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15 November 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: LTC Robert E. Wagner,
Senior Advisor, Quang Tin Province, Dec 70 - Jul 72

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) 2 July 1971.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of LTC Robert E. Wagner,
subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from
the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance
with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as
the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the
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4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as a
result of subject report should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff
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US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
Brigadier General James A. Herbert  
Deputy Director, OOMI  
APO 96222  

Dear Sir,  

Inclosed is my End of Tour Report. I have always thought that much of this material has application elsewhere, but have never had much success selling my programs outside the province. This paper represents my last effort.

[Signature]

Robert E. [Last Name]  
LTC, AR  
Province Senior Advisor  

DAFD-OTT  
72B019  
Inclosure
SUBJECT: Completion of Tour Report (CTR) – (RCS - MACORDS 174.01)

TO: COMUSMACV
ATTN: AC of S GORDS
APO SF 96349

1. Reference is made to MACV Joint Directive 4-70, dated 1 December 1970.

2. In accordance with referenced letter, the attached Completion of Tour Report is submitted.

3. Please note that this report is in two parts. Part one is an end of tour essay on some concepts I desire to submit through official channels before I depart. Part two is the format required by the above reference.

ROBERT E. WAGNER
LTC, AR
Province Senior Advisor
PART I

VIETNAMIZATION: A POLICY - NEVER A PROGRAM

1. INTRODUCTION

I hope my last writing in 1970 does not sound like the cross complaints of an angry, not so young, young man. Rather this paper represents the thoughts of a slightly disappointed man in NLF who is disappointed because he thinks we should do better. In effect, it is a liberalized version of the formal completion of your report which restricted my expression.

By my point of view is field level, and my target is security related advisory programs, through the philosophy behind my views applies equally to the entire spectrum of advisory functions. Development programs are not mentioned because they appear to be on the right track of Vietnamization, particularly Social Welfare which has done an outstanding job coping with 500,000 refugees in NLF during the recent emergency. Unfortunately programs such as land reforms, rural credit, and village self-development become academic if we are losing battles.

What this paper is advocating is the translation of a highly theoretical national policy termed Vietnamization into a specific, hard-nosed advisory program with time phased objectives. It seems to me we have the goal but have never designed a system to achieve our objectives except in the most general terms.

2. ADVISORY MISION ANALYSIS

Vietnamization must be based on some sort of problem solving procedure which has the effect of translating a broad policy into a specific advisory program at field level. If this is not done, monitoring and self-maintenance become the sole function of an advisory team, a sorry and all to common state I call "hill top sitting". Advisory teams must ask themselves "In our particular functional area, what system must the Vietnamese master before the US withdraws?" The answer to this question should provide the foundation for a specific advisory program. I call this problem solving approach mission analysis.

Example:

First Level Specificity:

Basic Question: What systems must the Vietnamese master before the US withdraws?

Answer: The development of a land transportation system - extremely important in the light of diminishing air assets. (There are many answers to this question; land transportation is one example).

Second Level Specificity:

Question: What should a transportation system advisory program encompass?

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Answer: Road maintenance, bridge maintenance, security, convoy procedures, vehicle maintenance. (Each one of these areas would be a distinct advisory program.)

Third Level Specificity:

Question: What exactly road is the US currently maintaining?

Answer: QL-1, the lifeline of MR-1 is currently being maintained by US Engineers. The Vietnamese must assume this responsibility if the province is to survive after US withdrawal.

The Specific Advisory Program: Inform the Vietnamese that the US will no longer maintain QL-1 by a certain date and actively assist the Vietnamese in designing a substitute maintenance system for QL-1 that they can support after we leave.

Designing the new system is critical to our success here. To many advisory teams Vietnameization means merely taking away support on departure day. The designing of a substitute system within the resources of our clients is our most important advisory function.

The advisory mission analysis just described is applicable to any advisory area, and, of course, in this case parallel advisory programs would be developed to address the entire problem of road transportation. The point is that there must be some sort of mutual discipline that translates Vietnameization into specific advisory programs.

This very basic approach is not apparent on many teams, especially those dealing with security. If some skepticism exists regarding this observation, simply visit a field advisory team and attempt to escape from the canned briefing of endless statistics and ask: "What are your advisory programs? What are your priorities? What must the Vietnamese master before this team is taken out of the area, and what are you doing about it?" You will be greeted by a stunned silence. When this problem is multiplied region, or even countrywide, the results are catastrophic for Vietnameization.

3. ADVISORY FADE-OUT

I believe there are three premises implicit in Vietnameization which dictate a withdrawal of the US advisory presence, a process we term "fade-out".

ONE: Advising, at least advising as currently structured, is no longer an open ended problem. The days of large advisory organizations and manning all districts with Americans are coming to an end.

TWO: The success of an advisory program depends on the eventual phaseout of the advisory effort. If we maintain a perpetual advisory presence with no time schedule, the Vietnamese will never master certain systems which, eventually, will be essential to their survival as a viable state.

THREE: The continued presence of an American, or Americans, who have no essential function other than merely monitoring the situation will erode the confidence of the Vietnamese to ever go it alone. Complete Vietnameization becomes a matter of national pride which I think will only come with independent
achievement. We fight an enemy that deploys forces all over Southeast Asia. Our allies find it difficult to send one division from one region to another. Scarcely, I believe, do we instill a sense of national identity and destiny which can counter the enemy's spirit. This can never be accomplished as long as we maintain a highly visible advisory presence. Closely related to the subject of national pride is an argument I have heard many times opposing the continued presence of district advisory teams or a single district advisor. The argument usually goes: "In terms of national resources, the cost of maintaining district teams is literally nothing considering the billions already expended on the Vietnamese war." This argument totally ignores the cost to Vietnamese spirit and independence. I believe we must cost this side also.

I had a recent conversation with the Province Chief very germane to this subject. As usual, I was haranguing about the almost complete inactivity of the 2nd ARVN Division. The Province Chief replied that as long as the US provided massive support, the South would never really fight. This support sapped their pride and their will to combat their "brothers from the North" on equal terms. The enemy enjoys a tremendous moral and psychological advantage because he fights with relatively no outside assistance.

One man's view, but certainly something to consider - not now during a tactical emergency - but over the long view. Continual massive combat support and a perpetual advisory presence with no specific program erodes the national pride of our allies. A crippling dichotomy sets in: They are afraid to do without us, and, at the same time, are ashamed of receiving such support.

4. ARVN

I have to believe that ARVN has been our greatest disappointment. No advisory program appears to exist. We have created an Army in our own image that depends on massive fire support and air mobility. When these assets are removed, operational paralysis sets in.

ARVN has never been subjected to mission analysis as described in paragraph 2. We have never asked ourselves the question, "What impact will the withdrawal of massive combat support and combat service have on the ARVN, or, corollary to this question, how should ARVN be restructured, doctrinally and organizationally, so that this army can conduct effective operations with minimum US support?" The answers to these fundamental questions will provide the basis for an ARVN advisory program.

Very briefly, I believe this program should be developed along two interrelated themes:

C1E: Air to Ground. ARVN must transform itself from an airmobile to a ground configuration. VNRF does not possess an adequate number of operational helicopters to support airmobile operations except in a few selected divisions. Right now, at least in the 2d ARVN Division, a lack of aircraft results in complete immobility.

Contrary to the heated denials of many senior ARVN advisor, this campaign has demonstrated that ARVN simply does not know how to operate on the ground. They must develop foot-mobile operations similar to the enemy. They should be expert in forced march techniques, night operations, and deep,
foot-mobile raids. In short, ARVN must learn to operate as a lean, mean, hard-hitting infantryman who walks rather than rides to battle.

Just as important as ground operations is the development of an overland combat service support system. ARVN, at least in this AO, remains very much dependent on aerial resupply. I am convinced that Chinooks are rapidly becoming artifacts; this means that effective, ground-mobile operations cannot be conducted because they cannot be supported.

TWO: Tactics: The absence of massive firepower places a tremendous premium on maneuver. The ARVN units I have observed do not employ any form of maneuver other than the frontal assault, which, of course, is a deadly business if not properly supported. No thought is ever given to flank or flanking maneuvers. The result of this sort of employment is either numerous casualties, or, more frequently, no attack at all since the necessary firepower is not available.

The principles of ground fire and movement also seem to be forgotten. Seldom is a base of fire established consisting of organic weapons while a maneuver element moves against the enemy. ARVN battalions appear to be completely dependent on outside fire support which is a tragic situation because much of this outside fire support will eventually be gone.

A training program must be implemented that incorporates basic combat unit tactics to include fire and movement and the employment of organic fire support. Many critical professional skills must be relearned that have been forgotten during the days of firebases, airmobile operations, and massive support.

The ultimate objective of the advisory program just described is to train ARVN to conduct offensive operations at a reduced level of combat support and combat service support — a level that they can sustain after the US withdraws. This goal is absolutely essential to our mission in Vietnam.

5. TERRITORIAL FORCES

Many Americans do not understand the role of territorial forces. They tend to think of security in terms of ARVN only. The most frequently asked question among advisors today is, "Will ARVN stand up to the NVA?" The future security of Vietnam appears to hang on the answer - at least our efforts in building up ARVN seem to reflect the philosophy that the way ARVN goes the war goes. I submit that in a people's war, this simply is not the case. ARVN cannot secure this province or the region regardless of their combat effectiveness because of their sheer lack of numbers, mobility, and motivation to protect the local population. As mentioned previously, ARVN is largely an American creation. Its traditions, doctrine, and operations are almost exclusively US inspired. As an Army they are capable of fighting in Laos, Cambodia, and the underpopulated areas of South Vietnam (with massive US support). Unfortunately, they have little or no relationship with the local population. In this war, identification with the land and the people is fundamental to an effective fighting force. Territorial forces, on the other hand, represent the only truly national military force in Vietnam. They are of the population and literally are fighting to protect their own ricefields. It is a cliché that in the last analysis the people must determine the outcome of this war. The territorials, to include the PSD, are the people - an armed citizenship. I am not saying that ARVN does not have an important security role in the war; however, its role is peripheral because of their lack of identification with the local population.
This certainly has been demonstrated during the post-set offensive in Quang Tin Province. The only units that have really fought have been the territorials. ARVN seems to function mainly as a fire support processing agency.

Considering the fundamental security role of territorial forces, something must be done to improve their support. It appears that whenever Americans talk about improving forces, they express themselves in quantitative terms only. We always talk of ‘more of the same,’ more MF, more FF, more space. We seldom discuss improving combat support or combat service support for the territorials. What is required is not more of the same, but rather, different type units. For example, sector needs a transportation unit to move troops since air mobility is non-existent; organic engineer support, at least capable of pioneer-type road maintenance is another requirement; a cavalry squadron is also needed for operations in the jungle which is the responsibility of the sector commander. The list could go on. Advisers must think not only in terms of quantity, but also in terms of improving support for territorial forces.

During this campaign, I have seen many combat support assets lie dormant which are desperately needed by the EF/FF, particularly combat engineers and cavalry. Perhaps, and I am sure this is utter heresy, some territorial could be transferred from ARVN to sector to correct support deficiencies. The issue is that the territorial forces are going to bear the brunt of the fighting in populated areas, they should be adequately supported and this does not consist of merely adding to their numbers.

6. CONCLUSION

a. CRITICISM: Since this paper could be considered controversial in some areas, I am going to address several anticipated comments.

(1) The paper is extremely critical of ARVN, an advisory area for which the author had no responsibility.

Answer: True, I had no direct responsibility, but province security must be a carefully orchestrated affair between sector forces and ARVN; consequently I was, at least, very interested. Since ARVN advisers never developed an advisory program designed to win ARVN from US support, I knew that eventually province security would suffer, and that is my advisory responsibility. I should add that my comments on ARVN are based first on personal, field observation, and second on communication with PAs in other contested areas of South Vietnam.

(2) An advisory program is never mentioned for territorial forces. Certainly they have similar problems to ARVN.

Answer: Our most important advisory program was called Independent and Cheaper Operations. The objective was, through training and a series of pilot model operations, to win sector forces from US support. I think this program has been successful. The EF/FF do not think of combat operations in exclusive terms of US support. They can and do operate effectively with organic support only. Many province teams have a similar program. The tragedy is that division advisory teams do not.
(3) The comments about improving support for territorial forces are for too general. How much cavalry, how much transportation, etc.

Answer: Additional Combat Support and Service Support for Territorial Forces was the Subject of a definitive study published by Team 16 in May 1971. This study received absolutely no reaction from higher headquarters. If any reader desires a copy, Team 16 will send one immediately. We are looking for allies.

(4) Paragraph 3, "Advisory Fade Out" appears to be advocating leaving our allies in the lurch.

Answer: I am not advocating abandoning the South Vietnamese to fate. Paragraph 3 is discussing an advisory technique - not a political philosophy. Advisory fade out is based on the belief that complete Vietnamization must eventually depend on the pride of self-achievement rather than massive US support and a ubiquitous advisory presence.

b. The central theme of this paper is mission analysis as outlined in paragraph 2. Many people will undoubtedly disagree with my views regarding ARVN, territorial forces, and advisory fade out. Though important, these ideas become secondary when compared to an overall mission philosophy which implements Vietnamization. At this stage in the war field advisory teams must have more of a function than merely sitting on top of a hill to monitor the situation; they must translate Vietnamization into specific advisory programs.

The mission of Team 16 has provided the basis for all our advisory activities: "TO TEACH THEM TO DO WITHOUT US". Each key member of Team 16 has applied this mission statement to his advisory area of responsibility (mission analysis) and various advisory themes have been developed. Some of the more general themes are:

(1) Security - to influence province to conduct Independent and Cheaper Operations, a program designed to wean sector forces from US support.

(2) Logistics - to influence province to develop a viable land transportation system. This takes on tremendous significance in the light of dwindling air assets.

(3) Development - to influence province to improve RTV sites where the people are living under wretched conditions. The list of advisory themes could continue, but I believe those pretty well illustrate our mission approach. I want to emphasize that Vietnamization, as understood by this team, does not mean that we no longer advise, but rather that we advise selectively, withdrawing where the Vietnamese have developed expertise, and advising aggressively on systems that our allies must master before we withdraw.

Without a similar mission analysis approach, field advising will remain an open-ended problem - a perpetual advisory presence with no function, and, correspondingly, no growth on the part of our allies. They will never be able to assume the burden of independence which is our objective in Vietnam.

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I recommend that guidance be issued from the highest US command echelons to the effect that field advisory teams develop hard-hitting, specific advisory programs with time-phased objectives. Vietnamization must be more than a highly theoretical national policy. We must develop at field level an implementing program or this war will never be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

[Signature]

ROBERT E. WAGNER
LTC, AR
Province Senior Advisor
PART II
SECTION I

NAME: ROBERT E. WAGNER

GRADE: LTC

SSN: 226-42-3959

BRANCH OF SERVICE: US ARMY

PROVINCE: QUANG TIN

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: Dec 70 - Jul 72

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 5 Jul 72

PREVIOUS TOUR(S) IN VIETNAM (DATES INCLUSIVE): May 66 - May 67

ASSIGNMENT OF PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR(S):

District Senior Advisor, Duc Long District
Chuong Thien Province

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SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?

Command and General Staff College
Tour of duty as District Senior Advisor

2. What training did you have for this position?

Vietnam Training Center, Foreign Service Institute:
Basic, DS4, R&I and Languages courses (22 weeks)

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?

None

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?

Minimum 18 months; maximum 2 years

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies.

Yes

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?

There were no programs substantially delayed due to a lack of support. Recently, the handling of the Quang Tri refugees at Chu Lai Base and the locally generated refugees from Kien Duc and Thang Binh Districts has been most successful particularly because of responsive support in the areas of FL 480 and technical assistance.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what change would you recommend?

I recommend no change except as noted in the Functional area... portion of this report.

8. Do the MACQIDS Management Information System Field Reporting Requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in the pacification program?

They provide a means to measure progress; it is the person who submits the report who determines the adequacy. It is true that the Vietnamese must eventually have their own system but as long as there are advisors in the field, we must take responsibility for determining the accuracy of the information which we submit.

9. Were the instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where there were conflicting instructions?

There were no instances where there were conflicting instructions...
ANSWER QUESTIONS 10-15 BY GIVING AN ORDER OF PRIORITY

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:
   1. Territorial Security
   2. War Victims
   3. Public Works
   4. Agriculture

11. The most effective paramilitary forces are:
   1. RF
   2. FF
   3. HSDF

12. The most successful pacification programs are:
   1. Territorial Security
   2. War Victims
   3. Public Works

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:
   1. Territorial Security
   2. War Victims
   3. National Police

14. The least successful pacification programs are:
   1. National Police
   2. VIS
   3. RD Cadre

15. The programs that have the least impact on the pacification effort are:
   1. Ethnic Minorities
   2. Land Reform
   3. Youth Affairs

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16. The rural people (are) (are not) aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making. If not, how can they be informed.

Whatever awareness the people have, it is too vague to be of considerable value. The local programs expounded upon by government officials are too general for the average Vietnamese to apply them to himself. What is needed is a "rice roots" program of information. This is not a system explaining some doctrinal national program or goal, but a locally devised here-is-what-this-means-to-you program. The Province Chief does not, in fact, address the people. He talks to them through their officials or leaders. Province officials must get out to the people.

17. The people are (are) (are not) committed to the GVN when you assumed your job. Why?

The Vietnamese who has little to lose commits himself to whoever gives him the opportunity to live as normal a life as possible. Where there is security and, by his standards, prosperity, he is committed to the GVN. Where these do not exist, he remains committed only to himself, an understandable opportunist who will support whoever shows promise in providing what he wants. Until the current offensive, the people became more and more committed to the GVN. Now, many are measuring sides and their commitments and waiting for the winner. I consider the present commitment to be about the same as when I arrived.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately explained to you and your counterpart? (Yes) (No) If not, how can this be accomplished?

The pacification plan comes across as a format drill of mimeographed ideas and unrealistic goals. Much of what is contained in the national plan is locally reproduced using the same language. The goals set at province are a fractional representation of the national goals whether they apply or not. The pacification plan is too doctrinal; provinces should be allowed more initiative in measuring local capabilities, needs, and interests and then given the latitude to establish their own priorities and goals. They usually accomplish only what they intend regardless of what they may write. The opportunity to write a realistic plan would reveal their actual intentions to planners at the national level.
SECTION III

Functional Areas

On the following pages discuss the successes and failures and back-
ground of functional areas that have occurred during your tour as a
province advisor. Give your comments on what changes should be made to
improve each program in the future.

Recommendation for additional subjects for discussion during the de-
briefing interview should be included on Page 19 - "Other Areas".
RF/PF: The territorial forces have come a long way in the past 18 months. Where they were previously dependent on US assets for everything from fire support to resupply, they now function with little outside assistance. It was no sudden shock when these assets were no longer available. Our advisory program of "Independent and Cheaper Operations" provided for a gradual decrease in US support so that the RF/PF would be prepared and capable of functioning without it.

I have always held that the territorial forces are the key to success in this peoples' war. Training and support were two areas which did not reflect the importance of their mission. Our sector level unit refresher training for the RF and the similar subsector level training for the PF have increased proficiency and morale. Since much of the training is conducted by the unit leaders, it has also provided a new esprit and sense of unit identity.

Additional combat and combat service support has been slow in coming. There is still an inadequate amount of artillery assigned to the sector. More engineer, VNAF (for command and control), maintenance, and vehicle support organic to the sector is needed. They are presently functioning well without it, but this still reflects a dependence on outside (ARVN) assets where there should in fact be none. Our "Field Trains" concept where each of several teams, all co-located near sector headquarters, has responsibility for a specified unit has done much to provide logistical flexibility in a highly mobile territorial forces environment. It has been tested on several surge-type operations and has proven rapid and effective.

PSDF: In March of this year and probably for the first time since the beginning of this war, the PSDF played an important role in a province-wide operation. The combat PSDF were employed as security for forward resupply points and aid stations. Support PSDF carried the needed supplies out to the operating forces and evacuated the wounded. This was a great success, creating a sense of participation and accomplishment previously unrealized by those part-time soldiers. PSDF training has improved but continues to need additional attention.
Field Police: When carefully controlled and supervised, the Field Police are an effective paramilitary force. This has been proven during their employment as a part of the province Hung Hoang forces. However, without close supervision they have been virtually ineffective. The basic problem, and this applies to all of the branches of the National Police, has been one of inadequate leadership coupled with a lack of prestige. The police have been the target of a major advisory program within the province. The progress made has been very small when compared to the effort expended. They have made minimal headway in the implementation of the many national programs devised to improve them.

National Police Operations: The National Police have yet to successfully implement the foot and mobile patrol program. Operations, both combined and separate, do not follow the prescribed concepts. Criminal investigation procedures, reporting, and follow-up are poor. The police reflect a 100% solve rate since they only report those crimes where they have a suspect. The ID card program has moved well. The basic problem remains to be a lack of prestige, tenuous jurisdiction over military offenders, a poorly defined command structure, inadequate training, and poor leadership. A nation-wide psyops campaign with the objective of improving the prestige of the National Police would be a most important first step in the right direction.
Village Self Development: The VSD machinery is well developed within the province. Frequently the projects, although completed on time, are poorly executed. E.g. cement buildings blowing down in a typhoon due to high sand content, which demonstrates a certain amount of corruption in the system. The process, however, is generally working with the people participating in project selection more often than not.

RD Cadre: The new RD cadre mission of working with RTV sites and other war victim areas is more germane than last year's mission. The effect RD cadre had on village administration was minimal in spite of peak strength. The current offensive has halted their efforts in the RTV/war victims program since they have been temporarily organized into company size units to assist in providing security.

Ethnic Minorities: The Vietnamese Ethnic Minority Office in Guang Nghi has responsibility for the small montagnard population in this province. Our advisory effort in this area is minimal.

Local Government: Recent village elections have reflected a high level of competition and voter turnout. The VMGD (TM and VAK factions) has lost some ground to the Cong Nghi which is heavily supported by the GVT. I consider the elections to adequately demonstrate a popular appreciation for a local democratic system.

Aid in Kind: We have reduced our use of AIX consistent with the basic concepts of Vietnaminization. The principle AIX support provided now is paying the salaries of the province VIS' culture/drum team. This support will end as of 30 June, this year.
War Victims: Our major locally initiated effort in War Victims has been to improve the lot of people in RTV sites. Basically, we selected a target RTV area which was accessible and relatively secure, employing our pilot model technique. After coordination with the various service chiefs, the project was presented to and well received by the Province Chief. Essentially, our concept was to activate a coordinated effort by the local services with the Social Welfare Office providing the money, RO Cadre providing the manpower, and other services providing the needed technical assistance. By our encouraging this coordinated action, the existing machinery was put into motion and the available funds into use. Unfortunately, the current offensive has brought this project to a halt, but the basic groundwork has been laid for its continuation once the situation stabilizes.

RTV objectives in terms of both returnees and payments were greatly surpassed in 1971.

The introduction of Quang Tri war victims to Chu Lai has, with minor exceptions, been handled well. Support from higher headquarters has been excellent, and the local Social Welfare Office has functioned most effectively. The current offensive has regenerated a local war victims problem and this continues to become more and more serious as the enemy advances. Effective assistance is also being provided to these people.

Social Welfare: The Social Welfare Office has directed the majority of its effort towards the war victims as already discussed. The formation of a separate veterans' Affairs Office was an excellent move since service to them has improved considerably. The housing project which was built for the veterans last year was a dismal failure as the veterans refused to move into the completed buildings.

The office did an excellent job of distributing relief supplies after typhoon Hester, but there is some question if all the supplies actually reached the needy after being sifted through lower level relief committees.

Last year PL 480 was discontinued due to poor management and corruption.
Chieu Hoi: The N51 Chanh rate has dwindled to practically nothing. This is a result of the fact that most of those who would Chieu Hoi have already done so and only the hardcore are left. An increase in abductions during February and the induction of personnel from areas lost to the enemy during the current offensive will probably result in an increase in N51 Chanh over the coming months. Presently, this team only monitors Chieu Hoi activities without active advising.
Report Requirements: Vietnамization of the HIE and TFES was a tremendous accomplishment and should be applied to other reports as soon as possible. I am aware of the planned replacement for the Big Kick but must point out the current fallacy in that report. There are no district teams in Quang Tin. The Vietnamese, without direction from their higher headquarters will not complete the report. The statistics which we report are not even a good guess without VN input and most of them are a repeat of the previous months figures. We have attempted on several occasions to gain relief from submitting a monthly report and have explained that the figures can be no better than inaccurate. We still must submit the report. The report is serving the system; the information is apparently unimportant. I will not belabor the much repeated points of excessive report requirements in a period of continuously reducing strength; the questionable validity of Vietnamese reports (and some US reports); the necessity for checking on information which has been received from Vietnamese sources; or the frequent lack of response to information which has been submitted.

Report Feedback: I believe that report feedback is useful to higher headquarters as a measuring device. It is useful to a province team as an indicator of relative standings, assuming that all teams are reporting the situation as it really is. Obviously, report feedback will be no better than the input. Since we are attempting within the limitations of report format to reflect the true situation, and since the province team in Quang Tin is the basic organization with its finger on the pulse of pacification, report feedback does not tell us anything about the province that we do not already know.
Phung Hoang: The Phung Hoang program is often restricted by the advisory doctrine. The goal of the program is the neutralization of VCI, but much advisory effort is directed towards operational systems and records in the PICO, DIO, and VICO. In Quang Tin at least, specific targeting is beyond the state of the art. The majority of neutralizations in 1970 were kills as a result of US, ARVN and RF/PF activity. During 1971, this began to change as province Phung Hoang forces became more active. Eventually the captured figure was greater than the kill figure. Vietnamese reporting also became more honest and the neutralization goals were still surpassed. The "Blitz" type operation employed by our Phung Hoang forces is not complicated. A target area is selected, cordoned, and flooded with field police, APT, and FRU. There is usually a list of persons who are to be arrested based on information which has come into the PICO. In spite of its lack of sophistication, it has been effective and I believe that is what counts.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Public Health: We have not expended any concerted advisory effort in this area for over a year. Health conditions, with primary advisory assistance coming from Region, continue to improve slowly. The Public Health Office has recently been very active in inoculating and assisting the Quang Tri refugees.

Education: This is a well executed Vietnamese show.

Public Works: QL-1 is presently in better shape than it has been in over a year. This is primarily due to the efforts of the new Vietnamese service chief who is stretching his funds, making maximum use of limited resources, and effectively managing his labor force. He is receptive to our advice and understands the importance of QL-1 in its role as the region's lifeline.

Economic Development: Over the past 18 months the only significant long range economic development has been the completion of major repair work on the lines of communication to the mountain districts. The primary reason for upgrading these roads was to increase security and provide means for ground resupply; once military traffic was moving along those roads with some degree of regularity, commercial traffic was bound to follow. The current offensive has slowed this logical succession of events. There has been a small business construction boom along QL-1 with a subsequent increase in the quantity and variety of commodities available on the market. There is a new bank, and movie houses are under construction in Tam Ky. There has been no advancement in terms of industrial potential. However, there has been some effort to develop export commodities (cinnamon, pepper precious woods), but security in the growing crops and transportation difficulties have impeded progress.

Land Reform: The modest goals set at Province level are still too ambitious. Progress has been slow since there are no real large landholdings to be divided.

The local office is administratively effective. There are still concealed landlord/tenant relationships but this is no serious problem and there have been few petitions for the land since the landlords are local people or the land is village owned.

Domestic Production: Livestock projects have been a continuous failure. However, the production of the miracle rice (VN 6 and 20) has increased substantially and TN 20 has been particularly well received. There is more room for expansion in miracle rice, but many farmers still demonstrate a reluctance to make the initial capital investment. Quang Tin will never be a great producer of miracle rice until security permits the damming of the rivers in the mountain areas and the construction of a province-wide, controlled irrigation system. There had been a limited introduction of VN 1. Fishing production has increased but not significantly.

Labor: The local labor office has veritably no function. The CFT and particularly the Tenant Farmers Union in Tam Ky enjoys a respected and politically active position in that community. The CFT provides a better tiller credit facility and better fertilizer at a cheaper price than the government.
Youth Affairs: These are primarily supported by private and religious organisations. Youth organisations have played fairly active roles in cleaning up for sanitary hamlet projects and have recently assisted with the Quang Tri refugees at Chu Lai. This functional area has had minimal advisory emphasis within the province.

Public Administration: At province level, the power of decision remains centralized in the Province Chief. The Province Council seldom disagrees with his decisions. There have been some significant advances at village level with the village councils, particularly those elected this year, having a greater impact on local decisions. The self-sufficiency goals, except for in the urban area of Tam Ky, have not been sufficiently met. The PMT works with relative effectiveness in the field but does not get out frequently enough to have any significant impact. The vertical communications system from village to province and vice versa is adequate.
JSYOP: Considering the size of the organisation, the funds invested, and the advisory effort expended, there has been less return from the VIS than from any other service in the province. Recently, there have been weekly newspapers published for distribution in the districts, but little else has been done. The various themes which have been developed have been handled in a shallow manner. There is little effort to get out to the people in contested areas where enemy propaganda efforts are most significant. The majority of the work done is in areas which could reasonably become subject to a critical visitor's eye. We have reduced advisory effort to a minimum since no amount of advising, suggesting, prodding, or encouraging has brought results.
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report (LTC Robert E. Wagner) - Senior Advisor, Quang Tin Province - Inclusive Dates Dec 70 - Jul 72**

**Lt. Col. Robert E. Wagner**

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