AMERICAN-ALLIED RELATIONS IN TRANSITION

A REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE
STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER ON 3-6 MAY 1973 IN
JUAN-LES-PINS, FRANCE

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"AMERICAN–ALLIED RELATIONS IN TRANSITION"
A REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE
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JUAN–LES–PINS, FRANCE

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Richard B. Foster, Director
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This paper presents a summary of the discussions at the colloquium "American-Allied Relations in Transition," held at Juan-les-Pins, France, 3-4 May 1973. The report seeks to reflect the general tenor as well as the substantive issues discussed during the colloquium sessions.

The focus of the conference was on the development of new security concepts that could meet the Soviet challenge. Whenever possible, distinctions between the views of European and American participants have been made. The final section consists of the specific recommendations of the conference. Two appendices are attached; Appendix A lists the papers presented at the colloquium, and Appendix B the attendees, both participants and observers.
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a summary of the discussions at the colloquium "American-Allied Relations in Transition," held at Juan-les-Pins, France, 3-6 May 1973. The report seeks to reflect the general tenor as well as the substantive issues discussed during the colloquium sessions.

The focus of the conference was on the development of new security concepts that could meet the Soviet challenge. Whenever possible, distinctions between the views of European and American participants have been made. The final section consists of the specific recommendations of the conference. Two appendices are attached; Appendix A lists the papers presented at the colloquium, and Appendix B the attendees, both participants and observers.

DISCLAIMER

The views and conclusions contained in this report are those of the authors on what was discussed by the conferees. They should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the U.S. Government.

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FOREWORD

The establishment of strategic nuclear parity between the superpowers and the changing environment of American-European relations underscore the need for orchestrating common Western objectives and for reforging a long-term U.S.-West European partnership. The current negotiations of the West with the Soviet Union, notably SALT II, the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe highlight the necessity for overcoming the political, military and economic strains that undergird the sense of malaise in the Western Alliance.

In an effort to evolve strategic concepts more responsive to the requirements of the seventies, the Strategic Studies Center of Stanford Research Institute brought together representatives of leading West European and American research institutes and other distinguished Europeans who had long concentrated on examining new strategies for Western security. A colloquium was held in Juan-les-Pins, France, on 3-6 May 1973. In addition to the thirty-six participants, fourteen government observers from Britain, France, Italy, Spain, West Germany, and the United States listened to the discussions about which concepts best fit a true and more meaningful partnership. This report seeks to convey the main themes and conclusions of the conference and the flavor of the actual dialogue; it is not an interpretation of the conference as seen from the vantage point of the writers or other members of the Strategic Studies Center.

The colloquium was designed to facilitate an interaction of views between U.S. and European researchers. It sought to analyze new ways for restructuring the Western Alliance, and for realizing a true partnership between the United States and its European allies. It enabled the American researchers to gather firsthand data on how prominent West Europeans viewed the problems of security and defense. The colloquium served as an important research instrument for the project National Security Policy Research Support under Contract
DAHC15-73-C-0380 with the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense.

A total of 12 papers were assigned to American and European researchers. These papers served as a starting point for the discussions at Juan-les-Pins. The listing of the papers can be found in Appendix A to this report. Participants and government observers who attended the colloquium are listed in Appendix B to this report.

Out of the conference at Juan-les-Pins plans came for convening a meeting of the European research institutes to establish a European Defense Research Institute. This institute will be designed to study and recommend (1) new concepts of European security and defense and (2) modes of trans-Atlantic defense cooperation more responsive to the changing strategic environment of the seventies. An organizational meeting has now been scheduled for 29-30 October in Paris. It is anticipated that a report of the October conference will be published at a later date.

Richard B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center
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The Nixon Doctrine explicitly recognizes the changing strategic environment of American-European relations and the need to evolve a strategy that can endure beyond the challenge of the seventies. The bilateral and multilateral negotiations of the Western allies with the Soviet Union further underscore the urgency for developing a set of common goals in order to strengthen Western cohesion. Yet the domestic pressures in the United States to reduce defense expenditures and the military presence abroad, as well as the U.S. acceptance of strategic parity in SALT I, have deeply affected the European perceptions of the U.S. commitment to Western European security and defense. The crisis of confidence in the transatlantic alliance, given the immediacy of negotiations with the Soviet Union, notably SALT II, the force reduction talks, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, highlights the need for reforging a long-term U.S.-allied partnership and for orchestrating common Western objectives and a common coherent strategy.

In reshaping the Western security and defense posture, the role of Western Europe needs to be identified. There appears to be a divergence, however, in the perceptions of the United States and its allies of the part Western Europe should play in the global or even the Atlantic context. The issue of France's role, moreover, continues to bedevil the Western allies. If not an integrated ally, France's determination to defend the West must nevertheless be harnessed to a Western strategy. Against this background the crucial concerns that dominated the dialogue at the conference of the Strategic Studies Center of Stanford Research Institute in May 1973 at Juan-les-Pins, France, were: (1) American and European concepts of Europe's role in the Alliance, (2) the evolvement of a grand strategy that marshals all resources of the Western allies, and (3) France's role in the Alliance. The conference brought together distinguished strategists and
researchers from the United States and Western Europe who had long concentrated on developing new security concepts.

1. The Soviet Challenge

There appeared to be a widespread belief among American and European participants alike that the threat of direct Soviet armed aggression against Western Europe had markedly declined. At the same time, however, they were acutely aware of the progressively improving Soviet military capabilities vis-à-vis the West. Notably the European participants stressed the stark superiority of Soviet conventional forces in the European theater. In addition, if the weight of the military balance in the center of Europe was clearly in favor of Moscow, the European members warned that Soviet capabilities had grown at an even faster rate at the flanks of NATO.

The utility of Soviet military force, however, was largely seen in an indirect fashion as the instrument to back up Soviet political initiatives. The detente climate notwithstanding, Soviet goals in Europe had changed little. The Finlandization of Western Europe remained a fundamental Soviet objective. Realizing, however, that a detente climate served Soviet ambitions more effectively than a cold war environment, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to embark on an aggressive course and instead galvanizing the West Europeans into a concerted defense buildup.

Several European participants stressed that the Soviet Union pursued a grand strategy which was derived from Russian tradition, and which orchestrated political, diplomatic, military and economic courses of action, and coordinated all instruments of power toward its more enduring goals on which the control of Europe featured prominently.

Conducive to the Soviet objective of Finlandization of Western Europe was the political malaise in the European nations. European prosperity notwithstanding, the individual European nations were beset with profound domestic crises. The gradual paralysis of political will
in the West European nations appeared to many participants the most ominous development. Some felt that particularly Scandinavia, where the will to cooperate in Western defense was least developed, constituted Western Europe's weakest link.

Few saw any real progress toward the harmonization of European political and military policies. Prospects for European unity that transcended the economic dimension appeared even more remote to most European participants. So did, therefore, the possibility that Western Europe would be able to assert political influence commensurate with its population, size or economic strength. Yet a concerted effort in the political and military realm was clearly seen as a prerequisite for coping with a Soviet campaign of political coercion and blandishment. In light of the parochial focus of many of the younger generation and their neutralist bias, the future offered little optimism about the prospects of Western cohesion and European solidarity. Several participants pointed to the radicalization of the universities, notably in West Germany. Still, a few discussants expressed a different view and argued that the European Community offered the potential for promoting political and military collaboration among its members. On the whole, however, most speakers felt that the political inertia of the West European nations and the limited prospects for European unification combined to create an environment in which the Soviet objective of Finlandization could come within Moscow's reach.

2. The Need for a Grand Strategy

If there was clearly a consensus on the nature of the Soviet challenge and the political dimension of the Soviet military threat, there was a similar expression on the need to evolve a broad overall strategy. Such a strategy should go beyond purely military considerations and harness the military as well as the political, economic, and technological resources of the West. But beyond the general acceptance of the urgency to develop such a strategy, there was no agreement on the prescription. Participants differed on some of the key political ingredients and on the military and economic components of such a strategy.
This divergence derived partly from the different national perspectives of the conference participants, and partly from their different concepts of the roles of the United States and Western Europe in the Western Alliance.

An American participant warned that the inability of the West to identify acceptable terms for the new transatlantic relationship portended dangers for the East-West negotiations on security and economic questions. There was an incongruence, from his vantage point, between European desires to see the United States continue shouldering the major burden in the military arena, and European readiness to compete unfairly with their Atlantic partner in the economic realm.

A second American participant explained that the very essence of the Nixon doctrine was the need to establish strategic stability in order to prevent nuclear war. In the current U.S. concept political and military stability in Europe was to be the cornerstone of the emerging global order. But this implied that the interests of the European nations, both East and West, and the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union would have to be accommodated in some type of a negotiated solution. At the same time, this led to a fundamental dilemma in U.S. policy: on the one hand, Washington sought to negotiate with Moscow to reduce the chances of nuclear war; on the other hand, the United States would have to retain a strong alliance and continue to extend its nuclear umbrella over Western Europe in a partnership arrangement.

Contrary to their American counterparts, the European speakers harbored doubts over the U.S. commitment to the security and defense of Western Europe. Their major ally, in their view, apparently sought to limit its European ties. The American retreat was partly reflected in the portents of U.S. troop withdrawals either in a unilateral fashion or through a negotiated formula at the force reduction talks. Other signs of U.S. disengagement could be seen in the dwindling credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to the defense of Western Europe. While most participants underscored the need for the continued coupling of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces to the defense of the
European continent, few European spokesmen believed that this linkage had remained unimpaired. The arrival of strategic nuclear parity, the May 1972 SALT accords as well as Vietnam war fatigue were the key developments that had eroded the credibility of the U.S. nuclear pledge. The discussion clearly indicated that the United States needed to clarify its perception of the role of its strategic nuclear forces in the Western defense posture.

One participant took issue with the requirement to retain the coupling of Western Europe's security to that of the United States. He argued for a two-pillar concept of the Alliance in which Western Europe would assume full responsibility for its own defense, including its nuclear protection. Others suggested that Western Europe be divided into three regional defense groupings: a northern sector of Scandinavian countries which would be reluctant to join in a new cooperative defense effort anyway; a central region of Britain, France, West Germany, the Benelux and possibly Italy with a new European-based defense structure; and a southern Mediterranean flank with unique political-military problems and strategic location argued for establishing an entity separate from the center. The creation of a southern group, which depended heavily on naval forces for its defense, might facilitate extending the shadow of Western power to protect Western interests in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions. Several of the European conferees sharply disagreed and warned against the disruptive effects which the formation of different groupings would have on the Alliance.

3. The Military Dimension of Grand Strategy

Without necessarily accepting the removal of U.S. nuclear protection of the European continent, the European participants stressed the need for devising a new Atlantic partnership in which their countries would have a greater voice in alliance councils and would take on a greater share of the defense burden. The various formulas that were proposed clearly reflected different national biases. Without necessarily decoupling the United States from Europe's defense, the majority of the Europeans called for strengthening the British and French nuclear forces—either separately or in a joint arrangement—as the core around
which the defense of Europe could be organized. The European strategic deterrent forces, several participants maintained, would have greater credibility for Europe than the more powerful nuclear panoply of the United States. This was true even in their role for extended deterrence, for neither France nor Britain could seriously contemplate abandoning West Germany or Italy to the Soviet Union.

Various participants—Americans as well as Europeans—urged that London and Paris start collaborating in the nuclear field. This would not necessarily require, according to most arguments, surrender of national control or a supra-national decision-making organ. One European conferee reminded his audience that the United States remained a major obstacle to an Anglo-French nuclear entente. The British were prevented from any nuclear data-sharing by their agreements with the Americans. As long as the United States continued its restrictive interpretation of the McMahon law, Britain remained tied to its obligations to the United States. Moreover, unless opinions in Washington changed, the prospects for American assistance to the French nuclear program remained equally remote.

Several European participants advocated that the Europeans take the initiative in strengthening the Western defense arrangements. As a first step, one of the speakers suggested to form, possibly within the framework of the West European Union or perhaps the Eurogroup, a European standing group which would examine procurement problems, new weapons development and deployment, training, doctrine, and a whole range of other issues that could pave the way for the creation of a European defense command. Once this command would be established, presumably within the midterm period, the major responsibility for the defense of Western Europe could be shifted from NATO. Such a structure would permit a more efficient and rational division of labor in defense responsibilities within Western Europe.

Meanwhile, France should be accorded a greater role in the policymaking process of the Western Alliance on defense matters. One discussant made an eloquent plea for lifting the present quarantine from France in the military realm, without, however, insisting that it
surrender its independence or freedom of maneuver. As several of his colleagues had advocated, he endorsed nuclear collaboration between France and Britain, and subsequently coordination with the United States. The proponents of enhancing British and French strategic capabilities also emphasized the need that London and Paris develop a tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. Several participants insisted that the entire range of weapons, from the bullet to the thermonuclear weapon, be available to the European allies.

A minority took sharp issue with these ideas and cautioned that a bilateral or trilateral nuclear club in the Western Alliance would divide the allies more starkly into nuclear and non-nuclear members or equal and less-equal ones. Nuclear planning should remain the domain of all members concerned. Special consideration should be given to the views of countries in which the targets were located and where the warheads were stored or deployed. It was probably not a coincidence that some of the representatives of the smaller powers and West Germany subscribed to this position.

In dealing with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, their deterrent value was unanimously affirmed. But when it came to the role of tactical nuclear weapons if deterrence were to fail, a similar split emerged as existed on the role of French and British nuclear forces. Most speakers held that the combination of Soviet superiority in conventional forces and Soviet blitzkrieg tactics made the conventional defense of Western Europe untenable. Several conferees—both American and European—made a case for the early use of tactical nuclear weapons. To restore confidence in the Alliance, the West Europeans should be assured that tactical nuclear weapons would be used against Soviet aggression when the military situation required this. As far as the Soviet perception was concerned, however, there should remain uncertainty as to the timing and circumstances in which the Western allies would resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Rather than as a substitute, tactical nuclear weapons were clearly seen as a complement to the conventional fires. Still the purpose of their employment should not only be to support military operations and
halt the enemy's thrust. Their use also carried the political aim of showing the aggressor allied resolve to defend with all means. For this reason, as one participant held, their first use should be accompanied by a political declaration to stress the risk of escalation to the aggressor.

Some argued that the United States should retain control of the tactical nuclear weapons available to the Alliance. Others, who also endorsed the strengthening of European strategic nuclear forces, advocated that the Europeans, i.e., presumably the French and British, acquire as quickly as possible their own tactical nuclear panoply. As one conferee put it, the West could only deter a war which it was prepared and able to fight. Several made the case for deploying more accurate and cleaner tactical nuclear weapons with smaller yields. The technology was in hand and a number of European participants pleaded strongly that the United States, as a minimum, fully inform its allies about the new weapons' characteristics and, if possible, make the technology available to its allies. Particularly the political leaders needed to be educated about the capabilities and effects of the various types of smaller nuclear arms and their political significance.

The European conferees displayed a keen interest in the so-called mini-nukes, which they defined as relatively clean weapons with yields of below 50 tons and a CEP of a few feet. The introduction of controllable mini-nukes would widen the range of options for the allies. A couple of speakers went so far as to propose that the threshold between the mini-nukes and conventional arms be eliminated; the former should be treated as part of the conventional arsenal. The present barrier to their use, which was primarily psychological, should therefore be removed. One of the participants sharply disagreed. Without necessarily rejecting the early use of tactical nuclear weapons, he pointed out that his experience had taught him that no political leader would be prepared to surrender control over nuclear weapons. The decision to use a nuclear weapon, mini or maxi, remained fundamentally a political decision.

A few of the participants from the smaller NATO powers were concerned that their companions were advocating a new strategy — warned that the
time was not ripe for reopening the debate on the nuclear strategy of the West. According to one conferee, the problems in Western Europe were essentially political and could not be solved by changes in the military strategy of the West. Moreover, in his view, the West Europeans were not interested in the nuclear and military dimensions of the European situation. The political, psychological, and economic fissures in American-European relations needed to be solved first.

Other evidence that not every participant attached the same importance to the tactical nuclear component of the Western defense posture could be seen in the suggestion that the West negotiate a "no-first-use" agreement with the Soviet Union. It was pointed out by others that an accord not to be the first one to use nuclear weapons against a conventional aggression would effectively neutralize the tactical nuclear deterrent and greatly enhance the political utility of Soviet conventional forces. The West Europeans would be left in the shadow of massive Soviet conventional power. It was probably no surprise that some of the West German representatives vigorously took exception to this proposal.

If opinions differed regarding the relative merits of tactical nuclear weapons, there was a much broader consensus on the role and need to improve the conventional capabilities. Conventional forces were still required, partly for psychological reasons, partly for purposes of defense to stop an initial attack, or if necessary to be used in conjunction with the nuclear forces. Neither American nor European conferees, however, could contemplate the possibility of a sustained conventional conflict in Europe.

The topic of advanced military technology, including the technology for precision guided munitions or the so-called smart weapons, elicited sharp interest on the part of the European participants. Many felt that the precision guided munitions and other advanced systems, such as remotely piloted vehicles, offered the promise of a reduction in cost and manpower and, at the same time, markedly increased military effectiveness. The American government was repeatedly and strongly urged to make the new technologies available to its European allies.
Some of the participants cautioned not to overestimate the consequences of modern technology. Technology could contribute to solving the strategic and perhaps even the political problems, but it provided by no means the full answer. The Soviets, moreover, were bound to acquire similar technologies and improve their weapons systems and firepower, thereby neutralizing at least part of Western progress. Not all conferees shared this opinion. If the new technological advancements for both tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons could be incorporated in the current capabilities, a situation could be created in which neither the Soviet Union nor the Western allies would be able to mount a sustained offensive against each other. From this point of view it did not matter whether the Soviets could develop similar advanced systems, because a stalemate at the local level could ensue just as a stand-off existed at the strategic level. In the West could bring this situation about, the participant maintained, the political as well as military advantage which the Soviets now derived from their overwhelming conventional capability would be neutralized.

In short, most participants, Americans as well as Europeans, saw a great deal of merit in the new military technologies and called for studying their potential impact on the Western defense posture. Although not everyone extended this requirement to cover the tactical nuclear stockpile, there was a general consensus that technological expertise should be harnessed to support the Western cause.

4. The Economic Dimension of Grand Strategy

While the principal focus of the discussions was on the political, military, and technological components of grand strategy, the conference voiced concern that American-allied economic relations today were all too frequently conducted without regard for their political and military implications. Many participants commented that policies in one area were likely to reinforce or obstruct progress made by the Alliance in other fields.
There are several economic problem areas that impact on the cohesion of the Alliance. The most visible area concerns the dispute over restructuring the international trade and monetary arrangements.

Some American participants attributed the trade and monetary disputes to conflicting U.S. and European perceptions of the nature of the European integration effort. The United States saw the European Community as wealthy and moving progressively toward greater economic unity and strength. However, the American participants believed that the European governments rejected this view and insisted on seeing themselves as a group of rather vulnerable middle-sized states seeking to engineer a very fragile integration process. Consequently, progress in overcoming the trade and monetary obstacles was partly a function of changes in European government perceptions of the European Community and its future evolution. These American participants concluded that the West European nations should assume the responsibilities that accompanied increased economic power, and should make the key concessions in the pending negotiations with the United States.

A quite different view on trade and monetary problems was voiced by the European participants. Many of them placed the blame for the collapse of the Bretton Woods system on the U.S. refusal to introduce economic austerity measures in the late 1960s. They recalled that France and other European countries had warned the United States that it had to impose economic restraints, and not pass off to Europe the costs of domestic inflation. But Washington had regarded these warnings as unfriendly suggestions.

A number of European participants were particularly critical of the liberal economic measures which President Nixon had proposed to remedy the monetary and trade problems. These measures were designed to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers, provide freer access for American agricultural goods in foreign markets, and remove gold from any international payments role. These participants suggested that priority should go instead to a new monetary system with an international currency not denominated in dollars. Other European conferences added that the effort to resolve current economic problems should be comprehensive and include the development of common policies on energy and multinational corporations.
In his 1973 State of the World Report, President Nixon highlighted another major economic problem area. He called on the Atlantic Alliance to seek this year a lasting solution to the balance of payments difficulties caused by the U.S. military presence in Europe. Statistics presented at the conference showed that the U.S. balance of payments deficit on the military account was about $2.2 billion, if allowance is made for devaluations. Existing offset arrangements reduced this figure to $1.6 billion, which constituted the net deficit on the military balance of payments.

Several American participants observed that unless the U.S.-European economic problems were solved and the deficit on the military account remedied, the U.S. administration, already pressed by Congress, might feel forced to withdraw American troops from Europe. A number of European conferees agreed that the resolution of the balance of payments problem was a requisite for persuading the American people that the U.S. military presence needed to remain in Europe.

While there was general agreement that the Europeans should do more to ease the U.S. burden for the Western defense effort, the conferees were divided over the form that this effort should take. One American participant presented his idea for an International Security Fund, a multilateral clearing house for deficits on the military account. Several European participants suggested, however, that changes in the trade and monetary systems alone would not be sufficient to offset the economic burden of the U.S. troops in Europe. Moreover, it was wishful thinking to expect Western Europe to restructure its trade and payments arrangements simply to help the United States correct its balance of payments deficit. Even if the European governments saw this option as desirable, it was naive to believe that any lasting solution could be achieved in one year's time. The real solution lay elsewhere. The United States should exercise greater self-discipline and fiscal/monetary responsibility.
The present U.S.-European economic discord came at a time of growing Soviet activity in world trading and monetary markets. Increased East-West trade, technology transfers and freer capital flows were recognized by the conferees as contributing to a relaxation of international tensions. However, there was a solid consensus urging greater Western awareness of the potential political as well as economic dangers involved in expanding East-West economic relations.

It was noted, first, that as a centralized economy the Soviet Union had absolute control over its own market. It could favor certain customers and suppliers over others, thereby obtaining significant bargaining leverage in international economic dealings. If the West failed to reach a common policy on trade and monetary arrangements within the next few years, the Soviet Union could use its bargaining leverage to aggravate further the lack of cohesion among the Western trading partners.

Both American and European participants warned the West to avoid becoming too dependent on the Soviet Union as a market for agricultural products and industrial technology, and as a supplier of energy and raw materials. Such dependence might force the West to make unilateral concessions in economic negotiations, and because of the linkages in the international system, in political/military negotiations as well. The conference urged that the West reach a consensus on the economic dimension of grand strategy before engaging in more extensive East-West economic activity.

There was considerable discussion on another area that would condition a new grand strategy: How would the European entity evolve, and what would be its international economic role? Oddly enough, one group of participants, mostly Americans, entertained a more optimistic view of Europe's future than most of the European participants had.

Most of the Americans asserted that the European Community was a strong and vibrant economic unit steadily progressing toward greater economic integration. Progress in the economic realm would, they claimed, eventually be translated into European political and defense collaboration, and result
in a larger global role for Europe. They believed that not only should Europe do more—for example in Western defense and in the removal of trade barriers—but Europe could do more in these matters. Having successfully achieved many of the original objectives of the Treaty of Rome, the proverbial Old Testament of Europe, the time had come for a redirection of the European Community’s international status and responsibilities.

A second group of mostly European participants granted that significant economic achievements had been realized, but drew quite different conclusions. One participant referred to Jean Rey’s famous statement that “Europe will be made by money or it will not be made at all.” He observed, however, that while money (and the expectations of the benefits that integration would bring) helped, it alone could not lead the European Community to further integration in economics, and to collaboration in politics and defense. The most important variable was political will; at this point, this ingredient was not present. Without political will and without an overwhelming external threat or challenge to galvanize this will, the European Community would not progress much beyond the Common Market stage of integration.

One European conference warned that some of the proposed American economic policies could vitiate the attempts of the European Community to achieve economic and monetary union. For example, several European participants presented the American demand that the Common Agricultural Policy and its variable levy be modified to allow for greater access for U.S. agricultural products; yet these were the most concrete achievements of the Community! These conferences added that any U.S. policy that impeded European integration would promote the traditional Soviet objective of preventing a West European union.
5. **Demands of Negotiations**

Grand strategy finds its implementation not only on the battlefront or in the chambers of the high priests of finance and trade. Perhaps the most critical arena where the players meet is at the East-West negotiations on security and arms control. With SALT I an event of the past, the key negotiations are SALT II, the arms reduction talks in Vienna, and the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

An American participant elaborated on his interpretation of the U.S. approach to the negotiations. Washington appeared to be pursuing a strategy of linkages. Its aim was to build an interlocking structure of agreements in such a way that conflict or obstruction in one area would risk destroying the entire structure. The American government apparently hoped to create a vested interest on both sides in mutual restraint. If the Soviets sought to conclude an agreement on trade or technology, they would have to cooperate in other areas, such as in the security negotiations. The U.S. strategy of linkages implied that (1) the Soviets could be bargained with, and (2) despite the adversary relationship between the superpowers, the two powers could identify selective areas for cooperation.

The participants generally concurred that the present negotiations were fraught with dangers. The inability of the alliance to define a common strategy with respect to an optimal NATO posture and its failure to arrive at a concerted position left the issues to be solved in the East-West negotiations rather than in a West-West forum. In the East-West negotiations, however, the Soviet Union had clearly the advantage. It did not have the same problem of having to forge a consensus among its allies as the United States had. Consequently a relatively unified Warsaw Pact faced an uncoordinated Western Alliance and neutral nations.

The Soviet Union would have ample opportunity to exploit the divisions in the Western Alliance. For one thing, in order to split the United States from its allies, the USSR sought to encourage in the perception of the West European nations the notion that the superpowers were
forming a condominium. The United States in this bilateral relationship would be prepared to compromise the interests of its allies in its efforts to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet goal to create the image that the superpowers determined Europe's destiny was evident in Moscow's effort to inject the American forward based systems (FBS) into SALT. The U.S. nuclear capable aircraft deployed in Europe were directly tied to the defense of Western Europe; to discuss these systems in a bilateral context would engender profound concern among the U.S. allies. Even in a multilateral context, at the force reduction talks, for example, the delicate issue of FBS could easily be exploited by the Soviets to create divisiveness within the Western Alliance which lacked an agreed position on the FBS. This split was also reflected at the Juan-les-Pins conference itself. One participant pointed out that the nuclear capable aircraft could invite Soviet preemption and created instability in the Western posture. A second advanced the argument that the utility of the FBS should be evaluated not only in terms of their capability to reach Soviet territory. The aircraft also served to perform interdiction missions in areas east of NATO where Soviet troops could be concentrated. As such the FBS fulfilled the role of "intermediate deterrent" and not just one of escalation. Another conference agreed and stressed the function of the FBS as a link in the chain of deterrence.

Another explosive issue that the Soviets would undoubtedly try to press at SALT II was an accord to prohibit the transfer of technology for offensive nuclear systems. Again, this would serve to enforce the image of a Soviet-American condominium and deepen the tensions between the United States and its British and French allies. It would also effectively foreclose any American support to a potential Anglo-French nuclear endeavor. The United States, in the opinion of one participant, was at a distinct disadvantage in SALT because it was forced to labor under its commitment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The European participants warned their American counterparts of other Soviet plays in the negotiations, such as the possibility of proposals for a no-first-use agreement and the creation of a nuclear
free zone in central Europe. The majority of the European conferees felt—and their American colleagues agreed—that either possibility would leave Western Europe at the mercy of superior Soviet conventional forces and would decouple the security of Western Europe from that of the United States.

In the conference at Helsinki the Soviets were seen as seeking to win recognition of their World War II gains and to legalize the ideological division of the European continent. The Soviets hoped to promote the disintegration of the NATO alliance. They would probably propose instead, if not at Helsinki then in another forum, a security pact for Europe which would allow them a senior voice in all decisions affecting European arrangements.

Several participants were of the opinion that the force reduction talks carried with them the most serious risks for Western cohesion. The Vienna meetings were cited as a salient example of Soviet efforts to instill the perception of a superpower entente. Most European participants expressed skepticism about the force reduction talks. They pointed out that the Soviets had recently in reduced some 1200 to 1500 T62 tanks into Eastern Europe without recalling any of the older type tanks. The latter would obviously be used for bargaining purposes at Vienna. Furthermore, the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces for only a few hundred kilometers; this would not diminish Soviet capability for endangering the security of Western Europe or for exerting military pressures all along the line from Finland to Turkey. Geography, as Napoleon reportedly once said, was the destiny of nations.

A few conferees advanced the thesis that the Soviets, beset with fears of a two-front conflict, were genuinely interested in reducing their forces in Europe. One of the participants, however, explained that Soviet dominance over the Eurasian land area remained a fundamental and traditional objective of the government in Moscow. The Soviets might try to solve their two-front problem by trying to become a Far Eastern naval and air power without abandoning their efforts to achieve a position of superiority in Europe, and for that matter, in the
Middle East. In this respect several participants underlined the Soviet concept of a grand strategy in which all regions of the globe were interrelated.

One of the conferees expressed concern that the arms reduction talks could lead to a system of arms control that would vitiate or destroy the Western Alliance if restrictions on movement, use, and logistical support of forces were negotiated. If the Western allies at Vienna would accept limitations on the re-introduction of equipment and forces, on the maintenance and allocation of equipment, on deployment of weapons and troops, and on logistical support, the entire internal defense arrangements of the Alliance and its constituent members would become subject to an international agreement, an agreement which the Soviets helped to decide.

These types of discussions served to illuminate why some of the participants repeatedly emphasized the need for the Western allies to articulate their common political objectives and to identify a common strategy that related the military components to the political and other aspects. Indeed, the main theme of the conference was clearly the necessity to orchestrate all elements of strategy and to develop a global perspective. The need to counter somehow the trend away from international concerns and allied collaboration was voiced many times at the conference table. It was recognized that this was largely a matter of reviving national will rather than designing new or stronger military structures. The latter merely reflected a concept of national purpose and shared alliance goals. To the extent that the conferees dwelt on the military ingredients of collaboration, the focus was on the political use of military capabilities and on the political implications of military strategy and tactics. In essence, a major lesson of the conference was the message that the United States and its allies not become engrossed in searching for narrow technical and military formulas at the negotiations lest the political implications compromise the cohesion of the Western Alliance.
6. **Recommendations**

In conclusion, at the end of the three-day meetings, a number of recommendations were made. The suggestions for practical steps in the near future were the following:

(1) West European research institutes should use the momentum generated by this conference and take the initiative in defense research collaboration.

(2) The European research institutes should engage in research aimed at improving the present strategy and doctrine and at defining the role and the relationship of the strategic nuclear forces, the tactical nuclear forces and the conventional forces.

(3) In order to keep the momentum of this conference going, the following steps were planned:

   (a) The Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, would issue a summary of this meeting to all the participants.

   (b) General Beaufre recommended the convening of an October 1973 meeting in France of the European research institutes to define areas of agreement and cooperation for European defense research. However, the projected October meeting should not preclude the convening of smaller meetings between individual institutes in the interim.

   (c) At the October meeting, these West European research institutes would explore the problems of the current East-West negotiations (SALT II, MBFR and CSCE).

(4) West European research institutes should consult with each other in order to establish, as soon as possible, a European Defense Research Institute. The plans for the European Defense Research Institute should be discussed at the October meeting. General Beaufre requested that those who had studied the possibility of establishing such an institute send him their suggestions at their earliest possible convenience.

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* The conference has been scheduled for October 29 and 30, 1973 in Paris.
(5) To assist the European research institutes in addressing the problems discussed at the conference, the U.S. Government should make available, through appropriate channels, additional information regarding new developments in weapons technology, notably in the area of precision guided weapons systems.
Appendix A

TITLES OF PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE*

"The Nixon Doctrine: An Emerging U.S. Policy"
Mr. Richard B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center
Stanford Research Institute

"U.S.-European Economic Issues in the East-West Politico-Military Context"
Dr. N. R. Danielian
President
International Economic Policy Association

"A Strategy for the West: An American View"
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
Assistant Director
Strategic Studies Center
Stanford Research Institute

"The American Approach to Negotiations"
Mr. Walter F. Hahn
Associate Director for Research
Foreign Policy Research Institute

"America, Russia and Europe in the Light of the Nixon Doctrine"
Dr. Richard Pipes
Director
The Russian Research Center
Harvard University

"The Soviet Union and Western Europe"
Professor Leopold Labeled
Editor
"Survey"

"Malaise in Europe: Diagnosis and Prognosis"
Mr. Walter Laqueur
Director
Institute of Contemporary History
and Wiener Library

* The titles of the papers presented at the conference differ slightly from the titles as listed in the conference program.
"Northern Europe in the Process of European Security"
Dr. Johan J. Holst
Director
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

"A View from the Southern Tier"
General Duilio Sergio Fanali (Retired)
Honorary President
Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies

"Strategy for Europe"
Air Vice-Marshall S.W.B. Menaul (Retired)
Director-General
Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies

"A German View of Western Security and Defense"
General J. A. Graf Kielmansegg (Retired)
Chairman of the Council of the Research Institute for Defense and International Affairs

"European-American Cooperation"
General André Beaufre (Retired)
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Appendix B

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