DYNAMIC FOREIGN POLICY INTERACTIONS

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Prepared for:
Advanced Research Projects Agency
National Science Foundation
15 July 1973
An approach to the study of the interactions of nations is developed in this paper based on the perspective that nations develop routines for dealing with each other, routines of reciprocity and bureaucratic inertia. More precisely, this approach seeks to specify how decision makers select types of action and reactions from an inventory of foreign policy outputs to meet different kinds of routine and non-routine international situations. The theoretical structure of this approach is laid out which essentially posits that the foreign policy output of a nation is a function of reciprocity and bureaucratic inertia. To differentiate the relative impact of each, the concept of uncertainty is introduced. Finally, it is acknowledged that nations are not all governed by theoretical restraints imposed on them through the parameters of inertia and reciprocity, that there are other forces at work both within these nations and within their environment which influence the impact of inertia and reciprocity. Several such forces are identified and briefly discussed (e.g. domestic events, and third party actions).
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DYNAMIC FOREIGN POLICY INTERACTIONS

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July 15, 1973
STATEMENT OF PERSPECTIVE

The approach developed here is designed to increase our understanding of the way nations deal with each other. It is based upon the belief that the behavior of one nation towards another is a function of its previous experience in dealing with that nation. In short, it is the perspective of this approach that nations develop routines for dealing with each other, routines of reciprocity and inertia. Other forces which affect the exchanges between two nations do so in such a manner as to strengthen or weaken the effect of one or the other of these two routines.

In attempting to develop a greater degree of knowledge about the interaction of nations in the international system, we consciously strive towards an explanation of this interaction. What underlies this approach is a desire to specify how national decision-makers tend to select types of actions and reactions from an inventory of foreign policy outputs to meet different kinds of routine and non-routine international situations. Several basic assumptions underlie this approach.

a) The concept of foreign policy as a set of decisions by officials is adopted.

b) Foreign policy activity can be understood as consisting of discrete behaviors representing the outcomes of these decisions.

c) Policy can be interpreted as the aggregation of these behaviors according to some logic imposed upon them by the actor or the observer.

d) The behavior of one actor towards another actor (foreign policy) is responsive to the actions of other nations and involves efforts to influence who the leaders of these nations will be, what decisions they will take, and how they will define the relations between their nation and others.
e) Foreign policy is made in an environment by decision-makers who have mixed desires and domestic constraints to cope with. Their activity is essentially a process of adaptation to the external and internal environment which they seek to coordinate in an effort to maintain economy and sovereignty of the nation state.

On a still more abstract level it is argued that national decision-makers consciously choose policy which may affect the overall patterns of cooperation or conflict in the international system. This type of explanation generally assumes that there is at least one individual within the nation who understands the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in the system, who knows how other statesmen and his own constituents will react to a given policy, and who uses his knowledge to get around the constraints which reactions impose. This is the argument made by Stanley Hoffman (1968) in his delineation of roles in American foreign policy. This was also the type of argument made by William Langer (1931) in his discussion of the policies and motivations of Otto von Bismarck.

RELATION TO PREVIOUS WORK

One of the earliest advocates of the events approach to international interaction was Charles McClelland. He suggested that once the relations of international politics were broken down to their most elementary form they can be selected and organized according to two references—of actors and interaction. For McClelland, interaction analysis or demand response pattern analysis has as a preoccupation, tracing the resulting patterns and trajectories of actions.
He suggests that national systems have access to only a limited inventory of demands and responses in coping with the situations produced by system disturbances. How the government of the national system tends to select types of actions from the inventory to meet different kinds of non-routine international situations provides evidence of its operational code in international politics (1966:105).

Recently several theorists have underscored the importance of considering the total interactions, especially those between antagonists. Burton (1968) asserts that the progression towards war depends upon the equal contributions from both sides, each being governed by perceptions of threat. North and his colleagues assert that war may occur in a number of ways, but the chances of its occurrence are increased by the hostility in the crisis atmosphere generated by the joint exchanges of parties involved (1968). Zinnes has been concerned both with the expression of hostility and with its perception and the ensuing responses (1968). These authors all emphasize the process of exchange that underscores the symmetric importance of both participants and actions. Thus, the flow of foreign policy exchanges between nations has certainly been the topic of discussion, debate, and analysis. It has infrequently been the target of formal theoretical development, however.

While our current problems stem from a lack of formal explanation of the patterns and interactions between nations, it must be pointed out that the difficulty has not been because we have lacked a basis for making formal explanations. The possibility of using the international communications literature, (which is rich in suggestions
for formulating formal theories) has been made by a number of international relations scholars (Deutsch (1953), McClelland (1967), and Phillips (1973)). Quincy Wright (1955:269) defined international communications as the "art of using symbols to express, to inform, to formulate, or to influence the opinion and policy of groups on matters of importance for international relations. In a narrower sense it is the art of using symbols expressive of one nation to influence another. As a discipline it is the philosophy guiding that art and the science analyzing international communications, determining their purposes, and measuring their effects." In fact, we can view the entire political process as a process of mutual modification of images through feedback in communication (Boulding, 1956:102).

Consider the simple communication system. Such a system has a message and three operating parts: a sender, a medium or channel and a receiver. There are several difficulties to be encountered in the process of communication, however. Does the receiver actually receive the message as the sender intended or does interference in the channel distort or garble the message? An excellent review of these problems can be found in Alan Whiting's (1969) discussion of the problems the United States faced in the bombing of North Vietnam. The United States had to convince the Chinese that its aircraft did not intend to cross the Chinese border. Whiting points out that many statements and subsequent actions were repeated to insure that the Chinese correctly understood the intentions of the United States. Such complex communications structures are a common feature of the international environment. Nation
states are information processors dealing with so much information that their information gathering powers are frequently taxed. How nations cope with this problem and to what degree these communications affect international relations is a crucial question in international relations according to Karl Deutsch (1968), who has hypothesized that wars are caused by the inability of decision-makers to handle message overload situations.

CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

To further develop this explanation of foreign policy outputs, consider the competitive international environment in which a nation operates. The behavior of one actor toward an object state is in part a response to the strategic problems which that actor faces with respect to its understanding of the other's goals and activities. It is not especially daring to suggest that behavior begets behavior, we simply expect that nations will generally act much like individuals, in the sense that there is a strong tendency to return behavior similar to that received. Nations are assumed to be operating not in a vacuum but in a real world in which inter-nation interaction is a reality. A nation, as an actor in the international system, will largely base the nature of its interaction with the second nation or object on the nature of the last or last several actions of that nation towards itself. By way of example, consider the work of Lewis Fry Richardson and his contention that the rate of change in hostility of one nation towards a second depends upon the level of hostility which the second harbors towards the first. This idea of a relationship between the
actions of one nation and the past behavior of the object nation has been generalized by Dean Pruitt (1969) with the introduction of the concept of reciprocity. "The change in one party's level of output on a given dimension often produces reciprocity (also called reciprocal change) i.e., a resulting change in the other party's level of output on the same or another dimension." These thoughts can be expressed in the following statement: an actor's behavior towards a specific object is a function of the behavior which it received from the object; more simply put, behavior begets behavior. Mathematically, this statement is represented by the following equation:

\[ B_{nq,m,t} = \sum_{m=1}^{P} \alpha_m B_{qN,m,t} \]

where

- \( B_{nq,m,t} \) is the behavior of nation n directed toward nation q on dimension m at time t.
- \( \sum_{m=1}^{P} \alpha_m B_{qN,m,t} \) is the weighted sum of each of nation q's behaviors toward n as measured, respectively, along the P dimensions of behavior. The weights (\( \alpha \)'s) used in computing the sum are the relative importance of nation q's behavior, on each dimension, in influencing the behavior of nation n on dimensions m.

This equation states as a working hypothesis that an actor's behavior results from the patterns of action of its object. Others working in international relations, Tanter (1972), Azar (1970), and Leng (1972) suggest similar hypotheses.

This can be called a tit-for-tat model of the relations between nations. But international relations must certainly be more
than a tennis match in which each actor's response is to his object's service. There are forces at work over time within a nation which work to insure specific strategies be employed when dealing with specific object nations. Halperin suggests that "most of the actions taken by bureaucracies involve doing again or continuing to do what was done in the past. In the absence of some reason to change their behavior, organizations keep doing what they have been doing" (1970:9).

Bureaucratic inertia, as an explanation of performance in organizations, is appealing and leads to the working hypothesis that a nation's behavior in foreign policy results, in part, from its own prior patterns of action. Stated formally: a given nation's behavior toward a specific object is a function of its previous behavior toward that object. Mathematically this can be translated into the linear equation:

\[ B_{nq,m,t} = \alpha_m B_{nq,m,t-1} \]

where the symbolization is identical to the first equation and \( t-1 \) is a time period earlier. Combining the two approaches together to form a single equation:

\[ B_{nq,m,t} = \alpha_m B_{nq,m,t-1} + \sum_{m=1}^{p} \alpha_m B_{nq,m,t} \]

The meaning of the individual terms remains the same as in the two preceding equations.

(1) The new equation expresses mathematically the contention that foreign policy dynamics are powerfully influenced by both bureaucratic inertia and reciprocity.
McClelland (1961) suggests that the workings of a modern foreign office resemble the day to day operations of a well run industrial plant. Following this suggestion we may develop the tit-for-tat models somewhat further. Multitudes of difficulties and problems would be received and dispatched from the daily flow by specialists in handling foreign affairs. To cope with this complexity, experts reassign responsibility for monitoring the exchanges with specific countries. The ability of the experts to deal with their assigned tasks is in part a function of their understanding of the intent underlying the patterns of behavior which were received from object nations in the recent past. In order to know the appropriate response to make to an object nation, the experts must be able to understand clearly and unambiguously the messages which they are receiving from the object. Halperin and Kanter suggest, "the nations affect the actions of one another less by physically compelling changes in behavior than by acting on one another's perceptions and expectations; interaction among nations is primarily a matter of threats, promises, and warnings designed to influence behavior by persuasion. Accordingly, the primary vehicle for the exercise of international influence takes the form of 'signals' among international actors. Actions--the outputs of the national security bureaucracy--are 'signals', designed to persuade another nation to alter its behavior in the preferred direction" (Halperin and Kanter, 1973:40).

Thus, the transmission and reception of information is a major feature of the behavioral exchanges between nations. Every act of a nation can be considered as a potential piece of information communi-
cating to other nations the intense desires or dislikes of the acting nation. In addition, the variety of behavior is itself, an important aspect of the information conveyed. If the multitude of international behaviors is structured into a basic set of patterns, the variety of international interaction can be shown to reduce to the knowledge gained from each of these patterns of behavior. If, for instance, the behavior of nations reduces to eight basic patterns, then there are eight areas in which information is being transmitted.

There are two procedures for delineating these basic patterns of interaction. The first technique would be to employ a large number of variables measuring interaction and to factor these variables to delineate a basic set of patterns or underlying dimensions (Phillips, 1969; McClelland and Hoggard, 1969). Another technique would be to specify a set of variables which are thought to be logically discrete and all inclusive. The second approach would have to specify the underlying rationale for such a collection of variables. The CREON data set has a group of variables which seem to meet the requirements for the second approach and it is accepted in this development. There are eight variables which indicate a continuum of commitment of resources on the part of the nation using them. These variables are laid out in Table 1. Notice that they vary from procedural discussions to military actions. It is felt that nations choosing foreign policy output from any one of these eight acts are signaling varying levels of commitment of natural resources from relatively minor commitments for procedural acts through relatively severe commitments for military actions.
The amount of information being conveyed between nations in any period of time must depend upon both the number of signals transmitted from nation to nation as well as the variety of signals. Techniques have been developed to measure and account for both the variety of signals transmitted and the amount of information transmitted. The heterogeneity of these signals—that is the variety of basic patterns at any point in time is a measure of the uncertainty which would attend any attempts to specify the sender's selection process (Cherry, 1957; Shannon and Weaver, 1949; Ashby, 1952).

Information theory provides an excellent measure of the uncertainty, \( H \), present in a set of signals:

\[
H = \sum_{i=1}^{N} - P_i \log_2 P_i
\]

where \( P_i \) is the independent probability of the occurrence of signal type \( i \) and there are \( n \) types of signals. Thus, from the probabilities \( P_i \) of different types of signals occurring in a given time period (same month), the uncertainty associated with the score for that period can be ascertained. If all outputs are equally likely, uncertainty is at a maximum. It is common to divide the actual uncertainty by the maximum value, deriving as a result the percentage of (maximum) uncertainty \( (H_{\text{max}}) \), which is more easily comparable across sources with differing sets of signals.

Let us consider two examples: first the case in which a particular nation chooses to send to a particular object 80 acts in a given time period. The distribution of these acts is such that each of the
eight variables are used ten times. Notice that the actor has chosen to send an equal number of each type of signal to the object. By way of contrast another nation sends the same object 80 acts in the same time period but they are all the same act. The relative uncertainty figure for the distribution in Example one would be 1.00, and that for the distribution in Example two would be 0.00. Thus, the implications of uncertainty are that in the equal probability instance, there is no way to judge if further occurrences would be more likely to fall in one category rather than another. In the second example, we can see that the object nation would be more likely to expect to receive the same act he has been receiving in the last eighty sequences. Thus an observer's uncertainty as to the likely activity of the actor represented in the second example is reduced. The smaller the $H_{rel}$ figure, the more certain it is that a nation will choose a particular activity. McClelland has interpreted this relative uncertainty by suggesting: "A common sense way to view a series of $H_{rel}$ numbers is to think in terms of a 'fanning out' toward equality of distribution across the category system with the larger figures and a channeling in of the distribution towards relatively frequent occurrences in fewer categories with the smaller figures. As the ratio approaches 1.00 it suggests not only that everything that could happen has been occurring but also that the behaviors have shown increasing signs of disorderliness. The information measures do not tell us what the particular lack of ordering is, but they do give us a technical indication of a large amount of variety in the emissions. As the
ratio decreases towards .000, the suggestion is that (1) there may be present a large amount of highly patterned and repetitive behavior and a limited variety in the action or (2) very little is occurring" (1973:91).

A long series of analyses by Charles McClelland and his associates (1965, 1968, 1973) have been carried out with the variety measure introduced above to establish how it functions in crisis and non-crisis periods. They have demonstrated that the mix of behavior does indeed change in a crisis towards greater variety. The basic results are these: (1) With occasional exceptions, a $H_{rel}$ of .700 or higher is associated with crisis months and only with crisis months. (2) If we operationalize the beginning and duration of international crises with a $H_{rel}$ of .700 or higher, we are able to state when a particular crisis began and how long it lasted. (3) All non-crisis periods, with rare exceptions, have monthly $H_{rel}$ figures below .700 (McClelland, 1973:92-93). The literature on communications in international relations argues that in periods of crisis, system overload occurs and actors display an inability to respond consistently to foreign policy inputs (Holsti, 1965; Burton, 1968). This would suggest that for dyads in periods of high relative uncertainty, usually crises, nations are less able to respond consistently to their object nation's activities. But it seems to be the case that in periods less uncertain than crises, nations are capable of responding more reciprocally when they know more fully their opposite's interactions. This point needs further development.
Burton has suggested that one of the "tricks" in negotiation is that actors should send frequent responses if they wish to communicate changes in the perception of the situation. He also suggests that the process of resolution of conflict is in part a process of testing whether information is received as it was transmitted (Burton, 1969: 54-55). One function of ambiguity and noise in message signals sent from one nation or another, as pointed out by Jervis, is "to make it easier for actors to strike and maintain bargains. At first glance the contrary argument seems more plausible—that the easier it is for each side to make its views understood (at least on the semantic level), the more the bargaining process is facilitated... this position might be correct if the actors could make the other side believe they would act the way they said they would" (1970:127). But since this is normally impossible, noiseless bargaining would make simple initiatives less plausible and thus more likely to be discounted.

In communications terminology noise is characteristic of a communication period with high relative uncertainty. Thus when nations are sending multiple types of signals it would appear easier for other nations to respond with what they judge to be appropriate behaviors. This is so because multiple types of signals allow a nation to test whether its intent was correctly received by analyzing the multiple responses. It is also likely to be the case that if one nation wants the other to believe its intent, it had better signal its intent in multiple ways or by orchestrating its signals.
Nations which are interacting frequently must consider how they can make other nations understand the intent of their communications. If a nation wishes to orchestrate its foreign policy outputs to facilitate understanding:

1) It must design and deliver messages in a way that will gain and hold the attention of the intended object.
2) The signals must adequately refer to past experience between actor and object.
3) The communicator must choose actions to match his verbal statements so that the message is convincing.
4) The communicator must be able to notice and interpret any responses as either feedback or as the performance of preferred behavior before he can estimate his degree of satisfaction measured against his country's objectives.

Now let us interpret what we seem to be getting at in this discussion. When single signals ($H_{rel} = 0$) are sent, they are likely to receive only a moderately standard response. Slightly more complex messages (with a relative uncertainty value greater than zero but less than 0.5 for any given period) are somewhat more easily responded to in a systematic fashion. On the other hand, those messages which are quite heterogeneous in the number of signals sent (but short of the complexity facing crisis participants) can be responded to clearly and consistently.

This leads to the following assumption:

Provided that the communications channel is not overloaded, the more heterogeneous the signals sent from one nation to another in a given time period, the more certain are observers in specifying an appropriate response.

Extrapolating from this discussion, let us suggest that when there is a homogeneous signaling from one nation to another (that is,
when the redundancy in signals is high) one would expect the recipient nation to identify less clearly the intent of the actor and to act on its own inertia. For periods of time in which there is a heterogeneity of signals (behaviors), and thus a richer mix of behavior for that time period, objects are more certain about the implications (real or potential) of the actor's behaviors. In these periods of time, reciprocity should exert a stronger influence than inertia upon foreign policy outputs. Hence, objects adjust to actors' strategies more readily in periods of high uncertainty and tend to continue doing what they had done in the past during periods of low uncertainty. Formally:

\[ (3) \]

In periods of high relative uncertainty reciprocity is a better predictor of foreign policy output of a nation than is inertia, while in periods of low uncertainty inertia is a stronger influence than is reciprocity.

What we have tried to accomplish here is a differentiation between when bureaucratic inertia on the one hand, and reciprocity on the other, tends to best explain foreign policy output. In order to facilitate this effort we have relied upon a new concept: uncertainty. The concept is given meaning in information theory and that meaning has been borrowed here. Three points are worth reiterating:

1) Information is assumed to be associated with a selection process. That is, there is available to the sender a choice of signals to be sent.

2) Such a process is basically statistical in the sense that it involves probability considerations concerning the likelihood that a given signal will be sent.

3) The amount of communication in the sense of transmission of knowledge (semantic information) is not considered in information theory.
Returning once again to the discussion of a well-run foreign office, we note that such an office is composed of country specialists who:

1) Monitor, categorize, sort and interpret incoming signals; and
2) Develop routines for converting the signals received into different information to serve specialized purposes.

Because of shared experiences in dealing with each other, an ordered pattern of understanding takes shape jointly for both the actor and the object. The information filters, in the form of these specialists which each nation relies upon become more adept at processing more and increasingly complex information and in responding in more heterogeneous patterns of behavior. This reasoning leads to:

(4) The development of complex patterns of interactive behavior is dependent upon relatively frequent and consistent exchanges in the past.

SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

A specification of the completed system of statements about foreign policy outputs can now be given form:

Axiom 1 A given nation's behavior toward a specific object is a function of its past behavior from that object; more simply, behavior is a function of inertia and reciprocity.

Axiom 2 Provided that the communications channel is not overloaded, the more heterogeneous the signals sent from one nation to another in a given time period, the more certain are observers in specifying an appropriate response.

Theorem 1 In periods of high relative uncertainty reciprocity is a better predictor of foreign policy output of a nation than is inertia, while in periods of low uncertainty inertia is a stronger influence than is reciprocity.
Axiom 3  The development of complex patterns of interactive behavior is dependent upon relatively frequent and consistent exchanges in the past.

The CREON data collection comprises three months from each of the ten years 1959-1968. Since data are available for only one quarter from each year, our ability to test Theorem 1 is limited to testing the effect of signal heterogeneity upon reciprocity; any test of inertial effects would require contiguous data.

The propositions applicable to the CREON data set which we have been laboring toward may now be stated:

Proposition 1: Reciprocity will be lower in periods of low uncertainty than in periods of high uncertainty.

Proposition 2: The complexity in patterns of interactions will be greater in dyads which exhibit frequent exchanges than in dyads which interact only infrequently.

SUMMARY

At this point in the development of a theory of foreign policy exchange, a self-contained explanation has been reached. But foreign policy exchanges should not be considered as a monotonous ballet in which all players are governed by identical restraints placed upon them through the parameters of inertia and reciprocity. It is to be argued here that a number of other forces are operating both within the nation and within the nation's environment which influence the degree to which a nation reciprocates behavior received or chooses to continue past behavior. These indirect forces which are at work in the decision-making process are not as yet, formally developed but likely candidates can be identified.
Certainly the pressure of domestic events would seem to act as an important instrument or force in influencing a nation to over or under respond to the receipt of behavior from other nations (Phillips, 1973). During periods of intense domestic activity, key decision-makers must devote energies to solving or controlling the internal disruption to the degree that their time is consumed with domestic events, their ability to orchestrate foreign policy is minimized. Since this is the case, we would expect over and under responses to opponent's moves during these periods. One way in which domestic events and international situations may interact to create pressures upon the choice of routines being employed is by changing the level of decision-makers involved in a decision. In its simplest case we can divide decision-makers into two groups; working level bureaucrats and senior political offices away from foreign affairs. On the other hand, international crises ought to draw senior political offices into the decision process.

Third party actions are also considered to be influencing the action and reaction model that has been set out here. At the data collection level, Hermann and Salmore point out the need for considering the indirect object of a behavioral action (1970). Phillips and Hainline (1973) have studied the secondary impact of actions in the stimulus response models developed here of the triad--Soviet Union, United States, and China. Phillips and Callahan (1973) have attempted to formalize this position to account for the indirect efforts of third parties on the behavior of a dyad.
Perhaps the most important of a nation's basic functions is its ability for self-transformation "[t]o respond to events in its environment in new ways or at least in different and more rewarding ways" (Deutsch, 1968:17). Upon close investigation, Deutsch finds that there is a certain underlying similarity between the governing or self-governing of ships and machines and the governing of human organizations (such as foreign-policy-making organizations). "Steering a ship implies guiding the future behavior of the ship on the basis of information concerning the past performance and present position of this ship itself in relation to some external course, goal, or target. In such cases the next step in the behavior of the system must be guided in part by information concerning its own performance in the past" (1968:182). Deutsch proceeds to suggest that all self-steering networks have three basic elements: receptors, effectors, and feedback controls (1968:182). Whatever ability to act autonomously an organization such as a nation-state may have is in its feedback controls. Norbert Weiner defines these feedback controls:

This control of a machine on the basis of its actual performance rather than its expected performance is known as feedback, and involves sensory members which are actuated by motor members and perform the function of telltales or monitors, that is, of elements which indicate a performance . . . (1950:12).

Deutsch develops the notion of steering based upon feedback in considerable detail. "Steering is always employed with reference to both a purpose, or goals, and an evaluation of previous successes and failures through the mechanism of feedback."
What has been attempted here is a rationale for looking at the exchanges between nations. It appears to be the case that nations attempt to achieve reciprocity in matching outputs to inputs. But this consistency is a function of their goals and the information, or feedback, they have of previous success and failure. What must follow is an attempt to expand upon these notions and to identify those forces which make the process a dynamic one with a good deal more fluctuations than simple matching routines would suggest.
FOOTNOTES

1. The author wishes to express gratitude to the National Science Foundation (Grant #GS-3117), to the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, and to the Ohio State University Instruction and Research Computer Center for their support during the preparation of that paper. In addition, special thanks to Robert Crain for assistance on related papers.

2. "This theory is about general tendencies common to all nations; about how they present defiance, how they suspect defense to be concealed aggression, and how they respond to imports by sending out exports; about how expenditure on armaments is restrained by the difficulty of paying for them; and lastly, about grievances and their queer irrational ways, so that a halting apology may be received as though it were an added insult." (Richardson, 1960:13).

3. Research in psychology tends to support the notion of reciprocity. Taylor (1965) and Tognoli (1967) provide evidence suggesting that increases in the intimacy of a subject are due to the increasing intimacy of his companion's remarks. Changes in the rate of smiling also tend to be reciprocated in the same time (Kendon, 1967). Explanation for the norm of reciprocity may be found in Gouldner (1960) and Pruitt (1965, 1968). Homans (1961) has attempted to explain reciprocity in terms of stimulus-response learning theory.

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TABLE 1

Eight Behavioral Variables Used

The eight behavior types (behavioral variables) used in this study are derived from the Sequential Action Scheme of the CREON codebook.

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<th>Variable Number and Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<td>b₁  PARTICIPATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>b₂  DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE</td>
<td>All &quot;Evaluative&quot; except &quot;Procedural&quot; statements</td>
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<tr>
<td>b₃  VERBAL COOPERATION</td>
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<td>b₄  VERBAL CONFLICT-DEFENSIVE</td>
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<td>b₅  VERBAL CONFLICT-OFFENSIVE</td>
<td>All &quot;Unelicited&quot; &quot;Desire&quot; and &quot;Intent&quot; except &quot;Procedural&quot; seen as &quot;Undesired&quot; by Actor</td>
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<td>b₇  NON-MILITARY CONFLICT ACTION</td>
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