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SUBJECT: Final Report - Evaluation of Personnel Service Companies

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: aVNG-P.D
APO 96375


2. In accordance with the provisions of the foregoing reference, the attached final report has been completed by the DA Evaluation Team and is forwarded for review and transmittal to Department of the Army.

3. Request one copy of the USARV and CINCUSARPAC forwarding indorsement be furnished the Commanding Officer, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

NORMAN M. LEARY
Captain, AGC
Adjutant

31 Mar 1969
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL OPERATIONS
Military Personnel Management Team, Vietnam
O/O Army Concept Team in Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96384

FINAL REPORT

EVALUATION OF
PERSONNEL SERVICE COMPANIES
TOE-12/67E

Submitted by:

PAUL E. LASKER
LTC, Infantry
Project Officer
AUTHORITY


Message, AVHAT-IÜD, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, 81725, 29 Nov 68, subject: Evaluation of Personnel Service Company in RVN.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Department of Army Military Personnel Management Team in Vietnam is indebted to the following officers for their help in the evaluation:

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MAJ Marrell M Gillan, CO, 537th Personnel Service Center
MAJ Jack Keadle, CO, 516th Personnel Service Company
MAJ Walton B Stamper, Project Officer, ACTIV

PROJECT OFFICER

Lieutenant Colonel Paul E Lasker, Infantry

EVALUATORS

Major Billy M Walker, Field Artillery
Major Jerry E Merrill, Adjutant General Corps
Major Harold J Baumeister, Field Artillery
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this project was to evaluate the effectiveness of four Personnel Service Companies (PSC), TOE 12-67E, in support of operational units in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to determine whether the units' effectiveness could be enhanced by changes in personnel and equipment authorizations, mission, functions, and operational concepts.

The mission of the Personnel Service Company is to act as custodian of and maintain the field individual military personnel records. Due to geographical dispersion of supported units, the tactical situation, and communication difficulties in RVN, support teams organic to the Personnel Service Companies had been dispersed to provide support to major supported units. Each of the companies evaluated was operating under the personnel Management and Accounting - Card Processor (PERMACAP) System. Two Personnel Service Companies, the 520th and the 537th, had combined to form a Personnel Service Center and were evaluated as one entity.

Collection of data and evaluation of the companies was conducted in all four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) in RVN during February and March 1969.

With some exceptions in the Company Headquarters, personnel authorizations were generally adequate. Equipment authorizations were deficient in not providing for photocopier, decollator and offset press capability. The quality of records maintenance and personnel management assistance performed by the PSCs was adequate. Unit commanders had been relieved of the administrative burden to maintain personnel records; however, in some cases, this relief was negated by such administrative requirements as verifying inaccurate data prepared by the PSC and preparing their own personnel data reports. Responsiveness of the PSC to supported units in RVN was best achieved through the employment of composite teams. PSC mission accomplishment requires that a continuous indoctrination program be conducted for all key individuals in the personnel administration and management system.

It is recommended that changes to TOE as well as the doctrine contained in this report be reflected in appropriate publications.

Users of this report are invited to send inquiries to Chief of Personnel Operations, ATTN: PMDC, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20315.
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1. REFERENCES


d. Message, DA 888181, 22 Nov 68, subject: Evaluation Plan - Personnel Service Company in RVN.

e. Message, AVHAT-LED, HQ USAV 81725. 29 Nov 68, subject: Evaluation of Personnel Service Company in RVN.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this project was to evaluate the effectiveness of four Personnel Service Companies (PSC) in support of operational units in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to determine whether the units' effectiveness could be enhanced by changes in personnel and equipment authorizations, mission, functions, and operational concepts.

3. OBJECTIVES

a. Objective 1 - Personnel and Equipment

Determine whether personnel and equipment authorizations for the Personnel Service Company, TOE 12-67E, are adequate for support of operational units in RVN.

b. Objective 2 - Adequacy of Support

Determine whether the services provided by the Personnel Service Companies in RVN are adequate and to what extent supported units have been relieved of an administrative burden.

c. Objective 3 - Improved Effectiveness

Determine what changes to mission, functions, and operational concepts should be made to enhance the performance of Personnel Service Companies participating in stability operations.
4. BACKGROUND

The requirement to evaluate PSCs in RVN was recommended for addition to the ACTIV program for FY 68-69 by Department of the Army at request of the US Army Combat Developments Command. During normal DA staffing of the Evaluation Plan proposed by ACTIV, it was determined that the Office of Personnel Operations (OPO) would provide personnel from the Military Personnel Management Teams to conduct the evaluation.

5. SCOPE

The four companies to be evaluated were the 222d assigned to the 44th Medical Brigade, the 515th assigned to the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, and the 520th and 537th assigned to the Saigon Support Command. The 520th and 537th had combined to form a Personnel Service Center and were evaluated as one entity. The companies' bases of operation were located at fixed military installations where they were housed in semi-permanent quarters and utilized facilities and equipment which were not organic to the companies. Many items of equipment had been placed in storage.

6. DESCRIPTION

The mission of the PSC is to act as custodian of and maintain the field individual military personnel records, and accomplish the personnel actions and services which are attendant upon this responsibility. The company provides centralized personnel service to the headquarters as well as to the subordinate units of the command to which assigned. Due to geographical dispersion of supported units and the tactical situation in RVN, communication in many areas is difficult and, in some areas, nonexistent for short periods of time. In some cases, support teams organic to the companies had been dispersed to other geographical locations to provide support to major supported units. Each PSC was operating under the Personnel Management and Accounting - Card Processors (PMACAP) System (See Annex A).

7. APPROACH

Data required to accomplish Objective 1 was obtained by questionnaires administered to the PSC commander, division chiefs, and supply personnel. Objective 2 was accomplished through interviews with supported unit commanders, SIs, adjutants and PSNCOs. Additional data pertaining to Objective 2 was obtained by reviewing Officer and Enlisted Qualification Records in the custody of the PSC commander. Information required to accomplish Objective 3 was obtained by analyzing the effect that changes to mission, functions and operational procedures might produce on the unit's methods of operations as related to their current method of employment in RVN.

8. ENVIRONMENT

The evaluation of the four PSCs was conducted in I, II, III, IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) in RVN during the months of February and March 1969.
9. Data COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

a. The primary means of collecting data was through the use of questionnaires. Observation of actual practices and the use of various checklists also contributed valuable data. The project officer and all evaluators participated in the collection of data.

b. The primary sources of data included commanders, supervisory, and operating personnel both in supported as well as supporting units. Other sources of information included files at Ha, UH/TV and at the Data Service Center (DSC). All data was sorted according to objective and analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively.
THIS PAGE NOT USED
10. PERSONNEL

a. All PSCs evaluated were organized under MTOE 12-67E as implemented by USARPAC General Order for each unit. The MTOEs deleted the Military Pay Division, the pay supervisor in the Standardization and Training unit, and upgraded several enlisted positions in company headquarters and in the Administrative Machine Division. The number of personnel authorized in a PSC depends upon the number of troops which a PSC is required to support. The PSCs are referred to as a type A thru E organization. Figure 1 indicates the different types of PSCs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TROOPS SUPPORTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2,000 - 4,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>5,000 - 7,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>8,000 - 10,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>11,000 - 13,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>14,000 - 16,999</td>
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</table>

Figure 1. PSC Support Capability

b. An evaluation of assigned and authorized personnel of the PSCs revealed the following facts.

(1) All PSCs had more personnel assigned than authorized. The 222d PSC was over 2 officers and 11 enlisted men; the 537th PS Center was over 2 officers and 4 enlisted men; and the 518th PSC was over 20 enlisted men.

(2) The 222d PSC and the 537th PS Center had established composite and second echelon support teams which resulted in some similarity of personnel positions within the PSC. These two PSCs organized their teams to meet their particular requirements. The 222d PSC, for example, found it
necessary to have clerks at each team for processing of R&H requests. The 537th did not have this requirement but had placed clerk typists on their teams for processing the team's correspondence.

(3) Evaluation of the Personnel Records Division revealed that all units utilized less personnel than the TOE authorized. Depending upon the PSC, the records clerks maintained from 26C to 325 records. This represented a greater work load than established for these clerks by the TOE. The unit commanders felt that they could provide adequate record maintenance based on that number of clerks and utilize the remaining personnel in other areas. The requirement to have personnel in other areas was a result of a particular requirement imposed or assumed by the PSC.

(4) Company headquarters in the PSCs had more personnel assigned than authorized. A majority of these overages varied in positions among PSCs; for example, a repair and utility team, company detail personnel, reenlistment and training NGO, additional supply and motor personnel. The 516th PSC was required to provide messing facilities for a finance detachment, a base postal unit and post exchange personnel which required additional mess personnel not authorized in the MTOE.

(5) All of the above positions were evaluated and found to be different in each PSC. No valid requirement for these positions could be established outside of the particular PSC that would justify a TOE revision.

c. The following positions were found to be required within the PSC.

(1) A First Sergeant. This individual was necessary to handle company administrative and housekeeping functions.

(2) A Motor Sergeant. This individual was required to supervise the vehicle repairmen authorized by the TOE and maintenance of the unit's vehicles.

(3) A Postal Clerk. Replacements were assigned from the Replacement Battalion to the PSC. They were rapidly reassigned; however, those replacements used the PSC as a temporary mailing address. This placed a large postal requirement on the unit and a Postal Clerk was required.

(4) Two operators per flexowriter. As a result of the centralized order cutting, at least two shifts of these operators were required. TOE positions were not identified for flexowriter operators. The units were using clerk typists (71B) and personnel specialists (71H) for operators. These individuals were on-the-job trained. Company headquarters was authorized four clerk typists in a type C and five in a type D unit. In either case sufficient personnel were not provided to operate two shifts.

II-2
Two operators per reproduction machine. One mimeograph operator was authorized by the MTOE. Again, with the centralized order processing, two shifts were required to keep current with the work load.

d. No PSC had assigned personnel to the Standardization and Training unit. The units felt that these personnel authorizations were not required.

e. All FSCs had local nationals employed against MTOE slots. Reactions varied among the unit commanders on whether some advantage could be gained from utilizing local nationals as key punch operators, cooks, clerk typists and mechanics. Their feeling was that the labor market did not support the required skills and during enemy action the local nationals were not available for work. They also felt that if local nationals were employed it should be on an augmentation basis.

11. MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (MOS)

a. The evaluation included not only an analysis of strengths but also investigated appropriateness of MOS authorized by TOE. Interviews with supervisors along with evaluator observations revealed that some MOSs should be changed.

b. The 222d PSC had five Medical Service Corps (MSC) officers assigned as substitutes for the authorized AG officers. Since the PSC serviced a Medical Brigade, the MSC officers were more acquainted with the personal problems associated with medical personnel and could provide more responsive and understanding personnel support.

c. Personnel operating the flexowriters had not been trained in this specialty. As this is a delicate and complex machine, this training should be received during Advanced Individual Training. The MOS most appropriate would be a clerk typist's (71B) MOS.

d. PSCs were using multiliths as reproduction equipment. Individuals operating these machines did not have the correct MOS. Offset pressman, MOS 83P20, should be included in the MOS structure.

e. All other MOSs were considered appropriate.

12. EQUIPMENT

a. The paramount factor here was that much of the TOE equipment had been turned in for storage as units were not operating in the field or under field conditions. As a matter of fact, the PSC operated quite similarly to garrison units. Most of the office equipment used by the PSCs was Common Table of Allowances (CTA) office furniture and equipment and not TOE equipment. Interviews with supervisory personnel together with observations revealed some TOE equipment deficiencies.
b. The following equipment is considered necessary for PSC operation and improvement:

(1) A photocopier is necessary in order to provide the reproduction capability that is required of a PSC. The 222d PSC which had a photocopier averaged 95 different types of reproductions over a three day period. These were special orders, Army Regulations, messages and general correspondence which due to the nature of the material precluded typing this material.

(2) Two offset presses are needed for reproduction purposes in that two PSCs averaged 650,000 impressions a month and one averaged 1,200,000 per month. Several considerations must be noted. Flexowriters which type the orders operate more effectively using Multilith Masters in place of stencils. Mimeographs use stencils. PSC orders normally have more than one individual on them and are reproduced in 300 or more copies. Stencils provide poor reproduction for this number of copies.

(3) One 6-Strip Decollator is required to furnish the many copies of different records and rosters to their supported units and higher headquarters by the PSCs. The 222d PSC used 30 boxes of folding tabulating paper one month, 40% of which was 6-part paper. The 537th PS Center used 58 boxes of this paper, 64% of which was 6-part paper. A definite requirement exists for this decollator.

(4) An additional 083 sorter is required. The TOE authorizes one 083 sorter. The speed of the 083 sorter severely limits the AMD ability for sorting cards. The PSC sets up and prepares the majority of their reports over a 15-20 day cycle. The operation of the 083 sorter during this time is 80% of its month's work load. The month end reports would materially be expedited with an additional 083 sorter.

(5) One Polaroid Camera and allied lighting equipment is required. Personnel were visiting the PSC to initiate requests for ID cards. They were required to go to the signal support activity to have a picture taken. This should be handled completely by the PSC. Having this equipment would enable PSC contact teams to complete ID card actions during their periodic visits to supported units.

(6) Although not emerging during the evaluation of the PSCs, coordination with the USARV Comptroller revealed that based on their experience voltage regulators, dehumidifiers, and vacuum cleaners should be included in future authorization documents. It was further recommended that an appropriate Prescribed Load List (PLL) be developed for all equipment other than the ADPE. This PLL should include such items as compressors for air-conditioners, fuses for voltage regulators and ballasts for fluorescent light fixtures in the M513 vans.

c. An evaluation of the maintenance of equipment revealed the following maintenance problems.
(1) Flexowriters had considerable down time due mainly to minor adjustments such as a typebar being out of adjustment and the tape reader misreading. The customer engineers (CE) were located in Saigon and, on occasion, were not readily available. The tabulating equipment repairmen, MOS 34B, were not trained to repair the flexowriters.

(2) Two PSCs were using multiliths. Some problems were found with the belt feed and with the roller warping on these machines. This was caused by the machines being operated in buildings without air conditioning. After continuous operations, the machines tended to heat up. The 516th PSC was utilizing an A. B. Dick offset press which did not have a belt feed and the rollers were not affected by the heat.

(3) In the 222d PSC and 537th PS Center, the 36,000 BTU air-conditioner located in the Univac 1005 van tended to freeze up during the hottest time of the day. This required that the Univac 1005 shut down until the proper operating temperature was again reached. It appeared that the air-conditioner was not operating effectively. To service the air-conditioner, it was necessary to send it to support maintenance. There was no float air-conditioner available for replacement. This would require the ADP equipment to be non-operational during this repair time.

13. FINDINGS

a. The units had more personnel assigned than authorized and that most of those overage personnel could not be justified.

b. A requirement existed for the following additional individuals in the PSC TOE:

(1) One First Sergeant.
(2) One Motor Sergeant.
(3) One Postal Clerk.
(4) Four flexowriter operators for a type C unit; three flexowriter operators for a type D unit.
(5) Two offset press operators per offset press.

c. Personnel were not being assigned against the positions authorized for the Standardization and Training Unit.

d. Local nationals were employed against MTOE slots and they were not available for work during certain alert conditions.

e. MSC officers were used in lieu of the authorized AG officer positions in the 222d PSC for purposes of providing more responsive support to the 44th Medical Brigade.
f. A requirement existed for the following additional TOE equipment:

(1) One photocopier.
(2) Two offset presses for a Type C and D unit.
(3) One 6-strip decollator.
(4) One additional 083 sorter.
(5) A Polaroid camera and allied lighting equipment.

g. The USARV Comptroller stated that voltage regulators, dehumidifiers, and vacuum cleaners should be included in the TOE. In addition, the Comptroller felt that an appropriate PLL should be developed for all equipment other than the ADPE.

h. Maintenance problems were experienced with the flexowriters, multiliths, and air-conditioners.

i. Flexewriter down time was most frequently caused by some minor problems and on occasion customer engineers were not readily available to make necessary repairs.

j. Tabulating equipment repairmen, MOS 34B, were not trained as flexowriter repairmen.

k. Clerk typists, MOS 71B, were not trained in flexowriter operations.
14. PERSONNEL SUPPORT PROVIDED

a. Recurring Reports

(1) The 518th PSC was providing all supported units with recurring reports and rosters as outlined in AR 600-16.

(2) The 222d was providing Personnel Information Rosters (PIR) and Personnel Inventory Reports; however, the PIR was only distributed to the support team level and the Personnel Inventory Report to the major subordinate unit level. Personnel Qualification Rosters and Personnel Suspense Rosters were not being prepared.

(3) The 537th PS Center was providing supported units with the Personnel Information Rosters and Personnel Inventory Reports. Personnel Qualification Rosters were also being provided but were only distributed to the composite team level. Personnel Suspense Rosters were not provided.

b. Other Data and Services

(1) Alphabetical Rosters for both officer and enlisted personnel were provided supported units by the 222d and 518th PSC and the 537th PS Center. These rosters were used primarily as a locator and served as a ready reference for all personnel in the command.

(2) The 518th PSC was also furnishing supported units with a monthly Disciplinary Roster which provided the commanders with a listing of personnel in their command with disciplinary actions.

(3) In addition to the Alphabetical Roster, the 222d PSC was providing a monthly Personnel Data Roster. This roster provided some of the essential data required by supported commanders.

(4) Total records maintained by the PSCs/Center are shown at Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total Records Maintained</th>
<th>Number of records maintained by each clerk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>222d PSC</td>
<td>9,473</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518th PSC</td>
<td>10,366</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>537th PS Center</td>
<td>19,702</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 Records Maintained by PSC
(5) The 537th PSC had established two and three man contact teams which visited supported units on a scheduled basis. Personnel records for the unit being visited were carried with the teams and referred to the unit commander or his representative for review. If required, new DA Forms 41 (Record of Emergency Data) were initiated and any other changes required were made on the records.

(6) Monthly PSNCO meetings were being conducted by the 518th PSC and the 537th PS Center. These meetings were for the purpose of providing periodic instructions on new or changing procedures and policies within the command. Newly assigned PSNCOs in the units served by these two PSCs also received an orientation to familiarize them with the operation and organization of the PSC and to emphasize to the PSNCOs that they represented a technical and valuable extension of the PSC. In addition, newly assigned PSNCOs were given the benefit of experiences and techniques found successful by other PSNCOs.

(7) All PSCs had established procedures for insuring that unit commanders or their designated representative had access to the Military Personnel Records Jacket (MPRJ). Policy in the 222d PSC was that records would not be allowed to leave the teams. Commanders desiring to see an individual's records were required to visit the team for review and screening. Few exceptions were made to this policy. Policy in the 518th and 537th was that records would be furnished commanders when requested for a 24 hour period.

(8) In and outprocessing of all replacements and overseas returnees was conducted by teams from the PSCs/Center. During inprocessing, Personnel Data Cards (DA Form 2475) and Reenlistment Data Cards (DA Form 1315) were prepared on newly assigned personnel. Policy in the 518th PSC and the 537th PS Center was that the individual handcarry these cards to their unit of assignment. The 222d PSC, however, mailed the cards to the gaining units.

(9) Personnel requisitioning for all supported units was accomplished by the management divisions in each of the PSCs; however, the 537th PS Center was not annotating requisitions with T or Z coding. A problem area existed in that there was no way for USARV AG to determine by their flight rosters what individuals had been allocated to fill requisitions. Although USARV AG was receiving some graduation rosters from some CONUS schools, not all rosters were being received. This resulted in many individuals not being pinpointed and assigned to the units which required their special qualifications.

(10) Supported units were being assigned qualitative MOS fill to the extent such fill was available to the Personnel Service Companies. Assignments to all units was done based on established priorities.

(11) All replacements for the 222d, whether arriving at the 22d or 90th Replacement Battalions, were processed through the PSC prior to
assignment to supported units. The 537th PSC received all replacements through the 90th Replacement Battalion. Upon arrival at the PSCs or support teams, replacements were inprocessed and in coordination with unit PSNCOs assignments were made. All PSCs were assigning replacements within the EDCSA date established by the Replacement Battalion.

(12) All three PSCs were prepared to provide assistance in training unit clerks when requested; however, the supported units rarely requested such assistance. For the most part, unit clerks were school trained when they arrived but needed some additional on-the-job training. This additional training was done by the 1st Sergeants and/or PSNCOs.

15. QUALITY OF SUPPORT PROVIDED

a. Recurring Reports

(1) Personnel Information Rosters furnished by the 518th PSC and the 537th FS Center were generally inaccurate. This finding was based on an actual screening of the rosters by the evaluation team and from repeated comments made by commanders, S1s, adjutants and PSNCOs. Many of the inaccuracies were caused by the supported unit's inattentiveness to detail and, in some cases, lack of knowledge. Errors were also being made in the personnel management divisions, personnel records divisions, and the AMDS. There was both a lack of coordination and quality control among these elements. In an attempt to provide quality control the 518th AMD provided the records division with a printout of changes made from change cards submitted. The records division then crosschecked the FIR, the change cards and the printout to insure that all changes were made properly. The 537th FS Center had assigned an analyst to each team and this individual was charged with the responsibility of initiating all change cards. Even with these procedures the FIRs still appeared the following month containing errors that were previously reported but were not changed. Considerable deviation from the prescribed format for the FIR as outlined in AR 600-16 and DA Pam 600-8 was also noted.

(2) The Personnel Inventory Report prepared by the 518th PSC was in accordance with the format outlined in AR 600-16 and appeared to be accurate. Those prepared by the 222d PSC and the 537th FS Center were not prepared according to format.

(3) Personnel Qualification Rosters prepared by the 518th PSC and the 537th FS Center were in proper format and were accurate. However, the 537th FS Center provided copies of this roster only to their composite teams. This failing resulted in the commander not having a valuable management tool at his disposal.

(4) Personnel Suspense Rosters were being provided to supported units by the 518th PSC. The format had been modified in that the medical data block had been omitted and the units had been charged with the responsibility of coordinating with medical dispensaries to insure that all
immunizations were administered at the proper times. Plans were being made by the 537th to provide their supported units with a PSR for the month of April 1969.

b. Other Services

(1) Measurement devices employed by the evaluation team to determine quality of personnel service support being provided and the results of these checks are shown in Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement Device</th>
<th>222d PSC</th>
<th>537th PS Center</th>
<th>518th PSC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Check of Qualification Records</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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Figure 3. Quality of Service Provided by PSCs

(2) Errors noted on qualification records were improper classification, utilization and assignment, date of annual audit not shown, required AOR (Advanced Overseas Returnee) and ORR (Officer Returnee Report) annotations not made, and CONUS area of preference not entered. A considerable percentage of errors noted were failure to annotate qualification records with AOR and ORR month, and CONUS area of preference in Item 42 of the Enlisted Qualification Record (DA Form 20) not entered.

(3) Proper and sufficient publications can assist the PSC to perform with maximum effectiveness. A check of each publications section was made to determine if the DA Form 12 series was in effect. Two PSCs did not have current DA Form 12 series and the PSC which had updated these forms was not receiving distribution on a regular basis.
(4) Personnel service support throughout all PSCs was adequate when compared with the CONUS experience of the evaluation team members in measuring effectiveness of personnel services. Personnel assigned were responsible individuals who were imbued with the fundamental nature of a service organization. Personnel actions and requests, for the most part, were processed expeditiously. Through interviews with commanders, SIs, adjutants, and PSNCOs and actual observation it was determined that the average time lapse for complete processing of a personnel action was 5 to 7 days. Most delays were attributed to distances between the PSC and supported units and the difficulties in transporting hard copy material in HVN.

(5) Inprocessing procedures at all three PSCs were good and records of newly assigned personnel were being screened for accuracy and completeness. Procedures 6-1 and 6-2, AR 600-16 were being closely followed during inprocessing. The 518th PSC and 537th PS Center did not have an established procedure for identifying personnel not drawing proficiency pay (specialty) who were eligible for award upon arrival or become eligible at a later date. There were cases noted where individuals were eligible for receipt but had not been properly awarded specialty pay. They had established procedures to identify those individuals already drawing specialty pay when they arrive in the command. Procedures had also been established in all PSCs to insure that the award of superior performance pay did not exceed current DA authorized percentages for each HUB. During inprocessing, all officers were required to conduct an audit of their records and the date of audit was entered. The same procedure was followed when the officer outprocessed. DA Form 41 (Record of Emergency Data) was also checked with each officer and enlisted replacement and changed if necessary.

(6) The on-the-job training (OJT) program in all PSCs needs improving. This area was not given much attention either by supported units or the PSCs. Seven instances were noted where individuals had been in an OJT status in excess of 90 days without action being taken to award a new BIOS or SMOS.

(7) There were no provisions made in the 222d and 537th PSCs for informing individuals of their current leave balance. The 518th PSC did provide this data on the monthly PQR. PSNCOs interviewed stated that when questions on current leave balances arose the individual was referred to the servicing finance section for assistance.

(8) Another measure of the quality of service provided by PSCs was the accuracy of data being submitted to the Data Service Center (DSC) by the PSCs. The accuracy of this data should reflect the accuracy of data contained in the PSC data banks. Accuracy data obtained from the USA RV DSC showed that the 222d had a 41% error rate in data submitted, the 537th had a 29% error rate; and the 518th showed a 27% error rate. The accuracy of data submitted by the PERMACAP PSCs had shown a considerable improvement in the last 3 months. As a matter of interest, overall USA RV accuracy figures for February 1969 revealed that PERMACAP units had a 26% error rate while non-PERMACAP units had a 28% error rate.

III-5
16. **Satisfaction with Support Provided**

a. **Unit Requirements**

(1) Commanders and staff personnel supported by the 222d felt that as a minimum they should be provided an accurate Personnel Information Roster and Personnel Inventory Report. In addition they also felt they should be provided a Personnel Qualification Roster, Personnel Suspending Roster, a DEROS Roster and an AMED Officer Roster. These rosters would materially assist in proper personnel management and provide necessary additional information on personnel in their commands. Battalion commanders and staffs supported by the 537th PS Center stated that they needed, in addition to the Personnel Inventory Report already provided, a Personnel Qualification Roster and a Personnel Suspening Roster. Key personnel support by the 518th PSC felt the data already provided would be sufficient if it were more timely and accurate.

(2) The majority of commanders and staff personnel interviewed felt that the Personnel Data Cards being received on newly assigned individuals did not contain sufficient pertinent items of information on replacements. They all felt that upon initial assignment of replacements the field 201 file and the qualification records should accompany the individual and the units be allowed to retain them for a sufficient period to record needed data.

(3) Several commanders and S1/adjutants indicated a strong desire to have all personnel records returned to unit control. Argument in favor of this requirement was that it would give the commander the responsiveness he needs for personnel administration. Further discussion in this area revealed these personnel realized that centralized personnel support is required to provide timely and accurate data to higher headquarters; however, they felt the system must be improved to provide more responsiveness to the commanders. Responsiveness to these personnel meant answers to questions in minutes instead of hours, and action on personnel action requests in hours as opposed to having to wait days as they were doing. This feeling was strongest among those units separated from the PSC or support team by considerable distance.

(4) Timely receipt of special orders on newly assigned personnel, promotions, reductions, and awards and decorations was also a requirement by commanders and staff personnel. Again complaints in this area were most prevalent among supported units separated from the PSCs/Center. Late re-assignment instructions on individuals scheduled to depart Vietnam are creating considerable problems. The 518th PSC provided the evaluation team with statistical data which revealed that of 755 E1 through E6 personnel eligible for reassignment in February 1969 only 354 received assignments 30 days or more prior to DEROS. The other 401 personnel received their reassignment instructions less than 30 days from DEROS. Further investigation in this area revealed that these individuals had been properly reported on the AOR.

III-6
b. Relief from Administrative Detail

(1) Commanders supported by the PSCs/Center evaluated had been relieved of the administrative burden of maintaining personnel records.

(2) Supported units of the 222d PSC were not receiving all of the monthly recurring reports and rosters which the PSC was capable of and should be providing. These units were required to manually prepare their own Personnel Information Rosters and had to submit them to support teams for forwarding to the AMD. This reversal in normal procedure considerably increased the administrative burden of all supported units. The primary reason given for this procedure was that the AMD wanted to establish an accurate data bank and this was the best way of doing it. In all other areas of personnel support, the majority of commanders and staff felt that the 222d PSC had reduced their administrative burden.

(3) Supported key personnel in the 518th PSC and 537th PS Center, for the most part, felt that they had been considerably relieved of their administrative burden. They felt that they would be further relieved if the data and services provided were more timely and accurate. Too much time and effort was spent in correcting data provided and gathering other pertinent information on individuals which could and should be provided by the PSC/Center.

(4) All commanders and personnel staffs supported by the 518th PSC and the 537th PS Center felt the orientation of newly assigned PSNCOs and monthly meetings provided considerable assistance to their units. They also expressed a desire that similar meetings and orientations be conducted for S1s and adjutants.

17. FINDINGS

a. Personnel data provided by the PSCs/Center in recurring rosters and reports generally contained inaccuracies.

b. The 222d PSC and the 537th PS Center were not providing supported units with all required recurring reports and rosters.

c. The 518th PSC was providing supported units with required recurring reports and rosters.

d. The 537th PS Center was employing contact teams which visited supported units to make on-the-spot corrections to records and allow commanders and key staff personnel to review each individual's records.

e. Monthly PSNCO meetings and orientation of newly assigned PSNCOs were being conducted by the 518th PSC and 537th PS Center.

f. None of the PSCs/Center were conducting meetings or orientations for commanders and their S1/adjutants.

III-7
g. The USARV AG had no sure way of determining all replacement personnel who had been allocated by DA to fill slots requiring T-coding.

h. All PSCs/Center were providing assistance in training unit clerks and PSNCOs when required or requested.

i. There was a lack of coordination and quality control in all PSCs/Center particularly in verification of PTRs.

j. In and outprocessing procedures at all PSCs/Center were good.

k. Personnel actions and requests were processed as expeditiously as distance and communications problems would permit.

l. The majority (59%) of commanders and key staff personnel felt that the PSCs/Center were providing personnel data and support required by the commander and his staff.

m. The majority (67%) of commanders and key staff personnel felt that support rendered by the PSCs/Center had reduced the commander's administrative burden.

n. All commanders and key staff personnel felt the PSCs/Center were providing the desired technical advice on personnel management problems.

o. Personnel service support throughout the PSCs/Center was adequate as compared with the CONUS experience of the evaluation team members.

p. Fifty-three percent (53%) of RVN returnees in one unit had not received timely reassignment instructions.
OBJECTIVE 3, IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS

18. PRESENT MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

a. Mission

(1) The mission of a Personnel Service Company is to act as custodian of and maintain the field individual military personnel records, and accomplish the personnel actions and services which are attendant upon this responsibility. The service includes that which satisfies the personnel requirements of the individual as well as that which the supported commanders need to permit them to discharge their personnel management responsibilities. The keynote in Personnel Service Company operations is responsiveness to the needs of the supported commanders. Normal assignment of the PSC is to non-divisional support command/brigades or to the medical, signal, military police and transportation brigades. In contrast to the support command/brigades the army-wide service brigades have subordinate units located throughout the combat zone. All procedures used by the company must be designed to minimize the problems inherent in performing personnel administration for a widely dispersed organization.

(2) The PSCs/Center were assigned to appropriate sized commands and were accomplishing the mission to the extent indicated in the discussion of Objective 2.

b. Functions

(1) The allocation of functions within the divisions prescribed in the functional chart in AR 600-16 was basically followed by the PSCs/Center evaluated. Limited revision of the functional divisions as well as relocation of certain functions appeared to be justified. Certain added functions were consistent with combat zone employment.

(2) Officer records were handled as a separate branch in all instances. The 518th had organized a separate officer section under the supervision of a warrant officer. Responsibility for Officer Efficiency Reports had been moved from Personnel Actions to Officer Records. This provided better suspense and controls over that function.

(3) Due to the volume and inherent actions required in R&R processing, separate clerks were assigned to perform this added function.

(4) The following functions had been retained in the supported command headquarters:

(a) Casualty reporting

IV-1
(b) administrative board actions
(c) Testing
(d) Congressional inquiries
(e) Awards and decorations

(5) An additional function performed by the 537th, complicated by its location at Bien Hoa, was the movement of replacements. Replacements coming into Bien Hoa AFB are transported to the 90th Replacement BN at Long Binh. The 537th was required to send transportation to the 90th and transport replacements for the Saigon Support Command to Bien Hoa for inprocessing. This required armed convoy escort, sometimes provided by the I P's, but normally by the 537th. After inprocessing, it was the responsibility of the 537th to get these replacements to their respective units. This required coordination of transportation by convoy back to Long Binh or to Saigon and by air transportation to the outlying areas of Vung Tau and Tay Binh.

c. Operational Concepts

(1) Command and Control

(a) All PSCs evaluated were employed in a command support role. The 222d PSC is assigned to the 44th Medical Brigade, the 513th PSC is assigned to the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command and the 537th Personnel Service Center is assigned to the Saigon Support Command. Operational control for the 518th and 537th is provided by the Adjutant General of the respective Support Command. Since an AG was not provided for the Medical Brigade, the CO of the 222d had been appointed to this position and operational control is under the Brigade CO.

(b) Although the command relationships between the three commands and their supporting PSC/Center were clearly defined, PSC relationships with station headquarters existed which lead to some of the difficulties with which the PSC CO is faced.

1 The 513th PSC had been attached to the Cam Ranh Post. This situation placed PSC personnel under the jurisdiction of the Post Commander for such tasks as duty officer and duty CO, article 32 investigations, and courts and boards.

2 The 537th PS Center was not collocated with its parent organization as were the other two PSCs. It was physically located six miles from Saigon Support Command at Bien Hoa Army Post and came under the control of the 101st Abn Div (A/B) (Rear) for housekeeping and security requirements. The primary effect of this relationship was the burden placed upon the PS Center to provide security personnel. One officer and 24
enlisted were required per day with an additional 32 enlisted personnel required per day under "G-H" alert conditions which existed quite often.

2. The 222d PSC had no command relationship with Long Binh Post Headquarters and, therefore, was not called upon to provide personnel for post details. This unit did provide personnel for the security of its area during alert conditions.

(c) Common to the 222d PSC and the 537th PS Center was the detachment of support teams to the location of the supported group headquarters. Though these teams technically were under the command and operational control of the PSC CO, the group CO and staff of the supported group had a strong influence over the personnel and operation. In the case of the support teams provided by the 222d, the team leaders, who were MSC officers, had been appointed as assistant adjutants for both the 44th Med and the supported group. This arrangement allowed those team leaders to act for either commander as the need arose which seemed to provide additional responsiveness to all concerned. In contrast, one support team of the 537th located at Vung Tau provided less responsiveness in that the team leader was only an extension of the higher command. He was an assistant adjutant for Saigon Support Command and, therefore, could not act in the name of his supported group commander. This made him less responsive to unit needs.

(d) In the case of the 222d and 518th PSCs the COs wore two hats - that of company commander and that of personnel officer. Though this was within current concept and an executive officer was provided by TCE, the PSC COs expressed dissatisfaction with the burden of both responsibilities. The 513th PSC Commander had, however, placed his executive officer in charge of all company administration, which freed him for his personnel officer duties.

(2) Organization and Employment

(a) The 518th PSC was organized with functional divisions. During the evaluation of the 518th certain advantages to the functional organization were evidenced. Since each functional division was under the control and influence of one officer/warrant officer, standardization of work procedures and policies was more easily accomplished as was effective utilization of human resources and capabilities. This functional organization, however, required the supported units to deal with several people in several places, frequently on the same subject. Several supported commanders expressed their dissatisfaction with the responsiveness of this organization.

(b) The 537th PS Center was organized into six composite teams with functional division offices as well. This was accomplished by using the resources of not only two PSCs but also the warrant officers, who were previously assigned to supported units as personnel officers by TCE.
Each composite team was responsible for the support of specific units based upon assigned strength. The functional division offices did not provide monitor and control supervision over the functions accomplished at team level. They performed only those functions which the CO had determined could best be accomplished centrally.

(c) Peculiar to the 537th was the fact that it was a combination of two Personnel Service Companies - the 520th and 537th. As the center was formed from these two companies with standard TOE structure, duplicity in certain key personnel was automatic and required some reorganization which took the form of a TDA unit. The key positions involved were that of the CO, executive officer, sergeant major and supply sergeant. This TDA type reorganization placed the senior officer as the center commander, the junior company commander as the CO of troops; one sergeant major was performing in that capacity while the other was NCOIC, Personnel Management Division. The senior supply specialist was the supply sergeant and the junior was his assistant. This unit was preparing its TDA for approval.

(d) The 222d PSC was organized into four composite teams, three of which were in the role of second echelon support teams. The headquarters element was consolidated into an AG office which provides monitor and control of team products. Since the teams were detached from the PSC, this headquarters element was necessary to provide standards and control. These four teams supported 166 subordinate units located in all four of the Corps Tactical Zones and were spread over a geographical area from Can Tho in the Delta to Phu Bai in the North. This represents a distance of over 550 miles between Can Tho and Phu Bai and a total area approximately the size and shape of the State of Florida.

(e) The Office Services Unit doctrinally subordinate to the Administrative Machine Division had been separated in all PSCs/centers visited. The 318th and 222d had redesignated this element as the Administrative Services Division. The 537th and the 222d had placed a warrant officer in charge of this operation. The 518th had a master sergeant in charge under the direct supervision of the PSC headquarters. Control of the ADP automatic typewriters (Friden Flexowriters) in the 222d and the 537th had been retained by this administrative section, but had been transferred to the Machine Division at the 518th. A separate OSU was more responsive to PSC CO.

(f) The Standardization and Training Unit had not been established at any of the PSCs evaluated and was considered unnecessary by the PSC CCOs.

(3) Operational Practices

(a) The effect of enemy action on operational capabilities varied from none in the case of the 222d and 518th to serious at the 537th. The location of the 537th at Bien Hoa subjected that unit to more frequent alerts and required an occasional shutdown of operations during local
attacks directed at the Bien Hoa AF3. Service under a continued readiness posture was marginal.

(b) The climate in RVN had definite effects upon operation of the PSC. The extreme heat during the dry season caused frequent close-down during the hottest part of the day. Specific effects have been addressed in the discussion on maintenance in Objective 1. Dust and grit covered desks, records and machines, thereby requiring more frequent maintenance of machines and careful handling of records and correspondence. During the wet season heat and dirt were replaced by humidity and water. The primary effect of the humidity was on paper which made it more difficult to use. The most critical effect was on punch card stock. PSCs kept their card stock in Conex containers or other areas that were not air-conditioned due to lack of storage area in the vans. Although stock was normally moved to the vans for dehumidifying before being used it did not eliminate the feed problems caused by these cards. Similar feed problems were experienced by the pressmen with paper stock. Rain was a problem in that some of the buildings were poorly constructed and water seeped through the roofs and, during heavy rains, flooded the floors. This was more of an inconvenience than a major problem.

(c) It has not been necessary for any of the PSCs evaluated to displace, therefore the effects of displacement on operational capabilities could not be evaluated.

(4) Communications

(a) Systems

1 Telephone communications supporting the PSCs in RVN was found to be poor. The PSCs experienced extreme difficulties in communicating by telephone both with their teams and their supported units. From the support team at Da Nang, routing to Long Binh was accomplished through several switchboards and a final switchboard at the 44th Red Horse resulting in virtually an unusable connection. Although only 20 miles distant, the 4th Transportation Command PSC in Saigon had such poor success in making telephone contact with the PS Center at Bien Hoa that he had to resort to daily vehicular trips to the PS Center. These trips required four hours to complete. Plans to improve it countrywide with a telephone system is shown in Annex B. It is anticipated that this dial system will be a major improvement in communication capability and overcome many of the existing problems and delays.

2 Due to the poor telephone connections experienced by the 222d PSC, radio communications which permitted an acceptable conversation when atmospheric conditions were good was being used. The 222d had experienced periods of several days when they were unable to establish voice communications with its teams.
3 Courier service was provided on a scheduled basis by
the 1st Signal Brigade to all major points in RVN and to many lesser loca-
tions. All three of the PSC/Center COs interviewed had chosen to establish
their own couriers because they considered the USAVE courier service less
responsive.

4 The Army Postal elements offer regular service which,
again, was used to a very limited extent by the PSCs. The FSCs through
experience feel it is too slow in-country to provide timely and reliable
movement of distribution.

5 The AUTODIN system of transmitting information was
well established in RVNAF. Terminals operated by the 1st Sig Bde were at all
locations where the PSC/Centers and their teams were located. These ter-
rinals were all designated as common user facilities available for input by
all agencies. The Data Service Center had a terminal dedicated to their
use although it was technically part of the AUTODIN system. Only the 513th
PSC was using AUTODIN terminals. All update cycles are transmitted from
the terminal at Cam Ranh Post to Long Binh. The terminal at Cam Ranh has
recently been moved from a separate location to the Cam Ranh Army Depot
for better security which has made it less accessible to the PSC than pre-
viously. However, the 513th still uses it for all cycles except the end-
of-month report which is taken by courier to Long Binh.

6 Distances to supported units presented significant
problems to a PSC, particularly those organized with second echelon support
teams. Surface movement was highly restricted and in most areas non-exis-
tent for administrative purposes. Movement of people and paper was de-
pendent almost entirely on our air capability. Distances from the PSCs
to their tears and supported units are reflected in Annex D.

(b) Information Flow

1 The flow of information was continuous to and from
all participants in the personnel support system. Timeliness and accuracy,
however, need considerable improvement. Data Service Center statistics
showed the inaccuracy of data received from PERUACAP FSCs to be relatively
high. Accuracy error rates for the evaluated PSCs were as high as 41% on
selected transactions. However, the overall USAVE accuracy rate of 26%
for PERUACAP units compares favorably to that of 28% for non-PERUACAP units.
Information on morning report submissions reflected as high as 10 day aver-
age lag time for some PSCs. PSCs were making continuing efforts to purify
their data banks as was the DSC. The DSC was in the process of forming
a PERUACAP team which will travel to the units and provide technical assis-
tance and perform inspections with emphasis on improving data and service.
Complaints were received from the PSCs that the DSC as the servicing Data
Processing Agency for the theater was not providing unit TOE authorizations
as it should. The lack of this information in the Organizational Faster
File at the PSC precluded the matching of current authorized and assigned
strengths. DSC was publishing a Roster of Exceptions but units indicated that an error printout would be more useful in analyzing errors.

2 The quantity of information flowing to the supported units varied as indicated in the discussion of Objective 2. The major weakness was timeliness. PIRs were late getting to the units from the PSC and late being returned to the PSC after correction by the units. The 518th did not run the PIR the first day of the month because of end-of-month requirements going to higher headquarters including the DSC. This made the run 10-12 days behind the cut off date for resubmission of the corrected PIRs by the units. This month-end peak reduced the capability of the PSC to be responsive to the supported commander. Although timeliness was the major weakness quality control and coordination was also lacking throughout the PSC. Coding by the clerks was verified by the analysts but for proper entry only. Accuracy of information transcribed from the records was not checked. Though key punching was run through the verifier, punches were checked rather than accurate information. Except in the 513th where a printout of update cards was furnished the records clerks before the monthly PIR update, data input into the system was not checked for accuracy until the PIR was actually printed and distributed.

(5) Supported Unit's Role

(a) The commander has several people to assist him in discharging his personnel management responsibilities and who are critical to the personnel management system. These people are the unit clerk, the first sergeant, the PSNCO and the S1/adjutant. Though the importance of the morning report to strength accounting was quite reduced under PERSACAP due to centralization of orders and by-product tape input, the unit clerk and first sergeant continue to be important to the personnel system. It is at this point of contact that an individual is discouraged or encouraged with personnel matters. Personnel actions involving promotions, reassignment, leaves and pay continue to start here under the PSC.

(b) The key link in the personnel service support system was the personnel staff NCO at each battalion, evacuation hospital, group, depot, and brigade. The effectiveness of the PSNCOs in the units visited was a direct reflection of the commanders utilization of this individual. In the hospitals and medical battalions supported by the 222d the PSNCOs were devoting approximately 40% of their time to personnel, most of this being processing actions rather than personnel management. The balance was spent at administrative duties such as correspondence, reports, files, and safety. In contrast, most PSNCOs in units supported by the 537th and 518th devote 100% of their time to personnel administration. This was found to be extremely important to the individual soldier since this provides him with personal service by a professional in the personnel system. Since the 537th and 518th are providing more tools for their supported units, the PSNCOs have a better opportunity for effective utilization. With few exceptions PSNCOs had good background in personnel and were knowledgeable
in the subject but some were not adequately familiar with the PSC concept. SIs interviewed had high praise for their PSCOs regardless of utilization, and strongly supported the need for such a person under the centralized personnel system. SIs commented as to the need for an administrative ICO as well.

(c) SIs and adjutants were generally lacking in personnel management knowledge and in knowledge of the system of PSC support under which they were operating. For the most part, battalion adjutants were unaware of what management tools were being provided and what information was provided in these rosters. Commanders also require more orientation.

19. FINDINGS

a. The 222d PSC, 518th PSC, and the 537th PSC Center were effectively performing the doctrinal mission for a PSC.

b. Combining the 520th and 537th PSCs into a PSC Center resulted in duplicity of positions at supervisory level.

c. The Office Services Unit was established as a separate entity from the OIC in all three PSCs which enhanced the PSC operation.

d. The Standardization and Training Unit was not being used.

e. The OR function was being performed by the officer records clerks in all units which provided best control and processing.

f. Organization with composite teams provided best responsiveness to commanders.

g. Second echelon support teams provided the best service when extreme distances between major commands were involved.

h. Environment had a dilatorious effect upon operational capability of the PSC.

i. Telephone communications systems are inadequate for the operation of the PSC and limit responsiveness to all levels of command.

j. The AUTODIN network is not being used to the fullest extent by the PSCOs.

k. Data banks at the PSCs and hence the DSC were inaccurate.

l. The DSC was obtaining the personnel to provide assistance to units.

m. The PSNCO was a critical link in the centralized personnel system and needed additional training in the PSC concept.

IV-8
n. Commanders, S1s, and adjutants at all levels of command are not familiar enough with the personnel system which is supporting them.

20. PROPOSED CHANGES TO FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

a. Functions

Officer efficiency reports should be relocated in the Records Division. Though this particular function is technically a personnel action, the officer records clerk is the more logical person to suspense and control O&E submission as part of records maintenance and screening.

b. Organization and Employment

(1) The duties and responsibilities of the Office Services Unit were found to be more closely aligned with the PSC headquarters than with the AHD. This unit should be redesignated as the Administrative Services Division of the PSC under the supervision of a warrant officer. This division should retain control of the ADP typewriters since the capability of these machines permits applications beyond that of orders preparation, e.g. automatic preparation of command letters in original copy form.

(2) No PSCs were utilizing their authorized Standardization and Training units. Perhaps this is due to the fact that definitive guidance regarding the effective employment of the Standardization and Training Unit is nonexistent. It would appear that this element could be effectively utilized in varied training and orientation functions (in addition to the function of standardizing procedures within the PSC). For example, it could orient all incoming PSNCOs and unit clerks on the PSC mission and the procedures followed to accomplish that mission. It could be the element controlling on-the-job training of all personnel clerks. Finally, this unit could form the framework for PSC contact teams that would periodically visit supported units and contribute so much toward assisting commanders with their personnel management problems.

(3) Though provided for in current doctrine and practice, the use of support teams is discussed here for the purpose of emphasis. The best organization of the PSC/Center appeared to be by composite teams rather than by functional divisions. Although the 518th was providing all doctrinal information and support for its commanders, a composite team organization would enhance the responsiveness by reducing the number of people to which a unit must go for assistance, and giving the supported commanders a feeling of being provided more personalized support. The employment of second echelon support teams provides the commander with direct support which is in complete consonance with the desired responsiveness but is most applicable to the brigade operating with separate battalions. The use of special purpose teams and/or assistance teams should be emphasized as they provide needed service to the commander and his personnel by periodically giving on the ground service through records review, emergency data update,
and identification card and tag replacement. This also helps to establish rapport with the commander and instill the confidence in him and his people that the centralized personnel system can do a good job for them. Because of the satisfaction with the current employment of the PSCs expressed by commanders, it is the professional opinion of the evaluators that the appropriate role for the PSC is that of support of a single major command and its subordinate units.

(4) The second echelon support team chief becomes a personnel officer in the eyes of the supported commander since the team is collocated and depends entirely upon that commander for administrative support. The concept of the team leader being assigned as assistant adjutant for the supported commander should be emphasized and encouraged to provide maximum support, responsiveness, and rapport.

c. Communications

(1) The personnel system should be given high priority in the communication network. Communications by telephone in future similar combat environments may not be better. HF and FM radio is a poor substitute for telephone communications. Courier and postal service is reliant on aircraft and good flying weather. Without the freedom of movement in the air which we enjoy in RVN, these services would be considerably curtailed. The most reliable available means of communication appears to be transceiving data from one terminal to another with the AUTODIN system. Since AUTODIN is already in a high state of operational capability and wide spread employment this seems the most likely source of dependable, rapid communication for personnel data.

(2) Additional emphasis is required at USAF DATCC on better and more complete programs for PERMACAP. In the units evaluated the tests run so far with the new programs indicate fewer local changes will be required than on the ones now in use. The primary complaint received on all DA programs was lack of pre-edits requiring extensive editing by the PERMACAP units before use. Emphasis on better programs will result in PERMACAP personnel having more confidence in the system with which they are working.

j. Supported Units' Role

Due to the vital role in the personnel system played by the unit clerk, first sergeant and PSNCO, it behooves the Army to give more attention to their military education. This is not to preclude the necessity for more and better trained personnel clerks as well. The emphasis appears to be, however, to keep the best qualified at the highest level. Apparently there is a need for more of these best qualified people. With the rapid promotion of NCOs, many are being deprived of the opportunity to become proficient in administration and personnel before they find themselves wearing first sergeant stripes. These NCOs must be schooled, OJT will not result in the desired product. Unit clerks are more often than not OJT'd
from a basic clerical MOS. PSNCOs though found to be qualified in personnel management agreed unanimously that they should be sent to the AG school before being assigned to the PSNCO position. Officer career courses should provide a better coverage of the personnel system to provide a better foundation with which to perform the duties of the CO, executive officer, S1, and adjutant at various levels.
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(U) SECTION V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

21. CONCLUSIONS

a. TOE 12-67 requires certain personnel and equipment modifications.

b. The USARV Comptroller has proposed certain equipment additions as well as a PLL requirement not specified by PSC personnel during evaluation.

c. The importance and complexity of flexewriter operations require formal training for operators and repairmen.

d. Although commanders were relieved of an administrative burden and the support provided by the PSCs is adequate, PSC effectiveness can be enhanced by emphasizing accuracy and timeliness of data as required in AR 330-14 and AR 600-16, and through more frequent and varied contact with supported units.

e. The USARV DSC is improving its capability to provide assistance to PSCs.

f. No requirement exists to alter the mission presently defined for PSCs.

g. Development of a separate TOE for Personnel Service Centers will result in specific identification of duty positions and more efficient use of personnel resources.

h. When the Office Services Unit is established as a separate division, it is more responsive to the PSC commander and provides more rapid service to supported units.

i. Control and handling of Officer Efficiency Reports can best be performed by officer records clerks in the records division.

j. The team concept of personnel service support is most responsive to supported commanders and should be emphasized in PSC doctrine.

k. The functions and operational practices employed by PSCs in RVN which proved effective for them require doctrinal consideration.

l. Due to the criticality of key individuals in the personnel support system, responsiveness of PSCs would be further enhanced by requiring all PSC COs to be school trained and by thoroughly orienting all commanders, S1s, adjutants, first sergeants, and unit clerks.

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22. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is recommended that:

a. Personnel Service Company TOE 12-67, be modified as indicated below:

   (1) **Personnel**

   (a) Add one First Sergeant, MOS 71H50, to company headquarters.

   (b) Add one Motor Sergeant, MOS 63H40, to company headquarters.

   (c) Add one Postal Clerk, MOS 71F20, to company headquarters.

   (d) Add four flexowriter operators, MOS 71B20, to a Type C PSC and add three flexowriter operators, MOS 71B20, to a Type D PSC.

   (e) Add two offset pressmen, MOS 83F20, per offset press.

   (2) **Equipment**

   (a) Add one photocopier.

   (b) Add two offset presses.

   (c) Add one 6-strip decollator.

   (d) Add one 063 sorter.

   (e) Add one Polaroid camera and allied lighting equipment.

b. PSCs implement the following internal measures:

   (1) Conduct informative monthly meetings with supported unit PSHCOs.

   (2) Establish contact/assistance teams and make frequent visits to supported units.

   (3) Conduct PSC orientation classes for all incoming commanders, S1s, adjutants, first sergeants, and unit clerks.

   (4) More fully exploit existing communications media to improve timeliness.

   (5) Establish more effective control measures to insure data input is accurate.
(6) Organize composite teams for responsive support to commanders.

c. DA establish these training policies:

(1) Require all NCOs who will be assigned as PSNCOs to attend the PSNCO Course 500-F1 at the Adjutant General School.

(2) Tabulating equipment repairmen, MOS 34B, receive training in flexowriter repair.

(3) Clerk typists, MOS 713, receive flexowriter training in CONUS prior to arrival in RVN.

d. USARV Data Services Center, as presently planned, organize an assistance team possessing the necessary expertise to:

(1) Provide responsive assistance to PSCs in purifying their data banks.

(2) Provide guidance to PSCs which will insure that data is provided as outlined in AR 330-14 and AR 600-16.

e. USACDC:

(1) Develop and propose a TOE for Personnel Service Centers.

(2) Establish the Office Services Unit as a separate division of the PSC in future doctrine.

(3) Assign the Officers Efficiency Report function from PAD to the Records Division.

(4) Consider proposed functions and organizational and operational concepts discussed in this report for inclusion in appropriate field manuals.

(5) Consider the proposal made by the USARV Comptroller that voltage regulators, dehumidifiers, and vacuum cleaners be added to the TOE and that consideration also be given to development of an appropriate PLL for all equipment other than the ADPE.
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ANNEX A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PERMACAP

1. Personnel Management and Accounting - Card Processor (Acronym: PERMACAP) is an ADP system which deals with personnel data and links the Army division and PSC with the Army Personnel Reporting System operated at Data Processing Activity (DPA) and HQ DA levels. Original PERMACAP plans included the following specific objectives.

   a. Modernize Army division data processing equipment by installing card processor equipment to replace certain types of Punched Card Machines.

   b. Redesign the Army division personnel data processing system so as to produce, in machine language, an acceptable input to the ---

      (1) DPA for Personnel Master File updating purposes.

      (2) Centralised Automated Military Pay System for military pay actions which originate through special orders.

   c. Provide for optimum validity of data entering the Army Personnel Reporting System by using card processor edits at Army division level prior to sending such data to the DPA.

   d. Facilitate the interchange and compatibility of data between personnel data processing systems by making use of standardized data elements and codes in accordance with AR 16-10.

   e. Decrease the volume of incoming report entries for divisional units by capturing essential data in a paper tape by-product as special orders are typed on automatic writing machines.

   f. Develop a standardized personnel data processing system which could be used wherever the same ADPE is employed by the Army.

2. Since its inception, PERMACAP has been broadened in scope to include all Army PSCs organized under TOE which authorize ADPE (i.e., Type B through Type II units). It has been phased into operation as individual Automatic Machine Branch/Automatic Machine Division (AMB/AMD) reached the ready stage, as determined by coordination between Army divisions or PSC, major Army field commands, CONUS armies, the USADATCOM, and DA Staff agencies. PERMACAP produces recurring reports and rosters from punched card files for military personnel management uses by commanders at various echelons within the scope of AMB/AMD servicing responsibility. It leaves resources available to provide other ADPE services desired by commanders at various echelons within the scope of AMB/AMD servicing responsibility, and shares ADPE with other ADP systems authorized by HQ DA (e.g., for military pay purposes) to operate at the AMB/AMD level. Under direction
of the DCSPER, PBEMACAP places the USADATCOM in the role of monitor for system design, development, documentation, maintenance, and coordination in order to achieve standardized program and procedure applications.
ANNEX B

THE SOUTHEAST ASIA AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE SYSTEM

1. Present telephone service in Southeast Asia for US Military and other
Free World Military Forces is provided by the Southeast Asia Telephone
System which is an integrated common user telephone network of both tactical
and fixed plant manual and dial telephone exchanges. A major portion of
this system is being converted to an automatic system which will provide
direct distance dialing throughout RVN and Thailand and will be called the
Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System (SEA-ATS).

2. Presently there are 53 dial telephone exchanges in operation in RVN and
Thailand of which 26 are Army. For the most part, these are commercial
type fixed exchanges ranging in size from 200 to 5000 lines. There are
additional Army exchanges planned for the system, three of which will be
operational during 4th Quarter FY 69. These manual and dial exchanges are
interconnected via manual long distance switchboards operated by the Army
and Air Force.

3. Full implementation of the SEA-ATS will be accomplished by activation
of tandem switching centers (TSC's) which will replace the present manual
long distance switchboards and provide direct distance dial service. Six
of these tandem switches are located in RVN and three in Thailand. Although
the Air Force will operate six of the switches, the Army has the responsi-
bility for installation of all nine.

4. The first two tandem switches were activated at Bang Pla in Thailand
and Can Tho, RVN in December 68 and March 69 respectively. Building con-
struction or equipment installation is underway at the remaining seven
sites and all are expected to be operational by October of this year.
The next switch to be activated in RVN will be at Da Nang and is scheduled
for 12 Apr 69.

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ANNEX C

GLOSSARY

1. Abbreviations

ADPE - Automatic Data Processing Equipment
AG - Adjutant General
AMD - Automatic Machine Division
AOG - Advance Overseas Returnee
AR - Army Regulation
ASD - Administrative Services Division
ASI - Additional Skill Identifier
AUTODIN - Automatic Digital Network
CONUS - Continental United States
DA - Department of the Army
DCSPER - Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
DBHOS - Date Eligible for Return from Overseas
DPA - Data Processing Activity
DSC - Data Service Center
EDCSA - Effective Date of Change of Strength Accountability
MOS - Military Occupational Specialty
MPRJ - Military Personnel Records Jacket
OER - Officer's Efficiency Report
OJT - On-the-Job Training
OPR - Office of Personnel Operations
ORR - Officer Returnee Rosters
OSU - Office Services Unit
PAD - Personnel Actions Division
PERMACAP - Personnel Management and Accounting - Card Processor
PIR - Personnel Information Roster
PMO - Personnel Management Division
PQR - Personnel Qualification Roster
PSM - Personnel Service Company/Center
PSNCO - Personnel Staff Non-Commissioned Officer
PSR - Personnel Suspense Roster
RVN - Republic of Vietnam
TOE - Table of Organization and Equipment
USARY - United States Army Vietnam
USADATCOM - United States Army Data Command

2. Definitions

a. ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINE DIVISION (AMD) - The organizational sub-
division of a Personnel Service Company responsible for performing per-
sonnel and administrative services through the use of punched card and
punched paper tape machines.
b. **COMPOSITE TEAM** - A group of functional teams consisting of one from each division of the Personnel Service Company, except the Administrative Machine Division, designed to provide complete personnel service for a specific group of units.

c. **FUNCTIONAL TEAM** - An organizational subdivision of each functional element of the Personnel Service Company except the Administrative Machine Division.

d. **PERSONNEL SERVICE CENTER (PS CENTER)** - A combination of Personnel Service Companies employed together when the supported troop strength exceeds the capability of one Personnel Service Company to provide adequate support.

e. **SECOND ECHELON SUPPORT TEAM** - A composite team or an equitable subdivision of a composite team, predesignated for attachment to units of battalion or larger size detached from the major supported unit for over 30 days, for the purpose of providing complete personnel services support.

f. **SUPPORT TEAM** - A general term encompassing composite and second echelon support teams and connoting a direct support role for a given team.
### ANNEX D

**DISTANCE TO SUPPORTED UNITS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PSC LOCATION</th>
<th>MAJOR HQ'S SUPPORTED</th>
<th>DISTANCE TO FURTHEST SUPPORTED UNIT</th>
<th>AVERAGE DISTANCE TO SUPPORTED UNITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>518th PSC Cam Ranh Post</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay Support Comd</td>
<td>35 Miles</td>
<td>5.5 Miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>537th PS Center Team #2 Bien Hoa Post</td>
<td>Saigon Support Comd</td>
<td>100 Miles</td>
<td>3 Miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vung Tau Post</td>
<td>53D GS Group</td>
<td>80 Miles</td>
<td>1 Mile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222D PSC HQ Long Binh Post</td>
<td>44th MED BDE</td>
<td>550 Miles</td>
<td>150 Miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team B Qui Nhon</td>
<td>55th MED GP</td>
<td>70 Miles</td>
<td>40 Miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team C Nha Trang</td>
<td>43d MED GP</td>
<td>60 Miles</td>
<td>35 Miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team D Long Binh</td>
<td>68th MED GP</td>
<td>96 Miles</td>
<td>30 Miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team E Da Nang</td>
<td>67th MED GP</td>
<td>60 Miles</td>
<td>55 Miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
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ANNEX E

REFERENCES


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7. AR 310-32, Organization and Equipment Authorization Tables; Personnel.

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9. AR 320-50, Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.


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12. AR 335-60, Morning Report.


15. AR 600-200, Enlisted Personnel Management System.

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19. FM 12-11, Jul 67, Administration Company: Division and Separate Brigades.


22. TOE 12-67E.

23. TOE 12-67G.

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ANNEX F

DISTRIBUTION

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F-1
Final Report - Personnel Service Company in the Republic of Vietnam

The purpose of this project was to evaluate the effectiveness of four Personnel Service Companies (PSC), TOE 12-67K, in support of operational units in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to determine whether the units' effectiveness could be enhanced by changes in personnel and equipment authorizations, missions, functions, and operational concepts.

The mission of the Personnel Service Company is to act as custodian of and maintain the field individual military personnel records. Due to geographical dispersion of supported units, the tactical situation, and communication difficulties in RVN, support teams organic to the Personnel Service Companies had been dispersed to provide support to major subordinate units. Each of the companies evaluated was operating under the Personnel Management and Accounting - Card Processor (PERMACAP) System. Two Personnel Service Companies, the 520th and the 537th, had combined to form a Personnel Service Center and were evaluated as one entity.

Collection of data and evaluation of the companies was conducted in all four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) in RVN during February and March 1969.

With some exceptions in the Company Headquarters, personnel authorizations were generally adequate. Equipment authorizations were deficient in not providing for photocopier, decollator and offset press capability. The quality of records maintenance and personnel management assistance performed by the PSC was adequate. Unit commanders had been relieved of the administrative burden to maintain personnel records; however, in...
In some cases, this relief was negated by such administrative requirements as verifying inaccurate data prepared by the PSC and preparing their own personnel data reports. Responsiveness of the PSC to supported units in RVN was best achieved through the employment of composite teams. PSC mission accomplishment requires that a continuous indoctrination program be conducted for all key individuals in the personnel administration and management system.

It is recommended that changes to TOE as well as the doctrine contained in this report be reflected in appropriate publications.

Users of this report are invited to send inquiries to Chief of Personnel Operations, ATTN: PMDO, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20315.