel and per diem expenses.

Research on recruiting, retention, and curriculum/POI is continuing,40 as recommended by numerous individuals.41 Host institution support of ROTC is a significant variable with great impact on the program. Institutions must apply for a program to get one. They contract with the Army to support it as required by law. Most provide much more support than the law requires--except for the requirement to produce 15 officers per year. The degree of physical support in the form of facilities, maintenance, budgetary, secretarial help, etc., is critical in light of the Army reducing its support. However, beyond minimum acceptable levels, these are not as important to enrollment as organizational, attitudinal, and moral support in most people's judgment.
Successful actions to increase enrollment have involved cross enrollments, obtaining female cadets, and extensive recruiting usually involving person-to-person recruiting by both cadets and cadre. Identification of prospects is critically important. Once identified, telephone conversations with graduating high school students, letters to them, and visits with them pay dividends of increased enrollment. Prospects are identified through close coordination with Registrars, contacting all incoming veterans and explaining ROTC benefits, accompanying university officials on visits to high schools, and maintaining close contact with high school counselors. Addressing incoming students during freshman orientation, having cadets sponsor incoming students during registration, and offering to help incoming students is important. Getting junior and senior cadets involved with overall operation of the ROTC, to include recruiting, is a necessity. Establishing a reputation of giving the best instruction on campus and having an open door policy for cadets/students to help them with all their problems has proven to be effective.

**CROSS ENROLLMENTS**

One of the DA management actions to improve ROTC was to expand cross enrollments from 413 to 600 schools.

In SY 1973-74, 43 of 3ROTCR's 65 programs had cross-enrollment agreements with other institutions, 22 did not. Of the 43 which had cross enrollments, 31 improved their ROTC enrollment in the fall of SY 1974-75 from the previous year, 13 declined. Of the 22
programs without cross enrollments 13 improved, 9 declined in ROTC enrollment from one year to the next. Average improved enrollment was 36 students for those improving. However, average improvement for those with cross enrollments was 41, for those without - 23. Average decline for those declining in enrollment was 30. However, the average decline for those programs with cross enrollments was 13, for those without - 53. This indicates it is highly desirable to have more cross-enrollment agreements. However, there are distinct limitations. Manpower with which to conduct the cross enrollments without harming the host program has become severely limited. There are also distinct limitations in capabilities to expand. As of 1 January 1975, Third ROTC Region's 65 programs had cross enrollments with 110 other institutions--mostly junior colleges. Cross enrollments projected for SY 1975-76 for the 64 programs in 3ROTCR (Spring Hill College's program was disestablished to become a cross enrollment) numbered 115. There was more intensive effort and management in the area of cross enrollments than the increase of 5 indicates. Actually there were 30 new agreements initiated and 25 dropped as being unproductive. In the past, no limitations had been imposed on distance-travel time from host institutions to cross-enrolled schools. No new cross enrollments can now be established that exceed 50 miles distance or one hour's travel time. Distances from ROTC host institutions to cross-enrolled institutions expected to continue through SY 1975-76 in 3ROTCR range from .2 of one mile to 154 miles. About one-third of them exceed the new criteria of 50 miles or one hour's driving time,
10 of them exceed 100 miles distance, and 2 exceed 150 miles. A further indication of possibilities and limitations is the following illustration of availability:

**Fall 1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Resident undergrad degree seeking students enrolled</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Host ROTC</th>
<th>CE</th>
<th>w/ROTC Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Region</td>
<td>2,379,727</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Region</td>
<td>1,499,589</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Region</td>
<td>690,727</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Region</td>
<td>1,674,493</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,244,536</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The population among whom the detachments work and from whom their programs get students are important and vary considerably as the following illustrates.

**Population Characteristics**  
(U.S. Census 1970 updated in 1972)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROTC Region</th>
<th>% of U.S. Population</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% Rural</th>
<th>% Black</th>
<th>% with Spanish Surname</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Family Median Income (by State)  
(1970 Census, updated in 1972)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Above Poverty Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>$7,415 - $11,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>$7,441 - $11,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>$6,071 - $8,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>$7,494 - $12,443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parental Income Level of Students  
(1970 Census, updated in 1972)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below $10,000</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between $10,000 and $20,000</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $20,000</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXTENSION CENTERS

Another DA approved management action to improve ROTC was to expand the extension center program from 2 schools to 30 schools. Resource limitations will restrict that action such that 7 will exist in FY 76 and 12 in FY 77, but programming cannot be accomplished beyond that time frame. The extension center program is an effort to "try before buying" as to whether an institution can get enough students enrolled in ROTC to maintain a viable program before the Army establishes a full program there and signs a contract. It is limited in availability to degree granting institutions, but they can be established outside the 50 mile or 1 hour driving time limitation on cross enrollments. Extension centers can have cadre living in the town rather than having to commute to and from the host institution's area.
BASIC CAMP

One of the DA/TRADOC management emphasis items on ROTC was to improve attendance at Basic Camp. Prior to the 1974 Basic Camp there were no restrictions on the number of students who could attend. Within 3ROTCR, 562 applicants were selected as being tentatively qualified and were provided orders to attend one of the two cycles run that year. Individuals not reporting, declared unqualified for medical or other reasons, and voluntary withdrawals reduced the number to 463 of whom 407 graduated. The fact that only about 70 percent of the applicants judged by Region as tentatively qualified completed Camp is enough cause for concern to try improving attendance. However, just because a student goes to the ROTC Basic Camp at Fort Knox and successfully completes it is no guarantee that the individual will then return to college, or if he does that he will enroll in ROTC. During SY 74-75 considerable emphasis was placed on recruiting as many qualified Basic Camp applicants as possible, orienting them properly, motivating them to complete Camp, and to then enroll in ROTC. TRADOC allocated a "quota" to ROTC Regions to fill the somewhat arbitrarily selected limit of 2500 students whom they judged the Basic Camp at Fort Knox could accommodate in 1975. The number of applicants for the 1975 Basic Camp exceeded all expectations. There were actually 2607 students provided travel orders. Third ROTC Region was given quotas totalling 700 (230, 230, and 240 each for the three cycles respectively) of which 50 could be females (in the second cycle only). These "quotas" were not known by PMS or
Region headquarters until after significant recruiting had already been accomplished. Third ROTC Region received 950 applications (826 male and 124 female) which were processed to select the 700 students to receive space allocations. As has always been the case, some students who were selected did not report to Fort Knox, some voluntarily withdrew, and others were ineligible or not qualified. Quotas were shifted among Regions and last minute notifications were made to some students in attempts to fill spaces vacated by no-shows, early withdrawals, and disqualifications. Of the 950 applicants from with 3ROTCR, 170 (18%) withdrew their application, were judged ineligible, or not qualified before reporting to Fort Knox, 70 (7%) were nonselect or alternates (women). Of the 710 remaining applicants, 120 (17%) withdrew at Fort Knox or failed to report (no-shows), 6 were medically disqualified after reporting to Fort Knox, and 584 (61% of original applicants, 81% of those reporting to Camp) successfully completed. The nonselection of qualified applicants caused considerable frustration and wasted effort, particularly to those students who fell in that category and to the cadre who had contacted them, explained the program and convinced them to apply.

CONCLUSIONS

The Army needs to define basic minimum personal traits, skills, aptitudes, trained responses and knowledge or education required for an individual to be a competitive commissioned officer. We should identify differences, if any, between requirements for active Army, Reserve and National Guard officers if this data is not
already available in the Army as a result of Army schools systems engineering of their Officer Basic Courses (OBC) to produce an end product which meets the needs of field commanders.

From the above, we should identify the credentials an officer should possess for entry into OBC and whether more than one course needs to be developed to ensure all officers are as equal in competitiveness as we can make them upon finishing OBC.

We should then systems engineer the ROTC Program to ensure students have the opportunity to obtain the identified credentials in ROTC. We should identify the time required and alternative ways of providing the greatest possible number of students with the required credentials to meet prerequisites for entry into Officer Basic Courses. The identified time, skills, and education should then be developed into one or more curriculum or alternative routes to ensure development of the traits, skills, aptitudes, trained responses, abilities, and knowledge or education required. Alternative routes for those programs on campuses having more than one service ROTC Program should be considered. Vo-tech and junior college students should also be considered.

We should also study reducing service commitments required by students upon their acceptance of scholarships or entering the advanced course of the ROTC program and expand the Army's commitment to students in the form of guarantees. This must be tied in with any restructuring of the program to ensure equity between cadets and between the Army and individual cadets.
We should obtain and compare alternative cost comparisons in terms of money and manpower from alternative courses of action and analyze or estimate the effect of alternative courses of action on our ability to attract, motivate, and retain students.

Closer coordination should be developed at DOD level and with academic communities to ensure best utilization of total resources and most positive impact in civilian communities.

A reevaluation of manpower, equipment, and monetary systems should be made to expedite provision, amount, and quality of support PMS can apply to his program.

To the extent possible, we should develop Army unit sponsor programs with ROTC units.

We should provide greater flexibility to PMS and students in eligibility, entry, and completion of ROTC.

Scholarship programs should be modified so as to continue to attract great interest at high school level, select winners more likely to stay with the program, and give PMS more flexibility and control over scholarships after students are in the program and have been evaluated face to face over a period of time.

Obligations and guarantees should be modified to more closely align with benefits obtained between the government and contract students.

Summer ROTC operations should be modified to permit greater flexibility for both students and the Army.

We should evaluate and modify Professional Development Activities such as flight, ranger, airborne, and AOT.
Third ROTC Region Enrollment Projections

SY 75-76  11,931
SY 76-77  13,555

Projections are risky at best due to imperfect knowledge of what caused results in the past and our nonexistent knowledge of what will occur in the future. Many factors - some contradictory - influence students' decisions. The relative importance of factors change with time and among people involved such as the PMS, his cadre, university and community officials, and students. Events in the future raise new factors which can invalidate projections very drastically and rapidly. No effort has been made to project enrollment beyond SY 76-77. Preliminary telephonic enrollment reports in 3ROTCR of SY 75-76 enrollments indicate that the above projection will be exceeded (as of 3 Oct 75, 12,209 cadets were enrolled in 3ROTCR ROTC programs).

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Colonel, Infantry
440-28-6411
Student #76877
FOOTNOTES


5. COL Carl F. Lyons, PMST Kansas State College at Manhattan, Kansas (now Kansas State University), letter to CG Fifth US Army, 21 Nov 1958 with indorsements from CG XVI US Army Corps (Res) to CG Fifth Army dated 25 Mar 1958, from CG Fifth US Army to CG USCONARC dated 12 Dec 1958, and Deputy CG (RF) USCONARC to Department of the Army Adjutant General.


17. US Department of the Army. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) Memorandum For: Chief of Staff, US Army: Subject Reaction against ROTC Program SY 1969-70.


25. MG B. E. Huff, Jr., Chief of Staff TRADOC, letter to HQDA (DAPE), 15 Jan 1975.


27. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 10-5, 1 Apr 1975, pages 2-3 and 2-16.


29. LTC Alexander Budd, Historical Report on Third ROTC Region's first two years of operation, 1975.


31. BG Robert D. Stevenson, Deputy Director of Military Personnel Management, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Subject: Officer Accession Program Study, 25 Oct 1974, page 10.

32. Ibid, Tab G.

33. Ibid, Page 6 and Tab S.
34. M. David Lowe, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Officer Accession Program Study, 7 Nov 1974, page 2.


39. LTC Charles Laakso, Chief A&E Division, Third ROTC Region, letter to PMS, New Mexico State University, dated 11 Apr 1974, states in part: "Your question, 'What recruiting programs work?' is answered nation-wide by successful face-to-face cadre or cadet recruiting programs, preferably one recruiter to one prospect at a time (one on one)."

40. US Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Booklet: Meeting of the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs, 9 Jul 1975, p 29.

41. In Sep 1974, Third ROTC Region solicited comments from University heads in Third ROTC Region for comments on and addition to topics for the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs to discuss at their Nov 1974 meeting. Fifteen of the responses commented on these subjects. Five of those fifteen plus two others commented on criteria for establishment and disestablishment of units. The Army Audit Agency (AAA) when surveying Third ROTC Region in 1974 and again at a 3 October 1975 entrance briefing for an AAA 120-day nation-wide audit of ROTC indicated interest in topics directly related to these areas. All 180 suggestions from 29 of the detachments in Third ROTC Region for suggestions on how to improve ROTC either directly or indirectly pertained to these areas. Topics discussed at the 20-21 Nov 1974 and 9 Jul 1975 meetings of The Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs concerned areas impacting on these subjects.

42. US Department of the Army. HQ TRADOC letter ATRO-RM, Subject: Establishment of Extension Centers and Cross-enrollment agreements, to ROTC Region Commanders, 25 March 1975 reads, in part: "Limited resource guidance, dollars and manpower, available for programming through FY 77, will restrict the establishment of extension centers and cross-enrollment agreements...additional cross-enrollment agreement will not be approved
unless complete support can be financed and staffed from current resources....guidelines pertaining to cross-enrollment, i.e., not to exceed 50 miles or one hour's driving time, must be strictly adhered to in any new agreement....Emphasis must be placed on increasing enrollments on the campuses of institutions hosting ROTC units, and those extension centers and cross-enrollment agreements currently in effect.

43. Ibid, reads in part: "only 12 extension centers are now programmed through FY 77. This number includes the current two in existence, plus five each to be established in FY 76 and FY 77, respectively. This headquarters will select the FY 76 and FY 77 extension centers after careful analysis of all Region proposals."

44. US Department of the Army, HQ TRADOC, letter ATRO-OP, Subject: Extension Center Program to ROTC Region Commanders, 19 Aug 1975.

45. Interview with LTC Buck Rodgers, Third ROTC Region LNO to the Fort Knox 1975 ROTC Basic Camp, Aug 1975.
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   Letter to author, 28 Apr 75.

3. "Army Says ROTC Enrollments Lagging." Kansas City Times, 
   16 Mar 74.

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   Letter to Dr. Matthews, 11 Nov 74.

5. Arter, BG Robert, CG Third ROTC Region. 
   Letter to heads of institutions in Third ROTC Region 
   hosting Army ROTC, 26 Sep 74.

6. Arter, BG Robert, CG Third ROTC Region. 
   Letter to Dr. David Matthews, President, University of 
   Alabama, 27 Sep 74.

7. Arter, BG Robert, CG Third ROTC Region. 
   Letter to BG Smith, DCSROTC TRADOC, 18 Mar 74.

8. Atchison, Edward McAngus. Hup 2,3,4 (ROTC and National 

   US News and World Report, 1 Apr 74, pp 47 & 48.

10. Basham, COL Edwin W., PMS, Kansas State University. 
    Letter to author, Apr 75.

11. Budd, Dr. George F., President, Kansas State College of 

12. Bonner, John T. Jr., Vice President for Educational Services, 
    Ohio State University, "A Major Problem. Army Advisory 
    Panel on ROTC Affairs." (A paper submitted by Dr. Bonner 
    to the Advisory Panel at the 20-21 Nov 74 meeting.) 

13. Bonner, John T. Jr., "ROTC on Campus. Alive and Well or Dying 
    of Apathy?", Army, Sep 75.

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    First Two Years of Operation. Ft Riley: 1975.


17. Callender, LTC William E., PMS, University of South Alabama. Letter to author, 23 Apr 75.


22. Davis, COL James H., PMS, University of Arkansas. Letter to author, 24 Apr 75.

23. Dexter, COL George E., PMS, The University of Texas at Austin. Letter to author, 29 Apr 75.


25. Education Division, ROTC/MDCC Directorate, HQ CONARC. History of ROTC Curriculum. Ft Monroe, VA, 26 May 71.


27. Everitt, W. L., Chairman, Education and Accreditation Committee, Engineers' Council for Professional Development. Letter to MG Herbert M. Jones, The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, 29 Sep 58.


31. Fletcher, COL Paul M., Chief Operations Division, Third ROTC Region HQ. Letter, Memorandum for BG Arter, 13 Sep 73.


34. Giles, William L., President, Mississippi State University. Letter to BG Arter, 8 Oct 74.

35. Girdner, COL Ralph W., PMS, University of North Alabama. Letter to author, 23 Apr 75.

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44. Jones, MAJ Grady F., Assistant PMS, The University of Texas at Arlington. Letter to author, 29 Apr 75.

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47. Kimbro, LTC George T., PMS, Texas Tech University. Letter to author, 22 Apr 75.

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51. Lowe, M. David, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Officer Accession Program Study, 7 Nov 74.


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59. Owen, Dr. Don, President, Cameron University. Letter to BG Arter, 14 Oct 74.

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64. Redd, LTC John H. Jr., PMS, Alabama A&M University. Letter to author, 1 Apr 75.


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