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THE SOURCES AND PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR

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Prepared for:
Office of Naval Research
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

20 March 1975
This report summarizes the research activities of the International Behavior Analysis (IBA) Project for the period August 1, 1974 to March 1, 1975. An analytical framework for the study of international behavior is constructed. It is comprised of the factors associated with international action and reaction. These factors themselves are classified as either internal (domestic) or external (foreign), and facilitate the conduct of source and (decision-making) process analysis. In addition to these collections of factors, or variables, two classificatory schemes (of nations and actions) are developed.
20. Abstract

There are five distinct collections of variables which are (1) psychological; (2) political; (3) societal; (4) interstate; and (5) global-systemic in nature. The classificatory scheme of nations classifies nations on the bases of governmental structure, economic structure, and power capabilities. The classificatory scheme of international actions classifies the same on the bases of (1) a spatial dimension; (2) a temporal dimension; (3) a relational dimension; (4) a situational dimension; (5) a substantial dimension; and (6) a behavioral dimension. The five "components" along with the two classificatory schemes constitute the analytical framework. Its implementation is designed to yield insight into how, why, and when certain nations are likely to act and interact within the context of certain international action occasions.
THE SOURCES AND PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR

This report covers the period August 1, 1974 through March 1, 1975

Forward

This report constitutes the first technical report of the International Behavior Analysis (IBA) Project, which is designed to produce comparative and empirical generalizations about how, when, and why nations are likely to act, react, and (therefore) interact within the international system. The analysis of three distinct kinds of behavior fall within the scope of the IBA Project. First, the project is interested in discovering the sources of national action. When nations decide to act externally they do so in response to certain domestic and/or foreign stimuli. Accordingly, it is possible to identify three domestic (or internal) and two foreign (or external) stimuli: (1) psychological; (2) political; (3) societal; (4) interstate; and (5) global systemic. These stimuli represent collections—or components—of factors which may lead a nation to take a specific external action. They are elaborated upon with section IV-A of this report.

The second kind of behavior which falls within the purview of the IBA Project concerns the processes surrounding initiative decision-making. After a set of conditions give rise to a decision occasion, that is, after certain stimuli function as the source(s) of action, a nation must decide how to respond to the stimuli. Who is involved? What agencies and institutions are to assume important (decision-making) roles? How are interstate and global systemic conditions perceived by the decision-makers? Such questions represent but a sampling of those relevant to the conduct of initiative process analysis.

When a nation decides to initiate an action it responds to a set of stimuli essentially unrelated to the direct actions of other states. Behavior of a different nature is thus associated with the processes of responsive decision-making which occur when a nation is acted upon, that is, when, for example, nation A directs an action at nation B. The decision-making processes which occur within nation B illustrate the third kind of behavior with which the IBA Project is concerned.

In addition to explaining and predicting the sources and processes of international-foreign policy behavior, the project hopes to specify the conditions under which certain nations might initiate or respond to certain events. Consequently, it has been necessary for the Project to provide the means by which nations and events may be classified. Two classificatory schemes—elaborated upon in sections IV-B and C—have thus been developed.
Indeed, all of the above has been incorporated within a single analytical framework. Since the construction of this framework represents the primary task of the present contract year, the following sections will attempt to elaborate upon its important elements, as well as upon the analytical impeti which affected the process of its construction.
PART I
After more than a decade of scientific scrutiny, foreign policy phenomena have remained embarrassingly mysterious. As two inventories of "findings" have recently illustrated, foreign policy analysts have only succeeded in amassing a disjointed collection of queries (Jones and Singer, 1972; McGowan and Shapiro, 1973). While many scholars might retort with a defensive reference to the 'young science' of foreign policy, we prefer to trace the paucity of reliable foreign policy knowledge to some very basic—and corrigeable—conceptual failures. Accordingly, we propose to deal with two related sets of problems. First, we propose to deal with the issues associated with the identification of a functional scope of inquiry, and, secondly, with those surrounding the conversion of a conceptualized scope into an overarching analytical framework. While what follows is by no means preferred as a conceptual panacea, it is intended to illuminate and correct two of the failures which have contributed to the present state of the field.

I. THE NECESSITY OF A FUNCTIONAL SCOPE OF INQUIRY

The first step toward the production and cumulation of reliable knowledge is taken by the analyst who specifies a general area into which to delve. Essentially, this amounts to a selection of subject matter, or, more properly, a field of inquiry. If the area is without well-defined research boundaries—as is often the case in the social sciences, then the analyst must attempt to locate such boundaries or face the unhappy prospect
of producing disparate and noncumulative knowledge. The necessity for identifying a clearly demarcated scope of inquiry is thus self-evident. Without it we do not have "any very reliable classificatory or mapping system by which to tell what terrain is being covered or left unexplored" (Van Dyke, 1966, p. 1), or the blueprint according to which an analytical framework might be constructed. James N. Rosenau (1963) attaches even greater importance to the issues associated with the identification of a functional scope of inquiry. Indeed, according to Rosenau, a field simply cannot exist without its own subject matter:

In the absence of a subject matter with an internal coherence of its own, . . ., researchers can never be sure whether in fact they are engaging in a common enterprise. Under such circumstances, they may actually be working on highly diverse problems that share only the labels that are attached to them. What is regarded as 'the field' may be no more than a composite of several different enterprises that overlap in some respects but that have distinctive subject matters, viewpoints, and propositions of their own (1969, p. 310).

II. THE FUNCTIONAL SCOPE OF FOREIGN POLICY INQUIRY

Given the universal function of a well-defined scope of inquiry, foreign policy analysts should attempt to specify the precise boundaries of their field. Unfortunately, only a few have undertaken such a task and there is thus very little from which we might build.

A comfortable vantage point from which we might begin concerns the delineation of levels of analysis. As stated elsewhere in greater detail (Andriole, 1974b), levels of analysis refer to the general areas on and from which certain behaviors normally occur. Thus far, five two dimensional (causal and effectual) levels have been identified. They are, in ascending order, the individual, group, state, inter- and/or multi-state,
and global systemic levels of analysis, and may be viewed as representing
the universe of causal and effectual analytical areas. Foreign policy
behavior normally occurs on effectual levels three and four and results
from factors or conditions arising from the five causal levels of analysis.
Figure 1 thus illustrates the effectual levels on which foreign policy
behavior normally occurs as well as the nature of comprehensive foreign
policy analysis. In addition, Figure 1 provides the conceptual bases upon
which the field's scope of inquiry may be built.

(INSET FIGURE 1 HERE)

As the figure indicates, foreign policy behavior normally occurs on
the state and interstate levels of analysis. With reference to the func-
tional scope of foreign policy, these levels suggest behavior of two general
natures. The first kind of behavior refers to that which results from the
impact of certain internal and/or external stimuli. Such behavior suggests
the need to conduct inquiry into what may properly be conceptualized as the
sources of foreign policy. After a state decides to respond to a set of
stimuli, its decision-making machinery is set into gear. This occurs when
a state is initiating a foreign policy as well as when it is reacting to the
foreign policy of another sovereign entity. Such behavior thus suggests the
need for the conduct of inquiry into what may properly be conceptualized
as initiative and responsive decision-making. The scope of foreign policy
thus requires analysts to conduct inquiry into the sources and processes of
decision-making. In addition, the field requires foreign policy analysts
to conduct their source and process analyses with reference to the differ-
ences which exist among states and foreign policies.
The specification of such precise research boundaries should enable foreign policy analysts to conceptualize the behavior they wish to scrutinize without much difficulty. On the other hand, there is always the danger that scholars will randomly examine foreign policy phenomena without regard to an overarching scope of inquiry. In an effort to prevent such random research activity and insure the cumulation of reliable foreign policy knowledge, we thus propose the construction and application of an analytical framework whose features may be traced directly to the designated scope of inquiry.

Social scientists are by no means unfamiliar with such a strategy. By the very nature of their work, they must employ analytical strategies which are inferior to those employed by physical scientists. Since the understanding of human behavior is the primary object of their investigation, contemporary social scientists are not in a position to engage in controlled experimentation. Instead, they must rely primarily upon the systematic analysis of past events. Social scientists are seldom in a position to generate comprehensive explanations of human behavior without the aid of such a strategy. Thus, whether they inductively construct hypotheses of human behavior, or extract them from detailed isomorphisms, contemporary social scientists must rely upon a much less precise portrayal of the process of cause-and-effect than their counterparts in the physical sciences. Indeed, since their conception of cause and effect is a relatively obscure one, many social scientists have been forced to organize their analyses around the construction of analytical models, or frameworks. When properly
constructed, such frameworks serve to structure the (a priori) relationship between cause and effect. Moreover, well constructed analytical frameworks enable political analysts to extract specific hypotheses with a minimal degree of difficulty. Causal and effectual modifications are also easily assimilated into well constructed (flexible) analytical frameworks. For all such reasons is the construction and implementation of an analytical framework suggested as a viable strategy for the production and cumulation of reliable knowledge.

As stated, analytical framework construction should descend from a designated scope of inquiry. Conceptually, such a designation will suggest all of the causal and effectual levels of analysis from which all of the known units of analysis may be designated (see Figure 1). Initially, framework architects should be concerned with the comprehensive and coherent portrayal of their causal and effectual, or independent and dependent, variables. Second, the ideal framework ought to arrange and separate those variables which are analytically and conceptually interrelated into coherent clusters. Such a division will be an invaluable strategy for organizing, extracting, and testing hypotheses around similar or competing independent variable clusters. Third, if the subject matter and specific object of explanation so require, "intervening variables" must be acknowledged. Often visible within contemporary social scientific explanatory analyses, intervening variables are those which exert an intervening or modifying impact upon the causal-effectual process in question. Indeed, the arbitrary exclusion of intervening variables may result in the production of severely distorted knowledge. The fourth step in the construction of a truly viable analytical framework involves a conscious coordination between the chosen method
of inquiry and the actual delineation of the units of analysis (which arise from the analytic levels). If such a coordination is even slightly neglected, then hypotheses would be difficult to extract and almost impossible to test. In short, the ideal analytical framework must not only be comprehensive and flexible, but it must be operationalizable as well.

IV. FOREIGN POLICY ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK CONSTRUCTION

Foreign policy analysts have for some time engaged in the construction of analytical frameworks. However, they have seldom done so in conjunction with a carefully mapped scope of inquiry, or on the basis of any preconceived analytical criteria. As a result, it is possible to pinpoint the deficiencies within virtually all of them (Welch and Triska, 1971; Andricole et al., 1975).

The task at hand thus requires the construction of a framework designed in such a way that it might easily accommodate both source and process analyses—that is, inquiry into the entire scope of foreign policy behavior. Accordingly, a great many variables specifically related to both the sources and processes of foreign policy behavior need to be specified. Source variables, that is, those which may be conceptualized as the "causes" or determinants of (external) foreign policy behavior, must be conceptualized as internal or external. Moreover, they should be clustered into variable sets, or components, which may be regarded as vertically arranged, flexible sets of variables of the same class.

Those who choose to engage in the analysis of the processes by which foreign policy decisions are made and implemented also need to cluster the
relevant variables into components. Indeed, the very same internal and external components which might be utilized to describe, explain, and predict how states are likely to respond to certain internal and/or external conditions, may also be conceptualized as the objects of description, explanation, and prediction for those who are interested in conducting process analysis. Stated somewhat differently, the variables (components) which are conceptualized as independent (or causal) by those who engage in source analysis may also be conceptualized as dependent by those who engage in process or decision-making analysis.

Additionally, whether engaging in source or process analysis, foreign policy analysts must attempt to describe, explain, and predict behavior with reference to the differences which exist among states and foreign policies. While analysts have attempted to account for such differences through the application of a variety of analytical strategies, we propose the utilization of two multi-dimensional classificatory schemes. When taken together, the schemes and the source/process variable components constitute our analytical framework, which appears below in Figure 2.

(INSET FIGURE 2 HERE)

As the figure indicates, the framework is at all times comprised of three (independent, intervening and dependent) sets of variables. As is also evident, the five source/process variable components are derived from the five levels of analysis (see Figure 1). But perhaps most importantly, the figure illustrates how a single analytical framework can accommodate both source and process analyses by simply reversing the postulated causal chain and holding the intervening variable cluster constant.
Since antiquity scholars have recognized that an actor's foreign policy actions and reactions are linked to a complex cluster of internal and external factors. More recently, social scientists have attempted to construct frameworks which have yielded an array of variable areas for the comparative analysis of foreign policy behavior. But even the most potentially comprehensive frameworks—including those developed by Rosenau (1966) and Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein (1969)—have not delineated all of the significant variables or variable areas.

Components represent an exhaustive collection of variable areas for foreign policy analysis. Within each component are factors which are similar in nature. Specifically, five social scientific levels of analysis constitute the source of five distinct components, which have been labelled psychological, political, societal, interstate, and global.

Comprehensive foreign policy analysis requires an exhaustive specification of the universe of potentially relevant variables. Extensive empirical research on foreign policy has accrued in the past decades; but the voluminous literature remains regrettably uneven. Foreign policy scholars have zeroed in on one, two, or even all five of the variable domains without even attempting to specify the parameters and contents of each variable cluster. The inevitable result has been the presentation of partial and ad hoc lists of variables within general categories. Unfortunately, comprehensiveness cannot be achieved in a post hoc fashion; the exhaustive specification of variables and variable areas should precede data collection and analysis.
The inclusion of five components which are derived from the five basic levels of analysis guarantees that no major type of factor will be arbitrarily excluded. As empirical research progresses, it may be possible to delete one or more of the components. Obviously, the addition or deletion of variables within components can also be easily effected. Parsimony is therefore not neglected; but it is crucial at the outset to delineate comprehensively all potentially significant types of variables. The necessary pruning operation can be accomplished through subsequent research and theoretical refinement. The framework thus facilitates the systematic consideration of the "universe" of conceivable internal and external variables and simultaneously permits flexibility in actual research.

The causal and effectual relevance of the components can be highlighted within the context of a discussion of foreign policy source and process analysis. As noted earlier, sources of foreign policy behavior concern generalizations about causal forces or determinants of behavior. A set of independent variables--the five components--is used to explain the dependent variables--external foreign policy. Differences among states constitute an intervening variable cluster. In both theory and empirical research, a frequent focus of inquiry has been the nexus between domestic turmoil or conflict and foreign conflict behavior. An internal predictor variable from one component has thus been posited to be a source of one type of external or interstate behavior. The psychodynamics and preceptions of political elites, bureaucratic interaction and conflict, mass and/or attentive public opinion, and alliance aggregation are among the panoply of factors from different components which could be direct and indirect sources of foreign policy.
Research on the foreign policy process concerns the ad hoc and formal decisional units which respond to an external stimulus. Process analysts reverse the postulated sequence, conceptualizing the independent variables as dependent and positing the external event as the independent variable. An input from another polity becomes the determinant of a state's reaction. Varying external events can affect the rankings of the components which exert impact during the process of formulating a response to the incoming stimulus. Depending on the nature of the policy and state, for example, bureaucratic variables can be expected to become more or less significant as influences on a state's reaction to an external stimulus.

The eventual goal of inquiry is the ranking of variables within components and the determination of the relative causal and effectual explanatory power of each component in the contexts of varying types of states and foreign policies. Weinstein (1972, p. 357) maintains that the variable area approach in foreign policy analysis is insufficient because rankings lack explanatory depth. The key question, he asserts, is the nature of inter-relationships. But the component approach can be employed to determine how variables affect each other; causal configurations can be elucidated after the components have been ranked.

1. The Psychological Component

The individual or psychological component highlights the potential role of the individual actor in foreign policy. Change in leadership, for example, presumably affects foreign policy outputs and responses (Rosen, 1974). Biological factors can also be subsumed under this category (Siegele, 1973). But most research at this level of analysis concerns psychological influences on foreign policy.
The interface between psychology and foreign policy analysis has attracted sporadic attention from researchers. But theoretical and methodological issues and obstacles have proliferated since the simplistic reductionist research and speculation of past decades. Students of foreign policy would readily concur that the psychological variable domain is the most elusive and least amenable to systematic analysis of all categories of factors in foreign policy analysis. Psychological or "idiosyncratic" variables were incorporated into the Keeneau and Brecher frameworks, but in neither case were all relevant individual-level forces considered.

The fundamental problem concerns the relevance of the psychological component for source and process analysis. Is this system of variables simply superfluous? At the foreign policy behavior level of analysis—which is the dependent variable for source analysis and the independent variable for process analysis—depth-psychological intra-individual factors cannot be dismissed. Affective and distorting characteristics of human behavior can impinge on the process of policy formulation; irrational or nonrational factors sometimes influence the search for, selection, and use of data (Costello, 1970, p. 45). Such nonrational influences can be operative when a state generates or reacts to stimuli. Other types of individual-level variables undoubtedly exert even more impact. For example, it has been hypothesized that the beliefs of decision-makers account for more variance than any other single factor (Bonham and Shapiro, 1973, p. 56).

Four "levels" of analysis can be isolated within the psychological component. The first can be referred to as the area of psychodynamic causality. Personality traits—conceived as single factors or as clusters of personal characteristics—comprise the second level of inquiry. Belief systems analysis constitutes the third variable area. Perceptions, infor-
nation processing, and other factors which intervene between events in the real world and the decision-maker's belief system represent the fourth and most proximate level. Figure 3 attempts to elucidate the interrelationships of these psychological variable areas.

The domain of psychodynamic causality is the most remote level of psychological inquiry. While repressed conflicts and other depth-psychological phenomena may not account for an event per se, such influences can affect the style or mode of response. Given the realities of politics and ideology, the conflict between Woodrow Wilson and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge over the League of Nations was undoubtedly "inevitable." But Wilson's inner conflicts and personality needs shaped his uniquely rigid style of response and thereby transformed a serious partisan clash into a bitter and ultimately insoluble personal conflict (George and George, 1964). Idiosyncratic or actor-specific dispositions are thus potentially significant—at least for top level elites who confront the fewest constraints from role and structural parameters—but apply more to the qualitative features of a decision than to the actual content (Kelman and Bloom, 1973, p. 271).

Personality traits or dispositions represent the "intermediate concepts" level of analysis. Such characteristics as nationalism, belief in internal control over events, cognitive complexity, and dogmatism can influence policy outputs (Ierma-NN, 1974). An interesting effort has been made to identify fundamental personality dimensions and formulate predictive hypotheses about probable decision-maker actions and reactions (D'Aunato, 1967).

Research on belief systems entails the charting of an individual decision-maker's (or a decisional unit's) cognitive framework. A belief system is comprised of the actor's set of attitudes, beliefs, and values, a collection of phenomena which is organized into interrelated subsystems (Rokeach, 1968,
1973). Operationalization of the belief system variable area will involve
collection analyses which will be designed to yield belief, attitude, and value
subsystem profiles for foreign policy elites.3

The fourth level of inquiry involves a steep ascent from the domain of
psychodynamics and includes "surface phenomena" such as cognitions and perceptions. Perceptions have frequently been the focus of scrutiny in psycholog-
cal research on foreign policy decision-makers (McClellan and Shapiro, 1973,
pp. 54-60; Binnex, 1972).

As Figure 3 indicates, ego-defensive and other psychodynamic forces
are related to personality traits or dispositions. These traits interact
with such sociological factors as subcultural learning or norms to shape
the decision-maker's belief system. Such personality dispositions as psy-
chological rigidity, authoritarianism, and anachy may be precursors of at
least some attitude and belief components of a belief system (McClelly, 1967). The belief system per se consists of attitude and belief subsystems
(affective dispositions, cognitive-probabilistic propositions, and behavioral
predispositions) and a temporally prior and causally primordial value sub-
ystem. Value rankings and preferences, which structure attitudes and beliefs,
flow from basic personality needs. These needs are intertwined with psycho-
dynamics and personality traits. Decision occasions—which can be attributed
to domestic and/or external inputs—are perceived by the actor or elite unit
and filtered through the belief system. The foreign policy decision to act
or react, the final link in the chain, is a function of the belief system4 and pertinent variables from other components.

It is obvious that the postulated determinative relationship between
"aggressive" or "paranoid" leaders and foreign policy behavior—and other
simplistic inferential leaps which eventually discredited the "interstate political psychology" of previous decades—assigned to some psychic phenomena an exaggerated role as source and process variables. But the impact of elite belief systems and perceptions cannot be neglected. Stimuli are assimilated into belief systems prior to decisional actions and reactions.\(^9\)

2. The Political Component

Research on the internal variables which relate to foreign policy has been prolific. However, distinctions among variable areas are often neglected. For example, Haas (1965) refers to such domestic characteristics as type of government, degree of urbanization, economic development, population density, unemployment, deviant behavior, and domestic conflict. This "lumping together" of diverse phenomena blurs the differences among the internal factors which may be relevant for source or process analysis. The postulation of distinct causal and effectual levels promotes analytical clarity. The merging of political and societal variable clusters is also theoretically indefensible because it then becomes impossible to assess the relative determinative priority of the two levels of analysis.

The political component encompasses factors which are relevant to the political sector of a social system while societal variables, such as national culture and internal stability, function at the "state" or social systemic level of analysis. Figure \(4\) illustrates the impact of three basic variable areas within the political component. Formal institutional factors, linkage mechanisms or domestic pressures, and political system aggregate descriptor variables can all shape action at the political or group level of analysis. Source analysis is concerned with the determinants of action, including political factors and relevant variables from the other components. Process
analysis shifts the focus of attention to external stimuli and their impact on the variable areas within the political component. For example, do certain types of stimuli tend to increase the importance of public opinions?

Formal institutional factors refer to the constellation of policy structures which is officially responsible for the promulgation and implementation of foreign policy actions and reactions. A comprehensive list would include the head of state, ad hoc small groups, formal small groups, deliberative assemblies and parliaments, military, treasury, economic, and intelligence bureaucracies, and internal affairs units (Hermann, et al., 1973, pp. 95-97). Subsidiary realms of inquiry concern formal influences (such as a decision unit's constitutional status in the foreign policy system) vs. informal factors (including bureaucratic politics phenomena and social psychological factors such as group decision-making and risk-taking).

Although it has been assumed that foreign policy behavior, in contrast to the domestic policy process, involves fewer actors and tends to be restricted to a small foreign policy elite, trends such as the pluralization of the policy process, continuing structural differentiation, and the increasing similarity between foreign and domestic policy domains all suggest that a variety of decision units are involved in the processes of formulating and implementing foreign policies. The specification of the relative influence of decision units—both diachronically within systems and across systems—thus emerges as an important research question within the institutional domain of the political component. The same tendencies suggest that institutional interaction and conflict can be significant variables in the foreign policy decision process.
Variables within the institutional complex highlight the formal machinery for generating actions and reactions. A second variable area concerns unofficial or "extrasystemic" factors which can affect foreign policy behavior. Public opinion—conceived broadly as a panoply of factors ranging from mass moods and attitudes to media influences—may be viewed as a cluster of inputs which can influence policy outputs (Luttbeg, 1974, pp. 1-10). Figure 5 presents a framework for the analysis of these input structures or linkage mechanisms. 10

Extensive empirical data on public opinion and foreign policy have been amassed (Berritt, 1972). While simplistic stimulus-response models have been abandoned in the study of public opinion and public policy, perplexing theoretical issues await definitive resolution. Most researchers present evidence which fails to confront the critical questions concerning the actual influence of opinion inputs and the nature of decision-maker perceptions of and attitudes toward public opinion. 11 Furthermore, public opinion is often a response to elite cues and actions and events in the real world (Abravanel and Hughes, 1973, p. 112; Campbell and Cain, 1965; Epstein, 1965; Katz and Fret, 1965, p. 369; Peterson, 1971, p. 30; Rosi, 1965).

A third cluster within the political component consists of political system aggregate descriptor variables. These aggregate variables refer to phenomena which characterize the political system as a unit and vary over time. One specific example is the elite profile variable. Changes in elite attributes, bases of recruitment, and prior experiences may be associated with variations in foreign policy outputs and processes. This variable area has not elicited systematic attention from researchers. Aggregate variables have often been conceptualized as static forces and would therefore be housed
within a classificatory scheme of states. The policy-making institutional complex of a foreign policy system is a static structural variable whereas policy-making performance is a political system aggregate descriptor variable. Potential rate of change distinguishes classificatory dimensions from political component variables.

3. The Societal Component

In his analysis of the three levels of "images" which characterize research and theory on war and peace, Waltz (1959, pp. 34-35) points out that many scholars have traced the source of external conflict to the internal structure and conditions of states. Some of these factors—such as relatively enduring internal political arrangements and varying political processes and performance levels—constitute state type and political component phenomena. But other "internal variables" can be categorized within the societal component.

One major domain within the societal component is national culture, or a society's system of cognitive, affective, evaluative, and conative culture attitudes, beliefs, and values. These predispositions provide the foundation for more overtly political responses and opinions. Relevant research which focuses on the realm of foreign policy includes Wenzel (1971), who scrutinizes such below-the-surface politico-cultural restraints on West German foreign policy as sense of trust and identity. Feierabend and Feierabend (1969) consider the relationship between the level of need achievement and foreign conflict. Subsumed here also is research on religion and other aspects of culture which contribute to the politico-cultural climate or substructure.
Societal aggregate descriptor variables constitute the second variable area. Economic rates may be especially significant as determinants of national actions or reaction. Trend data on inflation, unemployment, balance of payments fluctuations, economic growth, and other economic indicators may exhibit strong relationships with some foreign policy decisions. Marxist and neo-Marxist interpretations about the significance of private economic interests as causal forces in American foreign policy have frequently been offered (Eley and Petersen, 1973, p. 162). It is also important to consider aggregate economic trend data as possible influences on foreign policy outputs and reactions.

The third variable area within the societal component is social structure. Galtung (1969; 1967, pp. 166-171) offers a center-periphery theory of attitude propagation and change which is based on the social structural variable. Census and other aggregate data on status rank dimensions can be combined to yield national social position profiles which can then be related to foreign policy behavior. Do variations in social structural heterogeneity have any impact on foreign policies?

Domestic conflict is the final variable area in the societal component. A variety of factors, ranging from rates of modernization and urbanization to external stresses and fiascos, may be sources of societal unrest and conflict. Static social structural differentiations are by no means the only sources of internal conflict. Internal tension may "spill over" into the sphere of foreign policy, especially if leaders intentionally externalize hostility as a response to internal solidarity problems (Good, 1962, p. 5).

The proposition that internal problems can be "solved" by externalizing conflicts has solid grounding in sociological conflict theory and in anecdotal accounts of the foreign policy process. Quantitative studies have been
conducted in an effort to determine the nature and magnitude of the linkage between domestic and foreign conflict behavior (Rummel, 1969; Wilkenfeld, 1973). In striking contrast to the ad hoc and uneven empirical research in other areas of the comparative study of foreign policy behavior, this sub-field of inquiry has been explored extensively (McCowan and Shapiro, 1973, pp. 79-83).

The societal component is one of five variable clusters. An inspection of the variable realms which have been delineated for this component suggests that societal factors rarely exert a direct impact. A need for security as a societal value does not lead inexorably to external aggressiveness or war but functions as part of the climate or context in which decisions are formulated. A state in which masses and elites attach very low priority to security values can be expected to refrain from "expansionism" unless the situational milieu, external stimuli, and/or the global or regional power distribution create a perceived need for a policy of aggrandizement. Conversely, states in which personal and societal security values are ranked very high (Germany in the 1930's?) will not ipso facto assume bellicose foreign policy postures. But the emphasis on security values does foster a latent predisposition to engage in aggressive behaviors.

4. The Interstate Component

The psychological, political, and societal components are essentially internal in nature. They yield variable areas which may be conceptualized as either independent or dependent within the respective contexts of source and process analyses. The remaining components are external in nature and derive their variable areas from the realities which exist outside--yet are perceived within--the territorial boundaries of sovereign states. With
regard to the construction of the present framework, the two external com-
ponents may be traced to the interstate and global levels of analysis
(see Figure 1). Moreover, the external components may also be conceptualized
as independent and dependent variable clusters. However, while the internal
components are readily reversible within the causal chain, the external ones
are somewhat less manipulatable. Indeed, a number of serious conceptual
issues arise when the postulated causal chain is totally reversed. Such
issues will be addressed as they surface within the appropriate analytical
context.

The external environment of states has long been of general concern
to scholars of interstate politics and foreign policy. In recent years,
the total external environment has received a great deal of analytical atten-
tion (Deutsch, 1966; Rosenau, 1969, 1971); and within the contemporary
context of interstate and global scarcity external environmental realities
are receiving even more attention (Brown, 1974; Einich and Einich, 1974).

Those who have attempted to conceptualize the sources of foreign
policy (and interstate interaction) have identified a number of inter-
state factors which may be categorized as semi-static or dynamic inter-
active realities. In turn, such realities may be conceptualized on the
basis of dimensional characteristics.12

Specifically, semi-static factors include alliance memberships, or
commitments (Singer and Small, 1969), bloc memberships (Zinnes, 1966),
and treaty or long term "friendship" agreements (Weede, 1970; Brzezinski
and Huntington, 1963). A number of analysts have attempted to assess the
impact of alliance commitments. Perhaps surprisingly, the existence of
alliance commitments during the period from 1315 to 1914 accounted for a
good deal of interstate conflict behavior (Small and Singer, 1966; Choucri and North, 1969). In her study of the pre-World War I crisis, Zinnes notes how states perceived to be outside a particular bloc are generally viewed as more threatening than bloc members (Zinnes, 1966, p. 186). Such perceptions might readily function as a source of external conflict behavior. Conversely, Weede (1970, p. 230) notes the stabilizing effect of military treaties, and Wright (1961) notes how political "arrangements" can exert influence upon the process of disarmament. All such variables must thus be included within the interstate component.

Dynamic interactive factors include levels of interstate trade and interstate trade agreements (Chadwick, 1969; Algoz and Broome, 1977; Rummel, 1969). Quite apart from economic structural variables, which will be housed within our classificatory scheme of states, trade levels and agreements refer to factors which may be expected to vary over time. Hence, their classification as dynamic interactive realities. Alliances (Wright, 1961) or pacts constitute additional interactive factors.

Perhaps the most important interactive realities are those which refer to policy inputs. Indeed, there are many analysts who believe that the actions of "other" states constitute perhaps the only real source of interaction. While we are hesitant to imbue policy inputs with such explanatory power prior to the application of our framework, we would certainly concur that policy inputs ought to be viewed as one of the most potent sources of foreign policy behavior.

Research related to the impact of policy inputs has been prolific (Dehio, 1969; Feierabend and Feierabend, 1969; Phillips, 1971, 1973). While much work has focused upon levels of conflict sent and received, many
analysts have defined inputs broadly enough so as to include actions and interactions of all natures (Etzioni, 1968; Jensen, 1965).

As is immediately evident, the natures of many of the semi-static and dynamic factors suggest the involvement of certain values and goals. Alliance activities, for example, may signify a desire for cooperation, while conflict policy inputs obviously suggest hostility. Accordingly, through the observation of interstate interactive realities, it may be possible to categorize factors according to their overall natures. Are interstate economic problems (issues) more potent sources of foreign policy than cultural or territorial ones? Are highly threatening inputs more potent than more routinized ones? Is a regional pact more source suggestive than a supra-regional one? These are only a sampling of the questions which might be answered through the conceptualization of interactive realities according to their overall natures.

Those interested in conducting responsive process analyses face some interesting problems involving the interstate component. Since the occasion for decision is necessarily determined by an external stimuli, there is some question as to how the interstate variables should function. Indeed, since the external stimuli must amount to a policy input into the decision-making system in question, dynamic policy input factors are rendered inoperative during the conduct of responsive decision-making analyses. Naturally, we define policy inputs broadly enough to include policies of all natures. Additionally, it is our intention to classify policy inputs (and outputs) within a multi-dimensional classificatory scheme. In order to conduct responsive process analyses, scholars would thus extract a policy (input) from the scheme, conceptualize it as an independent variable, and attempt to assess its impact upon our array of (dependent) process variables. Ob-
viously, the conduct of process analysis requires that other interstate realities (and variable areas) be regarded as important in so far as they are perceived by decision-makers; indeed, the input itself must be perceived before a response can be formulated. As decision-makers formulate their response, they also perceive an array of global systemic factors.

Summary, the interstate component is comprised of interactive realities which may be conceptualized as semi-static and dynamic. The factors themselves may also be conceptualized according to their dimensional characteristics.

Interstate interactive realities may be conceptualized as independent or dependent variables. As independent variables they are hypothesized as sources of foreign policy behavior, and as dependent variables they are hypothesized as the responsive results of extreme foreign policy behavior. The conduct of process analysis renders the dynamic policy input variable area inoperative in so far as the policy input is conceptualized as an independent variable (extracted from a classificatory scheme of foreign policy events [see Figure 27]).

5. The Global Component

Just as scholars have attempted to examine the role of interstate factors in the study of foreign policy, so too have they attempted to assess the impact of global systemic factors (McGowan and Shapiro, 1973, pp. 161-179; Jones and Singer, pp. 27-33; Newcombe and Newcombe, 1972, pp. 24-62).

Extracted directly from the global level of analysis, global systemic variables generally refer to the aggregate socio-political and physical realities which together constitute the global milieu. The factors or variables themselves may be organized into four general clusters.
The first cluster is comprised of those variables which refer to the attributes of the global system, such as alliance aggregation, power stratification, and systemic turbulence.

Research relevant to systemic attributes is quite well developed. Largely due to the efforts of those associated with the Correlates of War Project, for example, alliance aggregation has become a salient global variable. Indeed, it has been posited that in the nineteenth century alliance aggregation functioned as a stabilizing force within the global system, while in the twentieth the level of aggregation exerted a destabilizing impact (Singer and Small, 1963; Small and Singer, 1955). The notion of systemic turbulence has also been explored (Rosenau, 1971, pp. 1-7-159; Huntington, 1973). While other variables have been conceptualized to indicate systemic turbulence, the level of global conflict remains as the most important intuitive indicator.

Power stratification represents another global systemic attribute. Unlike alliance aggregation and the level of systemic turbulence, variables associated with the global stratification of power have sired a good deal of controversy. As noted in the profusion of competing conceptualizations such as bipolarity and multipolarity, scholars have found it difficult to assess the impact of power stratification upon the behavior of states (see, for example, Deutsch and Singer, 1954; Waltz, 1964; Rosenau, 1966). Nevertheless, we deem it essential to consider all of those variables relating to power distribution and stratification as potentially relevant.

The second variable area or cluster is comprised of factors referring to a state's status rank (and rank discrepancy) within the global system. Indeed, status has been conceptualized as an independent systemic variable giving rise to variations in economic (trade) behavior (Reinert, 1967),
and diplomatic interactions (Russett and Lamb, 1969). In addition, the perception of status rank discrepancy has been conceptualized as a determinant of global violence (East, 1972; Wallace, 1973).

Subsystemic phenomena constitute our third variable area. The work of Bruce Russett is particularly relevant to the specification of this variable domain (1968a, 1968b, 1968c, 1966). To what extent is behavior conditioned by regional or sub-systemic attributes? How might regions and subsystems be accurately identified? In what manner do subsystemic organizations and agreements impinge upon interaction? These are only a few of the questions which our subsystemic cluster will attempt to structure.

The final variable area of the global component is comprised of "textural" variables (Brecher, et al., 1969). Such variables refer to global culture, "rules," and norms—in so far as they may be found to enjoy an efficacious existence. The roles of global organizations and interstate law are thus found within this final variable area.

As with all of the components, the global component may—and indeed should—be utilized for the conduct of both source and process analyses. However, much like those external realities housed within the interstate component, global factors are exceedingly perceptual in nature, especially during the making and implementing of foreign policy decisions. Consequently, during the conduct of process analysis, foreign policy analysts must be careful to regard external global variables as relevant in so far as they are perceived by decision-makers. The conduct of source analysis, fortunately, presents no incorrigible conceptual problems.
Operationalization remains as a task that must be confronted. For some variables, such as domestic conflict, alliance activities, and public opinion data are readily available. But for variables like decision-maker belief systems and national culture, data are both scarce and of varying quality. Existing source material, including media, government documents, and memoirs, can be content analyzed to yield belief system maps for foreign policy officials. Hermann (1974, p. 210), for example, employs the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report in her study of the impact of leader personality on foreign policy behavior; Winham (1970, p. 47) relies on multiple reference sources, including Vital Speeches, Department of State Bulletin, Documents on American Foreign Relations, New York Times, Congressional Record, and testimony before Congressional committees.

Data acquisition is not the sole deterrent to research progress. Another problem is that not all crucial variables can be converted into "hard data." The arbitrary exclusion of such factors would obviously truncate the range of possible generalizations about foreign policy behavior. Quantitative scholars, for example, frequently assert that bureaucratic politics perspectives cannot be transformed into measurable phenomena.

Obviously, then, not all problems of operationalization and data collection have been resolved satisfactorily. At least some new data will have to be generated and existing collections will require revisions. The specification of variable domains and the listing of variables within components is a vital but initial stage in inquiry. Actual foreign policy process and source analyses cannot be attempted until operationalization strategies have been implemented for each of the five components.
B. CLASSIFICATION OF STATES

Critical to the construction of an overarching analytical framework is the development of a salient classificatory scheme of states. R. J. Rummel has emphasized the importance of this endeavor:

Grouping nations, objects, individuals, or cases by type is a basic step in describing phenomena and building science. The virtue of typing is that it enables parsimonious description of objects and facilitates reliable predictions about them based upon their tendency to group. Classification is the process of ordering cases into groups that best represent certain empirically measured relations of contingency, similarity, or both (Quoted in Phillips and Hall, 1970, p. 67).

While work on classification has been recognized as a key operation in the biological sciences for some time, scholars of interstate politics and foreign policy have recently begun to recognize that classification which leads to explanation is essential to the development of empirical theory (Kean and McGowan, 1973, p. 223). The usefulness of the classificatory scheme lies in its ability to aid in the prediction of distinctions in the internal or external behavior of the polities classified (Phillips and Hall, 1970, p. 67).

Most classificatory work in political science has focused upon the type of political structure (see, for example, Blondel, 1972; Almoni and Powell, 1966; Biephart, 1969; Dahl, 1970; Cutright, 1963). The degree of stability of the political system has also been a major concern (Lipset, 1959; Gurr, 1970; Eckstein, 1962). The level of military capability, and the extent to which it strengthens a regime and affects decision-making, has also been viewed as important (Blondel, 1972).

Paralleling these efforts has been a second major thrust. Emanating primarily from the literature of interstate politics, this research has focused on the development of empirically derived classificatory schemes. These efforts, relying heavily upon factor analyses of large sets of cross-national aggregate data, have demonstrated the importance of such
factors as size, economic development, and political structure as overarching classificatory variable clusters (Rummel, 1969, 1972; Russett, 1964, 1967; Sawyer, 1967; Banks and Gregg, 1965).

While classificatory schemes have begun to proliferate in the literature of political science, it is only recently that their importance has been recognized in the analysis of foreign policy. Indeed, James N. Rosenau's pre-theoretical scheme represents one of the few which explicitly deals with foreign policy concerns (1966). Utilization of Rosenau's classificatory variables of size, economic development, and political accountability has been quite extensive (Rosenau and Hoggard, 1974; Rosenau and Ramsey, 1975; Salmore and Hermann, 1969; Moore, 1974; Salmore, 1972; East and Hermann, 1971); and while we have criticized them elsewhere (Andrews, et al., 1975), the Rosenau variables may be viewed as comprising a most instructive classificatory foundation.

Two methodological issues must be addressed in connection with the type of classificatory scheme to be developed here. First, we have already alluded to the important distinction between the structural attributes of a society, on the one hand, and its level of performance in various spheres, on the other. The level of performance, or the degree to which the society is satisfying basic economic, political, and social needs, has been incorporated into the component portion of the framework. Structural characteristics, which pertain primarily to the economic and political system, will be viewed as portions of the scheme of states. Another way of viewing this distinction is to contrast attributes which are relatively stable over time (structural) with factors which are subject to short run fluctuations (performance).

A second issue pertains to the type of index likely to result from classificatory work of this sort. The issue revolves around the relative
utility of nominal versus interval coding, and whether we will then obtain
discrete as opposed to continuous measures. Implicit in the work of
Rosenau, as well as in the efforts of those who have utilized his eight-
fold scheme, is the notion that the dichotomization of classificatory fac-
tors is the most efficient way to deal with this problem. The argument against
this approach is that the dichotomous distinctions are too gross, and that
much useful information is lost as a consequence of their imposition.

The strategy adopted in the present framework is a direct outgrowth
of the use of multiple indicators for the various elements of the classifi-
catory scheme. The logical extension of this strategy is to develop a
scheme based on continuous rather than discrete measures.

The scheme below is premised on the assumption that the attributes of
states which have a direct bearing on foreign policy behavior may be derived
from two major areas: structure and power. The structural dimension is
further subdivided into two areas: governmental and economic.

1. Governmental Structure

There is considerable agreement among scholars of comparative and
interstate politics that type of political structure represents an impor-
tant factor in differentiating among states. In fact, this is perhaps the
only factor emphasized both by those concerned with classifying domestic
systems and by those concerned with classifying foreign policy systems.

The most widely used distinction with regard to governmental structure
involves the extent to which the political system is open or closed (Farrell,
1966; Rosenau, 1966). In this regard, it is important to keep in mind the
very important distinctions among the notions of democratization, political
development, and political stability. Gillespie deals with this distinction
as follows:
In measuring political development we look for such political indicators as the size of the governmental bureaucracy, the proportion of the governmental budget provided for administrative personnel, the number of governmental agencies, the specialization of tasks assigned to governmental employees, and so on. In measuring democracy and democratization, such indicators as the degree of competitiveness in elections and in the legislature, the extent of suffrage, and the degree of censorship are used (Gillespie, 1971, pp. 376-77).

Furthermore, as Gillespie again points out, while there is empirical evidence suggesting that stability is necessary for the maintenance of democracy, it is not necessarily the case that there is a relationship between political stability and democracy (Gillespie, 1971, p. 377).

There has been considerable confusion in the literature over the sorts of distinctions drawn above, as well as over the closely related distinction between structure and performance. Thus, Snow (1970), building upon the work of Banks and Textor (1963), develops a scale of political development which incorporates structural variables, such as the representative character of the regime, freedom of group opposition, type of political leadership, current electoral system, and freedom of the press, as well as performance variables, such as government stability, stability of the party system, and the current status of the legislature and executive. Similarly, Gregg and Banks (1965), in their factor analysis of the Cross-Polity Survey variables, isolate access—which is a structural factor—and differentiation and consensus—which are clearly performance factors.

has all attempted to assess the potency of political structure relative to other societal variables in explaining foreign policy behavior. It is our intention to build upon these efforts by supplementing the open versus closed distinction with a wide range of political structure variables. These would include many of the variables already mentioned above, as well as such indicators as democratic succession, political competition, electoral participation, and political suppression (Flanigan and Fogelman, 1971).

2. Economic Structure

Both the theoretical and empirical literature in foreign policy analysis has identified economic structure—usually in the form of level of economic development—as a key factor in both source and process analysis. The work of Rosenau (1966, 1967), Casanova (1966), "Leary (1969) and Butwell (1969) all attests to the implied impact of economic variables on foreign policy behavior. In addition, empirical work by East (1973), Koen and McGowan (1973), East and Hermann (1974), Salmore and Hermann (1979), and Salmore (1972) identifies economic development as one of several structural factors in foreign policy analysis.

It should be pointed out, however, that this literature has not been exceedingly careful in distinguishing between the structural and performance aspects of an economic factor. In addition, there has been some confusion over the concepts of economic development, modernization, and national development in general. Furthermore, much of the literature fails to deal with the distinction between level of economic development as a question quite apart from the notion of type of economic system, a more politically related concept. Finally, there is a lack of consensus over the general question of what constitutes the most useful indicators of level of economic development.
Concerning this latter point of identifying indicators of economic development, it is once again clear that a multiple indicator strategy should be employed. There is no need to summarize the extensive economic literature on this point (see, for example, Adelman and Morris, 1967), except to point out that in this particular sphere we should experience little difficulty in developing precise operational indicators of our concepts. Furthermore, the existing aggregate data sets, such as the Dimensionality of Nations Project and the World Handbook, contain extensive variable listings.

While it is clear that economic development exerts an important impact on foreign policy behavior, this influence is expected to be quite closely related to the type of interaction in which the state is involved. It is important to differentiate between the state as actor in the global interstate arena and its position within its primary economic system. It can be expected that differentials in level of economic development among members of a regional subsystem will be far less pronounced than they would be cross-nationally, and this will obviously account for important differences in interaction patterns. It is quite likely that cross-national indicators of economic development lose much of their significance when applied on a more restricted regional basis, and vice versa.

3. Power Capability

We employ the term power capability to signify the incorporation of three attributes which have traditionally been considered to be the primary determinants to interstate behavior. This particular aspect of the scheme must incorporate variables from three major areas: size, military capability,
and resources base. As Claude (1962) points out, there has been considerable lack of clarity in the literature concerning the roles which each of these factors plays in the foreign policy process. Clearly, each concerns a different aspect of capability and power potential.

Much of the literature of interstate politics and foreign policy refers to the key importance of a single one of the three factors of size, military capability, and resource base. For example, the Rosenau scheme utilizes size, usually operationalized as population, in combination with level of economic development and political accountability in order to classify foreign policy actors (Rosenau, 1956). In an earlier paper (Andriole, et al., 1975) he rejected size in favor of military capability, arguing that there was evidence of a very strong relationship between the two factors, and that ultimately military capability appeared to be more easily conceptualized as being a part of the foreign policy process. It is now clear that there is enough evidence to support the importance of indexing both factors. Similarly, the importance of resource base as a factor in foreign policy behavior must be emphasized (Sprout and Sprout, 1971). The evolution of the current energy crisis highlights the fact that states that are relatively weak in terms of size and military capability, but which possess a vital natural resource, can play a very profound role in the interstate arena.

The position taken here is that the combination of the three elements of power outlined above will contribute to the development of a very useful classificatory scheme. With regard to operationalization, it appears as though a multiple indicator approach will again be necessary.

It is important to raise a conceptual issue which particularly relevant to military capability. Much of the empirical literature dealing with power
and military capability ignores the notion that the majority of states have power dealings at both the global and regional levels, and as a consequence must develop very different behavior patterns (see, for example, Wallace, 1973; Ferris, 1973; Kean and McCowan, 1973). The present scheme incorporates a dual ranking system in order to deal with this problem, similar to that conceptualized with regard to the level of economic development.

C. CLASSIFICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

The importance which we have attached to the development of a salient classificatory scheme of states is again manifested with regard to our pivotal unit of analysis--foreign policy behavior. Indeed, our framework cannot accommodate comparative analyses unless states and foreign policies are properly classified. Unfortunately, very little has been accomplished regarding the specification of "foreign policy." As a result, it is necessary to proceed slowly, and successively address the issues associated with the definition, conceptualization, and classification of foreign policy.

1. Defining Foreign Policy

Before attempting to classify a phenomena, one should strive to define it. This suggestion is specifically aimed at those who have yet to agree on the meaning of "foreign policy" (Kornmann, 1971; Mecham, 1971; Morse, 1971). While many scholars have attempted to define their unit of analysis, few have done so on the basis of any common orientative or methodological assumptions. Instead, they have all too often defined foreign policy according to "... mental model [of] the distinguishing features of state behavior... on the assumption that the classes defined represent
characteristics which cluster empirically" (Kegley, 1973, p. 8). Accordingly, foreign policies have been defined on the bases of region, design, resources, values, goals, orientations, and motivations, among others (Hermann, 1972; Kegley, 1973).

Other scholars, more attuned to the scope and method of contemporary social science, have chosen to define foreign policy behavior as behavior and as based solely upon "action properties" (Hermann, 1972, p. 61). Such scholars have moved away from simple intuitive labelling and toward defining foreign policy on the basis of more systematic observations.

Definitions of foreign policy based on action properties have been accepted and refined by many social scientific foreign policy analysts. For our purposes, foreign policy may thus be viewed as consisting of those official actions (and reactions) which sovereign states initiate (or receive and subsequently react to) for the purpose of altering or creating a condition (or problem) outside their territorial-sovereign boundaries.

Interestingly enough, many of those who have attempted to define foreign policy have proceeded from the premise that the analytical unit most logically constitutes a dependent variable (see, for example, McClelland, 1970; Burgess, 1970; Rosenau, et al., 1973; Kegley, 1973, pp. 5-7). While it is true that foreign policy may be conceptualized as "output" or external behavior—and as a dependent variable, it is also true that it may be analytically conceptualized as an input and as an independent variable (Andricole, 1974b, pp. 272-286). Indeed, in order to conceptualize the entire scope of foreign policy analysis it is necessary to conceptualize foreign policy as both a dependent and independent variable in an effort to facilitate the conduct of both source and process (decision-making) analyses.
2. Conceptualizing Foreign Policy

Social scientific foreign policy analysts are interested in explaining and predicting foreign policy behavior; and, more importantly, are committed to doing so in a reliable (empirically verifiable) and useful (policy relevant) manner. Hence, the necessity for accurate and operationalizable conceptualizations.

Since our definition of foreign policy is based upon action properties, the term of "action" must occupy our attention. Accordingly, we believe that the term "event" may be posited as a conceptual equivalent of the term "action." While a large number of foreign policy analysts have recently employed the term, it has seldom been handled abstractly or as a concept constructed and specified prior to operationalization and data assembly. As an abstract concept, then, events have been portrayed as objectively differentiated portions of reality (Riker, 1957):

... although reality is continuous, human perception is not. For a variety of reasons we are unable to comprehend the whole of this continuous reality. For one reason, we are temporarily and spatially inside it... and thus we lack an external perspective. For another, more immediate reason, we cannot comprehend because of the complexity of detail that confronts us...

Faced with the complexity of continuous reality, humans understand it by breaking it up into pieces. Although a continuous reality cannot, by definition, consist of discrete motions and actions, we imagine starts and stops. What lies between the starts and stops we call events. Events are motion and action separated out of the continuous reality by the verbal imposition of boundaries (pp. 58-59).

"Faced with the complexity of continuous reality," foreign policy analysts must thus break it up into pieces—or events—which might be more manageable scrutiny.

In order to so scrutinize reality, it is prudent to assume that all events are comprised of a number of qualitative and quantitative attributes which combine to determine their overall natures. Such attributes may be viewed as clustered around six abstract universal dimensions which may be
characterized as (1) spatial; (2) temporal; (3) relational; (4) situational; (5) substantial; and (6) behavioral (Audriole, 1974b, p. 132). The spatial dimension refers to the particular area in which the event is occurring. In the study of foreign policy, the spatial dimension refers to the particular geographical area in which states act and interact. The temporal dimension obviously refers to the time period in which an event (or series of events) is occurring or has occurred. The relational dimension yields attributes which refer to the event's participants. Attributes from this dimension consist of the number of parties involved in the event as well as to their hierarchical order. In the study of foreign policy, relational attributes may be conceptualized with reference to geographical proximity as well as to the actual number of "actors" involved in the event. Such attributes may be depicted as monadic, dyadic, or triadic. Situational attributes refer to the operational context within which a decision must be made. Moreover, they are extremely perceptual in nature. "How much time have I got?" decision-makers often ask, "and how serious is that?" "Were we prepared for this event, or did it take us by surprise?" The answers to such questions are subsumed within the situational dimension. The substantial dimension, like all of the dimensions, is related to those above and below it on the dimensional ladder. Here the relevant attributes refer to the issue-specific content of the event. Is it an economic matter? A political one? An essentially "diplomatic" one? Or, perhaps, a military-security one? Obviously, before scholars can engage in the analyses of events, the attributes arising from this dimension must be specified. The final dimension, the behavioral, gives rise to attributes relating to behavioral characteristics that may be conceptualized along a cooperative-conflictual continuum where behavioral attributes might be identified.
The conceptualization of foreign policy events on the basis of six distinct dimensions is defensible on analytical and operational grounds. Analytically, the recognition of six distinct dimensions assures the delineation of all of the major possible dimensions of an event. Indeed, at this point we find it difficult to conceive of any additional dimensions. Consequently, the utilization of a six-dimensional conceptualization of foreign policy events (to the extent that it can be adequately operationalized) should minimize the distance between reality, measurement, and discovery.

With regard to operationalization, while many analysts have found it convenient to operationalize their conceptualizations of foreign policy events on the basis of "who does what to whom?" (Shapir and O'Leary, 1974, p. 2), foreign policy analysts are now in a position to attempt operationalization on the basis of "who does what to whom, where, when, over what, and in what immediate context?" Stated somewhat differently, analysts are now in a position to operationalize the actions and interactions of states which have occurred during certain time periods, within certain geographical areas and situational contexts, and over certain issues. Obviously, by operationalizing the total action or event, foreign policy analysts might produce comprehensive, comparative, and empirical generalizations about how and why states act and interact.

3. Classifying foreign policy

Our definition and conceptualization of foreign policy enable us to proceed with the construction of a multi-dimensional classificatory scheme. Indeed, had we ignored the requisite tasks of definition and conceptualization, our classification of foreign policy events could not aid us in the development of empirical theory.
Foreign policy events may thus be regarded as comprised of six abstract universal dimensions upon which more concrete attributes may be located. Interestingly, while foreign policy analysts have failed to construct a mutually exclusive, multi-dimensional classificatory scheme of events based upon the exhaustive—and anecdotal—delineation of abstract dimensions, they have implicitly employed some of the dimensions to "code" foreign policy events. Analysts such as Charles A. McClelland and Robert A. Young (1969), Edward Azar (1971), Ralph J. Rummel (1972), and Charles F. Hermann, Stephen A. Salmore, Maurice A. East, and Linda P. Brady (1971) have attempted to construct definitional and "ad hoc" classificatory schemes (Burgess and Lewton, 1972). Unfortunately, however, many such pioneers have failed to proceed from relatively abstract vantage points. Accordingly, whereas Rummel coded behavioral events, he failed to specify them on the basis of the substantial and situational dimensions; whereas McClelland and Young coded events according to the behavioral and spatial ("conflict area") dimensions, they too ignored important substantial and situational attributes; and whereas Hermann, Salmore, East, and Brady are presently coding events on the basis of many dimensions, they are not coding on the basis of an explicit spatial dimension and have violated some very basic temporal assumptions.15

At this stage in our research we are attempting to assess the feasibility (and desirability) of coding foreign policy events on the basis of all six abstract dimensions. Thus far, we have identified a large number of dimensional attributes which are discussed below.16

Spatial dimensional attributes may thus be listed as follows: (1) Africa; (2) East Mediterranean; (3) Eastern Europe; (4) North-Central Asia; (5) East Asia; (6) South Asia; (7) North America; (8) Central America; (9) South America; and (10) Western Europe.
The relational dimension is comprised of attributes referring to the relative position of the entities in action or interaction. This dimension assumes the need for not only locating the general (spatial) area in which the action and/or interaction is occurring, but for locating the more specific action/interaction arena as well. From the policy-maker's point of view, such a distinction is logical in so far as foreign policy behavior (that is, source general determinative and process decision-making behavior) is affected by the relative positions of the involved parties, and, from the analyst's point of view, the distinction supports the assumption that states may be expected to act differently depending on where they are situated in relation to the other acting party (or, parties). Specifically, the relational attributes refer to a number of broad categories signifying whether the parties in action and interaction are in remote or proximate relative positions and to the number of event participants.

The situational dimension has recently received a great deal of attention (Paige, 1968; Hermann, 1969; Hermann, et al., 1972; Brady, 1974). Hence its specification has been made proportionately easier. Since nearly all situational analyses of foreign policy behavior have implicitly or explicitly relied upon the work of Hermann (1969), the construction of the present scheme will also (cumulatively) build upon his understanding of situational variables. Essentially, Hermann suggested that foreign policy events may be categorized along three situational--or contextual--continua: decision time, awareness, and threat. Along the individual continuum, Hermann placed short or extended decision time, anticipation or surprise with regard to awareness, and high or low threat. As is immediately obvious, such variables should not and cannot be ignored by either the decision-maker or the analyst.
The substantial dimension has also received a good deal of attention (Rosanau, 1966; Brecher, et al., 1969; Lentner, 1974; Shapiro and O'Leary, 1974). The present scheme regards the following (substantial) issue areas (attributes) as important from both the policy-maker's and analyst's points of view: (1) military; (2) economic; (3) territorial; (4) scientific; (5) cultural; (6) organizational and (7) legal.

The final dimension is perhaps the most dependent of the six and therefore the easiest to conceptualize. Specifically, the behavioral dimension is comprised of attributes referring to the level of conflict or cooperation which characterizes the aggregate event. Again, many analysts have attempted to so characterize foreign policy events. Charles A. McClelland, for example, conceptualized twenty-two varieties of conflict and cooperation, including such categories as "yield," "promise," "propose," "protest," "demand," "seize," and "force" (McClelland and Young, 1969).

All of the above dimensional attributes have been identified with an eye toward operationalization. Indeed, their identification on the basis of abstract universal dimensions has assured us that operationalization will not be prematurely attempted. Fortunately, there are a number of useful data sets available; and while it may be necessary to re-code a large number of events according to some missing dimensions (and/or attributes), the existing data sets constitute a solid empirical base from which we might proceed. 17

V. CONCLUSION

We have obviously attempted to address a set of complex analytical problems in an ambitious manner; indeed, it may well be that in attempting to resolve a
few conceptual issues we have succeeded in raising a whole host of new and incorrigible ones. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the procedures associated with the delineation of a functional scope of inquiry and the construction of a related analytical framework constitute a sound strategy toward the production and cumulation of reliable foreign policy knowledge.

Having descended directly from the delineated scope of inquiry, the framework itself is designed to fulfill two purposes. First, it is designed to function as an umbrella under which a mass of heretofore disjointed research might be coordinated. Our discussions of components and classificatory schemes have—if nothing else—succeeded in interrelating a great many seemingly unrelated pieces of research.

Second, the framework is designed to function as an agenda for the generation of new research. More to the point, it is our hope that through the application of such a framework the analysis of foreign policy behavior might become a more systematic and fruitful enterprise. Naturally, we are not professing the construct as a finished entity. To the contrary, we have exposed the framework for the purpose of opening the process of its evolution.
FIGURE 1

COMPREHENSIVE FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Levels</th>
<th>Effectual Levels</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Individual</td>
<td>Individual</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Group</td>
<td>Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Composite Group (State)</td>
<td>Composite Group (State)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Inter- and/or Multistate</td>
<td>Inter- and/or Multistate</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Global Systemic</td>
<td>Global Systemic</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
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FIGURE 2
FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR: A PANORAMIC CONCEPTUALIZATION

SOURCE/FUNDING CONCEPTS

1. Psychological Component
   - Psychodynamics
   - Personality Traits
   - Socialization

2. Political Component
   - Political Institutions
   - Internal Institutional Factors
   - External Influence
   - Aggregate Dependent Variables

3. Societal Component
   - Social Culture
   - Social Structure
   - Economic Conflict
   - Aggregate Dependent Variables

4. Inter-State Component
   - Alliance Relationship
   - Trade Agreements
   - Political Contacts

5. Cultural Component
   - Cultural Attributes
   - Protestant
   - Orthodox Christianity
   - Textural Phenomena

CLASSIFICATION OF STATES

- Structural (Economic) Dimensions
- Structural (Governmental) Dimensions
- Power (Capability) Dimensions

CLASSIFICATION OF EVENTS

- Spatial Dimension
- Temporal Dimension
- Relational Dimension
- Situational Dimension
- Substantial Dimension
- Behavioral Dimension

Source Analysis

Process Analysis

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
FIGURE 4

THE POLITICAL COMPONENT AND FOREIGN POLICY SOURCE ANALYSIS*

*The conduct of process analysis would require that the above sequence be reversed.
FIGURE 5
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS: AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK

Sources of Opinions, Belief Systems, Opinion Inputs, Input Structures, Policy Process, System Outputs

Psychological
Sociological
Situational

Attitude and Belief Sub-System
Value Sub-system

Elite Public
Attentive Public
Mass Public

Direct Mass Pressure
Political Party System
Interest Group System
Elections
Media

Public Opinion and other relevant factors

Authoritative Decisions

Elite Anticipation and Shaping of Public Opinion
INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, Rosenau goes on to state that the comparative study of foreign policy may not represent a bona fide field of inquiry, and believes that "it would make matters much easier if a separate field could not be delineated . . ." (1963, p. 310). We disagree with both of Rosenau's assessments and vigorously postulate the necessity and feasibility of identifying a field and functional scope of inquiry.

Those who have addressed the problem include Edwards (1969), Coplin (1971), Lentner (1974), and Ardriole (1974a).

We prefer the term "framework" over references to the construction of "models" in so far as the latter term signifies a much more sophisticated analytical construct. Indeed, the inductive construction of analytical frameworks should precede efforts to more formally structure reality. To the extent that the study of foreign policy has not yet climbed upon an enlightened plateau, our efforts will thus concentrate on the erection of an analytical framework.

Within the causal chain, then, intervening variables logically and literally intervene between the independent and dependent variables. They serve to modify the causality of the question at hand. Moreover, since they are designed to portray a significant aspect of reality, they are very often viewed as integral to the construction of good theory. See Pruitt and Snyder (1969, pp. 1-2) and Kerlinger (1964, pp. 31-50). Thus, if intervening variables were excluded, explanations of political events would necessarily be incomplete. When left unaccounted for, the explanation and/or knowledge produced are often meaningless to the extent that they are not comprehensive. For example, scholars who fail to conceptualize inter-
vening variables might produce propositions referring to how states (in general) generally conduct foreign policy. Obviously, to a foreign policy decision-maker such knowledge would be meaningless. His need would be for propositions referring to how certain states would be likely to conduct foreign policy in certain situations. In order to produce comprehensive and generalizable propositions foreign policy analysts must thus mediate the relationship between determinants and action by conceptualizing an intervening variable cluster comprised of types of states.

Elsewhere we have constructed an analytical framework designed for the conduct of source analysis. While many of the analytical assumptions guiding the construction of that framework have enabled us to construct the present framework, the earlier framework cannot accommodate the conduct of both source and process analyses. See Andriole, Wilkenfeld, and Hopple (1975).

Each of the components will be described below. Space limitations preclude extensive discussions about each variable area; relevant details about the components and the framework under construction are provided in various Interstate Behavior Analysis Project research reports. See Andriole (1975a, 1975b), Wilkenfeld (1975), Hopple (1975a, 1975b, 1975a, 1975b), and Andriole, Wilkenfeld, and Hopple (1975).

For example, a critic could charge that data on belief systems and perceptions of decision-makers are relevant as reflections of political component phenomena (such as the norms of a small ad hoc decisional unit), interstate influences (decision-maker perceptions as reactions to stimulus inputs from another polity), and/or systemic stimuli (exemplified by the research of Hozom, 1972a, b), who hypothesizes that elite perceptions are a function of the national actor’s position in the international system). In any of these or other comparable cases, a decision-maker’s perceptions and
beliefs would not be genuinely independent variables. While Gabennesch (1972) offers a strongly sociological interpretation of the perceptual process and maintains that society is an objective reality (from which—he admits—individuals may select and interpret aspects), instances of selective and differential perception are too frequent to warrant wholehearted acceptance of Gabennesch's perspective. Intra-individual variables cannot be arbitrarily excluded.

Although it may be useful to measure the belief systems of subordinates and lower officials (to generate modal belief-value maps for foreign policy bureaucracies), most of the data collection effort will concentrate on the head of state, the chief foreign policy official, and any other active foreign policy elite participants.

Obviously, the belief system processing phase may generate a decision which is isomorphic with "objective reality." Furthermore, decision-makers vary across the range of such variables as psychological rigidity, dogmatism, and "impermeability" and this affects the propensity for constructing "reality" in an "objective" fashion; Holsti (1962, 1967), describes the rigid belief system of one foreign policy official. During the implementation phase, feedback can indicate the extent to which the belief system has misinterpreted reality. But feedback signals may be misconstrued or ignored.

Figure 5 represents a comprehensive framework for analyzing the nexus between opinion inputs and policy outputs. For foreign policy source or process analysis, the primary concern is with the policy process and system output phases. The other stages, such as sources of belief system components, are obviously more remote. The framework itself is discussed in detail in Hopple (1975a).
Excellent critiques of the existing literature are presented in Rosenau (1961: pp. 10-15) and Cohen (1973, 8-18).

As will become clearer when we develop the classificatory scheme of foreign policy events, during the conduct of both source and process analysis the type of event becomes an extremely important comparative consideration. Thus, policy inputs (events received) need to be specified according to their characteristics (type) just as policy outputs need to be so specified.

It is conceivable that an instrumental dimension—referring to the "how" in the "who does what to whom..." sequence—might be added. On the other hand, instrumental attributes are implicitly assumed within the behavioral and substantial dimensions. Indeed, Corson and McGowan have drawn a thin line between issue-area and "resource area" and "media or action" respectively (Burgess and Lowton, 1972). Consequently, it is possible— and in the interests of parsimony—to avoid the addition of yet another dimension. This, of course, is not to imply that the instrumental dimension has or will be arbitrarily ignored. As data is brought ever closer to bear, all conceptualizations will be scrutinized with reference to "pieces" of the "real world."

We have assumed that classification results from an essentially inductive procedure necessarily based upon the processes of definition and conceptualization. We are thus explicitly antagonistic toward those who would classify phenomena from existing data without regard to prior definition or conceptualization. Moreover, throughout our discussions of classificatory schemes (of states and events) we have consciously distinguished between classificatory schemes and typologies. Thus, where typologies are able to
predict the distinguishing characteristics of each of its "types," a classificatory scheme distinguishes between its types intuitively. When empirical data bear out the existence of the intuitive types, then an empirical typology may be said to exist. Thus, the schemes developed here cannot be evaluated typologically until empirical data is brought to bear (Tiryokian, 1968; Caldwell, 1972; Segré, 1973).

15 By randomly selecting yearly quarters they have—so to speak—painted themselves into an analytical corner. Indeed, it would be impossible to lag the CSCE data or utilize it to conduct trend or forecasting analyses. Accordingly, monitoring techniques would also be impossible to apply.

16 The coding of events on the basis of six dimensions may in fact prove to be impossible and/or undesirable. Nevertheless, we are convinced that it is prudent to at least examine the possibility of thoroughly relating conceptualizations of reality to our techniques of measurement. Accordingly, the list of dimensional attributes is conceptually and methodologically tentative.

17 Events data gathering projects have proliferated in recent years. Consequently, there is a great deal of research from which we might learn. For a review of such projects see Burgess and Lawton (1972).


ANDERSON, W. J. (1975a) "Interstate Realities and the Conduct of Foreign Policy." IIA Project Research Report #5, University of Maryland, January.

______ (1975b) "Global Systemic Variables and the Study of Foreign Policy" IIA Project Research Report #6, University of Maryland, February.


__**INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AS A SITUATIONAL VARIABLE**__


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PART II
VI. PAPERS

Research Reports:


3. Gerald W. Hopple, "Internal Political Variables and the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Framework for Research and Analysis."

4. Gerald W. Hopple, "The Societal Component and the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy."

5. Stephen J. Andriole, "Interstate Realities and the Conduct of Foreign Policy."

6. Stephen J. Andriole, "Global Systemic Variables and the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy."


Working Papers:


2. Gerald W. Hopple, "The Psychological Component and the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: The 'Relative Irrelevance' of Two Types of Sources."

VII. REPORT SUMMARY

A. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

The International Behavior Analysis (IBA) Project has been conceived as a long range research project designed to provide explanatory and predictive insight into the actions and interactions of nations. More specifically, the project has been designed to explain and predict how, when, and why certain nations are likely to act in response to certain sets of internal (domestic) and external (foreign) stimuli.

Since a whole host of analysts have attempted to explain and predict international behavior with little or no real success, it was decided early in the conceptual stage of the IBA Project that an overarching analytical framework be constructed. Such construction was posited as necessary to the organization and integration of the seemingly endless number of factors to be considered in the analysis of international behavior. Additionally, framework construction was posited as a device for the organization of research activities. PART I of this report (especially sections III and IV) has already expounded upon these notions.

Accordingly, the construction and specification of an overarching analytical framework has been retained as the initial and primary task of the IBA Project, and the one with which the principal investigators have been involved under the terms of the present contract (see PART II, section IV).

B. GENERAL METHODOLOGY

Thus far, the principal investigators have been concerned with integrating as much of the professional literature as possible under a single analytical umbrella. The "methodology" has thus been very basic; indeed, the principal investigators have strongly posited the necessity of defining and conceptualizing the phenomena in question before attempting to design sophisticated methodological strategies for the phenomena's explication (see below, section VII-D). We have, however, been cognizant of potential problems involved in the operationalization of portions of the framework, and, indeed, view operationalizability as a criteria which must be met by frameworks of this sort.

C. TECHNICAL RESULTS

Five source variable components (collection of factors relevant to international behavior) have been identified and specified: (1) psychological; (2) political; (3) societal; (4) interstate; and (5) global-systemic (see PART I, section IV-A). They represent collections of factors, or variables, which might give rise to certain types of international behavior; that is, they might function as the sources of international be-
behavior. The same components have been identified for the conduct of decision-making or process analysis. Since nations must respond to certain (internal and/or external) stimuli by deciding precisely what to do, decision-making behavior and analysis may be viewed as distinct from the analysis of the behavior and/or conditions which occasion decision-making. Such (decision-making) behavior occurs when a nation initiates an external action and when a nation must respond to the action of another nation. Distinctions may thus be drawn among the factors or conditions which lead a nation to act, the processes of initiative decision-making, and the processes of responsive decision-making. Logically, then, such distinctions point to three separate instances of analysis, or, to the analysis of international action, reaction, and interaction.

In addition to the identification and specification of five source-process components, the principal investigators have developed two classificatory schemes. The first is designed to capture the differences which exist among nations. More specifically, it provides for the classification of nations on the bases of three general dimensions: (1) governmental structure, (2) economic structure, and (3) power capabilities. The second scheme is designed to capture the differences which exist among international actions, which are classified on the bases of spatial, temporal, relational, situational, substantial, and behavioral dimensions (see PART I, sections IV-B and C).

The source-process variable components and the classificatory schemes of nations and actions were developed to facilitate the analysis of how, why and when certain nations are likely to act, react, and interact within the context of certain actions. In other words, the research which is to follow the construction of the overarching analytical framework will be explicitly comparative.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The remaining months of this contract year will find the principal investigators involved with the delineation of the actual variables which are to comprise the five components. Additionally, the two classificatory schemes will be polished; and all of the work will be conducted with an eye toward the second and third stages (years) of the IBA Project. These stages appear below and correspond to roughly one year of work each.

Primary and Subsidiary Tasks of Year 2:

Operationalization

(1) Operationalized definitions assigned to variable components, and to the classificatory schemes of nations and actions.

(2) Assembly of previously collected data.

(3) Data Collection.
(4) Design and Testing of data handling computer programs.

**Primary and Subsidiary Tasks of Year 3:**

**Analysis**

(1) Cross-national hypothesis testing
(2) Case-study hypothesis testing
(3) Dissemination of results