AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE – DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
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Nixon's Guam's Doctrine on July 26, 1969 was redefined and restated on February 18, 1970. The President's pronouncement states that the United States security commitments can be upheld without an all-out military manpower effort on the part of the U.S. With other words, the Nixon Doctrine has made the United States commitment one of assistance not guarantees.

The security policy involving East Asian countries was found to be highly centralized, especially around Secretary of State Kissinger. - The State Department and the Dept. of Defense have emerged with crucial roles in the formulation and implementation of this policy, as it involves military security decisions and commitments which have political impact. The military inputs to the decision-making process seemed more apparent than real. Consultation between the two Departments at the lower levels is effectively coordinated. However, there seems to be a need for more consideration to be given to this level of inter-agency coordination.

There is still a need for State and Defense to approach policy together, as a government not individuals.
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ABSTRACT

The most recent major policy statement on United States security commitments abroad was issued in President Nixon's Guam Doctrine briefing on July 26, 1969. Redefined and restated on February 18, 1970, the President's pronouncement states that United States security commitments can be upheld without an all-out military manpower effort on the part of the United States. To achieve this, the doctrine insists that individual Asian nations develop strong defense postures. The U.S. would depend upon these nations to supply their own manpower requirements in the seventies. The hope of the Nixon Administration is that Asian nations must become self-dependent and responsible for their interests. To this end, the Nixon Doctrine has made the United States commitment one of assistance, not guarantees.

The State Department and the Department of Defense have emerged with crucial roles in the formulation and implementation of this policy, as it involves military security decisions and commitments which have political impact.

The security policy involving East Asian countries was found to be highly centralized, especially around Secretary of State Kissinger. Military inputs to the decision-making process seemed more apparent than real. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was included throughout the formal structure of the National Security Council System, but their presence there did not seem to increase their
actual input. Policy-making was seen to be highly personalized, characterized by Mr. Kissinger. However, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger appears to be attempting to establish a counterpoise to, the overcentralization of policy around Mr. Kissinger by first establishing himself as a stalwart of defense policy, while trying to recreate a strong foreign policy arm in the Office of International Security Affairs. The real influence of the Pentagon is located in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Lower levels of government seem to be becoming more implementers of decisions, rather than formulators. In State they are cut off from top level decisions, while in Defense lower level Officials are learning that the decisions they could make before are now being decided between the Secretaries of the two Departments.

Consultation between the two Departments at the lower levels is effectively coordinated. However, there seems to be a need for more consideration to be given to this level of interagency coordination. The high officials can stray too far away from the area expertise that the lower level officials can provide. Details of policy can, and have, frustrated high officials because of the lack of coordinating with their lower counterparts. The same is true between State and Defense. Too often Defense and State are found to be saying different things, providing little consistency to U.S. policy, and allowing foreign governments to "play" upon the various attitudes of the Departments. Foreigners come to believe the idea of America that foreign policy can be made based on personal
relationships alone. There is still a need for State and Defense to approach policy together as a government, not individuals. Yet it appears that in the future Defense and State will diverge somewhat, Defense being much more hard-line than State in its approach to the threats it perceives. But for the moment, policy is still centralized around a civilian bureaucracy, even though the bureaucracy seems like one man.
PREFACE

During the past year, my project advisor was Dr. Robert I. Rau. I would like to take this opportunity to express my special thanks to him for the relationship he maintained with me and my project. As my advisor, he led me to lead myself, never pushing or pulling, but rather, motivating me. I learned not only about my topic, but also about myself. I stumbled quite a bit, but he was there to encourage me to continue without removing the obstacles so that I could learn to fend for myself. It was tiresome and frustrating, but exhilarating to finally hand in my project. His personal interest in both the project and my development is sincerely appreciated. Once again, thanks.

I would also like to express my appreciation to those State and Defense officials who took large amounts of their time off to talk with me, and answer any questions. I would particularly like to thank Capt. John R. Lewenter, USN, without whose personal advice and aid in study and in obtaining interviews I would never have gotten started. Again, thanks to all.
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Multipolar World

Since the winding down of the Vietnam conflict, the United States has been preparing herself to face a multipolar world. Some critics have charged that in reality this is a projected world image that the United States would like to see after so much suffering in Vietnam. The United States may just be looking for others to help her in relinquishing the role of world "policeman". Terms such as "burden-sharing" and "regions of power" are common in United States foreign policy dialect. But the world does have regions of economic power. While the Soviet Union is still a rising domestic economic superpower, the United States, Japan, and the European Economic Council dominate the trade of the international world. Militarily, the world is still nuclear bipolar; the same two countries possess the only large-scale conventional offensive forces. But China's conventional defensive capability adds a third pole, while small-scale conventional capabilities, and multipolar guerilla forces make military considerations many-faceted. Ideological confrontations now involve Western democracy, Chinese and Soviet Communism, and non-communist socialism. The world is multipolar.

For the United States, the unified, aggressive threat is gone. There is no monopoly on nuclear weapons. There is also doubt as to our ability to mobilize a superior conventional force to oppose an adversary. The dollar is weak, and our share of the world's economy
is only a third—though once we had one half of it. The United States no longer politically or militarily dominates as it once did. Small allies manipulate us, and others are becoming separated. We are retreating and withdrawing from the world scene in various degrees. The idea that the United States is expected to provide leadership and involvement to every country has disappeared, and in its stead there is a movement towards a more pragmatic military and foreign policy, reflective of the current politics of the world today.

The United States will not return to its previous position of sole economic and military superiority. The entire world is more prosperous with the rise of other nations. Threats are now less direct and are initiated for more than ideological reasons. The United States is wary of vague, distant conflicts. It now looks towards other countries to be self-reliant within their particular region of economic and military power.

The challenge is for the United States to protect her interests in light of the current world situation. Countries vie for United States support, others repudiate her, and some do both. Decisions must be made between international and domestic objectives. Questions must be settled about our national interests, and policy judgements made to base a national security doctrine upon.

The Nixon Doctrine

On July 25, 1969, President Nixon announced the "Nixon Doctrine" during a stopover on Guam Island. President Nixon referred to it again
during his State of the Union message on January 22, 1970. The Doctrine was the general guideline for an United States policy approach to a multipolar world. It was meant to demand and respond to world changes in dealing with many different facets of international and domestic politics. It was to become the national security policy of the United States.

The President has said:

- The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.

- We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.

- In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.2

But, while

...the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, ...America cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.3

Realistic Deterrence Strength and partnership4 are the heart of the Nixon Doctrine. Its essence is that the United States will join with her allies to help provide the military capability to deter aggression. But a deterrence which is realistic must have a military strength which leaves no doubt that a nation can—and will—respond with a force both powerful and usable at each level of conflict. Nuclear weapons
alone, though a powerful deterrent, do not meet the special requirements of providing for a country's security once it is broached. Readiness to use such a weapon is low, primarily at the lower levels of conflict of insurgency and conventional warfare which our smaller allies under our nuclear shield are most apt to have.

The Nixon Doctrine attempts to realign deterrence and military responsive capability by a concept called Realistic Deterrence. "This concept seeks to create a continuum of force for deterrence of conflict at all levels, as a partnership effort among United States and Free World nations." The Total Force concept was conceived to present a range of United States and allied military forces, with the capability to deter and respond appropriately and realistically at each level of aggression. "The goal is deterrence at all levels, but the readiness to act if deterrence fails." The intention of the Nixon Doctrine is defensive, but its capabilities are offensive.

These are the basics for understanding the Nixon Doctrine. But its rhetorical simplicity invites confusion. The stated Doctrine itself is only a "vague...definition of American interests and priorities. It does not (by itself) offer enough guidance as to how new priorities should be adjusted between United States domestic and international responsibilities and commitments..." It is not a specific, hardened guide to every action, but only a useful policy parameter for our allies and our own policy-making bureaucracies. The Doctrine depends
upon the participation of other countries, but its implementation rests with American officials using its flexibility to initiate or slow-down programs in light of new developments. President Nixon had not encumbered the institutions which execute United States foreign policy with specific instructions in regard to the special geographic, strategic, and political complexities of each world region. The Nixon Doctrine is only the general outline of a policy towards a changing world. It appeared that he had given the initiative to the bureaucracies to present their plans and strategies for United States policy actions in each particular geographic area. They were to determine the exact nature of our policy involvement peculiar to each region. "It is when one comes to the specifics of a particular region of the world that military policy guidelines take on real meaning. The soundness of the doctrine and the adequacy of the instruments for implementing it will then be tested."9

East Asia

East Asia is the only region of the world where the four major powers of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the People's Republic of China meet. Japan, the world's third largest economic giant, is the focus of the region. Taiwan and South Korea are maintaining two of the world's fastest growing Gross National Products (GNP). Their relationships with each other and foreign nations are changing. Political and military postures are being reexamined with the United States felt to be moving out, and the Chinese and Soviets offering various initiatives. The entire region is in a state of flux.
There are four dynamic influences upon the United States security posture in East Asia. These are:

First, United States policy itself.

Second, the current Asian view of their security situation.

Third, the political trends in Asia, and

Finally, the policies and competition of the four major powers involved in East Asia.

**Security Dilemma** United States security commitments in East Asia are based more upon our policy, than any "legal" obligations. There is no NATO structure to effect a regional partnership force concept. Nor has the United States - East Asian "relationship..." based upon deeprooted cultural, political, and economic affinities. The focus of United States policy interest has been towards preventing the region from becoming subject to the dominance of any one nation. At present, the capabilities and limits of power within the region are unresolved. To cope with the security uncertainties the United States continues to provide a nuclear shield. But its current security posture in Asia rests upon two major points of strategy:

First, to provide United States security assistance to enhance the indigenous capabilities for coping with external and internal threats, and to

Secondly, continue deployment of sufficient United States land, sea, and air forces to meet United States commitments to Allies' security in Asia.

To the United States administration, the two strategies are interrelated. Neither is sufficient by itself. Security assistance alone
will not ensure that a country will survive to the day that it is self-
sufficient; at the same time, United States deployment by itself only
perpetuates dependence upon the United States. Reliance is placed upon
allies to assume protection of their own interests, with United States
forces deployed to respond to overall United States interest require-
ments. It is recognized as a slow transition, combining "continuity
with change." United States force disengagement is to be replaced by
military assistance "involvement." Readily deployable United States
forces and security assistance are to signify "a shift in the nature
of American support while reaffirming American concern in Asian affairs."
Meanwhile, allied forces will be looked upon to assume more of the
regional responsibilities for conventional and insurgency warfare. Thus
the Nixon Doctrine Asian posture seems designed to combine provisions
for the realities of the present with the hopes of the future.

Some government leaders of East Asian countries have publicly
called for a lowering of the United States military profile, dismissing
any real "threat", and asserting their security independence. Japan,
for example, feels an embarrassment as an economic superpower in having
foreign troops upon her soil. But privately these same countries and
men will ask for concrete assurances of the United States' commitment.
Domestic pressure has increased against United States land presence,
but public officials do want some continuation of the American ground
troop level, not so much for their combat ability, but for the fact that
no one can attack that country without involving the United States.
"It is this fact--not pronouncements about the United States keeping
its commitments—that makes United States intervention credible and hence deters attack.\textsuperscript{17}

The reality of the Nixon Doctrine for East Asia is the withdrawal and reduction of United States forces. To them, the contradiction of the Doctrine is the United States pledge to maintain the same commitments, with reduced forces. Assurances of rapid deployment and nuclear armament do not put aside the fear that as the United States becomes less visible in East Asia, it will not have the capability to meet commitments when needed. The Seventh Fleet and Fifth and Thirteenth Air Force could not presently lend real credence to the United States pledge to return when needed. By their very nature, their presence is transitional, coming to and from, making their commitment seem less real, and less reliable. Visible assurances of ground forces are still needed by nations to assure them of the United States commitment to their security. To East Asia, the Nixon Doctrine's "...chief characteristic...is its ambiguity with respect to specific contingencies or situations. Here is the focus of Asian concern. While welcoming assurances and amplifying explanations by the United States, the Asian allies await actual performance."\textsuperscript{18}

United States Military Policy The United States is lowering her military presence in East Asia, and relying upon Asian lands to assume their role in the burden-sharing of defense. The two novelties of this Doctrine are the:

- complete dependence of the Doctrine on the hope that military assistance will fill the gap between continued policy
objectives and declining United States general purpose force capabilities, and

• the attempt by the administration to specialize the roles of United States and allied forces.\(^{19}\)

The United States looks towards Asia to provide the manpower for her defense as American troops are withdrawn. But America is willing to supply material assistance until the countries do have the capability to equally perform the tasks and functions of defense that United States ground forces once did. Melvin Laird, as Secretary of Defense, wrote that the United States would not require the same level of capabilities in Asia—as long as our allies are supported by assistance to assume their role in the burden-sharing of defense.\(^{20}\) We each have a part to play in insurgent and low-scale conventional warfare, supplementing each other by combining the two capabilities of manpower and assistance in promoting self-reliance.

To sum this United States military policy regarding East Asia, it is in:

• the United States intent to maintain some—although reduced—forward deployments of United States "land, sea and air" forces.

• "Flexible general purpose forces" are to be ready to "respond as necessary" to threats to United States interests.

• To combat subversion, primary reliance would be placed on indigenous forces, especially indigenous land forces.

• Heavy emphasis is laid upon the provision of economic and military assistance to enhance the capabilities of Third World friends and allies to cope with internal and external threats.

• One key criterion for United States assistance or
response is the existence of United States interests.

A second key criterion for United States prior assistance, or response in a crisis, is the demonstrated willingness of the affected nation to help itself.21

Potential United States Reaction to Aggression President Nixon has not stated that American personnel will never be used.22 He can recognize situations where only United States capabilities provide the flexibility needed in an action.23 "Mr. Nixon's aides concede...that there is nothing in his new doctrine that excludes a Dominican-style intervention in defense of vital interests. They say that the document is a call to the nation and government to define those interests more precisely and prudently than in the past, but they have only begun that job and it is never really finished until the movement of crisis."24 Nor has there appeared any sign that the United States is losing interest in an ally's territory, although Taiwan is wont to rise serious speculation. But at the moment, forward defense, encompassing our allied nations' lands, is still the American national strategy for Asia.25 In East Asia, the United States is trying to bring this defense under regional responsibility. The danger felt in the United States and abroad is how will, or can, the United States respond if our allies fail? It is felt that in lowering our force levels and conventional capabilities in East Asia, we have lowered the nuclear threshold. Melvin Laird in his complementary Defense Report to the House Committee on Armed Services, March 9, 1971 said, United States deterrence is predicated on the fact that "the Soviets and Chinese Communists cannot be sure that major
conventional aggression would not be met with the tactical use of nuclear weapons." Nor does "...having a full range of options...mean that we will necessarily limit our response to the level or intensity chosen by an enemy. Potential enemies must know that we will respond to whatever degree is required to protect our interests." There may be the potential danger that reluctance to become entrenched in a counterinsurgency war has raised the probability of nuclear usage. It is doubtful that the United States could ever rid itself of the inhibitions of using nuclear weapons--there are severe political and military restrictions. Yet there is said to be a "strengthened institutional support for nuclear alternative within the Office of the Secretary of Defense--notably among the International Security Affairs staff--that reinforces the persistent nuclear orientation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such significant commands as CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific)."

Realistic deterrence requires General Purpose Forces capable of being rapidly deployed to an area of conflict--this is the basis of our pledge to an Asian commitment. But the Secretary of Defense has said, "We face serious sealift problems in executing the rapid deployment concept required under our national strategy in the early stages of a contingency." Reserve mobilization to meet the requirements of a contingency beyond our reduced force levels cannot be relied upon because they are undermanned and ill-equipped.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) on May 8, 1972 issued a report
on the readiness capabilities of the Strategic Army Forces—the general purpose forces relied upon for military actions short of nuclear war. "It would be difficult for STRAF (Strategic Army Force) units to deploy quickly at full strength because many units are not combat ready," the GAO said. Over one-third of essential combat and combat-supported operations' equipment was reported nonfunctional.31

There would appear to be a widening gap between our security stance and realistic capabilities. This is the gap indigenous forces are to close, with United States security assistance. But at the present, "...there are advantages in having a capability to introduce ground forces for the United States, even if our political objective is to avoid that action."32 The low profile of the Nixon Doctrine does not immediately reduce the requirement of overseas bases, but demands ensurence of their availability until our allies are prepared to take our place.

The basic requirements and objectives of the United States in East Asia have been stated. The Nixon Doctrine advocates Asian self-help and United States withdrawal, but the "objective of consolidating the overseas structure...(must) be done without damage to our national interest."33 The "challenge is not merely to reduce our presence, or redistribute our burden, or change our approach, but to do so in a way that does not call into question our very objectives."34 Those commitments that are
in our interest must be met. Much depends upon the reliable assumption of self-defense by foreign countries. Once foreign troops have reached United States combat potential (or if they have), United States troops can be, and must be, withdrawn. The realization of the military assistance program's goals become increasingly important. This withdrawal then reinforces the need to retain naval (and air) bases in advanced positions, if the United States is to facilitate the deterrence and deployment security role which it envisions for itself once indigenous forces have assumed the capability for the initial defense. The idea appears good, but United States planners are now faced with effecting withdrawal in time with allied increased capabilities, in an atmosphere of both disinclination and advocacy, at home and abroad. It must be decided where bases are to be consolidated or closed. Both political and military considerations must be balanced. Troops and ships, once withdrawn, are difficult to return. But the Nixon Doctrine has set its goal. East Asian states can, economically and militarily, assume the security postures envisioned. If the United States persists in remaining in danger of involuntary involvement in a land war due to an unnecessary military presence, it has failed in the Doctrine's implementation.

Asian Views of Their Security The security of East Asia is in the interest of the United States. But the application of the Nixon Doctrine depends to a large degree upon Asian views of their security. The use of their bases and facilities is contingent upon the nature of the threat as we both see it. If our views are consistent, implementation
of the specifics of the Doctrine is naturally easier than if they were to confront one other. But there is not one East Asian security perspective—each nation has a different set of political and military considerations from which they view their particular situation.

**Big Power Confrontation and Asian Politics** The United States security posture must also reflect the big-power confrontation and competition within East Asia. Psychological effects derived from economic and political factors become just as important as a military balance sheet in determining the nature of a threat. Detente, political exchanges, and joint economic ventures are viewed, to an extent, on a par with the military potential of an "adversary." China, the U.S.S.R., Japan, and the United States of America confront one another economically and ideologically, as well as militarily in East Asia. But relations between East Asian lands and historic "adversaries" or allies depend upon the internal political activity of the countries. The fourth major effect upon the United States security posture in Asia will be the current political changes in Asia. "New political combinations... might be thought of as possible vehicles for future change in political style rather than as real political parties...." and could"...over time, work significant change in politics and policies." It includes the conservative Right, as well as the radical Left, each proposing a different United States relationship.

**Independence of Smaller Nations** The four major influences upon the
United States policy make Japan's, Taiwan's, and South Korea's approach to the Nixon Doctrine vary in operational detail. But generally, East Asian opinion appears to be that while "professing that the United States presence serves United States interests more than their own, there is also some concern over the prospect of an American withdrawal which, by its rapidity or degree, created a vacuum which others might be tempted to fill. The political problem is actually that of balancing these somewhat contradictory views so as to maintain the American guarantee while extracting from the United States maximum political and financial benefits." 37

President Nixon acknowledges the same situation, although in a different sense: "New nations have found identity and self-confidence, and are acting autonomously on the world stage. They are able to shoulder more responsibility for their own security and well-being." 38 The allies of the United States appear to be beginning to realize the influence they can have in the application of the Nixon Doctrine. It is they who must assume a responsibility—they are the ones being asked, albeit in a demanding way. Some want to "keep their options open" among the major powers, becoming restive about the presence of any one foreign nation's troops upon their soil. But others have decided upon the United States as their option, and "refuse" to allow the removal of United States troops. In this new multipolar world, where so much is still unsure and unsettled, the United States may be able to condition the choices of our more vulnerable allies—but not determine
them. Some small nations have the opportunity or resources to balance major powers against one another. The United States has been able to set rather wide boundaries for her policy. But small countries, by conscious effort of their politics and economics, can affect the Nixon Doctrine on a basis out of proportion to their size or relative power. The role our allies decide to play in the framework of the Nixon Doctrine will largely determine the means and manner of its application. Each will act in its own interest, feeling "little sense of responsibility to an over-all international equilibrium...(being) much more conscious of their local grievances." It how the Doctrine applies to East Asian countries "...partly depends on them, for the Doctrine's full elaboration requires their participation."

For the United States, "great power does not mean great freedom of action and decision. On the contrary, it often means very narrow choices of action, and what we can do to influence events in a given case may well be marginal." The bureaucracies charged with the responsibility for United States national security policy will formulate and implement the approach of the United States towards this region of the world. The Nixon Doctrine is only a guideline, while the politics of East Asia are a series of conditions and constraints. But the judgements and decisions which determine United States programs within these considerations are the result of the men in the national security policy making process.
Realistic Approach To Policy Commitments

It does not appear that the United States policy in East Asia is moving with a direct, purposeful objective. The Nixon Doctrine seems like a holding action, a guideline policy trying to temporarily cope with a changing world, while the United States is waiting for and creating situations favorable to its interests.

The United States has become a more accommodating power. One author calls it a "diplomacy of opportunism rather than a commitment: a flexible diplomacy to match much weaker capability." The Nixon Doctrine does give an air of uncertainty. Allies wonder if American blood would ever be spent again. Questions arise as to the American President's flexibility to act in a conventional attack upon an ally. American gold is nice, but manpower shows a real commitment. At the present, it appears that the "never again" spirit after Vietnam is the strongest limit against United States interventions. Next is the cost-effective saving of American lives and, in the long-run, money by relying upon allies while maintaining a major role in Asia.

Vietnam has made the United States reexamine and wonder about its philosophy towards and need for the structure of its commitments. The United States has fatigued itself by its largess of commitments. Now America has stated its intervention will be determined by the interest the United States has in a country. This, and the type of aggression, are to decide if United States force is necessary. The restraints on American power are military, economic, and political. Domestic pressure
has demanded a change in its growing disenchantment with the world. The budget has forced a look at United States overseas expenditures, and the military has been forced to meet constant commitments with decreasing capability. The funds are not being given to maintain forces at levels which our commitments call for--our capability is not there. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, has called into doubt our continuing ability to meet our commitments, "It is absolutely inevitable that, if present trends continue, we will lack the capacity to control and use the seas."^44

The Nixon Doctrine is good domestic politics for our time. It provides for a low posture abroad in its partnership concept. The idea that we are withdrawing troops from foreign lands and concentrating on domestic priorities appeals to the United States public. But the United States still has international commitments to meet. The question is our approach to them. Are we to equip a government to fully defend itself, or do we equip it in view of the presence of United States weapons and forces? The selective intervention concept of the Nixon Doctrine means a realistic assessment of commitments and countries' needs. Lands which historically can only marginally affect the U.S still receive security assistance if their defense capability is adequate. But, we don't know precisely to what extent our withdrawal and disengagement from East Asia can be compensated by increased expenditures or a different mix of expenditures on allied forces in order to arrive at the same United States confidence levels in political and territorial integrity of the countries ...we are not sure of the economic, social, and political
constraints which will limit the effectiveness, if not the desirability, of increased assistance. 45

The Doctrine may be good domestic politics, but its "statesmanship" is questionable. Countries are unsure of our assistance and commitments. Its ambiguity is confusing and to many within the American bureaucracy it is a "catch phrase" whose meaning they are not sure of.

It is these bureaucracies which will implement and determine certain United States programs formulated within the Doctrine's guidelines. The Doctrine has been established as the basis of our foreign policy and security posture. "Once formulated, policies or doctrines which seem successful become institutionalized. Whole bureaucracies are redesigned to implement the policies and staffed by men whose reputations and careers become inextricably associated with the policies. Policy analysis becomes focused on means rather than ends." 46 It is these means of making policy which often become more relevant than the final reading of the desired ends of policy.
II THE BUREAUCRATIC PERSPECTIVE

Shortly before Dr. Henry Kissinger became the national security adviser to President Nixon, he wrote an essay affirming "that there is no such thing as an American foreign policy." At that time, he believed "that if one wants to understand what the government is likely to do, one has to understand the bureaucracies of the problems." He felt that decisions produced by the foreign policy decision-making process were either the output of semi-autonomous organizations involved in the foreign policy bureaucracy or the result of the interactions of these organizations.

In studying foreign policy today, a student is presented with two major areas for analytical evaluation. He may treat what happens in the world as actions or choices of nation-states which are unified, purposive governments. He will then view these governments as reacting to stimuli purposely in one way, due to the obvious threats or environment which it faces. Or else the student may chose to focus upon the organizations and actors in each government, study the wire-diagrams showing the organizational structures of agencies and their people, and determine why various outputs or outcomes spewed forth from them become foreign policy.

In the first method of study, the national choice of policy is the basic unit of analysis in explaining the behavior of governments as purposive acts. Policy actions are seen as rational choices of governments, chosen because they provide the means towards a particular
end. Students try to find the purposive pattern within which the government is operating, and see where a particular action will fit. The international scene is viewed as a chess board, each nation-state intent upon securing a particular end by calculated moves. Graham Allison called this the Rational Policy Process.

But a government is composed of loosely-coordinated, feudal organizations, each dealing with its particular area of interest. Problem issues must be factored among them, because they often share parts of the same problem. In cases where the State Department and Defense Department both work upon a security policy matter, certain procedures are followed. These pre-established routines determine the manner of an organization's reaction to an issue. Decisions are seen as outputs of these individual procedural routines. A student who looks upon foreign policy choices as organizational outputs, wants to identify the relevant organizations and show the particular patterns of organizational process from which an action is produced. He would inquire into what organizations the government is composed of, which of these organizations usually act upon a certain type of problem, and with how much influence. This is the Organizational Process of studying foreign policy.

What has become more fashionable today, is the study of decision-making as the outcome of the internal politics of organizations. This is the Bureaucratic Politics Process, where who share power also
disagree upon how to use it. The problem is the resolution of the
disagreements. Bargaining skills and strength at bureaucratic in-
fighting characterize policy-making. Power drives, effectiveness,
and access to higher officials determines a policy outcome, as well
as perseverance or "intimidation." What policy decisions involve
is a political bureaucratic office game, where influence and power
of individuals, astride or within bureaucracies, deriving their
authorities from statute or status, play to win on their perceived
concept of what the "interest" of the nation should be, according
to certain rules and along regularized channels of action. Identifi-
cation of these individuals, their power, their influence, and
processes for gaining what they want focuses on the reasons for a
policy decision.

It was accepted in this project, that the foreign policy of
the nation needs to be approached by emphasizing the centrality of
the participants.* The way a nation reacts in the international
environment is due to the way the organizations and individuals

*It is acknowledged that one cannot forget the international
environment. For example, it is fear of a Soviet nuclear holocaust
that has the United States structuring her strategic policy. But
the manner in which it is done is determined by those organizations
and individuals involved in the decision process—and here is
where the final, definite form of our policy outcome or response
is nurtured and finally created.
within the national bureaucracy seek to respond to international stimuli—the threats and opportunities provided—in furthering their interests, goals, and objectives. It was assumed that membership in a particular organization formed to some extent the perceptions and goals of the individual. Interest was taken in the area of the bureaucratic and organizational relationships and internal concerns—the bargaining relationships between different parts of the bureaucracy. Of prime importance then were the participants and interests themselves.

**Participants and Interests**

In foreign policy, the American government actions are not the result of some unanimous "policy". The problem is that with the evidence and material usually available it is the best scholars can often do. But it is much different. Problems are not perceived in the same way by the participants involved. An issue is seen as a national security matter by one agency, another sees it as an economic matter, while a third is concerned about the diplomacy of the affair. On any matter involving more than one agency, different stands are taken because each agency has different stakes in the outcome.

**Participants** The central figure of the foreign policy making process is the President. It is he who sets the tone or the general direction of America's actions. His is the multiple role of decision
maker, coordinator, innovator,²⁹ and persuader.⁵⁰ He is the only one responsible for coordinating the conglomerate of agencies involved in all aspects of foreign policy. The only choices left up to him are the ones which could not be solved at lower levels. He must decide among the agency's options, and choose one. He is held responsible for weaving a foreign policy relevant to a changing world, protecting United States interests. Major policy initiatives are his decisions. He receives the rewards-credit or blame. As President Kennedy said, "The President bears the burden of the responsibility. The advisers may move on to new advice."⁵¹

But the President is only one man. Significant action on any issue can and does occur in several places at once. There has been delegated to others by law and by the Presidents themselves, responsibility and work in foreign affairs. Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the White House Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ambassadors, the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture and Commerce Departments, and thousands of officials working in these departments-here and overseas-play a large policy making role down the line which can bind the President in his power.

Presidents rarely, if ever, make decisions-particularly in foreign affairs-in the sense of writing their conclusions on a clean slate....The basic decisions, which confine their choices, have all too often been previously made.²³

Presidential appointees to the assistant secretary level may
have different policy perspectives than the President which wield considerable influence within their departments. They are expected to shape and use their department according to the President’s needs, but will not if they differ. The careerists in the departments also have power, although more of a negative type. They supply the expertise and information to the Secretary. If he does not have their support, troubles arise in implementing a decision that is made.

Presidents have also consulted men not in the bureaucracy—individuals who are experts on economics, energy, or military affairs. The position of national security adviser is the most significant. Presently, he is the closest confidante of the President. But even in just forwarding, rejecting, or delaying the papers he receives he wields considerable influence.

**Interests** Persons’ participation in making foreign policy is characterized by what they have as objectives, goals, or interests. Defense wants a military posture awesome enough to preserve the national defense. State is interested in a world where the United States can secure political advantages to serve her interest. The United States has committed herself to a free, developing world. Neither State nor Defense alone guarantees that.

Each Department, to an extent, has come to identify its interest with the national interest. Conflicting views must be resolved. Each Department feels that the particular stakes of the United
States which it is responsible for, should be the primary concern in policy decision. It is natural that the Departments will fight to enhance their respective roles in foreign policy, trying to increase their influence. Decisions are accepted if they do not endanger the autonomy of a department in preserving its domain in the area of national security it is responsible for.

The offices in the State and Defense Departments will participate in any issue they think affects their responsibility. The issue will be studied under the parochial considerations the office was created to be responsible for. State and Defense know there are recognized processes by which the issue must proceed. But positions of others are "scoped out" before an issue starts through the formal channels. Efforts will be made to bypass troublesome bureaus as much as possible. Papers will be presented to provide information in such a way that a person will think that what must be done is identical with what is proposed to them.

Interagency Interfacing Dr. Kissinger once remarked that there is "a sort of blindness in which bureaucracies run a competition with their own programs and measure success by the degree to which they fulfill their own norms, without being in a position to judge whether the norms made any sense to begin with." Problems arise when the programs, activities, and norms of several agencies run counter to each other. The main incentives for interagency
cooperation to resolve the differences are commitments to national goals. Cooperation seems to be more readily given when the President, a symbol of national interests, favors a certain policy. But each collaborative step is not altruistic. Agencies and officials will continue to consider the influence and benefits that are attainable by interacting with other organizations before doing so. There are two types of goals. The first is the achievement of the primary, superordinate goal—what they are tasked to do with United States national interests in mind. This can be a reexamination and restructuring of a country's military assistance program. The second is the realization of secondary or organizational interests—power, influence, status. This is the struggle to have the restructuring of the MAP program reflect what each agency or organization feels is parochially right. The interests of the organization are paramount here.

Considerations by Agencies as They Begin Participation

Agencies make several major considerations before engaging in interagency cooperation. They study the affect of joint decision-making upon the possible achievement of their particular goals. An agency tries to see how much emphasis will be placed upon their ideas and philosophy. The agencies examine the bureaucratic processes and procedures to be followed—are they conducive to their playing an influential role? Finally, how much credit or blame is possible by the process to be taken?
Type of Decision-Making in Interfacing. If resolution of the above factors leads to active interagency participation, the agency has felt the effort to be worthwhile. The joint decision-makers must now solve a problem, or a conflict. Problem-solving involves reaching a conclusion which is not yet fixed. Alternatives are examined with their consequences. Exchange of information becomes accurate, and helpful. The emphasis is upon a genuine solution, where preferences are stated conscientiously with the intent to find an answer for the needs and objectives concerned.

Conflict resolution is done by bargaining. The terms are fixed. Each party knows what he wants, and can identify where he is headed. Exaggeration is common, as are threats, "pushing", and other bargaining inducements. The actors attempt to convince the others of their views, and if not, try to win their neutrality, or effect a bargain to achieve a partial victory. But problem-solving and bargaining do not occur independently. Bargaining tactics can inhibit the limit of problem-solving when compromises are made, or agencies force a decision before all the alternatives and their consequences have been examined. Problem-solving can also adversely affect bargaining. Weaknesses to one's bargaining argument could be discovered, hindering on agency's bargaining position.
The major bureaucracies involved in foreign policy making are the Department of State and the Department of Defense. This study will now concern itself with their structure, roles, and relationship in formulating and implementing national security policy.
The State Department

The Department of State conducts four major responsibilities in the foreign affairs world. "It makes and executes political policy except in a few highly specialized areas, and it supervises policy making in those areas; it coordinates the efforts of all agencies engaged in foreign affairs administration; it makes and executes policy in functional areas not claimed by other agencies; and it supervises the Foreign Service of the United States, which executes political policy abroad, conducts such other operations as are entrusted to it by the department and other agencies, and supports representatives of other agencies administratively."

But when a notable former Secretary of State publicly writes "...the role, power and prestige of the Secretary and Department of State in the conduct of foreign affairs have steadily declined," it seems erstwhile to make an attempt to study its present day efforts in foreign affairs.

In 1969, after several months on the job, the recent Secretary of State, William P. Rogers said, "I don't feel I have an action group at my command as they do in other departments. Sometimes I have a feeling things aren't going to get done." The organization he was relying upon is not that difficult to understand. The Secretary of State heads the State Department, with a number of obligations. He is the senior personal adviser to the President.
on political-military matters. He is the chief United States diplomat in negotiations with foreign countries. Besides being the chief administrator of his department, he is the President's deputy in coordinating most overseas activities involving the departments of his colleagues, the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, etc. He is the chief representative of foreign policy to our Congress and defender of it to our people, as well as to the rest of the world. Finally, he is "Mr. State Department", "leader of officials, spokesman for their causes, guardian of their interests, judge of their disputes, superintendent of their work, master of their careers." But he is not first one, and then the other. Time, then, is perhaps the first of the limits upon an exacting performance by the State Department. Also, although the Secretary has the same interests as the President in overseeing the entire conduct of all aspects of United States foreign affairs, his authority is not coextensive with the President's in this area.

Also at the top is the deputy Secretary of State, an alter ego of the secretary. There is a rough and changing division of tasks between them. A third position is the under secretary for political affairs. This position has been traditionally reserved for one of the most senior career officers of the department, although he must be confirmed by the Senate after Presidential appointment. He has the function of speaking for the State Department on all political-
Military matters. He is also responsible for matters involving intelligence agencies, relying upon the Bureau of Intelligence and Research as a form of staff. Recently, a new position was created— the undersecretary for security assistance. He is responsible for the overall coordination and oversight of the United States security assistance programs, working closely in State with the Politico-Military Affairs Office. The deputy undersecretary for management is concerned with logistics and personnel, from office space to promotions. The position of counselor is an ambiguous one. It is high in protocol, sometimes the official being charged with substantial responsibilities, but just as often it has been "a position to which a man can be gracefully kicked upstairs."59 These officials are the men of the "seventh floor,"60 those responsible for resolving the conflicts of lower levels, and making the highest policy decisions. They have a small staff, two or three assistants. But except for the secretary of state, who heads the entire department, none of them is a bureaucratic head. These are the men on the next level of the echelon.

The five regional assistant secretaries compose the core of the State Department—East Asian and Pacific affairs, African affairs, Latin American affairs, European affairs, and Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. Henry Kissinger said, "If one wishes to influence American foreign policy, the time to do so is in the formative period, and the level is the middle level of the bureaucracy—that
of the assistant secretary and his immediate advisers. That is
the highest level in which people can still think. Above that, the
day to day operation of the machine absorbs most of the energy,
and the decisions that are made depend very much on internal
pressures of the bureaucracy. This is where political policy
is actually formed by the mass of day to day decisions which
have to be made. This is the level from which policy emerges,
slowly, surely, often binding the hands of those above. This does
not only include the assistant secretaries at the State, but also
their ranking colleagues at the other departments which affect foreign
policy. Responsibility for making or changing basic policy resides
with the President and Congress. State and Defense do not con-
csciously originate policy, being only critics, advisers, and advocates.
But the "small" decisions made, the activities taken by the middle
level of their bureaucracies in dealing with their foreign
countries, may set the stage and generate the events that either
force higher officials to follow a certain course or make a policy
change necessary. Each of these assistant secretaries heads a
bureaucracy; for instance, the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs. The regional bureaus handle all the day to day operations.
The post of regional assistant secretary allows him to give broad
policy guidance to his bureau's area, and provide the leadership
that drives his department. There is really no limit to each
bureaus' responsibility in its region of the world. Liaison with
other departments depends upon them. Functional bureaus must seek them out to affect operational decisions, as any part of the world they wish to deal in is within the scope of one of the bureaus. Former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk has called the assistant secretary’s job, “the crucial post in terms of the art of management of policy in our relations with the rest of the world.” It is the last level of officialdom appointed by the President. Because of this, he should be aware of the President’s policy intentions and concerns. He is then the first level which can apply his political considerations to the inputs being received from his bureau and other sources. As Paul H. Nitze said, “the regional assistant secretary is the first person on the ladder who can commit the United States of America.” It is important then that the assistant secretaries share the President’s and Secretary of State’s general views of the world.

The structure of the bureaus under the regional secretaries have changed several times. In March of 1966, the State Department established the new position of country director. This was the man who formerly headed the country desk in the bureau.

A new position of Country Director will be established in the regional bureaus to serve as the single focus of responsibility for leadership and coordination of departmental and interdepartmental activities concerning his country or countries of assignment. The country director was to report directly to the assistant secretary. But two areas of conflict have arisen. Some countries were
not deemed important enough to be given a separate country director, and instead were grouped together under one director. This was a similar arrangement to the old geographical offices which used to stand between the individual desk officers and the assistant secretary. Also, there has been a growth in the number of deputy assistant secretaries, who tend to concentrate on a small group of countries much like the office director had done before. The purpose of raising the old country desk officer to the dignity of country director had been to indicate a change in his function. Reporting directly to the assistant secretary, he was to deal with officials in other agencies of equivalent rank, and begin to provide the leadership for interagency affairs. Country directors cannot deal effectively at all with senior officials of other departments if they are still treated as desk officers of junior grade.

The organization of the regional bureaus is simple. An example is the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. It consists of the assistant secretary and four deputy assistant secretaries. Two of these deal with political problems, and the other with matters of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. Under these are the heart of the Bureau—ten country directorates. Some, as in the case of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, deal with one country. Others, as in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, handle several countries. There is an office which concerns itself with problems based upon regional significance, called Regional Affairs. The staff members have
backgrounds in economics, political-military matters, international organizations, and such diverse subjects as drugs and labor. The Country Directorates each have several country officers working for them, specialists not only in their country, but usually in a certain aspect of that land.

The functional bureaus in the Department of State have varying degrees of influence upon decision making in the regional bureaus and higher levels. They do make decisions in their operational area, and are most active in interagency coordination efforts. These include the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, of Congressional relations, International Organization Affairs, and Educational and Cultural Affairs. They are headed by an assistant secretary. Others, such as the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and the new Policy and Planning (the old Planning and Coordination Staff) Staff have a director at their top. Each of these last three play a significant role in foreign affairs. Intelligence itself will be dealt with later, but the Bureau of Intelligence and Research itself, within the State Department has eight major functions:

1) To provide the Secretary, Seniors, and political officers with information and judgments of current developments which affect United States policy.

2) Conduct research and analysis on substantive issues and problems.

3) Assisting in producing multi-agency intelligence products and multi-agency political papers (National Intelligence Estimates, NSSMS).
4) Manage outside research.

5) Provide advice and representation on interagency boards concerned with planning, evaluation, and intelligence.

6) Provide the Department policy guidance for intelligence activities by other agencies.

7) Provide communication, distribution, etc. to users of its information overseas.

8) Public affair efforts such as map distributions.

It is not an office that deals with covert operations, but mainly serves as an evaluator of the information sent by embassies and other agencies. It draws judgements after an analysis of world developments, and makes them available to the regional and functional bureaus.

The Policy Planning Council\textsuperscript{68} was once a strong element within State with regards to Defense. It was a form of "think tank" that concerned itself with only the top issues in long or medium-range terms, gathering special people for individual planning groups. The Council might not have had the organizational impact it did if the Secretary had ignored it or treated it as part of his staff. The influence of the Council depends upon how he wishes to use it. But before 1969, it functioned as a viable, free-reined office.

In 1969, the Policy Planning Council became the Policy, Planning and Coordination Staff, and an effort was made to bring it into the daily operations. There was a general feeling that it could no longer
remain aloof if it wanted the desired impact. It would now try to impress long range considerations into account. But the Policy, Planning, and Coordination Staff lost its influence, due mainly to the Secretary of State's loss of power. It weakened considerably as it tried to move into daily matters, and was ignored by the Secretary himself.

In testimony before the Senate on his nomination as Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger answered a question about the Planning and Coordination Staff:

I plan to strengthen the role and capability of the State Department's Planning and Coordination Staff both in analysing problems and in considering various approaches to their solutions, including medium and long-range planning. More generally, I plan to emphasise the requirement for all parts of the State Department to think of the long-range implications of our policies and to reflect them in tactical and short-term actions.69

In early March, 1974, the name was changed to the Policy and Planning Staff. Winston Ford was appointed its head. He is one of Kissinger's very close associates, and it indicates the importance he attaches to the position. There is a feeling within the Politico-Military Bureau that the Staff is increasingly becoming a more active group. They monitor operations and are included in most working groups—the ad hoc ones which involve the different State bureaus. Papers are written upon the initiative of Ford's staff, parts of them often being funneled out to the various bureaus for construction. The Staff is remaining out of the day to day operations unless they have long term and broad implications, whereby they are
brought to the attention of Ford or the Secretary of State. Their job is to spot issues where long range matters must be undertaken. There is no organizational responsibility to perform certain functions, such as are assigned to Politico-Military Affairs. It is once again more of a freewheeling office which voices its views on a range of topics. Its effect will be seen in the attention paid to them by Kissinger as policy develops.

Not all, but some of the issues the Policy and Planning Staff deals with involve political-military questions. There are no formal or continuing contacts with Defense. Officials rely upon those they know, or those with whom it is necessary to deal with on specific issues. For instance on the SALT negotiations they meet with the interagency committee, and do have a substantial influence. They also attend the meetings on \textit{\$FUFL\$} talks, and also automatically have a role in constructing NSSMs from the very nature of the office—-but their input depends upon the issue at hand. There are those elsewhere who have a more influential input due to their position, expertise, or power. However, the value of the Planning Staff's judgments may increase. Kissinger, originator of most of the NSSMs, is now at State and drawing upon their expertise with that of the men whom he brought there with him. No longer is he just the National Security Adviser, intent upon having his view prevail through the National Security Staff. The locus of power is changing, and so do the sources from which
policy considerations are weighted more heavily.

A paper from the Policy Planning Bureau to the Secretary cannot be done alone. Their papers need information, options, and the organization which the Secretary requires to make a decision. The purpose of NSSM's are to spell out objectives, the reasons why we support them, and reexamine and perhaps replace, the old ones. Not involved with the details of an issue such as the military assistance Program, the Planning Staff looks into the reasoning of our participation in the countries. Planning asks if the national objectives are served by the present system, but to get the information and objectives they must coordinate with the Bureaus and the Defense Department who are responsible for the program and its details. Within the State Department, Policy and Planning coordinates on political-military issues most closely with the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

**bureau of Politico-Military Affairs** There are four principal functions of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM): 73

- to advise the Secretary of State on issues and policy problems arising in the areas where defense and foreign policy intersect; to serve as the principal channel of liaison and contact between the Department of State and the Department of Defense; to develop the views and positions of the Department of State on politico-military problems that are under consideration within the NSC system; and to exercise on behalf of the Secretary, the responsibility for supervision of the military assistance and sales programs and to control the commercial export of arms.
The bureau is internally divided into seven offices, which deal with a large scope and variety of problems in the world.

The Office of International Security Operations (PX/ISO) deals principally with matters relating to United States military operations, facilities, and bases overseas. It reviews troop exercises and ship visits for potential political effects. It coordinates or supervises with the regional bureaus military base rights negotiations. Regional defense cooperation, State and Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, and issues concerning the law of the Sea and the seabeds are under the purview of this office.

The Office of International Security Policy and Planning (PH/ISP) handles questions that concern United States defense policy, and strategic implications of defense programs. Policy questions about foreign bases, troop levels, and weapon deployment are worked on by this office. The Director of PX/ISP represents the State Department on the working group of the NSC's Defense Program Review Committee. In NSC's dealing with strategic or military matters, and contingency plans, this office is responsible for State's "input".

The Office of Atomic Energy and Aerospace is responsible for anything of nuclear and space content. It helps determine our policy concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons. It clears nuclear ship visits and overflights of nuclear armed planes. Finally, it coordinates our nuclear policy with our Allies.
The fourth office is Munitions Control (PK/KC). They are responsible for supervising the United States export licensing program for articles of war on the United States Munitions List, under the authority of Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. The fifth office, the Office of Disarmament and Arms Control (PM/DCA), represents the State Department in all disarmament talks and arms control. They participate in formulating the United States position for SALT, MBFR, and such disarmament issues, and are represented on the NSC Verification Panel and as such, they also work on test ban issues.

The Office of Planning and Analysis for International Security Assistance (PM/PA) is the newest of the offices. It is charged with coordinating the annual guidance by the various departments of the security assistance program. It formulates five-year plans, and studies countries' force modernization requirements. It also must take into account the economic consequences of its proposed actions.

The final office is Military Assistance and Sales (FM/MAS). This office is the organizational unit charged with the supervision and direction of the Military Assistance Program. The Secretary of State has delegated this authority to FM/MAS under Section 612 of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended. Under Section 2 of the Foreign Military Sales Act, this office is also responsible for the supervision and direction of the foreign military sales cash and credit programs. Included within these programs are naval ship
loans, leases, and sales. It also participates in the group conducting the delegation of excess defense articles, and is responsible for the clearances of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups. It is this office which makes contact with Defense on such matters. It is the Defense Department which is responsible for the administration of the Military Assistance and Sales Program. But it is through Military Assistance and Sales, as it analyzes the issues which arise, and oversees the policy of the sales and assistance actions in foreign countries, that the Politico-Military Affairs Bureau becomes "the conduit through which flows the "general direction" and "continuous supervision" which the Secretary of State is required to give these programs."^74

The largest criticism of the State Department has been its characterization as a "fudge factory, or as President Kennedy called it a "bowl full of jelly". The criticism is not unfair. The Department is slow, as endless "clearances" are needed by different offices and bureaus who feel they should be involved in an action taken. The Department has not provided the strong leadership it should in foreign affairs, but rather appears cautious, lumbersome, and indecisive in its activities. But the fault is not all theirs. The State budget of about 500 million dollars compares to over 80 billion dollars for Defense. The Pentagon has a natural constituency among the military hardware industry and with the congressmen where the industries or military bases are
located. The State Department has no such constituency. It must supervise the foreign affairs of over 125 countries. Interests collide when a policy favorable to one country is at the same time detrimental to another. Will assistance given to one nation which sorely requires it, affect our relations with a peripheral ally who is this nation's adversary? It is State who is charged with providing these answers in the broad area of foreign affairs. It is much more difficult for State to have general concurrence on a policy and present a unified front than it is for a department with narrower interests in the world.

Military Establishment

National security policy is encompassed, and encompasses, foreign policy. Military security decisions and commitments are not without their political impact, at home and abroad. Military inputs, and their military-political expertise, have become an important aspect of the governmental decision making process. Every decision made concerning strategic planning, doctrinal development, or security activities, such as homeporting or military assistance, bodes ill or good for the conduct of our foreign policy. All come under the operating authority of the Department of Defense, alone responsible for the national security of America.

There is no activity which has more significance today in United States relations with foreign countries than military affairs. The role of the Defense Department is to administer within State,
Congressional, and Presidential limitations the geographical distribution of its resources. Troop deployments, daily ship visits, aid to friendly nations—executed by DOD in accordance to national defense requirements—are run daily by Defense personnel. Obtaining a base, withdrawing a division, implementing a security decision with a certain weapon system—each one is done amid political implications. It becomes Defense's role not only to implement decisions, but to participate in their formulation with defense requirements.

**Organization**

Created by the National Security Act of 1947, the Defense Department has expanded into a huge conglomerate. It is headed by the Secretary of Defense, who is the foremost personal military adviser to the President. This is the man chosen by the President to direct the Department in attaining the national objectives. It is essential that he possesses, and can display, the confidence of the President in him. Any high official who wishes to yield more than routine authority must have the trust of the President. A civilian, the secretary is a man who is highly capable, but usually unfamiliar with many of the aspects of the military enigma. He is given the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the nation's highest officers—as his personal military staff. The second role of the defense secretary is that of military commander. He is the first in the
chain of command after the President, and must structure the United States' strategic and tactical policy. His third role is manager of the department of defense. He runs the organization and is its final authority. The roles of the secretary also include being the representative for the Department before Congress and with State, as well as being the lobbyist for its interests.

Under the secretary is the deputy secretary of defense. It is their relationship which determines the management of the department. Former Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary Packard are said to have had the almost perfect division of labor. One defense official saw Laird acting with "consummate effectiveness as the "master politician" in handling the Defense Department's external relations; he was ideal as the chief military adviser to the President, and outstanding as the Department's top lobbyist on Capitol Hill. Meanwhile, Deputy Secretary Packard was the internally oriented manager who "minded the store". In contrast today, Secretary Scsolesinger and Deputy Defense Secretary William C. Clements are reportedly on cool terms.

At the next level are the ten assistant secretaries of defense. It is the assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) who has had the power and the role to most influence United States policy, and who provides the secretary of defense specialized nonmilitary advice on foreign affairs. The other assistant secretaries are involved to a lesser degree with policy,
but they must coordinate it with ISA. By executive authority, ISA develops and coordinates the Defense Department’s positions and policies on politico-military and foreign economic problems. Under ISA, the military services and overseas commands conduct the operations of security assistance. It coordinates the Defense Department’s representation on the National Security Council, “back-stopping” the Secretary’s participation. It also arranges DOD’s participation in international conferences. Finally, it is the official, authorized channel for liaison with the State Department.

The assistant secretary is aided by his principal deputy assistant secretary. Under them are six deputy assistance secretaries, of which four are regional. They do the job of coordination for the assistant secretary within and without the Defense Department in matters concerning their regional or functional areas. Working for them are the regional directors who head groupings of countries and their “desk officers.” ISA is the State Department within the Department of Defense.

There are other agencies and bureaus within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but, again, any activities of theirs affecting national security and foreign policy, is coordinated with ISA. In

"Backstopping" means preparing policy papers, giving briefings, readying answers to anticipated questions, and doing research on a subject for an official to have before he is to represent the agency on a certain point, preparing him before he goes before committees, etc.
one instance, the Director of an agency is also the acting assistant secretary of ISA.* One other agency which does play a significant part in policy formulation is the Defense Intelligence Agency, which reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, and also is responsible for formulating national security strategy.\(^\text{78}\) The JCS is composed of the chiefs of staff of the three services, along with another senior officer, the chairman. The commandant of the marine corps also sits as an equal on the board when a matter directly concerning it arises. The three service chiefs are supported by a staff of their own, as well as their own service bureaucracy, while the JCS as a whole has the Joint Staff working for them.

The JCS also serves as the operational staff between the secretary and the unified and specific commands. They are responsible for executing the strategic policy which they initiated. The JCS also plans and programs the material and military forces it needs in its annual Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). The last function of the JCS is performed separately by each Chief heading

\*This is Vice Admiral Ray Peet, USN, who directs the Defense Security Assistance Agency and is at the moment the acting assistant secretary of ISA.
his individual services as the senior naval, air, or army officer. This is the crux of the problem concerning the JCS—can they jointly provide professional military advise in the national interest as the senior officers of their services? They need the support and confidence of their service department's to work effectively as chief of staff. They are obligated to their services to represent their interests to the JCS as the service chiefs—but to what extent? This "two-hatted" role is a major cause of "splits" within the JCS—decisions where the members cannot agree upon one alternative. This leaves the decision to the defense secretary, strengthening his role as the JCS' is weakened.

The role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs has little to do with statutes. It is the de facto role, one supported by precedence and personality. The chairman is only one among equals, but he has come to be the senior military adviser to the President, and secretary of defense. Dealing with one man is easier, and the chairman has become a sort of "go-between" in the defense department. The joint service chiefs have looked upon him to represent their point of view to the secretary, or President. He has become their spokesman. But appointed by the President, he must be careful that he does not lose the support of the JCS by becoming his representative.

Since the 1960's, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has begun to take political, economic, and other non-military matters into consideration before their decisions are reached. After the
Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy charged them "to base their advice not on narrow military considerations alone but on broad-gauged political and economic factors as well." Informal communications with Defense offices and State bureaus were established. The Chairman is responsible for directing the Joint Staff in support of the JCS. This is carried out by the Director, Joint Staff, presently a lieutenant general, soon to be a Vice Admiral. He is assisted by the operations department of each service in the workload, and also in deciding matters within the authority of the Operations Deputies of the services.

The Joint Staff is composed of five directorates—personnel (J-1), operations (J-3), logistics (J-4), plans and policy (J-5), and communications-electronics (J-6). They prepare reports for the Joint Chiefs, which are for their use in making their decisions. J-5 "prepares joint strategic plans and studies for current and future application," it also "participates in requirements and development matters pertaining to the Five-Year Defense Program." Within J-5 are geographic divisions, as well as divisions dealing with military assistance and negotiations. It is J-5, along with J-3 (responsible for the current operations), which reviews the operational plans of unified commands that are involved in national policy questions.

The Joint Staff’s actions are closely coordinated with the service departments at each stage during their formulation. Done
to arrive at a unified position, it perhaps produces more compromised positions in order to have all the services agree to a decision. Each service pores over the issue at hand, intent upon reconciling it to their service's interests. The work of a Joint Staff action actually seems to be done by the staffs of each military department, who prepare their services' positions, and then try to negotiate them out within the Joint Staff. The first preliminary draft by a Joint Staff action officer is called the "Flimsy". After the blue version, there is the "buff", then the "green" or printed paper. At each stage, there is coordination as the services state their positions on each colored version. Purple is the color of paper used if the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagree, and white is the color of the memorandum which goes to the secretary when a unified decision has been made. The procedure is time-consuming, each color denoting a higher level which makes its comments and dissenting remarks on the paper. All green papers are forwarded to the Operations Deputies who approve them for the JCS if it is a matter they can act on with agreement, or forward them to the Joint Staff for further negotiations, or because of their importance. Every effort is made to reach an agreed-upon position at the lowest level possible.

Military Departments The military departments were removed from the operational chain of command by the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act. Operational command now runs from the President through the
secretary of defense via the JCS to the unified commands. The service departments remain the principal manager of the resources of the services—logistics, personnel, and research and development are all under their supervision, coordinated with each other and the JCS. But their planning and review of requirements, as well as their procurement of specialized weapon systems, have impacts upon foreign policy. They are concerned about national security and the role they will have in it. Questions concerning homeporting and base acquisitions necessitates their expertise and involvement. They too become concerned about political implications affecting their military doctrine.

Each of the departments is headed by a civilian secretary, who has working for him several under secretaries and various assistant secretaries in charge of managerial offices. The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act limited the role of these secretaries to managers, or extensions of the defense secretary. Assistant secretaries of defense became deeply involved in military departmental affairs in performing their functions, bypassing the service secretary. It is now recognized that an assistant secretary of defense must obtain authority from the defense secretary to work through the service secretaries to become involved in service affairs which concern them. The service secretaries are "primarily expediters and not formulators of the military plans and programs which constitute the policies of their departments"; they are the advo-
cators of their service's programs. It is then important for them to have the trust of their military chiefs of staff.

This is the second role of the JCS officers—performing as the chiefs of staff of their military organization. Together with the service secretary, he supervises the efficiency, preparedness, and resources of his service. As chief of staff, he is the Service's ranking officer, and the responsibility of its maintenance is his. But it is a unique role. He is the only member of his department who has a statutory role in security policy formulation by his membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He can support his service's programs in several ways. Besides the forum of the JCS, he can work through the service secretary to present an unaltered view to the defense secretary. Or he may go through informal OSD channels, trying to convince the offices on the way to the top level, that the service's view is credible. By statute as a JCS member, the service chief may go directly to the Congress or the President, after informing the Secretary of Defense, to make his case. The navy has tended to keep away from using methods which involves going through the office of the secretary of defense (OSD). The air force favors this approach, while the army holds an intermediate position. 85

The Department of the Air force is the only military department to have a deputy undersecretary for International Affairs within the office of the secretary of the department. If the air force
wishes to focus on a matter which is in the politico-military field, it can be handled through here, and not through the JCS staffing memorandums. It has not only provided the department an independent central point to coordinate air force political-military problems, but has become a convenient link for other components of Defense to deal with a matter involved with the service. If ISA were unsure of where to approach the department on some issue, they would start here. They deal with security assistance along with the range of defense political issues. The air force also utilizes the office of the deputy chief of staff, Plans and Operations, to centralize the problems of a politico-military nature. The directorate of plans is subdivided into functional and geographical regions. But it is with the International Affairs office within the service secretary that the air force achieves the interfacing within the Department of Defense which the other services do not have.

The navy has perhaps the best structured office to deal with politico-military issues. Within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations is the deputy chief of naval operations, Plans and Policy. It is divided into four divisions and three branches. One division is responsible for strategic plans policy (OP-61) according to regional as well as functional areas. The Politico-Military Policy Division (in OP-61) analyzes political implications of defense activity according to regional offices. One of the other divisions is accountable for naval security assistance implementation. But
there is no unit to compare with this within the office of the Secretary of the Navy.

The army has created for the same reasons as the air force a deputy undersecretary as a central point for security assistance matters. But it is not an international affairs office as such. Under the deputy chief for military operations, there is an International Affairs Directorate, with a small Politico-Military Division. Also within Military Operations is a Plans Directorate dealing with strategic policy planning.

Two weeks after his inauguration in January, 1969, President Nixon apologized for the emptiness of his oval office. It was still devoid of articles and paraphernalia—except for the four flags of the military Services. Nothing else stood about or decorated the room—just the symbols of the military services. "They" had sent them over that morning, when they had heard President Johnson had packed his away. It is a reminder of the military, and its place in foreign policy—everywhere. 86

The power and influence of the military arises from the legality and expertise in the means of violence they control. In doing the job they are given to do, fears of militarized foreign policy and loss of the principle of civilian supremacy are voiced. For several reasons civilian supremacy has not proved a problem. 87 But the
criticism of a militarised national policy means either our foreign policy is overweighted with military considerations, or is being excessively influenced by military men. All around the world are United States bases and United States forces. Defense policy is tied up in foreign policy. To a certain extent there is need of militarising foreign policy—but what is sufficient? Military leaders are concerned with power, and deal with it with force. The problem is not to overmilitarize the policy of the United States, not to leave the policy field alone to the military. They must become aware of political and economic implications of executing their policy perceptions. And it is the job of State, the NSC and other cabinet members to confront the military with it.

The use of the military today is a paradox.

Military power is an indispensable element of international involvement, yet the utility of military power is limited by the risks of its very use. The American response to this paradox has been a "mixed doctrine combining the policy of deterrence and the concept of control over conflict situations." But this policy of deterrence and control puts limits on American military power.

Military power becomes a requirement but not an active instrument of policy. The usefulness of military might is measured by the extent to which it can be translated into political power. It is an umbrella under which diplomacy, economic activity, and propaganda can be employed to further American interests. Military power might have to be used, especially in response to aggression or equally serious provocation. But even when force is brought to bear, the measure of success
is not the crude calculation of military victory, but the more difficult dimension of political achievement. 

Today, the major objective of military resources is not necessarily to "win" victories, but to deter conflict by developing political and psychological relationships in the world. "The development, deployment, and use of the defense establishment must be delicately related to political objectives." The major mechanisms for ensuring this relationship are the NSC, State Department, White House, and Department of Defense.

State and Defense Relationship's Interaction

The State and Defense Departments are the major, and often adversary or conflicting, participants in foreign policy formulation. Both departments have different interests to protect, different functions to perform, and different ideas as to what methods are best for achieving a national objective. They do agree, but just as often do not. These agencies are assigned their particular functions, but it is evident that they do overlap to a considerable extent. There is not, nor can there be, any fixed boundary between what is foreign and what is security policy. Military decisions impact considerably on foreign policy situations, and political considerations need to be taken into account. Military expertise and information are always necessary when military issues become foreign policy matters. Most important issues of security policy are joint State-Defense actions. Base rights, military aid, and
arms control negotiations or troop reductions require relating military means to foreign policy ends. The different assignments and responsibilities of the two departments makes disagreement inevitable. But disagreements themselves are not bad. They focus attention upon matters or specifics that need further consideration by one side or the other. What is undesirable is the lack of effective and timely means for resolving the differences which arise between these two major policy departments. There must be a close, working relationship between the State and Defense Departments to effect an integrated security policy. It must exist between bureaus and offices, from the action officers to the Secretaries, whether implementing decisions between the two bureaucracies, or formulating them within the National Security Council process.

It is difficult to ascertain the exact nature of the State-Defense relationship in foreign policy since President Nixon assumed office. Case studies present problems of gathering information which is still classified. Participants are still serving, and anxious about their positions. Generalized statements and observations sometimes are the extent to which a person can delve into aspects of the bureaucratic happenings between the departments. But from these, and others more wise in Washington’s ways, a general idea of the nature of the relationship can be gathered.
The offices most involved in State-Defense interfacing have already been mentioned. Within State there is, of course, the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, as well as the Under Secretaries for Security Assistance and for Political Affairs. But the burden of the day-to-day activity is borne by the geographical bureaus and the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. There is also some consultation between the Policy and Planning Staff and Defense, while the Bureau of Intelligence and Research maintains contact with the various intelligence offices within Defense.

The Defense Department coordinates with State principally through the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA). The Joint Chiefs of Staff also become involved with State, supported by J-5 and J-3 of the Joint Staff. The military departments each have offices dealing with State-related issues, but they are required to work through ISA in contacting the State Department. Also involved through these two (Military departments and the JCS) are the unified and specific commands, evaluating their strategic requirements. At the top is the Secretary of Defense, who has the assistance of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Office of International Security Affairs (ISA)

The chief bureau within the Defense Department for coordinating with State is ISA. Before Secretary McNamara left the Defense
Department he had built up two powerful Assistant Secretary of Defense offices. One was the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (OASD/SA), established in 1965 from the Office of the Comptroller. It took aggressive control over the entire defense budget process.

...the JCS and the military services were in large part reduced to simply responding to SA initiatives, and were likely to be summarily overruled if SA—acting as a staff arm of the Secretary, to be sure—decided that their responses were unconvincing or inadequate. It goes without saying that the White House staff, the Department of State, the Bureau of the Budget, and other such agencies soon found out (that SA was) where the "action" was...†

But it was ISA which had primary concern for establishing contact with State in matters of security policy, such as military assistance and troop exercises. It never filled the role announced for it in the late 1960's until a series of strong and talented Assistant Secretaries for International Security Affairs were brought in by Secretary McNamara. They gave McNamara strong staff support in his tendency to announce his own foreign policy views:

McNamara's so-called "posture statements" to Congress every winter included extensive coverage of foreign policy worldwide, and whenever he spoke in international forums—as at the NATO ministerial meetings in the spring or autumn—he seldom failed to make headlines with views that were loaded with foreign policy content or implications. The ASU/ISA and his deputy assistant secretaries—little loath to begin with—reacted to McNamara's wide-ranging activism by becoming themselves as aggressive and independent as they felt they had to be in order to survive. In the process, the aggressiveness and independence of many of them often struck
officials in State and in the Office of the JCS as arrogance and offensiveness. 95

Because of McNamara's stature and influence within the entire policy-making community, his ISA staff arm grew powerful and dominant. The decision-making bureaucracies became centralized with McNamara as the head. His offices and bureaus became the center of the "action" which he brought there, and which his assistant secretaries fought to maintain. The slow decline of the State Department in influencing foreign policy continued. Action was centralized in the civilian office of the Secretary of Defense, with ISA the principal foreign policy agency.

The head of the ISA is still responsible to the Defense Secretary. When Kelvin Laird became the Secretary, he encouraged the weakening of the two offices which had become unbeatable competitors of the military services-ISA and SA. 96 The services, particularly the Navy, 97 had bred a corps of officers skilled in systems analysis, and also political-military analysis. Secretary Laird has been pictured as a Defense Secretary more interested in resolving individual service interests than in keeping them in accord with Presidential priorities. 98 It had been ISA who challenged the services, forcing them to accept broader priorities than those of their own department. Now they were being ignored within the Department itself. ISA could no longer confidently be seen to speak for the Secretary, and its interagency influence was becoming
curtailed. It appears that the Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the State Department, U. Alexis Johnson, did not feel ISA was necessarily needed by Defense. Other groups in the State Department, particularly the Political-Military bureau, were battling to reduce ISA’s bureaucratic power. ISA complained that Deputy Defense Secretary Packard, a good friend of Johnson’s, agreed with State’s view, and was a de facto ally of State. They saw ISA’s weakness not as a reflection upon the office, but as a result of outside maneuvers to reduce its role, and the appearance that the Bureau had lost its main source of strength—a Secretary who used their advice as a strong influence in making his decisions.

ISA’s forte in defense policy-making was that it alone was to represent the Defense Department in interagency coordination. They could speak to anyone; but the services-intent upon their programs—were required to go through ISA to speak with State. It is a hard fought for prerogative.

Service-State "End-Running" "End-running" is a term used for bypassing the unit or person that another is required to immediately deal with on an issue. It is done for a variety of reasons—to reach someone who “can do something”, or to try to remove from the decision-making process an office which will surely block a program which the end-running agency supports. Or else a bureau may
be bypassed simply because it is not strong enough to stop it. 
This is one problem in State-Defense relationships.

In coordinating with State, ISA has the only Defense authority
to do so. But ISA's image has changed during the Nixon Administra-
tion. Dennis J. Doolin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
in International Security Affairs for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
has said that he felt that ISA was stronger in President Johnson's
time. The people there were more self-confident at his level, and
had less of a tendency to consult before taking a position. It
appears that the ISA group knew they had the confidence of their
Secretary, and felt they could speak for the Department with his
support without checking back for guidance whenever a question arose.
That assertiveness is gone today, and ISA's particular advantage
in departmental interfacing is weakening—that it alone in the
Defense Department is authorized to deal with State. Not only are
the Services restricted from going to State, but State also may
only deal with Defense through ISA. ISA can contact anyone in State,
but Pf must come to ISA.

In interviews conducted with officer's working in their
respective Services' policy and plans departments, there was general
lip-service given to their adherence in following the instructions
that they must work with State through ISA. However, one Admiral
candidly admitted to bypassing ISA. To him, ISA was weak, and the
personalities "bad" to deal through. He learned how the system was
institutionalised, going to recognised "pressure points" to make it work for him. These were certain people, "prime movers" he called them, who he could use. He saw his responsibility to Admiral Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, while the ISA head was reporting to the Secretary of Defense. He had to "get his job done", and if ISA were a hindrance, he went directly to State.

For this senior naval officer, State-Defense relations were a matter of finding out if someone in State could help him, and if so, going directly to him if ISA proved a problem.

**The Navy Working Through ISA** The Navy is notorious for dealing directly with State. A military officer within ISA stated that the Navy had no compunction to end-running anyone at all. As abusers of the system, they were "masters of the fait accompli." The major offender was OP-06, Plans and Policy. This was the office where Rear Admiral Robert O. Welander, allegedly involved in the fiasco of taking some of Mr. Kissinger's National Security Council papers, was the Assistant Deputy. The officer mentioned how less than ten years ago, no one in the Services would even go to an ISA "action officer" without permission, never mind trying to end-run it.

**"Action Officer" is the designation for the particular official within any bureau or office who holds direct responsibility for overseeing a particular issue the office is dealing with. The official is usually a desk level officer, who coordinates the views of his department and with other agencies, carrying the issue through to the high levels of officialdom.**
Several officials felt that this end-running on the Navy's part has a lot to do with Admiral Zumwalt. The officers have a job—and an admiral on their neck to accomplish it. Lead by Admiral Zumwalt they would get it done, anyway. An official queried about this commented that if Phase Two of homeporting in Greece were delayed within State, he would expect the Admiral would probably have lunch with the State officials concerned. The official admitted it was difficult to keep up upon Navy-State relations, often getting to the point where an ISA official can only say, "For God's sake, tell me what you're doing!" The Services have caused so many complaints that the executive officer of Mr. Nutter, the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs last year, was forced to distribute a terse memorandum reminding the Services of their role and obligations to work through ISA. But it continues, and officials unwillingly admit that they take their "hats off" to the Navy, with its "great system."

Several officers in OF-06 were asked of their relationship with the State Department. All commented that they were required to work through ISA. Near the end of the interviews, the officers were asked to comment upon the Politico-Military bureau of the State Department and their role-playing in State and Defense relationship. Answers within one area were quick and harsh. Examples were given of what they felt was their ineffectiveness. They talked of how often they were unable to work with FM due to its ineffectiveness.
in policy-making, and how PM was of little help when they were contacted. It was ironic to hear these officers' disappointment that they could not get any "action" from PM, then to remember their comments at the beginning of the interviews that the Navy did not contact PM, but worked through ISA.—as required.

**ISA's Decline** ISA has been beset with personnel problems. It has changed Assistant Secretaries quickly, and the post has now been vacant for a long time, with the deputy assistant Secretary for Security Assistance as acting head. The post of principle deputy assistant secretary is also vacant, and there is an acting head of another deputy assistant secretary position. The Office is almost without leadership. It has not lost its coordinating function, but it has lost its policy initiative. There are too many vacancies, but there appeared to be little concern about it. The ISA Office, once strong under Secretary McNaughton, has steadily gone downhill in capability and power. Some officials perceive the ISA as a home for noninfluential right-wingers. Others now see the ISA as too identifiable with the military services. Agencies tend not to cooperate with an ISA that no longer appears intent upon checking the military branches as it once did; they could as well go directly to the Services. There just appears to be little initiative leadership within ISA.

Mr. Nutter was the Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs. He handed in his resignation, as all top officials were required to do when the second Nixon Administration began.

However, when Secretary Laird said he was about to leave, Mr. Nutter did the same. But he left the post empty at a most crucial time—this was when Vietnamization began and the new administration started. There was no head to fight for ISA to be a factor in the national security process, let alone Vietnamization. Finally Mr. Hill was appointed. But he was a Secretary who liked to deal with broad ideas and not in details. It was not what was required to force ISA's way back to a probing, pushing power. Nor did Mr. Hill get along with the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Richardson, a talented official, noted for his ability to control the bureaucracy for his use. At present, the position is vacant. One official in ISA views the office as "rocking along now", these vacancies being a big reason.

A few officials interviewed wondered whether the Administration had not decided to relegate ISA to a lesser role in defense policy making. Most of these felt that it had, particularly in light of Dr. Kissinger's dominating role. Officers in the Service said that from the point of view of the military working with ISA, the relationship has not changed since the Kennedy-Johnson era—ISA still must be "onboard" to have a policy accepted rigorously in the Defense Department. But between ISA and the total workings of American policy, they have lost the influence they had once gained.
from a relatively weak Secretary of State who gave in to Defense, and the deference that the special assistant to the President for national security affairs, Walt Rostow, gave Defense in the National Security Council. With Defense being deferred to, ISA had more "clout."

In view of the bureaucratic politics within Defense and between it and the State Department, it is questionable if a strong ISA would make a difference, or if it is even a matter of concern.

There is considerable doubt in Washington if ISA will ever regain the level of power it once held in view of the way policy is being made today. At the present there is a new, strong Secretary of Defense, Dr. Schlesinger. Officials concede that quite a lot which before was acted upon at the ISA/assistant secretary level is now being resolved at the Secretary of Defense-State level. If ISA has a problem, Dr. Schlesinger will solve it, not ISA. One official in ISA felt this may be an outcome of the Middle East war, where Schlesinger and Kissinger acted together expeditiously on many issues. Dr. Schlesinger has said,

"the style of decision making is very important. I think that it is fair to say that, at the present time, some of the senior decision makers are men who like to do things in an individual way and in a private way."

Effort to Revitalize ISA  
But recently Dr. Schlesinger supported the nomination of Paul H. Nitze as Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA. Mr. Nitze served as head of ISA under McNamara. Under
him, ISA grew from a small "State Department" which advised the military, to a strong office, checking upon and prevailing over military opinion. As a result, Nitze was appointed Secretary of the Navy, and later became the deputy secretary of defense to McNamara and Clark Clifford. A Democrat, Mr. Nitze did not survive the incoming Republican administration of 1968.

Opposition arose immediately to Mr. Nitze's appointment. Top Pentagon officials have said that they were relying heavily upon Nitze to restore ISA's importance. It was reported that Mr. Kissinger was opposed to Nitze's nomination. People wondered if Kissinger was apprehensive of the competition his role would now have in foreign affairs with a revitalized ISA. For Mr. Nitze is no ordinary appointee. He has held higher positions—and the same one. He alone survived the purge of the United States delegation after the initial SALT agreement. He is presently working in the Defense Department as a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for SALT II. Nitze knows the bureaucracy and defense policy making. His contacts are wide after a 30-year governmental career, one in which he has served in both Democrat and Republican administrations. Mr. Nitze knows the patterns of decision-making and is himself a strong individual. It is not in Kissinger's interest to see a strong ISA that might challenge his control.

Opposition also arose for a different reason from conservative Republican senators. It was the democrat Nitze who had helped McNamara...
dismantle the military's power during his tenure. Senator Goldwater claims Nitze "came very close to destroying this country's military capability." What ISA had done was to place reins on the military advice given, and evaluated it thoroughly while becoming the spokesman for Defense on national security policy. Today it appears that Nitze was purposely chosen to reenhance the image and prestige of ISA. He is accepting a position lower than his previous appointment, and people question why. To many, it seems as if Dr. Schlesinger has decided to reinvigorate an office to counterbalance Kissinger in national security policy by placing at the head of it an individual who had done it before. At this time, the White House is sitting on the problem. It has not sent the name forward to the Armed Services Committee for consideration, although sources there all agree that Nitze would undoubtedly be approved. Kissinger holds considerably clout in the White House, but the bigger reason for the delay may be the opposition of Goldwater. The Senator is becoming increasingly important in holding conservative support against impeachment. ISA is not as important to the President.

Politics of Information What seems significant in Nitze's nomination, is the admitted effect that this one man could have upon decision making in security policy. What Nitze has, and which the others lacked, is established lines of communication from earlier days. Simply because of his stature he can obtain information he requires.
Power is based on information. Roger Hilsman wrote,

in Washington, the first to have a tidbit of information
is the first to interpret its significance and is the
first to be on the scene when discussion starts on what
the policy implications of the information might be. Information is required to make decisions, base judgements upon,
and gain initiative. One official noted that the Services tended
to cut ISA off from parts of the "traffic" and information they
had in order to reduce ISA's effectiveness. But Nitze's personality gives him access to select information.

As national security advisor, Dr. Kissinger headed the National
Security Council and chaired six of its interagency committees.
He alone is privy to the information that the President has. Power
is based on information, and information as to how decisions are
going is important. Because of his unique position Kissinger
is the only man who legally can know all of this. This is the power
which Kissinger uses to his benefit. State and Defense do not
have access to the flows of information Kissinger demands—they
just do not know exactly what information Kissinger has. Now that
he is also Secretary of State (actually controlling the information
of that Department) it is the Defense Department which cannot prepare
the arguments against what Kissinger will ask. When a particular
official or office asks a question about an issue, it becomes natural

"Traffic" is the term used for cables, and messages received
from commands or embassies overseas, or other sources of informa-
tion.
to surmise why the question was asked, knowing the functions and interests, and the privy information the asking party has. The pattern an issue is taking in that office becomes evident in the questions asked. But Kissinger has access to all sources of information, and no one is sure of exactly what he knows. There is no feedback from Kissinger, who holds his cards close to his chest. The Defense Department does not have a picture of where a question that Kissinger asks fits in. They do not know how to answer Kissinger, because they do not know what he is aiming towards. Information about what is occurring at Dr. Kissinger's level is important to the Defense Department. The desire for knowledge facilitates certain irregularities, such as Yeoman Charles E. Radford and Admiral Welander's alleged "use" of Kissinger's personal documents, in order to obtain material.

It is this information that the status and experience of Nitze has contact with. This is what Kissinger would "fear", and why he would not want Nitze in a competitive position in the Defense Department. He is tough-minded, bureaucratically able to gather the data he needs, and "combine the experience gained as a policy-oriented senior State Department official with a strong grasp of weapons technology acquired in the Pentagon." He would have been a formidable opponent.

Role of ISA But no one can say that ISA is inconsequential. ISA
still represents Defense from the political point of view. It is the job of the Joint Staff to let ISA make the military’s case. They help convince the Secretary of Defense. If the Secretary is in agreement, it becomes his job to persuade the State Department. He does so by putting ISA in contact with them. ISA has the operational arguments from the Services, but now it must muster the political arguments against State. Difficulties arise, though, if ISA cannot be brought “onboard.” The Service must make its case appear worthwhile to ISA officials to elicit their support. Nor does ISA “play dead” when State takes a policy move. For instance, military general officers are curtailed from visiting certain “more dictatorial” allied countries where troops may be stationed. But it was just a matter of ISA notifying State of an impending visit to have a flag officer travel to these certain country to visit troops. In one incident, an ambassador, through State, forbid any more visits because he felt that their arrivals were showing an implicit support of the military regime. Though State’s perogative, ISA was successful in continuing such travels, although the officers were forbidden to have contact with officials of the country.

But much of ISA’s worth seems to be in implementing decisions. ISA is the same as before, but the personalities have changed. The Navy, for example, does not appear to be able to get ISA to commit theirselves on the desirability of homeporting in Greece.
One official felt that ISA either:

1. Does not want to look foolish if it decides wrong, or

2. Perhaps they really disagree with the Navy's view, and could be presenting the Navy's case to the State Department in such a way that the Navy would lose.

The Navy is forbidden to deal with State, but in such circumstances the incentive is strong.

The two points, if true, show a lack of decisive, dynamic leadership within the ISA organization. Issues depend upon people and emotions, and ISA is composed of military as well as civilian officers. Because of this, Service parochialism is another problem in forming ISA's policy positions. One senior official interviewed said that Service parochialism was a problem, but not often, due to countervailing checks. The military men assigned to ISA are "watched like hawks by the other services." Once an officer is perceived acting in a biased, service-oriented way, he loses his effectiveness. His judgements are seen as the views of his Service, and he is immediately "turned off." One point made was that ISA civilians themselves shared parochialisms for certain Services— one wryly commenting upon his sympathy for the Army's common foot soldier.

Another official in ISA felt that some members on the ISA staff were action officers for their services. A few come directly to ISA from duty in the plans and policy offices within the Services.
They are immediately conscious of their Service's needs, and it is difficult for them to recognize broader interests in their new position. An intangible, which several officials commented upon, was the fact that military men were presently in very prominent positions in ISA. Vice Admiral Ray Peet, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Assistance, is serving as the Assistant Secretary of ISA while the position is vacant. It is hard not to act partial, particularly when an officer is wearing two hats. Another important position held by a military man is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Plans and NSC Affairs. This is the office that has taken over responsibility for homeporting within ISA. The acting head is Major General Schoning, an Air Force officer, and the Air Force is not particularly happy about some of the operational details of homeporting, though they do concede some necessity for it in United States strategy. One official wondered what effect these military men have upon the outcome of a policy.

It is interesting to note how homeporting came under the auspices of Plans Policy, though it was not directly related to it. Larry Engelberger, now the right hand man with Kissinger in State, was stronger than the assistant secretary of ISA when he headed Policy Plans. He simply drew homeporting, along with the MBFR talks, to his office because of his demanding personality. He had a Rear Admiral as his deputy, who was, in effect, the naval action officer on homeporting. The office was strictly pro-navy.
when both officials left, however, Mr. Hill, then assistant secretary for ISA, moved General Schoning up to be acting secretary. Homeporting has remained in Policy Plans, and when questioned why, one official spoke of its worldwide impact, cutting across regional lines, involving Japan and others, as well as Greece. Policy Plans traditionally handles these large matters of policy, especially when there is a major functional part, this time by the Navy. But there is also a personnel reason a Policy Plans senior official said, "Policy Plans is extremely effective." But perhaps the major reason homeporting remains in Policy Plans is because regional desks cannot take it back. They are too weak to control this issue within their office bureaucracy. A deputy assistant secretary commented that the power behind our SALT negotiations dropped out of ISA due to weakness, and would not have if Nitze were there. As one unit, ISA is too weak to maintain a prominent position within the structure of United States foreign policy making today.

ISA is an example of intra-and-interagency politics. There are conflicting relations not only with State, but within the Defense Department, and even ISA itself. ISA has a weak bureaucratic position, which is further weakened by the military today in foreign policy. The action has moved elsewhere.
IV The Military-and-the Non-Defense Civilians

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Most articles written now on the Pentagon emphasize the increased role that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have been given in the national security process. During McNamara's tenure he had made clear his suspicions of the military advice given by the military and JCS. He established two powerful bureaucratic weapons to wrest away control of a divided Pentagon, "PPBS" (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System) and "SA" (Systems Analysis) were used by his "whiz kids" to pillage the proposals of the JCS, subjecting them to factual and cost-effective scrutiny. It was several years before the military learned the new ropes, and by then McNamara had command, practically ignoring the annual Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), the strategic wisdom of the military. Systems Analysis simply overruled the military and JCS if they felt their judgement was faulty.

Appearance of Increased Military Role When Secretary Laird took over, he was committed to two primary goals in the Pentagon: (1) to increase the military's participation in decision making, reducing the roles that of ISA and SA; (2) to increase the Pentagon's liaison throughout the bureaucracy.

The role of the professional officer was first seen to increase by the created participation of the JCS in the National Security
Council (NSC) machinery. Military officers, were members of practically all committees and ad hoc groups within the NSC. To most observers the military looked as if it never had it so good.

Although the Secretary of Defense sits on the NSC, with the Chairman of the JCS only as an invited participant, the Chairman sits on all sub-groups and committees of the NSC as a co-equal member with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Military men seem content with their role, seeing order and sense in the formal processes of the NSC, of which they are now active members. This outward formality of policy-making appears to have pleased the military, with the office of the JCS having seats on all groups and committees at the Deputy Secretary level.

Within the Defense Department the military was thought to have been relegated to a position where ideas on policy are heard. Secretary Laird called it "participating management", a decentralization of the Defense Department, where all proposals are considered. Services were invited to take initiative in managing their own money and administration. But Vincent Davis has written that Laird soon discovered his need for the office of Systems Analysis to evaluate the assortment of proposals given by the Services. The office began a rejuvenation under Leonard Sullivan in late 1973.

An officer working closely with Secretary Laird also commented that neither Laird nor his key aids ever read the JSOP Volume I. An Assistant Secretary of Defense interviewed said that the JSOP
is "stupid", being so large that no one reads them. Laird also found ways to force the Services to spend their supposedly discretionary money in specified ways. One example is that 30 percent of their total obligational authority in Fiscal Year 1974 was already committed by the secretary. The Secretary was also involved in setting priorities for the military, accepting a cut by a service in one area, but refusing the reciprocal rise of its budget in another area. The practice of "participatory management" seemed to go through the motions, having no essence. But officers seemed content in at least now being allowed to go through the motions.

**Reality of Military Role** Interviews and issues seemed to show that the increased role of the military in security policy determination is more apparent than real. Centralization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not decrease in reality. Lately, it has even significantly increased under Secretary of Defense, Schlesinger. The military seems to have taken on the tools of the past administration, becoming experts in systems analysis and skilled in the operations of political bureaucracies. But the centralization of foreign policy has moved out of the Defense Department, and up to the high levels of the White House. Nixon and Kissinger were not so interested in the operational area of policy when they instituted the NSC process. Their concern was with policy direction, prompting Kissinger to say sometime after he established the NSC process:
Process itself is a boring subject. You can make awfully stupid decisions with a brilliant process. The basic question the President has asked me to produce from the bureaucracy is: where are we going, and how do we get there? It is the question he keeps constantly before us.126

Some officials feel that perhaps the JCS has lost its prominent die-hard role with detente. The White House and Laird have allowed them a participating role within the decision-making process. But the services just seem to accommodate themselves to security policy guidelines given by Kissinger, just trying to be where the "action" is. They do not in reality seem to have much impact upon major policy decisions, but have become important tools in implementing someone else's decision. The JCS does not seem to have developed an office or the men capable of becoming a counterpoise to Kissinger's strategic policy thrusts. They are not prepared for the doctrinal thinking of Kissinger, much as they were once not prepared for the management of McNamara. Kissinger has commented: "In my experience with the military, they are more likely to accept decisions they do not like than any other group."127 Part of the problem is Kissinger's system, but part of the blame lies upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

One of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense I talked with had been involved with McNamara when SA and ISA began their pre-empted reign. He felt that the JCS had hurt themselves by allowing ISA to take the place of their Plans and Policy section, J-5. The JCS could not agree upon essential issues, allowing ISA to become a virtual empire. But the problem today is that ISA is now a weak
bureaucratic empire, and so is the J-5. There is an absence of strong military advice in the Pentagon concerning security policy. The JCS' political influence has been substantially reduced. They were not asked by the administration to play a major part in protecting the Safeguard ABM before Congress. The decline in the prestige of the military during Vietnam has allowed the White House greater discretion in accepting or rejecting the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Staff as a staff has no real power. They work for the men who run it—the Services. The Joint Staff does not make policy, but reflects what the Services want. They rely upon the services, which also provide the training, equipment and administration as well as the world strategy inputs for the Joint Staff to consider. Papers "color" their way up to the Chiefs in the "tank", until what critics call "log-rolling" has compromised each service's position until each service can come to an agreement. The JCS sometimes appears to be more of a legislative body than a planning one. Planning for strategy is done in the services, given the strategy input of the unified commanders. It is then coordinated in the JCS. It is not in the interest of the JCS to split, being politically bad to give the Secretary of Defense a choice among their differences. They want to control what the military's choice is; however, often the only way they can do so is to muddle the different parochial plans of the services together
to gain one agreed-upon position. When Kissinger came in, the JCS procedure had a hard time to keep up. So Kissinger brought up the staffing level of the NSC, no longer really asking the JCS to develop plans for, say, the withdrawal of one and a half divisions from Korea. His staff would do much of the general planning, and then inquire about certain questions from the JCS. The JCS staff had to then answer the individual questions without an idea of the "big picture" and how they fit in. Several officials noted that J-3, current operations, was perhaps the only significant arm of the Joint Staff today. Basic doctrinal shortcomings in political content, due to the procedures of the JCS, have weakened the J-5 to where a director in one geographical region of ISA has said they are, to some extent, "kept out" of deliberations.

The JCS is a very structured organization. It must be because of the parochialisms of the services. But it most often produces the least common denominator from the service's inputs. They are responsible for advising their chief of staff on JCS matters; they form their particular service position on every issue. Within the navy there are officers who must become tank experts. The navy scrutinizes each service's proposal to judge how it will affect not only United States strategy, but also its particular interests.

It is mainly the JCS that the ISA office works for. Problems once arose in ISA's tendency to supplant the JCS' position with their own military advice. Today the problem is the relatively
weak position of ISA. The services do the homework on an issue, but it is the JCS which carries it to the Secretary of Defense. ISA provides the political arguments to the Secretary and to the State Department. The JCS is dependent upon the ISA, but only a strong ISA will make them work through their office. Most feel that the JCS' counsel is being heard and considered at the highest level in years. Military views are wanted, but the ISA office has declined in ability and the JCS has remained much better at operations than planning. In reality, it seems that the JCS' role in national security policy is not a large one, unless one considers the implementing stage.

The Services

The Services are advocates and expeditors of security policy, not formulators. Their role is operational—to implement the security decisions which have been made. But the services each have a politico-military section to advise their chief of staff for JCS meetings, to remain aware of the political implications an action may create, and, perhaps most importantly, to be cognizant of the affect upon the operations and strategy of their service which a political development may cause. A return of a foreign base or island, the restriction of overflight rights, or the failure to renegotiate a base-rights treaty will specifically affect a service's operations. Each of the services has a slightly different
structure for handling such matters, but the procedure is much the same. The study will deal generally with all three services, and specifically with the navy.

The navy is said to be a defense department in itself. In a sense, it seems true, being the only service with land, sea, and air tactics and strategies. In the absence of budget constraints, it is the OP-60 division (Strategic Plans Policy and Nuclear Systems Division) which works for Admiral Zumwalt and with the Defense Department, especially ISA, and the OP-96 group (Systems Analysis Division) which have the major impact on the naval stance. The 96 group was first headed by Admiral Zumwalt when Nitze was the Secretary of the Navy. Admiral Train is its present head. The 60 division is included in the OP-06 Plans and Policy department of the navy. It is a functional organization, responsible for broad issues of strategy. But some will argue whether this comes from OP-60 or OP-96 these days. Within OP-06 is the 61 division, responsible for foreign affairs. Its duties overlap with OP-61 and OP-63 (security assistance), but its work is more refined, with political implications within the defense regions.

Perhaps of all the services, the navy is the most independent. There is a sense of "don't work with us, tell us and we'll do it. We always deliver." The army, and to a degree the air force, are more conclusive to unification between the services. Their roles and capabilities are not as many as the navy's. Duty for naval personnel in the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not as highly
desired as it is in the other services. But the Joint Staff has become a welcomed intermediary to the navy, as people are particularly looking at it under Admiral Zumwalt.

Once JCS strategic requirements are established, the services must meet the commitments assigned to them. For instance, the navy may be assigned a certain number of aircraft carriers it must have deployed and deployable in the Pacific Ocean at any one time. This decision has been made after a NSSM, with major JCS input, has gone through the NSC cycle. It may not meet what CINCPAC has established as its priorities, as the NSDM combines the joint wisdom of State, Kissinger, and Defense. But once made, the navy must determine how it will meet the commitment assigned to it. Homeporting may be deemed necessary by the navy in order to meet the commitment because of fiscal constraints and decreasing number of aircraft carriers available. This is determined by OP-61 (some say OP-96).

Homeporting necessarily involves foreign countries and political and military relations with them. It is the OP-61 division which is responsible for the politico-military problems which would arise out of such an issue as the navy attempts to meet its commitment. Homeporting is a naval support function, not a strategic problem. The JCS has already decided the strategic outlay, and the navy is told to meet it, deciding for itself how. Nor is homeporting a policy issue, until major political problems occur. It then becomes the responsibility of OP-61 to help resolve the political difficulties.
Matters such as homeporting are interservice functions in support of JCS requirements. State has no place in this, until the navy's functioning to support this requirement involves matters State is responsible for. It becomes OP-61's job then to "educate" the people in ISA (who will deal with State for the navy) to its viewpoint. The service must find where the obstacles are to its proposed program—is it Policy and Planning in ISA or the regional desk? It is OP-61's job to "grease" these officials, accommodate them, drink coffee, all the while trying to convince them that the political issue must be decided in the navy's interest.

The people who can help on an issue are called "pressure points." The path that a proposal for homeport takes in decision-making starts with the acceptance of the idea by the Chief of Naval Operations. He goes to the Secretary of the Navy who, accepting the proposal, approaches the Department of Defense's ISA. Included in the decision will be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics. The air force and army would be consulted if the operational details, such as housing, will involve them. The Judge Advocate's Corps and the Public Affairs Office make recommendations, along with JCS approval of the proposal. This is all coordinated within ISA. The issue then goes to the Deputy Secretary before it is handed to the Secretary of Defense, where a memorandum advocating acceptance is sent to State. The man in the navy who maintains contact with the process of the issue, and "prods"
it along, is the Forward Deployment Coordinator in the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics. If he perceives a problem in one of these areas, he goes to the naval office responsible for that particular side of the issue. For political problems, it is OP-61.

Within the Defense Department, there are different levels at which the navy may contact ISA, depending upon the urgency and weight of the matter, and upon how the navy feels it can solve a problem which arises. An issue may go from the head of an OP-61 geographic branch to an ISA desk officer. Or the head of OP-60 may contact the Chief of Naval Operations. He in turn will ask the Secretary of Defense to order his ISA office to follow through on the navy's problem. Or the head of OP-61 may contact the assistant secretary of ISA, who is presently a vice admiral serving as acting secretary.

A service has "scoped" things out well before these formal processes have been initiated. "Pressure points"--persons who can get things done--have been identified. There are certain ones which can be "pushed" more than others. It was pointed out earlier that the navy has little compunction about going directly to State. The services are allowed to exchange words with State to inquire about some incident, but there is to be no drafting of policies or messages. One admiral admitted that he found it necessary to bypass ISA. Another office indirectly acknowledged that it goes
directly to State. One branch of the office felt that FM was of absolutely no help. They "called them up to do something, and they didn't even know what we were talking about."[133]

The problem which has arisen in the Services is that they have found it "difficult" to determine exactly what is a "substantive matter". These are the issues which a service is forbidden to discuss with State. The navy, acknowledged to be most proficient in the ways of bureaucracy, define it rather loosely. If the case it brings to ISA or another office is not accepted as the navy desires, the service will try other "pressure points".

OP-61 is in a unique position. Not only must it represent the navy's side to ISA, but it must determine if ISA's or State's contrary views are more realistic. It is their job to look at the overall picture, and act as a liaison to the navy, from ISA (and State), if foreign policy considerations are acknowledged to preclude the navy from implementing some action. It is difficult for these officers to accept such a situation, knowing that it is defeating a naval proposal. It appeared that the officers I met in this office were attuned to the world-wide politics that military considerations create. But while other officers in the service did not seem so aware of political problems, it recognized that it was not their job to take them into account in their positions.

The Department of State

Most officials interviewed within the Department of Defense
characterized the State Department as a lethargic, slow, hard-to-work-with organization. Political considerations are not so black and white as the security function Defense is performing. State is also much more conscious of Congressional reaction to an issue than the military is. It becomes more difficult to obtain State approval for homeporting a ship in a country which have a military government when Congress inquires about the appropriateness of tying ourselves so closely with a dictatorship. It can become frustrating to deal with such slow machinery, but the State Department is the agency charged with the responsibility of foreign policy.

The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

It is difficult to exactly determine the present role of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in security policy making today. Officials interviewed felt that there had to be an office such as PM in the State Department. They develop the expertise to evaluate Defense's proposals, to supervise the military programs (i.e. MAP) which State is responsible for, and to give State an independent military input into its security policy deliberations. Many of the officials in PM are military officers.

It appears that PM was a rising power in policy-making during its first years since 1969. At least 80 percent of the interdepartmental study assignments by the NSC through October, 1971 included contributions from PM. But PM had its problems. When the White House became convinced that the SALT outcomes were weak, the blame
ISA generally becomes involved with the desk officer or geographic-directorate of a country in the regional bureaus in State, but does on certain (and frequent) occasions deal with FM. Many of the issues involve technicalities—ship clearances, port clearances, types of aircraft to base in a country. But some evolve into major issues, such as homeporting. FM then becomes responsible for coordinating these functional matters within State. Officials within ISA view FM as "growing stronger", being talented, but politically ambitious. They view FM as an "octopus", gathering issues to itself with countless "arms". But they admit that FM has the capability to do so. There is an intense jealousy growing between the regional affairs offices within the regional bureaus as FM continues to become involved in matters that were once strictly their responsibility in their region.

This view is supported in State. A regional office characterizes FM more along the lines of the Department of Defense. They are hard-working, rushing to meet deadlines, staying late—FM's extent in doing this is absent in the rest of the State Department, at least until Kissinger arrived. One official felt the rest of the State Department was asleep to the extent of FM's growth. When things needed to be done fast, people were going to Ph. At the same time, FM is interested in doing it for them. He saw FM as an
"amoeba"—growing steadily by dividing itself—and logically so. Issues in one region are increasingly becoming important in their effect upon another part of the world. Programs or military functions are not privy to any one regional area. Security assistance is worldwide, and homeporting involves such diverse countries as Japan and Greece. FM has been steadily garnering responsibility for such issues, and expanding to encompass them. At first FM, when created in September, 1969, was just creating jobs. Now they are seen as a bureau which readily takes over on a matter which another office is delinquent in. Seeing something which needs action, they "jump on it".138 This is in contrast to other State personnel where it demands their attention. It has become increasingly evident that FM provides much of the leadership and staff work in State matters, often doing things ad hoc.

In interviews held later in the year, an increasingly different picture of FM emerged. It is hard to determine if this was due to Kissinger's arrival, or a different set of officials interviewed. An official in ISA said that FM was no longer as "hot as it used to be".139 They just did not know where the trouble areas were. This view was endorsed by several officers in the Plans and Policy department of the navy. They mentioned that FM was not even aware of what they were talking about on one issue. At other times, FM was completely useless to them, serving only as a "telephone directory"
to contact someone in State who did know about the matter.\textsuperscript{140} There was a general feeling that State was not utilizing their FM people, allowing them to become "sleeping dogs", doing nothing.\textsuperscript{141} There was a general consensus that FM was just not "cut in" on substantive issues.

If it is not just a peculiarity of the specific geographic or functional areas these officials work in, and accepting that FM was increasing its strength, the change may be due to the arrival of Dr. Kissinger as Secretary of State. Henry Kissinger works much the same in State as he did when he was only the national security adviser to the President. Much of the action in State is centralized in his office. He gathers the information in from his various bureaus, but there is not as much feedback. FM's problem is compounded. A senior official in the Department of Defense commented that FM was not strong because Seymour Weiss, the Director of Ph, was not a Kissinger man, having a difference of views.\textsuperscript{142} In late April of this year, Kissinger fired Mr. Weiss. It will be significant to see how Mr. Kissinger intends to utilize this bureau now in formulating foreign policy.

FM is confident of their military expertise, and now cautious about it. They were much more hesitant to agree with Phase II of homeporting in Greece, after having been embarrassed by the Congress for their lack of a role in Phase I.\textsuperscript{143} Their problem is that they would become identified with Defense's position if acquiescence to
a proposal is given without thorough review. There is still some suspicion of the military officers serving in FM. An officer in the Defense Department said that one officer in FM had been placed there specifically to "keep an eye" on his service's interest. It is difficult to visualize any officer within FM jeopardizing his position or the confidence placed in him by intentionally acting with any sort of parochial motive. It is hard for an officer to shed the point of view he has been in contact with throughout his career. But if he does not, he loses all effectiveness in his job.

What State, especially FM, likes to do is to establish and develop Service contacts. Although they cannot deal with anyone but ISA, it is convenient to have officers within FM who have officer colleagues working in Defense. It serves to multiply sources of information, and facilitate getting to the origin of data. It, too, is a form of "end-running", as FM's only Defense authorized point of contact is ISA.

One contention of the services with FM (who spearheads the action) is that it is State's prime offender in becoming involved in operations. Although they should be concerned about their nature and scope, unilateral actions to end military operations through the ambassador have denied the Defense Department their proper role. In such areas, coordination between the agencies needs to be developed.
Policy and Planning Staff

One last problem will be the emerging role of PM and the Policy and Planning Staff. Policy Plans has the new head of Winston Lord, a close Kissinger associate. It was mentioned that Policy Plans will most probably play an increasing role within State on medium to long-range issues involving military affairs. PM is the Bureau most responsible for the day-to-day coordination of these matters. How PM and Policy Plans now effect their respective roles, may form a prominent relationship for State to deal with Defense. Again, it much depends upon how Kissinger now plans on using their respective bureaus.

Geographical Bureaus

The geographical bureaus have the various country officers, experts on the totality of our relationships with these nations. As the core of the Department of State their power has gone into an eclipse along with the Secretary's of State. These bureaus have all too often been reactive, rather than initiative, in the NSC forum. Kissinger once wrote, "Bureaucracy considers originality unsafe." Some feel that Secretary Rogers was chosen by President Nixon to prevent the State Department's self-asserting bureaucracy from fouling his plans. These geographic bureaus seem to have played a mundane role in policy-making. They continued to supply their information and expert advice, but when major policy initiatives were undertaken, they never started with their offices. They seem
to approach an issue from an operational or tactical point of view. Little consideration is given to a strategic, conceptual approach, relying upon older views to mold their responses by. What they lack is the ability to present innovative, long range alternatives. An obvious exception to this was the Middle East shop under Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco. Having the complete confidence of Kissinger, his Bureau alone was allowed the autonomy from strict NSC procedures. But he had, besides Kissinger's trust, the ability to work effectively, long range and short range, on the Middle East controversy.

But the offices which the Defense Department must often deal with for settling an issue is the regional bureau. PM is the chief liaison, but it is the regional bureau who is responsible for what will happen in his specific area. Personalities play a major part in this relationship. Officials interviewed will often comment upon the facility with which he can work with one country officer, and yet be entirely frustrated with another. One official in ISA explained his relationships with a certain regional bureau. He mentioned several officials he considered "bad". One had too parochial a point of view for the country he was responsible for. Another official he just pictured as hard to work with. He then mentioned the men he dealt with effectively, all characterized as strong men. What becomes important is the recognition that these
offices are only as effective as the men in them. Their job will always be present—to supervise the day to day policy with a foreign land, interpreting situations and making judgements on how to deal with them. But their effect will demand a driving personality to have them regain a preeminent position in deciding new policy, and changing old. When Dr. Schlesinger was asked if foreign policy considerations are adequately represented in the development of the national security policy, he answered, "No, Sir, they are not. They have not been in my judgement." He mentioned that after SALT I, Japan raised the question whether the number of missiles the United States agreed to would be enough for her nuclear umbrella to be credible. Others have pointed out the lack of an East Asian expert on the NSC staff at the time of the China Trip of President Nixon was decided. Both are areas for which the assistant secretaries of state should be responsible for and involved in. A major problem has been Kissinger's type of diplomacy, and the centralisation of foreign policy at the White House, vice the State Department.

The regional affairs offices within the regional bureaus seem to be having less of a say in political-military situations. FM has increasingly taken over their responsibilities, being better equipped for it. A regional officer mentioned how one deputy assistant secretary disregarded the regional affairs office, acting much like an action officer. The secretary went straight to the
country offices, bypassing the coordinating function of the regional affairs office.

Having their troubles in maintaining the control of foreign policy in the State Department, the geographical bureaus should increasingly look towards a different participation as Dr. Kissinger begins to institutionalize foreign policy. The assistant secretaries are now responsible not only for making recommendations, but for presenting the alternatives rejected. When Dr. Kissinger took over the State Department he asked for all the options on a policy to be forwarded to him, stressing that offices and officials were not to be lined up on any one position before an issue would be sent to him. Addressing the State Department employees for the first time, he said, "In thinking about policy it is not necessary to make those compromises as the papers are being written."\(^\text{148}\) It will be seen if centralization of decision-making in the Secretary of State will actively involve the Bureaus, or reduce them to a sort of staff for the Secretary's use.

The National Security Council Structure

Presidents have differed in how they have used the National Security Council. Mr. Nixon wanted a system which would be efficient and effective, treating issues systematically, concerning itself with planning, producing alternatives, examination of all proposals, and the effective implementation of the final decision.\(^\text{149}\)
The duties of the NSC are:

(1) ...to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security.

(2) ...to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.150

Mr. Nixon desired to establish a system which would give air to all the views of agencies concerned on a matter. He wanted distinct options, with their pros and cons, presented to him, not compromised agreements. This was to be done after intense inter-agency study, encompassing long-range considerations and implications.

The National Security Council This is the highest body of the system. It is composed of the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Emergency Preparedness. The Chairman of the JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, the adviser for national security affairs, the Secretary of the Treasury, and others, when appropriate, are invited to participate.

NSC Staff The NSC staff is headed by Mr. Kissinger. He has about 30 people under him. There has been a constant turnover of these personnel since 1969. It appears that Kissinger's high-handed
policy making has left these officials without the support they needed to speak in his name. Top quality men left, unable to continue without the effectiveness which they could have been able to speak in Kissinger's name. Many are now career officials, owing allegiance to first an agency, then to the White House.

The Staff is designed for both operations and planning. Operations is responsible for regional and functional issues, seeing that papers prepared have the proper options and alternatives, maintaining contact with all relevant agencies, and sitting in on interdepartmental groups. The planning staff looks ahead to anticipate problems, provide planning guidance, examine policy papers and work closely with the operations staff to ensure options are spelled out and agencies are participating.

What is unique about the NSC staff is that it is the only part of the NSC structure which cuts across agency lines to obtain a total government view. It can obtain the attention of both the President, through Mr. Kissinger, and of the government agencies. Agencies came to it rather than the staff having to seek out the agencies.

Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) These groups are the core of the NSC system. They produce the majority of the studies. There are five regional groups each chaired by an Assistant Secretary of State.
The regions correspond to the geographical area for which each assistant secretary is responsible for. A sixth group is the Interdepartmental Political Military Group, chaired by the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. On each committee there is a representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JCS, CIA, the NSC staff, and other agencies at the discretion of the chairman. These committees have three main functions: (1) to prepare policy papers, (2) to resolve problems of an interagency nature that are at the assistant secretary level, and (3) to initiate contingency plans if a crisis should occur. These groups submit policy papers, the NSSMs, directly to the NSC Senior Review Group.

**Senior Committees** The Senior Review Group is one of six committees established at the Deputy Secretary level. All but the Under Secretaries Committee is chaired by Mr. Kissinger as the security assistant to the President. Their membership is basically the same; besides Mr. Kissinger there is the deputy secretaries of State and Defense, the director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the JCS. The Senior Review Group determines what issues will go to the President or the NSC, reviewing the issues to ensure that the study has included all the viable options and alternatives of each of the agencies, returning the study if necessary.

The second policy group, the Defense Program Review Committee
analyzes the defense budget. The Verification Panel is responsible for the technical analysis of the arms control issues. The NSC Intelligence Committee advises the President on the intelligence inputs.156

The Undersecretaries Committee is concerned with the implementation of NSC decisions, setting forth programs and recommendations to ensure the execution of the decisions. The Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) is the Senior Review Group during a crisis. It is really outside the formal NSC processes, concentrating on crisis management rather than policy considerations.157

A NSSM indicates Presidential approval for particular study to be undertaken. Such a NSC study can only be initiated by the President, ensuring that no agency can force an issue against the President's will. The NSC staff establishes the NSSM's requirements, assigning it to the appropriate Interdepartmental Group. This Group is responsible for gathering and presenting all the alternatives and options, along with their implications, back to the NSC staff which forwards it to the Senior Review Group for review. Depending upon the weight and importance of the issue, this Group will send it to the President for a decision or the NSC for consideration, once it has determined that the study has met the objectives specified for it. In the NSC, the alternatives are presented, discussion follows as the options are explored. The President, after asking a few questions, will withdraw and after
some reflection make a decision in the form of a NSDM. It is while the President is alone that hr. Kissinger's influence is the greatest, as he presents the cover-page for the study to him, written by his staff. He alone is the personal adviser to the President at this moment.

What the system provides President Nixon is control of the NSC system, the presentations of clear choices, not log-rolled compromises, and the consideration of long-term factors in the immediate decisions. Most importantly for security policy,

The system provides a structure for integrating the threat and use of force with the practice of diplomacy, one of the basic tenets of the Kissinger method. Indeed, foreign policy has now become indistinguishable from national security affairs.

When the renovated NSC structure was announced in 1969, the President said that the Secretary of State would be his principal foreign policy adviser and be responsible for the execution of foreign policy, supervising and coordinating all interdepartmental activities of the United States overseas. The Department of State chairs the six Interdepartmental Groups, and is represented on all Senior Group committees.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is represented on all Interdepartmental and Senior Groups. ISA is the center for NSC matters, furnishing the staff support for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, while Systems Analysis does so for technical matters.
The JCS, while only an invited participant on the National Security Council, has co-equal representation with the Deputy Secretary on all sub-groups of the system. Secretary Laird directed that the JCS could communicate with the White House on NSC matters only through his office to forestall any problems.

J-5 is responsible for coordinating JCS participation, with the J-5 Regional Division Chiefs of the JCS sit on the Interdepartmental Groups.

The Key Men The men who have been the key to the NSC system have been Nixon and Kissinger. They are portrayed as extremely confident foreign policy actors, both possessing a preference for secrecy. They tend to loathe the cumbersome bureaucracies charged with carrying out policy, preferring to centralize their management at the very top as they participate in a very high degree of personalized diplomacy. Each man wants the options presented to him for a decision, remaining distrustful of the work of bureaucracy below them. What they wanted was the presentation of clear, specific options, incorporating long-range ramifications so that they could determine the path of policy. A small, but highly effective and expert staff is of prime importance to these men to evaluate, demand, produce, and direct the papers containing the alternatives upon which decisions could then be made by the two principals.

Kissinger entered the security policy-making process as a
towering intellect. He had dealt with national security in his writings in the academic field. He had the ability to perceive and understand the issues which he immediately encountered when he accepted his job. This is in contrast to the relative unfamiliarity of Mr. Rostow, his predecessor, with the bureaucracies and affairs of national security policy. From the beginning, Kissinger was prepared for his role.

What he encouraged during the NSC process was for agencies to argue each other's position, identifying alternatives and implications, vice reaching common agreements. He placed the NSC staff in a position of the devil's advocate, injecting questions, listening to answers, and taking in the entire procedure. They were there to be persuaded, not to persuade. What Mr. Kissinger wanted was the clear expression of all problems and options thought to be present in an issue. He was not determined to win the agencies to his side, but would rather come out later with a decision (NSDM) explaining little, but expecting implementation.

Adversary confrontations between agencies were to provide chances for further insight into a matter by the NSC staff. They then used this insight along with information obtained from any outside contact, to prepare a cover memorandum for Kissinger's signature, which was to accompany the completed study into the President. Difficult to assess is this invisible side of the NSC process. Little is known about what each cover memorandum contains,
and less about the personal discussions between the President and Mr. Kissinger before the final decision is announced. But it is Kissinger alone who finally approves the cover memorandum, summarizing points of views and options, and it is Kissinger who finally appears to have the last word or recommendation with the President before the decision.

It becomes obvious that the NSC staff, under Kissinger, enjoyed relative latitude in controlling the staffing process. It was they who formulated the study requirements and questions under Kissinger, decided the Group to forward the study to, and generally constructed the guidelines of each study. It then becomes one man's duty, Mr. Kissinger, to summarize and evaluate the proposals given to him for advice to the President.

The State and Defense Departments were both afforded apparently, high roles in the new NSC structure. The State Department chaired the six Interdepartmental Groups, and the Under Secretary chaired the Undersecretaries Committee. However, the assistant secretaries were expected to act within the NSC structure, not without. Their responsibility was to the NSC, not to their Secretary as they performed their NSC functions. At the same time, the Undersecretaries Committee, though at first briefly playing a highly affirmative role due to the mutual respect between Under Secretary Elliot Richardson and Henry Kissinger, and Richardson's amazing bureaucratic skills
and technical expertise, continued to lose the importance it had never actually attained. Defense participation was in reality at a low point. The military's prestige was tarnished as the Vietnam War drew to a close. Defense Secretary Laird looked upon the NSC with some indifference, feeling that its paperwork was unnecessary. And as detente grew, the die-hard views of the JCS were continually ignored. Several officials interviewed commented that they felt the reason that the B-1 bomber was given to the Air Force was to keep them from "interfering" with the SALT talks.

When Nixon took Presidential control of foreign policy, he emphasized planning over operations, saying: "In central areas of policy, we have arranged our procedure of policy-making so as to address the broader questions of long-term objectives first; we define our purposes, and then address the specific operational issues." While concentrating on decision-making and policy initiatives, Kissinger and Nixon neglected the role of implementation. It was only later that Kissinger realized that for policy to be effected, a policy-maker must become involved in the bureaucratic intrigues, ensuring that the policy is followed according to the proper objectives and guidelines. Kissinger said in July, 1970:

"...the outsider believes a Presidential order is consistently followed out. Nonsense. I have to spend considerable time seeing that it is carried out and in the spirit the President intended."
But the job is too much for one man supported by a small White House staff. To manage foreign policy, Kissinger needed a staff responsive to his demands, not only for deciding policy, but for ensuring its acceptance within the bureaucracies. He needed men at critical positions within the government, capable of being dealt the authority to move policy his way. A major reason that Mr. Kissinger may have become Secretary of State, is that he found it unpleasantly necessary to become personally involved in the bureaucracy to ensure execution of his decisions. Officials directly responsible to him were also the ones charged with supervising policy. It appears that Kissinger realised the effect implementation has on policy, becoming intimately involved himself.

But with Kissinger moving to State there is a feeling that the general orientation of the NSC structure will change. Dr. Schlesinger commented that, "The structure has got to change as authority changes."\(^{167}\) With Kissinger's departure from being solely the national security adviser, Schlesinger predicted that several committees "must" fall into decay, no longer being the focus of Kissinger's energy. A senior ISA official interviewed saw the NSC staff as having much less influence today, especially as Kissinger and Schlesinger have begun to act between themselves to solve matters. He characterised the staff as "scratching to keep in" the workings of policy. And no longer does ISA and others
respond without hesitation to the NSC staff's demands that they be consulted. Units and bureaus are acutely aware that there is a new center of power in Washington.

Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs in ISA, Dennis J. Doolin, commented upon how his office worked in the NSC structure:

For the less operations or operational problems that we have in Asia we do tend to use the formal structure fairly religiously. But I must say that in the particular case of our area there (classified), one item that we attempt to avoid is step two, sending the completed study to the NSC staff, because it has a tendency to be—well, it is just subject to each individual's own preference and opinion of course.

Mr. Doolin's remarks show a hesitancy to use the NSC system in important matters. He continues his comments by remarking that:

One of the most dangerous things you can have is authority without accountability. I think that one of the things that concerns me in the Washington context is that too much power is concentrated with the National Security Council staff and they are not—they can not be called to task by the legislative branch of the government.

State and Defense Changes

The State Department has changed with Kissinger as its head. State is much more active these days, though it may be reacting from fear. Kissinger has inspired people to look more closely at their work. Questions are being asked, and initiatives taken. The ambassadors are sending inquiry after inquiry to the State Department, letting Henry know that they are busy. Where the State
Department has been scared to make waves, Kissinger has not.\textsuperscript{171} The regions and desks are talking with each other more, but not as much as the seventh floor and first six floors should be talking with each other. What has happened is a fragmentation of the State Department. The seventh floor is operating in a vacuum.\textsuperscript{172} State has centralised much more around Kissinger's office since he took over. Decisions are being made without informing the lower level people, and although there are appearances of a rejuvenated State, many officials are beginning to feel that they are spinning their wheels.

Trying to get a single position out of State to present the Defense Department has been next to impossible. But it has increasingly become unified under Kissinger. Defense on the other hand, makes a concerted effort to obtain one position before going to State. It becomes important in their interagency negotiations. But more and more there is the appearance that the "little men" on the bottom six floors of the State Department--and their counterparts in Defense--are merely implementing decisions made at the higher levels.\textsuperscript{173} The bureaus seem more in an effort to catch up, rather than planning ahead.\textsuperscript{174}

It has been mentioned that State has had the tendency to become involved in areas of operations. A danger of Kissinger acting alone as one man is that it is possible for commitments to be made which exceed our resources. Kissinger does not take time for
the small details from the Defense point of view. They agree that conceptually, Kissinger has a great deal of knowledge, but not of the "nuts and bolts" of defense. There have been incidents where commitments or promises of equipment has been made, but Defense did not have it to meet the promise. It shows insufficient coordination, endangering our policy by not being able to carry it out.175 Kissinger holds his cards close and comes up with innovative decisions; however, it becomes difficult for Defense to implement his decisions if they are not consulted during their formulation. For instance, Kissinger once promised a country certain military assistance articles. He had not concerned himself with their availability or the legality of transferring the material, failing to consult the ones responsible for the hardware. It was too late when it was discovered that the articles could not be delivered since they were not excess, legal, or available.176 In theory, the Defense Department is charged with carrying out the implementation of defense policy. But consideration must be given to their defense requirements and conditions prior to any decision for an effective policy to be determined.

The Defense Department has also become highly centralized at the top, most recently under Dr. Schlesinger. He is a Harvard Ph. D., a professional military analyst before heading the Atomic Energy Commission and Central Intelligence Agency.177 It is thought to be Dr. Schlesinger, while at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
as the key man on defense, who finally convinced Admiral Zumwalt
to initiate a major new shipbuilding program.\textsuperscript{178} He is highly
respected, an expert on military affairs who considers himself
the equal of Dr. Kissinger. He has been strengthening the mili-
tary's hand (through his office) in security policy. He has
been helped by the image created of the United States military
helping the "good guy" (Israel) in the recent Middle East war.\textsuperscript{179}
The United States domestic plights have also shifted attention
elsewhere, especially as the draft and Vietnam ended.

Dr. Schlesinger is considered more of a hard-liner than Kissinger,
one Assistant Secretary of Defense picturing him as reducing the
complex to the simple. Another official in State acknowledges
a sort of wariness of him, feeling that he sees things as either
black or white, seldom gray. The Secretary of Defense has pointed
out that his department does not make foreign policy, but that the
military impact just influences the generation of it, and its
application. He cited three roles of the Department of Defense in
foreign policy:

(1) Adaptive—the military provides the force behind foreign
policy, so that observations by United States political
leaders are not taken as lacking relevance on the world
political scene. In providing the force, the Department
of Defense should be responsive to political leaders.

(2) Affirmative—In order to exercise force if necessary,
the military must be in position, necessitating a foreign
base structure, and the aid of foreign governments.
This provides subsidiary objectives that may themselves
influence other objectives, and
(3) Positive—The use of the instruments at hand to achieve a political objective.  

The mere placing of the military in a position where it is to serve as an instrument of policy, forces the Department of Defense to make recommendations which act upon and transform policy. It points up the inherent weakness of State. The Department has no resources, and thus there is a great tendency when in trouble to lean on Defense and their resources for aid. Dr. Schlesinger is forceful and forthright with his views—and public. He upset the State Department several months ago with his comment that he would recommend bombing Indochina if an invasion from the north was undertaken. In nuclear policy, his and Henry Kissinger's views differ to some extent. Henry is scared that too much of an increasing American advance in nuclear technology will scare the Soviets away from detente, while Schlesinger presses for America to concern herself with preventing a Soviet nuclear advantage. Neither man has different objectives, but differ significantly in their approach to the nuclear problem. Dr. Schlesinger supports a defense budget calling for major appropriations for nuclear developments, while Secretary of State, Kissinger does not believe that any meaningful arms reduction negotiations can take place under an increasing American advantage in the nuclear field. A split has apparently come between the two sides, causing Mr. Nixon to reportedly lecture on the need for negotiated arms reductions and the futility of the arms race, at "a national security council-type" meeting.
Dr. Schlesinger has said,

"While we look at these structures (State, Defense, NSC), we must recognize that we are dealing with senior personalities, and that the structures will be adopted to the personal styles of whoever is involved."

Kissinger and Schlesinger have a unique relationship. Often said to be a bad one by the press, all senior officials who were interviewed said that it is, in reality, quite good, despite some differences. The two Secretaries eat breakfast and lunches together throughout the week. More importantly, their styles of policy-making are closely similar. Both have centralized decision-making in their respective Departments through their office. Decisions which were made before at the assistant secretary level are being decided between these two men. Problems which arise are continually being handled by the Secretaries themselves. Once a Department of Defense position is determined, it is often Schlesinger, talking directly with Kissinger, who will resolve the affair. And Schlesinger is determined to play his part in formulating national security policy. He has said that since there are several objectives of American policy, and they must be coordinated through a mechanism of coordination, he is "usually loathe to refer to the primacy of the State Department." He felt that it is "a frequent occurrence" that military input is lacking in a situation, especially from the JCS. He deplores the tenacity of the diplomats to wait until a decision is forced upon them, as they attempt to keep their options
open. He feels they should "fish or cut bait." 186

The Kissinger-Schlesinger relationship has cut down on the amount of interagency paperwork, due to their personal discussions. State, especially, is loathe to send Kissinger huge staffing papers, preferring to talk with him. However, the danger is that a decision may be made by the two principals without informing the system. Though cumbersome, the bureaucracies are often privy to information significant to a decision. Knowing something which the two Secretaries failed to perceive, the responsible bureaus may delay and hesitate to implement a decision. They need to be included in decision-making even when the major State-Defense relationship is the direct consultation of the two secretaries.

Case Study

In late 1972, it was determined to undertake a reexamination of the Korean Force Modernization Plan. This program totaled $1.5 billion for security assistance to supply South Korea for the modernization of her armed forces. The following is a case study of the decision-making process, determined entirely from interviews.

An interagency group was appointed by the Under Secretaries Committee to study the reexamination of the Korean Force Modernization Plan. The group was chaired by Mr. Sneider, Deputy Assistant Secretary of East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the State
Department. Representatives from the following agencies were on this Steering Group:

- Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
- National Security Council Staff (NSC)
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
- Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)
- International Security Affairs (ISA)
  - Regional office
  - Korean Desk
- Security assistance (Security of Defense) (ISA/SA)
- Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM)
- East Asia regional office in State (EA/RA)
- Korean desk in State (EA/K)
- Under Secretary for Security Assistance
- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

The Department of Defense was responsible for the military position of the study—called the Korean Force Requirements Study (KFRS). However, State and the NSC were also involved in it.

Colonel Wieland represented the State Department (an exchange officer in PH/PA, Planning and Analysis for International Security Assistance), and John Bushnell (an exchange Foreign Service Officer (FSO) with the NSC) represented the NSC. The Department of Defense was represented by Rear Admiral Tesh, assistant deputy director of ISA/SA in the Planning and Policy section of ISA.

In January, 1973, Tesh, Bushnell, Wieland, and Mr. Brands (an Asian expert from the office of the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis) met in the Department of Defense. They formed an outline of the KFRS and established guidelines. The Steering Group's sub-committee (of which Wieland, Bushnell and Mr. Saltay from OMB were on it) agreed to their guidelines.
A trip was planned for Brands, Bushnell, and Tech to go to Seoul and CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific). State had no representative until Wieland was appointed, although an air force officer. It demonstrates the confidence placed in the military officers working in PM. The group met with J-5 representatives at CINCPAC, and discussed their proposals. They also contacted the systems analysis man at CINCPAC. They then left for Seoul to work with the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) and United Nations (UN) Command there.

In Seoul, they talked with CINCUNC (Commander in charge, U.N. command, reporting to the chairman, JCS) and the Commander, United States Forces, Korea (reporting through CINCPAC to JCS)—the same General. The four men worked with the United States contingent of the UN command (J-5 people), and met with the various Service component commanders in Korea.

Groundrules were drawn up to determine what it takes for Korean forces to defend or deter an attack by North Korea with no United States augmented force, only logistic support. A system analysis approach was used, relying upon a joint DIA/CIA (Defense Intelligence Agency/Central Intelligence Agency) intelligence report as a basis for their study. It was one of the few times participants could recall a DIA/CIA report where the two agencies on their estimates. The American embassy provided the
economic data for analysis in determining the appropriate level that South Korea should bear in financing the Plan.

Work continued on the above through February and March, with Tosh being project head during this time. In early April, the KFRS report was sent through CINCFAC to Washington. Brand returned to Seoul to "glue" the report together, until it was circulated to:

The Secretary of Defense
JCS
ISA regional office, Mr. Dennis Doolin
State-Wieland, Sneider, and Ranard (Korean country director) working together.
OMB
NSC

These departments and people furnished comments on the defense portion of the report. Then, in mid-April, 1973, a meeting of the Steering Group under Mr. Sneider was conducted, including Mr. Pickering, the deputy bureau director of FM. They discussed the paper and the numerous recommendations of the departments. The draft was rewritten with agreed upon recommendations. There were compromises, so, as one official said, "the President did not have to make a black and white decision." At the same time, on the political and economic portions of the study were written in the State Department. Both FM and the Korean desk worked on it, but the FM representative, Col. Wieland, stopped when disagreements arose. When interviewed, he felt that it would have made little difference on the outcome to continue participating. The Korean desk thus did most of the work, particularly Mr. Newsome in the economic area, using the
embassy's data. The papers were then put together (defense, political, economic) and addressed by the Steering Group in May when completed. A draft had been written for the Steering Group Report by Wieland, Pickering, Ranard, Sneider, and Newsome. The Steering Group disagreed with several parts, so Sneider appointed a subcommittee chaired by Ranard. Included were:

Mr. Fint—Regional ISA
A colonel from ISA/SA
Capt. Morgan and Col. Adams—JCS, J-5
Baltay—OMB
Bushnell—NSC
Newsome and Renard—EA/K
Capt. Warren—EA/RA
Col. Wieland—PM/PA

The paper was also reviewed by Mr. Brown, PM/ISP (International Security Policy and Planning). The subcommittee held two days of meetings till 10 o'clock at night in early May, 1973. They were to work out their disagreements, and refer back to the Steering Group those they could not. Points of contention were brought out in the Steering Group, such as one between OMB and NSC. All disagreements were settled, including a major one between State and NSC worked out between Bushnell and Wieland. The next day, however, Bushnell contacted Wieland several times to ask him to change the paper in several aspects to which they had agreed the night before. Wieland refused, since he could not act unilaterally. There was a feeling that Bushnell's boss in the NSC, Mr. Kennedy, was perturbed at what Bushnell had agreed to, ordering him to change
Pickering and Sneider were advised of the situation, and when the Steering Group met that afternoon, going through the report word by word, the NSC tried to introduce changes—not to the conclusions, but to the recommendations.

The NSC proposals were not accepted by the Group as a whole, and the NSC was invited to footnote the paper with their disagreements. The report was put into final form in PX, and a memorandum was drafted from the chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to the President, pointing out the differences of the committee. Approved by the Steering Group, it was forwarded to the Under Secretaries Committee. In the report were several tables, one indicating several options of Foreign Military Sales (FMS). This portion contained varying views upon how much the Korean Government should be asked to pay for in military sales, vice receiving grants. Footnotes were incorporated by Bushnell, Wieland, and Flint.

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee usually does not hold meetings. The Deputy Director for Planning in the States Planning and Coordination Staff (S/PC), Brandon Grove, sent copies of the report to the members, asking for comments or concurrence within ten days. For the first time the services had a chance to see the entire report, including the political and economic sections. Their representation before had depended upon the JCS, J-5, having to act through them. Other military representation on the Group had been
the DSA, DIA, ISA, and SA—a total of five representations. The Navy was upset because it had not been mentioned. Capt. Morgan felt that Col. Wieland, USAF, was working for his service in the affair. This was due to his arguments that the quantified systems analysis approach to Korean aircraft need did not take into account what he deemed reality, trying to equate ground support aircraft when bombers were unequal in numbers. He felt they could not do this because of the possible advantage the one side with more bombers had in destroying the ground support aircraft during an initial attack. The Air Force felt somewhat the same way. But the argument was abandoned because the JCS feared a split decision, infamous since McNamara's days. However, Wieland wrote into the final report several lines asking for a United States review of the Korean aircraft needs. This was a form of "end-running", as Wieland and Bushnell were kept out of the Department of Defense's RKFS redraft the second time. Mr. Clements and Mr. Rush (respective Deputy Secretaries of Defense and State) finally addressed the paper, coming to very close agreements on RKFS funding and length of time to distribute the material over, although Defense did differ over a small point. NSC still differed in the major aspects.

Word came from Henry Kissinger in July that the NSC option on funding the program had been accepted, vice State's and Defense's. The RKFS was also accepted. The Plan seemed almost self-defeating,
as it became evident that the NSC official's opposed to the State-
Defense option were the ones who constructed the arguments for Kissinger
to present to the President.

Within 30 days, Defense and State separately submitted reclaim-
ants, requesting that the funding decision be reconsidered. Over
three months later, on November 10, 1973, General Scoucroft, USAF,
one of Mr. Kissinger's assistants forwarded a memorandum to State
and Defense acknowledging that he had received their request, and
that a Senior Review Group meeting would be called, but in the
meantime the decision would stand as is.

A sidelight to the Modernisation case study, was the CIPC ques-
tion. CIPC is the abbreviation for Coastal Interdiction and Patrol
Craft. The United States Navy was trying to sell these to the
South Koreans, even though still under development. The cost of
its research and production were from the Korean Military Assistance
Program, but was to be reimbursed by the United States Navy. The
Navy later found itself in a budget squeeze, and not wanting
the CIPC herself, left the costs to the Korean hAP. 187 After a
Steering Group meeting, Admiral Tesh met with Wieland, Pickering,
Sneider and Mr. Ford (PA/PA). He became angry at their opposition
to the CIPC, stressing, "CIPC will be in it (modernization Program)!"
The difficulty of this question between State and Defense is that
State, by law, determines the MAP levels. However, Defense, who
administers the program, feels that it can unilaterally determine what items will be transferred. State does not subscribe to this view because they feel that any type of weapon will have a political impact.

The vested interest of the Navy seems to be the overriding consideration. One naval task officer even said, that the navy's interest is the national interest. They have admitted that the craft are only made for opposing infiltration from the sea, and that aircraft are better suited for the purpose. Additionally, the navy cannot guarantee the CIPC will work. PM has opposed the plan, along with LSAA, noting that one ship at a central point with radar can meet the purpose better by calling for aircraft when an infiltrating boat is picked up. There is a feeling that the navy wants the technical knowledge from developing a small boat which it lacks, without paying for it.

The navy also disposes of naval vessels in East Asia by transferring ships to foreign countries. Until June of 1972, most transfers were by loan. Now the navy transfers most of them outright by sales. In order to do so, they must be stricken off the Naval Vessel Registries. Admiral Gerhard, Director, Security Assistance Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel, will recommend that a ship be stricken due to its age. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) will determine if it is true, and then the Secretary of the Navy will decide. Such a sale, or loan, is
especially beneficial to the navy since the transfer of a ship is seen to come from Admiral Zumwalt, not the United States. Ambassadors and the other services are not very enthused about such a program, knowing that foreign countries recognize the Navy as their beneficiary, prompting them to go to the Navy for other military troubles.

A decision is to transfer a ship to an East Asian country, may be made because a foreign CNO requests it, the United States in its JSOP feels the country requires one or a request may come through diplomatic channels. The request is measured against a United States priority list of countries which determine the importance of countries to the United States. This is done by the navy's assistant for JCS Matters and Ship Transfers, who also determines its availability. The navy then approaches DSAA with their request, who go to ISA and their General Counsel, the JCS, NSC staff, State Department, and to Congress for notification of a sale or permission for a loan. The JCS goes to CINCPAC for his views, and PM, in State, asks the country's ambassador for his. The process takes about a month, the final decision coming back to the Assistant for JCS Matters and Ship Transfers in the Security Assistance Division. The navy has had little difficulty in obtaining State and Defense permission, especially from PM, J-5 and ISA, until recently. In the case of Taiwan, every piece of equipment transferred must be approved by Henry Kissinger or his
NSC staff. There were two submarines authorized for transfer to Taiwan at the time of President Nixon’s trip to China. However, that has been cancelled by Kissinger. More recently, he has disapproved the transfer of 160 tanks and the MK37 weapon system to Taiwan. There is the impression that Kissinger is acting as the desk officer for Taiwan, often leaving little more than empty motions for those whose responsibility is Taiwan—especially in State—to go through.

Korea is especially anxious for United States decommissioned ships. They have recently asked for all our 1975 ones. The State Department disapproved the last two destroyers that the navy wanted to give to Korea because they did not have any operating and maintenance money to keep the ship operating once they received it, requiring 30 million dollars. To sidestep that obstacle, the navy informed State that the destroyers were going to go as replacements for older ones Korea had.

Many decisions made in East Asia seem to be centralized in the White House. Concerning troop reductions, Defense Secretary Schlesinger admitted before the House Appropriations Committee this year, that the major reason for keeping American forces in Asia at about their present size “lies under the heading of political rather than military considerations.” The Chinese are not as interested as before in seeing United States troops leave the area,
fearing Japanese expansion. The Nixon Administration has issued formal statements encouraging Japan to increase militarily enough to defend her islands against external aggression. Arthur Hummel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, has said that the United States is content with the five-year defense programs of Japan for defense of her own home islands, and would never advocate nuclear armament. However, Secretary Laird had indicated that Japan might need to send a fleet as far as the Indian Ocean to defend her oil sea lanes, while some feel that his office might think nuclear armament a necessary probability. State and Defense officials differ upon the role they see Japan playing militarily, especially after the Middle East oil embargo. State is apprehensive about a possible reaction from South Korea if Japan were to militarize, and the United States withdraw. It was reported that a United States decision to withdraw its remaining troops from the Republic of Korea was vetoed only at the White House level.

The overall objectives in East Asia are 1) stability and, 2) to maintain United States influence as much as possible, doing so by keeping a regional balance of power by such devices as economic assistance, diplomacy, and military force presence.

The highest priority for the military then in East Asia is keeping the Japanese alliance intact. The navy feels that they can do this
by maintaining a presence in East Asia. The navy has been given commitments to meet, and feels that the only way it can meet them is by homeporting. Perhaps for this reason—meeting commitments—homeporting is most crucial. It cuts down on budget expenses, raises morale and reenlistments by basing dependents in the foreign home ports, and allows the United States navy to maintain only two other carriers in service for every one deployed, due to the reduction of transit, leave time, and overhaul requirements. It has been opposed, even within the navy, because it is viewed as tying the navy to a port of a foreign land, weakening its independence and the "low profile" it has maintained. Homeporting in Japan is not a controversial subject like Greek homeporting, due mainly to the tradition of United States homeporting there, the security treaty we maintain with Japan, and the democratic form of government they have. In such a situation the homeporting question is more of a naval function, than a policy matter. The only question which raised a significant problem was the homeporting of the U.S.S. *Midway*, an aircraft carrier, in Japan. The only reason for this was that it was a new class of ship to be homeported there. No difficulties arose in the American bureaucracies during this decision, and the only prospective problem was the Japanese government's agreement, which was expected. The lower levels of the two governments worked out the operational problems—economic survey to ensure the port could sustain the crew and families, check the
facilities, etc. The Japanese government was formally asked when President Nixon met with Prime Minister Tanaka in Hawaii last year. It was in a hotel room that Henry Kissinger approached his Japanese counterpart and obtained public agreement.

Lately, a question has arisen of whether the MIDWAY would be deployed to the Indian Ocean. State appears to back off from the suggestion, while the Defense Department concurs if the navy is expected to meet a commitment there. It could present a politico-military problem, as the Japanese inquire about the Midway's role in its defense, and others wonder why not base it in San Diego, due to the distance and purpose of deploying it to the Indian Ocean, vice Okuska, Japan.

The State-Defense relationship depends upon the issues involved. It is a question of where the "action" is, following an unwritten set of responsibilities and personalities. Further inquiry must be taken in several fields where the State and Defense Departments disagree, among them:

- arms control and disarmament.
- overseas basing requirements.
- continuation of MAAG missions, or their size and functions in less developed countries.
- interpretation of Congressional restrictions on United States Government activities including the size and role of United States forces.
Attention must be brought to the role State should play in the early stages of the Defense budget process, bringing foreign policy considerations to bear. Situations such as the closure of United States facilities overseas, must be examined to determine if political and military considerations have both been given their play. Obtaining information on recent and on-going issues is difficult. Yet it is only by case studies that the subformal processes by which decisions tend to be taken can be illustrated. One last area which needs further investigation is the intelligence community. Though not enough time to work upon it here, the data upon which different agencies act and evaluate their decisions crucially depends upon the intelligence-gathering community with which each one deals.

The Pervasive State and Defense Relationship

Policy differences which arise between State and Defense on politico-military matters are based upon different philosophical approaches:

Defense is primarily action oriented toward the effective completion of the military mission or attainment of the objective. In sum, Defense is animated by single minded pursuit of requirements to the exclusion of other considerations that might pertain. Conversely, State's proper role is to assess the impact DOD (Department of Defense) requirements, and the securance of same, will have on our foreign policy interests.195

There are elements in the mechanism of government that are satisfactory for coordination, but they do not seem to be being used.
One main reason why is the centralization of policy-making at the top. This is not only due to the personal preferences of the Secretaries of State and Defense, but is an outcome of events which have been rapidly entering the foreign affairs scene. Time is of essence, and thorough coordination takes time. Little decisions must be made quickly, and are -- at the top, so there is time to deal with the major questions which are pending. A danger of this lack of integration is the inadequate consideration of both political and military factors together. Dr. Schlesinger pointed out that this deficiency does not allow the United States to speak out consistently. There is then the opportunity for foreign governments to "shop around" the different attitudes of the different Departments, trying to play one off against the other.

Making decisions at high levels also presents the danger that the expert opinion of the lower levels often does not reach the top—exactly where it is most needed. Although Mr. Kissinger asks for all options, there may be the tendency to present them such that the one advocated is accepted, such as 1) bomb the daylights out of them, 2) surrender, or 3) negotiate a settlement.

A third aspect of bureaucracy policy-making is the relatively few officials who are concerned on any day to day issue, especially in the geographical bureaus. However, on any study or major decision, every bureau and agency remotely connected attempts to have its representative present, fearing that otherwise their view will
not be seriously considered.

Most officials agree that there is much more consultation now, but that the decision-making power has been taken out of their hands. It is due to a lack of a strong foreign policy arm in the Department of Defense, and was due to a lack of a forceful Secretary of State. With Mr. Kissinger, it is more of the lack for him to consult his Department. Diplomacy is highly personalized, while the military input into the process is more apparent than real.

The security policy involving East Asian countries was found to be highly centralized, especially around Secretary of State Kissinger. Military inputs to the decision making process seemed more, from the design of the formal structure, than they actually were. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was included throughout the formal structure of the National Security Council system, but their presence there did not seem to increase their actual input. Policymaking was seen to be highly personalized, characterized by Mr. Kissinger. However, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger appears to be attempting to establish a counterpoise to the overcentralization of policy around Mr. Kissinger by first establishing himself as a stalwart of defense policy, while trying to recreate a strong foreign policy arm in the Office of International Security Affairs. The real influence of the Pentagon is located in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Lower levels of government seem to be becoming more implementers of decisions, rather than formulators. In State they are cut off
from top level decisions while in Defense, lower level officials are learning that the decisions they could make before are now being decided between the Secretaries of the two Departments.

Consultation between the two Departments at the lower levels is effectively coordinated. However, there seems to be a need for more consideration to be given to this level of interagency coordination. The high officials can stray too far away from the area expertise that the lower level officials can provide. Details of policy can, and have, frustrated high officials because of the lack of coordinating with their lower counterparts. The same is true between State and Defense. Too often Defense and State are found to be saying different things, providing little consistency to United States policy, and allowing foreign governments to "play" upon the various attitudes of the Departments. Foreigners come to believe the idea of America that foreign policy can be made based on personal relationships alone. There is still a need for State and Defense to approach policy together as a government, not individuals. Yet it appears that in the future, Defense and State will diverge somewhat, Defense being much more hard-line than State in its approach to the threats it perceives. But for the moment, policy is still centralized around a civilian bureaucracy, even though the bureaucracy is almost one man. The rational of this process is decided upon by the President. He gives officials their place and role in the decisionmaking process, although it is true that his alternatives of choice are limited by the implementers of policy. They can, or cannot, make decisions work.
It has been difficult to penetrate the actual decisionmaking process between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. One is never sure whether a hidden hand of policy has been left uncovered. Perhaps the quote which follows should have been more appropriately the paper's epigraph.

The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself.... There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process—mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.

(John Fitzgerald Kennedy)
FOOTNOTES

1 See William H. Overholt, From the Politics of Weakness to the Politics of Strength (Croton-on-Hudson, New York: Hudson Institute, October 20, 1973).


3 State of the Union Speech, January 22, 1970.


8 See Foster.

9 For a further explanation of this idea, see Foster.

10 The first three factors were detailed in Angus M. Fraser, The Political Viability of the U.S. Base System in Asia After a Vietnam Settlement (Arlington, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, April, 1970), p. 3. The fourth is one which I felt equally applied. Perhaps a fifth trend might become the interests of the Asian lands to act in collective security groupings if regionalism becomes pronounced.


12 Foster, p. 67.


15 Fraser, p. 4.
16 Foster, p. 64.
17 Ibid., p. 107.
18 Ibid., p. 4.
21 Foster, p. 80-81.
25 See Ravenal.
26 See Building for Peace.
28 Earl C. Ravenal, "The Political - Military Gap," Foreign Policy, No. 3 (Summer, 1971), p. 33. Mr. Ravenal is the former Director of the Asian Division Systems Analysis, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
32 Ravenal, Peace With China, p. 37. This is a statement by Leon Sloss, former (1970) Director, Combined Policy, Office of Political - Military Affairs, Department of State.
34 See Building for Peace.

35 The Military Assistance Program (MAP) is the sale, loan, or grants of military equipment to foreign nations by the United States. Administered by the Department of Defense, it is under the overall guidance of the Department of State.

36 Fraser, p. 6.

37 Ibid., p. 5.

38 Building for Peace, p. 4.


40 Building for Peace, p. 20.


43 In the U. S. Information Services "Backgrounder" on the President's discussions with Asian leaders, Bangkok, July 29, 1969, it said, "The President's view is that American combat troops should not be committed in the fight against internal insurgency..." and "...officials do not look for a major expansion of (U. S.) military assistance (for internal insurgency reasons)..." For external aggression, U. S. intervention is governed by 1) Treaty obligations (although not automatic) 2) importance of threat, 3) significance of country, and 4) the general interest of the United States in a peaceful world and the attendant need to discourage aggression.


45 Ravenal, Peace With China, p. 151. Statement by Charles P. Shirkey, Consultant to the Under Secretary of State.

46 Overholt, p. 9.

The following three approaches to studying foreign policy of governments is taken from Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company (1971)).


December 1962, Television Interview, quoted in Hilsman, p. 17.


Hilsman, p. 43.

The term seventh floor denotes the top echelon of the State Department. These and the top officials who, with the Secretary of State, work on the top, or seventh floor, of the Department.
From a seminar by Henry Kissinger on "Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy" at the University of California, 1968. Published in the Washington Post, September 17, 1973.


Quoted by Hilsman, pp. 34.

The Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Circular #385, March 5, 1966.

Clark and Legere, pp. 121-122.

Statement by Ray S. Cline, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research before the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, on the Subject of the State Department, September 17, 1973. Hereafter, this commission will be called the Murphy Commission.

This is based upon interviews with officials in the Policy and Planning Staff and Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.


Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

National Security Study Memorandum.

U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Department of State Appropriations Authorization, Fiscal Year 1973, Statement of Ronald I. Spiers, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., March 10, 1973, p. 392. The information which follows concerning the Politico-Military Bureau comes from these Hearings and interviews with the State Department.

Ibid., p. 399.

The roles of the secretary are taken from Clark and Legere, p. 179 and a paper by Vincent Davis, Director Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, Univ. of Kentucky, entitled, "The Department of Defense and the National Security Council in the Formulation and Conduct of National Security Policy." It was edited and reproduced by the Murphy Commission.
A quote from an unnamed interviewee. Some persons I interviewed, however, felt that Mr. Laird in reality made too many of the little decisions about running the Dept. of Defense.


Yoshpe, pp. 78-81 gives a fairly detailed listing of the JCS structure. I also drew my information from an organizational chart.

Clark and Legere, p. 198.

Yoshpe, p. 157.

Lt. Col. Wm. F. Schless, USA, "The Service Secretaries—an Analysis" (Student Research Report M-65-152; Wash. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 31 March, 1965), p. 44. This is a paraphrase by Harry B. Yoshpe.

Clark and Legere, p. 199.


Hilsman, pp. 50-52.


Ibid., p. 23.

Ibid., p. 23.


94 Among them were Mitze, McNaughton and Warnke.


100 Testimony before the Murphy Commission, December 14, 1973.

101 This phase involves the question of whether to homeport a carrier, air wing; and wupport ship in Athens, Greece this year.

102 In the section devoted to the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs' relationship with Defense in policy-making, these interviews are presented in a wide scope.

103 The Department of State Appropriations Authorization, Fiscal Year 1973, Destler, p. 676.


105 Interview, March 1, 1974.

106 The manner in which ISA was forced to take a "reduced seat" within Defense in its decision-making, is given in the section on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
107 Interview, March 10, 1974.


110 The Washington Post, March 2, 1974, p. 3.

111 He was more of a hard-liner.

112 The Washington Post, p. 3.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Hillman, p. 64.

116 Interview, March 10, 1974.


118 "Homeporting" is the term used for basing U. S. Naval ships in foreign parts. Such a ship returns to the foreign part as its "Home"—the crew's permanent housing, etc. are in that port.

119 Interview, Deputy Assistant Secretary in ISA.

120 Interview, Deputy Assistant in ISA.

121 Davis, p. 3.

122 Ibid., p. 6.


124 Ibid., p. 15.

125 Ibid.


127 Ibid., p. 663.

128 The "tank" is the name given to the room where the JCS meets to discuss and decide matters.
Interview, March 8, 1974.

NSDM—National Security Division Memorandum. The final decision on an issue by the President.

Interview, March 10, 1974.

Interview, March 1, 1974.

Interview, March 10, 1974.

The Department of State Appropriations Authorization, Fiscal Year 1973—Leacacos, p. 663.

Interview, March 13, 1974.

Interviews, State Department.

Ibid.

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Interview, March 10, 1974.

Ibid.

Interview, April 6, 1974.


Interview, Department of Defense.


150 U. S. National Security Act of 1947, Title I, Section 101 (b).

151 Lucas, p. 53.


153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.

155 Ibid.


157 Lucas, pp. 64-66.

158 Lucas, p. 68.

159 Brodine and Selden, p. 20.


161 Lucas, p. 72.

162 Ibid.

163 Department of State Appropriations Authorization, Fiscal Year 1973, Leacacos, p. 663.

164 Interviews, May 7 and 9, 1974.

165 A New Strategy for Peace, p. 12.

167 Testimony before the Murphy Committee, December 14, 1973.

168 Interview, April 6, 1974.

169 Testimony before the Murphy Commission, December 14, 1974.

170 Ibid.

171 Interviews, State and Defense Departments.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.

174 Ibid.

175 Ibid.

176 Ibid.


178 Davis, p. 23.

179 The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 1974, p. 16.

180 Testimony before the Murphy Commission, December 14, 1974.


183 Testimony before the Murphy Commission, December 14, 1974.

184 Ibid.

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