Internal Security and Military Assistance to Latin America in the 1970's

a first statement

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Internal Security and Military Assistance to Latin America in the 1970s: A First Statement

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**INTERNAL SECURITY AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1970s: A FIRST STATEMENT**

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**ABSTRACT**
An assessment of the significance of internal security as a hemisphere-wide rationale and objective for U.S. Military Assistance Programs to Latin America. The major insurgency threats have diminished, but insurgency and other forms of domestic political violence remain problems that require some local governmental attention. Many Latin American militaries are now able to cope with these problems. Though internal security assistance remains a salient objective for many Latin American militaries, most expect MAP to serve other objectives as well. Because insurgency is affected so strongly by local political conditions, U.S. military assistance alone will have a marginal influence on insurgency outcomes; moreover, MAP can promote other objectives more effectively. It is concluded, therefore, that retention of internal security as the dominant rationale and objective of MAP, as during the 1960s, may be appropriate for certain countries and situations, but not as a general policy for the hemisphere.

**KEY WORDS**
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Latin America in the 1970s:
A First Statement

David F. Ronfeldt and Luigi R. Einaudi

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THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
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APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED
This Report originated in the spring of 1971 in consultation with Mr. Robert J. Pranger, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs, OSD/ISA. The results of the study have been briefed to officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), including the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs.

Our general purpose was to provide a hemisphere-wide overview of the prospects for domestic political violence in Latin America, and the implications for U.S. military responses and programs in the 1970s. In particular, we sought to assess the present and likely future significance of internal security as an objective for U.S. military assistance programs to the Latin American region as a whole.

This final Report underscores the diversity of conditions in Latin America, and emphasizes the difficulties that may consequently be expected from the application of a single, all-embracing objective for military assistance. Given the intellectual complexity of the research topic, the authors focused on the formulation of an analytic framework that would provide some structure to the multitude of factors affecting possible U.S. responses to specific security problems in Latin America. In developing this framework, the Report occasionally introduces unconventional ideas and perspectives. Given practical constraints on time and resources, however, the authors were unable to proceed to the next step: the refinement of testable hypotheses and the rigorous exploitation of data that would develop fully the cases for and against the policy alternatives that are discussed. Accordingly, this Report is offered more as a reflective essay than as a definitive analysis.

Finally, the reader should be aware of three aspects of the general environment that affect our conclusions. First, MAP resources could become so small as to render impractical any attempt to alter or broaden MAP's potential scope. Second, purposes other than internal security that Latin American countries might wish to advance with our
assistance might be attainable through mechanisms other than MAP. Finally, historical continuity, simplicity, and public responsiveness may continue to make internal security a more or less acceptable rationale for the 1970s, despite the general conclusions of this report.

Should these patterns of events take place, our recommendations against the maintenance of internal security as an exclusive and generalized rationale and objective for MAP might be weakened, although as we believe and argue below, an alternative U.S. posture, more closely related to the Nixon Doctrine and to broader U.S. and Latin American political-military objectives than internal security alone, would better advance common hemisphere interests during the balance of the 1970s.
During the 1960s internal security served as the dominant rationale and objective of the Military Assistance Programs to Latin America. For the 1970s, three alternatives may be posed for MAP to Latin America in general:

**Option I.** The retention of internal security as the dominant rationale and objective, as during the 1960s;

**Option II.** The retention of internal security as one of several objectives under a broader general rationale based upon the Nixon Doctrine; or

**Option III.** Complete elimination of internal security as a rationale and objective.

In order to appraise these alternatives, five criteria are used for examining the U.S.-Latin American policy context and conditions in individual countries. These criteria are:

(a) the general nature of local political violence (that is, what is the nature of the "violence"?);
(b) the status of local security capabilities (does the local government or military need outside help?);
(c) local security-assistance interests and objectives (if they receive assistance, how do they intend to use it?);
(d) U.S. security-assistance capabilities (can the U.S. provide the assistance that will be effective in the local context?); and
(e) U.S. interests and objectives (is it in the interests of the U.S. to provide security assistance?).

Our general findings, for Latin America taken as a whole, may be summarized in terms of each of the five criteria as follows:

(a) Major insurgency threats have diminished, but insurgency and other forms of domestic political violence remain problems that require local governmental attention.
(b) Many Latin American militaries have developed adequate capabilities to cope with current threat levels; but some, if not most, militaries continue to utilize outside assistance for the maintenance and continued development of their capabilities.

(c) Though internal security assistance remains a salient objective for many Latin American militaries, almost all of them expect MAP to serve other objectives.

(d) In general, U.S. capabilities to affect the outcome of insurgency struggles through military assistance are considerably less important than local Latin American political conditions.

(e) U.S. interests in internal security are less significant in many countries than are other potential MAP objectives.

As a result, although Option I—retention of internal security as the dominant formal rationale and objective, as during the 1960s—may be appropriate for certain countries and situations, internal security does not provide an adequate general framework for hemispheric policy. Indeed, prolongation of this policy could prove to be detrimental to U.S. interests and to U.S.-Latin American relations in general.

Option III—complete elimination of internal security as a rationale and objective—seems appropriate for those Latin American countries whose militaries are capable of coping on their own with their internal security problems. However, given the difficulties of predicting threats reliably, Option III would severely restrict U.S. flexibility and capacity to respond to future contingencies.

In sum, our findings support the conclusion that the regional policy alternative for MAP in the 1970s that best fits the criteria used here is Option II—the retention of internal security as one of several objectives, under a broader general rationale. This alternative seems to have the flexibility to fit the extreme diversity of conditions in Latin America, where some countries need internal security assistance more than others and where U.S. interests and objectives vary considerably from country to country. Indeed, this study reaffirms that local conditions, on a country-by-country rather than on a hemisphere-wide basis, should receive primary attention in both policy and research.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND THE OPTIONS

During the 1960s, Latin America was considered by many observers to be on the verge of violent revolution; Castro-like insurgencies were regarded as paramount threats to hemispheric peace and development; and advocates of arms control and of rapid economic development were agreed on the need to orient the Latin American military away from costly conventional defense missions. Under these conditions, internal security made considerable sense as the dominant rationale and objective of the Military Assistance Program in Latin America.

What changes, if any, do the conditions of the 1970s and the evolution of the U.S. and Latin American policy contexts suggest for the objectives of MAP for the 1970s? With respect to the central issue of internal security, there are three general alternatives:

Option I. Retention of internal security as the dominant rationale and objective, as during the 1960s;

Option II. Retention of internal security as one of several objectives under a broader general rationale based upon the Nixon Doctrine; or

Option III. Complete elimination of internal security as a rationale or objective.

*References to empirical studies of these and other Latin American conditions are contained in later sections. Readers interested in a summary of the policy environment at the time that internal security was adopted as the dominant MAP rationale for Latin America should consult Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America, Ohio State University Press, 1966.

**A distinction is maintained throughout this study between the reasons put forward to justify a policy, the rationale, and the operational objectives of the policy, which may or may not be made explicit. Sometimes the rationale and the objectives are identical, but it is not always apparent when they differ.

***A fourth general option is also conceivable, in which internal security serves as the rationale, but is not necessarily an operational objective. As discussed later in the text, this occasionally happens with U.S. assistance to individual countries whose military forces are not particularly concerned with internal security, or when the major
Varied—and sometimes contradictory—observations and arguments have been raised in favor of one option or another. We feel these arguments and observations can be grouped analytically into the following areas of concern:

(a) **The Significance of Violence:** the presence and general significance of domestic political violence in Latin America, particularly in terms of the objectives and capabilities of the violent actors, and the inherent threats to development and to U.S.-Latin American relations; in short, what is the nature of the violence?

(b) **Latin American Security Capabilities:** the general capabilities of the Latin American governments and militaries to cope with violent internal security problems, particularly with respect to the degree of their dependence on outside support and assistance for internal security purposes; in short, does the local government or military need outside help?

(c) **Latin American Security Interests:** the expectations (interests and objectives) of the Latin American governments and militaries toward U.S. security assistance, especially in terms of the uses to which they wish to see it put; in short, if the local government and military receive assistance, how do they intend to use it?

(d) **U.S. Security Assistance Capabilities:** the capabilities of the U.S. government and military to provide security assistance, particularly as regards its effectiveness in the local environment; in short, can the U.S. provide the assistance that will be effective in the local context?

(e) **U.S. Interests:** the interests, objectives, and expectations of the U.S. in providing security assistance; in short, is it in the interests of the U.S. to provide security assistance?

The above areas of concern do not necessarily merit or receive equal weight in the discussion and assessment that follows. Nor are the indices and evidence with which each is to be answered always apparent. Nevertheless, these five dimensions are clearly important; together they provide a framework for analyzing the manifold arguments that have been brought to bear on Latin American violence and on U.S. responses to it.

U.S. operational objective is the maintenance of good general relations with the local government. Where such situations arise, however, we feel that they would be adequately covered by Option II.
As questions, the five criteria may be used to examine whether and how the U.S. may respond to violence in a particular country or, more broadly, in the hemisphere as a whole.*

According to this framework, current perspectives and arguments on the three policy alternatives may be organized as follows, with the resulting identification of the conditions that may make one preferable to another.

OPTION I—retention of internal security as the dominant rationale and objective, as during the 1960s—is a policy suited to the following conditions:

a. Concerning the significance of violence: Rural or urban insurgencies threaten Latin American development and U.S.-Latin American relations.

b. Concerning Latin American security capabilities: Latin American governments are unable to cope without assistance with mass violence, instability, and revolution.

*Care should be taken to understand that in the preceding scheme (a) refers to U.S.-Latin American relations and U.S. interests in only the broadest descriptive sense. The primary purpose of step (a) in the analysis is to evaluate the nature of the violence—that is, its presence, its causes, its social composition, and the objectives and capabilities of its leaders. In the course of that determination, some attention may necessarily be paid to the potential or actual effects on U.S.-Latin American relations and U.S. interests, but mostly in a descriptive sense. That is analytically and practically distinct from the evaluative need to determine, from a U.S. governmental perspective, whether primary or secondary U.S. interests are being threatened and whether the U.S. has an interest in providing security assistance. That step in the analysis is explicitly contained in (e). In other words, the scheme seeks to separate evaluations of the nature of the violence from evaluations of affected U.S. interests and objectives—two analytical tasks that are often confusingly intermingled in practice. Furthermore, the scheme emphasizes that it may be useful to focus explicitly on U.S. interests and objectives as the final rather than the initial step in the process of analysis, simply because the clarification of the other factors or questions strongly affects the perception of threats and the need to act against them.

** Many of these arguments, frequently critical, are available in congressional documents. See, for example, United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America, Hearings, June-July 1969, 91st Cong., 1st sess., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1969.
c. **Concerning Latin American security interests**: Latin American militaries are more strongly interested in internal security assistance than in other forms of MAP assistance.

d. **Concerning U.S. assistance capabilities**: MAP assistance is likely to be effective in helping Latin American governments to deal with their internal security problems.

e. **Concerning U.S. interests**: Internal security assistance advances specific U.S. political, economic, or military interests in the target country in a manner alternative instruments cannot, and its predominance as an objective does not appreciably prejudice other interests and objectives.

**Comment**: Option I, that internal security be made the dominant objective and rationale, requires that all five conditions be met in substance, and is thus more likely to apply to a given country than to the hemisphere as a whole. For example, it may be in the U.S. interest to provide internal security assistance (condition "e"), but the local military or government may not want to publicize the fact (condition "c"). In such circumstances "internal security" would clearly not be the optimal rationale even for assistance with an internal security objective.

**OPTION II**—retention of internal security as one of several objectives under a broader general rationale based upon the Nixon Doctrine—is appropriate to the extent that the following conditions exist:

a. **Concerning the significance of violence**: Insurgencies create potential difficulties (as through the persistence of urban terrorist activity), but in most countries do not pose major threats to development or other U.S. concerns.

b. **Concerning Latin American security capabilities**: The internal security capabilities of the Latin American militaries have improved and approach self-reliance, such that there is a declining dependency on direct outside internal security assistance.

c. **Concerning Latin American security interests**: Latin American militaries desire other forms of assistance, either because they have other increasingly important needs and objectives which they hope MAP will help meet during the 1970s, or because they wish to deemphasize their internal security roles.

d. **Concerning U.S. assistance capabilities**: In comparison with local factors, MAP assistance can have only a secondary impact on counterinsurgency outcomes, even though the spectrum of skills and activities available under MAP includes, but is not limited to, internal security assistance.
e. Concerning U.S. interests: Internal security is only one among several objectives of MAP—though still a valuable one—and should be limited because it has undesirable political effects, or because other objectives of MAP become increasingly important.

Comment: Because it retains internal security within a broader framework of objectives, Option II has the flexibility to be adjusted easily to changing circumstances, including adjustment to a few individual cases that might require Options I or III.

OPTION III--complete elimination of internal security as a rationale or objective would apply to the following conditions:

a. Concerning the significance of violence: Domestic political violence ceases to be a problem in Latin America because it disappears; or because although violence, instability, internal war, and revolution persist, they are normal features of Latin American development that cannot be prevented; or because it is felt that violence and instability are not harmful to U.S.-Latin American relations.

b. Concerning Latin American security capabilities: Latin American governments and security forces are fully able to cope with domestic violence on their own, or with non-U.S. assistance from sources tolerable to the United States.

c. Concerning Latin American security interests: Latin American militaries are not interested in internal security objectives.

d. Concerning U.S. assistance capabilities: MAP assistance can have little or no real effect on the containment of violence or on the outcomes of revolutionary struggles.

e. Concerning U.S. interests: Internal security assistance is not in the U.S. interest because present and potential future internal security problems in Latin America are not likely to constitute threats to American interests; or because U.S. internal security assistance has harmed other U.S. interests by facilitating the repression of Latin American peoples, hindering development, or fostering dictatorship rather than

Such as politicizing the Latin American militaries, or allowing them to exaggerate internal threats in order to extract additional and perhaps unnecessary aid from the United States, or giving the United States an image as a repressive and interventionist force in Latin American politics.
democracy; or because it is deemed that the United States should follow formal policies of noninterference and nonintervention in domestic Latin American politics.

Comment: Though it might somewhat limit U.S. flexibility and the capacity to respond in a crisis, the inherent logic of Option III suggests that it could be adhered to in any situation in which any one criterion was clearly met.

* * *

Clearly, the issues involved here are highly complex, with the preferability of any option over another depending upon the existence of the conditions, or the validity of the perspectives, deemed to favor it. The succeeding discussions provide the authors' judgmental analysis of the merits of the contrasting arguments and observations, in order to assess whether one option may be clearly preferable to the others, according to the five criteria proposed above.
II. LATIN AMERICAN VIOLENCE: ITS NATURE AND PROSPECTS

Latin American governments are frequently portrayed as under attack from revolutionary and radical elements with national and international interests and objectives. Anti-governmental activities in Latin America have assumed many forms in recent years, including:

- Assassinations of political leaders;
- Rural insurgency, terrorism, and subversion;
- Urban insurgency, terrorism, and subversion;
- The peaceable but potentially violent mobilization of radical movements and organizations;
- Revolutionary coups d'état.

Of these threats, rural and urban insurgencies have received greatest attention under the rubric of guerrilla warfare. Indeed, during the early 1960s, Castroite revolution was popularly forecast for Latin America, and foreign-supported guerrilla insurgencies did beset a number of regimes. By 1970, however, rural guerrilla bands had been defeated or contained throughout the hemisphere, often with the help of U.S. Military Assistance Programs. Thus rural insurgency, though capable of provoking continuing trouble in countries with long traditions of internal violence, no longer appeared to be a viable or appealing revolutionary strategy. Moreover, it appeared quite clear

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*Most of this attention as been polemical rather than scholastic, beginning with Ernesto Guevara's own handbook on Guerrilla Warfare, 1960, and continuing with the Brazilian Carlos Marighela's Minimanual for Urban Guerrillas, 1969, both of which have appeared in numerous editions. Among the more recent treatments by outside observers, Luis Nericer Vega's account, Guerrillas in Latin America: The Technique of the Counter-State, Praeger Publishers, Inc., New York, 1969, is a useful synthesis, while Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1971, and the SORO Casebook Series provide differing perspectives on individual situations.

that the conditions for successful violent revolution had not existed, and could not be readily created even by determined bands of rural guerrillas.

THE CHALLENGE OF URBAN INSURGENCY

Nevertheless, persistent revolutionaries have resorted to new strategies and tactics of urban guerrilla warfare, in order to create the conditions for revolution, if not the revolution itself. As a result, incidents of urban terrorism, kidnapping, robbery, and propaganda abounded during the late 1960s, and the urban insurgents acquired credibility as internal security problems in such countries as Argentina and Uruguay. Thus, what rural insurgency failed to accomplish during the 1960s, it is feared—or hoped—that urban insurgents may achieve during the 1970s.

In practice, however, urban insurgency is proving to be even less of an internal security threat to Latin America than rural insurgency. Incidents of urban terrorism sometimes appear to be quite numerous, impressive, and sufficiently worrisome to require some military attention. Yet, incidents alone—even in large quantities—need not in themselves add up to a real threat to government institutions. Indeed, despite the volume of violent terrorist tactics, the revolutionary insurgents do not appear to be gaining a strategic advantage for themselves, whether measured by organized populist support, elite fragmentation, or institutional disruption.

Politically, of course, the very persistence of urban terrorism may have profound consequences, despite the failure of the insurgents to seize power themselves. Institutional disruption, as in Uruguay, may greatly affect patterns of political participation, including civil-military relations, and affect the whole range of government policy.

Militarily, however, insurgents will probably continue to fail to seize power in urban settings because:

*Realization of this possibility, which contradicted Guevara's early theories, is at the heart of much of what has been written by Régis Debray, who nonetheless also sought initially to explain away failure.*
(a) Overall, the Latin American urban sectors are generally not revolution oriented.*

(b) Government institutional capabilities for control and responsiveness are generally stronger in urban than in rural areas.**

(c) Many—though not all—of the insurgents started as romantic intellectuals and students who lacked discipline and competence at revolutionary action, and they are now frequently too isolated to be nationally effective despite their increased experience.***

(d) The insurgents have failed to develop a rural component to complement their urban strategy; historically, urban insurgency alone has never succeeded militarily without rural support.****

THE DECLINE IN EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Furthermore, not only do internal political-strategic considerations work against urban insurgency, but the external environment is no longer as supportive of violent revolution in Latin America as during the early and mid-1960s. Soviet spokesmen generally continue to advocate peaceful struggle, and even the Chinese and the Cubans have curtailed their former support for armed struggle. Fidel Castro now appears to favor a two-sided


** This is probably true despite the persistence of notorious problems of competition and absence of coordination among most Latin American police, military, and other security forces. Even in Uruguay, where they frequently make the authorities look like fools, the *tupamaros* can only aspire to seize power (if at all) by political, not military, means. This conclusion is supported by Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 20, No. 5, September-October 1971, pp. 14-23, who nonetheless also argues that the very presence of urban terrorists threatens democratic institutions.

*** The exceptions are chiefly to be found in "traditional violence" situations where radical causes were grafted onto banditry. For one example, which can also be applied *mutatis mutandis* to Venezuela and Guatemala, see R. L. Maullin, *The Fall of Dumar Aljure, A Colombian Guerrilla and Bandit*, RM-5750-ISA, The Rand Corporation, November 1968.

**** Evidence for this may be found in L. Gann, *Guerrillas in History*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1971.
policy--normalized relations with some progressive Latin American regimes combined with the encouragement of violent revolution in certain other countries. Even in the latter, Cuban support for revolution has in effect receded to the level of rhetoric; for Cuba's export of men, materials, and money has dwindled to the point that the active remnants frequently criticize Cuban inaction. In general, even when foreign participation in insurgencies was present during the 1960's, it was rarely, if at all, decisive in affecting the outcome.

**PERMANENT NONREVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE**

To say that revolutionary violence and insurgency will probably not constitute a serious internal security threat or problem during the 1970s is not to say that violence will abate in Latin America. Limited, non-revolutionary kinds of domestic political violence will probably continue unceasingly--and in some countries might even increase. The kinds of violent disturbances that can be expected are familiar, including, without attempting to present a formal typology:

1. peasant revolt and rural social banditry;
2. worker strikes and riots;
3. student rebellions and demonstrations;
4. racial, ethnic, and immigrant strife;
5. religious conflicts;
6. populist, multi-class demonstrations and disturbances, often over electoral or economic issues;
7. military revolts and coups d'état;
8. assassinations or murders of political leaders;
9. criminal violence associated with the smuggling of narcotics, arms, and consumer goods.

* Despite occasional rhetorical statements to the contrary, Chile is not likely to provide much effective encouragement to armed insurgents in neighboring countries--at least as long as good relations with these countries remain important to Chile's international posture.

These are the most durable forms of domestic political violence in Latin America. Where they exist, these problems may be treated as internal security threats by the governments in power. Nevertheless it is not clear that such internal security problems automatically threaten Latin America's prospects for development or, for that matter, its relations with the United States. Indeed, one may wonder whether development and modernization in Latin America can proceed without at least some violence. Far from being abnormal or unnatural, such domestic violence seems intimately related to Latin America's course and prospects for development (and decay, where it is also the case). More often than not, sporadic violence is an unavoidable and even necessary adjunct of such processes as bids by marginal social sectors to secure the resolution of popular grievances and to increase their participation in the established institutions; the emergence of new, modernizing elites and power groups within the nation; and—often overlooked—efforts by the government to establish and centralize institutional authority over isolated and unruly rural areas of the national territory. It is virtually impossible for governments to rid their societies of violence; and complete pacification might require such violence-laden suppression as to induce stagnation and be counterproductive.*

PAST ASSUMPTIONS AND UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES

With respect to these forms of "permanent" domestic violence, it is becoming increasingly clear that several common assumptions need to be modified, if not rejected. These are the interrelated assumptions that

o domestic political violence can necessarily have only bad consequences for national and hemispheric security and development;

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*This, of course, is the argument of Catholic radicals, who have introduced the term "institutional violence" to characterize a state so organized. For a general discussion of Catholic attitudes, see L. Einaudi, R. Maullín, A. Stepan, and M. Fleet, Latin American Institutional Development: The Changing Catholic Church, RM-6136-DOS, The Rand Corporation, October 1969.
the lower the level of domestic violence, the better necessarily the prospects for development; and

therefore nations and governments need to be automatically "shielded" against violence and violence-induced instabilities if they are to proceed with effective development.

Some commonly cited examples of the potentially bad consequences of violence and instability are heavy budget allocations to military rather than to economic development, the disruption of foreign investment, the deterioration of already-weak political institutions, and the proliferation of anti-democratic tendencies. *

These, however, are neither the only nor even the necessary consequences of violence. The presence of regionally circumscribed violence—even including insurgency—may actually help foster continued development by challenging the ruling institutions and elites to govern and perform in more responsible and productive ways, if they have the capacity. To the extent that the government rises to the challenge, official responses to problems of violence have included, in addition to necessary military measures:

- greater attention to rural needs and demands, including agrarian reform;
- the establishment of new institutions and organizations for channeling and responding to popular needs and interests;
- greater national integration for isolated and unruly areas;
- improved military institutionalization and capabilities.

Thus, depending on the government's capabilities and intentions, and on the characteristics of the insurgency, unsuccessful insurrections may stimulate salutary as well as adverse effects on national development. In cases where violence is limited, as in Peru during 1965-1966, the threat of increased violence can motivate government leadership to undertake important subsequent reforms. Indeed, even where the violence

*These last assumptions, characteristic of the Alliance for Progress plans, are still put forth in the recent book The Alliance That Lost Its Way by Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis (Twentieth Century Fund, 1971).
was considerable, as in Venezuela between 1960 and 1967, the salutary consequences of the government's responses to insurgency may over the long run outweigh the temporary adverse effects. Such optimism does not seem warranted for Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, where institutional fragility and political violence have persisted at high levels over prolonged periods of time. Yet even in those countries there have been some positive outcomes, primarily relating to institutional and rural development.*

FUTURE COMPLEXITIES

To say that domestic political violence, whether revolutionary or reformist, will probably not pose a serious internal security threat to Latin American development during the 1970s is not to say that the pressures and opportunities for radical change and reform will abate or cease during this decade. Rather, they will likely increase: the Latin America of the 1970s may become much more radical than the Latin America of the 1960s, with particularly profound consequences for U.S. economic interests.

In part, pressures for radical change will continue to emanate from insurgent revolutionary elements. One striking feature of the scenario for the 1970s implicit in the above discussion is that military containment of revolutionary violence is leading to new pressures for change. These may now come not so much from elements operating outside the established policymaking institutions, but from the emergence of new nationalistic elites and perspectives within the established institutions, especially the state bureaucracies, the military, and the Church. Thus, when U.S. interests seem threatened, U.S. policymakers may increasingly find that the source of the presumed threat is a

*For further elaboration of these points, see Sec. IV, pp. 28-31. We present them as preliminary findings for which the research evidence is as yet incomplete. To cite some research on just one country, for example, the points or "lessons" are substantiated by L. Einaudi, Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1868, P-4676, The Rand Corporation, July 1971; and by Lt. Col. John G. Waggener, "La Convencion, 1962-1963, A Classical Stability Operation in Latin America," U.S. Army War College Student Essay, 13 November 1967.
government itself rather than revolutionary elements previously classified as military internal security problems.

Latin American perceptions of just what constitutes an internal security threat are also changing. Concepts of national internal security that focus not simply on revolutionary insurgents, but more generally on economic development and social backwardness as the central causes of violence are increasingly appealing to nationalist elites, including military leaders. Under this broader conceptualization of internal security, threats are perceived to come not only from left-wing extremists but also from foreign interests and elites, which are presumed to dominate the economic structure, commit economic aggression, and assure national dependency on foreign powers and markets. Accordingly, major U.S. business interests are sometimes viewed as violence-inducing and hence as threats to internal security and to the prospects for national development. Thus, traditional U.S. notions of internal security (as stable conditions for business, diplomatic relations, etc.) may frequently clash with nationalist interpretations that are spreading among rising elites in some countries.

VIOLENCE AND FUTURE U.S. POLICY

In summary, what are the important points which stand out from this discussion, as they relate to the conditions for the three options discussed in Section I?

1. Revolutionary insurgencies, whether rural or urban, are not likely to constitute major internal security threats on a hemisphere-wide basis, though they may continue to create lesser problems requiring some military attention.

* This is a central finding of L. Einaudi and A. Stepan's Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil, R-586-DOS, The Rand Corporation, April 1971.

** And socialist critiques may similarly find acceptance in nationalist circles. Salvador Allende clearly is hoping to achieve this linkage by claiming that violence is the historic weapon of the political right, and democracy the precursor to socialism. See his Manosaje al Congreso, Santiago, May 23, 1971.
2. Foreign support for revolutionary violence has diminished, particularly in comparison to the early and mid-1960s.

3. Nonrevolutionary forms of domestic political violence will continue to generate some internal security problems, but will not necessarily prove inimical to Latin American development or to U.S.-Latin American relations.

4. The effective sources of radicalism affecting Latin American institutions, practices, and elites will increasingly be found within rather than outside established institutions, as a new generation of elites assumes power.

5. Internal security problems may increasingly be seen by Latin American officials to derive not only from the revolutionary insurgents but also from the politico-economic hegemony of foreign powers with local interests.
III. THE LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL CONTEXT

LATIN AMERICAN INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITIES

During the 1960s, MAP to Latin America was partly justified on the grounds that Latin American military capabilities were too weak to cope with the Castroite-Communist insurgency threat without external assistance. Internal security assistance was deemed essential if the Latin American militaries were to prevent violent revolution and provide the shield behind which their governments might proceed with development. Certainly, if Latin American militaries clearly had competent independent capabilities to combat the insurgencies, there would have been little justifiable need for direct MAP support for internal security missions as such.

What is the condition of Latin American internal security capabilities in the 1970s? Are the Latin American militaries still so weak, in relation to the current and anticipated threat levels, that the performance of their internal security missions must rely as heavily upon MAP support as during the 1960s? In overall regional terms, Latin American military capabilities for internal security seem to have improved substantially since 1960. Modern techniques have been introduced in logistics, transportation, communications, air support, training, and general command functions. The impact has generally been strongest, however, on the professionalization of the officer corps and on the combat-preparedness of specific units, frequently MAP-supported, rather than diffused throughout the military structures.

How substantial and durable are these general improvements from an operational viewpoint? Certainly none of the Latin American militaries are adequately prepared to fight all-out revolutionary or conventional wars. To become so prepared would require exorbitant and indeed untenable expenditures of public resources and energies. Moreover, few militaries are capable of combating and controlling such major incidents as simultaneous guerrilla operations in both rural and urban areas if these had more than token popular support. Nevertheless, recent experience suggests that most of the region's militaries can adequately cope with minor and moderate internal security problems and
threats, with little or no foreign assistance other than routine acquisition of training, small materiel supplies, and specialized noncombat advice, such as on the installation of management systems.*

According to the analysis in the preceding section, during the 1970s Latin America will be characterized precisely by minor and moderate—not major—levels of domestic political violence. With few exceptions, therefore, Latin American military capabilities appear to be generally consonant with their expected internal security missions and threats. Indeed, while it is clear that most Latin American military forces fall short of the ideal in matters related to maintenance, management, and logistics, it also appears that several military forces, notably those of Peru and Colombia, might have a good deal to teach others on doctrine, organization, tactics, and techniques.**

In general, those countries with militaries that seem most capable of meeting expected internal security needs in fairly self-reliant fashion include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Together, these nations account for most of the land, population, and resources of Latin America, as well as for most of the MAP allocations and expenditures (70 percent during 1966-70). Therefore, within the region, internal security capabilities appear to be most adequate in precisely those countries that have together accounted for the majority of past MAP activities. To the extent that MAP continues to those countries (and there are now only training grants to the major countries), there may be less need for programs designed to alleviate shortcomings in their internal security capabilities, and greater need for attention to general institutional capabilities for professional military conduct under a wide variety of circumstances.

Yet this growing independence in internal security matters does

* This, in fact, is largely the content of U.S. Military Assistance Programs to Latin America since 1968.

** An exchange on these matters between U.S. and Latin American officers, which can take place partially through educational institutions like the U.S. Army School for Latin America at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, or the John F. Kennedy Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, could also provide indirect support for the maintenance of present internal security capabilities.
not yet mean the end of dependency. In the first place, a small number of cases remain (perhaps including Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala) in which the militaries appear to have difficulty in sustaining their limited capabilities against revolutionary insurgents without some foreign assistance. In the second place, there still remains some possibility of a serious internal contingency arising which local forces might not be able to control without external assistance. On both those accounts, and allowing for national variations, militaries within the hemisphere continue to be dependent upon outside resources for the performance of some internal security missions. (The "fit" between Latin American needs and U.S. assistance capabilities is discussed in Section IV.)

Insufficiency of Military Means Alone

Military capabilities and security capabilities are not, however, synonymous. Rather, there is a crucial nonmilitary dimension to effective internal security: the political capabilities of the government. Indeed, the significance of military factors in counterinsurgency and pacification depends critically upon the nature of the political context. Political conditions are more important than military conditions in explaining the causes of insurgencies and other forms of domestic political violence; and likewise political measures and factors (such as effective leadership, institutional accommodation, and popular support), rather than military capabilities, essentially determine the final outcomes. Indeed, in case after case in Latin America, it appears that military capabilities were less significant than political factors in the overall explanation of the successful defeat or containment of revolutionary insurgencies or the resolution of domestic problems involving other forms of political violence.

Though frequently of critical immediate importance, military capabilities may not mean much in the absence of political capabilities to rule and govern. As a general observation, increases in military

*Section IV, pp. 28-31, presents some data in a further discussion and elaboration of this point.
capabilities do not necessarily provide equivalent or even cost-effective increases in internal security capabilities; the real weaknesses and incapacities may very well be political rather than military in nature. Indeed, for Latin America as a whole, an increase in military capabilities appears to be less important now that so many important countries seem to have developed fairly adequate military capabilities for internal security.

**Latin American Capabilities and U.S. Policy**

In summary, then, these major points bear upon the three options:

1. The internal security capabilities of many Latin American countries—especially the larger, more developed ones—improved substantially during the 1960s, and though still greatly improvable, they are reasonably adequate for coping with the probable internal threat levels of the 1970s, making those countries less dependent upon extensive outside assistance and support.

2. For some countries more than for others, there still remains some dependency upon continued, though declining, external assistance for developing or sustaining capabilities for internal security missions.

3. Greater improvements of Latin American internal security capabilities may be less important than similar improvements in government political capabilities to respond to and cope with the nonmilitary causes of domestic political violence.

**LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS**

MAP performance is affected not only by Latin American capabilities, but also by the expectations (interests and objectives) that Latin American governments and militaries bring to bear on it. Even though MAP is meant to serve U.S. interests and objectives above all else, the ways in which it does or does not meet the expectations, needs, and problems of the recipient countries may have great consequences for the political, military, and economic relations between the U.S. and the recipient. For example, U.S. refusal to sell Peru jet fighters, and Peru's subsequent purchase of French Mirages, provides an outstanding case of the disfunctional consequences of unharmonized
objectives. In general, as the Nixon Doctrine explicitly recognizes, a U.S. program that is designed to some extent to harmonize rationales and objectives with a host government is ordinarily more effective than a U.S. program that is poorly coordinated with particular local objectives.

Allowing for variations from country to country, what then is the scope of general expectations—or interests and objectives—of the Latin American governments and militaries toward the U.S. security assistance programs? In discussions with Latin Americans, the authors have heard proposals that MAP resources be used to promote the following wide-ranging local objectives (not all of which necessarily coincide with U.S. objectives):

- to improve operational capabilities for internal security and counterinsurgency;
- to carry on civic action missions;
- to enhance, where needed, the capabilities for conventional external defense and territorial control;
- to help develop the capacity required to control U.S. and other nations' private fishing boats operating in national waters;
- to promote general military professionalization and institutionalization;
- to retain access to logistical and other supplies in case of emergencies;
- to promote good working relations and contacts with the U.S. military;
- to decrease the costs of programs, procurements, and developments that might otherwise be too expensive to afford, or that might detract from civilian socioeconomic development funds;
- to keep abreast of information about modern technological developments in the military field;

*This conflict is set into the broader framework of Peruvian politics and U.S. foreign policy in Luigi R. Einaudi, *Peruvian Military Relations with the United States*, P-4389, The Rand Corporation, June 1970. The unwillingness of many Americans in public life to recognize Latin American interests of a defensive nature is amply demonstrated in the hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, April 14, 16, 17, 1969, *United States Relations with Peru*. 
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o to promote the transfer of technology and technological skills that have civilian as well as military applications;

o to obtain specific items of equipment or advice that are unobtainable elsewhere;

o to retain the United States as a major—but not necessarily exclusive—supplier of arms, equipment, and training;

o to provide military personnel with opportunities for foreign travel and entertainment;

o to oppose Communism and other forms of extremism;

o to enhance the partisan political stability of certain governments;

o to improve the prestige of the military in its own country and elsewhere;

o to keep open channels of political communication and develop influential relations with a powerful (military) sector of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus;

o to improve their sources of intelligence and information as to U.S. dispositions and intentions;

o to retain the United States as an ally in hemispheric and other international forums;

o and indeed just to please the United States by accepting something its government wants to give.

Clearly, there are complex and sometimes contradictory objectives and expectations, ranging from some that are essentially military to others that are quite economic and political in nature. Just as clearly, Latin American militaries and governments expect MAP to serve much more than just internal security missions, depending upon the particular country and its circumstances. The complexity of national expectations, even when they are not supported by the United States, can cause difficulties for a MAP rationale that is singularly identified with one particular military mission, such as internal security.

During the 1960s, internal security was indeed a foremost military preoccupation in many Latin American countries, and thus the internal-security rubric seemed to function fairly well as the dominant rationale and objective of MAP. Yet even then it was beginning to be inadequate from a Latin American perspective. Many officers resented the implication that they were accepting U.S. assistance to make their countries secure in accordance with (or on behalf of?) U.S. interests. In several
important countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, other defense objectives were deemed equally or even more important and legitimate. Moreover, in countries such as Colombia and Peru, military officers sometimes blamed civil officials for internal security problems and represented heavy responsibility for problems they felt could not be resolved by military means alone.

During the 1970s we can expect a narrow internal security rationale to become considerably less congruent with Latin American perspectives. Whether as a result of lessening threats or improved capabilities, internal security needs and missions are becoming less vital in a number of countries, such as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, which prepared for and defeated or contained rural insurgencies during the 1960s. Moreover, during the 1970s objectives other than counterinsurgency seem likely to assume increasing importance in many Latin American countries, making internal security even less relevant as a general rationale. In particular, Latin American militaries continue to perceive conventional external defense missions and needs as having legitimacy, and hope MAP will accommodate to this. Spreading claims to territorial sovereignty over oceans to a 200-mile limit reveal the value they place on such conventional defense missions. At a minimum, even though they do not expect U.S. support, Latin American militaries desire to maintain practical working relations with the United States, apart from internal security missions.

Finally, though internal security objectives appear to be declining in importance relative to other needs to which the Latin Americans hope MAP will accommodate, Latin American militaries and governments will certainly retain internal security as one of their several preeminent concerns. Indeed, in Chile and Mexico the internal security missions are receiving more attention than ever before.

Latin American Security Interests and U.S. Policy

In summary, then, the following points bear most importantly from a Latin American viewpoint upon the choice among the three options:

1. In general, it appears that Latin American objectives and expectations have been much more complex than the MAP internal
security rubric can satisfactorily encompass, and this will continue to be the case.

2. In some countries Latin American officers consider internal security to be an unprofessional or politically hazardous institutional preoccupation; they wish to deemphasize it, particularly the association of internal security with submission to U.S. interests.

3. With the decline in insurgency threats in most countries and a general improvement in military and police capabilities, internal security will become less essential as a security-assistance objective, though it will still remain important if only on a contingency or preparedness basis.

4. Security assistance expectations and objectives other than internal security will probably assume increasing importance for the Latin American militaries and governments during the 1970s.
IV. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTAL CONTEXT

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE CAPABILITIES

MAP is premised in part on the assumption that, through internal security assistance programs, the United States has effective capabilities for influencing the outcomes of revolutionary violence in Latin America. In fact, through MAP the United States has contributed, directly or indirectly, to the defeat or containment of virtually every major rural insurgency that has arisen in the hemisphere in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution. The difficulty lies in assessing that contribution. Just how significant was MAP in the counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1960s? Just how effective an instrument is MAP for promoting internal security in Latin America today?*

Analytical Complexities

Some observers might argue that MAP has been an extremely effective instrument for developing internal security, indeed that it has virtually saved Latin America (or at least some countries) from Communist revolutions. From this viewpoint, local military capabilities were so lacking in the early 1960s that the insurgents might have won, as they did in Cuba, if the United States had not provided substantial advisory, doctrinal, materiel, and training assistance. From this perspective, U.S. assistance made a profound contribution to local military capabilities, and military capabilities were precisely the decisive factors in successful counterinsurgency.**

In practice, however, it appears to be quite difficult to model the direct relationships between MAP allocations and programs and effective counterinsurgency outcomes. The view we have outlined above makes effective counterinsurgency dependent on the MAP input. The difficulties

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* A fuller study of MAP would also have to relate effectiveness at internal security with the effectiveness of MAP in contributing to other purposes. Unfortunately, the limits of this study do not allow for such an assessment, except by implication.

** This perspective, found more often in public press and political circles than among academic observers, probably reflects traditional U.S. "can do" attitudes considered with some anti-political ethnocentrism.
for determining the MAP input begin right at the level of data collection and include such questions as,

Were MAP allocations used for internal security or for other missions and objectives?*
Which MAP allocations related directly to internal security, and which related indirectly to it?
How much of the materiel allocated arrived at the destination in time and in ways to be effective?
What resources did the host military have or might have mustered without U.S. assistance?

With regard to analyzing local outcomes, the difficulties pertain not only to data collection, but also to the definition of what is meant by "effectiveness" or "success" at internal security and counterinsurgency. Does it mean the capacity to limit the impact of the insurgents on the population and the government (or to physically eliminate them) or to change the conditions that nurtured them? or all of these? or something else?

Despite these problems, it seems clear that there is no simple, direct relationship between MAP inputs and local counterinsurgency outcomes. MAP provided substantial internal security assistance and Latin American governments and militaries successfully defeated or contained the insurgencies in their countries in the 1960s; however, this does not necessarily mean that MAP was particularly effective, or even that it was a major factor. Theoretically, at least, insurgents might have failed of their own incompetence, or local military forces might have produced similar outcomes without assistance while using MAP inputs for other purposes.

Certainly, with respect to the countries that have experienced active insurgencies (Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela), there appears to be no simple correlation between the general scope of MAP allocations and the failures of insurgency, if these are measured by the scope and duration of the armed struggle. As one glaring

*See our discussion of U.S. interests, below, for a listing of some of these related objectives.
comparative example, Colombia has apparently benefited in quantitative terms much more from MAP than has Bolivia, yet the guerrilla insurgencies have been more readily defeated in Bolivia than in Colombia.

Conditions for Success

What additional variables or conditions may intervene to account for this uncertain relationship between MAP inputs and insurgency outcomes, and perhaps provide an even better explanation for the successful containment or defeat of the insurgencies of the 1960s? The answer might be clearer if we were briefly to describe the optimum or ideal conditions for MAP effectiveness, then consider whether they were met. These conditions could be stated as follows: MAP would be most effective in contributing to internal security when

(a) all MAP allocations for internal security are actually used for internal security in the recipient countries;*
(b) the Latin American militaries have high capacities to absorb and retain the benefits of assistance;
(c) counterinsurgency is essentially a military activity; and
(d) the insurgents have limited political prospects and capabilities for success, and are relying on military action to create political conditions, as happened, for example, with Guevara in Bolivia.

If all four conditions existed, then the effectiveness of MAP capabilities might loom very large indeed in the explanation of successful counterinsurgency. In fact, however, it appears that only the last condition was generally the case during the 1960s.

In the first place, MAP allocations authorized for internal security simply could not always go directly for the improvement of internal security capabilities in the recipient countries. Though the inputs may sometimes have had worthy indirect effects, it appears that occasionally MAP had relatively little to do with internal security

*This includes, perhaps, the critical internal security dimension the United States might seek to retain: the capacity to respond to a genuine request for sale of a specific service or materiel item otherwise unavailable to an ally.
capabilities, especially in those countries not faced with serious problems of political violence. Clearly, to the extent that MAP did not serve internal security objectives, U.S. capabilities to contribute to internal security through assistance need to be qualified.*

A second intervening consideration is the nature of the recipient military, for it is precisely the local institution that converts MAP allocations into counterinsurgency operations. In particular, the effectiveness of MAP is constrained and conditioned by the capacity of the host military to absorb, use, and retain MAP inputs. These capacities reflect local military development and self-reliance, and involve such institutional features, among other things, as the general level of education, the presence of technicians and technically trainable personnel, officer assignment and rotation policies, inter-service and intra-service management systems, the experiences with arms and equipment hardware, and the level of general professionalization.** Theoretically, the higher the absorptive and retentive capacities of the recipient military, the more effective U.S. assistance can be; yet a recipient military with those characteristics may not need much assistance. The lower the absorptive and retentive capacities of the recipient military, the less effectively it can use U.S. assistance.

* This point is discussed further in the next section, from the perspective of U.S. interests and objectives.

** Detailed and reliable measures of local military effectiveness are of course difficult to obtain in advance of actual operations. Some indicators of local capacity and self-reliance that may deserve greater attention than they have received in past analyses include:

- **NCO Corps.** Does it provide a basis for effective operations? Factors to consider include the role of noncommissioned personnel with command authority (as distinct from personnel with specialist skills), their training, and their rate of retention (attrition) in service.

- **Counterinsurgency doctrine.** Is it realistic in light of local conditions? One factor, which would also suggest the degree of dependence on external assistance, would be whether foreign manuals are relied upon in preference to, or to the exclusion of, locally produced analyses and doctrine.

- **Military school system.** Does it provide the basis for a professional and adaptable institution? What courses are taught? by whom? to whom? What is the nature of the dependence on supplementary training from abroad?

One indicator of dependence on U.S. support might be, for example, man-months of training provided by the United States as a percentage of man-months of training provided locally.
as a whole; yet only one unit, well-trained, well equipped, and psychologically motivated through MAP, could significantly improve the capabilities of this recipient military. In practice, the more developed Colombian and Peruvian militaries have indeed displayed a somewhat greater capacity to utilize MAP inputs for counterinsurgency than have the less developed Venezuelan and Guatemalan militaries. Nevertheless, the inclusion of this factor does not explain adequately why guerrilla insurgencies were defeated or contained more promptly or more roundly in some countries than in others.

Indeed, these points suggest a lack of strong correlation between a recipient's military capabilities and the failure of an attempted insurgency. For example, the Bolivian military has had much less capacity to absorb and retain military assistance than most other militaries. One unit of Bolivian rangers did absorb a heavy dose of U.S. counterinsurgency training in a short period of time, but once U.S. support was withdrawn their comparatively low retentive capacity was shortly reflected in the ranger unit's inability to remain operational as an independent combat-effective force. Nevertheless, during the 1960s rural insurgency was more readily defeated in Bolivia than elsewhere.

The Primacy of Politics

In fact, virtually all cases indicate that military considerations (whether U.S. assistance or local capabilities) were less important than domestic political conditions in determining the outcome of insurgencies.

- In Bolivia the Guevarista insurgency failed primarily because it attracted no popular support from the conservative peasants of the altiplano, who were historically proud of the Bolivian revolution and its problematic land reform.
- In Colombia the various guerrilla movements failed primarily because they rallied little popular support beyond their traditional enclaves, because the central government institutions were fairly strong, and because government officials increased communication with the rural areas.
- In Guatemala the insurgents have failed repeatedly because they lacked popular support, because civilian groups formed to act as counterinsurgent terrorists on behalf of the government, and because central government officials began to pay somewhat more attention to pressing needs in the rural areas.
In Peru revolutionary insurgents were denied prospects for peasant support in the La Convencion valley when the government linked the area into the national economy and polity by building a road, dispatching official bureaucratic representatives, and instituting a mild land reform.

In Venezuela the guerrilla groups failed basically because the central government institutions were relatively strong, and because the political and organizational skills of President Rómulo Betancourt and his party attracted popular support to the government.

If we compare these cases, we see some striking similarities, which make the primacy of political factors in effective counterinsurgency stand out all the more clearly. Geo-politically, the Bolivian altiplano, the Colombian departments of Antioquia and Marcuetalia (among others), the Guatemalan Northeast, Peru's La Convención valley, and the Venezuelan regions of Falcón and El Charal are all characterized, in varying degrees, by several significant common features: they are all physically isolated areas with unruly impoverished populations that have begun to destroy the old hacienda system of life but have not yet been integrated or linked into the national economic markets and government bureaucracies. It was essentially the political impact of these conditions that caused those areas to become logical bases for insurgent revolutionaries. Indeed, throughout history the great peasant revolts have typically occurred in postfeudal societies that are just beginning to undergo a centralization and bureaucratization of political power and authority—a fact suggesting that occasional peasant rebellions are natural and not necessarily alarming features of development and modernization. Further, as the Latin American experience demonstrates, such rebellions are neither long lasting nor capable in themselves of producing durable political change on a national scale.

Moreover, a comparison of the cases also reveals striking similarities in the government policies and measures that prevented the insurgents from succeeding in those areas. In each case, the insurgents failed not because of military measures alone, but rather because of political conditions and government policies taken in collaboration with the military. More specifically, the resolution of the internal security problems ultimately depended upon successful extension of the
general institutional authority of the central government to the affected area. This was usually accomplished by sending government bureaucrats along with the army soldiers, by organizing party or interest groups for the articulation and representation of demands, by opening government offices that would provide acceptable institutional forms for processing and directing local demands, and by instituting some—even minimum—socioeconomic reforms that served to rally popular allegiance for the central government.

Military activity thus symbolized central government power and authority, thereby contributing to the stabilizing process. Nevertheless, experience suggests it was the effective presence of minimally responsive government agencies and officials other than the military that really afforded discontented peasants and other elements a viable alternative to support for a guerrilla or bandit countergovernment. Over the long run, the establishment of institutional presence through social and political programs has accounted more than military activities for the demise of the guerrilla forces within their spheres of influence. Governments that lack political capabilities in this sense are at a tremendous disadvantage.

Evidence from the Cuban case tends to confirm this general analysis. The region in which Fidel Castro and his band were able to establish a popularly supported guerrilla base was precisely an area in which civilian government agencies and officials had little or no presence, not even police. Historically, whenever violence or other serious problems had arisen in the Sierra Maestra, the army was dispatched to settle the matter. For a broad range of reasons, Batista's government particularly lacked the capacity and the responsibility to deal politically and institutionally with popular problems in that region. Since the local institutional alternatives boiled down to support for the reform-minded guerrillas or collaboration with repression, many chose the former.*

* Even Ernesto Guevara recognized the primacy of this political environment. In his handbook on guerrilla warfare, he noted that a violent strategy was tenable only after peaceful actions had been closed off by the government. In his Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War Guevara gives in passing abundant proof of the importance of the support received from members of Cuba's provincial upper classes, like the Babún
Had the United States provided massive internal security assistance to the Batista government of Cuba in order to combat the rural insurgency of Castro and the urban insurgency of the 26th of July Movement, the outcome would probably have changed only in the unlikely event that political and institutional factors (such as the capacity of Batista's army to absorb assistance and use it intelligently) had changed also. Nevertheless, it now seems clear that, aside from Cuba, the conditions for violent nationwide revolution did not exist in any of the other countries that experienced guerrilla warfare during the 1960s. In fact, conditions were only rarely sufficient for the revolutionary insurgents to establish power domains in isolated unruly areas that were just beginning to be incorporated in the national authority structures. These rural "foci," in turn, did not have the national impact anticipated by revolutionary theorists, and many of the self-styled revolutionaries ultimately proved to be romanticizing students and teenagers with capabilities for little more than dramatic acts of terrorism that made good international press copy without being of direct political consequence.

Indeed, it appears to be precisely because revolutionary conditions did not exist that military means (and with them, MAP internal security assistance) appear to have been effective. If the military, and especially the political structures, had been so weak that conditions for revolution or civil war objectively existed, then MAP inputs alone might have done little good, or would have proved extremely costly in other dimensions.

Political Limits of MAP for Counterinsurgency

It is in the political rather than the military sense of internal security capabilities that many Latin American governments are weakest. Incremental improvements in political capabilities might have much greater payoff than further incremental increases in military capabilities. Military officers seem well aware of this in some countries: army officers in Colombia have even pressured civilian counterparts to

brothers. Nonetheless, like so many of the practitioners of insurgency and counterinsurgency, Guevara ultimately focused primarily on tactics and techniques of violence, thereby overemphasizing military factors in a fashion that contributed to his own death.
improve their competence and responsibility, and in Peru the armed forces ousted Belaúnde's civilian regime primarily because of its perceived political incapacities to rule nationally and effectively. However, great difficulties slow the improvement of civil-military cooperation and impair the capacity of civilian bureaucrats and other officials to govern effectively and responsibly.

MAP can naturally do little about this, and there is always the risk that the very presence of MAP, particularly with a strong internal security rationale, could detract somewhat from the political conditions required for overall success. The availability of MAP may also facilitate preoccupation with military responses to internal security, thus diverting attention away from shortcomings in political capabilities for response and rule. These political capabilities, in turn, have considerable impact on the ways in which military assistance is used by the recipient, which may potentially range from repression of the citizenry to pressure for governmental reform.

From this discussion, it appears that because of the importance of domestic factors, MAP has probably not played a decisive role in resolving internal security issues in Latin America. In general, it appears that MAP has contributed most clearly to helping modernize the Latin American militaries as professional institutions with multiple capabilities—with obvious benefits also for operational internal security capabilities. Moreover, if the United States and the recipient country agree on the uses to be made of it, MAP can contribute to the maintenance of politically useful cooperative working relations and contacts between the United States and the Latin American country. Indeed, it is in these general areas of general military development and politically useful intra-military contacts that MAP may have the greatest or most effective capabilities for the 1970s.**

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* The presence of foreign advisors tends to weaken the personal authority of host country military officers, and may even make them appear to be acting in behalf of foreign interests.

** Provided, of course, that some of the restrictive legislation, which frequently has turned even attempts to purchase equipment from the United States into sources of discord, are removed or substantially amended. See the discussion above, under Latin American security interests.
U.S. Security Assistance Capabilities and U.S. Policy

In summary, then, what are the major points here that bear most importantly upon the choice among the three options?

1. Rather than being a primary factor, MAP capabilities have limited, though important, secondary significance in the overall process of successful counterinsurgency.
2. In contributing to internal security, the impact of MAP may be limited by the diversion of resource allocations to other objectives, especially in countries not particularly concerned about internal security problems.
3. MAP's direct contribution to internal security may be limited by the recipient's incapacities to use MAP training and equipment effectively.
4. The primary factors in successful counterinsurgency are domestic political conditions and policies, to which MAP can usually make little effective contribution.
5. MAP capabilities appear to be more effective for achieving objectives other than internal security, such as the establishment of good U.S.-Latin American working relations and contacts, and the development of general professional military capabilities (which have indirect benefits for specifically internal security capabilities).

U.S. INTERESTS

Military assistance programs are designed to achieve objectives in the furtherance of U.S. interests. What is frequently bewildering to analysts of MAP, and what frequently makes important programs vulnerable to hostile outside critics, is the variety of objectives found, formally and informally, in official statements, Congressional testimony, and private arguments. An inventory of the overlapping and frequently contradictory objectives attributed to MAP might include the following:

- to prevent the growth of influence by the Soviet Union or foreign powers by assuring that the United States remain the predominant military influence;
- to reduce the threat from the extreme left;
- to improve the viability of certain regimes and governments;
- to promote political orientations favorable to the United States;
- To retain significant political influence for the United States within Latin America;
o to retain the Latin Americans as allies in hemispheric and other international forums;
o to lessen potential for interstate conflicts, and thus to discourage conventional wars and arms-races in Latin America;
o to reduce the politicization of the armed forces;
o to encourage the militaries to play a positive role favoring democratic political and socioeconomic development;
o to keep the militaries from consuming domestic funds that might better be allocated to socioeconomic development activities;
o to raise the level of economic development and technical capacity through civic action and training programs;
o to maintain the U.S. position as the preeminent supplier of equipment, arms, and technology, and thus to provide markets for U.S. skills and production;
o to restrain the expansion of military forces for conventional war;
o to improve operational capabilities for internal security;
o to sustain and perhaps strengthen U.S.-Latin American military relations as they apply to any needs for cooperative conventional hemispheric defense or peace-restoring missions;
o to maintain the capability of Latin American forces to contribute to international peacekeeping efforts;
o to promote military professionalism and institutionalization;
o to promote good working relations and contacts at the military level.

Although internal security served as the dominant rationale--and thus the principal objective--of MAP during the 1960s, this rough listing clearly suggests that the complete MAP objectives have in practice been much broader and more complex. They are political and economic as well as military in nature, and the internal security rubric does not embrace them all comprehensively. In the past, of course, MAP has served some important objectives, such as hemispheric preparedness and good working relations, which relate to internal security only indirectly, if at all.

The Internal Security Objective

During the 1960s when internal security needs and threats were deemed paramount in Latin America, the internal security rubric made
considerable sense as the dominant rationale and objective of MAP, despite the operational presence of other objectives. Yet even then there were signs of the rationale's limits, inadequacies, and costs. Most importantly, the balance between internal security and other objectives varied from country to country. For example, in Colombia and Guatemala internal security was a crucial governmental objective, whereas in Argentina and Brazil it was less important relative to the conventional hemispheric defense roles of their militaries. In all the major countries of Latin America except Mexico, the internal security design may have delayed, but certainly did not restrain their militaries from making costly purchases of technologically advanced weaponry from other foreign powers when the latter could not be obtained from the United States.

Moreover, besides such limitations, the internal security emphasis proved to have some undesirable and costly political side effects. Specifically, there were dangers that the U.S. was being drawn into internal partisan disputes, that the internal security emphasis was only further politicizing the Latin American militaries against U.S. wishes, and that some countries might exaggerate their estimations of their internal security threats in order to extract aid and assistance from the United States that could only be obtained by telling Americans what they seemed to want to hear. These side-effect costs would probably continue into the 1970s if internal security were retained as the principal MAP rationale and objective—though different rationales and objectives may similarly entail undesirable side effects.

The issue of MAP priorities for the 1970s has not yet been settled; yet it is increasingly clear that, from the U.S. perspective, internal security is becoming considerably less essential and less meaningful as the dominant rationale and objective. Of course some of the reasons for this relate to the reduced threat level, the improved Latin American security capabilities, the changing Latin American security assistance objectives, and the secondary effectiveness of MAP capabilities for specific internal security assistance situations. In this section, however, we are concerned not with these factors of the overall equation, but only with the relationship of the MAP internal security objective to the furtherance of overall United States objectives and interests.
What are current U.S. interests in Latin America? What makes Latin America valuable to the United States? Difficulties are inevitably encountered in trying to answer this question. Nevertheless, some of the basic, and indeed traditional, factors involved would generally seem to be the following:

1. **Military Interests.** The major military factors appear to be the denial of strategic bases in Latin America to hostile foreign powers; the maintenance of U.S. military supremacy in the Caribbean area; the Panama Canal and the U.S. military installations there; the continuing potential for Latin American participation in military alliances and activities; and the related demand for U.S. military training, equipment, and advice.

2. **Geographic Interests.** The major geographic factor is the strategic proximity of the Caribbean zone, including Mexico and Central America. South America (except for Venezuela and Colombia, which border the Caribbean), the Southern Pacific and Southern Atlantic waters, and the Cape Horn area seem less significant to the United States, although modern technology has diminished the significance of distance and therefore much of the geographic factor as well.

3. **Economic Interests.** The major economic factors that enter into U.S. interests are the value of such vital imported raw materials as petroleum and certain minerals, U.S. private investments, export markets, and the potential for industrial development in a few countries. However, though some very important U.S. corporations have major economic stakes in Latin America, it is difficult to see that United States society and its government per se have particularly strong economic interests in Latin America, Marxist theories of imperialism to the contrary, although loss of revenue from U.S. investments in Latin America would adversely affect our balance of payments. Certainly there are alternate sources for the strategic raw materials, and the nuclear stalemate and the advances of technology make Latin America less important as a strategic reserve for postwar recovery than may have been thought a generation ago. In the future, although the diversified industrialization of countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina will increase the economic (not to mention political) value of those countries to the United States, the resulting economic relations seem destined to approximate those we now have with Europe and Japan.

4. **Political Interests.** Major U.S. political interests appear to be the presence of generally pro-Western and pro-democratic ideological orientations, the presence of generally pro-U.S. governments in a number of major countries, and the need for some Latin American support in the form of votes in
international organizations and ratifications of international treaties. These interests are most threatened when a government aligns with or accepts penetration by a foreign power hostile to the United States.

5. **Communications Interests.** The major communications factor that enters into U.S. interests seems to be the Panama Canal, which is vital for inter-oceanic seagoing transportation and commerce.

6. **Psychological Interests.** The historic relations between the United States and Latin America, symbolically united by the concept of the "New World" and by traditional political and economic ties, has led to a difficult-to-identify but nonetheless important psychological relationship. Often referred to as the "special relationship" between the United States and Latin America, this relationship consists essentially of the assumption that the United States has been the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, and that every successful opposition to the United States therefore implies a weakening not merely of the United States position in Latin America, but, by inference, in the world.

Without attempting to establish priorities among these interests, we may ask how much of a threat internal security problems in Latin America may be expected to pose to U.S. interests. Based on the earlier conclusions that in general foreign-supported revolutionary insurgents stand little chance of mounting major operations or of seizing power, it appears that threats to U.S. interests from that source will not be serious in regional terms. Sporadic incidents of kidnapping, murder, hacking, building burning, and robbery directed at the lives and property of U.S. citizens certainly constitute some threat to U.S. interests, especially in a symbolic sense, and may require MAP as one possible response. Yet such forms of terroristic violence have not, and probably will not, add up to substantial threats to the major interests of the U.S. Government—especially in comparison with the threat levels perceived during the 1960s. Moreover, again in broad hemispheric terms, it is even more difficult to see that indigenous forms of reformist or protest violence will pose direct threats to general U.S. interests outside of the psychological sphere. Of course violence may sometimes indirectly threaten specific U.S. interests, such as the stability of a pro-U.S. regime or the general investment climate, but this is unlikely to become a hemisphere-wide threat. Rather, the most frequent
threats to traditional U.S. interests will probably come nonviolently from within Latin American regimes as the result of the rise of radical, or simply opportunistic, reformist, nationalist elites. In general, then, it appears that domestic political violence will not constitute a hemispheric threat to U.S. interests, though it may do so in a very limited number of countries.

Other Potential Objectives for the 1970s

Moreover, not only is the internal security objective becoming less important in terms of U.S. interests, but other objectives are assuming increasing importance for the promotion and protection of U.S. interests during the 1970s. Those objectives which may be furthered to some extent through MAP include:

- maintaining cooperative working contacts and relations through some advisory or liaison presence with local military forces;
- remaining the predominant foreign military influence in Latin America;
- securing political influence within radical nationalist regimes with military participation;
- preempting the possible spread of Soviet influence;
- fostering a generally pro-American orientation among officers;
- encouraging a hemispheric capacity for potential military co-operation and peacekeeping in future emergencies;
- helping to deter arms races and wars between Latin American countries;
- regaining a share of the Latin American arms market, and of the associated transfer of sophisticated technology and new equipment;
- continuing to promote the depoliticization, professionalization, and institutionalization of the Latin American militaries;
- restraining the expenditure of other U.S. resources on security assistance;
- and discouraging the unnecessary expenditure of Latin American resources on security matters.

Most of these objectives are only indirectly related to internal security, and some of them, such as regaining a share of the arms market, seem in
practice to have assumed top priority. As this happens, it will make less sense to treat internal security as the dominant rationale and objective of MAP, for in practice that will simply not be the case.

Nevertheless, internal security will probably continue to play a role as a significant objective of MAP in two ways: as a continuing country-specific program, and as an occasional contingency requirement. In the first place, what may be true for the hemisphere in general is often not true for each country separately. Country variations in Latin America are substantial. Accordingly, though internal security may play a lessened role in our relations with many of them, it may assume a continuing prominence in a few cases, perhaps Bolivia and Guatemala. Yet even in these countries it is doubtful that internal security programs will need to be sustained on a large scale or even that internal security would provide the best overall rationale or focus for MAP. Where local conditions automatically confer domestic political prominence on the military, in fact, it may be particularly advisable that U.S. relations with the military not be justified on an internal security basis.

In the second place, given the abiding unpredictabilities of the Latin American scene, there remains some residual probability that a serious internal security threat to U.S. interests might arise at some point (within the sensitive Caribbean area, for example). Under such circumstances, the United States might have a definite interest in supplying rapid internal security assistance to the particular government involved. The relatively limited probability of such a "worst case" situation certainly does not warrant its becoming a major operational preoccupation of MAP; yet it appears useful to maintain a residual capability to provide effective internal security assistance in an emergency through MAP.

Of course, to maintain that the internal security objective will continue to have some secondary importance on only a regular country-specific or irregular contingency basis is not to illuminate the policymaking criteria or conditions for actually providing such assistance in specific cases. Section I suggests five possible criteria or conditions that may be applied for deciding against or in favor of such assistance in a specific case.
U.S. Interests and MAP Policy

In summary, what then are the points here that bear most importantly upon the choice among the three options for security assistance?

1. In general, overall MAP objectives (and experiences) have been much more complex than the internal security rubric could satisfactorily rationalize, and this will increasingly continue to be the case.

2. With the decline in hemisphere-wide insurgency threats to U.S. interests in a number of countries and the general improvement in military and police capabilities, internal security is becoming less essential as an operational security-assistance objective, though it will remain important on at least a contingency or preparedness basis.

3. Security-assistance objectives other than internal security are assuming much greater importance for the 1970s, a period in which the United States appears to have few vital interests capable of being threatened by expected insurgencies.

4. The internal security emphasis of the past is now having some undesirable and even costly side effects.
V. CONCLUSION

Our purpose has been to investigate the relevance of internal security as a regional rationale and objective of MAP to Latin America in the 1970s. Three broad alternatives—to retain, modify, or eliminate the internal security emphasis currently in use—were set forth in the introduction as a means of giving focus to the analysis. Evaluations of the nature of domestic political violence, of Latin American security capabilities and interests, and of U.S. assistance capabilities and interests have been used as five criteria for judging the preferability of one option over another. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the following overall conclusion may be reached.

Option I—the retention of internal security as the dominant rationale and objective—may be appropriate for specific countries and situations, but for the hemisphere as a whole, this general policy alternative no longer seems relevant in terms of any of the analytical criteria employed here because of the following five negative conclusions:

(a) insurgencies do not pose a major threat to Latin American development and U.S.-Latin American relations;
(b) many Latin American militaries no longer need external assistance to cope with internal security problems;
(c) Latin American governments do not expect to use MAP for internal security objectives only;
(d) the United States does not have the assistance capabilities or effectiveness to control the course of domestic political violence in the hemisphere's development; and
(e) the U.S. Government in practice does not seem to expect MAP to serve and promote exclusively or predominantly the internal security objective.

As a result, prolongation of this policy, held over from the 1960s, could prove to be quite costly to U.S. interests, and to general U.S.-Latin American relations.

* Objections may be voiced because we did not, in the conclusion to this study, specify what countries (e.g., Uruguay) we feel should come
Option III—the complete elimination of internal security as a rationale and objective—may be appropriate for a few countries and situations, and has in its general favor the facts that the major insurgency threats have diminished and that Latin American militaries are increasingly capable of maintaining order. However, for the hemisphere as a whole, this policy alternative does not seem particularly relevant because of the following five negative conclusions:

(a) insurgency and domestic political violence have not ceased to be problems requiring governmental attention;
(b) the Latin American militaries do not all have adequate capabilities for coping with internal security problems;
(c) Latin American governments do not wish internal security to be eliminated as an objective;
(d) the United States is not completely lacking in capabilities to contribute to internal security; and
(e) the United States does not have an interest in relinquishing the possibilities of providing internal security assistance to some countries in some situations.

In general, implementation of Option III might severely restrict U.S. flexibility and capacity to respond to future contingencies and crises.

Option II—the retention of internal security as one of several objectives under a broader general rationale—appears to be the best policy alternative for MAP in the 1970s because:

(a) insurgency and other forms of domestic political violence remain problems requiring government attention;
(b) some, if not most, Latin American militaries continue to depend upon some outside assistance for the development or maintenance of their internal security capabilities;
(c) almost all Latin American governments expect MAP to accommodate to objectives they feel are important other than internal security ones;

under an internal security rationale. To do this, however, would require application of our criteria in an explicit fashion for which we have had neither the time nor the sponsorship.

Such a rationale might be derived from the Nixon Doctrine, harmonizing some of the more general interests both Latin America and the United States share in constructive military relations.
(d) while having some capabilities to contribute to internal security, MAP can serve other objectives even more effectively; and

(e) the United States expects MAP in practice to promote other important objectives than internal security.

In general, Option II seems to have the flexibility required by the extreme diversity of conditions in Latin America, where some countries may merit internal security assistance much more than others, and where U.S. interests and objectives may vary substantially from country to country.