PHASES OF A CRISIS

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Phases of a Crisis

A turbulent international system is likely to spawn, with increasing frequency, international crises. But the very causes of the system's turbulence render forecasting—which actors are most likely to be involved over what issues and under what circumstances—virtually an impossible task. There is, however, some theoretical justification to expect that while forecasting who, what, where and when may be extremely difficult to predict, it is possible to forecast the likelihood that a given dispute will escalate into a crisis. This is conceivable because conflicts, including crises, go through identifiable phases or stages of development. The expectation is that however short the period or ambiguous the events, a crisis has a buildup phase, a confrontation period and a letdown, or to use McClelland's term, an abatement period. An empirical data base of the differential aspects of these stages, conceived in this study as differential interaction sequences, would contribute substantially to forecasting the likelihood that a given threat situation will evolve into a full-blown crisis.

In CONFLICT AND DEFENSE, Kenneth Boulding says conflicts (viewed in general terms) proceed through definable states. The succession of states of a conflict is not random and therefore regularities exist and are identifiable (Boulding, 1962: 19). The principal problem in conflict management is "catching" conflicts early. With the advantages of hindsight, axial points in a crisis can often be detected. But such diagnostic practices are seldom satisfactory. What is clearly needed is a more complete understanding about the sequential dynamic of a conflict-ridden situation which locates a crisis within a particular stage of development. On the basis of this knowledge, information is then available which anticipates the most likely trajectory of the crisis in the future.

interest here is the interaction sequence that distinguishes the pre-confrontation, or buildup phase.

A review of the crisis literature singles out Bloomfield's CASCOM (Computer-Aided System for Handling Information on Local Conflicts) as illustrative of a phase type model of conflicts. CASCOM rests on five basic premises: (1) conflicts have a common structure and are not always unique or random, (2) conflicts always go through the "dispute phase" and one or more of the other phases, (3) each phase has distinguishable factors some of which escalate the conflict while others tend to subdue it, (4) changes in these factors affect the likelihood of the conflict moving from one phase to the other, and (5) the trajectory of a local conflict can be changed by policies designed to minimize and/or offset violence promoting factors.

Bloomfield and his associates conceived all local conflicts as stemming from some substantive dispute. The issue may vary, but the principal feature of the conflict's first phase is the fact that the dispute is not conceived in military terms by any of the antagonists. Consequently, this dispute phase is distinguished by its non-military character. An escalatory threshold is breached when the military option is introduced into the dispute. The second phase, the pre-hostilities stage, represents a transition from the dispute stage where antagonists see the military option as more likely and more appropriate in the resolution of the dispute. It does not mean, however, that violence has actually occurred. Another phase threshold is violated when military force is actually used. The use of violence in the hostility stage is systematic, it generally engulfs more participants, larger geographic area, greater volatility and escalatory potential. The post-hostilities, or fourth phase, commences when military violence ceases, and is followed by the final stage which occurs when the dispute is no longer perceived in military terms by the respective parties.
Figure 1. below, depicts the i.i.t. model.

**Phase I** Dispute, pre-hostilities, pre-military

**Phase II** Pre-hostilities, but seen in military terms

**Phase III** Hostilities

**Phase IV** Termination of hostilities, but military option remaining

**Phase V** Post-conflict, but dispute remaining

**S** Settlement of dispute

CASCOM's design is supposedly fashioned after the needs of foreign policy planners in crises. Bloomfield and his associates are disquieted by the low ebb of crisis management policy planning in the U.S. government. This condition can be attributed to the scant level of knowledge about crisis dynamics as well as the standard bureaucratic inertia and games arguments. To alleviate some of the knowledge problems, CASCOM incorporates the idea that information should be available to policy planners to compare current crises with previous situations to find policy-relevant similarities, or dissimilarities. Comparable information, organized according to the phases of a conflict, easily retrieved, and policy-relevant are intermediate features in CASCOM design.

One way CASCOM achieves its policy relevance is by focusing on the control measures adopted by different parties during different phases of the conflict. Conflict control, a concept very similar to the coping concept in this study, is used to answer the question, "what would one do if the objective were to minimize international violence?" (Bloomfield and Beattie, 1971: 36). The
objectives for control vary depending on the phase of the crisis. Throughout all phases, but particularly during the dispute phase, control measures intended to eradicate the underlying causes are repeatedly employed. During the pre-hostilities phase, control measures are implemented to prevent the use of coercive diplomacy and/or to restrict the scope of potential hostilities. After violence has erupted, control measures are initiated to moderate or terminate the violence. During the fourth phase, when open hostilities have ceased, measures are embraced to prevent the resumption of coercion. Once the conflict has de-escalated to the dispute phase once again, strategies are adopted to resolve the dispute and to avoid any further re-escalation. In CONTROLLING SMALL WARS, Bloomfield and Leiss (1969) show for selected local conflicts, which factors in different phases are operative, which control measures are used to offset escalatory factors, and which to reinforce conflict minimizing forces.

CASCON is representative of the phase-type models of crisis development, but Herman Kahn's ON ESCALATION (1965) is probably the best known phase model. Kahn makes no pretext to having a general theory of conflict, but the model is based on a fundamental conceptualization of escalation. Kahn holds "... the tactics and strategy of escalation are, to some degree, the tactics and strategy of negotiation and persuasion in a context of coercion" (Kahn, 1965: 246). Kahn offers a "ladder" of escalation as a means of facilitating thinking about emerging conflicts. Movement up the escalatory ladder comes as thresholds are breached. Rungs on the escalation ladder are linearly arranged and refer to increasing levels of conflict intensity. Specific crises are not thought to follow rigidly from one rung of the ladder to the next. What is important in Kahn's mind is the region of conflict intensity depicted by each rung and the dynamics of moving from one level to the next. The ladder is clearly not a theory of international relations, but as Kahn says, it "may be used to set a context for the discussion of escalations in terms of regions of the ladder, steps up and down the ladder, rungs of the ladder, and so forth" (Kahn, 1965: 38).

The upper reaches of the ladder include such rungs as "Spasm or Insensate War", "Civilian Devastation Attack", or "Slow-Motion Countercity War" are inappropriate in the present context. The rungs of the ladder delineating the conflict regions of a traditional crisis are however, germane; they include:
(Nuclear War Is Unthinkable Threshold)

9. Dramatic Military Confrontations
8. Harassing Acts of Violence
7. "Legal" Harassment—Retortions "Traditional Crises"
6. Significant Mobilization
5. Show of Force
4. Hardening of Positions—Confrontation of Hills (Don't Rock the Boat Threshold)
3. Solemn and Formal Declarations
2. Political, Economic, and Diplomatic "Subcrisis Maneuvering"
1. Ostensible Crisis

At the subcrisis level, all the "sounds" of a real crisis are made, but this maneuvering, though not without some justification, is artificial, meaning it is not quite credible. In the second conflict region, acts are taken by the parties to inflict discomfort and inconvenience on another. These acts are perceived, and accurately so, as threatening by the respective parties. According to Kahn the objectives are to punish, pressure and convey information to the opposing party.

The traditional crisis region involves new stresses. Positions are hardened, demonstrations and displays of force are more frequent, acts of violence are common and opposing nations are brought "eyeball to eyeball" in tests of will, nerve, commitment, and resolve. Despite this, national decision makers are apprehensive about taking too dramatic a step in this period for fear of escalating the conflict to an unmanageable level, meaning a nuclear one. "There is, therefore, a tendency not to let even a low-level crisis start—a constraint not to rock the nuclear boat" (Kahn, 1965: 42).

Elsewhere, Kahn along with Anthony Weiner, argue that crises frequently have the following characteristics.

1. Events often converge to cause a high degree of complexity.
2. Time pressures increase.
3. Adequacy of information seems to decrease.
4. Uncertainties seem to increase.
5. Instrumental control is decreased.
6. Decision-makers are under extreme personal stress.
7. Internal decision and bargaining relations change.

Kahn, following the guidelines established by these characteristics and the traditional crisis rungs, analyzes the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962. The examination is cursory and restricted, but it does suggest the applicability of Kahn's regions of conflict and movement up and down the ladder of escalation.

Quincy Wright (1965) has suggested a comparatively simpler four stage model of conflict. The first stage is where the parties become aware of certain key inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are followed by a period of rising tensions and difficulties. Tensions produced in the second phase of the conflict give rise to pressures just short of military force to mediate the tensions and inconsistencies typifying the third period. The final stage of the conflict is encountered when the military is used to intervene and war develops.

Quincy Wright takes a different tack to the threshold issue; he emphasizes a perceptual basis for moving from one state to the next. His factors include: (1) a willingness to escalate, (2) the importance of the perceived national interests in jeopardy by the conflict, (3) the perception of available armed forces, (4) the perception of the cost of an outbreak of hostilities, (5) the perception of world opinion, and (6) the perception of vulnerabilities to destruction. Each of these factors functions as a threshold in Wright's model. Their operation is so obvious it hardly bears developing, but by way of an example, it could be hypothesized that: the greater the willingness to escalate to eliminate the inconsistencies, then the more likely the conflict will breach a threshold and move to a new level of intensity.

Wright's inclusion of these perceptual or judgmental factors is an interesting acceptance of Richard Lazarus' point that threats exist when an evaluation is made of a situation to the effect that a future state of undesirability is implied. "The appraisal of threat is not a simple perception of the elements of the situation, but a judgment, an inference in which the data are assimilated to a constellation of ideas and expectations. If you change this background of cognition, the same situation will now have a very different significance, perhaps no longer signaling harm to the individual" (Lazarus, 1966: 44). Cognitive appraisal of an interaction sequence is an
important component in coping with threat situations. More will be made of this point later, but one of the basic premises of the approach to international crises espoused here, is that the cognitive appraisal by national policy elites of an international dispute is a vital intervening variable in the escalation dynamic. Actions will be taken on the basis of these appraisals. Coping strategies endeavoring to deal with inter-state stresses will be adopted, in the main, consistent with the view policy elites have of the future (Kelly, 1959: 46). This anticipation of the future, based on inferences taken directly from observable events occurring at the present, gives a threat situation one element of its dynamic, emergent potential.

It is a fairly common tendency among scholars to view a crisis in three essential stages: an initial buildup stage, the peak stage, and the resolution stage. Schwartz's view of a crisis takes this form (1972: 171, 172). The initial period is earmarked by a distinct deviation in pre-existent patterns of behavior, tensions, commitments, or whatever else has a known, pre-established norm. The normalcy idea has been successfully tested in a number of recent empirical studies the first of which were conducted by McClelland and others in the Taiwan Straits Crisis study (1967) and followed up during the World Event/Interaction Survey project, and again later by others in the event-data movement (Hoggard, 1970a; 1970b; Tomlinson, 1971; McClelland, 1968; Azar and Koehler, 1972; Azar, 1972). The peak period contains the major strategic moves in the conflict. Political, diplomatic and economic stresses are most acute in this phase thereby demanding policy decisions which will turn the conflict one way or toward the other, that is toward escalation or resolution. The resolution-of-crisis embodies decisions which establish new behavioral norms, new alignments, or commitments. Schwartz's model is highly influenced by his acceptance of a crisis classification where (1) the quality and quantity of committed military and political capability, and (2) the immediacy of the crisis confrontation are the strategically-relevant information for decision makers. Crisis management strategies implemented by national policy elites are primarily designed to influence the behavior and attitudes of enemy foreign policy-makers (Schwartz, 1967: 470, 473).

From a sample of crises Schwartz uses to test the variations of the decision making behavior in simulated and historical cases, it is noted that the initiation, peak and resolution stages are restricted to a few days.
Table 1. THE SAMPLE OF CRISSES STUDIED BY HISTORICAL-ANALYTIC METHODS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Peak</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>June 24-25</td>
<td>June 26-29</td>
<td>June 30-July 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Oct 29-Nov 3</td>
<td>Nov 4-6</td>
<td>Nov 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quemoy</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Aug 29-31</td>
<td>Sept 1-7</td>
<td>Sept 28-Oct 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Feb-June</td>
<td>July-Sept</td>
<td>Oct-Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonkin</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Aug 8-9</td>
<td>Aug 4</td>
<td>Aug 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This table is taken from Schwartz, 1972: 172.

It is not clear whether these phases would be longer in other crises not included in Schwartz's sample. Certainly other analysts would allow for this possibility. Schwartz's analysis does proceed from an interaction point of view where the crisis is a critical turning point in a conflict between parties. This view does not dictate the position that each phase duration be restricted to a few days, but it does appear to be germane to Schwartz's approach.

Glen Snyder (1972) proposes yet another stage model of crises which is somewhat more detailed than the one advanced by David Schwartz. The elements of crisis bargaining capture most of Snyder's attention but he does present an interesting developmental view of crises.

An international crisis, Snyder contends, is "international politics in microcosm" (1972: 217). As such they contain all of the dynamic elements of international politics which normally undergird the periods of quiet diplomacy, but are hyperextended in a crisis. A crisis is, therefore, a "concentrated distillation" of the elements that are normally at work in foreign affairs. Definitionally, Snyder views a crisis as a "transitional zone" between peace and war. Crisis behavior is a mixture of both peacetime diplomacy and coercion, and it is this mixture that makes a crisis so fascinating to study.

From this vantage, it is useful, Snyder explains, to view crises from a stage model. The pre-crisis stage, growing out of a background of peacetime politics, involves an activation of a conflict. The pre-crisis gains momentum because at least one party in the system is discontent with conditions as they stand and expresses, or at least
intimates, a willingness to alter the status quo. This expression of dissatisfaction is met with resistance by the targets toward whom it is directed and an exchange of demands, warnings, accusations, all fairly mild of course, follows. As yet violence, and certainly war are essentially inappropriate and unused policy alternatives. If unresolved, the pre-crisis phase is followed by a "challenge" by one party which is resisted by the opposition resulting in a substantial increase in the possibility of war breaking out. The challenge may be verbal behavior or it may involve some display or show of force. A period of direct confrontation evolves as a consequence of this challenge. Coercive diplomacy, increasing tensions, solidification and hardening of positions, and efforts to gain control of the situation are inherent in the confrontation stage. From this point a transition to war, a further escalation of the situation can occur or the crisis situation can deescalate into a negotiation phase. It may even follow that some limited form of war will break out quickly followed by a negotiation period. Unquestionably the result of any one of the phases will modify the participants' perceptions which in turn will affect the nature of the new peacetime conditions once achieved.

Snyder acknowledges that this stage model is somewhat of an ideal type. Even a cursory examination of historical cases reveals that crises have great variability and diversity. He feels, therefore, that whatever empirical similarities there may be, will, of necessity, be rather general. This stage model is useful to Snyder as a scaffolding whereupon the bargaining process can be draped. In conclusion, Snyder remarks,

We have, in a sense, come around full circle from our opening remarks which emphasized that an international crisis is "international politics distilled," and bottled in a small container of time. Of course, such factors such as time pressure, urgency of decision, and momentousness of possible outcomes lend special characteristics to crises which are not found in "ordinary" diplomacy. It is still valid to say, however, that crises tend to galvanize, concentrate, and bring out in high relief most of the central forces and elements in international politics, revealing their relationships in their starkest and most explicit forms. The dilemmas of crisis management--the use of coercive power while avoiding excessive costs and risks, accommodating to the interests of other states at minimum
sacrifice to one's own interests-- are also the central dilemmas of "statesmanship" in general (Snyder, 1972: 255).

Russett has also been attracted to the "causes" of war problem generally and the evolution of conflicts specifically. The well-known tailor from Yale uses an automobile accident accounting scheme to explain the origin of World War I. Russett rejects the "war guilt" thesis and accepts Sydney Bradshaw Fay's accidental cause interpretation of the war's source (Fay, 1928). Fay argued that the Central Powers in Europe never intended for war to erupt nor did they realize how close to the brink they had come until it was too late. Russett adopts this argument as his central assumption. The major powers did not deliberately want general war in much the same way that the driver of a car does not purposely collide with a truck. Russett observes "... the war or accident arises because of numerous acts of commission and of neglect, acts whose probable consequences were not foreseen at the time" (Russett, 1962: 4). The surprise dimension in Russett's accident accounting scheme, comes when the negative consequences of inadvertent behavior suddenly become unavoidable. Unless "accidental causes" are present then Russett's model is inapplicable. To accommodate the demands of his accounting scheme, four elements are chosen: Cause (remote, mediate, and direct); Key Event, Point of Surprise; and, Point of No Escape. These are not overly precise concepts as Russett himself recognizes. Cause refers to those factors without which there is an "overwhelming probability" that war would not have resulted. Remote cause are conditions which make possible the chain of events leading to the hostilities. Mediate causes are acts that (1) precede the outbreak of violence, (2) lead quickly to surprise, and (3) follow the surprise increasing the situation's general deterioration. Direct causes are actions taken by the parties to the dispute which come before the key event. A key event is the declaration or the actual outbreak of general war. Russett allows for the prospects of the "phony war", like the 1939-1940 example, so he reserves the key event to the actual outbreak of violence. The point of surprise is an awareness factor; it becomes operative when policy makers realize that the inevitable state of war is upon them. When war can no longer be prevented and nothing the parties can do will forestall the inevitability of a sustained conflict, then the point of no escape has been broached.

Russett is satisfied that the model is capable of
filtering out those actions which, had they been averted, could possibly have avoided general war. Russett proceeds to suggest what might have been done to avert this accidental war.

Theodore Abel (1941) advanced a four-phase scheme to crisis maturation. Abel takes the general position that all social phenomenon are the products of developmental processes. There are many contributory factors and causes are extremely difficult to pinpoint. Abel draws a parallel between the study of war and criminality where it was learned that individuals become criminals not because of some general causes or even multiple causes combining together. Criminologists focus, therefore, on process analysis rather than causal analysis per se.

Abel advocates a similar approach to the study of war. "If, instead of the vain search for causes, we turn to a study of the pattern according to which a war situation develops, the element of decision will be found to be an integral part of the war process" (Abel, 1941: 853). Abel has really two points: first that the element of decision will never surface significantly so long as the search is for the generalized causes of war, and secondly, searching for behavioral patterns is a more suitable design procedure in the study of social phenomena, than quantitative tests for causal laws is.

Abel's four phases are: (1) the appearance of a problem, (2) a give-and-take period, (3) issue intensification and crisis development, and (4) the climax. Problem awareness in the first phase usually takes the form of a "threat to power."

Generally speaking, the events which are interpreted by a group as a threat to its power are precipitated by adverse changes in existing relationships, or changes in the relative position of groups which make it increasingly difficult for the dominant group to maintain its power. A conflict situation arises when the resistance of another group creates an obstacle to the intention of eliminating the threat to power" (Abel, 1941: 854).

The give and take phase arrests the attention of the parties on one another's behavior. Here the interactive interplay of their behavior gives the crisis its internal dynamic. The next phase tends to highlight and focus the issue while limiting the range of policy alternatives. Under these
conditions a distinct crisis occurs. The crisis' climax begins when negotiations fail to resolve the conflict and other forms of coercive diplomacy prove inadequate. What is important about Abel's model is that it identifies these stages years before the hostilities ever begin. In this sense the phases are longer than what is generally understood to be the case in the other phase models. Nevertheless Abel's ideas about the importance of patterns, processes, decisions and the four stages could, it seems, be applied to crises as well as more general conflicts.

Another valuable contribution to the idea of phases is Morton Deutsch's work on productive conflicts. In his Kurt Lewin Memorial Address before the American Psychological Association in 1968, Professor Deutsch laid out an extensive discussion of both productive and destructive conflicts. Deutsch applies a phase scheme only to productive conflicts, but it can be readily fitted to destructive conflicts since Deutsch views them as nothing more than deviant cases of constructive processes.

Deutsch is satisfied that conflicts are not intrinsically destructive, a view held by many conflict theorists including most notably Lewis Coser (1956). What interests Deutsch most is the question whether there are distinguishable processes which result in constructive outcomes as opposed to destructive ones? Are deadly, destructive processes substantially different in character from promotive conflict processes? After reviewing various authors and to answer this question Deutsch offers the following overlapping conflict sequence.

1. An initial period which leads to the experiencing and recognition of a problem which is sufficiently arousing to motivate efforts to solve it.

2. Second, a period of concentrated effort to solve the problem through routine, readily available, or habitual actions.

3. Then, with the failure of customary processes to solve the problem, there is an experience of frustration, tension, and discomfort which leads to a temporary withdrawal from the problem.

4. During this incubation period of withdrawal and distancing from the problem it is perceived from a different perspective and is reformulated in a way which permits new orientations to a solution to emerge.
5. Next, a tentative solution appears in a moment of insight often accompanied by a sense of exhilaration.

6. Then, the solution is elaborated and detailed and tested against reality. And

7. Finally, the solution is communicated to relevant audiences.

There are three key psychological elements in this process:

1. the arousal of an appropriate level of motivation to solve the problem;

2. the development of the conditions which permit the reformulation of the problem once an impasse has been reached; and,

3. the concurrent availability of diverse ideas which can be flexibly combined to novel and varied patterns (Deutsch, 1969:20-21).

These phases can be summarized as the problem identification phase, the routine response phase, the failure-withdraw phase, the incubation phase and the solution phase. The scheme is evidently influenced strongly by Deutsch's underlying assumption that mutually cooperative orientations are the most likely strategies to resolve the conflict. It is quite often the case that parties to a conflict do not have "mutually cooperative" perspectives. One party to the conflict may recognize a conflict and work to resolve it while the opposing party is content with conditions as they are. Or if both recognize the problem, they may take conflicting resolution strategies. Deutsch suggests, and much of his empirical research confirms, that when discontinuities exist in the parties' orientations, a change toward mutuality will occur (Deutsch, 1949a; 1949b; 1958; 1960; Deutsch and others, 1967).

Russett, Abel and Deutsch have all had an influence on L. L. Farrar's approach to the "metamorphosis" of a crisis. Farrar offers his phase model of six level sequences as being less abstract, capable of handling accidental and intential conflicts, constructive and destructive disputes, and focusing more on the behavioral factors and less on the psychological factors than the other models. Farrar maintains that his phases are more distinct and the
conflicts unfold in a more decisive order. He tests his levels against 13 cases which seem to satisfy him that the model warrants "somewhat broader conclusions." The six phases are: the background, the incident/incubation, the confrontation, the negotiation/mediation, resolution and the epilogue/aftermath phases.

The background stage can vary in length and it is extremely difficult to pinpoint exactly when it begins. Farrar limits its duration to a few years, at the most a decade. Though he adopts a short term background because it seems more applicable to the metamorphosis of a crisis as opposed to a more general conflict. The incident/incubation stage begins either with a decisive incident or when the plan for confrontation commences. Farrar allows for the accidental or deliberate initiation of a crisis in this stage. The confrontation stage of the crisis starts when the planning is implemented, or when an incident provokes a crisis between parties. There can be no crisis unless antagonists actually confront one another. Once negotiations begin, however, the confrontation ends. The negotiation/mediation state begins when efforts are launched to resolve the basic dispute. This period may take the form of direct negotiations, mediation by third parties, by arbitration or intervention by a third party. The stage ends when discussions fail and the crisis escalates or when they succeed and the issue is resolved peacefully. The resolution stage begins when (1) grounds are established for settling the issue by means of an agreement, (2) recognition that no agreement is possible and the issue is postponed; or in the case of a violent crisis, (3) settlement is not possible and at least one of the parties decides the issue requires violence. The resolution stage applies to the crisis, but not necessarily the underlying dispute. It is just as difficult to determine offences when a crisis ends as it is fixing a starting point. The epilogue of a crisis involves a reduction of tensions.

The purpose of this paper has been to review those authors who have (1) maintained that crises, like conflicts in general, pass through distinct, recognizable phases, (2) labelled and described those phases, (3) proposed the sequential order, if one could be proposed, for each phase, and (4) specified the nature of thresholds which if breached cause a transition from one step-function to the next. The CASCON model suffers because the violence threshold is too rigid. Violence can erupt quickly, and then subside without ever really changing the character of the dispute. In other words violence is introduced early but not sustained and to view the crisis as being in the pre-hostilities phase is
neither functional for analytical or policy purposes. Farrar's model suffers from a different form of rigidity. He supposes that it is sufficient to argue that his stages follow a regular sequence. There is, however, nothing in his empirical analysis which confirms this contention. Russett's model, on the other hand, is too restricted to accidental conflicts; it is simply not general enough to really be helpful. It has a bias against purposeful violence. Another major weakness is that its terms and their definitions are so imprecise that reliability would be very difficult to achieve. Aside from Deutsch's sequences few of the phase models handle overlapping sequences very well. And except for Kahn's notion of activities within region's of conflict, few of the models allow for behavioral variability.

The conclusion is that though scholars have advanced the notion that conflicts proceed through identifiable phases and some schemes have been present; no phase model could be used to locate a crisis in a given phase of development and on the basis of that knowledge, provide a probability estimate of its proceeding to the next phase. These two tasks are as yet unfulfilled by any of the models.
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