SHEIK'S WAR AND PEOPLE'S WAR. DIFFERENT PLAYING FIELD, SAME RULE BOOK

Hubert W. Lacquement

Army War College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania

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Item 20 continued.

Completely. Offensive battles and defensive battles fought using each man's doctrine are outlined and compared.

Both Mao and Lawrence maintained that, given proper conditions, the guerrilla was unbeatable. Study of guerrilla masters like Lawrence and Mao is essential to learn how these conditions can be fostered or prevented.
USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Essay)

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S.W.E.K.'S WAR AND PEOPLE'S WAR
DIFFERENT PLAYING FIELD, SAME RULE BOOK

by

Colonel Hubert W. Lacquement
Ordnance Corps

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
15 October 1974

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
T. E. Lawrence and Mao Tse Tung are two of the masters of modern guerrilla warfare. The writings of each man and descriptions of their campaigns were studied to derive the principles upon which they based their strategic decisions. Comparison of these principles revealed many similarities and only one major difference: Lawrence taught that pitched battles should be avoided while Mao preached the need to encircle and annihilate enemy forces completely. Offensive battles and defensive battles fought using each man's doctrine are outlined and compared.

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T. E. Lawrence and Mao Tse Tung were two of the most successful guerrilla leaders of the 20th century.

Oxford-educated Lawrence was a brilliant archeologist determined to assist the Arabs to regain their independence from Turkey and restore some of the former glories of Arab culture. The intense loyalty of his Arab irregular troops was a product of his dynamic leadership, his strong emotional appeal to Arab nationalism, and his skillful disbursement of some three and a half million dollars in British gold.

Mao, the well-educated oldest son of a middle class peasant family, was an intense nationalist, bent on remaking Chinese society and rescuing China from internal weakness and foreign exploitation. He raised and led troops carefully indoctrinated with his own philosophy, first against the forces of Chiang Kai-shek, and later against the Japanese.

Lawrence developed his concepts leading camel-mounted tribesmen in the desert, using his forces to fix in place a large and extended Turkish force. Mao developed his ideas while operating in the mountains of Kiangsi province, concentrating on developing a strong political base among the local peasantry and on avoiding destruction by the vastly superior encircling forces of Chiang Kai-shek's army.

It would seem unlikely that two such very different men, both highly original thinkers, operating under such very different
conditions, would evolve similar strategic doctrines. The purpose of this essay is to briefly describe the conditions each man faced, analyze the doctrines each developed, compare what they said and then, very briefly, look at how each put his theories into practice.

THE ARAB REVOLT

Before the outbreak of WWI, the British and Turkish Empires met at the Suez Canal. When Turkey sided with Germany shortly after the war began, the British immediately began to plan military operations to eliminate the Turkish threat to the canal, Britain's lifeline to her possessions in the Far East.

In 1914 the Arab subjects of the Ottoman Empire had only recently begun to chafe under Turkish rule. The rise to power of the "Young Turk" movement in 1909 was accompanied by a strong emphasis on the supremacy of the Turkish race and language over all others and a strong anti-religious policy, both of which were very offensive to the Arabic-speaking people who made up half of the Ottoman Empire. Violent repression of Arab dissent by the Turkish military governor of Syria in 1915 and 1916 solidified Arab opposition to continuation of Turkish rule. In June, 1916, Sherif Hussein of Mecca, nominally the religious leader of all Islam, finally raised the flag of Arab rebellion in the Hejaz, the province occupying the northwest edge of the Arabian peninsula.

Seeing the value of an Arab rebellion in distracting Turkish forces, the British quickly moved to provide advisors and equipment
to Sherif Hussein. Among the advisors was a young staff captain named T. E. Lawrence, who had engineered his escape from a staff job in Egypt because of his burning desire to play a part in winning Arab freedom.

Turkish forces in Arabia were supplied almost exclusively by the Medina railway (See Map 1). When Lawrence joined the revolt, the Turks were concentrating in Medina for an assault on the holy city of Mecca, from which they had been driven in the first days of the rebellion. The Turkish Army was relatively modern, well trained and equipped with machine guns, artillery, and eventually a few aircraft. Its weaknesses were its total logistic dependency upon the Medina railway, its relative lack of mobility (when compared to camel-mounted Arab irregulars) and the hostility of the Arab population.

The Arab forces were composed mainly of tribal warriors, who came and went as the mood seized them. They had little formal organization and few weapons heavier than rifles. Their camels gave them great mobility in the desert, and their extensive experience in hit and run raids against other tribes made them masters of guerrilla tactics.

Lawrence joined the Arab forces after their initial successes had turned to failure in futile and expensive assault against the Turkish trenches defending Medina. Lawrence felt Hussein could never pull together the Arab Empire that Lawrence wanted to see governing all the Arabic-speaking lands of the Middle East, but
decided that one of his sons, Feisal, in command of one third of the Arab forces, had the necessary leadership ability. Having made this decision, Lawrence proceeded to get himself assigned as Feisal's advisor.

Although senior British advisors supported the Arab plan to attack the Turks in Medina, their most strongly held position, Lawrence decided that this would be playing Arab weakness in regular warfare against Turkish strength. He saw that by interdiction of the Medina railway the Arabs could keep the Turkish forces in Medina too weak to make trouble, while the political desirability of maintaining control of the second holiest city in Islam would keep the Turks from withdrawing the Medina garrison of some 15,000 men to reinforce the Turkish forces facing the British in Palestine. He was able to convince Feisal to adopt this course of action, and to move his base northward, first to Yenbo and then to Akaba, where he could receive better logistic support from the British Navy and operate more effectively in raids against several hundred miles of the Medina railway. After the move to Akaba the Arab forces under Feisal acted as the right wing of the British Army in Palestine, tying down nearly 25,000 Turkish troops east of the Jordan. They were such an effective distraction that they even persuaded Liman von Sanders, the German general commanding Turkish forces, to send the Turkish Army threatened by the Arabs substantial reinforcements from the Palestine front only two days before the British launched their decisive September 1918 offensive there.
Lawrence wrote a great deal about his experiences in Arabia and Syria, and discussed his tactics intensively, but he never explicitly enumerated the strategic principles he followed. The following listing is derived from my studies of his writings and the analyses of other students of his methods:⑨,⑩,⑪

**PRINCIPLES OF LAWRENCE'S GUERRILLA STRATEGY**

1. **Propaganda.** Gain support of the local populace, erode enemy morale. ⑫,⑬,⑭ "The printing press is the greatest weapon in the inventory of the modern commander.",⑮

2. **Detachment.** "We were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves till we attacked."⑯

3. **Security.** Perfect intelligence to permit certainty in planning, ⑰ a population sympathetic enough to rebel cause not to betray insurgents, secrecy.⑱

4. **Mobility.** "...in Arabia range was more than force, space greater than the power of armies."⑲ "Camel raiding parties, self-contained like ships, might cruise confidently along the enemy's cultivation frontier, sure of an unhindered retreat into their desert element which the Turks could not explore."⑳

5. **Concentration on Enemy's Weakest Link.** ㉑

6. **Many-Branched Approach.** "If I met fifty checks, I could yet see a fifty-first way to my object."㉒
Avoidance of Pitched Battles. "Battles in Arabia were a mistake, since we profited in them only by the ammunition the enemy fired off."

Exploitation. "Surely if there is one military maximum of universal value, it is to press hard on a rout."

THE BIRTH PANGS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

Mao Tse Tung gained his first military experience in 1911, at the age of 18, as a soldier in Sun Yat Sen's revolutionary Army. After the successful overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, he left the Army and returned to his studies. Ten years later he became one of the founding members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1927 he was involved in the abortive, Communist-led Nanchang uprising, which Chiang Kai-shek's forces bloodily suppressed, killing Mao's wife and many of his friends. After the subsequent failure of the "Autumn Crop Uprising" he led in Hunan province, Mao withdrew with the remnants of his forces into the Chingkanshan, a remote mountainous region on the borders between Hunan, Kiangsi and Fukien provinces (See Map 2). This was ideal guerrilla country, rough terrain cut up by many fast flowing rivers, uncertain government control due to conflicts between the provincial governors and inhabitants used to exploiting the ruggedness of their countryside as refuge after bandit raids into surrounding cities. Mao arrived in this region already convinced that the Chinese peasant was the solid base upon which a new China could be built. This conviction,
in opposition to firm orders from Moscow to base the Chinese revolution on China's small industrial proletariat, had already led him into serious conflict with the leaders of the party. The previous failure of the CCP to devote much attention to military matters and the disasters that the Party had suffered after the defeat of the Red Army by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, convinced Mao that creation of a strong and effective military force was essential to the Party's survival.

During the next few years Mao's forces consolidated their hold on the Chingkanshan and defeated four major attempts of Chiang's forces to evict them. The principles Mao formulated during this period were used against Chiang's attacking forces, later against the Japanese, again against Chiang after WWII and against US forces in Korea. Mao later indicated that his defeat by Chiang in the fifth campaign, the defeat that led to the Long March, was due to failure to follow the principles observed in the first four.

Kenmin Hc\textsuperscript{27} reports Mao's post-Korean War formulation of the principles of war as follows:


These principles seem to reflect a considerable amount of post-guerrilla war thinking, and I prefer the following list of ten principles, derived from Mao's writings of the late '20's and early
'30's (although never grouped together by him in this exact way).

PRINCIPLES OF MAO'S GUERRILLA STRATEGY

1. **Primary of Politics.** "This army is powerful because all its members have a discipline based on political consciousness."  
   "Our principle is that the party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the party."  
   "The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of the guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awakened."

2. **Offensive.** "The basic principle of guerrilla war must be one of offense, ..."  

3. **Propaganda.** "We divide our forces to arouse the masses, we concentrate to deal with the enemy."  
   "We must be for ... the view that the Red Army is a propagandist and an organizer of revolution."  
   "We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops."  

4. **Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One.** "Our army must concentrate an absolutely superior force -- six, five, four or at least three times the enemy strength -- and pick an opportune moment to encircle and wipe out one enemy brigade (or regiment) first."  
   "War of annihilation is the fundamental guiding principle of military operations."
   "...encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly, let none escape."  
   "Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective."
5. **Deception and Surprise.** "The Red Army's operations are, as a rule, surprise attacks." Ingenious devices such as making a noise in the east while attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and now in the north, hit and run and night action should be constantly employed to mislead, entice and confuse the enemy.

6. **Security.** Thorough enrollment of population as an intelligence gathering medium. Secret and swift concentration, denial of all intelligence to the enemy. "The principle of preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy is the basis of all military principles." "...fight no battle you are not sure of winning."

7. **Mobility.** "...guerrillas must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind." Rapid and secret movement, sudden violent attacks, rapid disengagement, speedy withdrawal.

Red soldiers marched 100-120 li per day (33-40 miles), compared with government troops 70 li.

8. **Consolidation of Base Areas.** "...guerrillas without base areas are roving insurgents and can have no connection with the political aspirations of the indigenous population."

9. **Flexibility and Alertness.** "Guerrilla commanders adjust their operations to the enemy situation, to the terrain and to prevailing local conditions. Leaders must be alert to sense changes in these factors and to make necessary modifications in troop dispositions to accord with them."

10. **Centralized Planning, Decentralized Execution.** "In a word, it means a guerrilla war waged independently and on its own
initiative under a unified strategy."  

**COMPARISON**

Comparison of Lawrence's and Mao's principles shows many similarities and only one major difference. Both placed a high value on propaganda, the security produced by expert intelligence and counterintelligence efforts, superior mobility, concentration against enemy weakness and exploitation of success. Lawrence's "many branched approach" and Mao's "flexibility and alertness" have much in common, although the former suggests breadth in advance planning and the latter relates more to the reaction to developing situations. There is also a broad area of commonality in the thoughts behind Lawrence's "detachment" and Mao's "deception and surprise," since Lawrence viewed "detachment" as the key factor permitting his forces to surprise the enemy by their appearance at an unexpected point.

The greatest contrast is between Lawrence's "avoidance of pitched battles" and Mao's "concentrate a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one." Both objected to attacking an enemy in fixed defenses, but Mao's repeated urging to attack the enemy on the move and annihilate his forces finds no parallel in Lawrence's writings. Both sought to aggregate a number of small victories into a final, complete victory,  

but it seems that Mao's much longer exposure to danger, casualty lists, defeat and victory gave him an acceptance of "the butcher's bill" that Lawrence never
developed.

Part of this difference in outlook certainly grew from the differences in the cultural traditions, temperament and experience of the two men, but part of it may also have resulted from the fact that the differences between the Red Army and Chiang Kai-shek's forces were significantly less pronounced than the differences between the Turkish Army and Lawrence's Arab irregulars. Perhaps the lack of the comfortable mobility margin that permitted the Arabs to disengage at will and withdraw into the safety of the desert led Mao to decide that the security of the Red Army could be assured only by annihilation of the enemy.

Despite this difference in stated views on the desirability of decisive and annihilating battles, many of the operations conducted by the two men are strikingly similar, as comparison of the following operations will show.

**DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

Map 3 outlines Lawrence's defense of the town of Tafileh, about 15 miles southeast of the Dead Sea, against a regimental-sized Turkish attack on 25 January 1918. The Turkish advance came as a surprise to the Arabs, and Lawrence assumed command of the defense when the local Arab commander decided that he was unable to cope with the situation. Lawrence first threw out skirmishers to delay the Turkish advance across the successive ridgelines crossing their line of approach, then began preparation of a final defense
line just east of the town. As other irregulars began arriving at Tafileh, he organized them into flanking parties. A group of villagers was armed with light machineguns and sent out to attack the Turkish right flank, while a group of mounted warriors was assembled to assault the left. The approach of the villagers on the right flank was undetected by the Turks until they opened fire at less than 300 yards, silencing the Turkish machineguns and inflicting heavy casualties. The charge of the mounted Arabs from the other flank followed almost immediately, routing the Turkish infantry, beginning a retreat not many of them survived.\textsuperscript{53,54}

Map 4 outlines the Red Army's May 1931 defense of its Kiangsi base area, in the operation the Nationalists described as the "Second Bandit Extermination Campaign." Chiang Kai-shek's numerically superior forces planned a converging advance on the Red Army's base area, culminating in a final, decisive battle near Ning Tu (slightly south of the center of the map). Mao responded to the advance of the government forces by deploying guerrilla forces to harass and delay each of the converging columns while he concentrated the bulk of the Red Army near Huang--p'o. After assembling his forces, he threw almost the entire strength of the Red Army against each of the advancing columns in turn, in the order indicated on the map, defeating each in detail.\textsuperscript{55}

Although vastly different in scope and numbers of men involved, these actions are similar in their use of cut up terrain and irregular forces to delay and disorganize an advancing enemy, in the
violence of their attack on the enemy once he had ceased to advance and in their concentration on the enemy's flanks and rear.

**OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

The last major offensive action of the Arab forces under Lawrence was the attack on Deraa, a key rail junction about 35 miles east of the Sea of Galilee (Map 5). General Allenby, commanding the British forces in Palestine, had asked Lawrence to sever the railway supplying the Turkish forces in Palestine two or three days before the start of the British offensive scheduled for 19 September 1918. This was done on 15 and 17 September, with the Arab forces making the cuts indicated by "X's" on the map.

When on 24 September the Turks began destroying their supply facilities in Deraa, obviously preparing to withdraw, Lawrence moved on Shiek Saad, a commanding position on their line of retreat. His raids on several nearby villages during the approach march, coupled with his previous railway demolitions, convinced the Turks of the validity of his claims that they were outnumbered (in fact, there were several thousand Turkish and German troops in Deraa, about seven hundred men in Lawrence's party). The collapse of the Turkish front in Palestine and the belief that superior Arab forces lay on their line of retreat demoralized the Turkish forces, and more than two-thirds of the troops who began the withdrawal from Deraa and the Syrian countryside to the south never reached Damascus. The local populace, called to rise against the Turks
only after the retreat had begun, assisted Lawrence's small force in turning the Turkish withdrawal into a rout.

Deraa itself, abandoned by the retreating Turkish forces, was occupied by the Arabs on 28 September. The town was thus taken by a propaganda preparation followed by attacks on its lines of communication.

Map 6 depicts the Battle of Suchow, a city that was at the time the key point in Nationalist plans for the defense of the Yangtze Basin and Nanking.

The strong positions of the 7th Group Army east of Suchow were compromised by the defection of two of its generals and nearly a quarter of its troops as soon as the attack began. The subsequent withdrawal into Suchow attempted by the remainder of this Group Army was frustrated by these turncoats and encircling Communist troops. A relief column sent out from Suchow was driven back by the Communists, and the 7th Group Army was annihilated by 22 November.

At the same time that Ch'en I's forces were attacking the 7th Group Army, Liu Po-Ch'eng's forces drove the 2d Group Army in from its defensive positions west of the city and drove the 16th Group Army in from its positions south of the city. These additional defeats panicked the defenders, six additional regiments defected to the Communists, and the Red armies linked up south of the city.

Chiang Kai-shek then ordered the 8th Army and the 12th Group Army to move up from the south and reinforce the Suchow garrison.
This move was frustrated by the Communist encirclement of the 12th Group Army and defeat of the 8th Army.

Deciding that the fate of the city was sealed, its garrison decided to break out, link up with the encircled 12th Group Army, and escape to the south. The remnants of three Group Armies left the city on 1 December, but they were outmaneuvered by the Red Army, encircled at Yungcheng, and finally annihilated. They never reached the encircled 12th Group Army, and it also was destroyed.

The rigidity of the Nationalist defensive tactics enabled the Communists to mass their forces against the weakest point of their defense. The effectiveness of Communist propaganda sapped the fighting strength of those Nationalist units that did not respond to it by defecting, and the superior generalship of the Communist Commanders allowed them to exploit every mistake their enemies made.

Deraa and Suchow were similar in the importance of the propaganda preparation that preceded the attack, in the multiple approaches, and in the destruction of the defending forces as they tried to escape from a city whose communication routes they could no longer command. They differed greatly in scale, but each served as capstones to long and costly campaigns.

CONCLUSION

Given the great similarity in principles and the fact that Mao developed his thoughts 10-20 years after Lawrence, the question:
"Did Mao study Lawrence's operations and writings?" is an interesting one. The similarity between Lawrence's, "We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed," and Mao's "...the guerrilla must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind," is striking. One of Mao's generals was reported to have carried a Chinese translation of Lawrence's *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, so there is certainly a possibility that Lawrence's writings could have influenced Mao. Most students of Mao's military works, however, believe that the primary influence shaping Mao's military thinking was his own extensive military experience. He read widely, including the works of standard western military theorists such as Clausewitz and Jomini, and was a careful student of the early Chinese military writer Sun Tzu.

Mao's unique contribution is the way in which he combined the theories of these earlier authorities with his own military experience and his knowledge of his people to develop the Army and the doctrine that eventually gave the Chinese Communist Party control over the destinies of a quarter of the human race.

Mao and Lawrence - two very different men operating in completely different environments who came up with essentially the same prescription for successful guerrilla war. They both claim that, given conditions necessary for guerrilla operations, victory for the guerrilla is inevitable. The absence of effective counter-measures will certainly assist an insurgent in developing these
necessary conditions. Therefore, one of the most challenging tasks facing today's professional soldier is the careful study of the history of guerrilla wars to learn how creation of these necessary conditions by an insurgent force can be nurtured or prevented. Only the soldier with a thorough understanding of guerrilla war can fully exploit its strengths and weaknesses, and a study of the masters, Mao and Lawrence, is a good first step in developing that understanding.

[Signature]

H. W. IACOBIEMENT
Colonel, USAF

2. Ibid. p. 21.


5. Zeine N. Zeine, *Arab Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, pp. 84-85.


7. Lawrence, p. 103.


12. Lawrence, p. 60.


16. Lawrence, p. 194.

17. Ibid.


19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.
24. Lawrence, p. 196.
38. Chassin, pp. 151-152.
40. Ibid, p. 112.

43. Jacobs, pp. 28-29.

44. Chassin, pp. 151-152.


47. Wang, p. 15.


52. Lawrence, p. 224.

53. Jean Beraud Villars, *T. E. Lawrence, or the Search for the Absolute*, pp. 190-192.

54. Nutting, pp. 117-120.


56. Nutting, p. 150.

57. Villars, p. 240.


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


   (A well-balanced biography presenting an excellent picture of factors that made Lawrence the man he was when he joined the Arab Revolt, and his life after the war. Treatment of Arab Revolt very brief, the military student or historian will have to look elsewhere for information of value on this period.)


   (Originally published in French in 1952)

   (An excellent outline of events from 1945 to 1949, based largely on French intelligence reports of that period.)


   (Detailed description of Nationalist and Communist actions in battles of the "First Bandit Extermination Campaign, 1930-1931.")


   (Highlights social change as core issue of insurgency. Emphasizes need to use it to rob insurgents of support rather than to oppose it. Discusses need to balance efforts between modernization of the society the insurgent is attacking, protecting vital resources and pursuing guerrilla units.)


   (Outline of the history, geography and economy of Arabia)


   (Key biographical data on T. E. Lawrence, including his archaeological expedition of 1910-1914.)

   (A good analysis of Mao's principles.)


   (The military work whose contents T. E. Lawrence considered his best guide in the conduct of military operations.)


   (Good analysis of the roots of Lawrence's strategic thought, summary of the results of his campaigns.)


   (Article based on USAWC paper. Briefly applies Lawrence's teachings to Vietnam.)


   (Good biographical introduction, followed by selected items from Mao's writings.)


   (An introductory section followed by selections from *The Seven Pillars* and hitherto unpublished private letters. Of interest in understanding the man, but of little value in understanding his guerrilla warfare techniques.)


   (Good background on Arab history, but only a short section on the Arab Revolt of 1916-1918.)


(A good review of Communist Chinese guerrilla war doctrine.)


(An excellent history of organization, doctrine and tactics of the PLA from its inception through the Korean War. Must reading for the student of guerrilla warfare and every soldier interested in the strengths and weaknesses of the PLA.)


(Codification of Mao's latest statement of the principles of war. Evidences thinking of post guerrilla period.)


(Good historical account of Lawrence's role in Arab Revolt, little analysis.)


(Concentrates on the factors, physical and philosophical, leading to evolution of Mao's views on war.)


(Interpretive study based on both previously published resources and some newly opened papers that Lawrence's will had requested not to be released until 2000 A.D.)


(Good listing of principles derived from study of Mao's writings.)

(Lawrence's autobiographical account of his role in the Arab revolt. Fascinating but not always illuminating look into the mind that guided the revolt. Most valuable if read after Liddel-Hart's study of Lawrence's Arabian campaigns.)


(Not a true biography, but a rather a detailed examination of his role in the Arab revolt and of his tactical and strategic concepts. It includes results of interviews with Lawrence and many of his comments on early drafts of chapters. Should be the first book read by someone who wants to study Lawrence's operations.)


(Useful as an indicator that dogma derived in guerrilla period is still preached to the masses.)


(A good extract of principles from Mao's works.)


(Swedish view of Lawrence's exploits, commenting on the imperialistic philosophy underlying Lawrence's motivations.)


(A collection of essays, many of guerrilla warfare.)


(A textbook expounding Mao's views on guerrilla tactics and strategy. Since it is used as a text by many insurgent leaders, it should be carefully studied by the military student concerned with counterinsurgency.)

(Shares some essays with other collections of Mao's works, but has some not found elsewhere. The best single volume for the student of Mao's military thinking.)


(Very elementary, concentrating on tactics. Strategy considered very little.)


(Interesting outline of guerrilla philosophy based on an analysis of quotations of Lawrence and Mao.)


(Highly critical of Lawrence and his writings, claiming he took credit for results of Arab planning, leadership and fighting, which he later identified as his own.)


(Knowledgeable but somewhat biased commentary on Red Chinese tactical concepts by a Nationalist Chinese Official.)


(Good biography, concentrating on Lawrence's leadership of the Arab revolt, apparently based largely on Lawrence's *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom.*)


(Excellent as a brief overview of the man and his accomplishments, superb collection of photographs. Based on a wide range of sources, including the most recent, it presents an unusually well balanced view of Lawrence's character.)

(Good overview of guerrilla warfare, excellent bibliography.)


(Chapter XI contains excellent outline of Chinese strategy for a Sino-Soviet war, still based firmly on Mao's guerrilla experiences.)


(The basic classical Chinese work on warfare, required reading for officers of the Red Army. Mao's writings show strong influence of Sun Tzu's thought.)


(A French view of T. E. Lawrence, painting him as a natural pirate or guerrilla leader, a great improvisor but not a great strategist, driven by a desire to exclude France from Syria.)


(One-page description of 85 battles, each accompanied by an almost incomprehensible sketch map. Rewarding for study of a particular battle if one has the patience to transcribe place names to a good topographical map.)


(Good background information on history and geography of the People's Republic of China.)

(Outlines Mao's theory of protracted war, compares it with way war against Japan actually developed, concludes that theory was never successfully put into practice.)

44. Zene, Zeine N. Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism. Beirut: Khayat's, 1958.

(Disputes common Western view that Arabs chafed under Ottoman Turkish rule prior to 1909, presents a good outline of Turkish reasons for siding with Germany in WWI.)
MAP 2

Area of operations during Bandit Extermination Campaigns

SOUTH CHINA

TSINGHAI KANSU SHENSI HUNAN HUPEH KWEICHOW KUANGSI CHUHUN HUPEH HANNAN YUNNAN VIETNAM BURMA LAOS THAILAND
DEFENSE OF TAFOILA - JANUARY, 1918

MAP 3
ATTACK ON DERRA - SEPTEMBER, 1918

Shiek Saad

Tafas

Muberrib

Er Remtha

Ghazale

Nisib

Jabir

El Umaziya

MAP 5 32
THE BATTLE OF SUCHOW
(5 November 1948 - 10 January 1949)

1st Phase (5 - 10 Nov) As Liu Po-Cheng forces 10th and 17th S.A. toward Suchow, Chien's encircles 7th S.A. vicinity Hsin-Chang on 10 Nov, 7th S.A. (5 divisions) annihilated by 12 Nov. Following failure of rescue attempt from Suchow, communist forces file up south of Suchow.


3rd Phase (16 Dec - 1 Jan) Evacuating Suchow on 1 Dec, TVD-mixed forces (100, 17th, 15th S.A., total 200,000) encircles vicinity Yung-Cheng on 4 Dec and annihilated by 10 Jan.

MAP 6