Research Report

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Differences in Attitudes Toward Leadership Between "Draft-Induced" and "True" Volunteers

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Stanley M. Nealey
Principal Investigator

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**Title:** Differences in Attitudes Toward Leadership Between "Draft-Induced" and "True" Volunteers

**Authors:** George C. Thornton III, Jack Hamilton, Stanley M. Nealey

**Summary:**
Attitudes toward interpersonal influence in the Navy of enlisted men classified as "draft-induced volunteers" and "true volunteers" were explored by administering questionnaires to 307 Navy recruits at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) at Los Angeles and Denver and 365 trainees during the final weeks of Navy basic training at San Diego.
Recruits and trainees were classified on the basis of Selective Service Lottery number and response to a question of whether the draft influenced their joining the Navy. Specific differences in perception of leadership climate, preferences for styles of interpersonal influence and attitudes toward leadership were found. The "true volunteer" groups expressed preference for close and formal supervision, stated that they expected to like their supervisors, and displayed less aversion to order giving and coercive leadership from superiors. The "draft-induced" groups expressed relatively greater preference for informal leadership and general supervision and perceived that supervisors on civilian jobs are more informal, permissive, and democratic. Differences between the groups increased as a result of basic training experience.

In spite of these differences, draft-induced and true volunteers expressed many similar perceptions of and attitudes toward military leadership. Zero-draft may not produce the large difference in quality and type of recruit that has been suggested by previous studies and speculation. Those differences in attitudes which do seem to exist among persons of different draft pressure may make the training and supervision of enlisted men easier in the future. On the other hand, if the military wishes to attract a larger number of young men into the service, it may have to adopt leadership approaches more like those in civilian jobs in order to change the unfavorable image of the military revealed by the high draft-pressure groups in this study.
ABSTRACT

Attitudes toward interpersonal influence in the Navy of enlisted men classified as "draft-induced volunteers" and "true volunteers" were explored by administering questionnaires to 307 Navy recruits at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) at Los Angeles and Denver and 365 trainees during the final weeks of Navy basic training at San Diego. Recruits and trainees were classified on the basis of Selective Service Lottery number and response to a question of whether the draft influenced their joining the Navy. Specific differences in perception of leadership climate, preferences for styles of interpersonal influence and attitudes toward leadership were found. The "true volunteer" groups expressed preference for close and formal supervision, stated that they expected to like their supervisors, and displayed less aversion to order giving and coercive leadership from superiors. The "draft-induced" groups expressed relatively greater preference for informal leadership and general supervision and perceived that supervisors on civilian jobs are more informal, permissive, and democratic. Differences between the groups increased as a result of basic training experience.

In spite of these differences, draft-induced and true volunteers expressed many similar perceptions of and attitudes toward military leadership. Zero-draft may not produce the large difference in quality and type of recruit that has been suggested by previous studies and speculation. Those differences in attitudes which do seem to exist among persons
of different draft pressure may make the training and supervision of enlisted men easier in the future. On the other hand, if the military wishes to attract a larger number of young men into the service, it may have to adopt leadership approaches more like those in civilian jobs in order to change the unfavorable image of the military revealed by the high draft-pressure groups in this study.
INTRODUCTION

The United States Navy now relies entirely on voluntary enlistments to meet its manpower needs. Before the draft was ended however, it was generally recognized that some portion of the enlistees were motivated to join the Navy because of the possibility of being drafted into another service. As the military adjusts to the all-volunteer force it is important to consider the differences in composition of personnel which may accompany the absence of draft pressure. The attitudes and expectations which new Navy enlistees have about the type of leadership style and organizational climate they expect to find in the Navy is the major focus of this study. The respondents also described their perception of leadership style and organizational climate typical of civilian jobs. It was hypothesized that there would be significant differences between a group of Navy enlistees who could be considered "draft-induced volunteers" in comparison with a group who could be considered "true volunteers." The draft-induced group might be expected to have less favorable attitudes toward military service than would the true volunteers.

A series of studies by the Air Force showed that draft vulnerability was related to a variety of characteristics of Air Force enlistees and officers. Vitola and Valentine (1971) found among 72,000 basic trainees who entered the Air Force
after January 1, 1970 that a true-volunteer group scored lower on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and the Airmen Qualifying Examination (AQE). Vitola and Alley (1972) found a similar pattern of differences among draft-pressure groups in a study of 18-year-old enlistees who entered the Air Force before becoming draft eligible. The true-volunteer group displayed less education and lower AFQT and AQE test performance. In addition, there was a disproportionate number of blacks in the true volunteer group. The authors concluded that such a pattern of enlistment will make it more difficult in the absence of a draft to fill high-aptitude enlistment quotas.

A study of Air Force ROTC cadets (Guinn, Alley, & Farmer, 1971) found similar results. Lower test score performance was found among the cadets who entered the program without draft pressure. In addition, a number of interest and attitudinal differences were found. The true volunteer cadets entered AFROTC "to become a pilot or navigator", were more frequently in majors such as business or biological and social sciences, tended to come from military families, and saw a military career as desirable. In contrast, the draft motivated group entered ROTC to "avoid draft pressure", was heavy in engineering, professional, and physical science majors, and did not value a military career very highly. The
authors concluded that under zero-draft conditions there may be significant change in the composition of officer personnel.

It has been suggested that a number of changes in personnel policies and practices may be necessary to attract and sustain adequate numbers of recruits in a zero-draft situation. Experience during the early months following the end of substantial drafting activity showed that some branches of the military and more specifically some duty assignments were not being filled by voluntary enlistments. In order to meet these and other problems a number of changes have already been instituted in various branches: enlistment bonuses, choices of duty and geographic assignment, elimination of certain routine duty (e.g., KP), and increased flexibility in free time use.

Results of a previous study (Nealey, 1972) under the current project provided tentative support for the contention that changes in leadership style may be necessary to provide a more appropriate management climate for effective supervision of future groups of enlisted personnel. The research summarized in this report was designed to explore differences in attitudes and expectations of Navy recruits who were under various amounts of draft pressure. If such differences are found, it may be possible to plan
programs to deal more effectively with the changing composition of personnel under zero-draft.

METHOD

Sample

The respondents in this study were two samples of Navy enlisted men: the first consisted of 307 Navy recruits at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) at Los Angeles (N=165) and Denver (N=142); the second sample consisted of 365 Navy recruits at the Naval Training Center (NTC) in San Diego. The AFEES recruits had just joined the Navy and were being processed prior to departure for basic training. The NTC recruits had completed seven or eight weeks of a nine-week basic training program. All respondents completed the questionnaires anonymously.

A group of "draft-induced volunteers" and a group of "true volunteers" were identified among the recruits in both samples on the basis of two considerations: draft lottery number and self-reported draft pressure. The Selective Service Lottery system provided an objective basis for categorizing the respondents according to their draft vulnerability. During the enlistment period covered by the study (1972) a lottery number of 96 or higher meant one had little chance of being drafted. Therefore, a lottery number less than 96 was the first criterion for possible inclusion in the "draft-induced" subsample. A person with a lottery number 96 or above was considered relatively free from draft pressure and potentially included in the "true volunteer" group.
A second, subjective criterion of whether an enlistee was draft-induced was response to the question, "To what extent did the draft influence you to join the military?" After talking with selective service, recruitment, and AFEES personnel, it was recognized that many young men felt they might be drafted even if they had a high lottery number. At the same time, many persons with low numbers didn't really care what their lottery number was; they intended to volunteer for the Navy in any event. Responses of 5, 4, or 3 on a 5-point scale where 5 indicates the draft had a "very large influence," were used to classify the respondent as draft-induced.

A combination of objective draft vulnerability and the subjective statement of the effect of the draft was used to identify subgroups for comparison. In order to be classified as "draft-induced", a respondent had to have a low lottery number and also subjectively report draft influence on his enlistment. "True volunteers" were those with high lottery numbers who also subjectively reported little or no draft influence on enlistment.

As a result of the classification procedure, 54 true volunteers and 31 draft-induced volunteers were identified among the AFEES recruits and 42 true volunteers and 67 draft-induced volunteers were identified among the NTC recruits.

Questionnaire

The questionnaires administered to the new recruits and recruits in training were parallel in form and con-
tent. The objective of the questionnaires was to measure perception of five organizational climate dimensions and five modes of expression of interpersonal influence or leadership power. In addition, a set of Likert-type attitudes items was included.

The five organizational climate dimensions were: (1) hierarchical vs. equalitarian decision making, (2) formal vs. informal superior-subordinate relations, (3) supportive vs. punitive handling of mistakes by subordinates, (4) close vs. general supervision, and (5) considerate vs. inconsiderate supervision.

These five organizational climate dimensions were described by means of five pairs of contrasting situations. On each dimension the respondent used a 5-point scale to describe (1) Navy basic training, (2) expectations of Navy duty 18 months after basic training, (3) civilian jobs, (4) the situation in which they would try hardest to do a good job, and (5) the situation in which they would be most satisfied. The objective of this section of the questionnaire was to compare basic training, regular Navy life and civilian life on the dimensions of organizational climate and also to obtain a description of the type of situation in which recruits felt they would be productive and satisfied.

The five leadership power dimensions were those identified by French and Raven (1959): (1) legitimate power based on
rank and position; (2) expert power based on knowledge; 
(3) reward power based on positive rewards; (4) referent 
power based on personal respect; and (5) coercive power 
based on negative sanctions and punishment.

Attitudes toward the five French and Raven modes of 
expression of interpersonal power were obtained by describ-
ing situations illustrating each mode of power expression. 
Respondents then indicated (1) how frequently each form of 
power is used during basic training, (2) how frequently they 
think each should be used, (3) how frequently each form of 
power is used in most civilian jobs, (4) how hard they would 
try to do a good job under each mode of power and (5) how 
satisfied they would feel.

Fourteen Likert-type items probed general attitudes 
toward the military, basic training, the supervision process, 
and taking orders. Each item was a statement of opinion with 
which the respondent indicated his degree of agreement.

Finally, the questionnaire contained a few biographical 
questions.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents descriptive information on the two 
subsamples of true and draft-induced volunteers at each 
research location. The ages of the samples show small but 
significant differences in each location; but in opposite 
directions: the draft-induced group is slightly younger 
at the AFEES centers and slightly older at the NTC. There
are no significant differences in size of home town or standing in high school class. This latter finding is in opposition to the results of earlier studies (Guinn, et al., 1971; Vitola & Valentine, 1971) which indicated that the high draft-pressure volunteers were generally more qualified. These results suggest that the true and draft-induced samples are quite comparable at both locations.

The perceptions of organizational climate in the Navy for the draft-induced and true volunteers in the AFEES and NTC samples are compared in Table 2. There are no significant differences in perceptions of basic training. The draft-induced recruits at NTC tend to see basic training leadership as more inconsiderate of their feelings. Consistent with this, the true volunteers at NTC expect their superiors in the Navy 18 months after basic to be more considerate than does the induced group. As one might expect, the true volunteers have a more positive view of Navy leadership during boot camp.

When the leadership climate of civilian jobs is described by the draft-induced and true volunteers, clear differences in perceptions are seen. True volunteers view civilian jobs as more hierarchical, formal, and punitive. Or, it may be stated that the draft-induced group believe civilian jobs are more democratic, informal, and permissive. These findings suggest that true volunteers have had less pleasant civilian job experiences than has the group that had to be induced to join.
There were few differences in the types of leadership climate which elicited the groups' best efforts. True volunteers want closer supervision for their greatest effort. Two other comparisons approached significance: There is the suggestion that true volunteers work better under more formal and punitive climates than do the induced volunteers. From the point of view of the draft-induced recruits, they will work harder under supervision which is more general, informal, and permissive.

When the recruits were asked what sort of leadership climate lead to satisfaction on the job, the true volunteers at both AFEES and NTC expressed preference for more formal climates.

Table 3 contains the comparisons of perceptions of the five types of interpersonal power. The true volunteers at AFEES expected to like their superiors (referent power) during the basic training and the true volunteers at NTC in fact found this to be the case more often than did the induced recruits. The true volunteers at NTC also stated that expert power was used more frequently. When asked what forms of power should be used, the induced group recommended higher amounts of expert and reward power relative to the true volunteers.

None of the comparisons for leadership power in civilian jobs were significant. This is surprising, considering that this question showed the most striking results in the climate section. The French and Raven power bases may depend more on
specific job experience than do the climate variables. The AFEES and NTC samples are young and have little job experience. Therefore, their perceptions with regard to interpersonal influence may be less well developed.

In comparison with the draft-induced volunteers, the true volunteers will try to do a good job if referent power is used. It is not surprising that the true volunteers are more responsive to this mode of leadership, because they would be more likely to identify with military leaders as a group. When satisfaction is considered, the true volunteers expressed greater satisfaction with referent power and less dissatisfaction with coercive power than the induced group. In addition, there are suggestions that the true volunteers at NTC are also more satisfied than the induced group with reward and legitimate power.

The comparisons of attitudes as measured by the 14 Likert-items for the AFEES samples are presented in Table 4 and for NTC in Table 5. At AFEES, only one item was clearly significant. The true volunteers were more willing to readily comply with an order. In addition, there was the tendency for true volunteers to see basic training as more important and to want officers to consider the feelings of their men.

The most striking contrast of attitudes is revealed in the comparison of specific attitudes at NTC, shown in Table 5. Nine of the fourteen comparisons are significant
and the reader should examine each item. Several items related to basic training show a difference in attitudes between draft-induced and true volunteers. The true volunteers at NTC expressed the attitudes that boot camp is an important part of military training (Item 1), that basic training isn't just an initiation procedure (Item 5), and that basic training will be relevant to combat (Item 9). The true volunteers also believe it is important for them to do well in basic training (Item 2) and believe a rugged boot camp experience is essential in order for recruits to respect the service (Item 11).

Differences in attitudes toward supervision are also revealed in a number of questions. In comparison with the draft-induced volunteers, the true volunteers do not have to like a supervisor to be able to work with him (Item 3) and they are more ready to comply when orders are given (Item 13). In contrast, the draft-induced trainees tend to lose respect for a superior if he gives orders just to show his authority (Item 8). Finally, the true volunteers are more willing to accept military rules and regulations as governing their off-duty behavior (Item 10).

DISCUSSION

The results support the hypothesis that there were differences in expectations, perceptions, and attitudes toward leadership styles and organizational climate among Navy re-
cruits under different amounts of draft pressure. The groups of low draft pressure ("true" volunteers) expressed more favorable attitudes toward military leadership and expressed preference for more formal and close supervision based on referent power. They are less dissatisfied with the use of coercive power and the show of authority. In contrast, the groups of high draft-pressure ("draft-induced") volunteers expressed less favorable attitudes toward military leadership, saw civilian jobs in a more favorable light, and preferred informal and general supervision. They expressed great dissatisfaction with coercive power and arbitrary order giving.

The differences in perceptions and attitudes were discernable at the time of induction and were more striking in the groups with experience in basic training. A simple count revealed significant differences on 7 items when the responses of true and draft-induced recruits at AFEES were compared. Significant differences on 19 items were found between the two groups of NTC recruits. The increased differentiation in attitudes between true and draft-induced volunteers from the AFEES samples with no military experience to the NTC samples with 8 or 9 weeks of experience in boot camp is clearest in two areas. First, with regard to types of expression of leadership power which will bring satisfaction, it can be seen in Table 3 that while no differences are present at time of induction, two significant and two nearly significant differences emerge at NTC. The true volunteers at NTC clearly will be
more satisfied when they like and respect their superiors (referent power) and less dissatisfied with the use of coercive power. In addition, at a lower level of confidence we can say the true volunteers are more satisfied when legitimate and reward power are used.

Booth & Hoiberg (1973) observed that over the 9 weeks of training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, a group of 735 Marine recruits showed increasingly favorable attitudes toward several aspects of the Marine Corps. The results of the current study indicate that subjects classified prior to entry into training as draft-induced vs. true volunteers may react differently to the training experience. In the case of the Navy trainees, the true volunteers reacted positively to training but the draft-induced group revealed less favorable attitudes after a major portion of training.

It should be noted that even the true volunteers are not completely satisfied with the current leadership in the Navy. In many cases, the results merely show that the true volunteers are relatively less dissatisfied than the draft-induced volunteers with the leadership climate and the methods of interpersonal influence in the Navy. To more fully understand the attitudes of the true volunteers, it is necessary to examine the actual means on individual items. For example, from Table 2 it is clear that the true volunteers will put forth effort when led in a democratic and considerate manner. The results in Table 3 suggest that true volunteers believe more referent
power and less coercive power should be used in basic training than is currently the case. In addition, Item 8 among the set of attitude items shows that the true volunteers lose respect for an officer if he gives an order just to show his authority.

**Implications.** If zero-draft produces larger portions of enlisted men who hold attitudes similar to the true volunteers in these samples, then training and supervision of these men may be relatively easy with current leadership approaches. At time of induction the true volunteers believed they would like and respect their superiors in the Navy. This favorable attitude may lead them to work harder than their draft-induced peers. The true volunteers are more readily willing to comply when orders are given. At NTC they liked and respected their superiors and believed that their superiors at duty stations 18 months hence would be considerate of their feelings. They also reported that they will work hard and be satisfied in situations where there are rather tight restrictions such as close supervision and formal interpersonal relationships.

On the other hand, in order to increase rates of enlistment, the Navy may be forced to recruit persons with attitudes more similar to the draft-induced samples in this study. When the draft existed, a portion of Navy recruits only reluctantly joined the Navy. To recruit and retain these reluctant persons under zero-draft may require changes in the leadership styles and climate. The draft-induced volunteers reported that they work harder under more general supervision and are
more satisfied with informal leadership and more dissatisfied when coercive power is used. They are less confident that basic training is important or valuable and they lose respect for superiors when orders are given arbitrarily. Retention may be a problem with these persons because they see civilian jobs in a more favorable light. In general, to induce persons with attitudes like the draft-induced volunteers into the Navy will require some changes in traditional military leadership.
Table 1

Descriptive Information on Subsamples of AFEES and Basic Training Recruits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AFEES</th>
<th>NTC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>True</td>
<td>Draft-Induced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\bar{x}$ (S.D.)</td>
<td>$\bar{x}$ (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>20.41 (2.04)</td>
<td>19.61* (.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of home town</td>
<td>3.68 (1.62)</td>
<td>3.20 (1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school class</td>
<td>2.87 (.83)</td>
<td>3.07 (.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

*p < .05
## Table 2
Perceptions of Organizational Climate by Draft-Induced and True Volunteers at AFEES Centers and Navy Training Center

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Climate Dimensions</th>
<th>True Draft-Induced</th>
<th>Draft-Induced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \bar{x} ) (S.D.)</td>
<td>( \bar{x} ) (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is basic training like?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical (1) vs. Democratic (5)</td>
<td>2.04 (1.23)</td>
<td>1.81 (1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal (1) vs. Informal (5)</td>
<td>1.24 (2.10)</td>
<td>1.45 (2.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punitive (1) vs. Permissive (5)</td>
<td>2.40 (1.77)</td>
<td>2.67 (1.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close (1) vs. General (5)</td>
<td>1.94 (1.07)</td>
<td>1.57 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsiderate (1) vs. Considerate (5)</td>
<td>2.78 (1.57)</td>
<td>2.68 (1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expect in Navy 18 months after basic?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical (1) vs. Democratic (5)</td>
<td>2.61 (1.00)</td>
<td>2.84 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal (1) vs. Informal (5)</td>
<td>2.10 (1.16)</td>
<td>2.10 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punitive (1) vs. Permissive (5)</td>
<td>2.94 (1.07)</td>
<td>3.07 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close (1) vs. General (5)</td>
<td>2.66 (1.16)</td>
<td>2.60 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsiderate (1) vs. Considerate (5)</td>
<td>3.38 (1.12)</td>
<td>3.03 (1.30)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>What are civilian jobs like?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical (1) vs. Democratic (5)</td>
<td>3.00 (1.28)</td>
<td>3.03 (1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal (1) vs. Informal (5)</td>
<td>2.90 (1.02)</td>
<td>3.58 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punitive (1) vs. Permissive (5)</td>
<td>2.98 (1.07)</td>
<td>3.57 (1.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Close (1) vs. General (5)</td>
<td>3.18 (1.07)</td>
<td>2.87 (1.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inconsiderate (1) vs. Considerate (5)</td>
<td>3.24 (1.14)</td>
<td>3.64 (1.14)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Situation in which you try hardest</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical (1) vs. Democratic (5)</td>
<td>3.39 (1.56)</td>
<td>3.23 (1.56)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal (1) vs. Informal (5)</td>
<td>2.86 (1.31)</td>
<td>3.39 (1.31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punitive (1) vs. Permissive (5)</td>
<td>3.26 (1.61)</td>
<td>3.37 (1.61)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Close (1) vs. General (5)</td>
<td>3.46 (1.40)</td>
<td>3.20 (1.40)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inconsiderate (1) vs. Considerate (5)</td>
<td>3.72 (1.34)</td>
<td>3.84 (1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation where most satisfied?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical (1) vs. Democratic (5)</td>
<td>3.75 (1.23)</td>
<td>4.13 (1.23)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal (1) vs. Informal (5)</td>
<td>3.44 (1.05)</td>
<td>4.03 (1.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punitive (1) vs. Permissive (5)</td>
<td>3.52 (1.27)</td>
<td>3.90 (1.27)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Close (1) vs. General (5)</td>
<td>3.50 (1.41)</td>
<td>3.23 (1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsiderate (1) vs. Considerate (5)</td>
<td>4.00 (1.18)</td>
<td>4.06 (1.18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \( p < .10 \)
** \( p < .05 \)
*** \( p < .01 \)
Table 3

The Use of Interpersonal Power as Perceived by Draft-Induced and True Volunteers at AFEES Centers and Navy Training Center

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes of Interpersonal Power</th>
<th>AFEES</th>
<th>HTC</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>True (S.D.)</td>
<td>Draft-Induced (S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency during basic training (1 = seldom; 5 = often)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>4.43 (.73)</td>
<td>4.29 (.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>3.96 (1.09)</td>
<td>3.96 (1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>2.59 (1.37)</td>
<td>2.84 (1.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent</td>
<td>2.86 (1.39)</td>
<td>2.23 (1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>3.98 (1.23)</td>
<td>4.30 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic training should use (1 = seldom; 5 = often)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>3.10 (1.14)</td>
<td>2.74 (1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>3.29 (1.10)</td>
<td>3.80 (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>2.77 (1.19)</td>
<td>2.52 (1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent</td>
<td>3.30 (1.04)</td>
<td>3.39 (1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>2.56 (1.15)</td>
<td>2.43 (1.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency in civilian jobs (1 = seldom; 5 = often)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>2.65 (1.32)</td>
<td>3.06 (1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>2.69 (1.04)</td>
<td>3.06 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>2.86 (1.08)</td>
<td>3.16 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent</td>
<td>3.17 (1.04)</td>
<td>3.36 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>2.62 (1.23)</td>
<td>2.30 (1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effort if type of power used (1 = no effort; 5 = try hard)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>3.86 (1.15)</td>
<td>3.45 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>4.22 (1.97)</td>
<td>3.97 (1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>3.63 (1.18)</td>
<td>3.97 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent</td>
<td>4.25 (1.91)</td>
<td>3.64 (1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>3.56 (1.32)</td>
<td>3.43 (1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction if type of power used (1 = dissatisfied; 5 = satisfied)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>2.63 (1.13)</td>
<td>2.32 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>3.57 (1.20)</td>
<td>3.52 (1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>3.29 (1.24)</td>
<td>3.71 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent</td>
<td>3.81 (1.96)</td>
<td>3.58 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>2.17 (1.12)</td>
<td>1.77 (1.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*tp < .10
*p < .05
**p < .01
### Table 4
Attitudes Toward Leadership Among Draft-Induced and True Volunteers at Two AFEES Centers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude Items</th>
<th>True (N = 54)</th>
<th>Draft-Induced (N = 31)</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I see basic training as a very important part of military training.</td>
<td>4.31 ± .80</td>
<td>3.90 ± 1.03</td>
<td>1.84†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I plan to make my best effort to do well in basic training.</td>
<td>4.52 ± .54</td>
<td>4.27 ± .91</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. If I don't like a supervisor, I can't work for him.</td>
<td>2.75 ± 1.13</td>
<td>2.43 ± 1.07</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I expect to make it through basic training without any serious problems.</td>
<td>4.08 ± .80</td>
<td>4.07 ± .80</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Basic training is mostly just an initiation you have to go through to be &quot;shaped up.&quot;</td>
<td>3.79 ± 1.13</td>
<td>3.80 ± .80</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. People who don't like each other can't do a good job together.</td>
<td>3.33 ± 1.23</td>
<td>3.63 ± 1.24</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I think there is a good chance of being injured during basic training.</td>
<td>2.92 ± 1.01</td>
<td>3.13 ± 1.14</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. If a supervisor gives me an order just to show his authority, I lose all respect for him.</td>
<td>3.36 ± 1.05</td>
<td>3.37 ± 1.16</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Basic training is important because everyone may be in a combat situation some day.</td>
<td>3.98 ± 1.06</td>
<td>3.67 ± 1.12</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Off-duty behavior of enlisted men should not be subject to military discipline.</td>
<td>3.43 ± 1.08</td>
<td>3.47 ± 1.25</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Without a rugged boot camp experience, recruits will have no respect for the service.</td>
<td>3.45 ± 1.10</td>
<td>3.04 ± 1.07</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. In making decisions, officers have to consider the feelings of their men.</td>
<td>3.84 ± .93</td>
<td>3.45 ± 1.02</td>
<td>1.69†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. When an order is received, the first and only thought should be immediate compliance.</td>
<td>4.04 ± .80</td>
<td>3.62 ± .80</td>
<td>2.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. It is more important to follow orders in combat than in noncombat situations.</td>
<td>3.69 ± 1.24</td>
<td>3.97 ± 1.21</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree

†p < .10

*p < .05
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude Items</th>
<th>True (N = 42)</th>
<th>Draft-Induced (N = 67)</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I believe basic training is a very important part of military training.</td>
<td>4.41 ± .86</td>
<td>3.75 ± 1.09</td>
<td>3.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It's important to me to do well in basic training.</td>
<td>4.69 ± .52</td>
<td>4.18 ± .83</td>
<td>3.92**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. If I don't like a supervisor, I won't try to do a good job for him.</td>
<td>1.88 ± .92</td>
<td>2.49 ± 1.08</td>
<td>-3.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I am making it through basic training without any serious problems.</td>
<td>4.19 ± 1.02</td>
<td>3.98 ± .95</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Basic training is mostly a lot of unnecessary things you have to go through to be &quot;initiated.&quot;</td>
<td>2.81 ± 1.35</td>
<td>3.40 ± 1.26</td>
<td>-2.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. People must get along well to do a good job together.</td>
<td>4.52 ± 1.06</td>
<td>4.57 ± .61</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. There is a good chance of being accidentally injured during basic training.</td>
<td>2.81 ± 1.29</td>
<td>3.19 ± 1.10</td>
<td>-1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. If a supervisor gives me an order just to show his authority, I lose a lot of respect for him.</td>
<td>3.48 ± 1.15</td>
<td>3.98 ± 1.07</td>
<td>-2.28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. If I'm ever in combat, the things I've learned in basic training will be very essential.</td>
<td>3.86 ± 1.12</td>
<td>3.12 ± 1.16</td>
<td>3.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. What enlisted men do off-duty should not be governed by military rules and regulations.</td>
<td>2.64 ± 1.30</td>
<td>3.37 ± 1.20</td>
<td>-2.90**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Without a rugged boot camp experience, recruits will have no respect for the service.</td>
<td>3.69 ± 1.32</td>
<td>3.13 ± 1.20</td>
<td>2.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. In making decisions, officers should consider the feelings of their men.</td>
<td>3.86 ± 1.05</td>
<td>3.88 ± 1.01</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. When an order is received, the first and only thought should be to obey it immediately.</td>
<td>4.21 ± .95</td>
<td>3.78 ± .93</td>
<td>2.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. It is less important to follow orders in noncombat than in combat situations.</td>
<td>1.91 ± 1.14</td>
<td>2.31 ± 1.05</td>
<td>-1.85*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree

*p < .05

**p < .01
REFERENCES

Booth, R. F. & Hoiberg, A.  Change in Marine recruits' attitudes related to recruit characteristics and drill instructors' attitudes. *Psychological Reports, 1973, 33, 63-71.*


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