AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY: IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE IN THE SEVENTIES

James R. Compton

Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

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by

Lieutenant Colonel James R. Compton
Civil Affairs

US Army War College
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The basic question is whether the United States Army Reserve (USAR) can maintain authorized strength levels in an all-volunteer environment. Examined are problems that USAR units are encountering in regaining authorized strengths after unprecedented losses in 1972, the tasks involved in keeping strengths up after reaching authorized levels, and some of the problems that loom for the future. Data were gathered primarily from working files of the Fifth US Army USAR Recruiting and Retention Office, and from communications with First and
Sixth Army recruiting officers. Inadequate retention rates, an alarming non-prior service recruitment picture, severe shortages in certain military occupational specialties, inability to recruit sufficient numbers from metropolitan and/or minority concentration areas, and failure of national authorities to provide the USAR with necessary "tools" for recruitment and retention are factors that are assessed. Conversely, several successful recruiting programs in local commands are examined and recommendations are made relative to programs/projects and needs, that will contribute to attainment of objectives. The USAR will require more national assistance in the form of incentives and emoluments, and will have to exert considerably more command emphasis at all levels, if it is to maintain 100 percent of authorized strength under the all-volunteer concept.
"We don't have time to spin our wheels, nor to tilt at windmills."

LTG Harris W. Hollis
Chief of Reserve Components
Department of the Army
Quoted in Army Times, 7 March 1973

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America has moved from a draft environment to an all-volunteer environment. We have moved from a budget that was dominated by Defense to one that is now dominated by social needs. We have moved from war to peace in only a few short years, from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy. We have reordered our national priorities.

Consequently, an all-volunteer Army is a part of the nation's future. Additional debate relative to validity is superfluous. The job of the Army and its Reserve Forces, is to make the concept work.¹

Historically, the United States has rejected the idea of maintaining a large standing Army. Instead, we have held to the idea of a small regular Army that in times of need can be reinforced by citizen soldiers who are able to make a contribution to all levels of military affairs.² It was this historical premise, and the tremendous amount of hostility generated toward the draft during the unpopular Vietnam conflict, that led to the all-volunteer plan. Its origin,
however, was not without perturbation. During the height of the Vietnam war, speakers at a conference on the draft, meeting at Chicago in December 1966, concluded that a well paid, volunteer armed force would be economically feasible and would eliminate the evils of conscription. However, in 1967, a civilian advisory panel on military manpower procurement, created by the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives and chaired by retired Army General Mark Clark, concluded that an all-volunteer armed force was undesirable, and recommended retention of the draft. Also in 1967, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, chaired by the eminent Burke Marshall, concluded that the all-volunteer concept was neither feasible nor desirable.

Then, on 27 March 1969, President Nixon established the Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. The studies of this commission resulted in what is commonly called the Gates Report (after its chairman, Thomas F. Gates), which recommended that an all-volunteer force be created.

The Gates commission reviewed the popular objectives voiced by critics of the all-volunteer army and concluded that the arguments for far outweighed the objectives. The conclusion was: "... that the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts...." The commission admitted that its lack of data on the Reserve
Components adversely affected a proper analysis of the problem, and indeed, Chapter 9 of the report, the chapter on Reserves, is lacking in many of the criteria that were available on the active forces. The chapter reveals that the Gates Commission's research on the Reserve Forces was superficial in many areas. Nevertheless, the Commission recommended adoption of the all-volunteer concept, and while the date for the end of the draft was set for 1 July 1973, the president's 1970 endorsement of the Commission's report caused a considerable reduction in draft pressure. This is illustrated by the fact that in December 1969, there were 100,572 non-prior service personnel on Reserve Components waiting lists, while on 31 July 1971, there were only 6800. Today, as is well known, waiting lists are essentially non-existent.

As a direct result of the ensuing exodus of unit personnel on completion of their obligations, and the difficulties in obtaining replacements under a relaxed draft environment, First, Fifth, and Sixth Armies' USAR enlisted strengths plummeted from a near 10\% percent in December 1971 to about 89 percent in June 1972. These abrupt and alarming losses left many USAR units across the country totally unprepared for the readiness crisis brought on by insufficient strengths. Crash projects to staff major commands with full-time civilian recruiters, and directives designed to place rapid emphasis on recruiting and retention in that particular time frame, were, in a sense, stop-gap measures.
Subsequently, full time recruiters were assigned to brigades and battalions, and part time recruiters were appointed on an additional duty basis in all units down to company size. These actions, plus increased command emphasis at all levels, including the publication and implementation of unit recruiting and retention plans and SOP's, halted the strength decline in mid-1972, but none of the three armies has been able in the 16 months since to regain 100 percent of enlisted authorized strength. Many individual USAR Commands have done so, however.

On the national scene, USAR strength by June 1972 had dropped to approximately 232,000 personnel, some 28,000 short of the authorized force of 260,000. The National Guard declined a similar proportion. The losses, however, were less than the 48,813 USAR and 51,462 ARNG losses predicted by Colonels Zamparelli and Clinton in their early 1971 Army War College project study on USAR strength. All of the shortages were in the enlisted ranks, as is the case today. The officer level is currently at more than 100 percent, although the problem of a partial void in USAR "middle management" will have to be dealt with in the future due to a larger than desired rate of junior officers leaving the Reserve Forces after their obligations are completed.

In 1970, as a part of project "PROVIDE", the Army issued a series of directives aimed at enhancing service attractiveness by elimination of "irritants". These directives were aimed
primarily toward the Active Army, but had some overlap in the USAR. Known popularly as the "beer in the barracks" incentives, they included elimination of reveille and other unnecessary formations, a liberalization of pass policies (no sign in - sign out, no bed-checks), beer at evening meals and in quarters and others of a similar nature. It is clear three years later that actions such as these were not contributory to any noticeable increase in either Active or Reserve strength levels. Instead, a 1972 DOD survey of 16,000 officers and 22,000 enlisted men in USAR troop units revealed that factors considered "favorable" toward a decision to join the USAR are (not necessarily ranked in priority) travel, pay and allowances, education and training, camaraderie, job security, retirement benefits, and patriotism. Negative factors are prestige, inconvenience to family, working conditions, chance of call-up, conflict with civilian occupation, hardships and hazards, freedom and job satisfaction. Interestingly, some of the favorable factors are "no cost" benefits.

A number of surveys conducted by the Army and by independent agencies have revealed that almost three-fourths of the personnel in the USAR in 1972 were there because of draft pressure motivation. Consequently, most personnel of this type upon separation will have to be replaced with young men and women who "want to join". They will be induced to do so because the USAR has something they want. As of this date, the only "measurable" incentives offered by the USAR that it did not have in December
1971 are pay increases (mostly in the lower grades), and post exchange (PX) privileges during inactive duty training (IDT) assemblies.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

Problems in Reaching and Maintaining Authorized Strength Levels

LTC Joseph M. Lojeck summarized early in 1971 the situation we face in the USAR today: "A review of the factors that motivate individuals to enlist in the Reserve Components indicates a serious problem will exist in maintaining Reserve manpower levels with the loss of the motivating influence of the draft".13

For the purpose of this essay, the USAR Components of Fifth US Army are taken as a model. On 22 October 1973, Fifth Army USAR strength is roughly three-fourths that of First Army and is twice the size of Sixth Army. The Army Command is located in mid-America, has metropolitan as well as rural areas, and has a good cross section of all the different types of USAR units in the United States.

In late 1971, Fifth US Army USAR units were at 100 percent of authorized enlisted strength. Today, this strength is 90 percent, about where it has been holding since June 1972. First and Sixth Armies experienced a similar decline. The employment in Fifth Army over the last two years of more than 126 full time recruiters, of more than 2000 part time recruiters, of career
counselors in every unit, and of Reserve counselors at Active Army installations, Recruiting Main Stations and Veteran's Administration Centers has no doubt helped keep the USAR from declining to an even greater extent, but none of these actions has made it possible for the Army to regain authorized levels. Figure 1 depicts Fifth Army USAR enlisted strength as a whole over the time frame mentioned, and Figs. 2 through 6 show what has happened to the various individual commands.

For easy comparison, the Army's six Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) are plotted together in Fig. 2, the five training divisions together in Fig. 3, the two transportation commands in Fig. 4, the two engineer commands in Fig. 5, and the remaining five general officer commands in Fig. 6. Headquarters locations are noted, although many commands cross one or more state boundaries.

It is interesting to note that four of the six ARCOM's are at 90 percent or above, but only one (90th) is at authorized level. Of the training divisions, only one (85th) is above 90 percent. By way of explanation, the 85th was recently reorganized, which accounts in part for its 117 percent statistic. However, the division was at 99 percent when reorganized. The two transportation commands are considerably understrength, the two engineer commands present an almost unexplainable polarization case, and there is considerable diversity between strengths of the other commands. The 75th Maneuver Area Command, Houston,
Fig. 2 Enlisted Personnel Strength Trends for the Six US Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) in Fifth US Army, Expressed as Percentage of Authorized Strength Attained.
Fig. 3 Enlisted Personnel Strength Trends for the Five USAF Training Divisions in Fifth US Army, Expressed as Percentage of Authorized Strength Attained.
Fig. 6 Enlisted Personnel Strength Trends for Five Other General Officer Commands in Fifth US Army, Expressed as Percentage of Authorized Strength Attained.
Texas, is quite small, but has been so successful in keeping its strength up that it does not even have a designated recruiter. Texas' 807th Hospital Center has shown the most success in rebounding from its strength loss, while Minnesota's 205th Infantry Brigade has experienced a fairly constant decline.

Supporting the claim that recruiting and retention are more difficult in the northern part of the Army area than in the south, six of the eight commands currently at 90 percent or better are located south of the Missouri-Illinois line, while eight of the 12 commands under 50 percent are located north of that line.

**Recruitment of Non-Prior Service Personnel**

"Off-the-street" recruitment is the greatest problem area facing the USAR today. The zero draft environment places no pressure on young men or women to join. Reflecting this situation, Fifth Army USAR units recruited a total of 560 non-prior service personnel in June 1972. In January 1973, this figure dropped to 156, and in September 1973 it was only 125. Figure 7 shows the decline in this area of recruiting.

Unfortunately, we have placed too much weight on financial remuneration as the single most important factor in recruiting. In 1971, LTC John E. MacDonald wrote: "The citizen-soldier appreciates additional financial rewards, but these rewards do not assume the same importance as they do for the full-time soldier since they provide only a fractional part of their total income."\(^{14}\)
Fig. 7  First Term Enlisted Personnel Enlistment Trends in Fifth US Army, Expressed as Number of Personnel Enlisted Per Quarter.
Basically, the problem is that the USAR does not yet have enough to offer today's youth that will induce them to exchange their "leisure time" for a citizen-soldier uniform. It is certain that incentives (not necessarily monetary) more important to these young men and women will have to be made available; and they will have to be incentives that are "wanted" and "valued". As mentioned, one of the two "real" incentives that the Reserve has been granted since the zero draft announcement is PX privileges during IDT assemblies, and, somewhat ironically, an unofficial study in Fifth Army area revealed that only some 33 percent of the current USAR members live close enough (25 miles) to a PX to be able to utilize it on a realistic basis. Conversely, the Active Army has been granted enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, proficiency pay, unit and station of choice programs, advanced educational opportunities, and GI bill benefits. None of these is available to the USAR.

The entire subject of non-prior service personnel recruiting is currently receiving additional consideration by both active and Reserve policy makers. However, it is clear that as USAR full- and part-time recruiters get more proficient as "salesmen", the appeal of the product to 18 year olds is declining. This decline in first term recruitment is also prevalent in First and Sixth Army USAR units.

Retention of First Termers

This is the second most critical area in the Reserve
recruiting and retention program. Far too many reservists are leaving the USAR when they complete their initial six year obligation. It is all too true that the bulk of E-4's and E-5's in the USAR today joined the Reserve during the Vietnam conflict when the draft was hanging over their heads.

In Fifth Army, around 40 percent (See Fig. 8) of all eligibles are being retained, a fairly good percentage, but unfortunately we are retaining only about 13 percent of the first term eligibles. Similar statistics exist for the other two armies. Career counselors have been appointed on an additional duty basis in all units down to company size, and programs have been developed to assure that all personnel scheduled to separate are counseled at least twice during the year prior to their scheduled separation. It is becoming more and more clear, however, that this situation will not improve until additional incentives for reenlistment are granted. Also, there are several other barriers to reenlistment that must be addressed before this rate will increase. The most prevalent involves IDT training in individual units. If one single complaint can be isolated as the greatest reason on the part of reservists for failure to reenlist, it is that situation that they describe as "meaningless training". It was aptly stated in 1971 that "it is difficult for a citizen-soldier to believe that he is a 'Ready' Reservist or Guardsman, an important element in the overall American defense structure, if his training appears unrelated to his mission and his equipment is outmoded.
Fig. 8 Enlisted Personnel Retention Trends in Fifth US Army, Expressed as Percentage of Eligibles Retained.
or nonexistent.\textsuperscript{15} Granted that commanders have been given wide
latitude in the establishment and conduct of training programs
and schedules, that equipment inadequacies are being corrected,
and that most units are engaged to some extent in community
relations, domestic action, or other socially-satisfying projects,
but a solution has not been found to the complaint by individuals
that "I do not feel that I, as an individual, am of value to this
unit.", Consequently, the exodus of first termers continues, and,
it costs $3800 to train each replacement. The introduction of
imaginative new approaches - both in the recruiting of capable
Reservists and Guardsmen and in their training to a state of true
preparedness - is a necessity.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Filling Hard Skill Military Occupational Specialties (MOS)}

Many hospital units in the USA are having an extremely
difficult time securing required numbers of doctors, dentists,
nurses, and other professionals. We are having trouble filling
Army Security Agency units where selected MOS require language,
cryptography, or other hard-to-learn skills. Some of the engineer
and transportation units are understrength. Wrapped up in this
area are problems that have financial bearing (a doctor, for
example, says "I can make twice as much money as a civilian
during the time I would spend as a reservist"), the amount of
time it takes to train some skills (one ASA MOS takes more than
a year of active duty before the MOS is awarded ("I might as well
join the Active Army")), the attitude of some commanders toward
women ("I don't want any females in my unit"), and problems related to getting enough school quotas for training the hard skills (the Active Army gets the quotas first, and there is, for example, a waiting period for up to many months in some skills). It is difficult to recruit for a 97. Charlie MOS (clinical specialist), if the recruiter cannot tell the prospect when he (she) will leave for training.

The Metropolitan Problem

Recruiting in large cities is often described as recruiting at its most difficult. This is reflected in the fact that a majority of understrength units are located in or near metropolitan areas. This condition is partially explained by the fact that many of the nation's urban areas have become "collection stations" for the impoverished, with massive ghettos and slums, wherein there are concentrations of ethnic minorities. Far too many of these citizens are "turned off" by the idea of patriotism, and the white, middle class, USAR unit recruiter encounters a great amount of difficulty in reaching these masses. This is unfortunate since the Reserve program can offer a considerable number of benefits to this segment of our population. However, we are not reaching it, as evidenced, for example, by the fact that only 7.2 percent (September 1973) of the USAR strength in Fifth Army is made up of minority elements. Influencing this part of the recruiting effort also is a howl and cry by some critics of the all-volunteer concept that the Army is going to become over-balanced with blacks.
A review of strength statistics reveals that severe problems exist in many USAR units in Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Milwaukee, and other large cities in the north. However, most units in Houston, San Antonio, Dallas, New Orleans, and Louisville are overstrength. Also units in rural areas are generally able to attain and maintain authorized strength levels easier than those in the large cities.

A partial explanation for this situation is that patriotism is still a "sales tool" in most rural areas. Also, the "social factor" of the Reserve Center or Guard Armory in small towns is an interesting aspect. The phenomena of USAR strength in the "solid south", wherein Third Army, at the time of its accession by First Army on 1 July 1973, was at 99 percent of authorized enlisted strength, is accounted for in part by the fact that almost every small town in Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, etc. has a USAR or Guard unit, and membership in it has a "social" connotation. Dances, meetings, conferences, and other "home town" gatherings are held at the center; there is an "identity" connotation, and commanders find that they can recruit and retain much easier under these conditions. This situation does not exist to the same degree elsewhere, particularly in the north and east.

It is becoming more and more apparent that successful USAR recruiting in metropolitan areas will have to be organized on a centralized or task-force basis, with black and other minority
recruiters as a sizeable part of the task force. The implication is obvious but there is still a long way to go before USAR minority participation reaches even the minority percentage make-up of the nation. The continued use of individual, white recruiters - without extensive coordination - in minority areas is likely to produce continued frustration for the unit commander.

The problems described above have been treated generally. There are countless others that make recruiting and retention a difficult task. Programs initiated to help resolve some of these problems are discussed in the next section, and additional suggestions are offered in the Recommendations section.

Programs Initiated to Resolve Problems

Full-Time and Part-Time Recruiting Force

The alarming decline in enlisted strength during the first half of 1972 led the USAR to devise a hasty, albeit full-time, field recruiting force. Civilian (GS-09) recruiting officers (RO) were stationed full time at ARCCM/GOCOM headquarters, and GS-07 recruiting specialists (RS) were assigned full time at brigade and battalion levels. Over a period of months in Fifth Army, a total of 20 GS-09's and 106 GS-07's were appointed. These positions were designated as "dual status", that is, each RO and RS was also assigned to a TO&£ position in a Reserve unit within his area of recruiting responsibility. The recruiter thusly came under the operational day-to-day control of the Staff Administrative
Assistant (SAA) of the center where he was stationed. The formula used to position GS-07 recruiters was one recruiter for 700 reservists in a USAR center or combination of centers.

At about the same time, commanders were directed to begin appointing recruiting officers and NCO's at unit level, these to work on a part time basis, that is, a part of each unit training assembly was to be used for recruiting activities. It was envisioned that the unit personnel would constitute the actual field recruiting force and the full timers would provide technical supervision and direction. By 1 January 1973, most of these recruiters had been employed or appointed. Also, in late 1972, each CONUS Army was authorized to appoint a full time recruiting officer, a Lieutenant Colonel, to provide Army headquarters with recruiting direction and assistance.

It is safe to say that the appointment of civilian and unit recruiters in 1972, and the added emphasis placed on recruiting and retention, were directly responsible for halting the rampant decline of USAR enlisted strength. Although there have been significant problems in reaching maximum efficiency with this force, its organization staved off what could have been a disastrous situation for the USAR.

Today, the "sales force" is undergoing critical scrutiny from the standpoint of how best to make it work. Some GS-07 recruiters who had been 6's and who took the recruiting job just to get a promotion are now being replaced, commanders are
consistently appointing more qualified people to unit recruiting and retention jobs, and policy makers are conducting studies to determine how to get the most out of the structure. Some preliminary thought, for example, is being given to removing the full time personnel from civilian oriented channels, having the GS-09's report directly to the Army RO, and the 7's directly to the 9's. This would help to eliminate two problems that have been plaguing the force: 1) that of commanders who assume that the GS-07 recruiters "belong" to them and will not permit these personnel to recruit for any unit except theirs; and 2) situations where SAA's have recruiters performing day to day jobs not related to recruiting and retention.

From an Army standpoint, this modification in the work force would facilitate a regionalized concept of recruiting where full time recruiters would recruit for every unit in their area of responsibility, where centralized "task forces" would concentrate on trouble spots, and where recruiters could be moved from area to area to provide assistance on a short-fuse basis. Under this concept, unit commanders would continue to be responsible for strength maintenance of their commands, and would control the activities of their unit recruiters, with the full time personnel providing technical assistance and direction on an as-needed basis within designated regions.
More Prominent Role for Reservists

Under the STEADFAST reorganization of the Army, which became effective 1 July 1973, the three CONUS armies essentially became Reserve Components armies, inasmuch as almost all the active installations and their personnel were assigned to the new Forces Command (FORSCOM) or to the new Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Under this concept, the Army CG commands the Reserve, and is responsible for Guard readiness in the Army area. Army Readiness Regions and Groups, composed primarily of active duty personnel, were organized and located strategically to assist the Army Commander in maintaining the Reserve Forces at high readiness levels. To provide Reserve Components' experience and knowledge, some 100 officers from the Reserve and Guard are being brought to active duty on special tours. They will be assigned to headquarters positions. This is an interesting move, inasmuch as it gives more responsibility to the USAR, for example, for operating the Reserve. And, it is not out of line with what many other countries have done. For example, in 19 countries, the Reserve Forces are larger than the active forces. It is, however, unfortunate that this kind of Reserve personnel utilization, actually the total force concept, is not accepted by many active officers and by some reservists, because the integration of Reserve personnel into active units, and vice versa, could provide a more solid base from which total force programs, for example, recruiting, could be launched.
Recruiters at Class I Installations and at Recruiting Main Stations

In 1971, Department of the Army established the Active Army Early Release Program, whereby selected Active Army personnel could get an early release to join a Reserve Component unit, to get additional education, or to accept a teaching job, etc. The plan was twofold: 1) to assist the needed drawdown of active forces created by US withdrawal from Vietnam; and 2) to assist Reserve Forces in maintaining authorized strength levels.

Consequently, Reserve Components NCO's were stationed, beginning in early 1972, on an active duty for training (ADT) basis at most of the Class I installations across the country. Called Reserve Components Career Counselors (RCCC), these reservists serve as points of contact for personnel who have definitely decided not to reenlist in the Active Army, but who will agree to join a USAR or ARNG unit for one year in exchange for an early-release from the active service. As the program accomplished its objectives relative to reduction of the active forces, the early release for almost every category except that for joining a Reserve unit was eliminated, and the "early out" for Reserve Components units was set at 90 days, where it is today.

Over a period of several months, RCCC's (usually one USAR NCO and one ARNG NCO) were stationed at every Class I installation where there were enough Active Army personnel separating to justify the effort. In Fifth Army, RCCC's were stationed at Forts Bliss, Hood, Leonard Wood, Polk, Riley, Sam Houston,
Sheridan, and Sill. Active Army personnel conducted the program at Forts Leavenworth, Wolters, and Benjamin Harrison since there were too few monthly separatees at those posts to justify special RCCC's.

This RCCC effort has provided substantial assistance in helping Reserve units maintain strengths, inasmuch as hundreds of personnel per month separating from the Active Army Class I installations have been assigned to USAR or ARNG units across the country. More specifically, from early March to mid-June of this year, 5724 soldiers agreed to spend a year in the Reserve Components in exchange for a 90-day early release. Also, there is the significant factor that these trained personnel have been retained for a minimum of a year in the Armed Forces, saving at least for that year the $3800 required to train a replacement.

In a related area, USAR and ARNG NCO's were stationed, beginning in early 1973, at recruiting main stations (RMS) across the country. These NCO's provide liaison between the Active Army recruiting forces and the Reserve Components. In Fifth Army, a total of 11 RMS have been staffed with liaison NCO's. At each RMS, a mutual referral system has been established with the Reserve NCO working daily with Active Army recruiters and vice- versa. The active recruiters refer to the NCO, young men and women who are candidates for the USAR, and the reservist makes similar referrals to the Active Army. The liaison NCO is charged with establishing contact and rapport with all of the USAR and ARNG units in the RMS area, with learning what their strength
needs are, and with helping these units reach authorized strengths by referring leads to them.

While this program is less than a year old, it has been proven to be a valid concept for Reserve Components recruiting, and plans are underway now to expand it to all 64 RMS in the US.

Even newer is the Veteran's Administration Center Reserve recruiting program. Reserve NCO recruiting personnel have been stationed at selected VA centers throughout the country. Their job is essentially the same as that of the RMS liaison NCO's, to counsel incoming personnel (veterans) who may be interested in joining Reserve units. These veterans are usually already trained in an Army MOS, many are combat experienced, and thusly their accrual to the Reserve constitutes a training cost savings for the Army. While this program is still in the test stage, and only four VA centers in Fifth Army have been so staffed for about six months (Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, St Louis), plans are underway to fill positions in several other central VA centers.

The Incentives Program

As mentioned earlier, new, really significant, incentives for the USAR program in the last two years can be counted on two fingers. Reservists have been granted meaningful pay raises, along with Active forces in recent years, and they now have post exchange privileges during inactive duty training assemblies. It is conjectured that Congress this session will approve full-time Servicemen's Group Life Insurance for reservists. Almost all of
the other incentives, however, that will assist in attracting more young men and women to the USAR appear to be "hung up" at Congress or DOD levels. These include enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for reservists, prorated college educational benefits, a "fair" Reserve GI bill, medical and dental benefits for survivors of reservists, proficiency pay, earlier retirement age for reservists, and others.

The Gates Commission foresaw the problem that would very likely exist in the Reserve Components, when it reported: "Change to 'first line of reinforcement' concept from the 'last resort' role they have been playing, add the loss of the draft incentives, and the results equal a somewhat less than desirable reason to enlist in the USAR or NG. Thus, recruiting efforts for USAR and NG, and retention efforts, must be at least as dynamic, as original, and as creative as those directed toward the Active Army". Yet the incentives needed by the USAR and ARNG have not been forthcoming.

There is little doubt that given enough incentives, costly as they may be, a career in a peacetime Armed Force could be made competitive with a civilian career, and the manpower requirements of the Armed Forces could be maintained with volunteers. There is more than sufficient eligible-age manpower availability. However, with 75 percent of the Reserve enlistments being draft motivated, compared with only 49.7 percent of the Active Army enlistees being draft motivated, the requirements for offsetting incentives is a greater problem for the USAR than for the
Active Army.

Most people think of incentives solely in terms of money. In reality, more money is only a part of the solution. As more and more effort is expended on the volunteer Army, it is becoming evident that Active and Reserve professionals, using ingenuity, resourcefulness, and experience will be the deciding factor in its success or failure. What is most sorely needed, as stated by former Secretary of Defense Laird, is a "vastly improved public understanding of the Reserve Components role in our nation's security". 23

Many incentives needed by the USAR do not have a monetary connotation. These include more attention to the individual reservist and his family, the assignment of priorities to public affairs planning, conveyance of the Army "professionalism" message to the country's opinion leaders, and a re-emphasis to all that the Reserve is a part of the one-Army concept.

It is interesting that FORSCOM, dropping traditional "format" in favor of critical needs, has in the last year liberalized recruiting and retention "policies" for the USAR. These include drill assembly passes for unit personnel who recruit a new member, authority to commanders to leave their recruiters at home station for recruiting duty when the unit goes to annual training, a significant increase in manday space allocations for recruiting, and others of a similar nature. While these cannot be regarded as incentives, but instead as "tools", they are helping.
LTC Louis Ginn described in capsule form the incentives needed by the Reserve Components to survive under the volunteer concept: 1) a modest set of monetary incentives; 2) true adoption of the One-Army concept; 3) an enlightened public; and 4) better leadership in the Reserve.24

WAC Emphasis

Major General J. Milnor Roberts, Chief, Army Reserve, DA has stated that the USAR goal is to recruit 10,000 women in its ranks by 1976.25 Women can now serve in all but 48 of the Army MOS, in any positions other than those that are directly related to combat or combat support.

Consequently, all three CONUS armies have initiated extensive WAC recruiting programs, and many USAR units now have women serving in TO&E positions formerly always occupied by men. In Fifth Army, WAC USAR strength has been more than doubled since January 1973, and WAC recruiting goals have been established for each of the Army's ARCOM/GOCOM's.

To complement this new effort, a number of new WAC programs have been initiated. For example, women can now be enlisted into the USAR, take their basic training one summer, return to their unit for a year, and take advanced individual training the next summer. Also, women with civilian acquired skills can now enlist, go to the WAC center at Fort McClellan, AL for two weeks of resident training, return to their units for 48 hours of home-
station nonresident training, and then be awarded a grade up to E-5.

USAR WAC recruiting officer positions have been staffed in the USAR Recruiting and Retention Offices at each of the three Army headquarters.

Command Recruiting Programs

Of considerable interest are the recruiting and retention emphasis programs that various commands in Fifth Army have initiated in support of their efforts to reach and maintain authorized levels. Even company size units have started specialized projects and campaigns. Often their application is to geographic locales, to the particular kind of unit involved, or to some other "technique", "method", or "gimmick" that proves useful to the unit or command attempting to increase its ranks. For example, the 88th ARCOM's Blue Clover Club, made up of the Command's officers and NCO's, takes a charter trip once a year to Europe. The two top recruiters in the command, and their wives, get to make the trip free. This is a part of "Project Survival", the 88th's recruiting and retention plan.

As another example, the 205th Infantry Brigade, a command that has fallen to 69 percent of enlisted strength, has recently initiated "Project 85." This campaign is aimed at increasing the command to 85 percent by 1 January 1974. As "good news", it features prizes, awards, and recognition for outstanding
recruiting/retention efforts, and, as "bad news", it calls for a freeze in personnel promotions for units that do not attain these goals by the stated date.

The 425th Transportation Command recently completed "Operation RAM" (Recruit A Man) that had as its goal a rapid upsurge in strength in units that were in trouble. The command used a sizeable portion of its manday space allocations to focus recruiting officers and specialists in local towns and areas where units were understrength. As a result, many units were able to improve dramatically the strength posture of their enlisted ranks.

There are countless others of these types of command programs, each designed to do one thing - bring more people into the USAR.

**Prior Service Accessions**

There currently are in excess of 800,000 enlisted personnel assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). These personnel have served a minimum of two years on active duty, are trained in one or more MOS, and are completing their six-year military obligations in what is commonly referred to as the IRR "pool". This pool is probably the single most effective current source in gaining new personnel for the USAR.

The program works this way. USAR units advise the Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC) in St. Louis, where IRR records are maintained, of the MOS vacancies that they have. RCPAC responds with the names of IRR reservists in
each unit's locale who possess the MOS skills needed. The unit's recruiters then contact these personnel and attempt to recruit them into the unit. The IRR member can be enlisted into the USAR unit at the grade he had when he was separated from the Active Army.

Thousands of IRR members have responded favorably to this program and enlisted in the USAR (See Fig 9). Unfortunately, the pool is decreasing rapidly each year and is expected essentially to be exhausted by about 1978. As an example, there were 394,625 losses in 1972, and 257,931 losses are projected for 1973.\(^\text{27}\) The reason is that under the all-volunteer concept, fewer young men are volunteering for the Active Army, consequently, there are fewer assignments to the IRR pool as these active personnel complete their active duty tour.

**Employer Support Program**

A discouraging element of USAR participation has been the conflict between reservists' civilian jobs and their military obligations. Far too many employers have said, "It's okay for you to be a reservist, as long as it does not interfere with your job here." In many cases, this has meant that the reservist has had to use his vacation time when going on annual training, has been denied civilian promotions by a belligerent boss, or has otherwise been harassed because of his Reserve participation.

To counteract this situation, President Nixon last year ordered the establishment of a National Committee for Employer
Support of the Guard and Reserve. He appointed as chairman, Mr. J. M. Roche, former chairman of board for General Motors Corporation. The mission of the committee is to garner the support of the nation's millions of employers in behalf of the Guard and Reserve programs. The committee has organized subcommittees at all levels of society, and presentations have been designed to explain to employers the benefits they derive by having reservists in their firms. As of June 1973, the committee has received signed statements of support from 50 governors, 330 mayors, and nearly 13,000 employers, covering more than 25 million employees (about 31 percent of the total work force). Efforts are continuing to get the support of every employer in the country.

CONCLUSIONS

In general, it is concluded that the All-Volunteer concept is feasible and practical in a peacetime environment. Further, with some limitations, the goals are attainable, but will be more difficult to realize in the Reserve Components than in the Active Army. With regard to the resources required to attain the volunteer USAR goals, manpower (and womenpower) availability is more than adequate to meet requirements. Additional funds will be necessary but they perhaps are not as important to success as is the proper use of resources currently available to the Army. As important to this success as money and "no cost" improvements is
the need for starting a massive and effective public relations

effort to improve the Army's image.

It is broadly concluded that:

1. The All-Volunteer concept for the USAR is feasible and

   practical in a peacetime environment.

2. The goals are attainable; however, attainment of

   necessary strengths under "zero draft" motivation is an incumbered

   goal.

3. Reaching and maintaining the required Army Reserve and

   Army National Guard strength in a volunteer environment will be

   the most difficult task confronting the Army.

4. The male and female population of the United States is

   more than adequate to support the concept.

5. Funding at current levels plus an additional amount to be

   determined is required to reach the all-volunteer goals. In this

   connection, costs equals results (C=R) is an insolvable question

   without the added factors of experience, national economic

   situation, and "no cost" actions taken.

6. Dollars alone will not assure success in reaching and

   maintaining a volunteer USAR of the quantity and quality required.

7. The most promising avenue toward attainment of goals is

   exploitation of the resources now at the Army's disposal and within

   the Army's authority to modify or utilize. Herein lies basic

   success.

8. The USAR image has been at a dangerously low ebb.
Continued improvement of this image must come without delay if the Army is to realize optimum benefit from expenditure of funds or from implementation of "no cost" improvements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations, aimed at reaching and maintaining an all-volunteer USAR, are of two types - those suggesting specific actions and those suggesting study or review of concepts and ideas. The order of presentation is not indicative of the importance or priority of the recommendation.

It is recommended that:

1. Public information and recruiting programs be expanded and revitalized, utilizing every means of communication available.
2. An attractive, factual, and comprehensive USAR Career Catalog be made available to high school students and educators detailing:
   a. The availability and prerequisites of civilian and military educational opportunities.
   b. Career development policies.
   c. Assignment procedures.
   d. Fringe benefits available.
   e. Leave and pass policies.
   f. Opportunities for advancement and travel.
   g. Retirement benefits.
   h. Options available to women.
3. Commanders and noncommissioned officers at all levels be indoctrinated as to the important role they play in the success of the all-volunteer concept. Indoctrination should include, as a minimum, a review of modern leadership techniques, methods of insuring job satisfaction, discontinuance of menial tasks, understanding and application of the "Freedom of Failure" technique, and lessons learned to date from various tests and studies relating to the all-volunteer concept.

4. Annual training, living and working conditions for Reservists be made as attractive and rewarding as possible commensurate with military order, discipline and mission accomplishment.

5. High enlistment standards be established and maintained to provide selectivity in procurement and retention.

6. The Army continue to push for a wage scale competitive with industry, and for additional and substantial monetary incentives to attract qualified personnel into the USAR.

7. An OOE (recruiter) MOS TO&E position be provided for each USAR unit down to company size.

8. The feasibility of giving female soldiers a wider role in the USAR be expanded. Examination should include a review of the desirability of increased female strength authorizations and a look at utilization of female soldiers in the "all male" units.

9. Retirement age for reservists be immediately reduced to age 55.
10. Push for USAR enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, a 
fair-share GI bill, improved educational opportunities, and 
medical/dental benefits for survivors of members.

11. "Space Required" travel aboard military carriers be pro-
vided for all troop unit USAR personnel at least once each five 
year period for the purpose of recreation and leave travel. 
Destination limited to areas normally serviced by military or 
government carriers.

12. Direct low interest government loans be made to 
reservists for college educational purposes.

13. Armed Forces Recreational Centers be established for 
or extended to members of the Reserve Components.

14. The Selective Service System be retained on a standby 
basis.

15. That every resource be made available to overcome the 
"meaningless training" complaint in many USAR units.

"It may be laid down as a primary position, 
and the basis of our system, that every 
citizen who enjoys the protection of a free 
Government, owes not only a proportion of 
his property, but even of his personal 
services to the defence of it . . . . ."

George Washington 1783

JAMES R. COMPTON
LTC, CA, USAR
FOOTNOTES


3. Harry A. Marmion, Selective Service: Conflict and Compromise, p. 60.


7. Ibid.


10. US Department of the Army, Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation, p. 20 (hereinafter referred to as "PROVIDE").

11. Zamparelli and Clinton, Ibid.

12. Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Ibid.


15. The Modern Volunteer Army: A Program for Professionals, p. 27.


27. *Ibid*.

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