AN EVALUATION OF THE ANTI-SOVIEZ
GUERRILLA WARFARE POTENTIAL IN SOVIET
ESTONIA

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The basic question concerns the existence of a significant anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare potential in Soviet Estonia, and its possible usefulness to US/NATO strategy. The conclusions are based on the little-known anti-Soviet guerrilla operations by Estonian guerrillas in 1941 and in 1944-1957, and on an assessment of the current political orientation of Soviet Estonians. An extensive review of literature in English, Estonian, and German languages provided the data used. Estonian emigree publications were particularly valuable. The research indicates that the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian
Item 20 continued

feelings of Soviet Estonians have not abated and are actually intensifying, and that significant anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare can be expected in Soviet Estonia in case of war between the US/NATO and the Soviet block. Immediate and substantial US support to Estonian guerrillas will markedly enhance their operations. Taken in the context of the larger anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare potential believed to exist in the entire Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, proper exploitation of this potential in case of war is in US interest. In peacetime, proper use of this potential may well become a significant factor in deterring Soviet aggression in Europe. The potential in Soviet Estonia must be considered in this strategy.
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INTRODUCTION

Probably the least known of anti-Communist resistance movements in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe during and after the second World War took place in Estonia -- the northernmost of the three former Baltic republics, forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940. The resistance and uprisings in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are well known. So is the nationalist movement in Soviet Ukraine. Of the Baltic countries, the anti-Soviet partisan warfare in Lithuania during and after World War II is covered by numerous books and articles;\(^1\) a recently published book deals exclusively with the resistance movement in Soviet Latvia.\(^2\)

No single publication deals comprehensively with the anti-Soviet resistance movement in Soviet Estonia. This paper intends to fill this void. It will also assess the current political orientation of Soviet Estonians, and explore the potential for renewed guerrilla warfare in Estonia in the framework of a general war in Europe. The impact of such a potential on US and NATO strategy will only be briefly touched upon, since the real potential can adequately be evaluated only within the parameters of the larger anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare potential in the entire Eastern Europe. Such evaluation is beyond the scope of this paper.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Estonia is located at the northeastern Baltic coast, bordered in the north by the Gulf of Finland; in the west by the Baltic Sea;
in the south by Latvia; and in the east by Russia proper and by the Lake of Peipsi. Its 1837 square miles equate roughly to the combined size of Maryland and Massachusetts.

Ethnically, Estonians are closely related to Finns. Both stand apart from the rest of the races and languages of Europe. Estonian history reveals ample grounds of dislike and animosity toward Russians and Germans alike. Little precise historical data exists prior to AD 1000. The country was independent until 1227, when it succumbed to German crusaders. Part of the country was initially ruled by Denmark. By 1346, the entire country was under the domination of the Germanic Teutonic Knights and Catholic bishops. In a series of destructive wars that followed, Sweden in 1645 became the undisputed ruler until the Great Northern War when, in 1721, Estonia became a province of Czarist Russia, and remained part of Russia until World War I.

Collapse of the Czarist rule and the October Revolution resulted in the proclamation of independence by the Estonian Diet on 24 February 1918. However, the German troops occupied Estonia the following day, ignoring the proclamation. German became the official language. The collapse of Germany in November 1918 forced the German withdrawal, with Soviet troops following closely at the heels of the retreating Germans. The Estonian War of Independence had started.

Fighting on two fronts against the Soviet troops and the returning German Free Corps, the Estonians finally succeeded in clearing their country of both historical enemies. A peace treaty with the Soviet Union came in force on 3 January 1920. Thereafter, Estonia remained
independent until the events of World War II destroyed the republic.

SOVIET TAKEOVER

The fate of the three Baltic republics was sealed on 23 August 1939 when Molotov and Ribbentrop signed the Soviet-German Treaty of Nonaggression. A secret supplementary protocol to the treaty placed Estonia, Latvia, part of Lithuania, and Finland under the Soviet sphere of influence. Subsequently, the Estonian government was forced to sign, in September 1939, a mutual assistance pact which gave the Soviets the right to numerous bases, and for stationing 25,000 troops, in Estonia. Similar pacts were forced on Latvia and Lithuania. Finland was approached, but refused to sign. The result was the Finnish-Soviet Winter War of 1939-1940. A number of Estonian volunteers participated on the Finnish side, and later formed the nucleus of the "Erna" guerrilla unit which deployed to Estonia at the start of the German-Soviet war.

After a relatively calm period of nearly nine months, the Soviets commenced a coordinated attack of accusations, provocations, and ultimatums on the three Baltic countries, resulting, in June 1940, in the invasion of all three countries by Soviet troops, in staged revolutions, and in forced one-party "elections." The farce culminated in the "elected" chambers of deputies asking Kremlin's permission for each country to join the Soviet Union. Estonia was incorporated on 6 August 1940, having been preceded by Latvia and Lithuania a few days earlier.

The first Soviet occupation was marked by compulsory sovietization of the economy, including the nationalization of even privately
owned one-family houses, and partial collectivization of farms. The latter was not completed until the second Soviet occupation. The terror of the NKVD became all-pervasive. Not even veteran Estonian Communists were safe from mass arrests, deportations, and murders. The worst came during the night of 13-14 June 1941, when over 10,000 people were herded into cattle cars and deported to Northern Russia and to Siberia.\(^{16}\) The total population losses during the first occupation amounted to 59,967 persons — roughly five per cent of the total population of Estonia.\(^{17}\) In view of these atrocities, it was not surprising that the Germans, although disliked historically, were universally greeted as liberators after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, and that many Estonians took up arms against the Soviet oppressors.\(^{18}\)

**GUERRILLA OPERATIONS**

Guerrilla operations against the Soviet authorities in Estonia can be divided into two phases: operations in 1941 until Estonia was cleared of Soviet troops, and operations beginning with the second Soviet occupation in 1944, and continuing into the middle 1950's. The intervening period of German occupation was characterized by the increasing participation of Estonian units within the framework of the German armed forces on the Eastern front. Each of the three periods will be examined in detail in the following sections.

**Guerrilla Operations in 1941**

The groundwork for guerrilla warfare in Soviet Estonia was in
existence before the opening of hostilities between Germany and the USSR. The underground movement had been organized long before the German attack. The mass deportation in June 1941 added hundreds of men to those already organizing in the forests and marshes.

The outbreak of hostilities saw a rapid buildup of partisan units throughout the country. The men poured to the units from many sources. Since the Soviets had disarmed the Estonian National Guard (Kaitseliit) and had collected all arms from the civilian population immediately upon the Communist takeover, initially the best armed guerrilla units consisted of large numbers of Estonian deserters from the Soviet army. Desertions of full platoons were not uncommon. The desertions in northern Estonia alone amounted to 600-700 soldiers.

Other relatively well-equipped units resulted from Soviet mobilization. Although the Soviet policy was not to equip Estonian draftees until safely moved out of Estonia, some draftee convoys had been armed in the general confusion. For example, some 200 armed draftees escaped at the town of Valga during a German air attack with weapons and ammunition, and joined the guerrillas. Many others escaped in smaller groups or individually, with or without weapons.

The great majority of partisans, however, consisted of civilians of all ages who simply felt that the time had arrived to regain the national independence through armed action. Although some, mainly farmers, had managed to hide individual weapons and even hand grenades, most were poorly or not at all armed.

An unexpected addition of well-armed men came from Finland. During the Finno-Russian Winter War, hundreds of Estonians had fought
In the Finnish army. At the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, many were quickly organized into the so-called "Erna" units and landed in Estonia either by sea or by parachute. Resupplied by air from Finland, they became the nucleus of larger guerrilla units. Small radio-equipped teams also carried out intelligence activities.

Strength estimates of Estonian guerrillas in 1941 vary from 50,000 downwards. The figure of 50,000 appears quite unrealistic and probably includes many non-combatants. A more realistic estimate puts the figure in northern Estonia to 15,000, of which 5000 were well-armed and fully active. An accurate figure of guerrillas in southern Estonia is even more difficult to arrive at, since the Germans advanced rapidly through the southern part of the country, and arrived on 12 July 1941 at the line of Parnu-Viljandi-River Emajõgi. However, on arrival, they found that the line had been held by Estonian guerrilla units since 8 July. Some of the southern guerrilla units joined the German advance; others remained behind as security forces; still others disbanded. Based on the information from various fragmentary sources, the guerrilla strength in southern Estonia probably did not exceed 4000 men.

Guerrilla operations ranged from harassment of local Soviet officials and attacks on small Soviet security details to procure arms and ammunition, to battles with regular NKVD and Soviet army units, to liberation of whole towns, including the second largest Estonian city of Tartu. Another important guerrilla function was to provide armed protection to hundreds of refugee camps, the largest of which near the village of Kautla contained some 2000 fugitives.
Losses as to the killed in action are fairly accurate from source to source, and are placed around 550 guerrillas killed. The number of wounded and missing in action varies from a low estimate of 308 to a high of approximately 1300.

Although severely hampered by lack of weapons and ammunition, guerrilla operations in 1941 caused the Soviets severe losses in manpower and in freedom of movement, and provided important intelligence to the advancing German army. The Soviet losses in Estonia due to guerrilla operations have been placed to 4,800 killed and 14,000 prisoners.

The Soviet rout from Estonia ushered in a three-year continuation in the fight against communism, this time in organized units in German army, which culminated in fall 1944 in renewed guerrilla operations against the Soviet forces upon the second occupation of Estonia.

**Conventional Anti-Soviet Warfare 1941-1944**

Upon the arrival of German troops in 1941, many guerrillas joined the advancing German units in liberating the remainder of Estonia. Beginning in August 1941, various security groups and police battalions consisting of Estonian volunteers came into being within the framework of the German Army. The security groups were later reorganized into so-called East battalions and used as front-line infantry.

In the Fall of 1942, the German authorities decided to create an Estonian Legion under the auspices of the Waffen-SS. Better weapons and equipment served as an inducement to join, but fear of being used in sectors other than the Estonian sector of the Eastern front slowed
As suspected, the first of the Estonian Waffen-SS battalions — the "Narva" battalion — was used to replace the Finnish volunteer battalion in the 5th Waffen-SS Panzergrenadier Division "Wiking" in the Ukraine.

Mobilization of Estonian men of year groups 1919-1924 in March 1943 included a choice to join the Estonian Legion. The expanded Legion, now renamed 3rd Estonian Waffen-SS Volunteer Brigade, was employed on the Ukrainian front. Later, it was renamed 20th Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS, and in February 1944 transferred to the Narva front in Estonia. The October 1943 draft of year groups 1925 and 1926 provided mainly fillers to existing units. The next draft in February 1944 of the year groups of 1904-1923 provided manpower for the formation of so-called border defense regiments. An additional draft of twenty older year groups was used to enlarge the regional Self-Defense (Omakaitse) forces.

In summer 1944, the "Narva" battalion and the three East battalions were transferred to the 20th Waffen-SS division. By now all but the 200th Infantry Regiment of the Finnish army, consisting of some 2,200 Estonian volunteers, were fighting on the Estonian front. At least 1,800 voluntarily returned to Estonia in August 1944, and were incorporated into the 20th Waffen-SS division.

The great mass of the latest draftees was used to form six border defense regiments. Four of those formed the 300th Provisional Infantry Division. All saw front-line service, as did some of the Self-Defense battalions and regiments.

The total strength of Estonian units in various formations including
the Self-Defense units in fall 1944 is estimated in the neighborhood of 60,000 men.\textsuperscript{56} An estimated 18,000 to 20,000 Estonian soldiers escaped to Germany.\textsuperscript{57} A small number managed to escape to Sweden.\textsuperscript{58} The bulk of Estonian troops, however, remained in Estonia, either voluntarily or involuntarily.

\textbf{The Second Phase of Guerrilla Warfare}

The second phase of anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in Estonia, which commenced upon the German withdrawal from Estonia in September 1944, differed markedly from the first phase. Since the core of the guerrilla units was formed by Estonian soldiers who had served in German army, these units were much better trained and equipped. Many Estonian units, particularly the border defense regiments, were overrun or bypassed by the rapidly advancing Soviet troops and simply went into hiding in local forests and marshes.\textsuperscript{59} Some of the Waffen-SS units were also caught in the Soviet advance; others were able to effect a more orderly withdrawal.\textsuperscript{60} However, even of those units and individual soldiers who had the opportunity to redeploy to Germany, many voluntarily remained in Estonia.\textsuperscript{61} For example, the great majority of the "Narva" battalion stayed behind with their commander.\textsuperscript{62} So did several other battalion-size units and many smaller units.\textsuperscript{63}

The Soviet mobilization of the year groups 1911 to 1926 which commenced almost immediately after the reoccupation of Estonia caused many of the draftees to join the partisan units.\textsuperscript{64} Additional manpower came from those accused of being German collaborators or "kulaks".\textsuperscript{65} Whole classes of high school students formed auxiliary organizations supporting
the partisans, and were later arrested en masse by the NKVD.66

The main support, however, came from the Estonian farmers in form of food, clothing, and other supplies.67 Forced collectivization of the agriculture in 1949, which was accompanied by mass deportations of some 40,000 farmers and their family members, eliminated this very effective source of supplies.68 Subsequently, supplies were obtained by raids on various local Soviet supply points.69

The forced collectivization also ended the heretofore excellent intelligence and warning system, run by farmers, which had kept the guerrillas informed of all Soviet army and NKVD movements. Tapping of private NKVD phone lines, however, continued functioning.70

The guerrillas were well armed with modern German arms including machineguns, mortars, and antipersonnel and antitank mines. Ammunition was plentiful.71 When the German ammunition ran out by 1948, the majority of German weapons had been replaced by captured Soviet weapons, for which ammunition was obtained through offensive action.72

Platoon and company size guerrilla units, formed by former Estonian soldiers, were not unusual in 1944 to 1946.73 Even battalion size units were known.74 These units were gradually reinforced by university and high school students and by large numbers of farmers. Well organized and professionally led, such units constituted the major centers of resistance, operating out of hidden base camps. Less effective were the smaller armed groups, often accompanied by women and children, and the many individuals whose main aim was simply to evade capture.75 Many of the latter responded to a series of Soviet "amnesties" between 1944. Initially well treated to induce others to surrender,
after a few months all were arrested and deported. The response from the organized guerrilla units to these "amnesties" was minimal, and the great majority of guerrillas continued to fight.

Initial guerrilla operations in 1945 consisted largely of attacks on NKVD units conducting mass arrests, and of reprisals against the local Communist functionaries. However, larger battles also took place, the largest of which was fought in the county of Tartumaa where an 800-man guerrilla force destroyed an entire Soviet army division and dispersed several additional NKVD regiments. During the years 1944-1946, the countryside was almost totally controlled by guerrillas. Local Communist functionaries in villages had to be withdrawn into the nearby towns; motor traffic had to be restricted to daytime convoys under heavily armed guards. During the winter 1946-1947, large scale Soviet roundup operations employing two infantry divisions with armored reinforcements resulted in fierce battles in the forests and marshes along the Lake Peipsi and in counties of Tartumaa and Võrumaa. The inevitable result was the dispersion of larger guerrilla units and destruction of many base areas, but resistance continued.

Mass deportations in March 1949 brought new life into guerrilla operations. Many new men joined the guerrillas. Operations also intensified. Ambushes of NKVD columns and deportation trains, and demolition of bridges, highways and railroads, were common. Numerous deportees were set free. Whereas in 1951 the countryside was still largely under the guerrilla control after nightfall, by 1952 the Soviet superiority, coupled with losses in combat and to diseases, was finally making itself felt. Guerrilla leaders were increasingly being killed.
Finally even the most optimistic of guerrillas lost their long-held belief in the United Nations' declarations concerning the right to self-determination and liberty for all peoples, and apathy took over. In spite of all, some kind of guerrilla warfare persisted until the unsuccessful Hungarian uprising in 1956, which destroyed the last hopes of any help from western democracies. The last guerrilla leader, according to Soviet press, was captured in 1957.

Active resistance had come to an end. Passive resistance, however, continued. The guerrilla losses during the second Soviet occupation remain unknown. The total guerrilla strength can only be estimated. A conservative estimate places the active organized guerrilla strength at a minimum of 5,000 guerrillas, with the main concentrations in the counties of Virumaa, Parnumaa, and Võrumaa. This is probably an underestimate; the real strength may never be known.

APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENT

Any evaluation of the current political orientation of Soviet Estonians, passive resistance in Soviet Estonia, and of the anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare potential in Estonia must take several interrelated factors into account. The dislike of the Communist politico-economic system, and the dislike of Russians and everything Russian, is sometimes extremely difficult to separate where Estonians are concerned. The hatred of Russians has deep roots in Estonian history. It was the Russians who kept the Estonians in absolute bondage for some one hundred years until the middle of the nineteenth century. This, and the
abortive effort of Russification in 1880's, served as a foundation for the rebirth of nationalistic fervor characterized first by passive, and in 1905 by active resistance to the Czarist oppressors. These nationalistic feelings culminated in the 1918-1920 War of Independence against what was largely perceived as the same Russian imperialism, this time under the guise of Communism.  

Russification is again a major issue in Soviet Estonia. Its importance is readily seen from the official Soviet census figures. Whereas in 1934 Estonians constituted 88.1 per cent of the total population, the figure in 1970 was 68.2 per cent, with the proportionate increase primarily of Russians in the total population. Demographic studies published in 1973 indicate a further decline of Estonians to 66.6 per cent. Soviet military personnel and their dependents are not included in these figures. The proportion of Estonians in their own capital city of Tallinn is even lower at 56 per cent.

Resistance to Russification manifests itself in many ways: from open contempt of anybody who does not speak the local language, to semi-official policy of Estonian Communists to Estonianize the Russian intruders. Often Estonians refuse to respond at all when addressed in Russian, or respond only with derogatory remarks in Estonian. In 1971, leaflets by an organized group of Estonian technocrats, titled "Estonia for Estonians!", made their appearance. The message was obvious. Another index of the dislike of Russians is the relatively low rate of intermarriages between Estonians and Russians, and the high rate of children from whatever intermarriages there are who opt for the Estonian nationality and language.
The distrust is mutual, extending even into the party member ranks. The Soviet distrust of Estonians manifested itself first in the extensive purges of the Estonian Communist Party in 1949 and 1951, and more recently in the "elections" to the Estonian Party Central Committee, with only 22 native-born Estonians "elected", versus 44 Russians of Estonian extraction, and 26 pure Russians. The dislike of Estonians of the Communist system has its roots in the Estonian War of Independence, strongly reinforced by the lingering horror of mass deportations and other measures of suppression and terror in 1940's and 1950's. Another index of anti-Communism is the disproportionately low membership of Estonians in the Communist Party as compared to other Soviet nationalities.

Acts of resistance to the Soviet system are becoming more frequent. These acts vary from underground anti-Communist publications to open anti-Communist and anti-Russian demonstrations. Toward the end of 1960's, a document signed by the "Representatives of the Technical Intelligentsia of Tallinn" was circulated, demanding the creation of independent neutral states under the United Nations' control at the western border of Soviet Russia proper. The Soviet underground paper, "A Chronicle of Current Events", in June 1972 issue discussed the demands of the underground Estonian National Front for the restoration of independence through free elections, and also mentioned the advent of a new underground journal titled "The Estonian Democrat". An anonymous letter by a group of Soviet Estonians reached the west in 1972 demanding that the Baltic question be taken up by United Nations, and that the countries in question be freed of Russian occupation.
"The Chronicle of Current Events" also describes more open acts of resistance, among them the arrest and conviction of four working-class Estonian youths accused of possession of weapons and of being the organizers of an anti-Soviet resistance movement. In September 1973, the Soviet Estonian radio broadcast the courtroom proceedings against the instigators of an anti-Soviet demonstration which had taken place in July 1973 in the town of Pärnu.

Sports events are often marked by anti-Soviet demonstrations. During an international basketball tournament in Tallinn in 1970, loud booing greeted the raising of the Soviet flag and the appearance of the Soviet team. In contrast, the United States team was greeted with loud cheers. In 1972, the victory of the Czechoslovakia's ice hockey team over the Soviet team resulted in student demonstrations in the streets of Tallinn cheering Czechoslovakia's victory.

One of the most impressive demonstrations of nationalism took place during the traditional national song festival in Tallinn in 1969, when an estimated quarter of a million Estonians broke into spontaneous singing of forbidden nationalistic and patriotic songs.

Recent visitors to Soviet Estonia report that antagonism to Soviet authorities is on the increase, and that the Soviet hopes of decreasing rather than increasing the resistance of the younger generation have not materialized. Likewise, indications that Estonians continue in their desire for national independence remain strong.

Perhaps the most telling expression of anti-Communist sentiment was shown by the arrest, in 1969 or 1970, of some Tallinn students for parading with the slogan "Tellige TAPA KOMMUNISTI!", which literally
means "Subscribe to Tapa Communist!", the local newspaper in the town of Tapa. With the first word of the slogan omitted, it also means "Kill the Communists!". The slogan may well express exactly what would happen in Soviet Estonia if and when a realistic opportunity to regain national independence materializes. A general war between the Soviet block and the Western Allies would provide such an impetus.

CURRENT ANTI-SOVIET GUERRILLA WARFARE POTENTIAL IN ESTONIA

Based on the historical aspects of anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in Estonia during and after World War II, and on the significant anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiment in Soviet Estonia today, it is apparent that considerable anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare potential still exists in Soviet Estonia. It is unlikely, however, that this potential will manifest itself in the absence of an outside stimulus such as a general war between the Soviet block and the NATO allies, although a general upheaval within the Soviet Union itself may well provide such a stimulus. Employment of Estonian guerrillas in support of NATO aims can not, however, be realistically considered separately from the larger context of the overall anti-Soviet guerrilla potential which very likely exists in all Eastern European countries -- the Eastern European Soviet satellite countries, the three former Baltic republics, and the Soviet Ukraine. Evaluation of the overall guerrilla warfare potential in Eastern Europe is beyond the scope of this paper; therefore, evaluation of the various aspects of anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in Soviet Estonia must necessarily be conducted in somewhat of a vacuum. However, such evaluation becomes more realistic if the above
considerations are kept in mind.

Prompt initiation of anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in Soviet Estonia immediately after the outbreak of hostilities can be expected to accomplish the following objectives:

1. Interruption of Soviet lines of communication to important coastal and inland fortifications, missile sites, and naval bases which are known to exist on mainland Estonia and on the adjacent islands.115

2. Interruption of Soviet lines of communication through Estonia, particularly the highway and railroad arteries originating in Leningrad.

3. Sabotage and raids against other militarily important targets.

4. Intelligence gathering in the Soviet rear.

5. Diversion of significant additional Soviet military forces for rear area security over those normally employed in Soviet Estonia.

6. Reduction of Estonian manpower available for mobilization into Soviet armed forces by offering draft-age Estonians an alternative of fighting for national independence in the guerrilla forces, and by encouraging defections from the currently existing Soviet Estonian 8th Rifle Corps.116

7. Encouragement of passive resistance by the general population of Soviet Estonia.

8. Promotion of general disorder and uncertainty in the Soviet rear.

In order to capitalize most effectively on the anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare potential in Soviet Estonia, prompt action immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, or even preceding the outbreak, is
required. As a minimum, a concentrated propaganda effort must commence as soon as the hostilities appear imminent, to inform the maximum number of Estonians of the United States' intent to support fully, promptly, and tangibly any anti-Soviet guerrilla activities in Estonia. In supporting these activities, particular attention should be paid to the following:

1. Weapons supplied should be of Soviet manufacture or type to enable the use of captured ammunition, and thereby minimize ammunition resupply requirements from the outside.

2. Preparations should be made to resupply rations, since the internal resupply of food items may not be possible during the initial stage of operations because of collectivization and tight Soviet control over supplies of food.117

3. US advisers should preferably be of Estonian extraction and speak fluent Estonian, to facilitate communication, but even more importantly, to eliminate the traditional distrust of foreigners. Plans should be made now to increase the current number of reserve Special Forces detachments consisting of Estonian-Americans, and other Estonian-Americans currently on active duty or with previous active duty experience should be identified in advance to facilitate their quick transfer and deployment to Estonia as advisers.

4. Significant targets in Estonia should be identified in advance.

5. Every effort should be made by appropriate agencies to develop indigenous assets to the fullest prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

During peacetime, the Soviet Union should be made fully aware
that the United States does intend, and is fully prepared, to utilize indigenous guerrillas in Soviet Estonia and in other Eastern European countries, should hostilities break out. The significant guerrilla potential in the Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, and the disruption of the rear of the entire Soviet front that can be expected to result from the proper utilization of all available anti-Soviet guerrilla forces may well become a significant additional factor in deterrence of Soviet aggression in Europe. The contribution that the current political orientation of Soviet Estonians can make to this deterrence should not be discounted.

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FOOTNOTES

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4. Estonian World Council. *Memorandum to the European Security and Cooperation Conference Regarding the Status of Estonia*. (Place and year of publication not given.)

(This memorandum summarizes various aspects of establishment of Soviet rule in Estonia, and argues the case for reestablishing national independence to Estonia.)


(A German-language general history of the Waffen-SS; includes information about Estonian Waffen-SS units.)


(A short history of Estonia from ancient times to the current Soviet occupation.)


(An excellent and well-researched study, in Estonian language, of all aspects of life in Soviet Estonia, including the current resistance movement. It includes personal impressions gained during the author’s visit to Soviet Estonia in 1970. The author is an Estonian-born Swedish journalist.)


(A monograph of events dealing with the Soviet takeover of Estonia and life under the Soviet occupation.)


(The first volume of a highly valuable ten-volume compilation of recollections, studies, and historical data by numerous Estonian authors in the free world, published in Estonian language. The series covers, in a somewhat fragmentary fashion, the events leading to the Soviet takeover, the first Soviet occupation, the German occupation, and the Soviet reconquest of Estonia. Volumes 5, 7, and 9 are particularly valuable since they cover German military operations in Estonia, Estonian anti-Soviet guerrilla operations, formation of Estonian military units within the framework of the German armed forces and their participation on the Eastern front, and the Soviet reconquest of Estonia, including the fate of Estonian units. Other volumes cover other aspects of life in Estonia during World War II.)


(A six-volume sequel to the ten-volume *Eesti Riik ja Rahvas Teises Maailmasõjjas*, it adds additional material to the events in Estonia toward the end of World War II, and covers the various aspects of life in Soviet Estonia until 1960. The volumes consist of individual recollections of Estonians who escaped from Estonia prior to or during the Soviet reoccupation of the country, and essays dealing with various aspects of political, social, and economic life in Soviet Estonia. Particularly valuable are Volumes 1 and 2, which cover the last battles in Estonia, the Soviet reconquest, and the years of anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in Soviet Estonia.)


(First volume of a four-volume history of Estonian Border Guard regiments in the framework of the German army, including activation of different units, battle participation against the Soviet forces, and the fate of individual regiments upon the Soviet reoccupation of Estonia in 1944.)


(An excellent first-hand study of events in Estonia from the War of Independence 1918-1920 to the Soviet takeover and first occupation of Estonia. The author has served in various high governmental posts in the Republic of Estonia, including the presidency, and was the Estonian ambassador to Moscow during the crucial negotiations leading to the Soviet occupation of Estonia.)


(An interesting memoir, written in Estonian, of an Estonian volunteer in German army who later became a Waffen-SS war correspondent to Estonian Waffen-SS units. Last of a series of three books dealing with Estonian units in German army. Includes some information concerning anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in Estonia in 1941.)


(Memoirs of an Estonian officer who served successively in Estonian, Soviet, and German armies, reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel and a regimental command in the 20th Estonian Waffen-SS Division. The book deals primarily with his experiences in the various units in the German army, including the last battles in Estonia.)

(A detailed study of Soviet defense of Leningrad. Includes an account of the Soviet withdrawal from Estonia, and of the passive and active anti-Soviet resistance of Estonians.)


(A study of the Latvian anti-Communist resistance movement during the first and second Soviet occupation of Latvia.)


(A monumental study of the Soviet prison system. Includes the author's discussions with a prominent Estonian political prisoner.)


(A history, in German, of the 5th Waffen-SS Division "Wiking," which included the Estonian Waffen-SS battalion "Narva" prior to its return to Estonia.)


(An account of the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states, with some references to the anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.)


(A detailed study, in Estonian, of Soviet atrocities in Estonia during the first Soviet occupation 1940-1941. Includes some information of the anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in Estonia. First volume of a series of two volumes.)


(An excellent account of the Lithuanian anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare during the first and second Soviet occupation of Lithuania.)


(A history of the 3rd German Waffen-SS Armored Corps, in German. It includes accounts of Estonian units such as the 20th Estonian Waffen-SS Division and the 300th Provisional Infantry Division which were assigned to the 3rd Corps during the latter's employment on the Narva front in Estonia in 1944.)


(A well-documented study of the Soviet takeover of Estonia. Includes texts of various pacts and agreements, and stenographic records of negotiations of Estonian representatives with various Soviet functionaries including Stalin and Molotov.)


(A collection of monographs covering political and economic life in Estonia during the period of independence, and under the Soviet occupation.)


57. US Congress. House. Select Committee on Communist Aggression. 
Third Interim Report. 83rd Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: 

(A detailed record of the Soviet takeover of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.)

58. US Congress. House. Select Committee to Investigate the In- 
corporation of the Baltic States into the USSR. Hearings. 
Office, 1954.

59. Uustalu, Evald. The History of the Estonian People. London: 

(A history of Estonia, with main emphasis on the period of 
national independence 1918-1940.)

60. Uustalu, Evald and Moora, Rein. Soomepoisid. Toronto: Soo- 
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(An excellent Estonian-language history of Estonian volun- 
teers in Finnish armed forces in World War II. Includes an 
account of "Erna" guerrilla units, and the complete history 
of the 200th Infantry Regiment of the Finnish army, which 
consisted of Estonian volunteers. Also included is an account 
of the return of most of the Estonian volunteers to Estonia, 
and of their incorporation into the Estonian Waffen-SS units.)


62. Ziedonis, Arvīds, Jr., et al. Problems of Mininations: Baltic 
Perspectives. San Jose: Association for the Advancement of 

(A collection of essays by Baltic scholars in the free world, 
with main focus on the various aspects of life in the Baltic 
Soviet Republics.)