PROBLEMS IN THE USE OF AD HOC STRUCTURES IN DOO CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE

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**ABSTRACT**

The purposes of this research were to determine if crisis management tasks in the Department of Defense are handled by ad hoc groups, and to then analyze the question of whether the decision-making performance of ad hoc groups is inferior to the performance of permanent organizations. The research depended on a search of the social science literature, analysis of case studies of past crisis decision-making, and briefings by DOD officials and continuing -
20. Abstract (Continued)

others familiar with crisis management. In Task 1, it was found that the Department has standing procedures for activating units to handle crisis, but that the units created are still *ad hoc* groups. In Task 2, seven major problem areas were identified in which *ad hoc* groups are less effective than permanent organizations. The recommendation of the Report is that the Department establish a permanent, though not necessarily full-time, organization for crisis management. A final chapter suggests the requirements for and responsibilities of such a unit.
PROBLEMS IN THE USE OF AD HOC STRUCTURES
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IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE

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PROBLEMS IN THE USE OF AD HOC STRUCTURES
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Executive Summary

Definition of Ad Hoc Groups

Some organizational units may be called together to solve a specific problem. They have no permanent existence, but function only until the problem is solved or for some other reason the group is disbanded. Because these units exhibit less formalism and continuity, they are not commonly called organizations. In this Report we will refer to such units as ad hoc groups because they (1) do not exist before a problem arises; (2) are formed to handle a specific problem when it arises or is anticipated; and (3) are disbanded when the problem is solved or otherwise loses importance. The adjective ad hoc has no perjorative connotation whatsoever in this report. Its only meaning is to refer to temporary groups that are set up to handle specific problems.

Background

In a previous study of the individual and group-level factors which affect decision-making in crisis, we discovered a number of research findings which pointed to the conclusion that the performance of ad hoc groups is inferior to the performance of permanent organizations. For example, we found that permanent organizations make more creative and more effective decisions under conditions which impair the accuracy and creativity of ad hoc groups. In addition, we found that permanent organizations make generally fewer errors in their decision-making than ad hoc groups. The degree of previous experience with the performance of a particular task, a factor which is usually correlated with more accurate performance of complex tasks, has its greatest and most significant effect in the reduction of stress-induced inaccuracy.
What is the significance of these research findings for crisis management in the Department of Defense? It was our observation that there were no regularized procedures and permanent organizations in DOD for handling crises when they arose. Rather, the Department took something of a task force approach, putting together ad hoc teams to work on the crisis activity. Often these teams were composed of "available bodies" rather than a predetermined set of experts who should have been handling the crisis. If this observation were true, and the research findings were valid, then we would conclude that DOD could not achieve maximum effectiveness in crisis management because it was not organized to achieve that effectiveness. By juxtaposing the research findings on ad hoc groups with an analysis of DOD crisis management, we could make observations that had important consequences for the way in which the Department organizes itself for a crisis.

Project Objectives

The purpose of this project was to relate the research on ad hoc groups to an analysis of crisis management in DOD.

First, are crisis management tasks in the Department of Defense handled through ad hoc procedures and/or ad hoc groups? Our impressions in the earlier project that this was the case were based on sketchy observations, informal interviews, and hunches. We had to systematically investigate the question in this project.

Second, is the effectiveness of crisis management by ad hoc procedures and groups inferior to that of regularized procedures and permanent organizations? The conclusion of the earlier study was that this was indeed the case. But much of the evidence addressed the question either indirectly or by implication. In addition, the research surveyed in that project was largely drawn from small group experiments in laboratory situations. There was a need for a comprehensive statement that would focus on the specific proposition regarding the relative merits of ad hoc groups versus permanent organizations. Such a statement would marshal evidence from political science, organization theory research, sociology, and social psychology.
The purpose of the project, in summary, was to find out if crisis management in DOD was ad hoc, and if ad hoc crisis management was inferior to crisis management by permanent organizations. The two task statements that guided our research were:

1. Investigate the proposition that crisis management tasks in the Department of Defense are handled through ad hoc procedures and/or ad hoc groups.

2. Investigate the proposition that the effectiveness of crisis management by ad hoc procedures and groups is inferior to that of permanent organizations using regularized procedures.

Research Approach

The project that we undertook was a combination of literature search and briefings by DOD officials and others familiar with Department decision-making in crisis.

Bibliographic searches undertaken in the earlier project provided a first examination of the literature of political science, sociology, social psychology, military operations research, disaster research, and organization theory. Three computer-based searches were conducted: from the Defense Documentation Center, the National Technical Information Service, and the Psychological Abstracts Search and Retrieval system (American Psychological Association). Second, the bibliographies of various literature reviews and other general works provided many references. Finally, we constantly added to the list of possible sources as we reviewed literature and found relevant citations.

In terms of case studies of past crisis situations, we found little that was helpful. Most of those in the available literature concern Presidential-level decision-making. They focus on the policy process and the choice of options, and not on the support-level activity of DOD in which we were interested.

A body of literature that was most valuable was the disaster research literature. There has been a great deal of attention paid to the performance of organizations in coping with disasters—earthquakes, fire, and so on. Much of this has been produced by the Disaster
Research Center at Ohio State University. These citations appear in the bibliography. This literature provided valuable insights into crisis management, for the problems and organizational functions are almost identical, and many of the issues addressed in our project have been dealt with in these studies.

Results

Task 1. In Chapter 2, we report the results of an investigation of the proposition that crisis management tasks in DOD are handled through ad hoc procedures and/or ad hoc groups. The findings are as follows:

1. There are established, regularized procedures for implementing crisis action in the NMCC. Documents of JCS specify the manner in which the staff is activated, the membership of the various units, and in a general way responsibilities and relationships among units.

2. These established procedures are mainly concerned with staffing. They activate the various units that will handle crisis management, and they designate the memberships. The procedures do not, except in a general way, identify the decision tasks to be undertaken by the various units, and do not specify standard ways of handling crises.

3. The units that handle crisis management are ad hoc groups. Except at the level of minor, day-to-day crises, the units set up for crisis are ad hoc in the sense that they do not exist before the crisis, are activated to handle the crisis, and then are disbanded when the crisis is over.

4. There is no crisis group as such to operate in non-crisis periods with the task of anticipating crises. The job of monitoring the environment and watching for possible or incipient crisis situations is handled by the regular watch officers, the intelligence agencies, and the CINC’s.

5. There is no organizational unit, and no one person, with the responsibility of being a “crisis specialist.” This term does not refer to a substantive specialist; because there are so many possible crisis areas and issues, and because no two crises are alike, a group or person
with substantive expertise for crisis management would be unrealistic. Substantive experts have to be called into a crisis on an *ad hoc* basis. The term "crisis specialist" refers to a person or group who would be expert in the *process* of crisis management. These experts would be familiar with the emergency procedures; they would know how to collect, interpret, and use information from the watch centers and intelligence agencies; they would know where to go for required information and who to call in for the decision tasks involved. In short, there are no arrangements for an official knowledgeable about all aspects of the decision-making process that comprises crisis management.

**Task 2.** In Chapter 3, we report the results of an investigation of the proposition that the performance of *ad hoc* groups in crisis management is inferior to that of permanent organizations. We find that the following problems are associated with the use of *ad hoc* groups:

1. The use of *ad hoc* groups reduces the amount of planning that can be conducted prior to a crisis.

2. *Ad hoc* groups may not make full use of the organizational resources available for crisis management.

3. The use of *ad hoc* groups compounds the problems of inter-organizational relationships in a crisis.

4. The decision-making performance of *ad hoc* groups under stress is more likely to be impaired than the abilities of permanent organizations.

5. *Ad hoc* groups cannot provide the leadership and leader-member relations required in crisis situations.

6. *Ad hoc* groups are more likely to be disrupted by group conflict than are permanent organizations.

7. *Ad hoc* groups cannot achieve the group cohesiveness that permanent organizations can, and cohesiveness is positively related to performance, except at extreme levels.
Implications

The major recommendation of the Report is that the Department of Defense establish a permanent organization for crisis management. This organization would not be a full-time unit, but a number of individuals with other jobs in DOD who meet periodically in non-crisis periods and full-time only in crisis situations. In crisis the unit would be the nerve center of crisis management. Our recommendation is that these individuals be specialists not in the substantive issues of the crisis, but in the process by which decision tasks are carried out. For example, the unit would know what the information requirements are, how to get that information and how to interpret and use it. They would develop and implement decision aids. In short, this unit would provide expertise in how to go about performing all of the decision tasks necessary. The experts on the substantive issues of the crisis would be added to the group as soon as there were indications of a possible crisis. Such a unit would overcome the problems of ad hoc groups and perform a wide variety of crucial tasks which are not now performed, or not coherently performed, in the Department.
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PROBLEMS IN THE USE OF AD HOC STRUCTURES

IN DOD CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND

IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Unit of Analysis

Most units within a bureaucracy are organizations. That is, they have a formal structure, specialization of roles, regularized patterns of behavior, and some degree of permanence. Organizations can vary greatly in size and complexity, but if they retain the above defining characteristics, then they are organizations. The Defense Department is an organization as is the NMCC watch center. In this report, such ongoing units will be called permanent organizations.

Some organizational units may be called together to solve a specific problem. They have no permanent existence, but function only until the problem is solved or for some other reason they are disbanded. Because these units exhibit less formalism and continuity, they are not commonly called organizations. In government they have been called “task forces.” In social science they have been called “project teams.” Others have simply called them “groups,” and this is the term that we will use, with the adjective ad hoc to denote the characteristic that these groups:

1. do not exist before a problem arises;
2. are formed to handle a specific problem when it arises or is anticipated;
3. are disbanded when the problem is solved or otherwise loses importance.

The adjective ad hoc has no perjorative connotation whatsoever in this report. Its only meaning is to refer to temporary groups that are set up to handle specific problems.

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The purpose of the project reported herein was to compare the performance of ad hoc groups and permanent organizations in decision-making for international crises in the Department of Defense.

Background

In a previous study of the individual and group-level factors that affect decision-making in crisis (Shapiro and Gilbert, 1975), we found a number of research findings that pointed to the conclusion that the performance of ad hoc groups was inferior to the performance of permanent organizations. Disparate findings on specific aspects of performance could be combined to form such a conclusion. For example, the following important research findings (see Shapiro and Gilbert, 1975, pp. 85, 101) all imply that permanent organizations are better than ad hoc groups:

1. When there is conflict within the unit over solutions to the problem, permanent organizations react with increased creativity. That is, they generate new proposals or options. Ad hoc groups, on the other hand, react to conflict by compromise. They modify existing proposals in an effort to reach agreement.

2. Permanent organizations utilize their resources to generate options that are more effective in terms of solving the problem than options generated by ad hoc groups. This is particularly true where there is a high level of disagreement in the unit. The effectiveness of the options generated by permanent organizations does not change when group conflict increases, whereas effectiveness for ad hoc groups changes substantially for the worse in high conflict.

3. Experience with a task improves the decision-making behaviors of members of an organization. A significant problem in crisis management is the tendency to make a response to a stimulus before adequate information is available for a correct response. With increased experience from being in a permanent organization, the individual is less likely to make this error than a person in an ad hoc group.
4. From an overall perspective, permanent organizations make less decision errors than \textit{ad hoc} groups.

What is the significance of these research findings for crisis management in the Department of Defense? It was our observation that there were no permanent procedures and specialized organizations in DOD for handling crises when they arose. Rather, the Department took something of a task force approach, putting together \textit{ad hoc} teams to work on the crisis activity. Often these teams were composed of "available bodies" rather than a predetermined set of experts who should have been handling the crisis. If this observation were true, and the research findings were valid, then we would conclude that DOD could not achieve maximum effectiveness in crisis management because it was not organized to achieve that effectiveness. By juxtaposing the research findings on \textit{ad hoc} groups with an analysis of DOD crisis management, we could make observations that had important consequences for the way in which the Department organizes itself for a crisis.

\textbf{Project Objectives}

The purpose of this project was to undertake this synthesis of research. We had two questions to answer:

First, are crisis management tasks in the Department of Defense handled through \textit{ad hoc} procedures and/or \textit{ad hoc} groups? Our impressions in the earlier project that this was the case were based on sketchy observations, informal interviews, and hunches. We had to systematically investigate the question in this project.

Second, is the effectiveness of crisis management by \textit{ad hoc} procedures and groups inferior to that of regularized procedures and permanent organizations? One conclusion of the earlier study was that this was indeed the case. But much of the evidence addressed the question either indirectly or by implication. In addition, the research surveyed in that project was largely drawn from small group experiments in laboratory situations. There was a need for a comprehensive statement that would focus on the specific proposition regarding
the relative merits of *ad hoc* groups *versus* permanent organizations. Such a statement would marshal evidence from political science, organization theory research, sociology, and social psychology.

The purpose of the project, in summary, was to find out if crisis management in DOD was *ad hoc*, and if *ad hoc* crisis management was inferior to crisis management by permanent organizations. The two task statements that guided our research were:

1. Investigate the proposition that crisis management tasks in the Department of Defense are handled through *ad hoc* procedures and/or *ad hoc* groups.

2. Investigate the proposition that the effectiveness of crisis management by *ad hoc* procedures and groups is inferior to that of permanent organizations using regularized procedures.

**Research Approach**

The project that we undertook was a combination of literature search and briefings by DOD officials and others familiar with Department decision-making in crisis.

Bibliographic searches undertaken in the earlier project provided a first look at the literature of political science, sociology, social psychology, military operations research, disaster research, and organization theory. Three computer-based searches were conducted: from the Defense Documentation Center, the National Technical Information Service, and the Psychological Abstracts Search and Retrieval system (American Psychological Association). Second, the bibliographies of various literature reviews and other general works provided many references. Finally, we constantly added to the list of possible sources as we reviewed literature and found relevant citations.

Case studies of past crisis situations were of little help. Most of those in the available literature concern Presidential-level decision-making. They focus on the policy process and the choice of options, and not on the support-level activity of DOD in which we were interested.
A body of literature that was most valuable was the disaster research literature. There has been a great deal of attention paid to the performance of organizations in coping with disasters—earthquake, fire, and so on. Much of this has been produced by the Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University. These citations appear in the bibliography. This literature provided valuable insights into crisis management, for the problems and organizational functions are almost identical, and many of the issues that must be addressed by crisis managers have been dealt with in these studies.

Finally, our research depended on a number of briefings with individuals, both within and outside of the Department of Defense, concerned with crisis management. The key contributors were:

- LTC Owen Greenblatt, Joint Chiefs of Staff, WWMCCS Operations and Evaluation Division, Operations Branch
- LTC A. B. Bundren, National Military Command Center
- Dr. Thomas Belden, Product Review Division, Central Intelligence Agency
- Dr. John Ponturo, Institute for Defense Analysis
- Dr. Leonard Wainstein, Institute for Defense Analysis
- Dr. Victor Vroom, Yale University
- Dr. Bernard Bass, University of Rochester
- Dr. Enrico Quarantelli, Disaster Research Center, Ohio State University
- Dr. E. Paul Torrance, University of Minnesota
- Dr. Fred Fiedler, University of Washington

Outline of the Report

The two major chapters of the Report correspond to the two propositions of the research task. In Chapter 2, we present our analysis of decision-making in DOD. The overall conclusion is that there are permanent and regularized procedures for setting up crisis management teams and directing their activities, but that the teams themselves are still ad hoc groups.
In the third chapter of the Report, we present our analysis of the relative performance of *ad hoc* groups versus permanent organizations. We find that the suggestive evidence of our earlier study is strongly supported by our present research. Crisis management by *ad hoc* groups is likely to suffer from a number of weaknesses. Because the preponderance of research has pointed to problems in *ad hoc* decision-making, Chapter 3 is organized around a discussion of these problems. However, our research has indicated several advantages which may be possessed by *ad hoc* groups:

1. *Ad hoc* groups, by definition, lack traditions and pre-existing structures. Although the absence of these features has a number of negative effects on group performance, it also increases the ability of a group to adapt quickly to a novel situation (Forrest, 1973; Dynes, 1970).

2. *Ad hoc* groups can serve the organization by taking on non-routine functions and freeing other organizational subunits to focus on familiar activities (Parr, 1970).

3. It is well-documented that extreme cohesiveness in a task group can have negative effects on performance (Deep, *et al.*, 1967; Janis, 1972; George, 1974; Bales, 1950). *Ad hoc* groups are not likely to become so extremely cohesive that their functioning is impaired by it.

4. *Ad hoc* groups are less likely than permanent organizations to be dominated by a few high-status members (Torrance, 1965). As a result, participation may be more equally distributed among group members.

5. Studies by Reingen (1973, 1974) and Schoner, *et al.* (1974) suggest that *ad hoc* groups may orient more appropriately towards risk than permanent organizations.

It appears, however, that the problems of *ad hoc* decision-making far outweigh these advantages, and it is on these problems that the report will focus.

A final chapter in the Report presents the implications of our study for crisis management in DOD.
CHAPTER 2
AD HOC GROUPS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The purpose of this chapter is to present our analysis of crisis decision-making in DOD. Our task was to determine whether the Department relies on ad hoc groups or permanent organizations for its crisis decision-making.

Crisis management in the Department of Defense is the responsibility of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The major locus of decision-making in crisis situations is the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The general purpose of the NMCC at all times is to provide the National Command Authorities (President and Secretary of Defense) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the means for making decisions and the means for implementing these decisions. The NMCC is a communications unit, and stands at the center of the command and control system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such a function is indicated by the list of specific NMCC activities which the NMCC briefing officer provides: 2

1. Acquire information
2. Consolidate and evaluate information
3. Display information
4. Disseminate information
5. Alert personnel, agencies, and commands
6. Conduct emergency conferences
7. Provide advice and recommendations
8. Implement directives from higher authority

Over the past years the NMCC has attempted to set up established procedures for the management of foreign policy crises. For example, in the mid-1960's the Center set up a

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procedure called the Threatening Situation Alert Report. At the first glimmer of trouble brewing in an area, the regional desk monitors were supposed to bring the situation to the attention of the J3. A formatted memo was used to provide a statement of the situation and information on personalities involved, potential options, importance to the U. S., and so on. The time frame was one to two months in the future.

The regional desks in NMCC pursued the Threatening Situation Alert Report for about six months, and then the procedure gradually fell into disuse. Most of the potential trouble spots did not develop into crises, and so the reports had little salience. With the pressure of more immediate and concrete matters, officers soon were ignoring this anticipatory procedure.

Not only were there procedures like this formatted memo, there were also attempts to set up permanent organizations to handle crises. In the mid-1960's the NMCC established a unit called the Crisis Coordinating Committee. This was an interagency group consisting of representatives from the State Department, Defense Department, and CIA. This group was to meet in non-crisis periods to draw up contingency plans for possible crisis areas. Its focus was comparatively long-range, looking about a year into the future. If a crisis developed in any of these areas, the Committee would be there to contribute its expertise.

According to an analyst familiar with crisis management in DOD in the 1960's, the plans of the Crisis Coordinating Committee "sank without a trace."\(^3\) The contingency plan for the Dominican Republic was "never even pulled out of the safe." The Committee was never an effective organization, and later fell into disuse.

There are two major problems with the kind of mechanisms for crisis management that have been described above. One is that they are anticipatory procedures, designed for drawing up analyses of and contingency plans for future potential crisis areas. This kind of activity always falls to the pressure of more immediate and more concrete concerns. The other problem is inherent in the nature of contingency planning. It is extremely difficult to

\(^3\)Interview with Dr. Leonard Wainstein, Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analysis, November 10, 1975.
draw up in advance substantive plans for managing a particular crisis. Either the plans will be so general that they will be useless when they have to be applied to the specific situation, or they will be so specific that they will not be applicable to the situation because that is different from what was envisioned. In either case, the plans will be ignored by the officials managing the crisis. If the Defense Department is to set up an effective crisis management mechanism, it must develop a mechanism different from these anticipatory procedures.

Instead of focusing on the anticipation of crisis, the Defense Department has recently been concerned with mechanisms for handling crises once they have started. Procedures for setting up the staffing arrangements for crisis management have recently been revised. The following is a brief, unclassified summary of those arrangements.4

Crisis procedures in the Joint Staff are organized around, and change for each of, three levels of crisis intensity. These three levels are:

- day-to-day or minor
- limited (e.g., Turkish invasion of Cyprus)
- major (possibility of U.S. forces involved; e.g., threat of Russian landing of paratroopers in 1973 Mideast war)

Minor Crises: NMCC Operations Team. For the lowest level of crisis, a regular Operations Team of the NMCC handles the situation. They give the crisis 24-hour coverage. At the same time, the NMCC operations people also keep tabs on and handle any activities related to the rest of the world. The NMCC Operations Team is a permanent organization, so it should be noted that at this level of crisis, crisis management is handled by a permanent organization.

4Summary is based on briefing from LTC Owen Greenhiatt, January 6, 1976.
For handling crises, the Operations Team can call on the support of:

1. NMCC selective augmentation: additional J3 divisions may be requested to support the Operations Team.

2. Rosters of on-call personnel from throughout the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: experts on the crisis situation, or other necessary personnel, from throughout OJCS may be called in.

3. Situation Room: A situation room next to the NMCC Watch Center can be established. It serves as the focal point for the immediate update of key senior personnel.

**Limited Crises: Crisis Action Team (CAT).** Should the crisis go to a point beyond the limited capabilities of the NMCC Operations Team, or require the continuous attention of action officers, a Crisis Action Team (CAT) may be activated. A JCS document spells out the procedures for activating a CAT and the membership. Members come from the Joint Staff directorates, the services, and the intelligence agencies. These people may not have worked together previously. In fact, it is likely that they do not all know one another. The Crisis Action Team is formed to handle the specific problem, and then it disbands. It is an *ad hoc* group. (It should be noted, however, that the procedures for activating the CAT, identifying its membership, and to some extent defining its responsibilities are established or regularized in a JCS document.)

Support is provided to the CAT by other *ad hoc* groups called *response cells*. These are critical for adequate staffing at this and at the higher level of crisis. Response cells are groups of officers established by OJCS, by the services, and/or by the agencies as necessary to back up their representatives on the CAT with either action officer support or administrative support. Thus, each member on an *ad hoc* group (the CAT) may be supported by an *ad hoc* group (the response cell).

**Major Crises: Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP).** When U. S. military forces might be involved in a crisis, the Emergency Operating Procedures may be implemented. Such
a situation usually requires the presence of top decision-makers on a continuous basis to make decisions and make recommendations to the National Command Authorities (President and Secretary of Defense). The purposes of the EOP are to:

- streamline action
- speed decision-making
- expedite coordination
- permit delegation of authority.

The Operation Planners Group (OPG) is the nucleus of crisis action at this level. It is the group that replaces the CAT when the Emergency Operating Procedures are implemented in a major crisis. Members, again specified in regularized procedures for activating the OPG, are high-level officials from the JCS directorates, the services, the intelligence agencies, and certain other Defense agencies. Like the CAT, and for the same reasons, the OPG is an ad hoc group. The OPG is supported by a number of other ad hoc groups activated by the EOP, and also by the permanent organizations concerned with the crisis: Operations Deputies, Joint Staff, OSD, the services, and other government agencies.

Observations

The preceding discussion presents an overview of the main mechanism for crisis management in the Department of Defense. In this project the first research objective was to investigate the proposition that crisis management tasks in DOD are handled through ad hoc procedures and/or ad hoc groups. We can now make some observations that relate to this question.

1. There are established, regularized procedures for implementing crisis action in the NMCC. Documents of JCS specify the manner in which the staff is activated, the membership of the various units, and in a general way responsibilities and relationships among units.

2. The established procedures outlined above are mainly concerned with staffing. They activate the various units that will handle crisis management, and they designate the memberships. The procedures do not, except in a general way, identify the
decision tasks to be undertaken by the various units, and do not specify standard ways of handling crises.

3. The units that handle crisis management are *ad hoc* groups. Except at the level of minor, day-to-day crises (which are handled by the regular Operations Team along with their other duties), the units set up for crisis are *ad hoc* in the sense that they do not exist before the crisis, are activated to handle the crisis, and then are disbanded when the crisis is over. The members of these groups may not have worked together on previous crises or other problems. Indeed, in an organization with the size and turnover of the Joint Staff, many members may not even know each other.

4. There is no crisis group as such to operate in non-crisis periods with the task of anticipating crises. The job of monitoring the environment and watching for possible or incipient crisis situations is handled by the regular watch officers, the intelligence agencies, and the CINC's. The watch centers of the State Department, DOD, CIA, and the other intelligence agencies are supposed to communicate with each other, if one of them sees a possible crisis, through the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Net (NOIWON).

5. There is no organizational unit, nor any individual, with the responsibility of being a "crisis specialist." This term does not refer to a substantive specialist; because there are so many possible crisis areas and issues, and because no two crises are alike, a group or person with substantive expertise for crisis management would be unrealistic. Substantive experts have to be called into a crisis on an *ad hoc* basis. But we use the term "crisis specialist" to refer to a person or group who would be expert in the *process* of crisis management. These experts would be familiar with the emergency procedures; they would know how to collect, interpret, and use information from the watch center and intelligence agencies; they would know where to go for required information and who to call in for the decision tasks involved. In short, there are no arrangements for what one analyst has called an expert on the "national nervous system."\(^5\)

\(^5\)Interview with Dr. Thomas Belden, October 22, 1975.
In summary, we conclude that crisis management in DOD is conducted by *ad hoc* groups. However, there are established, standard procedures for activating those groups, determining membership, and—on a general level—defining their decision-making responsibilities. Thus, if there are problems in the decision-making of *ad hoc* groups—the question to be analyzed in the next chapter—we would expect DOD crisis management to be subject to those problems, modified only by the fact that some established mechanisms for activating crisis management operations do exist.
CHAPTER 3
PROBLEMS IN THE USE OF AD HOC GROUPS

The second task of the research, reported in this chapter, was to marshal the evidence from the social science literature related to the proposition that the performance of ad hoc groups is inferior to the performance of permanent organizations. There has been a good deal of research focusing either directly on the proposition or on behaviors that have direct relevance to the proposition. These findings come from the fields of political science, social psychology, organization theory, disaster research, and military operations research. Our objective was to confirm or disconfirm the evidence favoring this proposition in our earlier research that was based mainly on findings from small group experiments in laboratory situations.

We have examined many research findings related to the performance of ad hoc and permanent structures. In this Report, we have combined these findings into seven aspects of decision-making performance in order to present a cogent analysis of the relative merits of the two forms of organization. The following areas are treated in turn in this chapter: planning, the use of organizational resources, interorganizational relationships, the effects of stress on decision-making performance, leadership, group conflict, and group cohesiveness.

Problem: The use of ad hoc groups reduces the amount of planning that can be conducted prior to a crisis.

Earlier in this Report it was noted that contingency plans for crisis are not likely to be used in a crisis situation. However, plans for the process by which the crisis is to be handled will be a crucial determinant of the effectiveness of decision-making. Such planning can facilitate such things as:
1. coordination among involved groups (Kennedy, 1969; Dynes, et al., 1964).

2. mobilization of crisis units.

3. avoidance of overlap, duplication, or omission of important tasks by specifying the division of labor (Dynes, et al., 1964).

4. The use of standard operating procedures for managing the crisis.

In general, a permanent organization has the advantage that it can develop and test and rehearse the wide range of procedures that should guide activity in crisis management.

To be maximally effective, crisis planning should meet the following requirements:

1. The plan should be an overall plan integrating pre- and post-crisis planning with the emergency activities of all involved units (Dynes, et al., 1964). It should encompass all time periods and involved units rather than being divided into separate plans for different periods and groups (Dynes, et al., 1964).

2. Plans must be widely known, understood and exercised. Preferably they should be rehearsed. Paper plans alone do not work (Dynes, et al., 1964). That they can undertake this kind of planning is a major advantage of permanent organizations (Kennedy, 1969).


4. Plans should specify in detail the procedures and lines of authority involved as well as the location of resources (Dynes, et al., 1964).

5. Plans must be constantly studied and revised (Kennedy, 1969).

In the Jordan crisis of 1970, the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) in the National Security Council had assembled a wide range of scenarios and detailed supporting plans for all reasonably foreseeable contingencies (Kettlehut, 1973). The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed and revised emergency action checklists. Schedules for 24-hour staffing were finalized and published. It is Kettlehut’s conclusion that these kinds of planning actions
contributed in crucial ways to the successful management of the crisis. A study of the reaction to an earthquake in Niigata, Japan confirms the value of planning by permanent organizations (Dynes, et al., 1964; Barton, 1969).

In contrast, a study of an ad hoc group shows the problems of lack of planning. In research on an ad hoc group of clergymen which formed to dispense food, clothing, and other services during the Detroit riot of 1967, Forrest (1973) shows that the group took hours before it could act because members had no expectation of participation in such a crisis, no plans had been discussed, and there was not even a consensus regarding the objectives of the group. This was crucial time lost, even though the group was later able to organize and function effectively.

At present, the Department of Defense gets a mixed score on this aspect of decision-making performance. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are rather elaborate and established plans for activating the units which will handle crises. But essentially these are staffing procedures that create ad hoc groups. Because the group does not exist prior to crisis, there can be little planning, rehearsal, and improvement of the decision-making tasks that will have to be undertaken in the crisis.

Problem: Ad hoc groups may not make full use of the organizational resources available for crisis management.

Kreps (1973) studied the crisis operations of police departments in fifteen cities. These were organizations in which there was a high expectation of participation in crisis, an emphasis on professionalism, and a substantial degree of information exchange with other organizations with similar expectations or experiences. In such situations, Kreps finds:

1. the development of a crisis "technology" based on knowledge and information regarding what should be included in crisis plans, what training techniques should be used, what equipment needs are, and so on;

2. the development of a wide range of complex alternatives that make full use of the organization's resources;
3. the development of organizational mechanisms to initiate changes in planning and operations;

4. a greater involvement of organizational subunits.

Other studies confirm the finding that permanent organizations develop a technology for the full use of their resources. In his review of the work of the Disaster Research Center, Brouillette (1968) concludes that communities which have had repeated experience with a particular type of disaster show permanent alterations in skills, resource allocation, norms, and values. Organizations in such communities develop standard operating procedures and act with great efficiency. This kind of efficient and skillful use of organizational resources was demonstrated in the handling of the Niigata earthquake disaster. The government had elaborate and specific plans designating the location and types of resources to be used and directing the organizational functions for the deployment of those resources (Dynes, *et al.*, 1964; Barton, 1969). In this sense, the earthquake was not a crisis because the community was organized to handle it.

In striking contrast to these studies is research on the crisis decision-making by *ad hoc* groups in the Kennedy administration. One of the major criticisms of the use of task forces (*ad hoc* groups) by the Kennedy administration was that it had "precipitously and methodically deprived itself of essential government machinery during its first few weeks in office" (Candela, 1974). The administration had dismantled the national security machinery necessary to pull together and to feed to decision-makers the myriad details essential to comprehensive evaluation and choice of alternatives. In short, the *ad hoc* group could not make use of the full range of organizational resources available.

**Problem:** The use of *ad hoc* groups compounds the problems of interorganizational relationships in a crisis.

Crisis place a great strain on the existing authority patterns and relationships among units in an organization:

1. They intensify any interorganizational conflicts which existed prior to the crisis (Hermann, 1963).
2. They hasten organizational restructuring which may have been only gradually emerging prior to the crisis (Barton, 1969).

3. They often create a need for a "superorganization," resulting in decreased autonomy for some units and increased autonomy for others (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1975).

4. Crisis creates a tendency towards an upward shift of authority, placing stress on lower-level units (Hermann, 1963; Milburn, 1972). However, at the same time that higher echelon people engage in more supervisory activities, matters requiring decisions on the part of lower echelon people mushroom. Therefore, the ratio of supervised to unsupervised decisions decreases (Brouillette, 1968). This creates boundary regulation problems (Dynes, 1970; Dynes and Quarantelli, 1975).

5. Previously unimportant units may take on important roles. Status hierarchies will shift accordingly, leading to strain among units (Dynes, 1970).

The emergence of ad hoc groups in the crisis compounds the above problems. Clashes over authority boundaries are more prevalent when ad hoc groups undertake functions which overlap those of permanent organizations (Dynes et al., 1964). Ad hoc crisis management groups may experience difficulty in having the legitimacy of their crisis authority accepted by other groups (Kennedy, 1969; White, 1966). There is evidence that permanent organizations which have day-to-day responsibility for decision-making tend to view ad hoc groups as outsiders and even as incompetents. For example, in cases in which an ad hoc Civil Defense group was supposed to have the major coordinating role in community crises, permanent organizations such as the police tended to avoid submitting to the authority of the ad hoc group (Kennedy, 1969). This conflict appears in such behaviors as the reluctance on the part of the permanent organization to share the information it has gathered with the ad hoc group.

The conclusion is that permanent organizations should be responsible for crisis management in order to minimize interorganizational conflict. The evidence from the research, particularly from the disaster research literature, indicates that organizations coordinate better in crisis if they have had a pre-crisis relationship.
Problem: The decision-making performance of ad hoc groups under stress is more likely to be impaired than the abilities of permanent organizations.

Some of the major and most substantiated findings in our earlier research concerned the relationships between stress and various aspects of decision-making performance. Specifically, we found that in an intensely stressful situation:

- The only goals which will be considered are those relating to the immediate present at the sacrifice of longer range considerations.
- Goals will be altered gradually as the crisis period continues, possibly as a way of avoiding feelings of failure.
- There is an increasing tendency as the crisis continues to make a premature choice from alternatives—often before adequate information has become available for a correct response.
- Decision-makers may not discriminate optimally between alternatives. That is, they may lump alternatives into gross categories and make decisions based on such categorizations without discriminating adequately between possible choices.
- Decision-makers may become impaired in their ability to predict accurately the consequences of the alternatives under consideration.
- Decision-makers become more likely to select a risky alternative.
- Poor or incorrect choice of an alternative becomes more likely. This likelihood increases as the crisis continues.

To these problems may be added the analysis of Janis (1972) on group decision-making. Janis finds that under high stress there is a process of "concurrence seeking"—a striving for mutual support or cohesiveness in order to cope with the stresses of decision-making. If this process gets too strong, it may lead to what Janis calls groupthink—a highly maladaptive way of coping with stress. According to Janis, groupthink is characterized by:
1. an illusion of invulnerability, shared by most or all the members, which creates excessive optimism and encourages taking extreme risks;

2. collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount warnings which might lead the members to reconsider their assumptions before they recommit themselves to their past policy decisions;

3. an unquestioned belief in the group's inherent morality, inclining the members to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions;

4. stereotyped views of enemy leaders as too evil to warrant genuine attempts to negotiate, or as too weak and stupid to counter whatever risky attempts are made to defeat their purposes;

5. direct pressure on any member who expresses strong arguments against any of the group's stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, making clear that this type of dissent is contrary to what is expected of all loyal members;

6. self-censorship of deviations from the apparent group consensus, reflecting each member's inclination to minimize to himself the importance of his doubts and counterarguments;

7. a shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgments conforming to the majority view (partly resulting from self-censorship of deviations, augmented by the false assumption that silence means consent);

8. the emergence of self-appointed mindguards—members who protect the group from adverse information that might shatter their shared complacency about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions.

In sum, extreme stress leads to poor decision-making performance, particularly with respect to the search for alternatives but also with respect to situation diagnosis and evaluation of alternatives.

For our purposes, the point to be noted is that ad hoc groups experience more stress than permanent organizations, and so are more likely to be impaired in the performance of the
various decision-making functions. The literature consistently supports this finding. For example, White (1966) suggests that high familiarity with the job to be performed in crisis reduces the effects of stress on individuals and groups. She defines high familiarity as requiring:

1. years of full-time experience;
2. the attainment of a level of mastery at the job such that what others might consider demanding is considered routine;
3. knowledge from long experience of what to expect from coworkers based on a feeling that they are in agreement about organizational goals and procedures.

Work from the Disaster Research Center also supports this view. Dynes (1970) states that permanent organizations which do not change significantly in structure or function during a crisis experience surprisingly little stress in crisis, and consequently perform effectively. The amount of perceived stress increases to the extent that unfamiliar structures are employed or unfamiliar tasks are undertaken—i.e., to the extent that decision-making is *ad hoc*. We conclude that permanent organizations are less likely to be impaired by stress in the performance of decision-making functions than are *ad hoc* groups.

**Problem:** *Ad hoc groups cannot provide the leadership and leader-member relations required in crisis situations.*

Simply stated, crisis is not the time to put a new group together, with no prior relationships between leader and membership. Research suggests that a history of strong leader-member relations is necessary for the leader to be able to perform his functions in crisis. The leader's functions are both task-oriented and socio-emotional. On the task side, of course, he directs the performance of the group in handling the crisis. On the socio-emotional side, he must deal with the interpersonal relationships of the group. These functions can best be performed where there is continuity of leadership from non-crisis to crisis situations (Torrance, 1961).
If the leader in an *ad hoc* group is weak, one of three reactions will take place, all of which are dysfunctional:

a. the group will attempt to depose the formal leader, permitting a new one to emerge;

b. the group will not depose the formal leader, but one or more informal leaders will share leadership with him; or

c. the group will depose the formal leader, and attempt to function without a leader.

The process of leader emergence in an *ad hoc* group is typically disruptive to the functioning of the group. It is particularly disruptive when a formally appointed leader exists, because there are sanctions against the emergence of the informal leader when another person has the formal designation.

When groups are *ad hoc*, the very least precaution that should be taken is to insure that the leaders have at least worked in some capacity with key members of the group on previous occasions. In the case studies of community disasters, the successful *ad hoc* groups had leaders who had worked with group members in the past.

The ideal leader of a crisis group (White, 1966) is one who:

1. belongs to a regular network of organizations which are to be involved in the crisis;

2. is a leader in this network and has a high level of responsibility in it; and

3. is familiar with the leaders of other organizations or groups, has worked with them before, and knows what to expect in their performance.

When such a leader is tied to a permanent crisis organization, decision performance is likely to be superior to that of the *ad hoc* group.
Problem: Ad hoc groups are more likely to be disrupted by group conflict than are permanent organizations.

With regard to group conflict, our previous research established two main points. First, we found that crisis situations lead to increased conflict within decision-making groups. Second, we found that task-oriented conflict is positively correlated with better group performance. That is, when there is disagreement on the resolution of the problem, there will be, once the decision is finally made, a greater consensus, a greater unwillingness on the part of group members to accept defeat, and superior decisions in terms of accuracy and adaptiveness to the situation. In contrast person-oriented conflict was found to impede group effectiveness.

In the present research, we have found with regard to task-oriented conflict that there can be too much of a good thing. Groups can experience too much substantive conflict. Further, and to the point of this Report, ad hoc groups are particularly subject to this. Hall and Williams (1966) indicate that ad hoc groups perform significantly worse than permanent organizations under conditions of high substantive conflict. Unlike permanent organizations, they tend to respond to group conflict by compromising on existing proposed options rather than by creating new options. In addition, the decisions of ad hoc groups under such conditions are less effective in solving the problem than the decisions of permanent organizations.

These findings are supported by Posner (1961) in his analysis of the Berlin crisis of 1961. He describes Kennedy’s ad hoc task force approach as slow and unimaginative. He implies that the level of substantive conflict reached in the group may have been too high for effective decision-making.

In addition to experiencing more task-oriented conflict than permanent organizations, ad hoc groups are also subject to more person-oriented conflict, and this is always dysfunctional. Over time, most permanent organizations will achieve socio-emotional stability because members who conflict with others will either change themselves, change the others, or leave the organization (Hare, 1962). Ad hoc groups do not have the time to achieve such stability, and so individual personalities are likely to clash and disrupt performance.
Another reason that *ad hoc* groups are more subject to person-oriented conflict stems from status hierarchy problems. In any new group a status hierarchy must be formed, and this process is usually characterized by negative feelings and high interpersonal conflict (Borgatta and Bales, 1953; Fisher, 1974). However, in a permanent organization there is likely to be a well-defined formal structure that will provide a framework for establishing the status hierarchy, thereby reducing conflict in the process. *Ad hoc* groups are less likely to have this kind of formal, organizational mechanism for limiting interpersonal conflict.

**Problem:** *Ad hoc* groups cannot achieve the group cohesiveness that permanent organizations can, and cohesiveness is positively related to performance, except at extreme levels.

The degree of group cohesiveness in a group or organization has important effects on positive behaviors and attitudes related to decision-making performance. Extensive research shows that:

1. Cohesiveness is the source of the psychological and emotional support a group should provide members. In cohesive groups:
   a. members become more attentive to one another (Olmsted, 1959);
   b. members grow to like each other more (Olmsted, 1959);
   c. members become more concerned with giving psychological support (Torrance, 1965);
   d. members are more likely to remain in the group (Cartwright and Zander, 1974);
   e. members have more feeling of loyalty to the group (Cartwright and Zander, 1974);
   f. members feel more secure (Cartwright and Zander, 1974);
   g. the group is better able to withstand stress without falling apart (Luft, 1970; Torrance, 1957; Olmsted, 1959).
2. Cohesiveness is associated with increased control of groups over their members. In cohesive groups:
   a. members become more similar in attitudes and behaviors (Olmsted, 1959);
   b. members are more likely to internalize group norms;
   c. the group becomes more resistant to the influence of any sources external to it (Maier and Thurber, 1969);
   d. members are more easily influenced and changed by the group (Olmsted, 1959; Cartwright and Zander, 1974).

3. Cohesiveness is associated with the patterns of task-oriented interaction. In cohesive groups:
   a. the degree of participation is increased (Cartwright and Zander, 1974);
   b. pressures develop towards increased equality and a corresponding reduction in status differences (Deep, et al., 1967; Bales, 1950);
   c. there is greater ease in agreeing on a group goal (Schacter, 1951; Berkowitz, 1954);
   d. conformity to group opinion is increased (Torrance, 1965);
   e. greater intermember friction can be tolerated without breaking up the group (French, 1941; Torrance, 1965);
   f. members are more willing to interact with each other (Davis, 1974).

How does cohesiveness relate to our comparison of ad hoc groups and permanent organizations? Permanent organizations are more likely to be cohesive than ad hoc groups. Research indicates that cohesiveness increases as a function of the following factors, all of which are likely to be associated with permanent organizations:
1. The existence of previous organization in the group (French, 1941);
2. Stability of the group's prestige level (Olmsted, 1959);
3. Stability of status structure within the group (Fisher, 1974);
4. Intermember friendship and interaction over time (Reicken and Homans, 1954);
5. Past history of success (Olmsted, 1959) or even failure (Davis, 1974).

It must be noted, however, that cohesiveness is likely to be intensified by crisis for both ad hoc groups as well as permanent organizations. Such crisis factors as exposure to threat, competition with other groups, and high motivation lead to greater cohesiveness (Cartwright and Zander, 1974; Davis, 1974).

Since cohesiveness is positively correlated with performance, and permanent organizations are likely to be more cohesive than ad hoc groups, we conclude that on this factor also, permanent organizations are superior. There is danger only when cohesiveness goes to an extreme level, resulting in the groupthink kind of phenomenon that Janis (1972) discusses.

It is essential that counterbalancing mechanisms be built into permanent organizations. George (1974), for example, has proposed a system of "multiple advocacy" which should work well in maintaining a productive level of dissent in a group without destroying cohesiveness.

Summary

By way of summary, it will be useful to repeat the problems of decision-making by ad hoc groups that are documented in the literature:

1. The use of ad hoc groups reduces the amount of planning that can be conducted prior to a crisis.

2. Ad hoc groups may not make full use of the organizational resources available for crisis management.
3. The use of *ad hoc* groups compounds the problems of inter-organizational relationships in a crisis.

4. The decision-making performance of *ad hoc* groups under stress is more likely to be impaired than the abilities of permanent organizations.

5. *Ad hoc* groups cannot provide the leadership and leader-member relations required in crisis situations.

6. *Ad hoc* groups are more likely to be disrupted by group conflict than are permanent organizations.

7. *Ad hoc* groups cannot achieve the group cohesiveness that permanent organizations can, and cohesiveness is positively related to performance.

We conclude, on the basis of many individual research studies examined in these seven areas, that the second proposition of this research project is a valid statement: the decision-making performance of *ad hoc* groups is inferior to the performance of permanent organizations, other factors being equal. Foreign policy crises will be more effectively handled by the Department of Defense if they are the responsibility of permanent organizations.
CHAPTER 4
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE

The major recommendation of this Report is obvious given the conclusions of Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2 we affirmed the proposition that crisis management in DOD is handled by ad hoc groups. In Chapter 3 we affirmed the proposition that the performance of ad hoc groups is inferior to that of permanent organizations. Therefore, we recommend that the Department of Defense establish a permanent organization for crisis management.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken an important step in this direction. In Chapter 2 we reviewed the set of procedures designed to implement crisis action. These are permanent, routinized directives for setting up units to handle crisis activities. The fact that they are standing directives is crucial. It means that certain designated individuals have the expectation of participation in crisis management. It means that the designated units can be mobilized rapidly when the proper official decides to implement crisis action. And it means that a certain amount of planning has been done, at least insofar as the question of who will be involved in crisis management is determined before the crisis. These constitute an important improvement upon earlier crisis management, in which participants might not have been chosen until the crisis was imminent or had already started. In our earlier research, we emphasized the importance of the time factor for effective decision-making performance. Any arrangements, such as a staffing plan, which help maximize the amount of time available for decision-making are highly beneficial.

However, it is the conclusion of our research that these procedures do not go far enough. The groups which are created for crisis management are still ad hoc groups as they are defined in this Report, and are therefore subject to all of the problems discussed in Chapter 3. For example, the group is likely to encounter problems in being fully knowledgeable of and making full and effective use of the organizational resources available to it. Or the group is likely to have difficulty establishing effective linkages with other units in the
crisis management structure. And the group will not have had the opportunity to develop
standard operating procedures to guide the conduct of the myriad decision tasks for which it
is responsible.

Therefore, we suggest that the Department of Defense take the further step of
establishing a permanent organization for crisis management. Let us consider what the re-
quirements are for such an organization.

First of all, it is important to note that when we use the term permanent organi-
zation we do not necessarily imply a full-time organization. It may be difficult to justify
the existence of a full-time crisis management unit in periods of calm on the international
scene. There probably would not be enough crisis-related work for such an organization.
We envision an organization composed of individuals who are regularly assigned to one of the
divisions of the Department of Defense. For a certain small percentage of their time, these
individuals would be required to meet together as the crisis management unit. The unit
would meet regularly at whatever intervals and whatever length were necessary to complete
its work.

What would be the responsibilities of a permanent crisis management organization?
In our Chapter 2 discussion of some past attempts at routinizing crisis management procedures,
we noted that attempts at anticipating crises failed. Either the process of trying to pinpoint
potential trouble spots fell into disuse due to the press of more immediate and concrete concerns,
or the contingency plans that were drawn up were ignored when a crisis started. In addition,
there are too many surprises in international politics, too many crises which cannot be antici-
pated and for which there is little or no advance warning. From these observations and our
discussions with analysts who have studied crisis management, we conclude that the activities
of the crisis management unit in non-crisis periods should not be "substantive." That is, the
unit should not be concerned with studying potential crisis areas, generating contingency plans,
trying to anticipate problems and so on.6 Given the surprise and variability of crisis, and given

6We do not mean to imply that there should be no attempt at early warning. On the contrary, we
believe that a great deal of attention should be paid to the problem of early warning in order to maximize avail-
able decision time. But early warning might best be left to the watch centers and intelligence agencies. It will
then be necessary, of course, to establish an effective link between the early warning systems and the proposed
crisis management unit.
what we know of past attempts to do just this, we feel that this kind of work would not be productive. We feel that the individuals with substantive expertise on the geographic area and the particular crisis issue should be called in to the group when the crisis breaks.

Instead, we propose that the crisis management unit be staffed with experts in the process of crisis decision-making. What needs to be developed by this unit, and remain its responsibility, is the set of procedures for carrying out the decision tasks of crisis management. This unit would develop and test standard operating procedures for handling crisis management tasks, and also train the relevant individuals in the use of these procedures. They would define the points at which decision aids would be most useful, and develop such aids. They would know what the information requirements are for the various decision-makers. They would know who to call in for crisis action, and how and where to call them. They would be specialists in the "national nervous system," familiar with information sources, procedures for calling up information, computer capabilities, and the interpretation and use of information.

The unit would develop standard procedures for mobilizing itself to a higher level of activity when a crisis was possible or incipient, and then to the highest level of activity for the full-blown crisis. It would expand in membership for crises. It would be at this time that the substantive experts for the specific crisis would be called in. The members of the crisis management organization would know what expertise was needed and who the experts were, and they would have developed standard procedures for bringing them together either physically or through a communications linkup.

The proposed organization would be the core or nerve center of decision-making activity in crises. Around it could revolve the ad hoc groups called for in the emergency procedures outlined in Chapter 2. For example, a group consisting of representatives from non-Defense agencies could be plugged into this group for the purpose of advice on proposed options and liaison with those agencies. As long as the central unit for crisis management is a permanent organization, we believe that decision-making can proceed effectively.

The crisis management unit that we propose would overcome the problems of ad hoc groups that now limit the decision-making performance of the groups created by the
emergency procedures. In addition, we believe that such a unit would undertake a wide variety of important tasks which are not now performed in the Department, or performed in any coherent manner. As specialists in all of the complex elements of crisis management, this group would, we believe, significantly improve decision-making.


Kennedy, W. C. *The Police Department in Natural Disaster Operations*. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, Disaster Research Center, 1969.


