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REPLY TO ANNOTATION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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2. Transmitted herewith are reports of Senior Advisors of the MR 4 Provinces, for the period ending February 1973.

   a. LTC K. Kobata, SA, Bac Lieu Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B007, Inclosure 1.


   d. LTC Frederick R. Daly, SA, Ba Xuyen Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B030, Inclosure 4.

3. These reports are provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the authors. These reports should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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HEADQUARTERS
CORDS ADVISORY TEAM 56
PHONG DINH PROVINCE, APO 96215

MACDR-56-S

SUBJECT: Deputy Province Senior Advisor Completion of Tour Report (RCS: MACCORDS 174-01) – LTC William F. Fitzpatrick, 281-28-1253

THRU: Deputy for CORDS
Delta Regional Assistance Command
APO 96215

TO: Headquarters, US Military Assistance Command
ATTN: MACCORDS (AC of Staff, CORDS)
APO 96222

1. Attached at Inclosure 1 is my Completion of Tour Report for the period 07 December 1972 to 27 February 1973.

2. Attached at Inclosure 2 is a copy my final counterpart letter.

WILLIAM F. FITZPATRICK
LTC, PA
Deputy Province Senior Advisor
NAME: FITZPATRICK, William F.

GRADE: LTC

SSAN: 281-28-1253

BRANCH OF SERVICE: Field Artillery

PROVINCE: Phong Dinh

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 7 December 1972 to 27 February 1973

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 27 February 1973

PREVIOUS TOUR(S) IN VIETNAM (DATES - INCLUSIVE): May 1963 to May 1964

ASSIGNMENT ON PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR(S): Civil Guard/Self-Defense CORPS
Advisor, Dinh Tuong Province
SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?
   One previous tour as an advisor and 18 years experience in the Army.

2. What training did you have for this position?
   Nine weeks at the PSA Course at Fort Bragg.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?
   Full language course to attain reasonable fluency.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?
   Eighteen months.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory?
   If not, specify deficiencies.
   Yes, excellent support was received from Region and Saigon.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming?
   Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available?
   Which ones?
   None to my knowledge.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?
   Recommend the forms be updated to reflect those currently being used.

8. Do the MACV/SVC Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification programs?
   Adequate but too standardized to cover all conditions in all provinces.
9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

Yes.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:

   1. Land to the Tiller
   2. Public Safety
   3. Agriculture

11. The most effective para military forces are:

   1. National Police Field Forces
   2. National Police
   3. PSDF

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

   1. Land to the Tiller
   2. Agriculture
   3. Education

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:

   1. Territorial Security Forces
   2. Land to the Tiller
   3. Education

14. The least successful pacification programs are:

   1. People's Organizations
   2. Youth and Sports
   3. VIS
15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:
   1. People's Organizations
   2. Youth and Sports
   3. VIS

16. The rural people are aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making. If not, how can they be informed?

   They are aware but have not seen many of the fruits of these programs.

17. The people, as you know them, are more committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why?

   Because of the security being provided by the Territorial Forces during pre & post cease-fire time frame. Since no territory was lost during this period the people feel the government is strong enough to protect them.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam? Yes

   However, goals should be established after thorough study and be based upon the actual capability of the Province. For example the Province had an original goal of 61,000 hectares of local rice yet has a capability to cultivate 85,000 to 90,000 hectares of local rice.

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart? Yes

   The plan was adequately explained to me by the individual I replaced and the Province Senior Advisor. I do not know if it was adequately explained to my counterpart.
SECTION III

TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

RF/PP: The Territorial Forces have performed well in most instances and where they did not it was usually due to poor leadership. There is a shortage of officers and NCOs in the RF as far as assigned strength is concerned. This shortage is even worse than it appears since many officers and NCOs are assigned to the ten battalion headquarters and seven subsector headquarters rather than the fifty-six rifle companies. I strongly recommend the size of these headquarters be cut down and the officers and NCOs be reassigned to the rifle companies. The state of training of the RF and PF is fair. This situation should improve in the future since the Province opened a PF training center on 15 January 1973. This training center currently has a capability of providing four weeks of refresher training to forty platoons a year. In addition plans have been developed for a one week refresher training course to be given at this training center to RF rifle companies. To insure continued success of Territorial Forces more emphasis must be given to training by senior commanders. The RF and PF forces have been real active during December and January. The main efforts have been directed at keeping the VC off balance just prior to the cease-fire. Their efforts were successful as evidenced by the fact that no friendly territory was lost during the pre and post cease-fire offensive.

One particular weakness stands out in the use of combat power. Quite often air strikes are directed at supposed enemy targets without any ground follow up. I believe more emphasis should be placed on proper air-ground operations.

PSDF: The PSDF have performed well in secure areas. The PSDF and National Police are responsible for the security of eighty-two hamlets in the Province. Recently the Province formed PSDF-PF teams in two villages. These teams consist of one PF soldier and three to five PSDF members and so far have proved successful. Plans have been made to extend this concept of operations to other villages. I believe that if the PSDF is going to be used in a peace time environment then a senior military officer, Major or Lieutenant Colonel, must be in charge of the program at Province level, given complete support by the Province Chief and funds to properly train the PSDF members. Similarly there should be competent officers placed in charge of the program at district and village level.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCES: With the exception of two platoons the NPFF have been properly employed and functioned very effectively. One of the two platoons, although assigned to a district, has been employed on static security missions in the Can Tho City. I strongly recommend that this platoon be relieved of its static missions and a proper mission be assigned to this unit. The platoon assigned to Thuan Nhon District has demonstrated a reluctance to conduct operations. In addition there has been some difficulty between the platoon leader, district police chief and the district chief reference the coordination and control of the few operations they have conducted. This matter has been brought to the Province Chief's attention and hopefully the situation will improve.
The Field Force platoons have averaged thirty operations a week in reaction to intelligence developed by the Province and District Police Operation Centers. Most of these operations have been combined ones with RF and PF forces.

**NATIONAL POLICE OPERATIONS:** National Police have been assigned and are living in all villages in the Province. Daily police patrols to hamlet level are being conducted in the three most secure districts in the Province. Police patrols to hamlet level in the other four districts are dependent on the security situation in each village. The Province currently has twenty-five Second Lieutenant and twenty-five noncommissioned officers commanding village level police stations.

All village police stations have radio communication to district level; however, the reports submitted leave much to be desired. This is partially the fault of the Province Police Chief for not enforcing proper reporting and due to the lack of education of the individual policeman. A great deal of effort must be placed on raising the educational level of the National Police so that they may be able to carry out properly all police functions.

**COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE**

**VILLAGE SELF-DEVELOPMENT:** The Village Self-Development Program in 1972 has not been successful. The program was started late and only eighty-five projects have been completed. Forty projects are underway and one project has yet to be initiated. This rate of accomplishment is way below par for this province when you considered how the program prospered when it was known as Self Help and assisted with generous USAID construction community support. The phase out of material support coupled with spiralling inflation costs at the time projects actually started has posed a serious problem with the project managers. Continued arbitrary determination by Village officials of the type and location of projects contrary to and in total disregard of the peoples' desires has aggravated the people's apathy to this once popular program. Continued emphasis in respecting the villagers' freely determined choice of development projects should reverse this unhappy trend and gain their enthusiastic support once again.

**RD CADRE:** The RD Cadre have been responsible for monitoring the Village Self Development, Rural Credit program, making village censuses, house identification, village mail delivery and acting as administrative advisors at the village hamlet level. While problems do exist, such as some instances of lack of cooperation and coordination between village officials and village RD Cadre, the tasked jobs are being accomplished. During the later part of 1972 and January 1973 the RD Cadre were additionally tasked with psychologically and politically preparing the people for the cease-fire situation. This change in emphasis was accomplished at the expense of the proper implementation of their other responsibilities. It is doubtful that the RD cadre has had enough propaganda training to appreciably influence the population. Whether or not their propaganda mission was successful is yet to be seen.
The Rural Teenager Organization which was organized by the HD Cadre, is showing great promise. A total of 5,222 youth from 6 to 17 years of age are actively participating in 40 village level organizations. After reading their 5 mottoes and realizing that the future of the country lies in the youth and that a sense of nationalism is necessary for the survival of South Vietnam, it is apparent how valuable this program is. Those 5 mottoes are:

1. A Rural Teenager must be loyal to his fatherland and love his country.

2. A Rural Teenager must make every effort to improve himself morally, intellectually and physically in order to become useful to his family and society.

3. A Rural Teenager must actively participate in all operations aimed at bringing peace and prosperity to his village and hamlet.

4. A Rural Teenager must contribute his initiatives for development of nationalism and people's traditions.

5. A Rural Teenager must promote solidarity and mutual assistance among members of the RTO in order to grow up in a fraternal community.

**ETHNIC MINORITIES:** N/A

**LOCAL GOVERNMENT:** After the enactment of Decree #120, 22 August 1972, unfilled vacancies within the local administration became nil. However, the status of the problem changed from too many officials to too few. As a result of many complaints at the village level Decree 010 was signed into law on 20 January 1973. This allows all class A villages (5,000 population and above) to recruit one military assistant for the position of Deputy Village Chief for Security.

The Province/City Training Center, responsible for disseminating Saigon policy and upgrading Village/Hamlet officials performance, continues to remain in its' second-class position. The training of Village/Hamlet officials in 1972 resulted in 92% of the goal attained or 1,400 officials trained. In November and December the 1973 Training Program was planned and revised. The new plan calls for the training of 498 village council men and 1,135 Village/Hamlet officials. Immediate implementation of the plan will probably be delayed due to the cease-fire and the Prime Minister's message requiring all personnel to remain at their official station at all times.

The short renascence enjoyed by the Training Center ended in January 1973 when the Province Chief ordered the replacement of the Training Center Manager. This is the tenth change in a year and a half. Very little will ever be accomplished through the Training Center unless the GVN enforces a policy of retaining a qualified individual in position of Manager for at least two years to provide continuity in the Training Program.
AIK: Some AIK expenditures have been of valuable assistance in executing emergency or non-funded projects, however on other occasions expenditures have been counter productive. VN counterparts, realizing that the funds were available, would hesitate to conform to the complicated GVN administrative and fiscal procedures. The availability of AIK funds therefore stymied Vietnamese innovation and ingenuity and fostered the habit of making grand plans without the corresponding budgetary considerations. Unless this is properly controlled the detrimental aspects of AIK fund can far outweigh the positive aspects.

WAR VICTIMS DIRECTORATE

SOCIAL WELFARE: Tremendous progress in Return-to-Village resettlement payments was made from 16 December 1972 to early January 1973. Record disbursements a 25 hamlets for 2129 families consisting of 13,798 people amounted to 150,651,800$VN. The goal for resettlement in 1972 was 17,815 people. As of latest tally on 26 January 1973, 25,341 people or 143% of the goal have been paid full resettlement benefits. Little has been achieved in completing developmental projects at RTV sites per Communiqué 1411. Of the eighty approved projects only twelve have been completed and seven are still underway. The cancellation of the practice of releasing advance funds for project implementation is the principal cause for this failure. In the post cease-fire period this program will have even greater impact on the pacification of the countryside since it ties in with the emphasis the GVN must put on rehabilitation and reconstruction in the political struggle ahead.

REPORT AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

REPORT REQUIREMENTS: For the most part report requirements have been reasonable. On occasions the suspense dates on one time reports have not allow sufficient time to cross check information received from a single Vietnamese source.

REPORT FEEDBACK: Some of the feedback data is very useful and has given us the capability to compare this province with others and to determine significant trends. However, much of the feedback data received was not used.

PROTECTION OF PEOPLE AGAINST TERRORISM

POPAT: The record of the POPAT program in the Province has been one of the best in Military Region IV. Most of the personnel assigned to work in this area are well trained and knowledgeable but lack motivation. The transition of the program to the National Police transpired more smoothly than envisioned with no discernible drop in the effectiveness of the program. Although described as the Nation's top priority program POPAT is just one of the multitude and receives serious attention only when pressure comes down from Saigon or Region. Very little specific targeting is performed and the majority of the neutralizations are random. The Province and District Police Operations Centers are content to accept that which is volunteered by the various contributing agencies rather than seeking information. The action agency for the most part is at villages level not at district or province level where all the assets are available. The Province Chief has designated an ARVN Captain as a full time special representative for POPAT. This is not an authorized position and has tended to confuse the issue. There is still a duplication of effort within the police department at province and district level. The Police Operations Centers and Special Branch both maintain separate dossier
My recommendations for the POP AT program are:

1. Eliminate the full time special representative to the Province Chief for POP AT.

2. Encourage province and districts to conduct more POP AT operations to relieve the burden on the villages.

3. Continue the management and efficiency inspections by Saigon and Region to eliminate non-productive positions and wasted effort.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PUBLIC HEALTH: Inspite of the small number of public health facilities (7 Hospital/Infermary/Dispensaries, 29 Hospital/Dispensaries, 26 Health Stations and 1 Provincial Hospital) the Province has been able to provide basic health and medical assistance to the people. The problem of staffing these facilities with professionally trained and qualified personnel is a serious one. Qualitative rather than quantitative stress must be given to the matter of licensing doctors and registered nurses. Practical midwives working in the rural areas should be trained along semi-professional standards and more adequate stocks of medical supplies and medical equipment needs to be available to meet normal as well as emergency situations. Community health programs leading to improve individual as well as group observance of elementary hygiene and sanitation should be given encouragement. Efforts must be made to see that each hamlet has at least one drug store.

EDUCATION: Considering the comparatively low budget the Central Government has customarily allotted to Education, local education authorities have performed in a very creditable manner. The planned consolidation of the primary and secondary education into a Province Education Service with single supervisory responsibility for both levels has not materialized although preparations towards this end have continued. There are still a number of classrooms that are closed for lack of teachers. The Ministry of Education is woefully slow to act on requests for fund allocation and the processing of dossiers for teachers and custodian help. Approval of MOE funding to combat illiteracy came too late this year due to bureaucratic delay. In the post cease-fire the MOE must assume a more aggressive and dynamic role in meeting its educational responsibility, if it is to cope with the expected shift from the wartime to peace time emphasis on educational progress.

PUBLIC WORKS: The responsibility for keeping LCCs open to both military and non-military traffic has resulted in the Province receiving ARVN Engineer support over the years. The ARVN Engineers have been a de facto extension of the Province Public Works which has shared the former's assets in both manpower and equipment. Were it not for this, the local Public Works would have been in extreme difficulty in accomplishing their task. The Public Works operates under a very tight, centrally determined budget, and very few professionals on its staff and has a critical shortage of needed road building and maintenance equipment. Unless military support is continued in the post cease-fire time period Public Works will need heavy pieces of equipment, additional personnel and an increased budget.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: Efforts to spur economic activity continue with commendable success. Rice production has been particularly good. Price stability while difficult to maintain in view of the galloping inflation has nevertheless received the attention of the DRI and teams have been dispatched to the districts at least twice a month to check local prices and to see that prices are posted openly. Labor and business leaders convened in March 1972 to work out problems of mutual concern that could contribute to better relations hence a more favorable economic climate. The great hopes and expectations reposed on the Tay Do Industrial Park remains unrealized. The Physical completion of the Park itself is still too meager to consider as being an accomplishment. The hope that the Park could absorb the reservoir of trained manpower talent that have been released by close out US military and contractor facilities just has not materialized.

LAND REFORM: It is hoped that 60,000 ha. of rice land in the province will have been distributed through the Land to the tiller program by 26 March 1973. Approximately 40,000 former tenant farmers will then have attained land ownership. The Province has sent applications to Saigon for approximately 61,000 hectares and has received back approved titles for approximately 50,000 hectares. However titles for only 42,000 hectares have been distributed to farmers. Unless local officials place considerable emphasis on title distribution this program will not attain it goal. The positive political impact being achieved through this program is obvious. While there have been and continue to be problems in the implementation of the program, and even though there has been a lack of dynamic leadership at the Provincial Land Affairs Service, considerable success has been attained because of the clearly defined goals, emphasis from the central government and the inherent positive nature of the program.

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION: Great strides have been made in agriculture with increased use of cultivatable land producing for the economy. In 1972 55,000 hectares of IR rice was cultivated along with 87,000 hectares of local rice. Never have local farmers enjoyed such prosperity. This has been primarily due to the relentless efforts of both advisors and advisees in winning once skeptical farmers over to the wisdom of using fertilizers, intelligent second crops and a belated acceptance of the value of sorghum as a source of animal feed. Continue TN rice cultivation is now dependent upon improved irrigation and water control. Animal husbandry goals were achieved quite early in the year with duck and cattle raising showing the highest percentage in increase. This productivity has been greatly supported by more than adequate available rural credit. This province with 4 Rural Banks, tops the Delta in this regard and ties with Gia Dinh Province on a national rating.

YOUTH AFFAIRS: The present ineffective youth and sports program is the result of unrealistic numerical goals, limited personnel and no provisions for monetary support. The organization of youth groups could make an important contribution to the development of the country if there were closer coordination with the Education Service, ND Order and PSEF. A more valuable and effective youth program could be attained by each of these entities bearing the responsibility of organizing youth groups within their own organization. The youth service could shift its emphasis to sports and provide the organized groups with personnel for athletic training and sports camping equipment.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION

PSYOPS: The overall effectiveness of the public information program is difficult to measure because of its very nature and because of the lack of personnel to adequately monitor the program. Civic action and radio and television broadcasts were consistently on the plus side. On the minus side, person to person contact left a lot to be desired. This included the use of the Thu Duc Cadets in a last ditch effort to win over the populace. Although the overall plan was commendable, the execution, as in so many GVN projects, was poor. In general leadership in public information was good. Public information, like all other GVN agencies, must reconcile itself to the fact that they must now operate from a GVN budget without local US financial help. This should force the elimination of unnecessary frills.
HEADQUARTERS  
CORDS ADVISORY TEAM 56  
PHONG DINH PROVINCE, APO 96215  

12 February 1973

Colonel Le Ngoc Day  
Province Chief  
Phong Dinh Province

Dear Colonel Day,

In accordance with the peace agreement the US military portion of the Province Advisory Team has ceased operations and will depart not later than 27 February 1973.

It is my sincere wish that the people of Vietnam enjoy a lasting peace and prosperity. As part of this peace I hope that your people will be free to choose their government representatives without fear of reprisal. However, I am convinced that the Viet Cong will attempt to gain political and military control of your country.

In my opinion your government has the required forces and equipment to counter any action by the Viet Cong should a conflict again develop. Whatever actions may be taken whether military or political must be aimed at providing security for the people and aid in gaining their confidence and support. Once all your people see the government providing honest and sincere support to their needs I am sure they will actively and strongly support the government.

As you know I have only been in your Province a very short period of time. During this time I have been impressed with the leadership provided by you in the conduct of military operations. Your plans and their execution has been extremely effective in preventing the Viet Cong from seizing control of any territory or the control of any portion of the population.

I will devote the remainder of this letter to pointing out some areas where I believe improvements could be made. I hope my opinions will be of use to you.

The number of qualified leaders at rifle company level is very low. However it is these companies that must carry the burden of any conflict that may develop within the Sector. Most of these companies are assigned to battalions and from what I have observed these headquarters, which are staffed with competent officers and noncommissioned officers, are
not utilized to any great extent in the planning and conduct of operations. I recommend that the staffs of these battalion headquarters be reduced and qualified leaders be reassigned to the rifle companies.

Regardless of the number of leaders available all of them must take an aggressive interest in the welfare of their men. In addition those leaders must be responsive to orders of their superiors, report information honestly and accurately, maintain a high standard of discipline in their units and require their personnel to properly take care of their equipment. In regard to the latter item I recommend an active program of preventative maintenance rather than a program of repairing or replacing equipment after it has broken down.

Corruption on the part of military and civilian officials must be cut down or better yet eliminated. The soldiers and the civilians in the Province who see or hear about corruption will quickly lose faith in their military and government. Once the people lose faith they will be very susceptible to the propaganda of the Viet Cong.

On several occasions there has been evidence of a lack of cooperation and coordination between district forces and the National Police Field Forces. A good example of this that was in Thuan Nhon District where the Field Force platoon leader did not bother to tell the District Chief or the District Police Chief when his unit went on operations. This platoon leader was receiving his orders from the company commander of the Field Forces and when he complied with the orders he moved his unit without telling any district officials. In order to have successful operations I recommended much closer coordination between the National Police and the District Chief.

During the short time I have been in Phong Dinh Province I have been greatly impressed by the outstanding performance of many of your staff officers. Their continued hard work should provide your countrymen with a secure and peaceful environment in which to live.

Finally I would like to thank you for the assistance and support you and your staff have given to the military members of the Province Advisor Team. All members of the team have learned much during their tours of duty in your country.

Sincerely yours.

WILLIAM F. FITZPATRICK
LTC, FA