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AUTHORITY
AGO, D/A ltr, 11 Jun 1980
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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Reports: Senior Advisors, Phu Yen, Pleiku, Quang Duc, and Darpac Provinces, MR 4, Period Ending February 73


2. Transmitted herewith are reports of Senior Advisors to the MR 4 provinces for the period ending February 1973.
   a. LTC John M. McDonald, SA, Phu Yen Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B015, Inclosure 1
   b. LTC Frank L. Day, SA, Pleiku Province, DAMO-ODU 73B019
   c. LTC Griffin N. Dodge, SA, Quang Duc Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B027, Inclosure 3
   d. LTC John C. Bosch, SA, Darpac Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B028, Inclosure 4

3. These reports are provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the authors. The reports should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, they should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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PROVINCE ADVISOR'S COMPLETION OF TOUR REPORT
(RCS: MACCORDS 174.01)

Section I

Name: FRANK L. DAY
Grade: LTC
SSN: [Redacted]
Branch of Service: Armor
Province: Pleiku
Inclusive Dates of Tour: 2 Dec 72 - 27 Jan 73
Expected Reassignment Date: 23 Nov 73
Previous Tour in Vietnam: July 67 - Jun 68
Assignment on Vietnam Tour: S3, US Infantry Brigade

Section II

1. What background did you have for your position?
   Masters degree in International Affairs.

2. What training did you have for this position?
   Province Senior Advisor's Course, Fort Bragg, NC, 1972

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?
   I was unable to complete the language position of the PSA course due to my required in-country date. I feel that the entire language course should be required for all DPSA/PSA.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?
   One and a half years.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory?
   The support from Region was unsatisfactory in the priority given logistical support of all classes for territorial forces. During the period of my assignment, most of the RF Companies and many of the PF platoons of Pleiku
Sector were under the operational control of MR 2. These units were assigned operational missions comparable to ARVN units. The level of logistical support, however, was not comparable particularly the replacement of combat losses of equipment. During periods of heavy contact, the RF lost heavily while exacting even heavier losses on the enemy, but because the losses were not promptly replaced, the RF effectiveness slowly decreased.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming?

Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available?

No programs were delayed for lack of support. Some delays were experienced due to misunderstandings and administrative inflexibility, such as that caused by the variance in the money given for War Victims for roofing tin and the local price for tin sheets. The local price for tin was so high that the money allocated for roofing was insufficient. The decision to either issue more tin or more money was not made for two months after the problem was identified.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?

The failure to fully Vietnamese the HES prior to the cease-fire leaves much work to be done before this expensive and potentially valuable tool will again be usable.

8. Do the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in the pacification program?

Yes.

9. Were the instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements?

The plan for rapid withdrawal and the plan to form the Joint Military Commission presented conflicting requirements and resulted in a lot of wasted effort and planning when the JMC plan was finally announced.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:

    a. Territorial Forces
    b. Land Reform
    c. VSD

11. The most effective paramilitary forces are:

    a. National Police
    b. PSDF
12. The most successful pacification programs
   a. Territorial Security
   b. VSD
   c. Land Reform

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon pacification effort are:
   a. Territorial Security
   b. Land Reform
   c. War Victims - Return to village

14. The least successful pacification programs are:
   a. Public Works
   b. VIS
   c. Agriculture

15. The programs that have the least impact upon pacification efforts are:
   a. Chieu Hoi
   b. STRD Cadre

16. The rural people are aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and the US are making.

   The Highlanders who live near the cities or LOC are aware of the GVN efforts, but those further removed are not. The GVN must expand its efforts to reach the Highlander in the interior parts of the province. It is essential to take the GVN to the Highlanders, rather than to try to drive them into resettlement sites. The GVN at cease-fire has a clear advantage in the amount of acceptance of its side and the rejection of the VC/NVA side. Without strenuous efforts and unless the GVN continue to demonstrate its genuine concern and fairness for the Highlander this advantage could be quickly lost.

17. The people are committed to the GVN more than to the VC/NVA but there has been no great change in the 2 months I have been on the job.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in the security and development of Vietnam. If not, what changes in the plan should be made.

   The plan needs to be carefully examined and revised to take into consideration the cease-fire, the coming multi-level political struggle and the newly obsolete programs such as Chieu Hoi.
19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately explained to you and your counterpart.

Yes.

SECTION III
Territorial Security Directorate

1. Regional and Popular Forces. Although these forces have been severely attrited in leadership and equipment by the last 6 months of combat, they represent a determined and capable force that easily contains the VC threat and can handle NVA attacks in battalion strength when generously supported by air and artillery.

2. PSDF. The self defense forces perform adequately overall and in a few examples, outstandingly. Their greatest weakness is in consistent, motivated leadership.

Public Safety Directorate

1. National Police Field Forces: Pleiku finally got its long absent third platoon of field police back from Phu Bon in January. They came back badly in need of replacements and training. These forces will be vital to territorial security in the post cease-fire environment. They should be kept filled and trained.

2. National Police. Pleiku's National Police show espirit, organization and devotion to duty. If these qualities can be propagated to all the villages and hamlets, the level of security and law and order will continue to rise throughout the province.

Community Development Directorate

1. Village Self-Development: Although Thanh An District lost much ground on VSD, the rest of the province showed considerable progress in completing their projects. This program should be continued in post cease-fire operations and should be supported by the US advisory elements that remain after the military withdrawal.

2. RD Cadre. The RD cadre men were to play a vital part in the effort to win back the D & E rated hamlets of cease-fire. They have the training and motivation to contribute much in this effort. The program deserves continued support.

3. STRD Cadre. The STRD Cadre are poorly motivated, trained and supervised. The program needs a great deal of improvement in these facets or it should be discarded. The STRD have a great potential in Pleiku, but they have not yet demonstrated the determination or the ability to meet their challenge.
4. Local Government. Local officials at the village and hamlet level are desperately in need of practical training in their jobs. Particularly the Highlander hamlets need help in the techniques of hamlet administration.

5. AID in Kind. This is useful and flexible program, it lacks the financial backing to be of any real impact. It is a nickle and dime operation that gets nickle and dime results.

War Victims Directorate

War Victims. The effort to care for, feed, clothings and house a constant load of nearly 18000 refugees is a continuous one that takes daily attention from all those directly connected with it. The leadership at the two main refugee centers was so hit and miss that a considerable advisory effort was required to keep the program moving. It must be a focus of attention for the US civilians remaining.

Chieu Hoi Directorate

The only problems encountered with this program were those associated with sloppy handling of the intelligence gained from newly arrived Hoi Chanh. The program has been met with considerable ambivalence on the part of GVN officials and citizens. The sooner the distinction disappears in post ceasefire Vietnam the better for the Ralliers themselves.

Reports and Analysis Directorate

1. Report Requirements. As previously mentioned the failure to Vietnamize the HES has seriously endangered its future value to GVN.


Agency for International Development

1. Public Health. The loss of the Korean Medical Team left Pleiku with only 1 surgeon regularly assigned. The province received 60 days grace with the arrival of an American volunteer surgeon, but at least one more surgeon must be assigned on a permanent basis. The Public Health Service must extend its services on a routine basis to the outlying hamlets. The sanitary hamlet program is a highly effective one that offers great promise for nation building in post war Pleiku. The US advisory effort should support it.

2. Education. A chronic shortage of trained and motivated teachers for remote schools continues to hamper the educational program in Pleiku. In addition, there is a great need to teach the Highlanders the value of education for their children. As the GVN expands its influence into the remote areas, it must expand both schools and the appreciation for education.

3. Public Works. A weak service in Pleiku, Public Works will be vital to the post war period. All roads need repair and most of the secondary roads must be rebuilt. The electrification of villages and hamlets has not even been started in any real sense. This is an area in which the remaining advisors can contribute a great deal.
4. Economic Development. Pleiku is rich in natural resources of timber, unused arable land and potential hydroelectric power. Almost anything permanent done in this area will pay dividends.

5. Land Reform. This program is critical to the future commitment of the Highlander to the GVN. It is currently highly successful in Pleiku, but it should be carefully watched by the US observers in post war Pleiku. There are indications that the Highlander may get less than his fair share without continual concern.

6. Domestic Production. An effective return to village program would increase domestic production by as much as 50% in one year.

7. Labor. Pleiku's labor force is unskilled, untrained, unorganized and largely unemployed. This is an area that needs much work in Pleiku.

8. Public Administration. A strong US effort to assist in training administrators would be of great value to the province. The tax structure is only one of many areas that are only vaguely understood by the responsible officials province-wide.

Joint United States Public Affairs Office

Psyops: The heading of this section is an anachronism. In Pleiku, VIS is ineffective and unimaginative. There is a great opportunity for effective propaganda work and a crying need for effective counter-propaganda. This program has been poorly advised by US advisors in the past, and it is even more important now. Someone who really knows this area should be immediately assigned full time to get it on the right track in Pleiku.

FRANK L. LAY
LTC, Armor
DFS/Sr Military Advisor
Pleiku Province
Senior Officer Debriefing Reports: Senior Advisors, Phu Yen, Pleiku, Quang Duc, and Darlac Provinces, HR 4, Period Ending February 73 (U)

Senior Officer Debriefing Report, Period Ending February 73

LTC John M. McDonald
LTC Frank L. Day
LTC Griffin Dodge

19 Feb 73

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