POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF CULTURAL CHANGE ON THE NAVY IN THE 1970'S

VOLUME 6 PART III
Section 9 THE CONTINUING MILITARY CONTEXT
Section 10 VIETNAM & OTHER IMPACTS
Section 11 OLD & NEW DIRECTIONS

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Final Report

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PART III

Section 9

THE CONTINUING MILITARY CONTEXT
THE CONTINUING MILITARY CONTEXT

1. In eight Sections—Philosophical, International, Technological, Bio-Medical, Social and Cultural, Organizations, Domestic Institutions, and National Orientations—we have presented an extensive array of predictions across a wide spectrum of human endeavor. In these eight sections, the data has emphasized the entire international and domestic society; from the data we have identified particular aspects which appear likely to impact in an important way on the Navy. In these eight Sections, the military context has been derivative.

2. At this point, we reverse this emphasis. In these final three sections we concentrate upon the military context itself—not exclusively, but preponderently. Some aspects of future change will be unique to the military establishment, or disproportionate, or special. The military Services are well aware of numerous trends in progress, and are devoting imaginative effort to coping with it. In this Section, we focus on particular forces of change and give greater scope to the broad effects of these changes on the continuing military context—authority, organization, civil- ionization, management, leadership, education, and motivation.

The Continuing Military Ethos

3. The military ethos has a very long history, invulnerable at its best to anyone attempting to banish, diminish, or subvert it, in the interests of what he alleges to be a better society. At its worst, it shares with a number of "civilian" rationales responsibility for some of the most horrid and brutal acts of human history. "Shares" is properly chosen; some of the greatest tyrants and destroyers have been civilians—in modern times alone, we have witnessed the depredations of Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Ho Chi Minh, and Jack the Ripper—civilians all.

4. At its best, the military ethos has exemplified courage, endurance, sacrifice, and love at very high levels in the protection of constructive, free
societies against the predators.

At the core of the American military ethos are several convictions about war:

- War is at the extreme limit of, but is still an integral part of, the social process; it is not an extra-human aberration separated from the political and social structure and processes.

- War occupies the extreme step of a single ladder of conflict escalation; so long as no authority exists to force sovereign nations to desist from escalating violence, issues in contention will continue to arise over which passion or the prospects of aggrandizement will impel certain nations to undertake successive stages of violence, including, on occasion, the ultimate stage.

- The coming of war to a particular nation has nothing to do, necessarily, with that nation's innocence, or virtues, or peaceful intentions, or desires; war comes to both sides at the will of one side, the predator.

- If a society has reason to believe its institutions deserve to endure, rather than commit suicide or destroy one's institutions so that they may be superseded by those of a predator, the society will fight a war to preserve itself.

- The military man in a moral society fights any war which the duly constituted authorities of his society instruct him to fight.

- If one enters a war, it is better to win than to lose.

- Amateurs do not win wars against professionals. To prevail against a physically powerful, skilled, and determined opponent, a nation must fight with at least equal power, skill, and will—and, preferably, with more.

- Even if one adheres to all the rules of war, war is lethal business. There is no known nice way to fight a war.

- The proper management of violence in war is not the application of maximum destruction, nor the application of gratuitous or wanton destruction, but the application of enough destruction to force the predator to desist from recourse to physical violence. Nevertheless, depending upon the predator and the circumstances, the purpose may still require massive destruction.
To defend a moral society at the risk of one's life is a highly moral act, and those who participate in that act need offer no apologies—on moral grounds, least of all to those who benefited from the outcome but did not participate.

These are rather stark statements; many qualifications and nuances would be needed to flesh them out into full meaningfulness, such as the paradox that ethics and morality have both a good deal and practically nothing to do with international politics.

Almost worldwide peace climates have permeated international relations at certain times in the past and will doubtless recur again. At other times, the military ethos will be sorely needed for the preservation of moral societies. The military ethos is, in democratic polities, a reaction, a response, a principle that springs naturally and spontaneously out of special sets of circumstances. But those circumstances (war) are rooted, not in the military ethic itself, but in the unpredictable hearts of acquisitive, power-seeking men. It is myopic to mistake one for the other. War will decline when men no longer have access to physical power in search of dominance over others, and will disappear when men no longer seek dominance. Only then, will prudence permit the dismantling of military establishments.

How to preserve the essential core of the military ethic during recurrent waves of optimism towards alleged improvement in man's nature (periodically bordering on euphoria), coupled with misunderstanding and dismissal of any requirement for military men and military policy? Obviously, many lines of current and future change will conflict with several core principles enunciated above; various compromises and syntheses, now unpredictable, will emerge. But the society will inflict wounds on itself if it fails to preserve a minimal core of the military ethic as part of its most vital core of its value system.

In any event, the total compass of the military's perspective embraces a number of activities informed by a spirit of public service, many pursued in common with other social institutions, such as education, training, exploration, research, mapping, disaster relief, communications, and transportation.
5. It is not our intention here to explain the military ethos back to the military, nor even to explain it to the civilian. Our purpose is to make a specialized analysis, in the light of our times, on which can be based some predictions of future impacts. While we maintain objectivity and detachment, we hold a basic conviction that no time is foreseeable in which the United States will not need a competent military establishment. We are not nearly as certain concerning many future aspects of military affairs, as we approach possible changes in missions, organization, and methods.

6. To begin on a firm note of continuity, we should like to quote three authors on three important but often—misunderstood elements of the military ethos.

7. The first relates to the rabid fear of war, to the emotional repudiation of even highly-principled defense of one's own society, as though war were unrelated to any social purpose whatsoever, and as if its events were totally unique. The military man has never been able to accept such an unrealistic view, and James Gould Cozzens caught some of this mystification in his fine novel, Guard of Honor:

...You can be sure of getting pretty much what you work for. Since when? Since always.

Had Captain D..., then, worked for this state that so well suited him? Was Captain A..., getting what he worked for? Were there, perhaps, temporary wartime restrictions on getting what you worked for? No, not if you could face the too-little-faced fact that war really brought you nothing that peace, mere living, couldn't eventually bring. The large-scale operation was what impressed you—some millions of men receiving at the same time through the same historical events their varying allotments of discomfort and disappointment and discouragement; some hundreds of thousands met occasions to dissolve in unthinkable fear or scream in unthinkable pain; some tens of thousands got an early death; but from which of these would a just and lasting peace secure you? Disappointment? Fear? Pain? Death? (BB78)
8. The second point of continuity concerns the relationship referred to in some quarters outside the military as "the caste system," usually meaning the officer-enlisted relationship, although some of its nature also characterizes the relationships between senior and junior officers, and senior and junior enlisted men. It is a very old concept. It has been modified on special occasions among particular groups of military men. Whether it can be substantially modified without eroding an essential element of military cohesion in crisis situations may be controversial. We are not here prejudicing possible future questions, simply beginning on an explanatory note. Perhaps no one has described the relationship so successfully as did Marcus Goodrich in his great novel (perhaps the best about an American Service ever written) Delilah:

The legal limits and caste barriers, more formidable than iron and steel, that are placed between commissioned officers as a group and enlisted men as a group are no mere markers of class distinction, although they fit with seeming final appositeness into the aspects of this. They extend, too, with their rigidities slightly disguised under amenity, even into the more comprehending precincts beneath the quarter-deck, where each subordinate is separated by them from the officers above him in rank. This separation takes the concrete form of dividing into distinct wardrooms, where the size of the ship permits it, the three general classes of officer rank: junior officers, senior officers, Captain. The case of the Captain, that remote symbol of impeccable and irresistible power who even must dine alone when the facilities of his ship provide adequate isolation, is, in extreme degree, an explaining example of these limits and barriers which are as indispensable a part of war on the sea as are the guns and the compass.

The Captain never can be just a man from Illinois who sleeps in rumpled pajamas, makes mistakes about history and uses his finger, when he thinks no one is looking, to push food into his fork. Familiarity, when it is permitted to prevail, if it does not breed the proverbial contempt, certainly breeds between the giver and receiver of an order, an order that may lead to death or frightful mutilation, at least two things impairing the confidence, the aggressiveness and the speed with which a battle crisis must be met.

First, in the giver of the order, it breeds a realization that
if he takes this step, which in his judgment is exigently indicated, it may convert into a gory horror that tall, ruddy-faced man who has the next chair at dinner, who likes raddishes, which he eats with a loud rending noise, and who smiles with pleasure when his home town of Baltimore is mentioned. The order may be given; but the doubts, emotional stresses and temptations to rationalization, set up then, distract from the almost inhuman concentration on the development of the battle that must prevail, if those already dead in the struggle are not to have died in vain and the battle is to be won.

Second, in the receiver of the order, familiarity breeds the constant reminder that the giver is merely a human being like himself, that the tactics on which he bases the summons to death may be as faulty as his familiar table manners, that he may be as mistaken here, in this fatal matter, as he was the other night at dinner in regards to the basic causes of the War Between the States. In the end, the order may be obeyed; but the slight taint of hesitation, dissatisfaction and lack of confidence in the obedience may be quite sufficient to infect a hundred surrounding men. lead to a half-hearted spurt where fury, accuracy and decisiveness are imperative. It was no crowd of cronies that responded with lethal alacrity to the command, "Damn the torpedoes! Go ahead!" (BB131)

9. The third point of continuity is a simple one, concerning the oft-forgotten fact that relatively very few men actually fight the enemy. The Services do not forget it. They are solicitous in protecting their fighters in various ways. For when the fighters are needed, they are needed badly; for even though the evolving nature of war is reducing the number of those who actually face an enemy on the battlefield, there are never enough of them. Something of the sense of relative rarity was captured by James Michener in one of his Tales of the South Pacific:

...I dimly perceived what battle means. In civilian life I was ashamed until I went into uniform. In the States I was uncomfortable while others were overseas. At Noumea I thought, 'The guys or Guadal! They're the heroes!' But when I reached Guadal I found that all the heroes were somewhere farther up the line. And while I sat in safety aboard the LCS-108 I knew where the heroes were. They were on Kuralei. Yet, on the beach itself only a few men
ever really fought the Japs. I suddenly realized that from the farms, and towns, and cities all over America an unbroken line ran straight to the few who storm the blockhouses. (BB234)

The Shaping of Modern Military Forces

10. The origins of mass military forces, says Janowitz, emerged in the socio-political struggles of the American and French Revolutions, and in the forms of nationalism that emerged from them. By arming the rank and file, they marked the end of post-feudal armies. The right of every citizen to bear arms was a revolutionary notion; joining with the extension of the franchise as a mark of citizenship, it transformed the nationalism of the masses.

The effect of arming masses was steady till WW II: civilianization of armed forces. Although it continued to be true that "preparation for war and war-making gives the military its distinctive institutional climate," the distinctive boundaries of the military weakened, the sources of officer recruitment broadened. More civilian-type skills appeared in the military. Patterns of authority shifted from authoritarianism to organizational decision-making. Other trends exerted influence; e.g., mobilization involved a larger segment of the population; air warfare made entire population targets; technology required sharing of authority by military leaders. In modern time, various trends have reached new heights of influence; new forces are shaking the bases of military legitimacy: hedonism, personal expression, opposition to the style of life of the military establishment, resistance to military authority, and diffuse moral criticism. (BM83)

11. An Englishman, Marcus Cunliffe, explored the martial spirit in America between 1775-1865. He maintained that pre-civil war America possessed a strongly militant tradition. Cunliffe identified three approaches to war, peace, and the military: 1) the anti-militarist, 2) the anti-professional, and 3) the professional military man. These approaches are embodied, he said, in three stereotypes: the Quaker, the Rifleman, and the Chevalier.

The Quaker represents simplicity, shrewdness, ingenuity, diligence, decency, piety, and indifference to the state's demand that he be a soldier. The Rifleman is anti-military but democratic and equalitarian, and willing to fight. The Chevalier is typified by figures like Philip Kearny and Robert E. Lee. All three are
fascinated by war—the Quaker, negatively, even though, as a pacifist, Quakers such as Walt Whitman wrote war poems.

Cunliffe also maintained that the anti-professional and the professional soldier were not as they seemed. He asserts that Sylvanus Thayer, the "Father of West Point," made the Academy into a caste system and isolated the military profession apart from society; whereas Alden Partridge, Thayer's predecessor and adversary had held to the notion of West Point as a center for the dissemination of military knowledge through the Regular Army and thence throughout the nation. (BP433)

12. The ROTC program is a unique American military institution. It grew naturally out of the belief that all citizens should join in defense of their country in emergencies.

The opening phases of the Civil War had shown the disastrous consequences of unpreparedness. Out of this experience, the Land Grant Act of 1862 was passed, laying the historical foundations of the ROTC program. The object was to teach military tactics at college and insure a large nucleus of citizens educated to military minimums, for reserve officers were considered preferable to masses of professional officers. (BN120)

13. Riesman criticizes:

...the unpolitical nature of the American military tradition, pursuing total victory regardless of everything else, as illustrated in the refusal to think about the political consequences of bringing the Soviet Union into the already nearly concluded war against Japan in 1945. In World War II there was a striking contrast between Churchill's concern as to what the relationships of the big powers would be at the end of the war and his willingness, if necessary, to prolong the war to protect what he regarded as British interests, and the dominant American desire, once in the war, to get it over with as simply and, in short-run terms, as efficiently as possible, whatever the long-run costs. This, and the traditional American lack of concern for military affairs during peacetime, is the sort of thing we were referring to in speaking of America's lack of 'a politically sagacious military elite.' (BB286)
14. One might remark here, in passing, that it is difficult to see how the desire dominating all of America to get it over with quickly, and the peacetime lack of concern for military affairs in all of America can be linked in cause-and-effect fashion with the lack of a politically sagacious military elite.

15. As another element of background in assessing the place of the military in America, it is pertinent to recall that over 26 million Americans living in 1970 were veterans of military service. (BB246)

16. Military Sociology is a field not widely studied these days. The parameters of the subject are somewhat unique because of its distinct focus on the presence of organized violence as an element in the calculus of actions between collectivities. This element has received scant attention from social scientists, largely because of the anti-military bias current in this industrial society.

The unleashing of organized violence on an unprecedented scale during WW I left little doubt that armed conflict is a major social problem. During the inter-war period, military sociology did not dwell on the characteristics of military organization, as shaped by battle field requirements, or with the activities of the military as specialists trained for the possibility that disputes are sometimes settled on the basis of force, irrespective of popular desire or the wishes of statesmen. To the extent necessary, military men tried to function as and to use sociologists in relation to their own problems. To seek solutions to problems faced by military management, military research organizations were set up.

17. General post-war sociology paid little attention to the processes by which military policies are normally formulated, and little to the place of the military within the society. A few subjects were explored, such as the military as a means of social mobility for certain population groups, as consumers of resources, and as agents of modernization. In time, a relatively small number of sociologists have sensitized the military to outside scrutiny of their operations. More and more, the entire apparatus of interaction between the military and the civilian sectors is being studied, from military organizations to civil-military relations. (BP243)
18. Current subjects of study include the relationship of the modernizing influence of the military in special contexts, the use of force in deterrent forms, career patterns, commitments, and selection procedures of military personnel. Another area for evaluation is the changing power position of military leaders. In fact, almost unlimited study possibilities exist, across the entire range of disciplines comprising the social sciences. (BP243)

19. We cite here some examples of recent and current research devoted to changes in progress in the military establishment. We draw on many sources, most heavily on sociologist Morris Janowitz:

Broad Changes in Process

20. Janowitz suggests that:

Tasks assigned to the military usually imply that the political process has been exhausted, and frequently the professional officer only has an awareness of the political process after there is evidence that it has failed. Hence, he is prone to believe that the political process can be eliminated or that the same result can be achieved by a more direct method.

Basic changes in the military over the past fifty years can be summarized by a series of basic propositions on the transformation of military organization in response both to the changing technology of war and to the transformation of the societal context in which the armed forces operate.

1. Changing Organizational Authority. There has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment, a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus. The organizational revolution which pervades contemporary society, and which implies management by means of persuasion, explanation, and expertise, is also to be found in the military.

2. Narrowing Skill Differential Between Military and Civilian Elites. The new tasks of the military require that the professional officer develop more and more of the skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders. The narrowing difference in skill between military and civilian society is an outgrowth of the increasing concentration of technical specialists in the military.
3. **Shift in Officer Recruitment.** The military elite has been undergoing a basic social transformation since the turn of the century. These elites have been shifting their recruitment from a narrow, relatively high social status base to a broader base, more representative of the population as a whole.

4. **Significance of Career Patterns.** Prescribed careers performed with high competence lead to entrance into the professional elite, the highest point in the military hierarchy at which technical and routinized functions are performed. By contrast, entrance into the smaller group, the elite nucleus—where innovating perspectives, discretionary responsibility, and political skills are required—is assigned to persons with unconventional and adaptive careers.

5. **Trends in Political Indoctrination.** The growth of the military establishment into a vast managerial enterprise with increased political responsibilities has produced a strain on traditional military self-imager and concepts of honor. The officer is less and less prepared to think of himself as merely a military technician. As a result, the profession, especially within its strategic leadership, has developed a more explicit political ethos. (BB164)

21. To illustrate convergence or overlap in civilian and military occupational fields, here are a few examples of the many jobs now found both inside and outside the military:

- Highway traffic engineer
- Clinical psychologist
- Machine records officer
- Tissue pathologist
- Forestry officer
- Postal officer

- Yardmaster
- Labor relations officer
- Civil defense officer
- Real estate officer
- Radio broadcast officer
- Laundry & fumigation officer (BB105)

22. A manpower specialist, Harold Wool, holds that changing patterns of enlisted occupational requirements in the two decades following WW II have resulted from changes in a number of interrelated factors: in force structure, in technology, in weapons systems, and in staffing policies.
Future staffing policies for support-type military functions will also have important impact upon occupational requirements, particularly in administrative and clerical specialties. Recent experience shows that forces operating to increase more technical components of the enlisted force have been counter-balanced by other structural changes that tend to increase the role of some of more traditional military occupations. (BB377)

23. Organizational doctrine, although it varies from military service to military service, has its traditional objectives: direct lines of formal authority, explicit definition of missions, clear channels of official communication between staff and operating units, and limitations on the span of control. The goals of an organization supply a meaningful basis for understanding differences in organizational behavior. The military establishment as a social system has unique characteristics because the possibility of hostilities is a permanent reality to its leadership. The fact that thermo-nuclear weapons alter the role of force in international relations does not deny this proposition. The consequence of preparation for future combat and the results of previous combat pervade the entire organization. The unique character of the military establishment derives from the requirement that its members are specialists in making use of violence and mass destruction. In the language of the soldier, this is recognized on a common-sense basis: military mission is the key to military organization. (BB164)

24. To analyze the contemporary military establishment as a social system, it is therefore necessary to assume that for some time it has tended to display more and more of the characteristics typical of any large-scale nonmilitary bureaucracy. The decreasing difference is a result of continuous technological change which vastly expands the size of the military establishment, increases its interdependence with civilian society, and alters its internal social structure. These technological developments in wcr-making require more and more professionalization. At the same time, the impact of military technology during the past half-century can be described in a series of propositions about social change. Each of the conditions symbolized by these propositions has had the effect of 'civilianizing' military institutions and of
blurring the distinction between the civilian and the military. Each of these trends has, or course, actual and potential built-in limitations.

1. An increasing percentage of the national income of a modern nation is spent for the preparation, execution, and repair of the consequences of war. Thus there is a secular trend toward total popular involvement in the consequences of war and war policy, since the military establishment is responsible for the distribution of a progressively larger share of the available economic values...

2. Military technology both vastly increases the destructiveness of warfare and widens the scope of automation in new weapons. It is a commonplace that both of these trends tend to weaken the distinction between military roles and civilian roles as the destructiveness of war has increased. Weapons of mass destruction socialize danger to the point of equalizing the risks of warfare for both soldier and civilian. As long as the armed forces must rely on drafted personnel, powerful influences toward civilianization are at work. However, there are limits to this trend, particularly in that actual limited war operations are already carried out only by professional personnel. While it seems problematic to achieve, the notion of a fully professional armed force in the United States without selective service became in 1965 a topic for political debate.

3. The revolution in military technology means that the military mission of deterring violence becomes more and more central as compared with preparing to apply violence. This shift in mission tends to civilianize military thought and organization as military leaders concern themselves with broad ranges of political, social, and economic policies.

4. The previous periodic character of the military establishment (rapid expansion, rapid dismantlement) has given way to a more gradual and continuous pattern of adjustment. The permanent character of the military establishment has removed one important source of civilian-military conflict, namely, the civilian tendency to abandon the military establishment after a war. Instead, because of the high rate of technological change, internal conflicts between the military services have been multiplied.
5. The complexity of the machinery of warfare and the requirements for research, development, and technical maintenance tend to weaken the organizational boundary between the military and the nonmilitary, since the maintenance and manning of new weapons require a greater reliance on civilian-oriented technicians. The counter-trend, or at least limitation, is the greater effort by the military establishment to develop and train military officers with scientific and engineering backgrounds.

6. Given the 'permanent' threat of war, it is well recognized that the tasks which military leaders perform tend to widen. Their technological knowledge, their direct and indirect power, and their heightened prestige result in their entrance, of necessity, into arenas that in the recent past have been reserved for civilian and professional politicians. The need that political and civilian leaders have for expert advice from professional soldiers about the strategic implications of technological change serves to mix the roles of the military and the civilian. But civilian leadership has in the past decade demonstrated great vigor and ability to give strategic direction and management to the armed forces. It would be accurate to state that while the roles of the professional military have broadened, civilian control and direction have been able to adapt to these changed circumstances. (BB164)

25. A small, homogeneous, isolated professional group is less likely to be subjected to role conflicts. The civilianization of the military, as well as the growth in the size of the military establishment, weakens organizational control over the individual enlisted man and officer.

Second, family responsibilities also create role conflicts. Military life involves routine transfers from one installation to another. The anticipated disruption of family life is another critical point in career continuity because it exaggerates the contrast between residential stability in civilian and military life.
These role conflicts, especially the conflict between military occupation and the attraction of civilian opportunities, are a primary factor in the turnover of military personnel. As would be expected, the turnover is greatest where the skill is more nearly equivalent to that in civilian employment—noncommissioned officers with electronic specialties. (BB164)

26. The effectiveness of military authority is deeply conditioned by the status and prestige which civilian society accords the military profession. It is generally recognized that, despite public acclaim of individual military heroes, officership is a low-status profession. An adequate level of prestige, difficult though that may be to define, is required to maintain organizational effectiveness and to inhibit excessive personnel turnover. In addition, the relatively low prestige of the military in the eyes of civilians conditions the conception that the military profession holds of itself. The military takes over this civilian image; with the result that the military exhibits extreme status sensitivity. The concern with status of the military professional is to be traced not only to the hierarchical organization of the armed forces. The military behaves very much like any other minority or low-status group.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the military establishment has evolved an elaborate basis for according its limited supply of status and prestige to its own members. Most pervasive is the criterion which is applied universally through the services, the distinction between the officers and the enlisted men. The other universal distinctions are between regulars and reservists, line versus staff, combat versus noncombat, and the like. There are also more particular designations, such as veteran status of a particular campaign, membership in a high-status formation, or graduation from a service academy. (BB164)

27. The following question may "exhibit extreme status sensitivity," but we shall ask it, anyway: Is it accurate to say that military "officership is a low-status profession?" Data on occupational stratification in the United States is not plentiful, but there are a few indicators. Insofar as the military Academies are representative of the military officer profession, some indication can be gleaned
from choices for colleges among high-ability secondary—high school seniors on National Merit Scholarship Tests, who were asked to indicate 3 colleges of preference in 1966. USAFA was 6th choice among all U.S. colleges; USMA, 17th; USNA, 24th; and USCGA, 27th. (BM112)

28. In 1965, Louis Harris surveyed "respect for professions" among males, females, college graduates, professional executives, and young Servicemen and their parents, in San Diego and Norfolk. On a scale from -5 to +5, +5 indicated highest respect, while -5 indicated no respect.

Seventeen occupations were selected: barber, physician, sales clerk in a store, scientist, truck driver, lawyer, enlisted man in the Navy, plumber, college professor, officer in the Marine Corps, bookkeeper, minister or priest, officer in the Navy, carpenter, radio or TV announcer, owner of a special store, enlisted man in the Marine Corps, public school teacher, farm owner or operator.

Results were as follows, with stratification and mean scores:

- physician-4.6; scientist-4.5; minister/priest-4.4; college professor-4.2;
- lawyer-3.9; public school teacher-3.9; Navy officer-3.8; Marine Corps officer-3.7; farmer-3.2; Marine Corps enlisted man-3.1; Navy enlisted man-2.9;
- small store owner-2.7; bookkeeper-2.6; carpenter-2.5; radio/TV serviceman-2.5;
- plumber-2.4; barber-2.1; truckdriver-1.8; sales clerk-1.6. (BM72)

29. Research accumulated at West Point shows that there has usually been a clear difference between public images of West Point and of the military profession in general. Consistently, the same three priority reasons have been given over several years for seeking West Point: 1. prestige and traditions of West Point; 2. a good academic education; and 3. a free education.

Up to 1964, the occupational prestige of the military profession had remained fairly constant over 40 years, traditionally ranking officers (Captain, Regular Army) at the border between the upper and middle third of the occupational prestige scale, and enlisted men in the lower third. Lovell noted in 1962 that, of 17 occupations, "military officer" was ranked 5th by teenagers, 6th by USMA cadets, and 7th by American adults. (BG35)
30. The 40-year survey effort referred to (extending over 1925 to 1963) listed 90 occupations. It is interesting that highest in prestige was "U.S. Supreme Court Justice," then "physician," "state governor," "Federal Cabinet member," "college professor," and "Representative in Congress." The only military entries were "Captain in the regular army" and "Corporal in the regular army," whereas, in addition to "U.S. Supreme Court Justice," the list also included "County Judge" and "lawyer." Since those listed at the top in this scale are senior positions within their professions, while captain and corporal are quite junior in the military profession, it would be interesting to see what results would obtain if the list also included "colonel," "admiral," or "Chief of Staff, United States Air Force." (BP189)

31. In any event, there has always been a certain amount of ambivalence in America about the status of the professional military officer.

As Janowitz notes;

...in the past, sociological analysis of military organization did not take into account the vast transformations that have occurred in the military, and therefore continued to emphasize authoritarian, stratified-hierarchical, and traditional dimensions as a basis for distinguishing the military from the nonmilitary bureaucracy. (BB164)

32. A great deal of emphasis is laid in some sociological circles on the authoritarianism that is alleged to characterize military persons, military organizations, military families, and military thought. An extensive area of the literature is devoted to the subject—too extensive and diverse here to explore in detail. That literature appeared to receive a major input in 1950 with the publication of The Authoritarian Personality, by T.W. Adorno and his associates (actually, Adorno was seeking to throw light on the nature of ethnic prejudice). A few among many other notable contributions include Christie and Jahoda, 1954; Kirscht and Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism, 1967; Miller, Individualism; Levinson, "The Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy," Eckhardt and Newcombe, "Militarism, Personality, and other Social Attitudes, "Campbell and McCormack, "Military
Experience and Attitudes Toward Authority.

33. One conclusion is that a considerable amount of confusion exists over failures to distinguish between the terms "military" and "militaristic." It is the conviction of a number of American military men that militaristic practices are unmilitary, and that there may be more militaristic civilians than militaristic soldiers.

34. In any event, the literature is somewhat ambivalent. Authority is a highly emphasized valued in military organizations. How much support is given to authoritarianism is less clear, probably because far less support is given to it. Some careful testing has demonstrated that military service is a liberalizing influence, not the reverse. Nevertheless, it is frequently assumed in one study or another that to be a military person is to be authoritarian, illiberal, and sympathetic to the Right.

35. One source holds that authoritarianism, as an analytical concept, is only useful if one controls in age and education variables. (BM125)

36. A longitudinal survey among West German forces explored the extent to which the organizational structure of the military actually leads to authoritarian attitudes. The results showed a decrease in authoritarianism over the period of service in the military. The older the soldier, the lower this level of authoritarian attitudes. The higher the education, the lower the authoritarian level. (BM125)

37. One study of the dependent children of military families, o- "Service Brats," held that attitudes of children "are consistent with their upbringing," although children of commissioned officers and NCO's responded differently to the Vietnam question. Officers' children believed more in victory, while NCOs' children were less committed to it.

At the same time, it was held that children of military families ran away from home more than children from any other single occupation group. The reasons given in one analysis range from the "black and white syndrome of military thinking" to the "right-wing atmosphere of the military." What makes a good
soldier does not necessarily make a good parent. The constant moving may not give the "Service Brat" a chance to establish more or less permanent relationships.

38. Another analysis insists that "the outstanding common feature of the militaristic complex was a pattern of rigid and restrictive childhood training practices." Add to this picture, parents, teachers and other authority figures who are aggressive and dominant in relation to their children, but who deny placing any values on aggression and dominance and "you have a picture of hypocrisy." Students object to the use of principles that are not implemented fully at home and abroad." Militarism is at least partly a function of hypocritically restrictive culture.

39. Frumkin, in a study by the Peace Research Group of Des Moines, concluded that militarism in the United States would seem to be in defense of laissez-faire capitalism, religious orthodoxy, and nationalism; but it would not seem to be in defense of democracy or idealism. On the contrary, it would seem to be on the side of authoritarianism of the right, and materialism, and anti-welfarism.

40. A study by the Canadian Peace Research Institute found that foreign policy attitudes in Canada were primarily related to religious dogmatism and fear of socialism.

Military Values

41. As noted, an earlier phase of this project suggested a typology of the institutional values of the Navy (so far as we are aware, no typology of institutional values of the Navy (so far as we are aware, no typology of institutional values of any military service has ever been produced before); these values were published in a separate volume. Using Elhel Albert's general scheme, we accepted the Basic Value Premises drawn from several sources, principally Nesbit and Rokeach: Justice, Reason, Equity, Liberty, Charity, National Survival, and National Welfare.

Then, at the level of Focal Values drawn from the spheres of American values, military values, and organization values, we constructed a typology of seventeen values in five clusters, and nominated the resulting structure as a
reasonably valid typology of the Institutional Values of the Navy:

1. The National interest
2. Battle Efficiency
3. Organizational Efficiency
   Constitutional Procedures
   Organizational Integrity
   Welfare of Navy Personnel
4. Authority and Discipline
   Freedom
   Equality
   Moral Orientation
   Scientific and Secular Orientation
   Individual Development
   Humanitarianism
5. Progress
   Activity and Work
   External Symbolism
   Material Comfort (BM152)

42. As discussed in the Section on Organization, Professor George England has been working for some time on instruments to measure the personal values of members of occupational groups, such as industrial managers, union leaders, teachers, and Navy officers. The instrument used is a suitable Personal Values Questionnaire (PVQ). A thorough search of literature relating to the Navy yielded an initial pool of 200 concepts. These were then tested for their relevancy and reliability through sample surveys of naval officers, and reduced to 86 concepts. (BM48)

43. England's report contains a model relating to the value systems of 271 Navy officers. The model allows one to make an operational distinction between various classes of values which have different probabilities of being translated from the intentional state into actual behavior.

The results show that Navy officers, in general, tend to have a moralistic value orientation. However, a considerable number of Navy officers also have a pragmatic value orientation.
The age of Naval officers, and the total time they have spent in the military, and to a lesser degree, rank, are correlated with the probability that increases in these elements means that naval concepts will be viewed more and more as "right" and less as "traditional." On the other hand, more-highly-educated officers tend to view the concepts as "traditional," and less as "right" or "successful."

There was little practical differences between pragmatists and moralists on demographic variables. (BM47)

44. England explains his terminology: "value" is viewed as being closer to the ideology of philosophy, than it is to "attitude." "Operative values" are those that have the greatest influence on behavior. "Intended and adopted values" are those that may be professed but that do not directly influence behavior to any great degree.

Each Naval officer was asked to rate 86 concepts on two dimensions: importance (high, average, or low), and meaning (successful, right, or traditional).

If an officer generally characterized the concepts which he rated high in importance also as successful, he would be considered as having a pragmatic value orientation. If he values it high in importance and also right, his preference would imply a moralistic orientation. (BM47)

45. England divided the concepts into eight clusters:

1. Ideas associated with individuals
2. Ideas associated with groups
3. Military functions and practices
4. Groups of people
5. Personal goals
6. Military goals
7. Military concerns
8. General ideas

Space precludes coverage of all 86 concepts here, but highlights of the findings were as follows: with respect to ideas associated with individuals, judgment, honesty, responsibility, and initiative are likely to influence a Navy officer's behavior to a large extent. Caution, individuality, and dignity appear as weak values and are expected to be least influential.

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With respect to ideas associated with groups, cooperation and human relations are operative values, while competition and prejudice appear as weak values.

In terms of military functions and practices, leadership and "my occupational specialty" are more important operative values, while military bearing and seamanship are low values.

Groups of people do not appear as influencing behavior of Naval officers. Of eleven concepts, only enlisted man, shipmates, and petty officers are likely to influence behavior to any appreciable degree.

With respect to personal goals the prevailing operative values were job satisfaction and achievement. The values that seem to affect a Navy officer's behavior to a limited extent were service reputation, promotion, job security, pay, prestige, military career, rank, and sea duty.

Military goals are strongly operative values and therefore are likely to influence behavior to a large extent. Among the more important mission accomplishment, national security, and crew welfare. Others include: military effectiveness, defense, ship welfare, technological advancement, and balanced readiness.

With respect to military concerns, professionalism is the prevailing common operative value; pragmatic officers add operative values of weapons systems and strategies, which are weak values for morally inclined officers.

With respect to general ideas, decision-making and education are likely to be operative values, likely to influence behavior more than the relatively weak concepts of war and risk. (BM47)

46. These findings are highly interesting and are highly relevant to the predictions of value change discussed in the Sections on Organizations and National Orientations.

47. We present some of the results of a study done on 267 officers of all Services enrolled at the Naval War College, using the Job Analysis and Interest Measurement (JAIM) Test.
What can be said as result of the present study is that the War College officers do not reflect the popular stereotype of the military mind. While they like to have personal responsibility for the accomplishment of important goals, this leadership style is strongly imbued with concern for their fellow workers. Virtually all of the officers chose encouragement rather than criticism as the proper method of motivation; 95% felt that an effective supervisor shows his workers that he is interested in them as persons and concerned about their welfare rather than refusing to get involved with their personal problems. While the War College officer likes his world to be ordered, he wants it order toward valuable goals. (BP349)

The fundamental difference found in the comparison of the data derived from the War College sample and the same data from a sample of Civilian executives in Government (with GS ratings of 13-15) is that the former sample is more self-confident and self-assertive, more trusting and even-tempered, and more willing to give support and comfort to others. He is more willing to assume a leadership position and is more goal-oriented. He derives greater satisfaction from societal recognition of his prestige and influence and wants his environment to be one which is stable, ordered and benevolent. The civilian Government executive is distinguished by his desire to participate in group activities, especially if it involves important work... (BP349)

49. When the responses of the Navy officers are compared with those of the officers of other Services, several significant differences are apparent. The Marines are most like the Navy, and the Army is most like them. Army officers are more self-confident, optimistic, supportive of others, and prone to social interaction; they are more self-assertive and prone to move against social aggressors. While they identify with authority more than does the Navy, they still prefer to work on their own to

Potential Impact

These findings by George England and the Naval War College are highly inconsistent with stereotypes of the military mind and the alleged authoritarianism of the military profession. The trends are for the prevailing military values to move steadily farther away from the stereotypes.
a greater extent than do naval officers. On the other hand, naval officers are stronger than their Army counterparts in their preference for an ordered structure, fewer unscheduled activities, and slow change to the existing order. Air Force officers are less cautious, more self-confident, and more aggressive. They are more inclined to value themselves in the light of their intellectual achievement. Naval officers are more practical and more willing to accept routines. Marine officers are more orderly and inclined to be more goal-oriented than the Navy. (BP349)

50. A Monitor journalist reported in 1970 from two war colleges:

In the past critics have often thought of the military mind as producing typical and predictable responses to problems, as wanting to spend more for defense, and as wanting to substitute might for skill and wit. However, it seems that this 'mind' is a dwindling commodity. The Monitor's George Ashworth attended seminars at the Army War College and at the Navy War College and found a substantial diversity of thought among those officers enrolled. A case in point would be the President's decision to move into Cambodia. While most agreed with the move, the sentiment was unanimous. Many officers at the college and in Washington appeared to believe that the ventures, while militarily sound, were oversold, thus leading the public to expect too much. Traditional solutions and views were much harder to find. Some views were undoubtedly more liberal than those of the American mainstream. Most observers believe such trends will be more evident in the period ahead. With the military emphasis on advanced education at civilian institutions, the military's brightest men will find themselves coming into steadily closer contact with the civilian world. This could lead to a greater awareness of the thoughts and views of that world. If the military become more involved, they can be expected to be more outspoken. (BN198)

Assimilation and Community

51. Janowitz asserts flatly, "While other professional groups speak of a sense of community, none rivals the military in this respect." (BB164)
52. Janowitz observes of military orientation:

Efforts to improve indoctrination of the professional code have a higher change of success because the indoctrination process is slow and continuous, and it applies to every aspect of military life. But efforts to explain 'why we fight' and to provide a conception of a political goal beyond that of defense of country have been more irrelevant than unsuccessful.

Any effort at political indoctrination in order to increase organizational control, or to prepare personnel for resisting Communist indoctrination in the event of capture, may have negative consequences if it undermines the American general distrust of dogmas and makes the men feel inferior because they are uninformed, or feel guilty because they are apolitical, vis-a-vis skilled propagandists. (BB164)

53. For the potential recruit, especially the volunteer, a positive attitude is based not only on the task of the armed forces but also on the fact that the military offers an adequate and respectable level of personal security. For the enlisted man seeking a professional career, it offers relatively promising possibilities. The strong regulations requiring nondiscriminatory practices—whether they be regional or racial-ethnic, or social class—have had the consequence of attracting the socially disadvantaged, especially lower-class persons with rural backgrounds, and Negroes who develop strong career commitments to the services. (BB164)

54. Weise examines some aspects of convergence between military orientation and youth interests: The young adult (18-24) undergoing military recruit training commonly gains or loses 10-15 pounds during 10 weeks due to physical conditioning and to the "culture shock" of joining the military. During this period of their lives, many young men are fascinated with physical experimentation, and find opportunities in the military environment; e.g., remaining awake throughout the night, testing for strength limitations, or finding capacity for alcohol consumption. Usually these men are strong and healthy. (BM149)

55. Janowitz comments on a sensitive point raised in the Section on Domestic Institutions:
There are reasons why civilian society believes the military can operate as a reformatory. The military establishment is an all-male culture which informally tolerates behavioral excesses to a greater degree than does mixed civilian society. The military provides a disciplined and predictable environment in which persons not able to utilize the freedom of civilian society can more readily adjust. The need for conformity in the military establishment is put forth in the interest of national security and in these terms can be more readily internalized. (BB164)

56. However, after three decades of selective service, civilian perspectives no longer operate to assist assimilation of recruits into the armed forces. Overt opposition to the system, even political criticism of its injustices, is virtually absent. But even in the absence of adequate empirical studies, it is clear that there is widespread confusion about military manpower systems, deprecation of the administration of these programs, and a reluctance to serve. (BB164)

57. When war is reduced to a potentiality rather than an immediate actuality, [certain] perspectives are very likely to develop. Since the potential selectee tends to evaluate the threat to national security as one involving total war, he finds it difficult to believe that his limited personal contribution is of any relevance. Those who have served, while they may understand the relevance of basic training, report to their civilian contacts that after basic training most of their military experience seemed without point.

But from the point of view of military management, the issue is deeper. The reluctance to perform military service is a fundamental expression of the personal hedonism of contemporary society. These negative attitudes can be so deep that selectees succeed in communicating their hostility to the professional cadres and even adversely influence the outlook of junior officers.

Actually, since the outbreak of Korean hostilities, selective service probably operates to procure a relatively larger number of lower class youth for
the Army. Although at the time of registration all social classes are represented, by the time of call-up for induction, lower class youths will be less likely to have acquired occupational or educational deferment. Health and mental achievement requirements operate in the opposite direction in that large numbers of lower class Negro youths are not selected. Induction and assignment policies ultimately influence the allocation of risk by social class. (BB164)

Potential Impact

58. The three-year term of service of the younger regular army soldier tends to be viewed as an employment contract with few penalties for failure to complete it successfully. However, the two-year term of the more mature selective service inductee is perceived as an obligation which he must complete successfully to maintain an established position in the civilian community to which he will return. (BB164)

59. Janowitz comments on military assimilation:

Few organizations place as much emphasis on procedures for assimilating new members as does the military establishment. Assimilation involves the ongoing process of recruitment, selection, training and career development. Not only must the new recruit, officer, or enlisted man learn a complex of technical skills. He is also expected to master an elaborate code of professional behavior and etiquette, since membership in the military means participation in an organizational community which regulates behavior both on and off the 'job.' In the process of assimilation the recruit learns the roles, the required behaviors of his office, which he must perform regardless of his personal preferences. Whatever gratification and rewards military life may offer, military occupations are frequently hazardous, strenuous, and at times irksome. Assimilation of military roles requires
strong positive motives if military tasks are to be performed with dispatch... It is through the process of assimilation that organizations demonstrate their viability. (BB164)

60. In an article about the "overwhelmingness" of recruit Marine training, Allen cites Joseph Henderson, a disciple of Carl Jung, who in Man and His Symbols states that the archetypal initiation that has pervaded all primitive cultures involves submission (enlistment), symbolic death by ordeal (degradation and physical demands far beyond what the recruit believes possible), and symbolic rebirth as a member of the collective consciousness (the Marine Corps). "It all fits... a true rite of passage to manhood." "...like a Skinner box," said a Navy psychologist, "Reward and punishment."

Marine Gunnery Sgt. Mike McCormick says: "They join because they want their girl to be proud of them, or their parents, or the gang on the block. Or they want to be proud themselves. They want to be somebody, want to be able to go home a big, bad-ass Marine..." (BN536)

61. Janowitz suggests that:

What is needed is a broadening of interest in research away from selection as a device to an understanding of the process of assimilation into the military, which involves not only selection but also the dynamics of training and career development.

Assimilation during initial training requires adapting the recruit to an all-male society and to a social organization committed to violence. The process begins with an effort to 'strip' all of the novice's ties with the civilian world which conflict with the requirements of the military and to substitute new bases for identification. At the most personal level the recruit faces a loss of privacy and exposure to a pervasive set of controls. The initial stage of training stresses combat roles; thereafter there is a progressive specialization which recognizes that most personnel will ultimately perform administrative and technical activities.
But, in the military establishment, the assumption is that only a decisive break is effective in the long run and that the rigors of basic training are in effect natural techniques of selection. Such initiation procedures are retained in the service academies, officer candidate schools, and aviation cadet classes, although they have been substantially modified in the basic training of enlisted men. (BB164)

The perspectives of some observers are blunt:

The views and actions of a soldier are not completely his own. They can affect the lives of his comrades, the efficiency of his unit, and the security of his country. He sets aside his unrestricted rights to free speech when he enters the service. In varying degrees, the necessary constraints against freedom of speech apply to other rights as well. When we ask what inherent rights the soldier has, the ultimate answer must be that he has none. The soldier, sailor or airman of whatever rank has only those rights and privileges which his society and his institutions have seen fit to grant him under the conditions with which they are faced. (BP176)

Since the welfare of the society at large depends so heavily on the reliability, efficiency, and effectiveness of its military forces, the quality and cohesion of these forces are second only to the broader interests of society at large. The quality of its leadership, the
discipline of its units, and the effectiveness of its operations determine, in large measure, the degree of security and freedoms the members of that larger society can enjoy. Any measure which weakens the society's ability to control its armed forces, by unnecessarily restricting the authority and prestige of command, weakens the military institution, limits its effectiveness and eventually undermines the security of its parent society. (BP176)

Military Organization and Management

64. ...it is obvious that organizational charts and rule books do not describe the way in which large-scale organizations operate. Informal practices and personal communication networks are required if coordination is to be accomplished. The military establishment is no exception.

Organizational control depends as much on what is communicated as on how it is communicated... In other terms, communications in a bureaucratic organization serve as facilitating mechanisms. Their effectiveness depends on the system of rewards and sanctions which has been created to develop socially cohesive units out of which an effective military system is constructed. (BB164)

65. But again it is the possibility of combat, and not hierarchical organization, that produces the command and communications patterns found in the military... The tendency to resist these organizational changes in the military establishment is concentrated among officers in the middle ranks. At the bottom of the hierarchy, the realities of combat or training force leaders to adapt; at the very top, the pressures come from the outside and leaders are selected because of their inclination to innovate. But in the middle range, divorced from these pressures, greater flexibility exists. (BB164)

66. While informal downward channels are important to overcome time lags in official communications and command, the informal upward flow is even more crucial for effective organizational control. Military command has official procedures for maintaining an upward flow of information by means of reporting
systems, technical chains of command, and official inspections. Nevertheless, the official flow of upward communication is less adequate than in some other types of bureaucracies. The military must rely on elaborate forms of informal communications to keep higher echelons informed. In part, this is due to the vast size of the military establishment and, in part, to the speed with which organizational developments need to be effected.

The oral briefing is a rapid and flexible device for upward communications, which permits a more or less informal exchange of information... (BB164)

The precision and schematic simplicity of military organization facilitate the introduction of automated communications and surveillance systems, and foster an impression of enhanced efficiency. Such innovations have additional results of critical sociological significance. In effect, electronic networks place great strain on human relationships. A centralization of decision-making at higher echelons is fostered by the relative ease with which problems can be referred to upper levels. Difficult problems are also transmitted with such speed that additional pressures are created for immediate decision at the final echelon, often without adequate opportunity for consultation and reflection. The transmission process itself requires a simplification of the issue and, consequently, increasingly divorces the problem from the organizational realities in which it occurs. (BB164)

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Potential Impact

These observations constitute warnings to leave uncommitted to the computer some part of every process or stage of personnel management by which personal human judgment may be exercised, and faulty decisions overridden. No matter how many outstanding qualifications an individual may have on his record, for example, his compatibility with a particular group can only be tested when he physically joins the group.

68. Professor Janowitz continues this series of insights:

These effects are now particularly apparent in personnel management policies. The introduction of automated record-keeping systems enables centralized agencies to distribute personnel according to explicit characteristics and presumed needs of a specific organization. At the same time, the local unit commander's ability to use with flexibility
personnel assigned to him is inhibited. Fitness for assignment to a specific position will be determined by such abstract, reportable factors as test scores and service schools attended, rather than the commander's observation of the man on the job. Vertical mobility is correspondingly retarded...

Thereafter, however, the heavy investment in these devices and the extensive reorganization that their utilization involves, operate as impediments to further innovations which cannot be accommodated within the existing structure...

Computers and automated decision-making devices have been eagerly accepted by military traditionalists because they are peculiarly compatible with rigid hierarchical conceptions of military organization. (BB164)

69. As the division of labor becomes more complex and more specialized, the commander's dilemma becomes more pressing. Technological innovations have often been introduced into military organization by the development of specialized units, rather than by the incorporation of specialized personnel into existing units. Consequently, the task of coordinating skill groups has been passed increasingly to higher levels of command. The major unit commander is not equipped with sufficient technical knowledge to supervise or assess adequately the performance of these specialized units, and is compelled to depend more heavily on the advice of his staff. Nevertheless, the commander is held responsible for their performance by the principle of hierarchy and the formal rules of the organization. The military establishment seeks to prepare him for this dilemma by increased schooling, rotational assignments, and specialized instruction in the techniques of management. (BB164)

70. A second source of strain in the military establishment flows from the continuous effort to develop a system of ranks corresponding to the new complex skill structure. In theory, in tradition, and in image, the military rank system was a continuous pyramid with direct and clear-cut lines of authority from the top to the very bottom. Actually, it has been transformed into a 'flask-like' shaped hierarchy.
the proliferation of skills in modern military organization has been accompanied by an expansion of the middle ranks.

authority has not been so much weakened as transformed. Military authority now more often relates to lateral coordination and cooperation than to a vertical exercise of authority between higher and lower echelons. The task of the highest echelons is increasingly to maintain a suitable environment within which the middle strata of specialists can coordinate their efforts. (BB164)

Supplementing more familiar analyses of the military occupation by Huntington, Janowitz, Lang, and others, Elliott R. Krause has added a number of new insights in a limited discussion:

The motivations for entry to a military career have grown both more complex and more materialistic as the social origins of the officer group have been democratized. The experience itself has evolved from one of preparation to fight in a rigid command structure to preparation to serve in a complex, technically oriented bureaucracy which sometimes fights... (BB191)

The distinction between line officer and specialist is most explicit in the Navy. This solution fails to recognize the basic problem: that the separate hierarchies must be reconciled rather than insulated. The increasing importance of engineering and weapons developments in the military establishment blurs the traditional distinction between the commander and the technical specialist.

However, the increased prominence of the specialist may have the most pervasive effect in the career perspective of the professional officer. Kurt Lang has pointed out:

No longer are officers, by virtue of officer status, merely military professionals. The new nature of military service drastically alters the significance of being an officer. For many it is less a professional commitment than a phase in a longer occupational career. (BB164)
A very interesting case study examined the milieu of the Navy disbursing officer within the bureaucracy. It concluded that there are influences on the Navy disbursing officer which move him toward personal functionings within systems of power and status in which rules become of secondary importance.

In general, there are four types of disbursing officers:

1. Regulation type: the true bureaucrat, who is usually "green";
2. Very loose type: will do anything for a friend or superior. They seldom last long;
3. Sincere type: Rules are seen as tools and less as controls. Well-liked by superiors and moves up, but his naivete concerning recognizable conflicts places him in less favor at higher levels;
4. Realist: The most successful career men are of this type. They assume the regulation facade when the client is not placed in the informal or rank structure. Many conscientious officials belong here when they recognize that strict interpretation of the rules often works injustice in terms of the obvious intent of the rules.

The military educational system, especially at the intermediate and senior levels, has a dual function. First, by formal study and practical assignments, it assists the officer in adjusting to the organizational patterns of higher echelons. Social solidarity among officers who are at the same stage in their careers is established by intensive experiences as 'students,' in a difficult and crucial period. These 'class' identifications persist as anchor points in their careers. Secondly, the school system performs a screening function.

The military is no different from other institutions in that the higher the position, the less important specific technical skills are, and the more important and general interpersonal skills. Thus at high levels the skills of the staff officers and the commander have an important element of overlap, or at least foster a convergence of viewpoints between command and staff.

During World War I a relatively new approach to the use of military personnel was stimulated by social research, namely, the importance of considering a person's intelligence, skills, and aptitudes in assigning him to a military occupation. The experiences of
military psychologists of this period provided a basis for the subsequent rapid development of personnel selection in civilian industry and business. (BB164)

77. During World War II social scientists broadened their interests beyond personnel selection and stressed the importance of research into motives and attitudes as aspects of military life. Research on 'morale' was by no means a new approach to the management of complex and large-scale organizations. But the armed forces, that is, the ground and air forces, undertook morale studies on a most extensive scale. In the summary study of these efforts, The American Soldier, prepared under the guidance of Samuel A. Stouffer, the potentialities and limitations of attitude and morale research are assessed. And again, as with the development of personnel selection during World War I, industry and business and continued the morale study as a tool of administrative management. (BB164)

The Military Role of the Primary Group

78. 'Morale' is much too limited a concept to understand the coercive forces of bureaucratic organization, especially of military formations as they operate in combat. The findings of The American Soldier studies serve to underline and reaffirm this sociological observation:

Thus we are forced to the conclusion that personal motives and relationships are not uniquely determinate for organization in combat... officers and men must be motivated to make the organization work, but not all of them have to be so motivated, nor must they all agree on details of social philosophy or be bound by ties of personal friendship in order for a functioning organization to exist. To put it another way, the best single predictor of combat behavior is the simple fact of institutionalized role: knowing that a man is a soldier rather than a civilian. The soldier role is a vehicle for getting a man into the position in which he has to fight or take the institutionally sanctioned consequences.
The American Soldier showed high convergence in under-scoring the central importance of primary group solidarity even in totalitarian armies as a crucial source of military effectiveness. (BB164)

79. Shils, also, observes that:

The elaborate studies conducted by Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues for the United States Army during the second World War have shown the great importance of primary-group loyalty for military morale and hence for efficiency in combat. These studies have shown the relative unimportance of direct identification with the total symbols of the military organization as a whole, of the state, or of the political cause in the name of which a war is fought, as contrasted with the feelings of strength and security in the military primary group and of loyalty to one's immediate comrades. The soldier's motivation to fight is not derived from his perceiving and striving toward any strategic or political goals; it is a function of his need to protect his primary group and to conform with its expectations. The military machine thus obtains its inner cohesion not simply by a series of commands controlling the behavior of soldiers disciplined to respect the symbols of formal authority, but rather through a system of overlapping primary groups. The effective transmission and execution of commands along the formal line of authority can be successful only when it coincides with this system of informal groups. (BB316)

80. A number of studies have called attention to the importance, for the efficiency of large organizations, of the correspondence between the formal chain of command in the larger organization and the informal primary-group network. (BB316)

81. Shils and Janowitz collaborated on a well-known study of cohesion despite disintegration in the Wehrmacht. Their studies of the German Army's morale and fighting effectiveness during the last three years of the war concluded that the solidarity of the Wehrmacht was based only very indirectly and very partially on political convictions or broader ethical beliefs.
The primary group was of ultimate importance. Where conditions were such as to allow smooth functioning and a high degree of cohesion was developed, morale was high and resistance effective, or at least very determined.

The conditions of primary group life were related to spatial proximity, the capacity for intimate communication, the provision of paternal protectiveness by NCO's and junior officers, and the gratification of certain personality needs, e.g., manliness, by the military organization and its activities.

Different modes of disintegration among Germans were seen at the end of WW II. In desertion, for example, the most important factor was the failure to assimilate into the primary group life; on the whole, deserters were men who had difficulty in personal adjustment, e.g., in the acceptance of or giving of affection.

82. Shils surveyed primary-group studies and their significant findings about internal primary-group behavior over the years. In his conclusion, however, he drew attention to the significance of extra-primary group determinants of behavior, both within the primary groups themselves and beyond their boundaries, and the personality structure of group members. (BP375)

83. Alexander George identified factors affecting the formation of primary group ties in small units of the Army:

1. Social background of unit members (e.g., homogeneity, heterogeneity)
2. Personality of unit members
3. Protectiveness of immediate leaders
4. Performance of immediate leaders
5. Military discipline, professionalism and role of soldierly honor
6. Commitment to one's social—political system, ideology and patriotism
7. War indoctrination
8. Exigencies of military life and the combat situation
9. Technical aspects of weapons systems
10. Replacement system and rotation policy
11. Social prestige of soldier profession
12. Egalitarian practices within the military organization (BB207)

84. Even in non-military environments, studies by Rensis Likert, Daniel Katz, and Herbert Hyman in war-production industries indicated that where stability of the working force and primary-group formation could be achieved, morale was higher and productivity correspondingly higher. (BB316)

85. The presence of elites in the socialization process are not, incidentally, unique or peculiar to the military environment.

In Lloyd Warner's study of Newburyport, Mass. ("Yankee City"), it was shown that membership in certain small face-to-face groups (or "cliques") played a large part in the determination of the deference position of their members within the community. He also showed that since some of these cliques conferred larger amounts of deference than others, attainment of membership in the former constituted an important goal in the behavior of socially ambitious persons. (BB316)

86. Lazarsfeld and Berelson's political behavior-electoral choice studies indicated that public variables (religion, class, residence, exposure to propaganda) are in some sense mediated by primary-group relations. (BB316)

87. It should be pointed out, as Janowitz does, that:

Primary groups can be highly cohesive and yet impede the goals of military organization. Cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards of behavior they enforce are articulated with the requirements of formal authority.

In the military establishment common social background assist the members in developing intimate interpersonal relations; similarities in previous social experience such as social class, regional origin, or age supply a meaningful basis for responding to military life. From a personality standpoint, the ability to offer and to receive affection in an all-male society forms the basis of primary group solidarity. The social isolate is not a military asset and is likely to weaken social cohesion.
A variety of studies, including *The American Soldier*, psychiatric observations, and the "Fighter Factor" study, seem to indicate that to some degree family stability, especially satisfactory identification with one's father, contributes to the ability to participate in primary groups. But this is only a partial statement, since it does not rule out the fact that strong emotions and even strong neurotic impulses may help a person mobilize himself to meet a military crisis. The capacity of personality to enter into intimate group relations in groups under stress is not well understood. (BB164)

88. In the United States it is as if a democracy felt that randomization of assignment would ensure better distribution of risks and the destruction of units with military traditions would guarantee civilian supremacy. To some degree, this has been American policy.

Potential Impact

In an age of increasing automation, when discrete functions within the purview of a group are performed by computer, the effects on primary-group formation may not be well understood. They may be quite different from the conclusions emerging from familiar past research.

When men do not know each other, combat units suffer in effectiveness... Primary groups are by definition a system of informal interpersonal relationships. Their value lies precisely in their independence of formal organization. Consequently, replacement packets when assigned no longer constitute primary groups but rather an additional element of formal organization... in the contemporary establishment the maintenance of conditions required for primary group solidarity is yet to be achieved. (BB164)

Leadership in the Military

89. As a large proportion of the tremendous literature on military affairs, the literature on leadership underwrites the unceasing emphasis of military persons and organizations on that subject. We discuss the subject briefly in several places in this report, but cannot even single out useful references here (see BP268). The subject continues to receive extensive study, from a multiplicity of approaches.

There is nothing new, for example, about adjurations within the military to temper the impact of the system and the intermittently harsh and
dangerous conditions by humanistic approaches such as in the advice of Maurice de Saxe, D., Maud'Huy (famed WW I French colonel), Schofield, Bradley, and a host of others.

Captain Fortson, USN, has reviewed the idea of "men" and "leader" throughout two centuries of the Navy's history, and how the picture differs today.

The men that have manned ships and stations have evolved from foreign mercenaries 'recruited' in the seaports, to the 'landsmen' from the midwest, to the young man of today who is the product of this affluent, materialistic, instant, push-button society. (BM52)

90. The Navy is faced with the problem of leading men with intelligence, discrimination, awareness, knowledge of one's rights, and generally more advanced in many other ways than we have ever had to lead.

Fortson gives suggestions on how to revitalize the training effort in the framework of General Order 21, "Leadership in the United States Navy and Marine Corps." Issued in the early 1960's, it was a product of the Navy's attempt to review its human relations needs in maintaining a well-led, efficient Navy, and reemphasized its leadership objectives. The objective of General Order 21 is to achieve an ever-improving state of combat readiness by:

- emphasizing leadership at all levels, based on personal example and moral responsibility,
- insuring that military ideals are exemplified,
- requiring personal attention to and supervision of subordinates.

Methods of handling men have remained basically the same as they were in the 1950's. Training in leadership was, for the most part, on the job, with sparse and sporadic formalized training. Even at the U.S. Naval Academy the primary leadership training was, and still is, by on-the-job execution by the upper class leading the Brigade of Midshipmen, although two courses of classroom work supplement this training. (BM52)
91. One approach to the analysis of leadership is that of Fritz Redl, who has shown the function of the group leader in reinforcing or weakening tendencies within the id and the superego. The person who takes the initiative in the performance of aggressive action against authority, for example, facilitates through identification with him the release of similar tendencies otherwise repressed, in the member of the group. On the other hand, a leader who confirms the authority or who himself is an authority, strengthens the superego tendencies in the members of the group and thus maintains order within the group. (BB316)

92. Some analyses are blunt: "you cannot motivate other people, you can only provide the task conditions under which they can become intrinsically involved in their task."

The military’s fascination with leadership theory and training and with motivation are wayward efforts to bolster bureaucratic structures which are increasingly irrelevant to the kinds of tasks it is undertaking, and to the orientation of the human beings of which it is composed. Let us not proceed on the assumption that one man, the leader, has all of every necessary quality to get the job done. The challenge, instead, is to invent and implement organizational structures which permit a series of leaders to arise wherever the expertise or knowledge is located, relevant to the task at hand.

Leadership, then, is a series of functions that need to be performed by one or more people. (BM53)

93. Concerning the search for leadership traits, Janowitz comments:

...after forty years of research and development in personnel selection, no satisfactory and reliable techniques have been developed...no single trait or group of characteristics has been isolated setting off the leader from the members of his group.

These observations are consistent with those in the Organizational Section concerned with predictions that flexible, temporary task-forces are more likely to characterize future work organization, with leadership shifting according to the nature of the problem under study at any one time. Such a general approach, however, inevitably incorporates greater instability, and possibly rivalry-tension, then is familiar to the military.
There is, however, one conclusion from these trait studies which is highly relevant. Repeatedly, it has been found that academic and scholastic achievements are unrelated to tactical military leadership; this is neither a basis for selection nor for rejection. (BB164)

94. One—analysis of these data indicated that five leadership 'functions' could be identified: (1) managing the squad; (2) defining rules and procedures for appropriate behavior; (3) performing as a model; (4) teaching squadmates; (5) sustaining squadmates with emotional support...although the performance of these leadership functions was related to squad effectiveness, it did not matter whether the squad leader or some other member of the squad performed the function. (BB164)

95. In the United States and elsewhere, the military elite holds a basic conservative ideological and political orientation and often is alarmed at, and misinterprets, the new requirements of military authority. Segments of the military elite see the new requirements as potentially undermining the entire basis of authority and coordination and as barriers to decisions on the strategic level. Concern with technological change does not necessarily imply concern with organizational change. Such officers fail to see how manipulative techniques supply the basis for developing the necessary strong subleadership required to operate effectively within a well-managed and closely supervised military formation. In fact, they fail to see that indirect and manipulative control of a rank-and-file leadership based on positive group cohesion is essential to maintain both decentralized initiative and operational control over widely disperse military formation.

Consequently, as the older techniques of military domination break down under technological requirements, newer forms based on manipulation emerge as highly unstable and loaded with tension. (BB164)

The Military Academies and Leadership

96. There has been only limited exploration of the recommendation for a ten-year career as a technique of recruitment and retention of selected personnel. Instead the services have pushed to increase the size of the military academy and to

-44-
train a larger proportion of regular officers who would be more committed to a full military career. (BB164)

97. Broadly oriented officers are subject to a variety of informal pressures to represent the interests of their services, and they are uncertain that their careers will be advanced since promotion rests with their individual services. (BB164)

98. Radway assesses the orientation of academy-trained officers:

The impact of these institutions on state and society is indirect and deferred in the sense that it is made through the men whom they shape for later responsibilities. Their contemporary influence rests largely on what they were like when today's military leaders were still students, and their mark on the next generation of admirals and generals will depend upon what they are like today. In each case impact varies with the kinds of students they attract and the kinds of experiences these students undergo. I believe the first of these variables counts for more than the second, i.e., that self-selection into an academy is a more important determinant of future attitudes or values than anything that goes on there. (BB247)

99. One criticism of academy orientation:

There is a vast difference between life at the academies and life in the Services. Idealism rules the academy, pragmatism the Service. The job or the academies should be to prepare cadets for the world in which they will function, not keep them in a highly ethical society that has no relation to the world in which the officer works and lives. (BM79)
100. The reliance on academy graduates is much heavier in the Navy than in the Army, and in both exclusion of nonacademy graduates from the top two ranks is complete. Only in the Air Force has there been an increase in nonacademy graduates at the general officer level, and this can be viewed as temporary in that the Air Force had a smaller cadre of academy graduates when it was organized. Thus while the armed forces display many characteristics of 'civilianization,' organizational autonomy has been maintained by the device of selecting academy graduates to the highest ranks. (BB164)

[Note: Non-academy graduates do occupy 4-star positions].

101. It should be noted that the U.S. Naval Academy has a civilian academic dean and a majority of its instructors are civilian teachers. The number of elective courses offered in addition to the basic engineering curriculum has been vastly expanded, increasing the potential versatility of graduates. There has been an infusion of civilian teachers: cross-Service activities are increasingly stressed. Conference-type learning periods have supplanted formal lecture-recitation methods, while collaboration with civilian scholars in strategic and international studies has been greatly expanded. (BB164)

102. One study concluded that military training at the service academies is not very good. What the service academies need is a clear definition of what kind of officer they want. They should want an officer who has the ability to think, possesses a fund of general knowledge, is versatile, and can extend his knowledge during his career. He must be able to communicate, lead others in combat, keep physically fit, and have a firm knowledge or the capabilities, limitations, and techniques of his Service. Officers must know when to be quick-reacting and take action, and when to sit back and think. Officers must be free thinking and creative, and must on occasion, rock the boat. (BM79)

103. An evaluation of entrants to the Coast Guard Academy found the Class of 1975 both bright and realistic. College Board averages were: verbal 562, math 646. When answering questions on why they chose to attend the Academy, they gave financial reasons more frequently than the desire for a good education, or the
desire for sea-going careers. The definite desire to be a Coast Guard Officer ranked 7th among responses. This is consistent with statements of motivations in previous classes. (BN237)

104. The following table compares entering freshmen at USMA and USAFA and national samples, all taking the American Council on Education Student Information Form on demographic data, socio-economic background, activity patterns, interests, and attitudes. USNA freshman data are shown in slightly different form. Data covered 170,000, entering 270 colleges and universities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Average in H.S.</th>
<th>USMA and USAFA</th>
<th>Men at 4 year colleges</th>
<th>USNA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A or A+</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>upper 1/5: 70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>next 1/5: 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B+</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>middle 1/5: 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>next 1/5: 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>lowest 1/5: 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C+</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(BM31)

105. Comparisons of Academy entrants with national norms on wide range of interests and accomplishments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achievements</th>
<th>AFA, MA, NA Plebes</th>
<th>All 4 yr., colleges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President of Student Organization</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varsity letter</td>
<td>73.6%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honor Society</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natl. Merit Recognition</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Academy entrants stand out where there is recognition of individual excellence. Where individual recognition is not as likely, plebes are roughly comparable (music, forensics, art, editor of school paper, publishing). Both Janowitz and Huntington document the concern of the military, dating back to Plato, with demonstration of one's accomplishments to all (hence, wearing of ribbons; saluting). Concern with athletic prowess is said to be indicative of aggressive drive and personal desire to assert manliness. (BM31)

-47-
106. The following age comparison is said to indicate the tendency to foster greater homogeneity in the academy group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age on entrance</th>
<th>USMA</th>
<th>All 4 year colleges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 or younger</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>older</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(BM31)

107. This table shows percentage of Academy classes who are sons of military persons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Juniors</th>
<th>AFA</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>All Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class '71</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class '72</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class '73</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "occupational inheritance" at USMA and USAFA is comparable to that in the medical profession. (BM31)

108. The median income of parents of college students is above the national average, and the Academy student is generally from a higher financial background than the average college student.

This tied in with Janowitz' reflections about different social stratification of the officer corps of the three Services. Janowitz concludes that the AF draws more heavily from the lower middle-class, while the Army and Navy draw more heavily from the upper middle-class. All significantly draw few from low-income families.

In religion, Protestantism has been traditionally dominant in the upper ranks of the military, as in other American elites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>AFA, NA, MA</th>
<th>All Inst.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are 29% Catholics at the USAFA, though the AF has the largest percentage of high ranking leaders who are Catholic. There is a religious decline at the Academies, but less than elsewhere. Janowitz notes a disproportionate percentage of Episcopalians among Protestant general and flag officers (in 1950, 40% of Army; 42% of Navy); he says a substantial minority were not born Episcopalians, but adopted the denomination later. (BM31)

109. Students entering service academies already are proven leaders who have out-performed their fellows in high school grades, winning sports letters, in being elected leaders, and membership in scholastic honor societies.

The typical entrant comes from an above-average income family; his parents are well educated; there is a 96% chance he is white; probably Protestant; likely to be from a small town; and politically conservative, with the expectation of becoming more so. Thus, the Academy graduate may get ahead for reasons other than merely preferential treatment (as some Academy critics allege from time to time).

110. A comparison was made in 1969 of political attitudes of entrants to military academies and those entering other colleges. It was said that those attracted to a military career already have a conservative bias. While many college entrants expect their political preferences to be more liberal in four years, entering plebes expected the reverse (other studies show that this expectation is not borne out). Response on a dozen issues were fairly close; but the analysts found some differences they considered significant. Plebes indicated willingness to help others (differentiated from cooperation), and the importance of diverse friends (said to be characteristic of conservatives). They placed emphasis on competitive qualities that obtain recognition from peers, but less on cooperation, or on contributing to development of theory, or on the performing arts. They stressed interest in friends "like themselves."

Early resignees were more likely to see themselves as serious students, pursuing educational goals.
The conclusions were that Academy entrants are high achievers, with high scholastic potential; but their course is one of competition with other achievers, not on belonging to a group with shared values. (BM31)

111. Laurence Radway has made an independent analysis of Academy students. At the time, he found only 4-7% alumni sons, less than at many Ivy League institutions (however, USMA 1973 has 15.4% of sons of career military men). Entrants are relatively bright, more likely to average A in high school then those at most civilian institutions, USMA 1973 has 44.3% from the top 10% of high school classes; USAFA 1973 has 53%, again, higher than most civilian institutions. However, compared to a few highly selective private colleges, the Academies have fewer from the top 10%, fewer who score over 700 in their College Boards; “the difference is at the topmost rung.”

Their leadership and athletic credentials are impressive. In general, they are upward-mobile youngsters from medium-sized cities who have to depend on their own merits to succeed, and who have already met the challenge of academic work, peer-group relations, and athletic competition. They are more ambitious, forceful, hard-driving, and dominant than most civilian undergraduates. They are

Potential Impact

These analyses have significance not only for authorities at the Military Academies but also for those concerned with institutional values, as they affect career goals in military professionals. Young officers who resign have criticized what they perceive as forced compromises among senior officers; they tend to blame, not the individuals involved, but the System. The emphasis on competitive motivation, the aspect of "beating out the others," may begin in the self-selection of Academy attendees, receive reinforcement at the Academies, and intensify throughout careers. While the pursuit of excellence is not likely to decline at the Academies or in the Services, some aspects of personal career competition may alienate a number of desirable young officers in future contexts. It may be worthwhile for the Navy to explore the implications of shifting some degree of emphasis from competition to more cooperation in career orientations.
more likely than their civilian peers to want to keep up with public affairs, assume administrative responsibilities, become community leaders, and obtain recognition. Also, they are less libertarian than civilian students, less likely to be turned off by emphasis on authority, conformity, tradition, or patriotism (see Lovell). The differences are not great, but they are consistent. (BB247)

112. Given the nature of American society, the absence of a post-feudal mobility, and the lure of material values, military life has long been relatively unattractive. Indeed, there is little doubt in my mind that the greatest achievement of the Academies, now as in past years, has been their ability to develop a reasonably firm career commitment in a reasonably large number of young men who do not originally have such a commitment.

Motivation to enter the Academies has been weakened by greater affluence, by readier availability of civilian scholarships. One-third fail to graduate, as usual—but the former reason was failure in academics; now, the reason is declining motivation. One Academy member sees three types there now: engineers, full of phlegm; boy scouts, full of enthusiasm; and mods and rebels. (BB276)

113. Is convergence, military and civilian, occurring also at the military academies?

Clark and others conducted an analysis of Air Force Academy attrition. Comparing departees with those remaining revealed that their personality characteristics were essentially the same as those who remained, but they were more likely to score lower on issues of traditional religious beliefs and "moral absolutism."

However, motivation or attitude patterns differed greatly. Attitudes showed significant differences. Those departing:

1. did not want more military academics, as much as those remaining did.
2. did not like the enrichment program as much.
3. did not like the heritage program as much.
4. did not want low-cost education as much.
5. did not feel as much academic challenge.
6. did not appreciate the prestige of the academy as much. (BG9)

Turning away from leadership aspects laid in the Academy milieu, we turn to a study of ROTC at the University of Oregon. The objective was to study background and/or attitudes of ROTC cadets to determine what interplay existed between university and military socialization patterns, and whether the "military mind" is "liberalized."

The authors found that ROTC cadets had patterns of family income, father's educational background and hometown size and grade-point average similar to those of the entire campus population. ROTC is not an upward-mobility mechanism; fathers are not viewed as disciplinarians; cadets had a lower degree of religious commitment (usually a higher degree is correlated with conservatism, militarism, etc.)

115. ROTC cadets scored higher on measures of personality authoritarianism, misanthropy, and punitiveness; but were similar to other students in self-confidence and neuroticism. ROTC members were more conservative politically, less alienated, less tolerant of dissent, more supportive of the Vietnam War, but only slightly more supportive of the ROTC program. Cadets reported 72% of their friends disapproved of their participation in ROTC.

The authors suggest recruitment of officers from college graduates (in liberal arts) rather than college beginners. (BM58)

The Concept of National Service

116. Proposed many times, the concept of national service occupied a 1971 conference, described at some length in the Section on National Orientations.

The conference kicked off with a provocative theme, as analyzed by sociologist Charles Moskos in his essay, "The Social Equivalent of Military Service." Moskos raised the potential benefit to the nation. It contains the seeds for constructive fallout in a number of activities and orientations of potential benefit to the nation. It has the potential of providing the long-sought "moral equivalent of war" in enlisting youthful energy and idealism; it could foster a number of practical enter-
the question, namely, setting aside the military function of armed forces, what elements of military service and experience need to be injected into civilian national service? What are the elements of a moral equivalent to military service, elements which make for effective basic education, personal development, and effective citizenship? Moskos, a long-time student of the enlisted culture of the armed forces, concluded that two elements are crucial: (a) the equalitarian culture of the military (albeit in an hierarchical and authoritarian setting) which deemphasized prior personal and social characteristics and 2 the organizational conditions which oblige middle-class persons to compete on a more equal footing with lower-class personnel and which facilitate contacts across social classes and cultural groups. In effect, the sons of the middle class are underemployed, while the lower class are overemployed. According to Moskos, this was one reason why many college students of middle-class origins resent military service—(i.e., service under lower-class non-coms) without regard to national military policies and the war in Vietnam. (BP370)

117. The organization of and personnel issues involved in maintaining an all-volunteer armed force were explored by Colonel Jack R. Butler. His formulation that such a force constituted 'a step toward national service' highlights the framework he employed. Butler directed the 1969 U.S. Army study on the all-volunteer concept, and subsequently was assigned to the staff section responsible for policy and plans to implement the all-volunteer armed force. By contrast, Adam Yarmolinsky, a member of the Harvard Law School and one-time advisor to President John Kennedy during the early phases
of U.S. involvement in South Vietnam, sought to identify potential limitations in performance under an all-volunteer system. He saw a transformation of the military in which its public service ethic would be weakened for a trade union ethic. (BP370)

118. Whatever reservations members of the conference had about an all-volunteer armed force—and many expressed strong doubts about its effectiveness and its relevance for a democratic society—it was generally assumed that the nation was moving toward such a concept. This trend derives in good part from the reaction to events in Vietnam and from the longer term transformation of the military organization which will require a marked reduction in manpower during the 1970's. (BP370)

119. In this connection, the following is one of the resolutions of the White House Conference on Youth:

1.2 America's youth wish to serve their society. Every poll testifies to their desire. But our Task Force opposes a compulsory program of national service and opposes as well the creation of a large centrally-directed Federal program of voluntary national service. Instead, we recommend that under the auspices of the Action Corps support be provided for volunteer service projects which are locally conceived and directed, projects which take their direction from people who serve in them, and from the people in the communities who are served. We particularly recommend programs of service-learning which are designed not only to meet pressing local needs but which also promote the educational growth of those who serve.

...Nor should national service be considered as a method for reforming or replacing the draft. Proposals to make civilian service available as an alternative to the draft fail to resolve compelling problems of equity that plague any attempt to compare civilian programs with military service. (BM153)

Trends and Predictions

120. In the present state of international relations, the military establishment persists in thinking mainly about the implications of future hostilities, insurgent, limited or total. But there is an immediate impact of the world-
wide U.S. military system on international relations and worldwide politico-military affairs. The official doctrines of the U.S. military establishment have had important consequences in fashioning Soviet strategy and tactics in the nuclear age. The stationing of troops in allied countries and the creation of new elites and counter-elites by military assistance programs are an equally important aspect of military operations. The conduct of military staffs in international alliances speeds up or retards the development of regional political and economic arrangements. The actual deployment of our air forces, and the public statements — threats and reassurances — that military leaders are daily forced to make, constitute for better or worse a most potent ingredient of political warfare. (BBI64)

121. Major General Robert Ginsburgh has analyzed the changing military profession. He points out that the military has many roles, determined by four major sources: American society, the world environment, technology, and the military profession itself.

American society gives the military its primary role of defense, but gives it other roles also — e.g., racial integration, "project 100,000." Other missions have been suggested, such as roles in procurement, manpower, transfer of knowledge, community relations, equal rights and opportunities. Two roles frequently implemented are disaster relief and riot control.

The world environment presents a context for changing roles in preventing war, fighting, negotiating, and advising.

Technology has changed roles, for example, in forcing tighter civilian control of more powerful weapons throughout the 1960's, and affecting new roles related to ICBM's and SAM's.

The military profession is continually changing internally, in influence and in choices. It is interesting how many ambassadors came from the military in recent years (e.g., Taylor, Anderson, Gavin). Specialization increases; in the Air Force, even outside the legal, medical, and chaplain fields, there are 300 specialties.
There is great need for generalists to tie it all together; to achieve closer relationships between the regular and reserve structures; and to accept and rehabilitate personnel not previously acceptable to the military services. (BP157) 122. Janowitz says that the mass conscript armed force with vast mobilization reserves is phasing out of existence. New volunteer systems and new militia systems are required.

In America, the military establishment, and especially the ground forces, are experiencing a profound crisis in legitimacy. More important than military service, the new hallmarks are literacy, patterns of mass consumption, and political rhetoric.

Volunteer concepts will change military strength in the 1970's.

The distinction between absolutists and pragmatists (in the military) continues the degree to which the military individual internalizes the implications of the strategy of deterrence. The military must abandon the conviction that it is in the "killing business" as the organizational principle of the profession.

Absolutists are fearful that a military force without combat experience will atrophy, that it will not be professional, not "masculine."

The armed forces have a deep generational gap between the middle-level officers and to high-ranking officers; the middle-level officers are more prepared for institutional changes.

Potential Impact

A great number of influences are converging to suggest study of the reconstitution of national armed forces establishments, e.g., the declining proportion of armed forces which actually engage in combat operations; the desire in advanced countries to reduce the size and costs of armed forces; the changing role of war in international conflict; and others. The relationship of forces in being to reserve and mobilization structures is changing.

It may be a viable concept, therefore, to reduce military establishments to fighting forces and direct-support forces, with all others in a different status that would still be compatible with the Geneva Conventions and international commitments.
Our military forces will be smaller in size; they will be a "force in being"; and they will be volunteer—all of these characteristics will reverse the trend toward civilianization.

Congress has so far rejected the concept of national service, which would strengthen the social definition of service to the nation, and in turn facilitate recruitment by creating a new legitimacy for government, community, and the military services. (BM83)

123. A 1966 study confirmed the continuation of a trend in operation since the Civil War, as a smaller and smaller proportion of fighting forces actually close with the enemy. This pervasive trend is the long-term direction toward greater technical complexity and narrowing of civilian-military occupational skills. An indicator, albeit a crude one, of this trend toward "professionalization" of military roles is the changing proportion of men assigned to combat arms. Figures comparing the percentage of Army enlisted personnel in combat arms (e.g., infantry, armor, artillery) for the years 1945-1962 show that the proportion of men in combat arms—that is, traditional military specialties—dropped from 44.5% in 1945 to 26.0% in 1962. (BMI06)

124. Battlefield tasks compose a relatively small proportion of the total military tasks today, and will take up an even smaller proportion in the 1980's.

Yet, the battlefield model of organizational structure continues to play a major role in the relationships among people, and between people and other tasks in the military, regardless of the needs of the task or the needs of the individual involved.

Thus, the military has had a particularly difficult time in adapting its structures to the changing nature of people, and to the changing nature of the tasks it is undertaking. (BM33)

125. By hearkening back to Maslow's pyramid of motivations, we can appreciate the basic dilemma of the armed forces today.

The basic identification of the composite military role in society is with Step 2 of Maslow's hierarchy, viz, safety and security, in the life and values
of the nation. McGregor said a satisfied need is not a motivator of behavior. In
times of affluence and in the absence of an immediate foreign threat, when citizens
feel nationally safe and secure, the problems of national safety and security do not
affect their behavior. Only in times of perceived threat and danger do the citizens
revert to more fundamental concerns; until then, they ignore them, deprecate them,
and proceed as though such concerns no longer impinged on their lives. (The same
as with food, shelter, etc. for those in affluent stages, who take them all for granted).

126. This situation may lead the military to seek to achieve visibility
and importance at upper rungs of the (national) motivation ladder—perhaps social
prestige, "national self-actualization in positive purposes," etc., perhaps in such
forms as social action, and civic action.
PART III
Section 10
VIETNAM AND OTHER IMPACTS
VIETNAM AND OTHER IMPACTS

GENERAL

1. We have already covered an enormous scope and diversity of change and prediction, gradually narrowing the focus from philosophical and abstract to concrete, and from international to domestic to military institutions. We have narrowed our focus to military institutions, even inside them, as some of their members engage in soul-searching and analyses of special impacts of social change. In this Section, we narrow our focus further to explore the powerful effects of the Vietnam War, and other prominent manifestations of the changing environment, directly upon the military forces. This Section is divided into subsections headed General, The New Sensibility, Dissent in Uniform, The Vietnam Veteran, Drugs, Minorities and Military Justice.

2. We quote here a number of criticisms of the military establishment — of what has been done and not done, of what should have been done or not done, and what should or will be done in the future. This background is presented here because it is believed to represent, in general, the actual status of much current social appraisal of the military and much prediction about future conditions involving the military — in other words, reflections of the real world with which the armed forces will have to cope. Many impacts are quite obvious in the data and need not be singled out for specific repetition.

3. It may be objected that some of this criticism is distorted, ill-meant, and unfair. We would simply stress, as we concur, that this situation is part of the problem that must be confronted and, it is to be hoped, resolved.

4. It is also in the nature of the war in Vietnam, the large numbers of conscripted men taken by the army, and the nature of media coverage of the war that the preponderance of this data concentrates on the Army (and to some lesser extent, the Marines) more than on the Navy and Air Force. Despite some imbalance, however, there are portents of potential value to all military services.
5. While it is something of an oversimplification, Deagle focuses sharply on the problem by saying simply that the armed forces are dealing with two very troubled and troublesome areas:

- alienated youth in the ranks, and
- a divided society eager to find a scapegoat. (BMII7)

6. Some of the serious effects on the armed forces include:

- the legitimacy of the military institution is questioned
- the morality of military activities is questioned
- military research is curtailed
- the cooperation of academic centers with military research and other activities is curtailed
- the participation by scholars and specialists in military research and other activities is being curtailed
- there are deepening reservations on grounds of ethics and morality to military activities, not only on the part of individuals alienated for various reasons, but also on the part of religious bodies and institutions
- the general sense of patriotism and of national obligation appears to be declining
- general acceptance of authority is declining
- the work ethic is declining
- achievement values appear to be less widely accepted
- requirements for education are increasing
- advancing technology requires more and higher levels of skill
- competition for qualified persons increases
- costs for manpower are rising
- equipment costs are rising
- budget allocations for military purposes, including research, are declining.
- dissent to the extent of subversion is disseminated with legal protection
- adversary roles against the government and the military are widespread in the press and other media
- in the view of some observers statutes are being interpreted widely as protecting the rights of the accused over the rights of society
- crime is increasing
- organizations are on the defensive vis-a-vis the individual
- social mores are loosening in sex, marriage, dress, etc.
- and many others

It should be observed here that not all these changes and effects will necessarily be harmful; some represent opportunities.

Ethical, Moral, and Religious Issues

7. One of the most profound movements in progress involves ethical judgments. Formal religious commitment is being eroded, and religious institutions are under attack; frequently, the most vigorous attackers are members of the religious communion being criticized, and frequently the grounds for attack are ethical and moral. At the same time, not only members and hierarchies of religious bodies but also scientists, scholars, educators, and other laymen have adopted antiwar and antimilitary positions, also on ethical and moral grounds, as well as on other principles.

The White House Conference on Youth recorded this resolution:

10.5c The hypocrisy of organized religion to profess love, brotherhood, and the celebration of life, yet by their too frequent silence having condoned the atrocities, incidents of racial prejudice, the slaughter of Southeast Asian peoples has not gone unnoticed by the youth of the United States of America.

Resolved: In order to correct this overwhelming paradox, the Task Force calls upon all organized religions to officially demand immediate and total withdrawal of all American troops from Southeast Asia. (BMI52)
8. The general conference of the United Methodist Church in April 1972, adopted a strongly worded resolution charging Americans with guilt in the Southeast Asian war and calling on the President to cease all bombing immediately. The Conference called on the "leadership of the United States to confess that what we have done in Indo-China has been a crime against humanity." (BN235)

9. An ecumenical assembly of clergy and laity of Protestants, Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Jews, in January 1972, charged that the Nixon Administration's Vietnamization policy was fundamentally immoral because it "forces Asian people to be our proxy army, dying in our places for our supposed interests." (BN320)

10. In the spring of 1970, two Jesuit seminarians being ordained priests in New York told Cardinal Cooke, who conducted the ceremony, that they could not exchange the kiss of peace with him until he resigned as Military Vicar of the Armed Forces. (BN352)
II. Joseph Roddy gave this account in Look in October 1971:

When [Father Daniel] Berrigan was a Jesuit seminarian at Woodstock, Maryland, 25 years ago, a beribboned and probably brave naval chaplain was a guest for dinner in the refectory one night. Berrigan remembers that when the military man entered, all the Jesuits stood and applauded. Berrigan was back at Woodstock for dinner the night after he was sentenced to three years in Federal prison for destroying draft records, and as he entered the room to speak about his crime and trial, all the students stood and applauded a convicted felon. (BN352)

12. A report prepared by the Corporate Information Center of the National Council of Churches was entitled "Church Investments, Technological Warfare, and the Military-Industrial Complex" and published in January 1972. It accused ten Protestant denominations of complicity through their stockholdings with the "irresponsible, immoral, and socially injurious acts" of 29 corporations holding military contracts. (BN435)

13. In an unprecedented action, the National Academy of Sciences, on April 26, 1972, urged the President to de-emphasize United States "reliance on military force." With 125 members present of the 750-member organization, only 2 or 3 nays opposed the resolutions. The Academy had previously leaned over backwards to avoid tangling with any Administration; but Academy President Handler said now "many members feel strongly that there are larger moral issues in the world, and the Academy has a right to express its views." Moreover, the group voted to give members more opportunity to review agreements with the military to do classified studies (about 2% of the annual $35 million budget). All members will receive brief unclassified descriptions of all classified projects; they will have three months to object or even send delegations to Washington. Nevertheless, although he personally refuses to join in war projects because he opposes the Vietnam fighting, Vice President Kistiakowsky urged fellow scientists to cooperate with the military. "We should not let the military become isolated, as has happened in some foreign countries." (BN388)
14. The Southern Baptist Convention, in June 1971, refused to adopt a statement that there are "moral ambiguities" in the Vietnam War. "When a man lays down his life for another, this is not moral ambiguity," said the Rev. William Brock, from the convention floor. (BN505)

15. Some implications for national security are inherent in several surveys conducted by the World Future Society among its own membership in May 1971. Since the WFS includes a high proportion of well-educated (76.5% with Master's or Doctorate) citizens, the implications lie in the allocation of support among views surveyed.

One question on Social Goals asked: How much effort should be expended to reach our various goals? The following is the priority accorded to the cited 12 goals:

1. Quality of the physical environment
2. Equality of opportunity
3. Spiritual well-being of the individual
4. Justice under law
5. Civil liberties
6. Quality of the cultural environment
7. Involvement of the individual in society
8. Social security
9. Personal physical security
10. Quality of the technological environment
11. Economic prosperity
12. National security

(BP454)
In the World Future Society survey of its membership, one result showed possible futures in decreasing order of desirability.

Respondents were asked to look at a list of possible developments and rate them from 1 (very desirable) to 5 (very undesirable). These were the results:

**Very desirable (scores between 1 and 1.5)**
- Nuclear disarmament

**Desirable (scores between 1.5 and 2.5)**
- Consumer advocates on corporate boards of directors (1.92)
- Complete disarmament (1.95)
- Guaranteed annual income (2.17)
- Decreasing importance of primary occupations (2.30)
- Increasing affluence and leisure (2.34)
- Slow-down of urbanization (2.35)
- One world government (2.42)

**Uncertain (scores between 2.5 and 3.5)**
- Less importance of organized religion (2.53)
  - Increasingly sensate cultures: empirical, this-worldly, secular, humanistic, utilitarian, contractual, epicurean, or hedonistic (2.54)
  - Less emphasis on technological growth and achievements (2.58)
  - World-wide industrialization and modernization (2.68)
  - Greater restrictions on international corporations (2.81)
  - Major change in family structure (2.95)
  - Break-up of large corporations (2.95)
  - Increased tempo of change (3.21)

**Undesirable (scores between 3.5 and 4.5)**
- Defeat of Communism (3.55)
- U.S. predominance in the world (3.85)

**Very undesirable (None)**

17. Major General Gerhardt W. Hyatt, Chief of Army Chaplains, stated that he does not separate religion from the, but he does separate political and military responsibilities. One should not interfere with the other.
He maintains that it is not his responsibility to question whether or not he goes to war. He does what he is told. His concern is with the men after they get into the war. He says one must not give to other men one's own conscience about the war. General Hyatt believes that humanity deteriorates without struggle (by struggle, he does not necessarily mean war). Mankind needs struggle to appreciate what he has and to learn how to act toward his fellow man. (BN586)

Miscellaneous Straws in the Wind

18. As a significant change, some military families are advising their sons not to enter the military profession. If extended, this attitude would diminish a traditional (elite?) source for recruitment of military leadership. The chief of Britain's recruiting service noted the same phenomenon (in Brassey's Annual, 1969) among some old British military families.

19. Since World War II, the United States has maintained 30-35% of its armed forces overseas. Naturally, numerous cultural interchanges occur between American troops and foreign nationals.

One example of intermittent tension is the illegitimate child fathered by American servicemen and left behind. Estimates: 80,000 to 120,000 such children in Germany; 30,000 to 50,000 in Japan; 15,000 to 30,000 in Korea; and 10,000 to 15,000 in Vietnam. Such children have no
American rights and receive no aid from the United States government. (BB246)

20. An Army Nurse Corps (Reserve) Officer won a major battle in a court fight to prevent the government from discharging her because she became a mother. She was awarded a preliminary injunction based on Federal laws and executive orders barring sex discrimination. (BN:72)

21. A dismissed enlisted woman charged the Navy with applying a double sexual standard and violating her constitutional rights.

Her suit asked the court to ban all military regulations based on sex. (BN514)

22. 20-40 cadets were implicated in a cheating case at the Air Force Academy. In 1965, 109 cadets quit the Academy after admitting they sold or bought examination papers. The USAFA honor code says "We will not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate among us those who do." In the past, code violators have been permitted to resign from the school voluntarily. It should be noted that the academic load at the Academy is much heavier than at a regular college or university. (BN491)

23. Of the men who pass physicals at examining stations, 3½% have to be discharged later, after entering a Service, because of prior physical defects. 40,000 in 1968 and 1969 were discharged because of defects they had as civilians, at a cost of $17 million in personnel, pay, and travel. But the cost of more effective physicals might outweigh the savings. Another factor is that the Services apply somewhat different criteria. (BN113)

24. In response to a changing domestic climate about war and the preparation and training of troops for war and the preparation and training of troops for war, the Army is dropping the cry of "kill! kill!" in its bayonet training. New training manuals discourage shouting of indiscreet slogans. (BN271)

25. The Navy court-martialed and acquitted Commander Andrew Jensen, a chaplain at
a Naval Air Station in Florida, and an American Baptist Chaplain. The charge was adultery. The American Baptist Chaplain Service said that "contrary to custom," the Navy had failed to furnish evidence of wrongdoing to the Agency, thus denying the church an opportunity to apply its own disciplinary measures. The Agency threatened, in reprisal, to refuse to provide the Navy with additional chaplains in the future. Eventually, the Navy agreed to provide such data in the future; and the Agency was satisfied. (BN276)

26. Today's clothing industry could not supply military clothing requirements for a major mobilization. There is no stockpile of cloth, and synthetic production is now dependent on overseas sources. (BN108)

27. Changing a long-standing demographic distribution of officer sources, graduates of military institutions such as VMI are coming in greater numbers from geographic areas other than the South. (BN91)

28. Assistant Secretary of Labor Usery ruled that off-duty military personnel can be included in bargaining units covering employees in commissaries and exchanges. The AFL-CIO had contended in opposition that military personnel are effectively on duty 24 hours every day.

Hence, in the future, some military men might find themselves bargaining with their commanders over such issues as pay and working hours, under certain conditions. There relationships are now governable under Executive Order 11491, the order governing the way federal unions deal with government agencies. (BN110)

Potential Impact

The significance of the Chaplain Jensen incident is the erosion of Navy autonomy, and the example of increasing interrelationship in the future with a multiplicity of other social institutions.
29. The Department of Defense is the only Federal agency that funds its own retirement costs. These rolls are now skyrocketing at a peak rate, accelerated by 20-year retirement, accelerated promotions, nonhazardous careers, manpower humps from World War II and Korea, and Vietnam. (BN247)

30. Dr. Gary Spenser, University of Florida sociologist, told the American Sociological Association, based on his analysis of the career of USMA classes of 1930-1945, that the pattern of employment of retired officers in education, business, and industry is "dangerous." "Can the freedom and responsibilities of democracy be effectively taught," he asked, "by people who spent 20-30 years in a caste system being saluted and obeyed?"

He said 3/4 of all retired officer jobs are in the civilian defense industry (the major employer of retirees of nearly every class); higher education (second highest employer); and "investment" (insurance, banking, real estate, etc). College teachers come from the highest graduating quartile; investment jobholders from the lowest (but probably make the most money). General officers are most likely to have been "high middle guys" in graduating classes. Infantry officers reach the highest rank; non-technical officers who concentrated on troop-leading functions had skills least marketable in civilian society. (BN124)

31. All retired commissioned officers who go to work for Defense contractors must file a report with the Department of Defense. The 17-question report asks what duties were performed during the last 3 years of military service and what duties are performed for the Defense contractor. The pertinent statute is a result of Congressional claims that too many officers were retiring, going to work for Defense contractors, and then doing work on projects they were involved in while with the government. (BN101)

32. All services have borne the brunt, not only of activities which turned out unsatisfactorily, but also of popularized descriptions which made good use of opportunities to adapt anti-institutional, anti-military approaches. In his book, The Arnhem Affair, for example, Neil Sheehan referred to the Navy as
"afflicted with a kind of arteriosclerosis, and insensitivity to the social environment in which it exists." [The entire project of which this item is a part calls that judgment into considerable question.] (BN14)

33. MIT's Professor Charles Stark Draper developed a unique and highly successful Instrumentation Laboratory, which did remarkable research for the military, including the Navy's POSEIDON missile guidance system. After considerable student ferment and protest on the MIT campus, Dr. Draper was removed in 1969 and his Laboratory converted to research in urban transport and other civil technological problems. (BNS10)

34. Several resolutions concerning national military affairs were recorded by the White House Conference on Youth; for example:

   6.11c Resolved, That the United States Defense Department be renamed the War Department.
   Yes 56, No 34, Abstain 3.

   6.11d The Department of Defense, due to its vested interest in war preparedness, should not produce educational material on foreign relations designed for public and troop consumption.
   Yes 49; No. 42; Abstain 3.

   3.21 Be it resolved: That the defense budget for the fiscal year 1972 be limited to 50 billion dollars. Experts and groups such as the Brookings Institution, the Urban Coalition and Mr. Seymour Melman have estimated that this would not endanger national security.

   Further resolved. That such cuts shall come from the areas of counterinsurgency and nuclear weapons systems.

   Be it further resolved: That no further military funds be allocated for Vietnam except for the purpose of withdrawing troops.
Defense spending must be reduced. The Federal government currently spends 46.45% of the Federal tax dollar on defense. These funds must be redirected so that a larger percentage will be spent on education — to establish new, more effective educational systems, including programs to serve individuals from low income backgrounds and persons with nonacademic interests.

The United States must set a specific date to withdraw all troops from the Indochina conflict. American tax dollars must be redirected from this expenditure to efforts to solve problems, including those involving education, housing, environment, poverty, drugs, etc. The Federal Government must not divert American tax dollars from these efforts to military research and development. (BM153)

Direct Impacts from the War in Vietnam

35. One great difference in domestic American attitudes toward the Vietnam War from attitudes toward previous wars was made by television. Historically, Servicemen having experience of real combat are reluctant to discuss their experiences afterwards, back home. It is not widely realized that, though World War II began in 1939, and full American participation began in December 1941, no picture of American dead was printed in American newspapers until the landings in Normandy, June 1944. From the very beginning in Vietnam, however, there is a constant public awareness of the cost in human lives. This serves to remind the American public of the ultimate cost of another war.

Potential Impact

The impact of television will be pervasive on any large-scale enterprise undertaken overseas. Probably never again should the nation undertake military conflict overseas without imposing censorship in some form, which may be impossible to do without a declaration of war. It is clear that the media will saturate their screens; if only one-sided material is available, they will saturate them with one-sided material. Any long-term balance in presentation cannot be left to the media; with few and intermittent exceptions, they will not...
TV projected coverage nightly into American living rooms. Since no North Vietnamese coverage was permitted or available, the carnage shown was invariably that among American forces, and occasionally among the South Vietnamese people. (BB246)

36. In a thoughtful column of September 1970, entitled "How About the Soldier?", Max Lerner pondered the angry and depressed mood of the professional soldier. The cycle of valuing and devaluing of the soldier is never pleasant during declines, but it is an old story. But to be given an impossible war to fight, and to be forced to fight it in the glare of total press and television publicity, prevented its being fought with maximum economy and proficiency and made the military the scapegoats. His conclusion, among others, was that the current isolation of the military would be intensified by an all-volunteer armed force; there is a difficult and trying time ahead. (BN88)

37. Retired Marine Colonel Heinl wrote: The Army of 1971 is divided into two subcultures: the draftee soldiers and their ambivalently-motivated junior officers; and the "lifers" — a contemptuous term for Regulars.

The "lifers" break down into those who are in Vietnam because they have to be in order to float up and ahead, and a few highly motivated or ambitious officers (mostly West Pointers) who seek combat and command so they can get to the top. Meanwhile, the idea for a draftee in a platoon is to stay alive for 365 days, make it bearable by smoking pot, and then get rotated back home. Some guys in a platoon will "foul up" in order to get a rear job. The lack of experienced regular NCOs is keenly felt. (BP182)

38. One glum appraisal of non-coms took this extreme view:

The senior NCOs — master sergeants, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants — are mangled victims of America's rapid social change. They
have come to the end of a long career, and instead of rewards find threats. Their
love affair with the Army has turned sour, and their remarks about the military are
sometimes more violently anti-military than those of any SDS member. (BN563)

39. Two former Army officers charged that American forces in Vietnam
were committing war crimes by the use of electric torture to obtain information.
The ex-officers gave their testimony to the National Committee for a Citizen's
Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes (a group organized by Professor Noam
Chomsky, of MIT). The two witnesses insisted that they had personally seen
electric torture applied. However, they said they did not see nerve gas used.
It was implied that it was a war crime not to inform the people about United States
engagements in Cambodia, and that bombing of areas far from enemy contact was
wrong, also. (BN194)

40. The Monitor expressed a view in mid-1971 that the Army is one
of the biggest casualties of the Vietnam War.

Officers are as unhappy as anyone else. We must
find a cure. We do not think the trouble can be
blamed on the home front. It was the 'high brass'
which allowed LBJ to believe that Vietnam could
be won in a year or two. He never would have
engaged himself otherwise.

The Senate did not exhibit wisdom in approving the Tonkin
resolution.

The damage is reflected in drugs and morale; the deterioration
began after 1965. The key factor was expanding manpower by the draft, compounded
by one-year combat tours. Thereafter, what started as a seasoned and professional
Army was transformed into amateurs, with declining morale and competence. By
1970, 8 out of 10 combat riflemen were draftees fresh from boot camp. What
happened to the lessons of Korea? The sad state of the Army is itself now a
major reason for winding down the war as fast as possible, so that, among other
things, the job of rebuilding the USA on a better basis may begin. (BN228)

41. In September 1971, the New York Times commented that the strain
of Vietnam had weakened the Army elsewhere. At least 9 of the 11 divisions on
active duty outside of Southeast Asia are incapable of waging immediate full-scale
war because of manpower and training shortcomings. Unpreparedness within divisions
like the Forth stems mainly from shortages in manpower and training, and morale
and disciplinary problems caused by the unpopularity of the war; and the draft has
aggravated the situation. So have race and drug problems. Also, in such units,
a large percentage of men are Vietnam returnees — short-timers with less than
6 months to do; hence, unit turnover is very high. (BN275)

42. The majority serving in Vietnam believe the war is neither right
nor necessary. This belief, however, is not accompanied by the tendency often
found in peace circles back in the world to glorify the enemy. Charlie is respected
for his courage but despised for his cruelty... By their murder and torture of civilians
and prisoners, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army have helped keep up
American morale. (BN563)

43. One article analyzed leadership and morale in the Vietnam context.
It quotes an unidentified general: "For a military organization to function, you've
got to have one of two things, iron discipline or perfect leadership. At the moment,
we don't have either." Iron discipline is impossible to develop in personnel from a
permissive society. The only other means available is better leadership, and this
required the support of a society which concedes respect to the role of the officer.
But this is exactly what the Army of 1971 is lacking.

The mission of the Army has changed. Many soldiers no longer
fight, but merely support the ARVN or wait until they are sent home. Many
officers feel that the manner in which the war was fought was wrong. (BN571)

44. Colonel David Hackworth, a much-decorated soldier, gave up
and retired because, he claimed, the leaders had not known how to handle the
war. They used too many inexperienced officers on short tours to lead men.
Young officers are repelled by the corruption and inefficiency of the ARVN and
the Army's hypocrisy in dealing with them. Other, older general officers are
despondent over the current situation but confident that the military can work its
way out of its current bad situation. Most of the general officers' comments are optimistic about the future.

The comments of Alfred B. Fitt, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower under Kennedy and Johnson, are enlightening:

Fitt believes Vietnam has been an unmitigated disaster for the country, the armed forces, and the Army. Fitt maintains that the war destroyed the conviction that the government is a responsible entity, entitled to support in its efforts. There is no trust between government and people any longer. Fitt explains that there was no plan for action in Vietnam, and that not nearly enough discussion about all the ramifications of our involvement in the conflict was conducted at the middle or even the upper levels of decision-making. He explains that he compartmentalized his thinking and got satisfaction from doing his immediate task. He speculates about the leadership problem in the Army, asserting that many young officers did not believe in the war and that this had an effect on the men.

Fitt believes that the Army can rebuild itself and its image after the war is over; and that as society finds just causes to believe in and fight for, so will the Army. (BN571)
45. Another analysis concentrates on griping and the willingness of more and more servicemen to act upon the gripes. Many enlisted men view the Army as a dying institution, killed by the cancer that his infected it. Yet for all the soldier dissent and the discipline and morale problems, many commanders regard today's American soldier as the best educated, best trained, most sophisticated ever to wear the uniform. The final test is the Vietnam war itself, where most of these young soldiers fought superbly in the longest, most unpopular conflict in our history. Some of the officers find virtue in their questioning. They view the situation as beneficial because it gives the Army bureaucracy a chance to justify it's action, something every bureaucracy needs. Generals Von Steuben and Pulaski remarked on the questioning of orders by American soldiers, when they trained troops during the Revolution. (BN575)

46. But drugs and theft are problems, and the Army knows this. A bigger problem is the sharp rift between the young soldier and the veteran NCO. They speak and think in different terms. The NCO favors the Marine Corps-type of discipline, while the young soldier is outspoken in his views and uncommitted to military protocol.

    Both are sensitive to civilian contempt for men in uniform. A major in the Green Berets expressed it best. "Before Vietnam the Army was self-assured and smug. They had the 'word' and they knew what was best. Vietnam changed all that." (BN575)

47. Army commanders in Vietnam claim that combat refusals were rare and that two incidents in October 1971 were greatly overblown. Problems arose when troops maintained that reconnaissance patrols were offensive actions and exceeded the Administration's declaration that the American role in Vietnam was to be defensive, while commanders believed that reconnaissance patrols are vital to any defense. (BN569)

48. Another account concentrated on "fragging" and heroin in Vietnam. By and large the causes of fragging were those that could have been guessed by experienced military men far from the actual situation: boredom, loss of a sense
of purpose, unnecessary harrassment of enlisted men by NCOs, and declining confidence in the Army as an institution.

In Vietnam the lack of something meaningful to do was the main reason cited for fragging and heroin use. As the infantry war slowed to a halt, the Army GI was left waiting principally for the date of his rotation home. He was often given "busy work," resulting in his trying to do his best not to do anything. The Air Force and Navy still had continuing missions in Vietnam; thus, idleness was less of a problem for them than for the Army. (BN510)

49. As good commanders have known from time immemorial, when the soldier is under pressure and busy, he is a better performer and far more cheerful than when he is idle. The action at Khe Sanh in February 1971, gave an illustration; when American forces geared up for a movement to support the ARVN incursion into Laos, spirits rose higher than before. (BN520)

50. In an in-depth interview, General Westmoreland gave an analysis of what he and the Army were trying to do to overcome its problems, making these points:

(1) The Army is attempting to analyze itself as an institution, critically and honestly.

(2) It is trying to develop an atmosphere that appeals to the young.

(3) It is examining leadership practices and management programs for means and ends, to ascertain how sensitive they are to problems and people.

(4) The objectives of the Army are to improve professionalism, improve Service life, and obtain public approval.

(5) It is appealing to minority groups by making available to them more spaces, more promotions, and greater responsibilities. (BN570)

51. Arthur Hadley, an ex-Ivy-League writer with much combat experience in World War II and Korea, accompanied combat units in Vietnam for two months, and rendered an insightful report:
As I spend time with a succession of Infantry platoons, I am conscious of a vast sieve sifting beneath the young men of our society. No one who objects violently will end up in the Infantry. From avoiding the draft to cultivating a noncombat specialty to merely dragging his feet, a man can assure himself of — at worst — a safe rear-area assignment. As a result, Infantry companies are peopled by a highly select group of men, though the selection is unconscious and bureaucratic. To take a line company and ask for volunteers from it further divides unfairly an already unfairly divided risk.

About 10 percent of this unit and other frontline units are black. The reports that in this war blacks are dying out of all proportion to their numbers in society are false. Judging from the number of black faces in the rear, it appears that they may be drafted out of proportion to their numbers, but in the dying units or the hospital wards containing wounded, the ratio of blacks to whites seems to be about the same as in the civilian population.

Notably absent are the Ivy Leaguers and graduates of other prestigious non-Catholic universities. In two months with frontline units, I met only two Ivy Leaguers. If our future continues to resemble our past, and if being a veteran remains almost a must in politics, then a generation of Ivy Leaguers may have Jim Crowed themselves out of politics.

Also usually absent are the very poor, black faces and white faces alike being mostly those of the middle class of each race. The psychological and physical health of those raised in poverty does not adapt to the strains of combat. The Vietnamese war, which the radicals so violently protest, actually unites them and the poor in safety, while the best of the middle class gets blown away. (BN563)

52. One of Hadley's points was paralleled by Heinl, who felt that the educated, college-graduate draftees have "rejected the leadership role that by background and education is their birth-right and responsibility." He describes a
highly intelligent Army brat, ROTC honor man, who had a desk job rather than a leadership portion. One influence on him were university professors who had either "shirked" (Col. Heinl's word) the Korean War or who had opted out as officers. (BP182)

53. This point needs to be remembered when first-rate candidates evade military service, and leadership positions are filled by second-raters and fifth raters. When the inevitable mistakes are made in war — the unnecessary deaths, the outbreak of an atrocity — it is sometimes the loudest critic who should have been there and done better. To those who were instrumental in eliminating ROTC, for example, at selective institutions, one may wish to say, "But when your sons are badly in need of high-quality leadership in grievous situations, you have helped ensure that it will not be available."

54. Another account analyzed the decline of discipline in the ranks in Vietnam, based on an Army survey that the Army refused to discuss publicly. Discipline had "eroded to a serious but not critical degree" that, in some cases, had brought on "degradation" in the carrying-out of unit missions. The cause was alleged to be the permissiveness within American society, which results in many officers and men being permissives in the military. Some of the young persons in the Services are anti-war, anti-military, anti-establishment, and anti-discipline people. A period of withdrawal contributes, for no one wants to fight if the reason for their being in Vietnam is ending.

The most serious factor in the discipline breakdown is weakness in the chain of command, especially at lower unit levels, where experienced officers and NOCs are rare; or where those who are experienced may not want to move for fear that a mistake could ruin their career. Attempts to bridge the gap through mixed councils of officers and men have served to dilute or by-pass the chain of command. The report concludes that through their own actions, the Services have impaired the military image, and that they must set their own houses in order. (BP98)
55. As the war wound down, many minor decisions frequently had to be referred upward for prior clearance because of costs. In actual day-to-day combat, this had some detrimental effects and probably cost some American lives, e.g., clearance procedures to get Med-evac helicopters, artillery coverage, etc.

The Army maintains elaborate statistics on what is happening to its units, surveying 20 different indices each month to measure the morale of major commands. "Though after what McNamara did to us with statistics in Vietnam, we're a little careful," remarks one officer who deals with them. "For example, re-enlistment is often used by Infantrymen as a means of getting out of the field. So a high re-enlistment rate that used to indicate a good outfit may now indicate a poor one.

Nevertheless, when studied with care, the statistics reinforce the image one gets on the ground. As the war winds down, AWOL, crimes and drug abuse are all rising rapidly, with by far the greatest rise in the rear. Article 15s (punishments by unit commanders) are up from 16 per 1,000 men in fiscal 1970 to 20 per 1,000 men this year. In fiscal 1970, 1,589 Article 212s (less-than-honorable discharges) were given to rear-area soldiers, only 1,080 to combat-area soldiers. Yet the combat-area soldiers outnumbered rear-area soldiers, three to one.

Fascinatingly enough, at the same time general courts-martial, which mete out the most serious punishments, are declining. This represents a profound change in the basic attitude of the Army in Vietnam toward its duty. "We used to feel that it was our responsibility to take the individual provided us by the draft and try and make a soldier out of him, return him to society a better man," said a general in Saigon who commanded troops on his first tour. "Now we 212 the bastard back into society the way we got him." (BN563)

56. A Service newspaper evaluated the Calley case as a landmark for all, as a restatement of what is acceptable combat conduct, and as reaffirmation that our Army is facing even its most difficult problems. But there is so much more...
that needs the attention of reform. (BN83)

57. Another thoughtful analysis by a Yale law professor reflected on the meaning of MyLai and the Calley trial, and advocated individual responsibility when judging whether war crimes have or have not been committed in Vietnam. The professor maintained that the Nuremberg trials established the precedent of assigning individual responsibility for acts committed during war; he opposed the idea of holding the nation accountable for Calley’s crimes in Vietnam because Calley’s actions, the killing of civilians in cold blood, were not indicative of our national policy. Calley was responsible for his actions, and further courts-martial should be convened to determine the responsibility of higher commanders for the MyLai incident. Our national obligation is to abide by the precedents set down by the Nuremberg trials and to assign individual obligation for acts done in warfare. (BP287)

58. Col. Oran Henderson, the senior officer put on trial in relation to the MyLai incident, offered atrocity conduct in all Services should to take full responsibility for the incident. He said he would have done anything the Army asked; he would even have signed false statements if it would have reduced embarrassment to the Army. General Westmoreland refused Henderson’s offer to serve as the scapegoat. (BP128)

59. A probe behind the facade of the court martial of Colonel Henderson tried to take a long look at the Army’s and, by implication, the rest of the military’s Command System. Testimony from the trial indicated that various officers of the Americal Division were not aware of the orders to report allegations of possible war crimes and knew of no definite procedures for reporting such
alleged crimes to higher authority. There was no system to police compliance with the Westmoreland directive to report suspected war crimes to higher authority. Initiative to report was left to tactical commanders. Furthermore, the frequent rotation of officers to and from combat assignments did not aid efficiency. For example, the discrepancy between the number of battle deaths reported by those at MyLai and those watching in helicopters was not checked. (BN540)

60. The MyLai trials imposed a degree of hesitation on a number of activities in Vietnam. For example, when the "Seals," the Navy commandoes, left Vietnam after presence there since 1966, there was said to be a certain amount of dampening effect, as they became more concerned over the rules of engagement. (BN506)

61. There continues to grow a small literature on various aspects of the American state of mind that allowed MyLai to happen and how society and the social scientists should grapple with this state of mind. (BN 116)

62. A series of analyses terminated with these general conclusions:
   1. The Army is a reflection of American society, with its strengths and weakness.
      
      The Vietnam war has strained the Army to the breaking point.

      3. Conditions will improve when the war ends.

      4. The Army must rebuild itself and revitalize itself. (BN573)

63. Several other conclusions were reached:
   1. The need is questioned for such a large defense force in Europe.

      2. The reasons given for maintaining a large force -- to have a base for negotiation of reductions with the Russians, and to give the President options -- are somewhat false. The real reason is that we also want to prevent the rising of the German Army.

      3. The German population does not really appreciate our efforts.
4. The prices of crime, violence, drugs, etc., among our troops are not worth it. Europe is responsible for its own defense.

5. We need a good defense establishment — one that civilians serve in to keep it honest. (BN573)

64. What steps have been taken to prevent the gap with the public, especially with young people, from getting wider?

One account related the efforts of a five-man team from the Army War College — all veterans of Vietnam, all Lt. Cols. or Colonels; and the group included a chaplain. They made their availability known to schools, groups, and colleges in the East, mid-west, and near-south. The team maintained a discussion style that was well-informed, reasonable, non-polemical, and willing to listen. They found the overwhelming majority of the students encountered to have honest and searching questions about American foreign policy and the role of the military in Vietnam. They tended, except for an occasion specialist or faculty activist, to be woefully short of complete facts, and long on denunciation of "establishment" policies. The main issue usually was the relevance of the Vietnam struggle to the United

Potential Impact

The practice described here — of informed military teams participating in campus debates — has much to recommend it in the future, concerning a number of issues that might benefit from face-to-face discussion. The participation of such "fire-brigade" panels, willing to talk anywhere they are welcome, will be a more viable practice in the future than following the traditional military tendency to withdraw into silence.
States in a period of changing priorities.
The panel argued that:

(1) The United States must shift a larger part of its resources to meet critical internal problems, but must not withdraw from Indochina because the North Vietnamese and Chinese regimes in combination could dominate Southeast Asia by force or subversion. Such a combination would substantially alter power relationships in the area, to the eventual disadvantage of the United States. North Vietnamese success would encourage similar wars in other areas.

(2) Communist domination of Southeast Asia would threaten the lifelines of Japan and other free Asian states, via domination of shipping and transportation routes in the Malay region.

(3) It is vital to our national interests to maintain confidence in our commitments where they are challenged. If we fail to meet our security commitments to those who depend on them it would erode the credibility of our arrangements to discourage aggression elsewhere, possibly in the Middle East and Europe.

The team did not attempt to "win" debates, merely to explain the facts of what happened and the reasons why: their effectiveness was patent on most occasions — not necessarily in obtaining instant reversals of conviction, but in providing what was in many instances the only clear, reasoned explanations of American policy and operations available, especially from mature persons who had actually "been there." (BP265)

65. After a tour of Europe, Alaska, and CONUS posts, General Westmoreland held a meeting with major commanders and information officers to voice his dissatisfaction with the way that information about the "new Army was being disseminated to the troops in the field." Some
observers felt that this slow-down in communications was due to a conscious effort by some to scuttle those aspects of "The Volunteer Army" with which they disagreed. In any event, the theme of the meeting was: "A well-informed and well-motivated serviceman is the best public image the military can have." General Westmoreland maintained that incidents like MyLai, the PX scandals, and others had hurt the Army more because the Army failed to clear up its own house, and more important, denied its shortcomings when the press first exposed these defects. In short, he said, admit the truth when confronted with it, and, better still, rectify your mistakes before someone makes political capital out of them.

And start the process by having a well-informed soldier.

Potential Impact

Future military participation on debate will depend for success partly on the Service's greater candor in uncovering and announcing deficiencies in their own operations.

One colossal aspect of the Vietnam War has almost escaped awareness in the domestic American consciousness. The course of the War existing in the minds of many Americans is almost the reverse of reality, in that their impression of the American military performance in Vietnam is strongly linked to MyLai and negative accounts, whereas the real American record is that of the 100,000 (?) platoon-sized incidents which conformed to the rules of war and did not become MyLai. The record was not established by exceptions.
67. Exclusive of combat actions, however, we have been bombarded with accounts and statistics about American bombardment of Vietnam — bombs dropped, refugees created, civilian casualties. Practically nothing is recounted of the constructive contributions — the thousands of schoolrooms built, villages reconstructed, dwellings erected, canals and wells dug, bridges and roads built, refugees resettled, civilians given medical treatment, food distributed. Even outside the official agencies and channels, the GI himself — as he always does, everywhere in the world — has dug deep into his own pockets to contribute money, and into his own leisure to contribute time and effort, to the erection of orphanages, churches, and a host of other facilities. These humanitarian activities — typical of American military forces (see BN39) — also constitute a substantial part of the American military record in Vietnam.

68. Nor were all expressions of opinion by Servicemen gripes or complaints. To a colleague criticizing the Army, a sailor wrote a letter to Navy Times, for example, recommending appreciation and admiration for the sister services of the Army and Air Force. (BN235)
69. Many letters from servicemen defended traditional service practices as serving rational purposes in military life, even reveille and short hair. One such writer implied that much of what is said to be wrong with the military stems from a more permissive civilian culture and from the grave doubts raised by a very unpopular war. (BN618)

70. Another letter to an editor from an "insider" outlined the causes of military discord today, maintaining that the degenerative processes, which have gained publicity only recently, have been going on for years. These processes were exposed directly because there were no mechanisms within the Army to make some problems known.

Greater honesty in efficiency reports, for example, concerning the qualifications of officers might have gone some way toward abolishing the myth of perfection the military seeks to perpetuate. The military must not develop unofficial elites that receive higher positions; must develop more realistic assignments; and must make assignments on the basis of service needs and genuine qualifications, rather than career benefits. The efficiency report cannot identify weakness because any such entry casts a pall over the individual's future. He is not supposed to have any weakness. Is there really an individual with no weakness? (BP285)

Potential Impact

This comment highlights the unreality of a record of many years of analysis of an individual which records no weaknesses. This ties in with the Army War College study of leadership, and the phase thereof in which evaluations by subordinates and peers were probed, as well as those of superiors. The results were highly disconcerting to some individuals' self-perceptions. Records which reflect only the results of an individual's relationships with superiors over a career (certainly affected by the facade he has presented to superiors) may be inadequate for future evaluation, in which it may be important to include several perspectives of each potential leader.
71. As the air war continued, some personal views of Navy pilots were published. Pilots compete to fly because it is challenging and exciting, and because they are trained to do it. One pilot said he would rather be in San Diego in a state of readiness for a war that might be more justifiable than in Vietnam, but he acknowledged that "we are doing a good job of the dirty job we have to do." (BN415)

72. As the ground war in Vietnam slowed down, while the air war picked up, the attitudes of soldiers left behind to guard bases seemed to be resigned to doing their jobs; but they were in no hurry to make contact with the enemy. (BN292)

73. One account summarized conversations with some newly arrived men of the _______ Division about their role in Vietnam and their thoughts on being one of the few remaining units in the country. These young inexperienced soldiers told of their fear of being the last Americans killed in Vietnam and their contempt for their officers, Army, and government. Their apparent demoralization stems from the winding down of the war. These soldiers expressed their opposition to the war and revealed several interesting things about themselves. First, although they had no experience with the North Vietnamese, they regarded them as fearsome warriors, while the South Vietnamese with whom few of them had experience, were regarded as cowardly thieves. They expressed contempt of their officers because, they said, the officers would not lead them very deeply into the jungle on patrols. Some of them showed regret because they had seen no combat. Others thought that the North Vietnamese would come out of the jungle, attack their base, and kill all of them. The Army in Vietnam is biding its time, waiting for the war to end. In fact, the Army's presence may be a net liability. If it is actually used in combat, and suffers losses, as it would confronting a North Vietnamese offensive, the uproar in the United States would undermine our essential aid to the South Vietnamese. The Army can only sit and wait until the ARVN raises another division. (BN553)

74. A probing analysis was reported in Army Times in August 1971. The report said of the Vietnam situation that the old cliché applies: "If you take
care of the troops, they'll take care of you." There is less discipline and drug trouble in the units that are productively employed. Few race problems exist forward of battalion headquarters. Because of mutual need, there is little trouble during fighting periods, but blacks tend to associate only with other blacks when their unit is off the line.

Soldiers perform better when commanders take the time to explain why some things are done. The generation gap surfaces from time to time; young commanders have better rapport with troops than older soldiers, even though the older men may be technically more competent. NCOs and company-grade officers believed the military-justice system has fallen apart.

Small-unit leadership gets high ratings in the report.

Problems uncovered: (1) older NCOs believe that discipline in the Army is non-existent. (2) veteran soldiers assigned to technical tasks after know less about the job than fresh-out-of-school youngsters. There is serious need for refresher training.

VOLAR officials learned that many noncoms are hostile to their efforts but could be converted. Men in grade E-4 and below feel that VOLAR would never work in wartime; for, they say, they would never volunteer for combat assignments. Soldiers in Vietnam want the Army, not an outside agency, to undertake a complete rehabilitation program for drug users.

The finding that validates a historical military principle: units that are not in combat or productively employed are the units with drug and discipline problems. (\*N 53, 55)

The Monitor reflected appraisals by young officers of the Army's two main difficulties: (1) In trying to develop tests and measures of its capabilities, short-term indicators of success have achieved greater meaning than long-term goals of moral and ethical strength. As a result, it has become more important not to be bad than to be good. (2) The Army has embraced the computer age — "Management ethos run wild." War has been reduced to a scoreboard: kill ratios, body counts, and attrition rates.

-91-
The scores had to keep going up if careers were to keep going up; and evaluation sheets, rather than the Vietnamese populace, became the most important thing to help along.

It is significant that most officers, even junior officers, don't seem to question the traditional, authoritarian way of the Service or the responsibilities of war. But they do strenuously object to the difference they see between ideals and actual values in practice.

Beyond concern with short-term measures and insignificant statistics, many officers see personal success placed above the good of the Service; poor managerial or technical competence; a looking upward to please superiors, rather than downward to the needs of subordinates; and a need to be honest enough to admit that things went wrong. (BN199)

76. While most attention focused on Vietnam, an occasional appraisal focused on servicemen serving elsewhere, as in Korea.

In Korea, the soldier divides his time routinely between work and recreation, with no one being overworked. Morale is adequate. Hard drugs are not a problem. Racial disturbances between black and white GI's occur from time to time, but this is not a great problem. Whether the Army in Korea is combat-ready is another matter. (BN356)

77. Another account focused on Army problems as seen through the eyes of the men and officers of the U.S. Seventh Army in Europe.

Concentrating on one unit, the Cavalry, the author describes how the GI's are forced to live in old barracks, with many using drugs and stealing from each other. The generals say the Army is no different from any other institution of our society, but is a mirror of society's ills. The principal source of the Army's problem is Vietnam, the longest, most unpopular war in the history of the United States. To keep it going, the Army was forced to strip the Seventh Army for replacements, bringing on a crisis in terms of morale, discipline, and combat readiness. At the time of writing, the Seventh Army was short of men, material, and money to carry out needed improvements in housing and in programs
related to drug abuse. (BN578)

78. Major General Garth, a division commander, sees some of his problems as an outgrowth of the civil-rights struggle, carried over from civilian life. He describes the situation:

"The black man is impatient with the pace of social change and has a tendency to take the situation in his own hands." (BN578)

79. Time magazine also referred to the Seventh Army:

The Seventh, in the shadow of Vietnam and bled of money and experienced men, must cope with boredom and resentment over shabby living conditions and higher prices off-post. An upsurge of racism, drug abuse, and disastrous morale, has resulted. General Davison encourages sensitivity sessions between white officers, white noncoms, and black soldiers. He says, "I think you have to discriminate in favor of and over-compensate for the blacks."

Davison feels the drug users are "young men who had a very real life problem, and who need compassionate, humane concern and not punishment." (BPI41)

80. Another stresses the boredom in military life in Germany — that is, life in the field is not boring, but barracks life is. One contribution is lack of knowledge of foreign languages on the part of Americans. Certainly, there are many opportunities for travel, sports events, theater, etc.; but many are apathetic. There is some racial discrimination in local entertainment, bars, etc. For too many young, drugs are available (hashish costs 1/8 the price in the United States). Officers and NCOs have recourse to liquor. TV is absent (American TV) on many bases; this puts a peculiarly modern strain on some marriages. (BN281)

81. Professor Morris Janowitz has mentioned frequently the "chronic underemployment in military life" in peacetime circumstances, as a problem of the future to be reckoned with. In this connection, a Harris survey of March 1972, on drug usage in Vietnam, asked "What would you say are the main two or three reasons why servicemen use drugs in the armed forces?"
Among the general public, the largest number (34%) said: "the pressures of war." But among veterans recently discharged from service, the largest number (22%) said: "Boredom, something to do." (The veterans' second highest response (19%) was "pressures of war").

Some Larger Perspectives on Vietnam

82. In a review of a book on Department of Defense Systems Analysis under McNamara, the use of such analysis is lauded, and it is shown how money was saved by cross military analysis. It was also disclosed that the DOD budget steadily rose under McNamara. While he left office, the book's author's point out, the Service bureaucracies remained, committed to pre-quantitative thinking. The "brass still preferred chrome to cost-effectiveness," and Congress continued "to trust generals more than geniuses."

On Vietnam, the Systems Analysis office was involved in three stages (1) pre-1967, when Systems Analysis did nothing; (2) a brief interlude of analytical criticism; and (3) imposed silence.

The reviewer questions why McNamara never called for quantitative studies in 1965, "when he was masterminding escalation." (BP316)

83. One journal printed a comment supporting that the theory that it was civilians who "made the war" in Southeast Asia and "messed things up," and it's the military that bears the brunt of these mistakes. (BP180)

84. Perhaps the biggest mistake made by the national government in connection with the Vietnam War was the cluster of decisions about 1965 (each of which had much to be said for it, however much there was to say against it):

- not to declare war
- to rely almost exclusively on the draft for manpower
- not to call up Reserves and National Guard
- to set the standard combat tour in Vietnam at one year

Even that cluster might have worked. But the factor that condemned that cluster to responsibility for the tidal wave of antiwar and antimilitary attitudes was the extension of the War beyond one or two years at most. -94-
85. In General Westmoreland's opinion, the dilution of leadership that occurred, particularly in the junior-officer and NCO ranks, was due to the government's failure to mobilize the National Guard and Army Reserve during the early days of the Vietnam buildup. Lower quality in experience and mental standards made incidents such as MyLai easier to occur. The influx of men into the Army with civilian offenses on their records was accompanied by a rise in disciplinary problems. The anti-military atmosphere rooted in Vietnam has caused fewer college students to take ROTC or reserve component training. Also, fewer are looking towards the military as a career. (BN159)

86. It is contended that anti-militarism among intellectuals and college students will not dissipate once the war in Vietnam is concluded; the quarter-century-old honeymoon between the American public and the military establishment has come to an end. One implication is that the military must impart to its incoming officers and men a calm and judicious recognition of the milieu in which they will operate. (BB246)

87. The following results emerged from a study made among 161 students of the Naval War College (over-30 group) and 456 officer candidates (under-30 group):

Both groups place "Settling the Vietnam War" at the top of their priority lists, with 83% of the officer candidates including it among their top 10 issues, compared with 77% of the Naval War College officers. The ranking issues do not tell much about the preferred method of settlement but both groups make it their most important issue by a substantial margin. After that, the lists are different. For the War College students, the next three most important issues are control of crime, Communist-supported insurgency, and race relations. For the officer candidates, the order of issues following Vietnam is race relations, the continued existence of poverty in the United States, and control of crime. Caution is necessary to avoid misinterpretation of rankings, however, since differences of a few percent can account for substantial differences in rank order. Control of crime for example is listed by 67% of the senior officers and 60% of the officer candidates, but this relatively small percentage difference causes a difference in rank order between second and fourth place. (BP26)

88. Additional findings from the same survey:
There is a difference in the overall distribution of attitudes between the two groups as found in this survey. On most questions more of the younger officers are liberals. They tend to be more concerned with domestic issues than international issues, more worried about issues of social justice, less worried about issues of national security, somewhat more often are mildly isolationist, and in any given circumstances less often favor the use of military force—all as compared with the group of more senior officers. In many cases, however, the degree of overlap in attitudes appears at least as compelling as the differences. In responses to almost every question, majorities of both groups select moderate answers, with smaller proportions at the extremes. The typical officer candidate as sketched in this survey is no more a wild-eyed radical than is the typical War College student a militarist—though there may be an example or two of each type in each group. (BP26)

89. it is part of the current atmosphere that, in a September 1971 review of two books about the military in a scholarly journal, the reviewing scholar professed himself mystified to account for the existence of the military, or to account for motivation to participate in military service. (BP133)

Some Post-Vietnam Trends

90. Outside the continuing familiar military missions, one area of increasing interest emerging in relation to the military establishment is variously termed civic action, civil action, social action, military civic action, or community relations.

Americans are highly ambivalent toward their military establishment. They fear its power; but they recognize its potential usefulness in emergency situations. Military authorities should provide support within traditional and legal expectations.

The character of natural disasters is such that new expectations sometimes emerge at variance with established ones and place pressure on the military to assume different roles. Military organizations may attempt to adapt somehow to the new expectations without outwardly breaking with the old ones; for when the immediate emergency is over, their performance tends to be judged by prior established norms rather than by emerging norms. (BP14)

Institution." Beck drew an interesting comparison of the moral legitimacy and status of both military and welfare activities (both are public subsidy of a social need, involve economic subsistence to non-productive people, etc.).

As public evaluation of military honor declines, even acceptance of military discipline becomes socially stigmatized; because a military man submits to the system, his own social reputation may become degraded.

Military personnel in periods of public indifference to theories of military honor can be expected to withdraw into mutual sympathy with their fellows, to become sensitive and defensive to civilian attitudes, and to define civilian values as irrelevant. We can also expect a shrinking of social participation within the confines of military bases, which then become, in effect, 'Military ghettos.'

What Beck calls "manpower effectiveness" especially in peacetime means "public reputation for social contribution, concentration on a definable organizational goal, as opposed to emphasis on the organization as a means of helping the needy." (BB247)

92. In Center, Colorado, the Army, with the consent of civilian authorities is helping to rebuild a community, a demonstration of constructive capabilities.

The Army responded to a request for men and machines (but not money or material); and a partnership was formed. The citizens

| Potential Impact | The whole area called "social action," "civic action," and similar terms by the military has beneficial implications for the military in the future. Many military bases of all Services perform a number of roles, some very substantial, in contributing constructive services to nearby communities. As pointed out in these citations in the final Section, expansion of social action may help refurbish the military image in American society in general, and provide opportunities for young Servicemen to immerse themselves in service to their fellow-man. Many major projects could be undertaken by the Services. For example, an earth- |
formulate the plans and objectives they want, while the Army supplies men and machine to help. The widely-repeated theme was that if the Army had to be kept busy, why not keep busy doing constructive things?

Negative reactions include a fear that the town will come to depend on the Army and not be able to shift for itself. Further, a fear of failure could lead to further resentment of the military.

Here the important thing is this: Fear of failure or of dependence on the Army must not be a cop-out" for not taking action. There is the possibility of failure in anything one does; it is the other side of success. (BN608)

93. There are considerations on both sides of social action, pro and con:

(1) The increase in societal violence may increase the domestic role of the military, with possibilities of damage to its image.

(2) There is a general view in some quarters against the military role in social change, shown in different ways: a) the possibility of uncomfortable involvement in politics (the activity may require special skills which the military do not have);

(3) The military may not be welcomed as competitors of civilian agencies; such as unions;

(4) Since DOD may not get increased funds to perform, domestic assistance would be rendered at the expense of some category of national security.

(5) The military image militates against involvement in certain kinds of social action. (BM41)
In September 1970, the Department of Defense announced its revised ROTC policies:

1. ROTC courses would be reviewed by institutions in the same manner as other courses with regard to academic credit.

2. Senior military officers of each ROTC unit would assume the rank of "professor" and be accorded the privileges of the rank. On the subject of cadets who break contracts, DOD agreed to permit an academic representative to sit in on the hearing of any such case and not to pull a student out of school to active duty for violation. However, DOD retained the authority to order contract violators to active duty as enlisted men when they violate or disenroll from school.

Also, the policy stated that students would not be denied enrollment because of their undergraduate major; the term "Program" would be used in lieu of "Department" as a descriptive term; and the Services will cooperate with the schools to develop mutually acceptable programs of instruction. (BN37)

ROTC cadets at their annual 1970 summer camp, conceded that their main reason for participation in the program was draft deferment — that is to postpone active military service until they had finished school, and to permanently escape service in the enlisted ranks. (BN280)

Without the likelihood of being drafted into the ranks, few students at civilian campuses will feel attracted to ROTC programs.

Making ROTC more attractive to students was the primary goal of the reforms proposed by the education associations. Part of the package was mercenary: more scholarships and higher subsistence allowances. The education groups also recommended that colleges be reimbursed for ROTC overhead costs at the rate of $500 per graduate.

To rectify its public posture toward the military-industrial complex a university may, among other things, stop spending its own money for officer
training. It could be an appropriate response to student charges of academic complicity in "militarism." (BP408)

97. Once plans for a volunteer army are implemented, only the prestige and the financial aid offered by the ROTC will draw "a civilian-oriented" leadership from the campuses into the officer corps. That prospect makes the negotiations underway in universities this year of potentially awesome significance.

If and when such a crisis comes, the subversion of the officer corps by its tradition of civilian higher education might set the last effective limit to the Government's use of its monopoly on military violence. (BP408)

98. Overall, enrollment for all three services fell from 260,000 in 1966-67 to 115,000 in the last academic year, a drop of 56 percent. The number of commissions granted fell from a peak of 23,000 in 1969-70 to 18,700. (BP408)

99. Although scattered bombings and fires caused serious property damage during the 1970-71 academic year, the number of violent incidents fell sharply and large protest demonstrations almost vanished.

At some universities, of course, ROTC is either gone or going. Since 1969, units have been disbanded, or scheduled for termination, at the request of 15 institutions, all but one (Stanford University) in the northeast corner of the United States. At an additional 12 schools, units have been discontinued because of low enrollment. But new units have been established at 30 campuses, all but seven of them in southern or border states. As a result, the military will be drawing fewer officers from Yale, Princeton and Harvard and more from Alcorn A & M College (Miss.), Austin Peay State University (Tenn.) and Parsons College (Iowa). (BP408)

100. Professor Janowitz offers this suggestion in Foreign Affairs of April 1972:
ROTC units must be reorganized so that any college student, either on entering college or when a junior, will have access to a collegiate ROTC program. In each of the ten major metropolitan areas, there should be a composite program, administered by an existing ROTC group, enrolling students from any accredited college in the area. (BP214)

**Potential Impact**

The Janowitz suggestion for composite ROTC groups in 10 metropolitan centers may overcome several current student objections to ROTC on campus and may reward further study.

### Conscription and Voluntary Service

101. The Monitor made this evaluation, prior to change in the conscription laws: The present draft is not only unjust and inefficient; it is also on the verge of collapse. After Vietnam the highest priority should go to establish an all-volunteer army. (BN213)

102. In 1970, Newsweek observed:

This country's whole system of military recruitment is carefully designed to ensure that the fighting men remain at the bottom of the pecking order. The draft is the principal instrument to this end. The Navy and Air Force recruit young men by saying to them, "Volunteer for us — if you don't, you may end up as a grunt." The army frantically counters by saying, "No, no, you don't have to be a grunt — enlist first, and we'll give you a nice, safe job." It is hard to imagine a more morale-destroying system of recruitment. It largely accounts for the extravagant noncombat-combat ratio in the services, for it puts a premium on finding the maximum number of noncombat jobs for enlistees. Moreover, it ensures that any ground combat capability is wholly dependent on continuation of the draft — which supplied the fighting men — and thus ensures that the draft must continue. (BP8)

103. The White House Conference on Youth offered these resolutions:

1.1 The Task Force on the Draft, National Service, and Alternatives endorses an end to the draft and the
establishment of an all-volunteer Armed Force. In arriving at our conclusions, we examined in detail the need for an adequate national defense, the inequities of conscription, and the feasibility and social desirability of an all-volunteer force and recommended policies needed to improve the Armed Services to achieve such a force.

The draft has alienated many youth against their country, and many others against their peers who were able to avoid service; it has caused many young Americans to adopt life styles different from those which they would otherwise have chosen; and it has had untold effects on the many who have unwillingly served two years in the military. This is not to suggest that there are not many who truly volunteer or willingly serve when called, nor that many draftees do not benefit from their military service. However, the human cost that the draft has levied can never be measured. The irony of the draft is that such forced servitude, such compulsion, is unnecessary. (BM153)

104. 1.1a We endorse the concept of an all-volunteer Armed Force. Some have expressed fears that an all-volunteer force would be socially undesirable, an army of the poor and the black, a professional army of mercenaries, a threat to domestic and international stability. Behind these questions of potential danger, is the tacit assumption that an all-volunteer force would be substantially differed from a mixed force of draftees and volunteers both in its composition and in the way that it would be used. The Task Force found no evidence to support these alleged dangers and rejects them; we found instead that the socially desirable aspects of the all-volunteer force far outweigh the alleged dangers. (BM153)

105. 1.1b Confident that the national security will not be jeopardized, we recommend that the draft law be allowed to expire on June 30, 1971.

Although we endorse repeal of the draft, we cannot be sure that Congress will adopt our recommendations. Because the draft has such a profound impact on the lives of young Americans, we feel that it is imperative for us to propose recommendations that would minimize the inequities in who serves when not all serve. In recent
years, the Selective Service System has been improved but still discriminates against some racial minorities and favors the more educated who can find loopholes in the law. The achieve greater equity in our present lottery draft, the full Task Force strongly endorsed the following recommendation to improve the operations of the System:

I.1c The existing practices of the Selective Service System must be changed as follows:

(1) We endorse the President's intention to phase out the II-S student deferment, but feel that it is unfair to make it retroactive by taking away any II-S deferements that have been or might be granted before any new draft law becomes effective. We also support the President's effort to phase out the IV-D exemption for divinity students and urge that the IV-B exemption for certain elected officials also be phased out. (BM153)

(2) In order to achieve equal treatment in the granting of medical deferments, we recommend that physical examination of black registrants must include a blood test for Sickle-cell anemia, a disease peculiar to blacks, and that the presence of the Sickle-cell anemia trait be accepted as the basis for a IV-F medical exemption. It should be noted that the Sickle-cell disease has already been accepted as the basis for medical exemption.

(3) We recommend that the requirements for membership on local draft boards be modified as follows: First, local board members should live in the area over which they have jurisdiction.

Second, local board membership should reflect the ethnic and economic composition of its constituency. Third, the age requirements for local board membership should be not less than 18 years of age and not more than 55 years of age with terms of service limited to a maximum of five years.

(4) We recommend that the present appeal procedure be altered to give every registrant the right to have witnesses and legal counsel present during personal appearances. Moreover, we urge that every registrant have the right to a Presidential appeal in the event
that his appeal is rejected by a state appeals board.

(5) In order to correct the present practice on appeal for re-examination for medical fitness wherein the registrant is re-examined by the same doctors, we recommend that any registrant making such an appeal be allowed to be re-examined at a Veterans Administration hospital or at a different Armed Forces Entrance Examining Station.

All of these changes will require Congressional legislation in any new draft law, and we urge their adoption. (BM153)

107. A continuing problem that has plagued the Selective Service System is that of determining who is a conscientious objector. Conscience is by its very nature, private, and no one can see inside the mind and heart of another. In order to mitigate the problems surrounding the granting of C.O. deferments, we recommend that the following provisions be adopted in any new draft law:

(1) Recognizing the private nature of conscientious beliefs and the difficulties faced by Selective Service in determining the sincerity of a man claiming to be a conscientious objector, we recommend that any man claiming to be a conscientious objector be granted such status subject to his willingness to perform, if called, two years of civilian work in the maintenance of the community or national health, safety, or interest.

(2) We believe that sincere selective objection as such be recognized along with objection to war in any form. We urge that local draft boards be informed immediately that the Supreme Court has recognized one form of selective objection, namely that young men who object now, but who do not know what they would do in a future hypothetical circumstance, can still qualify for C.O. status.

(3) We strongly urge that opportunities for civilian alternative service should be expanded to better utilize the skills of C.O.'s. In addition, a C.O. should be allowed to perform his service in his own community instead of the present system requiring him to find work.
outside of his community. Further, we reject the punitive provision in the present House draft legislation (HR6531) wherein a C.O. who fails to perform satisfactorily in his alternative job is inducted into the Armed Services. (BM153)

108. One of the more emotional issues facing our Task Force was, "What should we do about those Americans who have knowingly violated the draft law, or who are now in exile to avoid conscription?" Some believe that those who knowingly violated the draft law, thereby transferring the burden of service to others, deserve to be punished. Because of their strong beliefs that the draft is immoral, others favored the following recommendation that was adopted by a vote of 51 to 35:

As an act of compassion, we call upon the President, when the draft ends, to exercise his power to grant amnesty to all draft violators and exiles. (BM153)

109. An important concern expressed by many in our Task Force was that when the draft authority is terminated, what machinery should be retained to provide for a flexible response to any contingency requiring force levels that cannot be met by the all-volunteer active and reserve forces?

We recommend that when the draft is ended, a standby registration authority should be established that (a) entails no physical examination or classification of registrants; (b) requires only a simplified form calling for a minimum of personal information; and (c) can be accomplished at a post office or other local agency. Under this standby registration, the power to induct registrants can only be reinstated by a joint resolution of Congress upon the recommendation of the President. We further recommend that this standby registration authority be instituted for a period of four years with a Congressional review to come at the end of the third year. (BM153)

110. In his memorandum of August 21, 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced a new Department of Defense policy that the Reserves and Guards will provide the trained manpower in the event of any future
emergency requiring the augmentation and expansion of the active duty forces. We concur with this policy, but in order to assure compliance, we support the following amendment:

When the draft is ended, Congress enact legislation to insure that no person be drafted until all Reserve and National Guard forces have first been activated. (BMI53)

III. Senator Kennedy opposed the Goldwater-Hatfield proposal to raise military pay and a volunteer army. Kennedy said the bill would "provide just enough incentive so that the poor in this country who are denied the opportunity to go to college would end up being the volunteers." (BN177)

112. In February of 1971, Representative Herbert, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, urged larger raises for draftees than President Nixon had suggested. Herbert also repeated his opposition to ending the draft. (BN438)

113. Rosenbaum insists that a volunteer-army system will require that means be devised to preserve the National Guard and Reserves. He said that many volunteers would not have the intelligence to acquire skills, so that the military may have to hire skilled workers in competition in the open labor market.

He asserted that in the past men joined the National Guard to avoid the draft; but without the draft, the National Guard and Reserves may not survive. One possibility would be conscription for the National Guard. (BN538)

114. Gilman maintains that when we talk about maintaining a force of 2.5 million men on a fully voluntary basis, we are really talking about an increase in the degree of voluntarism of 20%, in terms of total force requirement. He feels there is reason to believe that the composition of the forces would improve rather than worsen under voluntarism.

The services are already relatively more attractive to sub-groups that have lower civilian alternatives; these sub-groups already have a differential incentive either to enter or to remain in the military. In consequence, increasing the level of pay cannot help making the military services also more attractive to those with
better civilian alternatives. If this reasoning is correct, the composition cannot possibly change in favor of lower class sub-groups. (BM57)

115. Professor Paul Schratz (a retired Navy Captain, and a political scientist) holds that the "volunteer Army" will not work. Money makes prostitutes. There are many who are not true professionals now, who are over-competitive in driving for promotion "over the bodies of junior officers and enlisted men." The pay of officers is now competitive with industry. Special incentives disrupt morale by paying juniors more than seniors.

The military is no longer the elitist corps it once was. It never will be again. The biggest failures have been in personnel administration and in leadership. Purely professional armies have always attracted the under-privileged. Between World War I and II, our small forces were scrubby and ill-equipped. and partly manned by the dregs. There is a need to have greater pay differentials as incentives, but not at the lower ranks. (BMI27)

116. We repeat here some of the discussion by the Gates Commission on the volunteer armed forces:

Negroes presently make up 10.5 percent of the enlisted forces, slightly less than the proportion of blacks in the nation. Our best projections for the future are that blacks will be about 14 percent of the enlisted men in a conscripted force totaling 2.5 million officers and men, and 15 percent in an all-volunteer force of equal capability. For the Army, we estimate that the proportion of blacks will be 17 percent for the mixed force and 19 percent the voluntary force as compared to 12.8 percent in the Army today. To be sure, these are estimates, but even extreme assumptions would not change the figures drastically.

If higher pay does make opportunities in an all-volunteer force more attractive to some particular group than those in civilian life, then the appropriate course is to correct the discriminations in civilian life — not to introduce additional discriminations against such a group. (BM54)
117. Increasing military pay in the first term of service will increase the attractiveness of military service more to those who have higher civilian earnings potential than to those who have lower civilian potential. Military pay is already relatively attractive to those who have very poor civilian alternatives. If eligible, such individuals are now free to enlist and, moreover, are free to remain beyond their first term of service when military pay is even more attractive. (BM54)

118. ...substitution will occur at the lowest level of the military ladder, among first-term enlisted men and officers, and turnover of these first-term personnel in an all-volunteer force will be approximately three-fourths of that in a comparable mixed force.

The truth is, we already have a large professional armed force amounting to over 2 million men. The existing loyalties and political influence of that force cannot be materially changed by eliminating conscription in the lowest ranks. Draftees and draft-induced volunteers in such a force are coerced into serving at levels of compensation below what would be required to induce them to volunteer. They are, in short underpaid. This underpayment is a form of taxation. (BM54)

119. Men who are forced to serve in the military at artificially low pay are actually paying a form of tax which subsidizes those in society who do not serve.

In the event of a national emergency requiring a rapid increase in the number of men under arms, the first recourse should be to ready reserves, including the National Guard. Like the active duty forces, these reserves can and should be recruited on a voluntary basis. (BM54)

120. The Commission has not attempted to judge the size of the armed forces the nation requires.

We unanimously believe that the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts; that steps should be taken promptly to move in this direction; and that the first indispensable step is to remove the present inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in the armed forces.

The United States has relied throughout its history on a voluntary armed force except during major wars and since 1948. A return to an all-volunteer force will strengthen our freedoms, remove an inequity now imposed. (BM54)
121. The often ignored fact, therefore, is that our present armed forces are made up predominantly of volunteers. All those men who have more than four years of service — 38 percent of the total — are true volunteers; and so are at least a third of those with fewer than four years of service. (BM54)

122. We return to another important perspective on these matters projected into the future, that of the White House Conference on Youth.

1.1h Whereas President Nixon has played an important leadership role in promoting the concept of an all-volunteer armed force; and Whereas the President appointed a distinguished commission of prominent Americans who recommended that the draft could be ended by improving the conditions of military life; and Whereas military pay is currently so low as to force thousands of servicemen to depend on food stamps and public welfare for survival; and Whereas the House of Representatives has overwhelmingly passed legislation which substantially implements the pay proposals of the Gates Commission; and Whereas the President has asked this Conference to report to him on the draft and the volunteer force; RESOLVED: We, the Task Force on the Draft, National Service and Alternatives, of the White House Conference on Youth, urge the President to support openly the pay provisions of the House Bill (HR 6531) which is consistent with our recommendations. (BM153)

123. 1.1i Although many men are drafted, a majority of our men in uniform are volunteers who freely chose to enter and remain in the Armed Services in preference to alternative civilian jobs. Our studies have shown that the numbers of these volunteers are diminished by extremely low rates of military pay (especially for the first-term enlisted man), poor housing, and often irrelevant work. If we are to end the draft and establish a viable all-volunteer force fully capable of providing for the nation's defense, we must make some major policy changes. Towards this end, our Task Force endorsed by a unanimous vote that the provisions of the following recommendation be adopted:

(1) The military social environment. We propose that a broad review be undertaken of the military rank and class structure, in particular, the enlisted-officer relationship; military regulations, especially the Uniform
Code of Military Justice; traditional customs and courtesies; and all of those factors that contribute to the military social environment, bearing in mind the dignity and the need for respect of each individual in the Armed Forces. Those elements of military life which do not contribute to the overall success of the mission of the Armed Forces should be eliminated or changed as appropriate.

(2) Civil Rights. We recommend that a civil rights provision should be included in the Uniform Code of Military Justice to insure that anyone who believes that he has been discriminated against for reasons of race, color, or creed, would have a normal channel for appeal.

(3) Equal Opportunities. Comprehensive manpower development and training programs should be enlarged and maintained to assist members of disadvantaged groups to obtain, within the Armed Forces, the skills and knowledge required to compete effectively for those assignments and opportunities for which their interests and aptitudes could reasonably be expected to qualify them. Among the objectives of this resolution is to minimize the likelihood of the burden of combat duty falling disproportionately on members of disadvantaged groups.

(4) Women in the Service. Ceilings set on representation of women in the services, now Congressionally imposed, should be lifted, and all phases of military life should be equally accessible to members of both sexes. (BM153)

124. A final unusual aspect that may appear on the military horizon is that of unionization. Two officers studies military unions in Norway and Germany for significance, if any, for the United States (Sweden and Austria also have military unions).

Their findings: The possibility is indeterminate in the United States; the greatest probability would occur under a volunteer force concept.

Potential Impact

Unionization of American military forces does not appear to be a viable concept within the next decade.
In highly unionized Norway, the military personnel union has found an accepted place. The German circumstances are different. Anxious to prevent a separate military political force, the Germans have gone far towards civilianizing their Bundeswehr, even the right to be represented by a union. However, the concept has not worked out smoothly in practice.

Military roles and national societies, as well as unions, are different in all three countries. American unionism tends to greater militancy. American military responsibilities and force structures are quite different from those of Norway and the FRG.

In addition to Inspector General channels and others within American armed forces for redress of grievances, many individual Congressmen, and Congress as a whole, have frequently championed the military and its members. It is not likely that Congress would relinquish control, or share control with a union. (BMI23)
THE NEW SENSIBILITY

1. The military has been subject to a number of challenges to leadership and discipline, some external and some internal, some more or less focused on the Vietnam War, and some surfacing out of the more general anti-authority, anti-institution surge loosely subsumed under the rubric "The New Sensibility."

2. External challenges emanate from a number of sources: certain campuses, certain intellectuals, anti-war groups, and other groups which link various grievances with anti-military positions. Internal challenges have emerged in the form of underground publications, appeals to outside agencies over alleged unfair practices, drug abuse, refusals to embark for Vietnam, and others, as well as the "routine" infractions, such as unauthorized absence and desertion. Some of these manifestations have complex roots, such as racial confrontations; others, such as refusals of Reservists to enter active duty when called, may be attempts to take advantage of popular social movements. (BG22)

3. A survey of leaders at training centers produced a profile of the general characteristics of recruits as compared with past generations which indicated that they are more intelligent, sincerely interested in human rights, more selfish, more critical of leaders, more difficult to lead in garrison, more demanding of the "why" behind orders, more idealistic; they manifest about the same degree of difficulty in achieving aggressiveness in training.

They also seem to be less respectful of military authority, less aware of the need for military discipline, less honest, less physically fit, less patriotic (in the way the military would define it), and less willing to sacrifice for others. (BG22)

4. Among students, a favorable attitude-to-Service is dependent more upon immediate personal factors than upon more general ideological or military factors: e.g., the extent to which a student feels the Service will disrupt his life, his perception of the attitudes of his friends and family (their influence), and the
way a student compares his own potential "sacrifice" with that of others being called into service. Military factors include: attitude to armed forces; attitude to selective service; attitude to war; and reaction to being drafted. (BP400)

5. Students appear to have a relatively favorable evaluation of life in the armed forces. Fully 79% agree that "military service will probably be good for me in some ways"; only 23% hold that "military service is a waste of time." Yet these feelings are not held with intensity. A student may be a long way from volunteering, yet he does not view service with complete distaste. Only 1 out of 5 disagreed with the statement "you owe it to your government to protect it in return for more important privileges." Yet the Vietnam War was not enthusiastically supported; 26-36% feel that the "war in Vietnam is not worth fighting."

Although individual variations in voluntary obedience are strongly influenced by immediate personal and situational factors, ultimate consensus requires prior acceptance of the legitimacy of the legal requirements. Indeed, it is this assumption of legitimacy which justifies the differential sacrifices required in times of crisis. (BP400)

6. Surveys by battalion commanders in the Seventh Army in Europe, aided by Control Data Corporation, produced these findings:

1. pride in one's beliefs is the most important personal goal to young white troopers;
2. wanting to do well and the desire for self-improvement are the most important goals to young black troopers;
3. the primary aim of lower-grade enlisted men in barracks is privacy;
4. young soldiers prefer sedentary to participatory entertainment;
5. in general, soldiers preferred to learn practical skills rather than improve their educational levels; and
6. the biggest improvement the Army could make among personnel of agencies serving the troops would be courteous treatment. (BN16)
7. Many professional military persons are sympathetic to many of the values of young people. Few would go so far, however, as a French Army General retired, who has become a hippie and promoted a pop festival. He also says he is starting a Hippie World Center in the south of France as a protest against generals and the army of conformism, technocracy, and ambition. (BN63)

8. The preservation of healthy attitudes in new recruits can be achieved. A recent study has shown that some fairly positive-minded and cooperative recruits are turned into embittered, disillusioned trainees with low morale, due to the "initiation-rite" philosophy that new recruits must submit, surrender, abjure and sacrifice, and then become committed to the military subculture.

The authors, on a research-based finding, suggest that the new recruit already accepts the necessities of military duty and the legitimacy of military service, and it is psychologically destructive to undertake a process of forced rededication and recommitment. "Twenty years of socialization by family institutions are not to be discarded. The military subculture is only the vehicle for defense; it is not what is defended." Thus, basic training is a training (and educational) process, not a resocializing one.

A solution has been attempted by using the law of reinforcement (behavior is determined by its consequences) as the principle employed in an incentive program. The positive conditioning paradigm makes rewards contingent upon desired behavior. In the Merit-Reward system, merits are secondary reinforcement, and rewards, in the form of privileges and promotion, are the primary reinforcement. The rules are explicit on a laminated merit card in the trainee's possession at all times. The system has proved to be a powerful motivational force, as judged from formal trainee rating scale evaluations, objective performance test results, reduction of delinquency, and improved attitudes. Difficulties center around Drill Sergeants, who must be willing to give reinforcement, which also means more written records and an ability to change attitudes from punishment orientation to reward orientation. (BP389, BM 39)
9. Officials of three Protestant churches urged reexamination of Anderson vs. Laird, a chapel-attendance case in which a United States District Court in Washington upheld mandatory chapel-attendance at the nation's service academies. The churches involved felt that the decision represented an infringement on religious freedom and perverted the real religious meaning of chapel service. In defense of the Academies practice, the following points were presented: cadets voluntarily attended the academies, with full prior knowledge of the requirement for mandatory chapel attendance. No religious preference was forced, only attendance; the purpose of the regulation is secular, since understanding of religion and the religion of subordinates is part of officer training.

In announcing its decision, the court also commented on the danger of a civilian judgment on what may be essentially a military issue. (BN30)

10. An increased sense of individuality also appears in the officer ranks. According to one source, many junior officers reject the Service because they are unable to discern opportunities to exercise initiative. (BM138)

11. Some observers do not admire the direction of military discipline over the past few decades. They say, although many attribute the Services problems to leader failure, the problem may be with the led. The military discipline system bothered few people prior to World War II, just as few people would question the system of organization in industry. World War II led to an explosion in the size of the Services. Too many units had to spread their leadership too thin. Inexperienced leaders who were unsure how to maintain control would become either too authoritarian or too permissive. This led to a wave of criticism by unwilling participants. Under this pressure, first the military judicial system was loosened, then unit discipline, and finally unit pride. On the premise that only the individual is important, the system of military discipline has been revised to protect soldiers, not the reverse. Out of the loosening and permissive society of the 50's and 60's emerged individuals who emphasized their rights, but not their responsibilities, and made evident their responsibilities, and made evident their disrespect for the Establishment. Part of a generation, "the brightest ever," has shown a willingness to use force to get its
way. The military services encountered difficulties in coping with these problems. When the individual is assigned no responsibility, society and the military get the blame. Restoring unit pride is the most important step in restoring military efficiency, including unit discipline. The leader is all-important in this process, and the military knows how to develop leaders. (BP149)

12. In relation to special situations such as a POW situation, a recent study found that there was no significant tie-in among personality measures or intelligence or leadership ability with one's resistance performance in a POW setting. (BM72)

13. The importance of the individual leader can be shown from an attempt to determine and measure aspects of airman morale. 167 questionnaire items were assembled and administered to 1000 airmen. Eight scales were derived, one of them defined as a measure of General Morale. Three of the scales were fairly independent of each other, but closely related to the General Morale scale: satisfaction with the Air Force as a whole, with management and communication, and with the unit and its leadership. The remaining four scales are relatively independent of all other scales; satisfaction with the immediate supervisor, with the Air Force as a military organization, with the job, and with the civilian community. The supervision scale is the only one clearly defined as measuring a uniquely identified facet of morale. For the other scales, a different approach in the analysis could yield another equally defensible set. (BG12)

14. Representative F. Edward Herbert (D La.) made a statement concerning morale and discipline in the armed forces after his appointment as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. He spoke out very strongly against the "new permissiveness in military regulations" — feeling that it would affect discipline adversely. The initial mail response was heavily in favor of Herbert's get-tough position, but an unfavorable mail response came later and mostly from Servicemen. (BN72)
DISSENT IN UNIFORM

1. The following subsection records a considerable variety of incidents involving military persons of all Services, officer and enlisted, and taking up a number of issues and circumstances of dissent.

2. It is not necessary to "see Communists under every bed," or to fail to recognize a number of complex roots of protest against the Vietnam War, in order to recognize that subversive elements have endeavored to exploit antiwar reactions in order to damage essential cohesion in the armed forces.

3. The Armed Forces Journal made a survey of the anti-war movement "among GI's" in September 1970, and came up with some interesting data. The "GI Alliance," headquartered in Washington, was attempting to coordinate the 14 or so anti-war groups in existence at that time. There were about 100 GI underground newspapers at that time (Army 39, Navy 50, Marine 4, and Air Force 10). Three well-established legal organizations endeavored to help dissenting GI's — one under the aegis of the Socialist Workers Party, and one sponsored by the Communist Party of the United States. Few, if any, Servicemen appear to have organized groups; the movement "is run by students, professional agitators, pacifists, and war dissenters," some with substantial financial support. The Internal Revenue Service revoked the tax-exempt status of one "philanthropic" organization called "The U.S. Servicemen's Fund," when its owner and backer was revealed to be the New-Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. Two officer groups comprise only junior officers and former officers — no long-established professionals or higher-ranking officers. The common objectives of most of these groups include the disruption, and if possible the destruction, of the armed forces. (BP153)

4. General Earle Wheeler, former Chairman of the JCS, in an interview for U.S. News & World Report, said that the 1970 atmosphere of hostility was only partly a result of the war in Southeast Asia and that it goes deeper and "at least some of it...is an organized effort." He felt strongly that it hurt the military, especially in its effort to retain trained men. (BP442)
5. In 1969, the American Command in Vietnam prepared a pamphlet containing a sampling of letters written to commanders in support of the troops and of the United States position there. It was a counter-action to a moratorium on publicity, and was said to express the opinion of the silent majority. (BN471)

6. Brigadier General Mataxis, in analysing the relationship between the military and the deserters, criticized the nihilists of the New Left for encouraging and mounting an all-out attack on the armed services. Activities include draft resistance and desertions, coffee houses near posts, underground newspapers, and anti-military propaganda. There are adequate laws to handle the situation: Title 18, Chapter 115, Treason (#2382); Seditious Conspiracy (#2384); and Advocating the Overthrow of the Government (#2385).

Both the policies of freedom of speech and the necessity for carrying out national defense directives have to be adhered to.

He feels that silence by the military has been interpreted as a sign of weakness, and it has made it harder on the troops, and quoted General George Marshall and General Lewis Walt on the need for discipline (i.e., morale, too) to keep casualty figures down. Steps in the right direction have been taken. The Department of the Army issued a letter "Guidance on Dissent" on 28 May 1969, which contained do's and don'ts for responses. "Constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions" in which legal action against "illegal dissent" could be based were presented. In the fall of 1969, the Department of Defense issued new guidelines which were worded more strongly. But these actions are not enough. New techniques are needed: e.g., identify and label organizations and individuals behind these activities; objectives, tactics and techniques must be identified and legal action taken. Overreaction must be avoided. He believes that these forms of dissent have had an adverse psychological effect on soldiers and have lowered their thresholds of fatigue and fear. (BP279)

7. Court decisions have given support to the military. The Fourth United States Circuit Court panel has ruled that the military can forbid antiwar meetings and publications on military posts in order to preserve discipline and
morale. The 1st Amendment is not violated. (BN34)

8. A soldier lost a legal war challenge based on a 1787 New York law which prohibits the government from sending servicemen overseas to fight an unconstitutional war. The court maintained that Congress had endorsed the Vietnam effort. (BN387)

9. A Pentagon message to lower commands said that, if circumstances indicated, or if damage or improper display of the flag might result, commanders could refrain from displaying the flag, or could properly lower it. Many objections were expressed; some insisted that nothing is to be gained by going underground. (BN56)

10. In the ethos of most soldiers in Vietnam, the pros and cons of national policy are not of prime concern. Even more of an individual ethos prevails than in World War II, for the Vietnam War for the individual ended, not with the outcome of the battlefield, but with the end of his one-year tour of duty in Vietnam. Like most combat soldiers, he is essentially anti-ideological, resisting superpatriotic appeals; nevertheless, he sees peace demonstrators as dangers to his chances of survival, and vigorously opposes them. He sees himself as fighting overwhelmingly for the interests of America. (BB246)

II. For instance, Col. David Hackworth attacked General Westmoreland's conduct of the war, Potential Impact

The one-year combat tour had great psychological effect, both positive and negative. Its implications for national military policy in the future need careful study. Its cost may increase exponentially as the war extends in time, requiring massive annual turnovers.
Officer ticket-punishing for career advancement, and the one-year tour. He insisted that bluster and insensitivity cost the Army good men, called Vietnamization a Madison Avenue propaganda campaign, and said that Westmoreland did not know what was going on while Vietnam Commander. He deserves a hearing because of his experience: 5 years in Vietnam, 9 Silver Stars, 2 Distinguished Service Crosses, 8 Purple Hearts. While submitting his field application for retirement, he released this announcement. (BN49)

12. Hackworth's condemnation produced strong rejoinders. While acknowledging that many mistakes were committed, some defenders of the Army argued that there were many good commanders. One said that while America's responsibilities are global, Hackworth is too emotionally involved with Vietnam to fully appreciate the problems faced by the Army.

This frustrated young colonel apparently did not consider that his interview might be more damaging to the United States security, and could in the long run cost far more lives than Hamburger Hill.

13. Jan B. Crumb, a leader of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, attended West Point, but resigned his appointment before graduating and served out his enlistment in the ranks. He left the Army in 1965. He claims that in 1963,
when he got to Vietnam, the peasants liked us. However, repeated failures to distinguish between friend and foe, indiscriminate bombing, and the use of Free Fire Zones taught the peasants to hate the Americans.

This started his thinking about the War and led to his forming The Vietnam Veterans Against the War. The organization's demands are:

1. Immediate, unequivocal, and unconditional withdrawal of all American Forces, military and intelligence, from Indo-China;
2. Formal inquiry into alleged war crimes;
3. Amnesty for those who refused to serve;
4. Improved benefits for those who served. (BP27)

14. Another critic is former Navy Lieutenant John F. Kerry, who spoke for the Vietnam Veterans Against the War before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 22, 1971. In his testimony, Kerry made an impassioned plea for the ending of the Vietnam conflict. The points made in his statement included:

1. Nothing in Vietnam threatens the United States that would justify the loss of one American life in Southeast Asia by linking such loss to the preservation of freedom.
2. Mystical war against Communism in Vietnam is non-existent. The peasant merely sides with the military force present and wants only to plant rice, maintain his home and community, and be left alone. The peasants have no concept of freedom and democracy and seem to get along without it.
3. Our operations in Vietnam, from monetary support for a dictatorial regime to Free Fire Zones, body counts, MyLai, and civilian deaths have not accomplished our objective. They have hurt us.
4. We displayed an arrogance by thinking we could Vietnamize the Vietnamese, and in thinking that men must die before we admit we cannot lose a war.
5. We have maintained a fiction between killing people in Vietnam by using ground troops and killing them by machines in the air war over.
Laos and Cambodia.

(6) Finally, the question of leadership is brought up. Where are our leaders — the ones who got us into this mess but are having a hard time getting us out? More important, why did we get into it? (BP233)

15. A rival group, called Vietnam Veterans for a Just Peace, are opposed to the Kerry group. This group maintains that Vietnamization and phased withdrawal are means of leaving behind a viable South Vietnam capable of self-defense. They claim that their sentiments are shared by the overwhelming majority of American military men who have served in Vietnam. (BN432)

16. One member of this group had served in Kerry’s outfit and said he had never seen any war crimes committed; to say they were commonly committed as a matter of national policy was a lie (Kerry never said that the committing of war crimes a matter of “policy”; he said it happened daily in Vietnam).

The group objected to the decision of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee not to hear their testimony. (BN432)

17. Four junior officers called for an investigation of the responsibility of General Westmoreland and Admiral Zumwalt and other United States military leaders for war crimes in Indo-China. (BN326)

18. Three junior Naval officers were denied a restraining order that would have stopped the Navy from discharging them early, which stemmed in part from their anti-war activities. (BN489)

19. In Columbia, South Carolina, three coffee house operators were found guilty of maintaining a public nuisance. The coffee house was one of the first anti-war coffee houses catering to GI’s. (BN501)

20. Seaman Roger Priest, tried by the Navy for publication of an anti-war newsletter, was acquitted of soliciting desertion and sedition, but found guilty of promoting disloyalty and disaffection by a five-officer Navy court. He was demoted to the lowest Navy rank and given a bad conduct discharge. (BP238)
21. Later, the United States Naval Court of Review overturned the conviction of the seaman because of a technicality. It is indicated that the Navy will not retry him, and therefore he will receive an honorable discharge. (BN448)

22. In August 1970, after four incidents of military bandsmen on Staten Island participating in anti-war protests, including inserting a New York Times advertisement signed by 38 members, the entire band was subjected to longer hours of duty, additional training, and other changes in procedure (including transfer to non-band units). Several of the soldiers filed suit under Article 138. No results were reported. (BN284)

23. The Army suggested that seven officers who oppose the Vietnam War submit their resignations to maintain "intellectual honesty." None of the signers was a career Army officer. The seven officers were queried by their unit commanders on the strength of their convictions. Those who had very strong convictions were offered the opportunity to resign. Lt. Col. Ross Johnson, Ft. Bragg Information Officer, said the men were within their legal rights in signing the protest, but maintained that their position was morally incompatible with their oath taken as an officer. Specifically, Col. Johnson referred to that part of the oath in which each officer agrees to obey the orders of the commander-in-chief. (BN580)

24. Servicemen stationed in England expressed their opposition to the Vietnam War by walking in separate small groups to the American Embassy in London to present petitions against the war. The men emphasized that they were not demonstrating but were merely presenting the petitions to their government outlining their grievances. The servicemen were stationed near English universities, where students helped them organizing their protest. (BN331)

25. After the demonstration, an Air Force officer, Captain Culver, was accused of having "solicited other military personnel" to take part in the protest and violated regulations that forbid demonstrations by service men overseas. He faced four years' imprisonment, forfeiture of pay, and a dishonorable discharge. Culver, the senior officer involved, presented antiwar petitions with
1000 signatures to the Embassy. Culver's attorneys said that military regulations barring demonstrations overseas by Servicemen were illegal. They claim the regulation is unconstitutional because it violates a Serviceman's right to free speech. (BN266)

26. Two former Marine officers, Lieutenants Randolph and McDougal, said that revulsion against killing and the inhumanity of war had led them to seek discharge as conscientious objectors. Lt. Randolph found it morally disgusting and an act of treason against his conscience. "My Marine training was indoctrination in a uniquely pernicious value system that showed a fundamental insensitivity to the human condition." He had graduated from VMI and won a Rhodes Scholarship. After Oxford, he realized that militarism was incompatible with humanity.

Lt. McDougal stated that Catholic training led him to his position: "I began to see the killing of a human being as murder, whether by euthanasia, abortion, capital punishment, or warfare." They both called upon the ACLU for aid, after the Marine Corps tried to discharge them as leadership failures rather than as conscientious objectors. Their case became a precedent, making them the first officers to win release from the Marines as CO's, although enlisted men had been released before. (BN414)

27. A letter to the Christian Science Monitor, condemning the war in Southeast Asia, was signed by "Concerned Graduates of the United States Military Naval, and Air Force Academies." (BN215)

28. The Concerned Officers Movement (COM) stated that they "want to convey to middle America that there are people very much against the war, whose loyalty can't be impugned." They would also like to turn to issues beyond the war; such as military reform. "COM hasn't breached any military regulations, but," a Navy spokesman warned, "It is one thing for individuals to express their private opinions, but when they go public and take advantage of the uniform, it's another." The group is considering asking a federal court to issue a declaratory judgment, defining the rights of officers and all Servicemen to speak their minds in public. (BP76)
29. The Service Academies have also produced critics of the war and the military. A West Point graduate sought release from the Army as a conscientious objector. His family background was military, and he entered the Academy with positive feelings about the military. However, after continued schooling and Ranger training, his feelings crystallized, and he felt that killing was inconsistent with his life. Army officials felt that he would be of no use to the Army and discharged him. (BN456)

30. Another West Point graduate, who refused to serve in Southeast Asia, charged his commanding general with conspiring to commit war crimes in South Vietnam. (BN605)

31. A West Point cadet was denied discharge, which he had sought after three years at the Academy on grounds that he was a conscientious objector. The Army denied the request, saying that the cadet did not have the depth of sincerity to qualify him as a conscientious objector. He appealed the case in local courts. (BN472)

32. Two officers commented on the need for discretion when an officer voices dissent. Professional military men must remain apolitical in terms of party so that they can serve objectively. One of the officers suggested that the place for dissent was in the election booth. (BN77, BN43)

33. In a letter to the editor, an Army Colonel brings up the question of how to decide what should and should not be classified and what action is appropriate for handling high-placed civilians who dissent by leaking security information or classified information to the public press. The writer of the letter believes that only the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be allowed to classify information. However, the author cited unnamed military officers whose
careers were ruined because of minor security infractions (the leaving of a classified document in a locked desk drawer), while a civil servant may give classified information to the press and suffer no ill effects. (BN138)

34. A special style of Potential Impact

leakage is becoming more widely practiced by persons actuated by individualism, activism, publicity seeking, or the opportunity to achieve a platform for the moral denunciation of others. Evidently, this practice is being endorsed by various elements of society, in the name of democracy. In the future, even tighter protective methods will have to be devised, perhaps including psychiatric screening of applicants in advance.

These are persons who serve in special assignments (or in similar assignments in the Department of State, CIA, FBI, and others) in intelligence, security, sensitive policy offices, sensitive planning offices (such as those with the duty of planning, say, the imposition of censorship in wartime), and other functions not suitable for public knowledge or discussion. To receive many of these assignments, individuals must agree to abide by certain regulations; in some, they certify in writing that they will not divulge information without specific permission. Obviously, however, more and more individuals are choosing to ignore official restrictions and classifications and to repudiate the oaths they have given, as they respond, or rush, to various publishers and producers, and achieve wide circulation for their
35. The question of dissent, its role in the military, and whether its rules and guidelines apply for all officers as well as enlisted men, has become an unresolved issue. The Army has been accused of upholding a contradiction—that of requiring a dissenter to document his past behavior while maintaining that he resign in an honorable fashion. Furthermore, one article blasts the Army’s belief that dissent and criticism of the Service should be done only after leaving the Service. The article asks why only officers are allowed to resign and why enlisted men must accept a court-martial or a dishonorable discharge for expressing the same opinions as the officer. In short, why fear dissent, when it can lead to a re-examination of policies and possibly improve the Army? (BN137)

36. A report by Secretary Laird to the House Appropriations Committee contained data on desertions.

In World War II, the Marines had a rate of 6.9 per 1000 and in the Korean War a rate of 19.7 per 1000. The Corps experienced a ten-fold increase in the rate of desertion and AWOL within a thirty-year period. The Navy rate has tripled since World War II and has reached 9.9 per 1000.

The Army’s pattern fluctuates more—in World War II, 63 per 1000; in Korea, 22 per 1000; and in 1970, 52.3 per 1000. The Air Force continues to show a low rate, 0.8 per 1000. (BN71)

37. Most absentees "are motivated by the same reasons that have caused soldiers to go AWOL since the dawn of history." According to Laird: financial and family problems, romantic involvements, misconduct which has led to disciplinary action, inability to adjust to military life, family pressures just before an overseas tour, and in aliens a desire to return to the home country. Only 2.5% of deserters are considered to have been motivated by political reasons or anti-Vietnam protest at the time of desertion.

Dissenters (as contrasted with deserters), according to Laird, are likely to have college experience, come from the Pacific and Northeast States, excel on classification tests, especially the verbal sections, express no religious
preference, and have an MOS in a clerical area. A study by the American University, of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, showed that 25% were Catholic, 23% were agnostic, 11.4% were Protestant, and 2.9% were Jewish. Two thirds of them enlisted, many under pressure of the draft; and before entering the service, they were split about equally among conservatives, moderates, and liberals. Only 7% said they were radicals before they put on a uniform. (BN71)

38. The rise of dissenting activity in the military has been paralleled by an equally sharp increase in the educational level of enlisted military personnel on active duty. Changes in draft deferments for graduate students in 1968 undoubtedly had an impact. This influx of students from the increasingly permissive society at large has had a great deal to do with the explanations Pentagon spokesmen have given for the existence of dissenters in the ranks. The Services have problems because society has problems, they say. Requests to interview some of the known dissenters met with no success. Officials said they left them alone because most of them were good soldiers otherwise. Sergeants interviewed suspected some of the numerous college-educated draftees, volunteers, and National Guard and enlisted Reserve trainees were responsible for dissent activity in their units. Another group inspiring dissent was thought to be Vietnam veterans assigned to wait in training units for a few months before their time is up. (BP366)

39. Resurgence of anti-militarism among intellectuals and college students will not dissipate once the Vietnam War ends. (RM103)

40. The White House Conference on Youth recommended: "reduction of United States armed forces to a maximum of one million men in order to avoid future Vietnams and to lessen the ability to intervene militarily in other nations. Yes 33; No 53; Abstain 4. (BM153)

41. There have been signs of continued tension on some campuses — a riot at Boston University occurred on March 27, 1972, when U.S. Marine recruiters appeared at the university placement office. In the clash with police, 30 "students"
were arrested. (BN300)

42. In an article describing a discussion between members of the press and the military, both attempted to reach an understanding of their relationship. On its part, the Army accused the press of unfair reporting, citing incidents where a good story about the military was not accepted by the media. Further, the military accused the press of being partly biased and of allowing editors to insist on stories putting the military in a bad light.

For its part, the press responded that it did not create the C-5A, F-14, and the Cheyenne aircraft problems, nor the Vietnam war. Further, members of the press said that even pro-military Congressmen are becoming increasingly critical of the military, especially unnecessary spending. The encounter ended with a plea for more press objectivity. (BN51)
THE VIETNAM VETERAN

1. The following is a New York Times item of January 22, 1972:

At the Oakland Army Terminal, in California, Specialist 4 Christopher J. Jimenez received a unique honor: an official ceremony proclaiming him the 1,750,000th American serviceman to return from Vietnam since 1961, when the first American troops were sent there.

A Veterans Administration official who welcomed Mr. Jimenez back to civilian life had some cheering news. The decision to honor the 1,750,000th returning veteran was chosen, rather than the two-millionth, because the possibility of welcoming the two-millionth man home is remote. There are only 170,000 American fighting men left in Vietnam.

2. In a review of No Victory Parade: The Return of the Vietnam Veteran, the critic summarized the main theme as follows:

"Veterans viewed the war and their role in it as 'all for nothing'; they felt that they were manipulated to fight a war that had no meaning or purpose." [This is apparently a wildly distorted expression of how Vietnam Veterans feel]

The review claimed that a Veterans Administration study concluded that most Vietnam veterans suffered from acute signs of diffuse paranoia, intense anger, personal and cultural guilt, and hostility toward authoritarian figures and institutions. The reviewer praises the book, and believes that the Vietnam Vet contains the seed for further eruption.

3. A New York Times article, "The Agony of the U.S. Army," pointed out that the worst aspect of being a Vietnam veteran is the castigation received simply for having served in Vietnam — as if the veteran were responsible for the government's policy.

The Louis Harris organization conducted a survey of problems of the returning Vietnam veteran, sponsored by the Veterans Administration. These were
some of the principal findings: On the whole, Americans have deep respect and sympathy for returning veterans. Residents of the South, and people 50 and over, are more friendly and sympathetic than any other group; ages 18-29 are somewhat more critical of the veterans' role than the total public. 63% of the public feels that returning servicemen receive friendly treatment; 48% feel the reception is worse than that extended returning servicemen from other wars. 96% of the veterans agreed that "friends and family did everything they could to make you feel at home again"; 69% felt "people at home made you feel proud to have served..." (BN147)

4. Estimates of ex-servicemen on drug usage in the military are lower than those of the public. The public seems far more willing to ascribe drug usage to dramatic reasons. 1/3 of veterans admitted to using drugs (marijuana and hashish) in the service; 2/3 of veterans admitted to using drugs before induction; 2% used heroin in the Service, and 1/4 used drugs since returning home.

15% of 2000 veterans interviewed were unemployed, with a rate of 21% for non-white and 31% for those without high-school diplomas. Only 51% of the public and 53% of employers said they would be "more likely to give an ex-Serviceman preference." 73% of the public, 82% of the employers, and 82% of the veterans felt that veterans are better qualified for a job after serving than they were before. (BN147)

5. Three factors influence today's veteran and society's reaction to him: (1) The United States has experienced wrenching change and polarization; in many ways, the society which the veterans are returning home to is not the same one they left; (2) The returning veterans themselves seem to be different from their counterparts in earlier wars; today's Servicemen — reflecting the demographic patterns in American society as a whole — are better educated, used to a higher standard of living, and generally more sophisticated; and (3) The controversial nature of the Vietnam war itself. (BM71)

6. Did the unpopularity of the Vietnam War rub off on those who fought it? The answer is both yes and no, due to the contradictory cross currents.
running through public opinion. On one side are the Southerners and older people who give the maximum support to veterans, and feel their reception from the President and American people has been generally good. On the other side are the young, the college educated, and the residents of the central cities, who seem to be more genuinely confused about the moral and ethical implications of the war and how these relate to the treatment of returning veterans. (BM71)

7. Another conclusion suggested in the previous series of statements is that there is a gap between the way most Americans think veterans should be treated, and the way they think the veterans are being treated. Four out of five (80%) agree strongly that veterans deserve respect, and a similar proportion think the veterans today deserve the same kind of welcome given returning servicemen of previous wars. (BM71)

8. The statements covering alienation — "people at home just didn't understand what you've been through..." "having been away for awhile, you felt left out of everything..." and "when you finally came home, all you wanted was to be left alone" — all suggest that, despite efforts by the President and the American people, a substantial proportion of veterans — although not the majority — feel alienated when they return home. This is particularly true among non-whites and veterans with less than a high school education. The evidence also suggests that most veterans are not looking for special favors or thanks for the time they spent in the military. They seem to be saying that what they want most is to get back to the routine of civilian life and see themselves as civilians again. (BM71)

9. The gap between how Americans think veterans should be treated, and how they think veterans are in fact being received, represents the public's concern that Vietnam-era veterans are not being received as well as — and if anything, are being received worse than — their counterparts in earlier wars the country has been involved in. From the research findings thus far, it appears that the whole question of treatment of returning veterans is a serious burden on the conscience of the American public. (BM71)
10. It was observed that young people — those 18 to 29 — within the American public held attitudes which were less positive and more ambivalent toward veterans and their role in the war than the total population. These are the contemporaries who are giving returning servicemen the less-than-enthusiastic welcome.

On the other side, having noted the Vietnam era veterans' sensitivity to this reception — made even more telling by comparing it with what earlier veterans found — it is relevant to trace how this works itself out in the process of readjusting to civilian life. One possible reflection of this is the apparent lack of desire of the returning serviceman to continue his identification with others like himself through membership in veterans service organizations. (BM71)

11. The research found 19% of Vietnam era veterans had joined a veterans service organization (American Legion, Amvets, Veterans of Foreign Wars) after separation. Among the veterans of earlier periods, 43% had joined one of these organizations after separation. (BM71)

12. Some of those who do join such organizations feel they encounter a generation gap. A few men report they find hostility, prejudice, and an excess of "Americanism," their financial contributions are appreciated; but not their ideas on how the organizations should spend money. (BP456)

13. Veterans seem less preoccupied with the way things should be, and are content to accept things as given, and do the best they can to readjust to civilian life. This passive acceptance holds for all groups except the alienated veterans — the non-white and non-high school graduates. Among these latter Servicemen, there is a real feeling that society owes them something for their efforts. (BM71)

14. Although there is wide recognition that the state of the economy today makes it difficult to find jobs, the veterans do not appear to be taking the view that their lot is harder than that of other unemployed civilians. The exception is non-whites. It is well known that, even when unemployment is low, the jobless
rate among non-whites is considerably higher than for whites. Recognizing that returning Vietnam-era veterans are coming home to an economy which is marked by 6% unemployment, it is not surprising that non-white veterans appear to be facing compounded difficulties in finding work, and thus sound more plaintive and more pessimistic about employment. (BM71)

15. It is interesting that returning veterans with some college two-year-college graduates show the greatest likelihood of continuing their education after leaving the Service. The fact that less than half of the four-year college graduates elected to continue their education after separation suggests that they had some discretion in timing their military obligation to come after they finished college or graduate school, and thus had planned to enter the labor force upon returning home. (BM71)

16. Apparently, after spending three, four or more years in the service, a man is exposed to many new opportunities, and typically does not want to go back to the same thing he was doing before he entered. This tendency does not generally hold for veterans with six months to two years of service, since they tend to exercise their re-employment rights to a far greater extent than any other group of returning service-men. (BM71)

17. Assimilation into the labor force after the Service does not appear to be related to educational attainment — as long as the veteran has at least a high-school education. The main factors apparently governing finding a job are race and the amount of time since separation from the Service. (BM71)

18. Non-whites and non-high school graduates' disappointment is understandable. These are the groups which have the highest rate of unemployment among all returning veterans, and come the closest to being alienated. (BM71)
19. To a significant proportion of employers who have had experience in hiring veterans, service in the armed forces appears to have made a genuine difference in the quality of the employee. These attitudes are entirely consistent with what was found earlier in this section:

82% of employers agree that veterans are more mature and stable now than before they entered the armed forces, and this makes them better qualified for jobs.

79% of employers agree that special training and occupational skills learned in the armed forces makes veterans more qualified for jobs than before their service.

62% of employers rate the training and experience that veterans have gained in the service either "very" or "somewhat useful" on the job.

20. What the American people imagine as a drug situation in the Service may come close to reality in Vietnam, but is exaggerated in seriousness in other areas. Although it is impossible to ascertain from the data what the level of drug usage is, if we are to believe the total veterans' most liberal estimates, the conclusion that the American people are misinformed on the subject is a valid one. On the other hand, if drug usage in the Service really only refers to Vietnam, then the public's view — although still exaggerated — is not so far from the veterans' own assessments. In this respect, the findings could be helpful in taking some of the emotionalism out of this subject, and placing public dialogue on a more rational basis. (BM71)

21. Finally, the differences between white and non-white responses deserve comment. Earlier it was observed that acceptance of drug usage among non-whites was far greater than whites. The findings confirm that conclusion. (BM71)

22. The White House Conference on Youth recommended these measures:

Means of communicating with servicemen and women about education, training and other benefits available should be established on a uniform basis, with military
services carrying the major responsibility of individual counseling. (BM153)

23. More information than is currently available is urgently needed to determine what services veterans need, especially with such small groups as female veterans and various ethnic minorities. Such studies should also suggest specific programs which can be initiated. (BM153)

24. Civilian-skill training centers have been established at major military bases in the United States to assist returning Vietnam Vets to find meaningful employment. The Services also expanded their counseling, job placement and education and vocational training services at overseas bases. (BN84)

25. In Veterans Administration hospitals, the Vietnam Vets constitute about 12% of the total number of patients. As their numbers grew, the rather sudden influx of several thousand assertive and independent-minded patients brought changes in hours, privileges, food, activities, and accommodations. The Vietnam Veteran is more skeptical of authority and regimentation, especially when compared to the older patients. Patients from Vietnam demanded to know specifically what was wrong with them, how long it would take to heal, and why each treatment was prescribed. Patients pushed for changes in policies, such as their own lights-out policies, and optional menus (e.g., pizza and beer). The patients' recovery is better and quicker with new approaches. Proposals for a Vietnam Institute were made, in which some 50 patients might live with their families in mobile trailers on hospital grounds, with day treatment while living at "home." The different life-styles, demands, and attitudes had an unsettling effect on some older patients and staff. (BN383)

26. In conclusion, the present reabsorption situation, while having some similarities with the past, presents a whole new set of problems and challenges to American society. (BM71)
One of the most difficult problems for the military to cope with has been drug abuse. For one thing, the military Services, like most other American social institutions, had little experience in coping with (non-alcoholic) drug abuse before the problem expended many-fold. For another, it has been difficult to accept anyone's statistics on the subject, so wildly inconsistent have been many alarmist spokesmen on the subject, some of the statistics cited below should be received with caution. In addition, this problem tended to be caught up in the whole barrage of anti-military criticism rooted in the Vietnam war, whereas the drug problem was one which many men first encountered in civilian life and brought into the armed forces with them.

The military has had two major roles connected with national drug abuse: scapegoat, and inventor of experimental (and later, applied) programs for motivating drug users to abandon the practice. From the beginning of 1970, until mid-1971, the military became the scapegoat because of the high visibility of military programs, yet drugs were and are a national problem. No less than three Congressional Subcommittees were simultaneously investigating drug abuse in the Armed Services; but none was examining the nation's problem. As the military got programs underway and improved them, the reaction has been for the extreme criticism to calm down. (BMI20)

A thoughtful Army Times editorial examining the drug scene admitted it did not know the extent of habitual drug usage among Servicemen, but it cast doubt about the high figures being thrown around by various politicians. The editorial advocated getting drug testimony in secret to get the best testimony, but made no suggestion whether the results of the secret hearing should be made public. The article questioned the validity of statements made by former drug users, believing that they tend to project their own conduct over the entire military community. The paper further points out that many groups in the drug culture tend to congregate. This may account for particular places and occupations that have a high incidence of
drug use. Furthermore, the drug problem infests various segments and levels of the population at large, and these segments and levels are represented in the military. The editors praised the programs being set up to combat drug use in the armed forces, but cautioned that drug problems in the Services should be examined in private, away from the harsh glare of publicity. (BN39)

4. Like several other groups and commentators on the subject, the White House Conference on Youth assumed that drug abuse was largely peculiar to service in the armed forces:

There appears to be little question that the subject of drug abuse in all areas of the military and with returning veterans has evolved into a major problem. This problem is particularly true with those veterans who have acquired a drug habit while in the service and returned to their respective communities who are not prepared to effectively deal with them. In view of the burden these individuals place on their families and communities, a much more meaningful and humanitarian posture must be assumed by the military and Veterans Administration. To this end, The Drug Task Force strongly put forth the following recommendations:

Just as all branches of the military provide a period of basic training for individuals entering service, they should also provide a comprehensive period of de-processing for individuals returning to civilian life. The purpose of these de-processing for individuals returning to civilian life. The purpose of these de-processing centers would be geared to reacclimating the individuals returning to civilian life, determining the existence of a drug problem, and taking proper steps to remove this problem before the individual returns to his community.

The military should and must change their attitude about chronic drug users among their ranks from that of wrongdoers subject to discharge under other than honorable conditions to one of a medical problem which must be dealt with by the military. The medical aspect should take into consideration the elements of service and non-service-connected disabilities. During the period of readjustment to civilian life and search for meaningful
occupation, the level of frustration is frequently great, especially for the minority veteran. He is confronted with all the insensitivity, prejudice and discrimination accompanying such transition into the community. He turns to the use of drugs, or continues his usage, and the destructive behavior associated therewith. To alleviate the burdens of such activity, we recommend that a system be devised to determine the various levels of disability derived from the use of drugs during active duty or after separation from the service so that he will receive the support services from the Veterans Administration presently available to other service connected disabilities.

The Veterans Administration must change the policy of its hospitals from treating only select neuropsychiatric disorder patients to include those individuals who have a drug problem. (BM153)

5. In July 1970, the Monitor wrote that future means of handling drug abuse would include: broader education and training programs; revision of disciplinary systems, with more emphasis on correction; if funds are available rehabilitate hard drug users as well as casual users. DOD officials feel that one important step will be to change the rules so that Servicemen feel free to seek help. At present the drug user is assured a "privileged" discussion only with his chaplain. One successful program has been to limit drug supplies by monitoring the mails. (BN222)

6. Captain Dean M. Steffy, Ph. D. in anthropology from Penn State, has been working for one year with the Army's drug-education program at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Some of his conclusions are: (1) The problem is one of educating the troops and educating the Army leadership at the same time; (2) The problem is not merely a medical problem or a psychiatric problem; it is both, and also a community health problem, and a cultural problem. Military leaders do not understand the cultural aspects of the problem. (3) Many people on drugs are not prepared for what happens in military life; it blows their minds. (4) To the users, it is cool to be a junkie. You are doing illegal things that are anti-society.
Drugs are symptomatic of some problems that were happening in the Army long before drugs became popular. The Army is not really aware of the all-encompassing nature of the problem. It is active in only two areas: drugs and racism; but the real problems are much broader.

7. Discussions with more than a score of soldiers and former soldiers, men involved in military drug control efforts and former addicts undergoing treatment at civilian centers in New York suggest these conclusions (July 1970): Addiction to heroin and other hard drugs is going undetected in the armed forces, and the use of soft drugs like marijuana is more widespread than official statistics show; this is made possible by a drug subculture based on the ignorance of superior officers, the anonymity of men on large bases, a strong "no ratting" buddy system, and the accessibility of drugs and of items that can be stolen to sell drugs.

8. It must be pointed out that the problem is complex because no one is sure of why drugs are used; how one gets started on them; what cultural factors are involved in drug use; what programs are most effective, etc. There are no long-range studies of the problem. Major Forest S. Tennant, Jr., a doctor attached to the 3rd Infantry Division at Wurzburg and the leading drug expert in Germany, set up the first drug-abuse center for soldiers in Europe. He claims that he did it on his own with his own funds and, after it was in operation, notified Army authorities of what he had done. He said if he had asked for permission to do it, the Army would still be deciding on it.

9. Dr. Tennant's figures show that 78% of the soldiers using drugs first started before coming to Germany, and 65% started after entering the Army. Thus only 22% first began in Germany. This would indicate that the Army inherited the drug problem from either Vietnam or the civilian society in the United States. Coupled with the confusion about how to solve the drug problem is the attitude of some NCOs and unit commanders. They regard the drug user as a criminal to be punished; this results in treating the drug user as an object of scorn. Rehabilitated drug users, upon returning to their units, get menial, useless jobs, and
are ostracized by the hierarchy of the unit. For the men who are working to help ease the drug problem in the Army, the task is frustrating. (BN576)

10. The Service Academies have not escaped the drug problem, but its extent is unknown. The U.S. Naval Academy has sought to present both sides of the question — those who say drugs are a problem at the Academy and those who say they are not a problem. The problem was brought up in the Annapolis Evening Capitol which carried an article in which an unnamed midshipman estimated, "conservatively" according to him, that about 1/4 of the 4,300 men at the Academy use marijuana. Random interviews with 20 middies refute the charges. Upperclassmen admit the marijuana has been smoked, but they question how often and how widespread have been the occurrences. All of those interviewed claimed that 1/4 was too high an estimate; the midshipmen interviewed said they can pick and choose from various life-styles available and that the use of drugs was not that widespread. (BN559)

11. Representative J. Murphy (D. New York) believes military drug users fall into four categories: the user whose basic problem is inability to cope with being in Southeast Asia; the conformist who goes along with the group; the weak personality who can't take the pressures of normal military life (60% of the addicts at Fort Bragg have never been in Vietnam); and the true addict personality, with psychopathic overtones.

Dr. Jerome Jaffe told a Senate Subcommittee that many Service-men used drugs long before they entered the Service. Urinalysis shows that 5.44% used heroin or similar drugs, while the rate for E-5 and below is around 10%. (BN41)

12. The U.S. Army Alcohol and Drug Education Course (USAADEC) at Yale University was needed for several reasons: the nation's predisposition toward drugs, the epidemic of heroin use in Vietnam, boredom in Europe, and easy access to pure drugs, especially heroin.

Brig. General Robert G. Gard, Jr., Director of Discipline and Drug Problems, said that, "There is an overall hostility toward the military establishment, which engenders the search for escape through drugs." The program is being
kept small to create a "ripple effect," the first 132 enlisted men and officers included as trainers are "expected to take a look at their own biases and to examine how these interfere with their ability to work with people who are ethnically, racially, or culturally different than themselves. (BN596)

13. A study by an all-Service, six-member Department of Defense team indicated in February, 1971, that, due to the "generation gap" between career NCOs and officers on the one hand, and their enlisted men on the other, the treatment and handling of drug users is compounded. The team stated that senior NCOs identify with the System and may interpret the young EM's questioning as disobedience. (BN122)

In June 1971, real innovation began when the President created a special agency to combat the drug abuse problem: The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP) with Dr. Jerome Jaffe as Director. While refusing to have direct control over drug programs in the Department of Defense, SAODAP is using the military as a laboratory for a national drug-abuse program. Starting in May 1971, urine-testing of Servicemen was instituted; but the decision was made to use the findings only for treatment, not legal prosecution. Fifth Amendment rights are, therefore, not violated. The Department of Defense, in the summer of 1971, declared that no one can be administratively separated from the Service under less-than-honorable conditions for drug abuse alone. The trend has been to keep personal use of drugs separate from the crime of pushing drugs. Rehabilitative therapy programs are being implemented that will provide care and motivate the drug abusers to respond positively to the care. The practices of personnel management will change as the military attempts to convey to drug abusers what is so good about life that they should not escape it. There is some resistance in the Services to the vast expenditures for treatment. Some feel that rehabilitation is not a proper mission for the Armed Forces. (BMI20)

14. A January 1971 directive set forth new policies for the disposition of military drug offenders within the entire Department of Defense: (1) A new definition of drug involvement was used which differentiated between "experimenters,"
"users," "addicts," and "casual suppliers." (2) I directed the Services to refer drug abusers for medical evaluation before disciplinary action. (3) The directive updated policy on marijuana. (4) It spelled out a tough policy on LSD users. (5) It also expended the responsibilities of the DOD Drug Abuse Control Committee. (6) A mandatory large-scale drug-abuse education program was inaugurated. (7) It encouraged drug rehabilitation programs. (8) It authorized use of amnesty programs. (BP246)

15. Under that directive, the Air Force extended its Human Reliability Program to automatically ground pilots or crew members at the start of any investigation concerning drug abuse. Other than simple short-term withdrawal programs, the Air Force would not engage in any drug-rehabilitation programs that time, but would concentrate on improved techniques of drug education and prevention. (BP246)

16. At the same time, the question of amnesty was left up to the individual Services. The Army undertook in Vietnam programs in which, if an individual turned himself in, he could get professional help. The Navy was studying amnesty and was offering help to those adjudged sincere, although LSD use was ground for discharge in the Navy. Marine Corps policy was to treat each case on its merits. The Air Force felt that it would probably adopt amnesty in principle, honoring the traditional doctor-patient confidence, but retaining its legal rights. The Army was experimenting with an addict-treatment program involving short-term transfer from heroin to methadone, and 12 weeks of rehabilitation. (BP246)

17. As of July 1971, under the Navy drug exemption program (amnesty), a user will not be disciplined so long as he cooperates in a rehabilitation program. The Navy does not require the user to give information on drug sources or users, but he may be requested to testify about such activities before official boards of investigation. A man who turns himself in may have his assignment changed, be deprived of his security clearance, or be removed from flight status. He is protected from dishonorable discharge, and the Navy may discharge him honorably. His involvement with drugs will be reported to the Chief of Personnel and noted on his service record. Disclosures made by a person who receives exemption are not
privileged in any sense and may be used for all purposes, including criminal investigation. (BN453)

18. In August 1971, the Marines' policy was to encourage drug users to accept help without fear of punishment, as opposed to disciplinary action. Drug rehabilitation centers have been opened, but the number are inadequate. Drugs are used as a means to escape problems, pressure, or boredom. Most users are white, unmarried, age 19-22, with 12 years or less of education, and in the lower 3 mental groups. Nearly 2600 Marines have sought help from the drug-exemption program, and more than 200 were found to be drug-dependent. Rehabilitation centers are at Miramar, California; Jacksonville, Florida; or those Veterans Administration Hospitals where such care is provided. (BN261)

19. In a shift of attitudes, Servicemen are informing on their fellows concerning heroin use, with the main targets being the drug pushers. This development was reported by Dr. Richard S. Wilbur, Assistant Defense Secretary for Health and Environment and his Deputy, Army Brig. General John K. Singlaub, at a press conference following a Southeast Asia inspection tour. Last June about 95% of all Army drug-related courts-martial were initiated by Criminal Investigators, Military Police or some other professional investigators. In November, about 50% were initiated by other soldiers.

A user of hard drugs is being pressed by others to turn himself in for detoxification under the amnesty program. Official statistics indicate that addictive use of narcotics is down sharply. Only 2.5% of servicemen leaving Vietnam have been using heroin. (In the summer of 1971, the figure was 4%.) There were 15 drug-related deaths in Vietnam in November 1970, but none for November, or December 1971. 2,000 men a month are still being referred to rehabilitation centers for detoxification and treatment, but there were only 200 addicts in October; there had been 600 in 1971. Three factors have contributed to this improvement: the education program, the rehabilitation program, and the deterrent effect of knowing there may be a random mandatory urinalysis test. 32% of recent veterans had used some type of prohibited drugs during Service, and
7% admitted using hard drugs. (BN133)

20. For 1971, based on the results of regular testing for drug abuse (screening for opiates, including heroin, barbiturates, or amphetamines) indicates the problem was small outside of Vietnam, with the Army showing the highest use rates in all regions:

Figures supplied by Defense showed to each service the number of people screened in each area and both the number and percentage of those clinically confirmed as hard drug users. Following are the official figures:

ARMY: Southeast Asia - 289,789 screened, 11,807 or 4.1% confirmed; Other Pacific areas - 36,808 screened, 579 or 1.6% confirmed; Europe - 20,061 screened, 190 or 0.9% confirmed; Other areas (Alaska, Southern Command) - 5950 screened, 75 or 1.3% confirmed. (BN40)

AIR FORCE: Southeast Asia - 79,155 screened, 423 or 0.5% confirmed; Other Pacific areas - 7675 screened, 20 or 0.2% confirmed; Europe - 14,682 screened, one or 0.01% confirmed; Conus - 31,980 screened, 218 or 0.7% confirmed.

NAVY: Southeast Asia - 19,544 screened, 49 or 0.2% confirmed; Other Pacific areas - 3821 screened, 14 or 0.4% confirmed; Conus - 32,564 screened, 54 or 0.2% confirmed; Other areas - 11,684 screened, 68 or 0.6% confirmed.

MARINE CORPS: Southeast Asia - 692 screened, five or 0.7% confirmed; Other Pacific areas - 8142 screened, 26 or 0.3% confirmed; Conus - 11,660 screened, 17 or 0.2% confirmed; Other areas - two people tested, neither confirmed. (BN40)

21. The future of drug abuse in relation to the military does not seem to promise much abatement, though doubtless the attempts to control drug usage among teenagers and young Servicemen will develop into effective programs. However, children of parents who use drugs frequently through prescription are more prone to drug usage and abuse than others. Some specialists now call doctors who prescribe drugs freely, "the pusher in the white coat." The prospect of society's being concentrated in urban centers, and the likelihood of ordinary life being lived on a higher level of tension, coupled with a widening social conviction that there is some chemical formula that will relieve any personal psychological pressure—all combine to make it probable that the drug-abuse problem in the military services is here to stay indefinitely. Control and rehabilitation systems may be able to keep the problem at a manageable level, but there seems no prospect that control systems will become unnecessary.
22. Many argue that part of the solution of the drug problem should include the legalization of certain drugs. A review of a book by John Kaplan entitled *Marijuana: The New Prohibition* argued for a repeal of laws which make the sale and use of marijuana illegal. Kaplan contended that many users have reached the point where breaking the law can even be a pleasant part of the ritual. The main consequences of such laws, in Kaplan's view, are to make felons of a vast segment of the population who would not otherwise be involved in crime; such laws have led users into a state of alienation from society and the legal system, thus generally contributing to the "breakdown of law and order." (BP341)

23. The Drugs Task Force of the White House Conference on Youth: 

...strongly recommend that government at appropriate levels control and license the sale, distribution, importation, retailing, advertising, purity, potency, age of user and the tax revenues of marijuana with a view to permitting its general use under reasonable standards. The Task Force has concluded that the social costs of the present legal framework for dealing with marijuana grossly exceed any damage or danger resulting from its use. (BM153)
1. Perhaps a balanced perspective on the problem of racial minorities in the military can best be obtained by first understanding the situation as it was before the intensification of recent years. We therefore refer first to certain observations and conclusions from a study of the subject done in 1966 (which in turn, refers to earlier studies, particularly those of 1943 and 1951). While we still have far to go, it is important to realize how remarkably far we have come in a relatively short time, perhaps justifying the inordinate length of quotation from one document.

2. In both THE AMERICAN SOLDIER and Project Clear (two surveys conducted in 1943 and 1951 respectively) large samples of Army personnel in segregated military settings were categorized as to whether they were favorable, indifferent, or opposed to racial integration in Army units. There were massive shifts in soldier's attitudes over the 8 year period, shifts showing a much more positive disposition toward racial integration among both blacks and whites in the later year. A look at the distribution of attitudes held by white soldiers reveals opposition to integration went from 84% in 1943 to less than half (44%) in 1951. An even more remarkable change is found among the black soldiers. Where in 1945, favorable, indifferent, or opposing attitudes were roughly equally distributed among the Negro soldiers, by 1951 opposition or indifference to racial integration had become negligible. We also have evidence on how Negro soldiers react to military integration in the contemporary setting. The Army is overwhelmingly thought to be more racially egalitarian than civilian life. Only 16% of 67 Negro soldiers interviewed in 1965 said civilian life was more racially equal or no different than the Army. The proposition is supported that, despite existing deviations from military policy at the level of informal discrimination, the military establishment stands in sharp and favorable contrast to the racial relations prevalent in the larger American society. (BM106)

3. Reported by Project Clear in 1951 are Negro-white crime differentials for three segregated posts in 1950. Proportionately, Negro soldiers committed four times more crime than white soldiers. In 1964, in the integrated military, statistics of a major Army Command in Europe show Negroes accounting for 21%
of the crime while constituting 16% of the total personnel. In a large combat unit in Viet Nam, for a three month period in the summer of 1965, Negroes received 19% of the disciplinary reports but made up 22% of the troop assignment. Although these findings, of course, are incomplete, they do point to a marked drop in Negro crime as compared with both the earlier segregated military as well as the contemporary civilian life. (BM106)

4. The military establishment was desegregated before the current civil rights drive gained momentum. In the segregated military, embroilments between Negro units and whites were an ever-present problem. In the light of subsequent developments in the domestic racial picture, it is likely that severe disciplinary problems would have occurred had military integration not come about when it did. The timing of desegregation in the military defused an ingredient—all Negro military units—that would have been potentially explosive in this nation's current racial strife. (BM106)

5. In general, the pattern of racial relations observed in the United States—integration in the military setting and racial exclusivism off duty—prevails in overseas assignments as well. Many of the establishments catering to American personnel that ring most military installations are segregated in practice. To a similar degree this is true of shore towns where Navy personnel take liberty. Violation of these implicit taboos can lead to physical threat, if not violence. Observers of overseas American personnel have noted that Negro soldiers are more likely than whites to learn local languages (though for both groups of servicemen, this is a very small number). A study found that Negro soldiers were five times more likely to know "conversational" German, and three times more likely to know "some" German than were white soldiers. These data testify that the Negro soldiers overseas, perhaps because of the more favorable racial climate, are more willing to take advantage of participation at informal levels with local populations. (BM106)

6. Color barriers at the formal level are absent throughout the military establishment. Equal treatment regardless of race is official policy in such non-duty facilities as swimming pools, chapels, barbershops, and dependents' housing, as well as in the more strictly military endeavors involved in the assignment, promotion, and living conditions of members of the armed services. Moreover, white personnel are often commanded by black superiors, a situation rarely obtained in civilian life. Recently the military has sought to implement its policy of equal opportunity by exerting pressure on local communities where segregated patterns affect military
personnel. A comparison of the 1950 President's committee report dealing with racial integration and the 1963 and 1964 reports of a second President's committee show that the earlier report dealt entirely with internal military organization, and the recent reports address themselves primarily to the National Guard and off-base discrimination. In brief, military life is characterized by an interracial equalitarianism of a quantity and of a kind that is seldom found in the other major institutions of American society. (BM106)

7. In their performance of military duties, whites and blacks work together with little display of racial tension. This is not to say racial animosity is absent in the military. Racial incidents do occur, but these are reduced by the severe sanctions imposed by the military for such acts. Such confrontations are almost always off duty, if not off base. In no sense, however, is the military sitting on top of a racial volcano, a state of affairs differing from the frequent clashes between the races that were a feature of the military in the segregated era. Additionally, it must be stressed that conflict situations stemming from non-racial causes characterize most sources of friction in the military establishment. (BM106)

8. The general pattern of day-to-day relationships off the job is usually one of mutual racial exclusivism for military men. Closest friendships normally develop within races between individuals of similar educational background. Beyond one's hard core of friends there exists a level of friendly acquaintances. Here the pattern seems to be one of educational similarities over-riding racial differences. In other words, the behavior of service men resembles the racial (and class) separatism of the larger American society, the more they are removed from the military environment. For nearly all white soldiers, the military is a first experience with close and equal contact with a large group of Negroes. Some racial animosity is reflected in accusations that Negro soldiers use the defense of racial discrimination to avoid disciplinary action. On the whole, however, the segregationist-inclined white soldier regards racial integration as something to be accepted pragmatically, if not enthusiastically, as are so many situations in military life. (BM106)

9. While the percentage of Negro enlisted men in the Army increased only slightly between 1945 and 1962, the likelihood of a Negro serving in a combat arm is almost three times greater in 1962 than it was at the end of World War II. Further, when comparisons are made between military specialties within the combat arms, the Negro proportion is noticeably higher in the line, rather than staff assignments. This is especially the case in airborne and marine units. Put
in another way, the direction in assignment of Negro soldiers in the desegregated military is testimony to the continuing consequences of differential Negro opportunity originating in the larger society. That is, even though integration of the military has led to great improvement in the performance of Negro servicemen, the social and particularly educational deprivations suffered by the Negro in American society can be mitigated but not entirely eliminated by the racial egalitarianism existing within the armed forces. These findings need not be interpreted as a decline in the status of the Negro in the integrated military. Actually there is evidence that higher prestige is accorded combat personnel by those in non-combat activities within the military. And taken with the historical context of the "right to fight," the Negro's overrepresentation in the combat arms is a kind of ironic step forward. (BM106)

10. There is almost universal support for racial integration by Negro soldiers; however, some strains are also evident among Negro personnel in the military. There seems to be a tendency among lower ranking Negro enlisted men, especially conscriptees, to view black NCO's as "Uncle Toms." Negro NCO's are alleged to pick on Negroes when it comes time to assign men unpleasant duties. Negro officers are sometimes seen as being too strict when it comes to enforcing military discipline on Negro soldiers. It is suggested that one factor contributing to the generally smooth racial integration of the military might be due to the standard treatment—"like Negroes" in a sense—accorded to all lower ranking enlisted personnel. (BM106)

11. Although the various military services are all similar in being integrated today, they differ in their proportion of Negroes. The Negro distribution in the total armed forces in 1962 and 1964 respectively, was 8.2% and 9.0%, lower than the 11-12% constituting the Negro proportion in the total population. It is virtually certain, however, that among those eligible, a higher proportion of Negroes than whites enter the armed forces. That is, a much larger number of Negroes do not meet the entrance standards required by the military services. In 1962, for example, 56% of Negroes did not pass the preinduction mental examinations given to draftees, almost four times the 15.4% of whites who failed these same tests. Because of the relatively low number of Negroes obtaining student or occupational deferments, however, it is the Army drawing upon the draft that is the only military service where the percentage of Negroes approximates the national proportion. Thus, despite the high number of Negroes who fail to meet induction standards, Army statistics for 1960-65 show Negroes constituted about 15% of those drafted. (BM106)
12. The military at the enlisted ranks has become a major avenue of career mobility for many Negro men. In all four services, and especially in the Army, there is some overrepresentation of Negroes at the junior NCO levels. The disproportionate concentration of Negroes at these levels implies a higher than average re-enlistment, as these grades are not normally attained until after a second enlistment. In 1965 in all four services the Negro reenlistment rate is approximately twice that of white servicemen. Indeed, about half of all first-term Negro servicemen chose to remain in the armed forces for at least a second term. The greater likelihood of Negroes to select a service career suggests that the military establishment is undergoing a significant change in its NCO core. Such an outcome would reflect not only the "pull" of the appeals offered by a racially egalitarian institution, but also the "push" generated by the plight of the Negro in the American economy. At the minimum, it is very probable that as the present cohort of Negro junior NCO's attains seniority there will be a greater representation of Negroes at the advanced NCO grades. The expansion of the armed forces arising from the war in Viet Nam and the resulting opening up of rank will accelerate this development. (BM106)

13. There are diverse patterns between the individual services as to the rank or grade distribution of blacks. The ratio of black to white officers is roughly 1 to 30 in the Army, 1 to 70 in the Air Force, 1 to 250 in the Marines, and 1 to 300 in the Navy. Among enlisted men, Negroes are underrepresented in the top three enlisted ranks in the Army and the top four ranks in the other three services. There is a disproportionate concentration of Negroes in the lower non-commissioned officer ranks in all of the armed forces, but especially so in the Army. An assessment of these data reveals that the Army, followed by the Air Force, has not only the largest proportion of Negroes in its total personnel, but also the most equitable distribution of Negroes in its ranks. Although the Navy was the first service to integrate and the Army the last, in a kina of tortoise and hare fashion, it is the Army that has become the most representative service for Negroes. (BM106)

14. Even if one takes account of the Army's reliance on the selective service for much of its personnel, the most recent figures still show important differences in the number of blacks in those services meeting their man-
power requirements solely through voluntary enlistments; the 5.1% blacks in the Navy is lower than the 8.2% for the Marines or the 8.6% for the Air Force. Moreover, the Army, besides its drawing upon the draft, also has the highest black initial enlistment rate of any of the services. As we find in 1964 that the Army drew 14.1% of its volunteer incoming personnel from Negroes as compared with 13.1% for the Air Force, 8.4% for the Murines, and 5.8% for the Navy. There has been a sizable increase in black enlistments in all four of the services from 1961-65: Army up 5.9%; Air Force up 3.6%; Navy up 2.9%; Marines up 2.5%. (BM106)

15. Racial integration of the armed forces has probably cost the military support among some of its traditional defenders, without gaining any increased acceptance from liberal-radical groups. (BM103)

16. Moskos cited the Navy as having the lowest percentage of blacks—4.3 percent while the United States has 11-12 percent in the total society. The Navy's black-to-white officer ratio is 1:300, while the ratio of black to white senior NCO's is 1:28. (BM103)

17. Two black Navy officers working on recruitment of more blacks said in August, 1970 there were two critical factors: first, the image of the Navy among blacks as a white middle class establishment with a place for blacks as cooks and stewards, and second the battery of tests for all officer candidates which places blacks in direct competition with whites who can take tests better. (BN168)

18. A New York Times article in August 1970 had said:

The lack of black faces in the Navy is one of the biggest drawbacks to recruiting. Only two black Navy officers are assigned to the Pentagon. Prospective Negro recruits ask why there are not more black faces around. Adding to the visibility problem is the fact that there has never been a Negro admiral. (BN403)

19. In 1972, the Navy promoted its first black to rear admiral.

20. The Navy has been catching up in the percentage of blacks serving and the equality of their distribution in the ranks. By February 1971, the number of black Navy officers had more than doubled since 1967. Blacks constitute nearly 5% of all Army field grade officers; but difficulty will be encountered in continuing this trend.
since the number of first and second lieutenants has declined since 1965. The Air Force has reinforced the black community's suspicions about the existence of a quota for blacks in its general-officer ranks. (BP80)

21. Several black Servicewomen said, in August 1971, (in contrast to Rep. Shirley Chisholm) they had encountered more discrimination on account of their race than their sex. One black woman Marine commented that she felt there was as much racial discrimination in the Marine Corps as on the outside, but that they are aware of it and trying to do something about it. (BN363)

22. The grievances of blacks in the military may be summarized as follows:

Lack of faith in the communications system. The Inspector General has just a paper function with the open-door policy, a request almost never gets anywhere because it ends in the low ranks. The chaplain shows sympathy but has little or no influence.

These opinions often result in black Servicemen seeking alternative grievance procedures, such as writing to their Congressmen.

A generation gap exists between black EM's and black NCO's.

The disproportionately high percentage of black prisoners in the military prisons causes them to believe that they get harsher punishment for the same offenses than whites.

The military-police over-react to blacks, especially in groups.

Many blacks feel they are not promoted according to their worth.

Racial polarization occurs—i.e., grouping together by race for all activities, black bars, clubs, music, etc.

Discrimination encountered in the outside world against a black man who has defended his country as well as his white brother seems unjust.

The military gives little attention to black needs—e.g., cosmetics, music, books. (BP80)

23. The Congressional Black Caucus decided to study racism within the military, prompted by the fact that although blacks constituted only 9.9% of the military's Servicemen, they accounted for from 16% to 53% of the total number of men under confinement in the various services. (BN283)
24. One author, an Equal Opportunity Officer, commenting on the minority problem in the service, said that the defeat of the Fair Housing Bill in 1966 was very significant because its message to black Americans was that you may have integration but not equality. The reversal of voting patterns concerning civil rights created deep mistrust.

The militant young black's view is that integration alone is unacceptable; equality is the goal. Under the concept of "separatism," to be integrated means that a superior accepts an inferior and grants him rights, but separatism means that there are two lateral and equal positions—the white position and the black position: Equal but different.

The sudden rejection of attempts to look and think exactly like the white American has resulted in some overreaction in the black lateral position, and overreactions to the change (e.g., police vs. Black Panthers). (BP340)

25. Current military racial problems are the result of nonrecognition or lack of appreciation of the fact that separate identifiable cultures are involved. There are many northern big-city ghetto blacks who, until they came into the Service, had no contact with whites. The ghetto's black is often sullen, aggressive, hostile, loud—a problem. Essentially, the ghetto Serviceman is a problem because he's in a strange environment, competing with others who are often from advantaged backgrounds. The black youngster is not under the slightest illusion that he is equal to everyone else. The white world, with its articulate conversation, upsets him and he does not even want to make small talk since his diction is poor. So when a fair supervisor starts him out like everyone, and tells him to compete, the black feels the supervisor knows he is going to fail and withdraws. (BP340)

26. The apparent lack of personality in black airmen is actually an unfortunate inability to communicate effectively so as to project personality. He is in awe of superiors and the power they wield. This individual feels so powerless and inadequate that when he does get up enough nerve to say something which he feels is constructive, he has to have 49 other guys with him for support and it comes off as a confrontation. The reaction of white airmen is noticeably lacking. They are usually in agreement with black grievances but are not from a cultural background which predisposes them for brinkmanship. (BP340)
27. Any time only black personnel are involved in something, even if it may appear nonracial, it could be a sign that something important is wrong. Communications helplessness creates this type of situation, e.g., demands for more soul music in the juke box can really mean that the blacks are feeling ignored as identifiable contributors to the service. The black appreciates the fact that prejudice exists in the society and respect those individuals who recognize and accept their prejudices and are therefore in full control of their expressed attitudes, e.g., Don't say I'm from the North; I grew up unprejudiced; although the Northerner has usually been more susceptible to reversals of attitude than the Southerner. It wouldn't hurt, for example, for a white supervisor to tell a black subordinate that he has picked up prejudices and is not sure of what things are considered offensive by blacks. In squadrons with racial problems, it often seemed that there was one personality which caused the tension—and usually he was a senior NCO. Yet sometimes it was because he was carrying out the policies of the Officer-in-Charge or the commander. (BP340)

28. There are "hard-core unemployed" in the Air Force, that is personnel who normally would not be hired but who were hired because of government contractual requirements. In similar situations industry learned that misunderstandings sometimes existed due to differences in cultural orientation. Tardiness, for example, was initially considered sheer irresponsibility, but it was gradually learned that some minority cultures neglect to stress the social value of timeliness. It took a considerable amount of time to orient minority people toward the reason why being on time was important; but in most cases, they were successful. (BP340)

29. Apparent "laziness" was actually an aversion to undertaking new responsibilities for fear of failure or fear of criticism. Translate this into the Service environment, and some individual "troublemaker" cannot believe that he is so important to the vast military machine that he need be given an Article 15. The punishment is then interpreted as a racial matter; and his behavior deteriorates. (BP340)
30. Under an all-volunteer force, the problem of having a large number of unprepared blacks and whites could be remedied by longer periods of basic training. Social values and cultural inadequacies may need to be reinterpreted. Rap sessions or roundtable discussions can be one-way communication channels if not properly handled and followed up with action. (BP340)

31. In July 1970, a racial confrontation rocked the Great Lakes Naval Base. An incident among five black Waves occurred and they were detained; until the situation was clarified, a mob of fifty black sailors had been threatening trouble and demanded the release of the Waves. Some public news media sensationalized the incident. Rear Admiral Draper L. Kauffman moved swiftly to control the situation. A 13-man race relations team of seven blacks and six whites, headed by the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Education and Training, was promptly sent from Washington on Admiral Kauffman's request. The Race Relations team's technique included visiting base commanders; talking to individual sailors on and off base, during working and free-time hours; and holding an open "gripe sessions" conducted by experienced personnel in civilian clothes. It turned out that most of the sailors' complaints were not, in fact, race related. An impressive statement was issued by Admiral Kauffman. Many of the team's recommendations were adopted; the following were typical of those involving racial aspects:

A strong policy statement concerning racial matters was issued by Rear Admiral Draper L. Kauffman, Commander of the Naval Base. It was learned later than many black sailors felt that this forthright statement proved the Admiral's sincerity and interest in the race relations problems.

A race relations seminar would be planned and implemented...

A booklet, "Racism in America and How To Combat It," would be distributed throughout the Base.

The Navy Exchange would expand its stock of black cosmetics, sundries, magazines, newspapers and related items.

The Navy Exchange also would obtain the services of additional blacks barbers and beauticians.
Additional books of interest to black Navymen would be ordered for the Base library.

Representation of minority groups in each watch section of the Base law enforcement agencies would be sought, as well as an improved racial balance in military security forces.

The correctional center and other detention areas would be improved as quickly as possible. (BP439)

32. Other recommendations now being acted upon or planned are:

- District and Base chaplains will develop sermons on race relations and brotherhood which will be given on a regular schedule.

- Recreational programs will be expanded by the Naval Training Center Commander with primary emphasis on a comprehensive intramural program. Plans for varsity sports are also being considered.

- Base officials, in cooperation with black community leaders, will explore the suggestion of inviting black girls to the Enlisted Men's Club on special evenings.

- Under consideration is a poster campaign which will stress the theme of mutual understanding between blacks and whites.

- Provision was made for a black barber to come to Great Lakes to instruct Naval Base barbers on how to cut an Afro.

- Articles on race relations matters will appear regularly in the Base weekly newspaper.

- All enlisted personnel will be given a form, which they may sign, which states that any man who feels he is being treated unfairly may take his case personally to his commanding officer. The form also discusses equal treatment and opportunity. (BP439)

33. Many other racial incidents have occurred within the armed services, for example, in the Seventh Army in Germany. Black soldiers complain of racial discrimination from German landlords. The Underground newspapers have exaggerated and fanned tensions. On the other hand, the papers have not glorified the drug
culture; and in that respect, they have helped maintain discipline. The greatest cleavage exists between the old and the young.

In the Seventh Army in Europe, some instances arose of groups of blacks and whites fighting each other, and even fighting among themselves, for control of the drug traffic. One of the features of the problem is terror; victims are afraid to report the robberies because their lives have been threatened. Part of the reason for rising crime in Germany is the influx of gangsters coming into the Army, often sent by judges as an alternative to jail. Another reason is rivalry among drug dealers. Still, another is military life itself, which sometimes finds expression in violent outbursts. Col. Matthew A. Wallis, Commander of the Armored Cavalry, said that black militancy is his most frustrating problem. (BN574)

34. The black militants view the Army as a racist organization reflecting the racism of American society. They believe the system of military justice is against them, that white soldiers are not punished for behavior which, on the part of blacks, would bring swift punishment, and that they are discriminated against in housing and in Army promotions. They also believe that the social climate in Germany is against blacks. Many officers feel that idleness contributes to the crime problem. Officers complain that they have difficulty sometimes in finding meaningful work for their men. All this leads to resentment, boredom, and eventually, crime. "Perhaps the toughest nut to crack is the disbelief by blacks that they can get a fair shake from the white establishment in the military. Crack this nut and you could have the answer to the whole ball game." (BN574)

35. A report by the Air Training Command cited in the New York Times on August 1971, found inequality and mistreatment in the Air Force. The cause was identified as blatant supervisory prejudice. In many cases supervisors were indifferent to human needs. The report called for the establishment of rapid and effective methods of finding, reporting, and correcting reasonable complaints and legitimate grievances. Councils and channels then in existence were said to be not working. Correction of inequities must extend to all civilian communities that are accessible to servicemen; if fair treatment cannot be obtained for all military
personnel and their families in those communities, then the base should be closed or relocated. Air Force commanders should begin to exert moral pressures within the legal intentions of Air Force regulations. The report made no plea for less discipline, rather, it urged that discipline, dress, and conduct regulations "be reasonable, understood by all, and strongly enforced with fairness and impartiality." Security police are often thought of as "the Mafia" by the black man and linked to the "pig" image; changing that image is crucial to easing tension. Equal-opportunity officers must be enthusiastic, knowledgeable, communicative, and concerned individuals. (BN337)

36. On November 1, 1971, the first class began at the Defense Department Race Relations Institute at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. Classes were scheduled to have 60 men, ranging in grades from E-3 through E-7, and O-2 through O-6. The Director of the school is white; the Deputy Director black. The courses comprise history and contributions of major minority groups; psychological, social and cultural factors directly related to the dynamics of race relations; community interaction activities; and practice in group leadership. Completing the course, students will return to their units to set up similar programs. Marines and Coast Guard, as well as reserves, will be involved at a later date. (BN112)

37. Not all commentators approve of all the steps taken by the Services: Some feel that only a small minority of blacks are at the root of present racial problems, both in and out of the military, and that these few, through vocal and physical acts of defiance, are placing a shameful shadow over all blacks. And they should not be appeased with further concessions and babblings about Black Pride.

There should be Black Pride but not at the expense of white, red, or yellow pride. Equal opportunity that is more advantageous to one group than another is no longer equal opportunity, and at present the blacks are far out in front. Rewards and punishments must in all respects be equal and not contingent on the past history or environment of any race or individual, black or white. (BN15)

38. A special course at Fort Benning has been established to help Army officers and NCO's cope with the crisis. The course was instituted by Maj. General
Talbott, Infantry Center Commandant, and is run by Major Tyrone Fletcher, a black. The thrust of the course is its attempts to get officers and NCO's to admit that racism is part of their personalities because they were brought up in a society that contains channels and pockets of racism. The course seeks to educate the Army's leadership to deal effectively with the young black soldier. Individual dignity is to be respected while fostering an attitude of professionalism and discipline, in which soldiers are to be responsible for their own conduct. Those who remain responsible get loose reins; those who do not, get more education and discipline. (BN609)

39. The program has its dissenters, some who view it with mixed feelings and some with hostility. NCO's complain that their word is no longer respected, that it takes an overwhelming amount of evidence before a man can be brought up for charges. Furthermore, NCO's complain that, because of Commanders' "open-door" policies, they are being bypassed in the chain-of-command. The Army asserts that this is being corrected with greater understanding of today's young soldier: substituting meaningful "adventure" training for make-work duties: making the barracks safe and comfortable to live in, and giving young officers less paperwork and more authority over the training of their men. (BN609)

40. Major Fletcher claims that there is a built-up hostility within blacks because there has been no outlet for the frustrations. His answers are education and a great deal of face-to-face communication. He admits he does not understand everything about race relations but he is working on it. (BN609)

41. Colonel Cody, U.S. Air Force, comments:

The racial problems of command leadership is not a separate and distinct entity from the youth problem. Each black officer is unique, just as each white officer is. Color should be considered only if color poses particular human or social difficulties for the individual. Everyone has prejudices; the problem comes when some leaders are unable to control them.
The commander can set the tone of the unit by actively seeking to promote better racial understanding. He should study the contributions of racial minorities to American history. He should learn the sensitivities and viewpoints of blacks. The prevailing racial attitude of the community and state restrictions on minorities should be known and steps taken to ease unfavorable impact (this also applies to foreign countries). Orderly channels to vent gripes, raise questions, and discuss attitudes are needed. Commanders also should aid young black officers in their concern for fellow blacks, i.e., endorse their participation in programs to help less privileged groups. A joint effort of black and white officers, with command support, could resolve the racial aspects of community-based relations. Men need to be taught how to cope with racial problems. (BM28)

42. A tendency for a kind of self-imposed, informal segregation on the part of black military personnel may continue. But sensitivity to civil-rights issues, coupled with racially-equalitarian internal practices, will most likely be sufficient (barring repeated military intervention in black ghettos) to preclude any widespread black disaffection within the armed forces.

A major turning away of blacks per se from military commitment is viewed as highly doubtful. It is ironic that more vocal anti-military sentiment is voiced within certain black separatist groups at the same time that the armed forces increasingly become a leading avenue of career opportunity for black men. (BM103)

43. Department of Defense directives have reiterated the military's longstanding equal-opportunity policies. The Defense Race Relations Institute has begun training full-time instructors, who will return to units and conduct courses throughout the armed services. Each base, post, or station probably has an Equal Opportunity or Human Relations Council, which receives complaints of racial discrimination and aims at arousing interest in the equal-opportunity program. A Council can investigate (but not initiate), complaints, report its findings to the base commander, and can recommend disciplinary action. Problem areas continue
to exist:

- people must adjust to a new emphasis on human relationships.
- it is difficult getting unhappy black (or other ethnic groups) and the Council together.
- discrimination can be hard to prove (e.g., in housing: "it's rented")
- there is a lack of interest among whites.

Some informal groups of blacks and whites get together to investigate incidents, ask the base commander for action, or go up the line even so far as to ask for a Congressional investigation; e.g., PEACE (People Emerging Against Corrupt Establishment) was set up at Sembach AB, Germany, with the tacit permission of the base commander. (BN308)

44. Over a period of eighteen months racial tensions eased dramatically at Camp Lejeune, N.C., because of an extensive program designed to promote understanding between black and white Marines stationed there. The highlights of the program were small group meetings and role-playing, as well as effective programs for discussion and reestablishment of lines of communication. (BN354)

45. Suggestions were made by a black sergeant at Sembach AB, Germany. Give blacks the option of taking their leaves back in the United States, so that they can be around black women; give blacks top priority on base housing, because they have more trouble getting rentals off base than whites; extend temporary housing allowances automatically to blacks, because it takes them twice as long to find someone who will rent to them; permit humanitarian transfers for blacks if there is a lot of racial discrimination in an area or in a certain country. (BN308)

46. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs Hadlow A. Hull stated: "We are taking steps to insure that racial prejudice or its appearance is eliminated in every area, with particular attention to promotions, military justice, and access to housing and other public accommodations off post."
On the other hand, he said, many of the social problems faced by
the military cannot be solved by the military alone, but must be solved by society
in general. However, the military must give it its best try. After honest and
sincere efforts to relieve their grievances, those who still cause unrest may have
to be separated for the good of the service.  (LN12)

47. Project BOOST (Broadened Opportunities for Officer Selection and
Training) is designed for Navy enlisted men of minority extraction who are qualified
for officer-educational programs in all ways (age, physical fitness, obligated ser-
vice) but lack the necessary scholastic experience. The project normally offers
an academic year of instruction, tutoring, and counseling, to enable the candidate
to compete equally with others when he applies for his next step toward com-
missioning.

The program is unstructured. Class attendance is not compulsory,
but a daily muster is held. Subjects include math, reading, writing, and sciences;
tailored programs are created. Bureau of Personnel Notice #1500 lists require-
ments. The project began in 1969 at Bainbridge as a pilot program; 40 pros-
spective officers are now enrolled at the academy and in universities. In September
1971, the program moved to San Diego, with 38 enrollees.  (BN241)

48. Black membership in the National Guard (NG) has gotten worse in
recent months, despite a major recruiting effort to increase their members in the
NG. The main reason cited by blacks for this trend is that the NG emphasizes
the white man’s objectives, which do not interest the black man. When the
white man’s goal becomes the black man’s goal, the National Guard will have a
proportionate number of them.  (BN64)

49. New recruitment goals for the National Guard include:
1. Double the number of black members of the Guard during
the next 12 months.
2. Hire at least 670 black technicians during the next 12 months.
3. Achieve black membership in direct proportion to the communities
served and represented by Guard units. (BN64)

50. The Navy Times cited the Marine Corps' new Commandant, General Robert E. Cushman, as planning promptly to take a "personal interest" in racial problems. He hopes to see that sergeants and lieutenants have the right attitudes, and he hopes to commission more Negro officers to work in military law. He agrees with the Navy's exemption program for drug abusers. In terms of a non-draft society, Cushman feels that the necessary numbers won't be hard to recruit, but efforts will have to be made for quality recruitment. (BN242)

51. The Air Force Academy hosted a four-day festival of black culture in January 1972. Out of 3900 cadets, 76 are black; but in 1963 there were none. Relations between black and white cadets had at times deteriorated to the point of frequent fights, and even a cross burning. Discussion sessions, articles, and committees did not help; and demonstrations were barred. Cadet Gilbert offered his festival idea, which had as its purpose "to enlighten, educate and entertain the cadet wing and the surrounding community as to what the black man is, was, and wants to be."

Church on Sunday was a special occasion. From Denver the New Hope Baptist Church minister, choir, and others came to the Academy's chapel. Spirituals were sung, and customs "answering the call of the pastor" followed. Dick Gregory gave a keynote speech. Fashion shows, black art and dance, food and films were presented. Black women from Denver helped in the presentations. (BI1293)

52. After the racial riot at Travis AFB, California, the following conclusions were reached:

1. Any commander who assumes he has no racial problem is making a mistake.

2. Commanders cannot rely on the chain of command and the Inspector General to keep abreast of racial problems. Some black don't trust these channels.

3. Commanders must get out of their offices and talk with their
troops. Human Relations Councils can be useful if the men on Councils really represent the troops, and if they are given enough power to make significant changes. Rubber-stamp Councils are useless.

4. No grievance, even if seemingly trivial, should be dismissed as just another GI gripe. Each complaint must be carefully considered and corrective actions publicized; if no action is taken, explain why not.

5. A good base newspaper can help spike rumors and reduce tension if reporting is accurate, timely, and complete. Information officers should be ordered to provide all newsmen with maximum information with minimum delay.

6. If the man thinks he has a problem, whether he does or not, the command has a problem.

7. Discipline must be enforced uniformly. Keep close tabs on court-martials and Article 15's for signs of discrimination.

8. Good leadership by section chiefs and other immediate supervisors can solve many human relations problems. Commanders must weed out supervisors who cannot lead men. Technical competence and time-in-grade are not sure-fire indicators of leadership ability.

9. Recreational facilities are no good if they aren't used. Activities should be tailored to the needs of different ethnic groups. A championship golf course may appeal to a commander, but not to his men. Mexican-Americans may want to play soccer, not football.

10. Blacks as well as whites may have racist attributes.

11. Pulling rank is no substitute for leadership. Today's Service-man, like the sophisticated equipment he operates, is more sensitive and complex than in the past. Both must be handled with care.

12. No installation in the armed services is immune to serious violence, whether it involves white against black or GI against the brass. (BP129)
MILITARY JUSTICE

1. Few aspects of military establishments are as misunderstood by "outsiders" as systems of military justice. Some critics have the impression that the armed forces devise their own codes of military justice in some whimsical, internal, bureaucratic fashion; whereas the Codes of Military Justice are Congressional Acts, coming under the Congress' Constitutional responsibilities to prescribe the rules governing the armed forces. Some critics see no basis for any differences whatsoever between legal systems in military and civil life; these generally ignore the experience of most military men, who would probably subscribe to General Eisenhower's comment that when one puts on the uniform, one accepts certain inhibitions. These are critical differences.

2. The Boston Herald Traveler in May 1969, for example, saw the Pueblo case as dramatizing the inequality between the men who give orders and those who carry them out. It said the whole affair presented a "Billy-Bud" dilemma of duty and conviction, of the individual's being punished and the institution's being spared. (BN620)

3. [It would be difficult, incidentally, to distinguish between men in uniform "who give orders" and those "who carry them out," since all but the lowest rank of recruit do both.]

4. In any event, the police and court systems of the military will be affected by much of the current ferment in what might be called the whole area of Law and Order in American society in general, involving questions of capital punishment, police procedures, police recruitment, prison reform, and others, in addition to specific criticisms of the military justice system itself.

5. A representative example of distorted analysis was contained in an article in the New York Times Magazine (May 1969) that said questions are being raised about military justice with greater frequency than ever before. Clearly there is a difference between military and civilian systems — (1) military tribunals do not recognize procedures for bail (which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights), (2) military
justice makes no allowances for indictments by a grand jury (also guaranteed),
(3) it does not pretend to offer a trial by peers; (4) military tribunals by their very
structure are incapable of producing an impartial trial. [The third statement above
is debatable; the fourth is indefensible.]

The situation is ripe for corruption due to pressure from the
high command. Those who defend dissenting soldiers do not look for Congress or the
military for relief, but have turned to the civilian courts.

ACLU attorneys have commented that "today they (defenders of the
military justice system) say free speech would destroy the Army; in the early 19th
century they were saying that if the lash were outlawed, the Navy would be
destroyed." (BP374)

6. Recommendations for sweeping reforms of the military justice system
were made in July 1970 by Senator Birch Bayh (D., Indiana). What he considered
to be the most serious defects were chances for undue command influence and
denial to the defendant of certain rights that he would be accorded as a civilian
including credit for time spent in confinement before trial; precluding military counsel
from seeking collateral relief; and a requirement that a defense counsel apply to the
prosecutor, rather than to the independent military judge, for subpoenas. (BP402)

7. Charges were brought at the Federal Bar Convention, in October
1970, that the military justice system should be scrapped, its main fault being that
it is placed under the control of the commander. Responses came from the Judge
Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force personally; all three felt the
system, with new 1968 revisions, was satisfactory. (BN123)

8. The White House Conference on Youth commented that:

The American public's attention has focused on the
growing controversy over the quality of military
justice. It is evident that many Americans, including
a substantial number of servicemen, are losing faith in
the military legal system. Action must be taken immedi-
ately to restore faith in the system. Reforms which
increase the typical serviceman's confidence in the
military's legal system's fairness will inevitably raise rather than lower the state of military discipline and morale. (BM153)

9. The appropriate Departments of the Executive Branch and committees of Congress should immediately undertake a comprehensive review and revision of the military legal system.

To implement this recommendation, the Departments and committees should consider the adoption of the following proposals:

(I) Command influence in the court martial. Every serviceman who is the accused in a general or special court martial should be granted the right to trial by a single, independent military judge or a panel of such judges. When the accused elects to have a jury trial by court members, the court members should truly constitute a jury of the accused's peers; officers should be tried by courts of officers and enlisted men by courts of enlisted men.

(2) Administrative board proceedings. The servicemen who are respondents in administrative board proceedings should be granted additional procedural safeguards. They should be granted such elements of procedural due process as a broader right to counsel and a more effective guarantee of the right of confrontation.

(3) Article 15 procedure. Current procedures are so informal that they might be unjust. All services should adopt the United States Army's rule that the serviceman in an Article 15 proceeding be guaranteed the right to consult legally qualified counsel.

(4) Survey of opinions. A survey should be made of young servicemen's perceptions of or opinions about the military legal system. The survey's scope should include members of the Reserves, including the National Guard. The survey's results should be distributed nationally.

(5) Legal rights and responsibilities. The limitations on servicemen's constitutional rights should be revised to eliminate any restriction which unnecessarily limits those rights more severely than the national defense requires.

(A) During basic training, servicemen should receive extensive training concerning their constitutional rights and the limitations upon the exercise of those
rights.

(B) National Guardsmen should receive additional training concerning their responsibilities under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and during civil disorders and disturbances.

(C) All servicemen should receive intensive training in the standards to be used to determine whether an order issued to them is illegal.

(D) Servicemen should be guaranteed their rights under the First Amendment to freedom of speech, press, freedom to organize and peaceably assemble. (BMI53)

10. The military and its system of justice have received a great deal of public attention from the handling of a wide variety of regulations — haircuts, homosexuals, desertion, AWOL, and drugs.

For example, at Ft. Meade in December 1971, a soldier was convicted of disobeying an order to get a haircut and fined fifty dollars. However, the argument continued. Is a haircut a reasonable area of military concern?

A special court in August 1970, found nine Marine recruits guilty of failure to obey a lawful order to cut their hair. They could receive Bad Conduct Discharges. (BN406)

11. General Westmoreland ordered a crackdown on long hair to make the Army conform to AR600-20 by maintaining the proper length of hair, mustache, and sideburns style. (BN132)

12. The Air Force, following the Army, in October 1970, set new hair standards, allowing sideburns to extend to the lowest part of the exterior ear opening, neatly trimmed mustaches, afros, and long hair. The directive is Air-Force-wide and takes responsibility away from the base commander. (BN119)

13. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt was criticized by the Washington Star for his ruling on hair. The Star maintained that American Sailors are looking sloppy and ugly from a combination of long hair and slick uniforms. (BN48)

14. A letter to the editor of the Army Times attempted to "restore a little perspective to the hair controversy," which was being discussed in the Army.
The author pointed out that the regulation on hair was designed to increase individual freedom, but not at the expense of individual responsibility. The abuse of the new regulation led to new limitations on the regulation as the author saw it. The soldier has two responsibilities: (1) a sworn duty to his country and his Service; and (2) the personal duty of improving both. Growing long hair fulfills neither obligation. Finally, the writer believes that the Army should attack problems that would yield results measured in terms of performance as well as appearance. He called for an attack on obesity. (BN58)

15. An 18-year old Marine, who admitted committing homosexual acts off base received an undesirable discharge from an Admiralty board. The ACLU represented the Marine and planned to appeal the decision in a class-action challenge to armed forces policies on homosexuals. (BN396)

16. Ronald Stenson, a Naval Dental Technician, was sentenced to receive a less than honorable discharge because the Navy discovered he had committed a homosexual act. It appears that Stenson gave the Navy almost 4 years of "excellent service"; this was undisputed testimony established at his hearing. Furthermore, this homosexual act was committed with a consenting adult in private, a civilian, and not on a Naval Base. It in no way involved any dereliction of duty. (BN590)

17. A book, *Homosexuals and the Military: A Study of Less Than Honorable Discharge*, by Colin J. Williams and Martin S. Weinberg, was described as follows:

A movement around the country in the past few years has been urging society to take a new look at attitudes and policy concerning homosexuality. One of the latest additions in this area is a study conducted by researchers at the Institute for Sex Research, founded by the late Dr. Alfred C. Kinsey at Indiana University.

Research for the study project began four years ago, Williams and Weinberg employed 64 men who had been in the military. Half of the sample group had received less than honorable discharges for being homosexual. The rest of the study group had received honorable
discharges.

At the end of their study presentation the authors concluded that regardless of the effects of less than honorable discharge, military policy concerning homosexuals is in our view unwise, unjust, and in essence unenforceable. Such policies are based on stereotypes of the homosexual that research has shown to be untenable and that result in discrimination against a minority. Not only is the cost of training lost when a serviceman is separated for homosexual conduct, but the expenditure on investigation and separation itself seems hardly worthwhile. The majority of homosexuals who serve do so with honor, and it seems foolish to pursue this group with the ardor that authorities exhibit.

The Institute for Sex Research is undertaking a major study of homosexuality. The research began three years ago and it is estimated that the findings will not be published for another year. Williams and Weinberg's book is not part of the current research project. (BN66)

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<th>Deserter</th>
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<td>Since 1966-1967, when 40,227 men deserted from the military, the number has grown. In FY 1968, 53,351 men deserted. During the Fiscal Year 1971, a total of 98,324 men at some time were listed as absent without permission for more than 30 days and were classified as deserters. Through that five-year period, a total of 354,112 young men had deserted from the service. Many of them, as the military explains, eventually returned to service, but as of this week 10 percent of them, or 35,259, were still at large. The rate of desertion surpasses that of any recent war. At the peak year of World War II, 72.9 men per 1,000 in uniform were deserting.</td>
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Desertion or AWOL at such levels would appear to call for radical new approaches to definitions, statutes, punishment, and every other aspect of the causes for absence on the part of the individual and the responses of the organization. Once a military crime of very high order, even desertion is now regarded much less seriously in practice. It may be that a much looser perspective in peacetime will justify a more stringent policy in war circumstances. What other types of organizations are plagued by heavy absenteeism? How do they handle it? Are the Services of the typical deserter or chronic absentee of such value as to warrant the cost of pursuit, apprehension, and trial — or even worth continued membership? Absenteeism on the large scale cited here
Last year the number of deserters per 1,000 men in service had reached 142.2. Would appear to call for a new thorough review of the entire system, possibly incorporating Merit-Reward approaches, or providing opportunities for make-up work periods, or a system whereby each day of absence means a loss of one day of leave, or other approaches.

19. The New York Times of August 15, 1971, said that the Army deserters rate is the highest it has been in 27 years. The first 10 months of FY 1971 had a rate of 62.6 per 1,000 men, which nearly equalled the World War II high of 63 per 1,000. This is a sharp increase from the rate of 52.3 per 1,000 for the FY 1970, and double the peak during the Korean War.

Desertions have hit the Army and Marines hard (Marine 59.6 per 1,000, Navy, 9.9 per 1,000; and Air Force 0.80 per 1,000). The Navy and Air Force are almost not affected. The traditional patterns of explanations do not fit; the problem includes those who returned from overseas as well as those who were on orders for Vietnam. (BN305)

20. Many AWOL and deserters are caught or returned; a vast number are repeaters. All have personal problems. They await processing in a "non-detention facility," where the average stay is 45-60 days; boredom there breeds violence. (BN214)

21. A special Senate Armed Services Subcommittee has been attempting to determine if the cause of desertions from the Army stem from political motives. The Committee's figures show that there were 282 Americans listed as deserters with political motives. 101 were aliens who supposedly went back to their homelands; while 181 were Americans. During the period under study, 5 million men served in uniform. A comparison of political deserters with the typical AWOL who is absent for 30-days-plus shows the political deserter to be a volunteer; to have slightly higher rank, less time in service, and better education; less likely to have had a prior disciplinary record; and more likely to have had a psychiatric problem in the past. (BP27)
22. An important element in any system of justice is consistency. Even very tough systems have been accepted by men when they are convinced that its provisions apply to all, impartially. An illustration of objection to selective indulgence was a letter from Navy enlisted men to the editor of the *Navy Times* concerning eight sailors who "missed" the *Constellation* when the ship deployed for West Pakistan. The critics felt that there had been a flagrant disregard of regulations; they considered it a blow to morale and Navy responsibility that the eight should have received a courteous general discharge under "honorable conditions." (BN259)

23. An Army Lieutenant's conviction for "conduct unbecoming an officer" because he waited at home over a year for orders to go to Vietnam was overturned by the court of Military Appeals. The Court felt the lieutenant was well intentioned and did what he was told, and that his not having received a post call was an administrative error blamable on the Army. (BN90)

24. The Senate was told in April 1971, of increase of incidents of "fragging," a term used to denote the use of grenades by soldiers on their own leaders. There were 209 such incidents in 1970, only 96 in 1969. Senator Mansfield expressed the opinion that fragging is "an outgrowth of this mistaken tragic conflict" which has caused a "disregard for life and limb." Because of the increase in these incidents, Mansfield said the Army has to take weapons away from soldiers after they leave combat areas. The Pentagon said this is normal practice, not a new rule. (BN554)

Potential Impact
The future of the military justice system is difficult to foresee. Many of its critics will not rest until it becomes identical in nature with the civilian system — or even, until it is removed from the military establishment and becomes part of the civilian system. Yet most of these critics have never lived under the military system; they have no personal experience of it; and they have no intention of living under the system even if it were to be made consistent with all their demands toward it. We are living more and more in a lawyer-ridden society, in which certain groups
25. Some critics of the military-justice system feel, not that it is too onerous, but that it has become too lax. The "fairness" of the system is questioned and charged with producing "reverse" civil rights. For example, it is said: (1) drug users are discharged with all rights and privileges; (2) participation in anti-war activities is unpunished; (3) the outright patronage of certain ethnic and "cultural" groups, who are allowed to operate on the fringes of the law, continues; (4) AR190-4 has been revised, so that custodial personnel are blocked from forcing convicted prisoners to have hair cuts. Rights are handed out free of charge to all except those who deserve them. We do not need new regulations, only enforcement with no exceptions because of culture, background, or habits. (BNII8)

26. The jurisdiction of the military-justice system has been diminished. A United States Court of Appeals decided to give retroactive effect to a 1969 Supreme Court ruling that substantially limited the right of the armed forces to hold court martials. The 1969 case held that the armed forces could legally try their members only for "service-connected" offenses. Other offenses must be left to civilian courts. Retroactive application of the ruling means that the Services must erase dishonorable or bad-conduct discharges given as a result of these convictions. The court said it could not "perceive any special needs of military discipline which justified encroaching on the benefits of civilian trial." (BS7)
27. An August 1971 article in Army Times said that problems faced by military justice include:

1. excessive administrative delay.

2. senior noncommissioned officer and junior officer dissatisfaction with aspects of military law.

3. failure of the Services to provide continuing education at all levels in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

4. need to provide "meaningful" hard labor for prisoners in post stockades.

5. recently publicized troubles with problem soldiers returned to military control.

Some possible revisions might be the establishment of a procedure something like the grand jury, and a less arbitrary system for selection of jurors. (BN50)

28. In spite of its possible shortcomings, some experts feel that military justice has many virtues. Melvin Belli has found military judges "much more intelligent" than the average jurist. The UCMJ was a spark to the revolution of the Warren Court in instituting reforms such as a ruling against self-incrimination and a right to counsel. F. Lee Bailey has also expressed admiration for the American military system of justice. (BN93)
PART III
Section 11

OLD AND NEW DIRECTIONS
OLD AND NEW DIRECTIONS

GENERAL

1. We have examined the data of prediction on very broad and partially abstract levels, such as philosophy, and on very particular and concrete subjects, such as technology of transportation. We have concentrated some of the data into the narrower focus of national orientations. We have considered some specific effects of Vietnam and other forces on the continuing military establishment.

2. We cite, in this final Section on Old and New Directions, as in the previous Section, a number of initiatives already underway or planned for the future by the military Services in relation to perceived current and future problems. The purpose of these citations is not to repeat back to the Navy a description of steps already taken by the Navy, but to cite a range of perspectives and insights reached by all the Services (and hence possibly suggest some new approaches to the other Services); to place military responses where they belong—in the forefront of responses occurring across the whole of American society; and to indicate possible gaps or extendable lines for further development in response to continuing ‘ends. This Section adds another dimension to this study.

3. No matter how far removed from the military may be one’s background, no objective observer can help being deeply impressed by two aspects of this account: the depth of concern for change demonstrated on every level of the military establishment, and the great variety of innovations willingly developed by the armed forces to respond vigorously in questioning old practices and introducing new approaches.
4. In this, the final major data Section of this report, we endeavor to unroll the carpet of projected change further into some corridors of the military future. Subsections included are General, Personnel Administration, Internal Communities, Training, and Redirections.

5. In the course of previous Sections, we have cited various criticism, comments, suggestions, recommendations and predictions relevant to the procedures of the armed forces. As indicated in various places, the military forces have already instituted a great number of changes. In this Section, additional initiatives are also cited, but by no means all that have been undertaken.

6. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt instituted what he called "people programs" soon after he became Chief of Naval Operations. After one year, he felt that the "people programs" provided positive influence and substantial gains in Navy recruiting, retention, and growth of career satisfaction.

A number of programs were emphasized as embodying two-way dialogue in the Navy. Some involved retention study groups, a special assistant for minority affairs, wives "ombudswoman" program, a number of other local councils and committees, and improved services, such as for dependent air charter, leave policies, and watch policies. (BN264)

7. The aim of the "people programs" was to:

"instill at all levels an attitude which clearly recognizes the dignity and worth of each individual and create an environment in which every officer and enlisted man will be treated with respect and accorded the trust, confidence, and recognition each human being wants and deserves." (BN264)

8. Service responsiveness is evident in many fields. For example, environmentalists are challenging the Army Corps of Engineers' water development projects, and the Corps is beginning to make accommodations, recommending against proposals on environmental grounds, seeking out the advice of environmental authorities, and trying to get more public participation in planning.
9. This is one aspect of direct confrontation between "preservers" and "builders," one of the most sharply defined conflict arising from the deeper issue of how long unbridled economic growth can be sustained in a world of finite resources. The Civil Works program of the Corps of Engineers represents about three-quarters of all the Federal money allocated every year for natural resources development. Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires all Federal agencies to submit an "environmental impact statement" on any proposal for legislation or other major action.

Critics of the engineers are increasingly using economic as well as environmental arguments against projects, because costs often exceed the Corps' initial estimates and also "intangible" benefits. (BN509)

10. Military initiatives now include exploring the credibility of internal Service-sponsored news programs. One such survey reported that "young enlisted men consider television the most accurate source of news, while older enlisted men prefer newspapers for accuracy and credibility."

Over 60% of men in Europe and 40% in South Korea did not watch TV news. 25% of the enlisted men and 12% of the officers in the United States did not watch TV news.

. The accuracy of Army-originated broadcast news is believed less by older soldiers.

. Enlisted men overseas are said to be more favorably disposed to Army broadcasts.

. About 60% described post or unit newspapers as good, but lacking enough news on lower ranks.

. Enlisted men (generally those under 25) spend more time with the radio, but received news from a post paper or a friend.

. Older enlisted men read newspapers more. (BN102)

11. The British have reported the results of numerous initiatives within their own military forces:
educational quality and quantity are rising
Army trades correspond more closely to civilian occupations
ex-Army people are increasingly sought by industry
crime rates have fallen
absence rates have declined

There are general trends toward greater self-discipline, improved training, and higher levels of responsibility for junior officers and NCO's. Higher pay scales and service salaries have fostered growing financial responsibility (as many as 85% of the men now take their pay as credit in their civilian bank accounts.) (BN7)

12. Admiral Zumwalt issued one of his famous Z-grams, focusing on four principal challenges for the Navy in 1972:
- The challenge to people
- The challenge to leadership
- The challenge to sociological change
- The challenge to national security

For people, his objectives included a more satisfying working environment, a better opportunity for family life, and meaningful careers.

For Navy leaders, his objectives included strong personal integrity, dedication, and understanding of the people they lead and the tasks they undertake.

Social objectives included elimination of drug abuse, elimination of racial discrimination, and improvement in the environment.

National security objectives were related to developments in other nations: high standards of material readiness; and economies and integration of men and mission. The Navy needs the LAMPS aircraft; surface-to-surface missiles systems; electronic warfare systems; air-to-surface missile defense; and sensors.

Pride and Professionalism: One's experiences each day should reinforce a sense of worth "as a valued member of a truly effective Navy; engender confidence and trust in those persons in positions of authority; and provide him with opportunity for proud accomplishment and professional contribution..." (BN254)
13. A Navy spokesman predicted Navy advantages in future budgets, due to a combination of factors: the Nixon Doctrine, winding down the Vietnam war, advances in Navy and Merchant Marine projects, the nature of Soviet challenges, and the personal leadership of Admiral Zumwalt. (BN248)

14. General Westmoreland, seeking to meet the challenge of a "finer" Army, said in February 1972 that the period of introspection and study is over; "now it is time for action." (BN142)

15. He cited the following areas for special attention:
   1. Officer performance
   2. Training and education of NCO's
   3. Establishing and maintaining a high order of self discipline
   4. Programs, projects, and policies of the New Volunteer Army
   5. Physical conditioning
   6. Food service
   7. Elimination of substandard personnel

   It is important to foster an attitude of challenge to prepare for the social changes of the next decades. (BN106)

16. One description of the regular Friday night retreat parade at the Marine barracks in Washington, described the impressive formation as an exercise in the expression of standard military formation, and is the Marine Corps way of saying that they have no intention of "going mud." (BP427)

17. Nevertheless, the new Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Cushman, immediately emphasized attention to certain problems. The minority recruit will continue to receive special attention. If the Navy accepts women in Naval ROTC, they will be welcome to serve in the Marine Corps.

   The Marines will reemphasize their amphibious role with the Navy. (BN251)

18. Another Marine Corps spokesman discussed what the Marine Corps is doing to meet the challenge of social change in the future:
1. Recruitment and enlistment are being toughened up, while the size of the Corps is dropping to 200,000.

2. Discipline is to remain tight, and the Corps is to remain an elite group.

3. The Marine mission is to return to the one laid out by the National Security Act of 1947: seizure and defense of land bases incidental to naval campaigns.

4. To keep themselves up-to-date, the Marine Corps is doing the following:

   A. Making assignments more meaningful
   B. Improving living conditions
   C. Using more straight-forward communication between men and officers
   D. Designing new uniforms. (BP219)

19. Unless the Army staff cuts back Army research plans a new Institute for the Individual Soldier, supposedly bringing together manpower research matters, will be formed with about a 100-man staff. Half would be military.

   Recently defending the idea before a not too friendly Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre (D., N.H.), Army research chief Lt. Gen. William C. Gribbe Jr. said: The Army has an understandable interest in the area. "We are intensively oriented toward the management of young people. The Army's business is a young people's business...And it seems to me that in our program we would be remiss if we didn't place a relatively high percentage of our total scientific effort on attempting to understand the man better, to respond to his needs in a more effective way, and to improve our effectiveness in his classification, selection, utilization, training and motivation." (BN55)

20. One statement said the aim of partnership in the United States Army is to combine the virtues of the traditional military with the freshness and hope of youth to keep the institutions focused on the future. (BN555)

21. One description of Project Volar (Volunteer Army) indicated certain steps the Army planned to make military life more appealing and to get ready for
the end of the draft in 1973: increased bonuses to combat troops, increased scholarships and allowances for ROTC, improved living conditions, hiring of civilians to do much of the soldier's dirty work (KP, etc.); emphasis on the soldier as an individual and increased concern in the Army for his welfare; increases in low enlisted-grade pay; purchase of TV commercial time.

One prediction leveled as criticism is that the Volunteer Army would be all black; the Army responds that "extensive studies" show the proportion of blacks will likely be 16 to 18% (now 11 to 12%). (BN397)

22. Lt. Gen. G. I. Forsythe, Chief of the Army's effort to raise an all-volunteer force says the administration's 1973 deadline is impossible to meet under current conditions. (BN429)

23. Later, the Army announced that 12 more posts would participate in Project Volar, and that some $75 million were being set aside. (BN24)

24. Two other major irritants, daily police call and sentry duty, have been sharply reduced in an effort to make military life more attractive to soldiers. For police duty, a few soldiers supervised by an NCO can do a better job than massed formations. Commanders were cautioned to stop assigning police chores as non-judicial punishment. Sentry duty will be cut by 1/3; soldiers will no longer be used to guard commercial activities on military installations. PX's, for example, will install electronic security devices as soon as possible.

Other changes: Restrictions on travel during off-duty hours were removed. Bed-checks were eliminated. The 5 day work-week was made general practice. (BN107)

25. No regulation was too minor to become suspect. For example, a ban against candidates touching wives during visiting periods was dropped at Artillery OCS at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma. The Commander said he doubted that the rule was widely enforced, but that it had no business being part of OCS policy, anyway. (BN160)
26. In February 1971, the Army undertook to use prime-time, paid-for T.V. advertisement, at the cost of $10.6 million. (BN8)

27. When the Navy released its 1971 advertising program, it appealed for free public-service space, saying that, unlike its Army brothers, it is already an all-volunteer force and did not have the money to run ships and pay for advertising, too. (BN294)

28. Other innovations announced by the Army: the end of reveille formations, serving of beer (3.2) with evening meals, liberalization of pass policies, and the promise of improved care for Army families. (BN454; BN195)

29. Secretary Laird made the following proposals to make military life more attractive and eliminate the need for the draft by mid-1973.

1. $3000 enlistment bonus for 3-year enlistees in infantry, artillery, and armor programs.

2. $68 million to improve Army and Marine barracks, by conversion into semi-private rooms, each with desk, chair, rug, and lamp.

3. Special-pay bonuses to reward superior performance and attract short-supply, skilled men, and to induce their re-enlistment.

4. Increase from $50 to $100 per month for ROTC subsistence

5. Reimbursement to recruiters for out-of-pocket expenditures.

(PN185)

30. Famed WW II G.I. cartoonist Bill Mauldin visited Fort Carson and commented that: "the most significant sights were ...Pfcs... operating out of the C.G.'s office; a low ranking e.m. is an advisor to the Division Commander, and another soldier has authority to stop armored convoys which are making too much smoke." Other changes which impressed him:

1. No barracks inspections

2. Face-to-face informal meetings between enlisted men and high-ranking officers
3. On-post coffee shops
4. Individualized, private living spaces and allowances to help decorate them
5. Enlisted men with special skills or interests placed in advisory positions
6. Credit cards and go-go girls at NCO and Service Clubs on post. (BP447)

31. Controversial black political figures have spoken to large groups on the post at Fort Carson without military escort and without incident. (BN75)

32. Not all appraisals are favorable. One observer charges that some of the changes (detailed elsewhere) that General Westmoreland and Admiral Zumwalt have made, are gimmicks to carry favor with an anti-military public and shill recruits with the false enticement that being a good soldier or sailor is really a snap. (BP181)

33. A number of critics object to VOLAR on the grounds that the relaxing of traditional standards will hurt discipline to the point of causing the Army to collapse. (BN31)

34. One basic combat-training-company commander insisted that what an incoming recruit needs is "to have his rear end kicked in each day" in order to make him a good soldier, not to have "irritants reduced," as the current command has been doing. (BN17)

35. A conference of Army Sergeants Major at Fort Benning expressed general support among high-ranking NCO's for the VOLAR program, but emphasized that top NCO's must remain hard-nosed and down-to-business; permissiveness at this level, the SGM's felt, could do more harm than good. (BN103)

36. In a Letter to the Editor, an Army captain detailed why he is proud to be a member of the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA). He reviewed his training and compared it to current training, making these points:
1. MVA is trying to give the soldier a sense of awareness of professionalism. It is an attempt to achieve two-way communication, whereby orders are clearly explained, and willing obedience substitutes for blind obedience.

2. Junior officers and NCO's hold the keys to success of the program.

3. Courses in race relations, rap sessions, and seminars are designed to improve communications, to get people to see themselves as others see them, in the hope of improving communication and understanding. (BN149)

37. Additional aspects discussed at Fort Carson: the "high-care factor"—commanders have been told to give a damn about their troops and see to it that their troops know it. Living conditions have been improved. These improvements can help solve morale problems and indirectly improve discipline, but to counter deeper societal problems, more substantial changes are required.

Responsibility for training is being returned to the company commander and shaped to the needs of the unit.

One activist sees tangible results from the "high-care factor" but insists that more fundamental changes in the treatment of enlisted men must be made. "You can put a man in a golden cage, but he is still in a cage."

One feature, Enlisted Men's Councils, has drawn particularly heavy criticism. Some suggest that if a soldier becomes accustomed to questioning practices in the garrison, he may balk at orders in combat. Many troops, however, feel that they are mature enough to distinguish between a garrison situation, when there may be leisure for discussion, and the battlefield, where instant obedience is required.

Practically all indicators of morale and discipline indicate improvement.

'Major General John C. Bennett: "What we are doing at Fort Carson is taking the best possible care of our soldiers and at the same time requiring them to meet the highest standards of discipline. They are inseparable." (BP130)

38. Colonel Cody, an Air Force analyst, holds that in the Air Force, as well, "leadership needs to be people-oriented and to foster professionalism."

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The young officer must be shown quickly that he "has joined an elite profession that is ever mindful of the needs of its people as well as the responsibility of its mission."

"An open door policy" is a passive concept of human relations, of communications which portrays a leader who probably listens to his men only when formally presented with a problem. Yet, all men are not accustomed to "going up" to authority to find guidance, but will turn to someone near. And the commander must be among those near if he is to be aware of their concerns.

Experience has shown that once the commander demonstrates his sincere concern for the welfare of his men, his subordinates will emulate him. (BM28)

39. The centralized concept of control will not be conducive to the new individualism arising in society.

Youth have a much less developed sense of identification with their families and communities than formerly; through sound leadership, they can be led into an identification with their units.

Youth's "peer group" orientation makes it substantially easier for them to accept the standards and norms of the group in which they find themselves.

They will embrace the military life if by our actions we can show them a service whose mission and professional ethics are based on mutual trust, faith and confidence, and group solidarity.

The group is the unit of action in the military; and by greater emphasis on group identification and loyalty, I believe we can attract and retain our share of young officers. (BM28)

40. One particular Army study group asked itself how various administrative procedures might be improved to contribute to the attainment of future-oriented objectives. Their recommendations were not necessarily accepted or endorsed by the Army, a few are included here only to provoke thought. For example, Question: "How can the integrity required in a professional Army be fostered?" Answer: Consider the quasi-administrative areas: statistical reporting, ticket-punching, and overcommitment.
Statistical Reporting

Continued emphasis must be placed on accurate and realistic statistical reporting to reduce the impact of generalizations that result from successive summari-zations...

Commanders, at all echelons, must be ingrained with the necessity for honest reporting, and, perhaps even more important, the acceptance of an honest report.

Realistic measures of performance for both units and individuals must be developed.

Ticket Punching

Publication of the specific requirements considered for promotion.

Standardize policies and criteria for the selection processes and order of merit listings used by career branches ... The criteria for the order of merit should be published and each individual should, upon request, be provided his ranking on the list.

Continuation and strict adherence to the command stabilization policy to ensure that these "tickets" are a true indication of an individual's ability to serve as a commander over a prolonged period, rather than just an entry on a record.

Adopt a system of subordinate and peer ratings to supplement the present efficiency rating system.

Overcommitment

Establishment of realistic priorities, at all levels of the Army, to ensure that those tasks undertaken are the most important and that the resources are available to accomplish them.

Manpower requirements for units should be based on the real world of an eight hour day, five day work week, rather than an unrealistic twelve hour day, seven day week. The Army should reduce the number of its units to ensure that these units have the personnel necessary to accomplish their missions.

The Army should institute a policy which encourages the use of impact statements by commanders at all levels in the chain of command. (BC56)
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

1. This report on future impacts should have provided a number of impressive insights by this stage, for practically anyone who has even modest interest in the course of military affairs. We shall have failed, however, if most readers are not persuaded of the special likelihood of numerous significant changes taking place in military personnel systems in the future. We cite here a kaleidoscope of changing perspectives and procedures in personnel administration; some items reinforce previous mention, some add supplementary material to fill in gaps and round out particular aspects.

2. Captain Charles Smith, Jr., skipper of the U.S.S. Detroit, has reflected on changes in the Navy. He notes that today it is a civilian and not a professional Navy, and a lot more psychology has to be used: "If a man really doesn't want to do something, you can't make him do it with a gun. And so you have to be careful in what you try to force people to do." He warns that there is a group whose leaders demand that people be malefactors as an entrance fee. These dissident elements have to be kept off balance. (BN598)

3. Some very ancient traditional military procedures are undergoing change. Air Force cadets are no longer required to attend cadet chapel services, but may attend any church service as a fulfillment of the chapel-attendance obligation. The Air Force believes that religion is important for leadership. Seniors have had a choice in whether to attend church or not at all. Critics of the Air Force want worship to be placed on a voluntary basis for all cadets. (BN535)

4. The Navy Times reported on initiatives taken concerning disabled personnel. The Navy and Marine Corps are adopting a more liberal policy for their disabled officers and enlisted people who want to remain on active duty. The Navy can retain a man who has lost a leg above the knee and has been fitted with a functional artificial leg, a man who

Potential Impact

We have elsewhere suggested that the drastic decline (unbroken since the Civil War) in the proportion of armed forces which actually faces an enemy in combat may vitiate the requirement that all persons entering an armed force have the same minimum physical and mental profiles as the minority who perform combat roles. In view of the probably intensive future competition for manpower,
who has lost an arm, or an eye, or who has other disabling injuries. The Marine Corps, however, has the option of not considering men for retention who have lost either arm, or a leg above the knee. The DOD policy is changing to be consistent with the Navy's.

The new policy applies to casualties of the Vietnam War and any future conflicts, and includes impairments that were the result of injuries received in the line of duty but outside a combat zone. (BN252)

5. According to Senator Stennis, manpower costs take up the following percentage shares of the military budget: defined narrowly as pay, allowances, and closely related items: 1964, 43.5%; 1972, 56.8%. If housing, recruiting, and similar items are included, "manpower" costs in 1972 approach 67% of the military budget. (BS12)

6. A subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee has accused the military of having excess rank. Statistics showed that there were more men at the higher rank of E-5 than at the E-4 rank immediately below it, and more E-4's than E-3's. This inflation of rank meant, among other things, that fewer men were classified for combat then in the past (1945, 24% combat; in 1967, 14% combat). Further, it was shown that the higher the rank, the less chance of being killed in combat (as of June 30, 1971 68% of Army dead in Vietnam were in grade E-4 and below). The Army defended increased rank, saying that modern weapons require more training and responsibility. (BN29)

7. The average grade of Service-men, as in the Civil Service, is rising. Since 1964, $1.3 billion has been added to the payroll, entirely irrespective of raises in pay per grade. Average pay has almost doubled in nine years, from $4264 to $8533; total allocation for pay and allowances

As automation tends to eliminate lower-IQ jobs, the average grade of those in Service will probably continue to rise.
alone has risen from $11.5 billion to $20.5 billion.

One of the reasons for these increases is that men in the lower grades are leaving in greater numbers. Another important factor is the growing sophistication of military equipment, requiring operators in higher grades. Interesting comparisons between World War II and the present highlight this point. In WW II, an E-2 jeep driver's pay would come to only 1.3 times the vehicle cost. During WW II an E-4 tank crew chief's pay was equivalent to 1/5 of the cost of the tank; now, he would be an E-6 but his pay would be only 1/27 of the cost of the tank. (BN68)

8. A widespread societal problem, which has its parallels in the military, is alcoholism. The Department of Defense has announced a wide program to treat its estimated 150,000 alcoholics. This was in response to a government report which found alcoholism to be the nation's greatest drug problem; causing at least 100,000 deaths a year; warping about 9 million lives; and costing in the neighborhood of $15 billion. That the military was not free from this blight was pointed out in 1971 by the General Accounting Office estimate that 5% (150,000) of the armed forces were known to be alcoholics.

Up until now, the DOD has used a punitive approach to combat alcoholism—denial of promotion, loss of security clearance, and expulsion from the Service. The new program ends the punitive approach. Alcoholism is now viewed as a "treatable disease." Further, there is a move to discourage events that glamorize or encourage excessive drinking, such as the "prop-blast" (when a new pilot receives his wings, he is expected to drink himself to oblivion), and the "two for one" policy at military bars. (BN413)

9. The Air Force is currently engaged in a one year, one base test of paying basic allowance for subsistence directly to all enlisted men. This experiment explores the idea of a straight salary to all military personnel and a discontinuation of all allowance and benefits. (BN236)

10. A move such as this, while still in an experimental state, does raise a number of issues which must be contended with:
Present law doesn't allow direct payment to all enlisted men. If everyone is paid the cash equivalent of allowances, the cost may be prohibitive.

Scaling down the number of men in the mess hall does not mean that overall mess hall costs can be scaled down by the same percent.

The system of allowances and benefits are interlocking and complicated. Some services offered cannot be priced on an individual basis.

Hardship area bases would still have to be kept open.

With everyone on straight salary, would the Service refuse to treat someone or fail to provide food if the Serviceman spent his food allotment elsewhere?

The Services have a huge investment in fixed assets. Congress would frown on a system whose rates of return on that investment was dependent on the Serviceman's decision to use the facilities or not. (BN236)

Recruiting

11. No recruiting efforts will become markedly viable until the image of the military is raised above its current estate. Most studies for the Volunteer Army, for example, show that money alone will not be enough of an inducement, and will not be the biggest factor.

12. A CDC study suggests the possibility of a one-year "tryout" period for new Servicemen. The potential recruit could be called an "aspirant." This type of program would have limited expenditures, and provide limited allowances to the trainee. It could test whether the individual wants the Service and if the Service wants the individual.

13. The Army experimented with a trial period for recruits in Georgia and South Carolina. It was a three-day, no-obligation period modeled after a similar British Army program. Out of 98 "aspirants," 66 flunked the mental and physical tests; 24 of the remaining 32 signed up. They were shown orientation films given tours and demonstrations, took tests, and underwent counseling. (BN272)
14. This same procedure was done as well at Fort Jackson. The recruits generally liked the whole idea, but the Army was not much impressed at the payoff. One quick change was to exclude Category IV's from future groups of "aspirants." (BN25)

15. Conscious of its post-Vietnam role, the Marine Corps has returned to peacetime recruiting; and hopes to rebuild the esprit and elitism it maintained before the Vietnam build-up. With an eye on peacetime functions, the Marine Corps will be less dependent on overseas basing; one division will be based on each coast, and one in the Pacific. The Corps feels that they can be ready anytime, and more available than other services. (BN197)

16. A survey of young male civilians, aged 16 - 21, showed some interesting impressions about the military Services. The Navy and the Air Force were voted the "best" overall Services. The attractiveness of travel was cited in either the ocean or flying media. The survey elicited the opinion that the Marine Corps offered the best chance to prove one's self as a man and sported the most attractive uniform. The Marine Corps also was checked most often as the Service with the highest traditions, prestige, and glamour; the best CO's; the most capable men; and the most respect in the public eye. The following were considered inducements to join the Service: travel, paid college education, assignment choice, skills training, pay, and enrollment in officer's training programs.

The following were considered deterrents to military service (the army was considered to involved in more of these than any other service): high risk of injury, extended time away from home, strict discipline, poor bachelor living conditions, low pay, and lack of career opportunities. (BN256)

17. An Army Times study of July, 1971, showed that the Navy's first term re-enlistment rate has doubled while the others showed little change. For fiscal year 1970-71 the figures as as follows: a) Navy: 11.6% to 22.6%; b) Army: 16.0% to 17.1%; 2) Air Force: 10.5% to 13.5%; d) Marine Corps: 6.2% to 5.8%. (BN96)
18. The Navy has now passed the Air Force in re-enlistment rates for career Regulars. A major unique difference related to the dramatic reversals for the Navy, compared to the other services, is a modernized personnel policy. The comparative figures for all the services are given below:

3) Air Force: pre-Vietnam-30%; 1968-17.6%; 1970-10.5%.

19. The Pentagon and the Army are at odds over results on the Army's $13.6 million spring 1971 advertising drive. At the time this article was written, the campaign had produced only 4,100 new recruits at an average cost of $2,585 a man. The Pentagon was not satisfied with the results of the campaign and had rejected, at least for the time being, the Army's proposal to spend an additional $3.1 million in radio and TV ads for August, 1971. Pentagon sources said more evaluation on the initial program was needed to justify the additional funds. (BN412)

20. An Army Combat Developments Command (CDC) study, "Personnel Offensive", looked at the problem of recruiting. The study group asked, and provided suggested answers, to the question: "How can the Army attract the quality of personnel necessary to build and maintain a professional and modern volunteer Army?"

- Promote better quality and dedication in those selected for and associated with recruiting duty.
- Branches must include recruiting duty as a priority assignment (Possibly even a career branch for recruiting officers.)
- No maximum limit on tour of successful recruiters—try to assign individuals who desire long stabilization.
- Allow only the recruiting station to which the individual volunteers to conduct interviews with that individual.
- Do not allow volunteers for recruiting from enlisted persons in unsatisfactory assignments.
. De-emphasize measurement standards in efficiency reports for recruiting officers and NCO's.

. Recruit for, and assign for, specific jobs, to insure suitability, job satisfaction, and better performance.

. Broaden scope of comprehension of entrance exams and the scope of military options available for recruiters to offer. (BG56)

21. Institution building for the professional officer corps will in the future require extensive lateral entry if recruitment is to remain representative and vigorous. Limited tours may be crucial for technical assignments and specialists in areas and language work. (BM81)

22. A poll done in 1970 indicates that ROTC may still be a viable source of manpower. Two-thirds of the college students polled supported ROTC programs as long as they were kept voluntary. (BP398)

23. In the Military's new pay scale, there is a sharp weakening of the traditional principles of pay increases based on length of service and an effort to develop rewards on the basis of merit. The concept of proficiency pay for enlisted men, originally intended to retain "hard skill" electronics personnel, has been gradually extended to include almost all military occupations. It is doubtful whether the military profession, as a profession, can solve its personnel problems on the basis of incentive pay scales, important as this may be. In the long run the rewards in civilian industry are likely to be more attractive for the most highly skilled and most proficient. The attraction of the military service for the professional involves such factors as style of life, social status, sense of mission, and the importance of military honor. However, a negative image of the military establishment in the American social structure stands as a powerful barrier to the recruitment of personnel. In a society in which individualism and personal gain are paramount virtues, it is understandable that some elements in the civilian population view the military career as an effort to "sell out" cheaply for economic security, despite low pay and limited prestige. In this view, the free enterprise system is real and hard, so that the persons who are unable to withstand the rigors of competition seek escape into the military. Enlisted men especially are viewed as placing individual security ahead of competitive achievement. (BB164)
24. The CDC study mentioned above suggested possible avenues for exploration to increase incentives to the youth of the 1970's. (None of these suggestions was necessarily approved by the Army as program objectives):

**Pay**

1. The first step of the volunteer-incentive program must be added pay which approaches civilian standards. 2. Pay should be related to performance and skill. Further study should be undertaken to determine new-pay approaches that would (in part or wholly) shift the pay thrust away from longevity and rank. 3. Study and test the feasibility of "negative payment," decreasing pay because of sub-standard performance of duty, being late for work, or unexplained absences.

**Education**

The Army should: (1) offer entrants the opportunity to complete two or more years of college or technical training while serving a "first tour." (2) offer a post-service discharge guarantee of either a job or transition training.

**Work Week**

The Army work week should be comparable to that in civilian life. To accomplish this objective, firm DA policy guidance and continued senior command emphasis is required.

**Fringe Benefits**

1. Annual leave policy should be changed to allow unlimited accrual. Further, week ends should not be counted as leave; 2. Reimburse military personnel for any kind of Service-related moving and travel expenses at the same rates that are paid to civilians; 3. Retirement benefits should be given for graduated career lengths such as 10, 15, or 20 year periods. (BG56)

**Rotation**

25. The military is a huge employer of manpower; the Army alone, with a million men and women, is the nation's biggest employer. (BN437) Heavy turnover necessitates an expensive training establishment. If it is desired to retain the majority for a long time, there will be resultant heavy manpower and retirement costs. (BN272)
26. It may be necessary to eliminate the world-wide personnel system which periodically distributes, rotates and redistricts military personnel. The Navy could strengthen and make realistic the notion of a home base; each officer would have a base affiliation with an operational, planning, logistical and educational unit that would represent his primary affiliation. This would make possible a higher degree of cohesion and solidarity, reduce family disruption, and increase career satisfaction. (BM81)

27. The rotation system was the subject of an editorial in the Army Times, which stated that the rotation system has beneficial points, but also tends to keep people "re-inventing the wheel." Every year 1/4 to 1/3 of the staffers are replaced so that in 3 to 4 years faces have changed, and proposals are made again and again. It has been estimated that if a given bit of information will cost no more than a certain amount, it will be cheaper to repeat the experiment than to research the scientific literature to see if it has been done.

The editorial recommends a central repository to keep track of recommendations of advisory councils, master's theses produced by military graduate students, papers developed in senior schools, and ideas included in service literature. (BN117)

Evaluation

28. Anthony J. Daniels, research officer with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in Washington, found that despite statements to the contrary, superiors are often insensitive toward subordinates and tend to regard innovation with concern.

Manpower studies and a VOLAR appraisal show how the efficiency reporting system rewards conformity at the expense of initiative, innovation and empathy with subordinates — qualities which

Potential Impact

Many studies of the subject have shown agreement that peer ratings are the most accurate evaluations, especially as predictors of future performance. In general, however, members of systems are apprehensive about peer ratings. Why these reactions occur should be the subject of future study. But if peer ratings are the most reliable, it seems self-defeating to any system that fails to use them. In almost every major approaching social trend, there are elements which will require more reliable tools for assessing performance, especially in relation to others. Some old Gordian knots will have to be cut, such as the situation in which one peer is selected...
are valuable military assets. In the current system no provisions are made for feedback from rated officers concerning the leadership characteristics of rating officers. Rated officers may not make allegations about rating officers.

A three-tier arrangement is suggested: Ratings by supervisors; ratings of supervisors; ratings by peers.

A new Officer Efficiency Report was tested in the summer of 1971, but the new format does not appear to present any large change. The article suggests that a workable replacement is needed.

A Harvard psychologist, David McClelland, has cited an interesting "research need": A way must be developed of assessing competence as opposed to assessing intelligence, a way of measuring the ability to behave intelligently in life situations. In this connection, J.B. Rhyne of Durham, North Carolina, has said that "man doesn't know whether he can be a self-controlled normal being if he wants to be." (BS33)

**Rewarding and Punishing**

29. Included among the numerous questions explored by the CDC "Personnel Offensive" study, was the following: "What actions can the Army take to make awards and decoration more meaningful?" The following actions were suggested:

- Simplify the present system...
- Commanders, personally, should take action...The use of the committee approach except for the highest valor awards, should be discouraged.
- Use command emphasis to enforce Department of the Army guidelines and regulations, and specifically limit local command interpretation.
- Prohibit the indiscriminate dispensing of awards and decorations by roster approach.
- Use command emphasis to discourage the comparison of numbers of awards and decorations issued as a statistical tool in measuring unit or commander effectiveness.
- Study the feasibility of adopting new incentives to reward performance for special assignment and performs well in it, thereafter possessing a built-in advantage over peers who did not have the opportunity; yet one or more of them might have performed better than he.
or valor in the form of cash bonuses, accelerated retirement service credit, and special administrative privileges. (BG56)

30. Another useful question explored was: "How can the Army improve the ability of commanders to maintain discipline, law, and order?"

- The current formalized Article 15, which requires a formal written record, should be changed to permit informal record keeping (not subject to inspection) at the company level.
- Study the feasibility of separating the Uniform Code of Military Justice into:
  - Criminal cases such as murder, rape, or robbery to be referred to civilian courts for trial.
  - Administrative or disciplinary cases such as failure to repair, late for work, AWOL, ineffectiveness, or insubordination to be retained by the military court.
- Emergency or war time stand-by procedures to be used when appropriate.
- If the above suggestion is not accepted, allow the accused the opportunity for trial by civilian court in criminal cases.
- Grant battalion commanders the authority to confine up to 30 days with resorting to a formal court-martial process.
- Unit personnel should receive additional training in the legal area; for example, there is an identified need for a legal clerks school.
- From an administrative standpoint, there should be two types of discharges: an honorable discharge, and a punitive discharge.
- Do not adopt a separate courts-martial command to dispose of a commander's problem soldiers.
- Publicity on the fairness of military justice should receive appropriate attention throughout a command.
- Expand the military law and justice course coverage in service schools.
- Use a probation system in conjunction with medical and rehabilitation services.
. Reduce the time lag between offense and trial.
. Establish confinement policies and facilities for women.
. Unit commanders should have command authority to institute extra duty and limited restrictions for minor offenses without paperwork.
. Encourage use of correction custody. (BG56)

Retirement
31. DOD planners have warned that if the military retirement system is not revised, its cost to the government could grow within 16 years to about 50% of all active-duty and Reserve basic pay. The cost could reach the 50% mark within 12 years, if the Administration-sponsored measure is enacted to provide a lifetime recomputation of retired pay.

Disbursements to present retired military people are about 25% of the active-duty and Reserve basic pay costs which currently run about $14.7 billion. There are some 840,000 retirees drawing about $3.7 billion. Assuming no changes in pay, the number of retirees by fiscal year 1988 should increase to 1,456,000, while the active force may be expected to remain about 2.5 million. Annual disbursements to retirees would be $7 billion. Pay to active and reserves would be $13.7 billion.

The effect of one-time recomputation would be to bring the retired pay cost to about $7 billion annual cost figure by 1984. At that time there would be about 1,343,000 retirees.

Normal increases are assumed as an annual 3.5% active pay hike and an annual average of 2% boosts for retirees. Considering normal pay increases as likely, retired pay costs will rise rapidly in the years immediately ahead and reach $7.7 billion within 10 years, when it will be almost 40% of the active and reserve budget. (BN13)

32. In 1940, there were 6500 retired officers. By 1970, the number had increased to 120,000. Retirement pay went from $28 million in 1940 to $1,075 billion per year in 1970. By the year 2000 it is estimated that the Army alone will be paying $6-7 billion in retirement pay, while all the Services combined will be paying out an estimated $18-25 billion annually.

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Civilians working for the Department of Defense are permitted to serve until age 70. However, with rare exceptions, military personnel are forced to retire. One critic proposes the following:

1. Make retirement mandatory at age 65—the Social Security norm—regardless of grade.

2. Abolish the 20-year retirement, an "unconscionable raid on the Treasury." (BP82)

Management and Administration

33. Janowitz summarizes the likely future posture:

In the near future, the United States military posture will be conditioned, and limited, by a changing manpower system. The professional military is likely to emerge as (a) a smaller establishment; (b) recruited more and more on an all-volunteer basis; (c) organized predominantly on a standby basis, rather than in older traditions as cadre for mobilization. (BM81)

34. Moskos, in American Enlisted Men, addresses himself to the question: how many men in uniform actually serve in combat? It is very difficult to estimate due to the unavailability of casualties by unit designation; the conflicting definitions of what constitutes "combat"; and the rapid turnover of men.

Press reports in 1967 said that the proportion of American soldiers in direct engagement with the enemy consisted of 14% in the first echelon; and about the same percentage in the next echelon: close-combat-support units. Therefore, "about 70% of United States servicemen on the ground in Vietnam cannot be considered combat soldiers except by the loosest of definitions." Of the entire 3.4 million men in the United States Armed Forces, only about 2% directly experience combat. (BB246)

35 The Christian Science Monitor said in the summer of 1971: unless the Army revamps itself, the draft will be gone, and the Army will be substantially smaller. It will be top-heavy in rank, low in capability. Too many enlisted men will be of the sort who sign up because they need bed and board temporarily.
If crisis develops, the Army will not be ready. In view of these possibilities, the following need to be considered:

1. Revamp officer-management procedures; increase specialization;
2. Review the Army-officer education system;
3. Formal training is being decentralized; more decisions are left to people in the field.

Still needed is a method to "buy people out" at the 12-13 year point, when it is clear the Army and they might benefit if they were to leave. Some call for the abolition of separate groups of Reserve and Regular officers, to improve incentive. The philosophy behind such demands is to get better commanders, improve overall professional climate, and allow more officers to specialize in areas that interest them. (BN199)

36. Colonel Cody of the Air Force adds to his insights quoted earlier:

A young officer should receive responsibility, and an opportunity to prove what he can do. Higher education almost invariably fosters higher aspirations. It is wise for the commander to recall that American military men have always asked for the reasons behind orders.

One of the most serious challenges of successfully leading young officers will be in structuring their work environment in a manner that allows the individual to achieve his personal goals and satisfy his needs, while simultaneously assisting the military unit to achieve its objective.

Behavioral scientists have helped by identifying the motivators of job satisfaction: the work itself, an opportunity for achievement, recognition of achievement, responsibility, advancement, and growth.

Mistakes will be made, but leadership is a function of experience; "just don't make the same mistake twice." (BM28)

37. Some insightful comments and suggestions on the evolution of the officer-enlisted man relationship are contained in Charles Moskos' The American Enlisted Man; for example, his perspective on the context of enlisted life as an anachronism in American society, as being labor-intensive in a post-industrial
society, in which average educational levels are rising. (BB246)

38. A research paper written by an Air Force colonel at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, dealt with the subject of command. The gist of his argument is that the military (the Air Force, in particular) must abandon managing its commands through the application of fear and other authoritarian interrelationships. The Air Force must adopt the latest research findings of the behavioral sciences, in order to encourage initiative, intelligence, and ability in management in order to attract and retain Air Force personnel. (BG6)

39. An Army Times article suggested granting the same freedom of movement during off-duty hours for enlisted men as enjoyed by officers. (BN4)

40. An Army Times editorial, speculating on imaginative approaches, threw on the table the provocative suggestion that the government of posts and bases be implemented by dividing the post into three areas—work, living, and service. The work and service areas would be run by military commanders, but the living areas might be run under a system of subordinate councils, much like a neighborhood. (BN127)

41. Charles Moskos maintains that military service has certain traits independent of its war-related qualities. For example, it has a unique social composition, and it provides an avenue for career mobility.

   Moskos uses income-distribution as a criterion designating class in American society. The enlisted ranks are always grossly over-represented with working-class youth and somewhat over-represented with lower-middle-class youth. The upper middle-class (especially college graduates from elite universities) indicate a marked aversion to serving as low-ranking soldiers, while the authoritarian features of the military are indicated, it is the egalitarian aspect that also repels them. The military is one of the few areas where middle-class youth must compete on a relatively equal basis with members of the lower-classes. The military is the only arena in which privileged youth may be subordinate to individuals from lower socio-economic levels. The resentment of the military
exhibited by college-educated soldiers is probably based more on personal pique than on hostility to the military stratification system. The enforced class leveling in the military has no counterpart in any other existing institution in American society. Unlike civilian education, and commercial or industrial organizations, equal acceptance and involvement are required in the military before or during formal training procedures; and results in the military's effectiveness. (BP370)

42. There are two important actions which officers and commanders should take. First they should begin motivating subordinates by seeing that the jobs under their command are rich in motivational factors. A job assignment should offer possibilities for achievement, recognition, advancement, growth, and responsibility, as well as be challenging and interesting. Second, we need to improve those factors that provide the principal sources of job dissatisfaction: salary, organizational policy and administration, supervision, working conditions, status, and security. (BP381)

43. Captain Fortson, USN, sees three facts surfacing in the literature pertaining to leadership:

1. That man is a part of every weapon—the most vital part—which determines whether the weapon shall be effective or not, and that it is useless to develop all but this essential part.

2. In training the naval officer and petty officer, little time has been spent on the most important requisite of efficiency, handling and controlling of men.

3. The absence of effective communication in general, and more specifically, the lack of communication between the low-ranking petty officer and the non-rated man which impairs discipline and personnel retention.

Fortson suggests that the handling of men can be learned from the following sources: observing the methods of "successful" leaders; one's own experiences; by an analysis of emotions created in one's self by various treatments of superiors; by study of the psychology of mobs; reading the literature; from women. (BM52)
44. Janowitz suggests that the military needs to explore options for some of its internal institutions and procedures. New approaches are needed in recruitment, careers, education, and deployments. He suggests a two-step government career, in which the first step would be military, and the second step would involve entry into Federal, state, or local civil service. Such a system would permit exit of most officers, for example, after 12 years, and leave room for extensive continuous input of younger military personnel.

The military must deal with the excessive number of general flag officers in all three services; perhaps 50-60% should be retired.

The military should end the worldwide rotation system, as excessive, expensive, and disruptive.

"Unemployment" within the military should be ended, as producing negative effects, especially upon young officers. (BM83)

45. Janowitz continues: There should be more emphasis on OCS as the source of officers, though it may be less representative of total American society, inasmuch as it will tend to be oversupplied with volunteers from the West, Southwest, rural areas, and small towns.

ROTC should be organized on a centralized basis in the ten major metropolitan areas, open to any college student in the area.

The three-step military school system should be contracted to a two-step system (the National War College duplicates the others). For other special subjects and developments, use short courses.

Academy programs should include one year at civilian universities (option: one year at a foreign university).

Establish a Department of Defense Commission to revise the essentials of discipline. An all-volunteer force must question openly and candidly the traditional military forms.

Military justice procedures should be transformed to conform more closely to those of civilian practice. (BM83; BS11)
46. The CDC study "Personnel Offensive" addressed itself to the question: "How can the Army improve professionalism of the non-commissioned officer corps?"

Among its suggestions were these:

. Establish a school system for NCO's comparable with that already established for officers. The system should provide for a basic course, an advanced course, and a senior course.

. Expanded civilian education should be provided for selected NCO's to insure continued academic and professional development.

. A formal and recognized apprentice training program should be introduced for senior NCO's, to facilitate on-the-job training. This is particularly applicable for first sergeants.

. Reevaluate the role of senior NCO's, specifically that of the command sergeant major, to provide more meaningful assignments which will capitalize on this valuable manpower resource.

. Career counseling must be provided the junior, as well as the senior NCO, to inform him of the opportunities available to him.

. Provide for a release program for NCO's who no longer desire to remain in the service. These individuals should be authorized to resign, by the same criteria as officers, without fulfilling a specific enlistment period.

. Commanders must be emphatically reminded that the NCO is an important link in the chain of command. He must be used as a leader of men and not a figure head or bystander. (BG56)

47. The CDC study also examined the question: "How should company commanders be trained to better prepare them to lead men in the 1970's?"

. All Army Promotion List officers should serve in an enlisted status for a specified period (6 months or longer) before being commissioned.

. All officer basic courses should devote a much greater amount of time to unit administrative procedures and techniques, personnel management policies and techniques, counseling, personal problem solving, basic human differences, and group dynamics.

. Develop a handbook for company commanders to present, in easy-to-understand form, the most likely problems which he may encounter and actions he should take to assist in solving soldiers' problems.

. All newly-commissioned lieutenants, on their initial permanent assignment, should be assigned, for at least one year, to a company-sized organization as a platoon leader or equivalent.
No officer should command a company without prior service in a company as a lieutenant.

Command of companies should not be limited to individuals in the grade of captain or below.

Company commanders must be stabilized so that they can know their men, become proficient through extended experience, and be permitted to solve their own problems and make their own mistakes.

Staff colleges and the war college should have courses of instruction in the current problems facing the young company commander and how the battalion or brigade commander can assist the company commander in solving these problems. (BG56)

48. A study group has been created at the Army's Combat Development Command. This group has been examining the dynamics of human social behavior and its relationship to Army organizations and missions. A key question which has emerged is this: How can the Army, which must remain essentially oriented to the harsh environment of the battlefield, identify and plan for the social and behavioral factors which determine the essential noncombat relationship between itself as an organization and the soldier as an individual member of society? (BP383)

49. In an era where resources of all types are becoming more scarce and when competition for competent motivated manpower grows more fierce, the Army must plan better for its human resources.

CDC has been investigating ways in which environmental behavioral influence (for example, psychological and sociological factors) could be introduced into the combat development process. Nearly all Army programs, geared for the present or the future, seemed to assume that, although the individual soldier would have to operate with changing technology, function in different organizational frameworks, and exist in different parts of the world, he himself is an unchanging element. This assumption does not conform to the growing body of knowledge in the social and behavioral sciences which identified man as an extremely dynamic, complex being. (BP383)
A new general frame of reference, a "whole-man concept," was established which called for consideration of human-personality factors (motives, needs, goals, values, etc.), in addition to the heretofore considered human-engineering factors (physiological tolerance, stress, reaction, perception, etc.). (BP383)

Leadership principles are taught essentially the same as they have been for decades, although at the USMA there has been an integration of political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and education. The only major innovation in course content appears to be an emphasis on group goal attainment.

The United States Army War College did a study on leadership. It was noted that great efforts were made between World War I and World War II to identify "traits of leadership." Behavioral science has about abandoned the "trait" approach, especially in formal organizations. Research of 40 years failed to uncover any set of unique leadership traits or qualities (including those on OER) that are invariant. Some have strong positive effects in one situation, but strong negative results in other situations. Behavior "depends on the situation." (BG22)

The study speculated on the character of the 1990 environment. It predicted American affluence at a level high enough to end hunger, homelessness, and insecurity, and the end of the traditional need to devote the major portion of personnel and organizational efforts to overcome these conditions. Interaction between wide distribution of technology, especially in the communications field, and society would lead to a broadened perception and awareness of the world because of increased information. People will be better able to make decisions to govern their lives. (BP383)

An organization expects job proficiency and disciplined response from the individual. The individual expects sufficient pay, worthwhile work, and respect for his dignity as an individual. The Army leadership study sees this relationship in terms of an "informal contract" (this appears in Aristotle as "Reciprocity"). This "contract" has some terms stated and some implied on both sides; for example, both the individual and the organization are sensitive to "fairness." A soldier sees as
"unfair" a move to eliminate exchanges and commissaries; organization sees as "unfair" a soldier's failure to keep physically fit. Neither of these issues are written in any "contract" (BG62)

54. There is usually a great volume of organizational expression on one side of the contract; but on the other, it is difficult for the individual to communicate upward against the tide of power and authority. The critical role takes place at the interface; the role of the leader. Both sides must see his performance as fair. (BG62)

55. How can the Army improve policies and procedures to strengthen the key role played by commanders in the function of personnel management?

- Study the feasibility of the delegation of authority for all administrative eliminations and separations to commanders with special court-martial authority.
- Eliminate unnecessary red tape through direct processing of personnel actions from initial to final approving authority.
- Revise certain enlisted promotion procedures:
  - Authorize commanders at all levels to promote up to and including grade E-4 without regard to quota, vacancy, or time in grade.
  - Authorize commanders at posts, camps, and stations to request promotion allocations through grade E-6 for special merit cases.
- Sensitize superiors at all command levels to the need for giving the soldier the feeling of personalization.
- Place more emphasis on strict adherence to the chain of command and eliminate "rap" sessions that undermine the intermediate commanders and NCO's by-passed in the process.
- Establish an administrative position, either NCO or WO grade, at company level to provide the company commander with technical proficiency in the personnel and administrative fields. (BG56)

56. How can the Army improve classification and assignment procedures to
insure continued success in getting the right man in right job?

- Review, evaluate, and revise, where necessary, the Army screening tests and measurements program to effectively evaluate the whole man, to include his personality, psychological aptitude, vocational interests, and leadership potential.

- Professional interviewing techniques with better qualified interviewers must be used in the initial classification process.

- Deemphasize the rapid processing of new recruits and emphasize more efficient and effective selection and classification.

- Establish additional test procedures and prerequisites for specialty MOS to allow for expanded lateral entry.

- Decrease the emphasis or requirements for high quality personnel in jobs requiring only minimum talents.

57. How can the Army reduce personnel turbulence?

- Establish a two-year PCS restriction for other than short-tour areas. This step may be drastic but initially this is necessary.

- Reevaluate the merits and shortcomings of homesteading.

- Eliminate or drastically reduce unaccompanied tours overseas.

- Utilize the unit-move concept whenever feasible.

- Expand command tour policy to include officers and NCO's down to and including platoon levels.

- Liberalize and expand the policy for tour stabilization, lengthening the period of stabilization wherever possible.

- Expand the present enlistment options for stabilized tours.

- Require all branches to determine if normal tour lengths can be expanded. (BG56)

58. What changes are necessary in entrance standards to achieve better utilization of personnel?

As noted elsewhere, many converging trends indicate that in the future the physical profiles required for
. Review existing mental and physical standards in light of realistic actual requirements. Different standards may be applied to certain jobs in different environments.

. Deny, categorically, entrance to hard drug users. Use urine analysis at the outset.

. Standardize entrance requirements for both sexes. (BG56)

59. What measures can be taken to decrease mal-utilization of personnel?

. Use the existing surplus reporting system as it was intended.

. Establish strict policies and procedures to insure that replacements are assigned to the unit for which requisitioned without siphoning off of personnel at each succeeding layer of command. (RG56)

60. How can the Army interest more quality personnel to train for combat arms?

. Change the existing negative approach toward retention in the combat arms to a positive one. The revised approach would have the man ask to get out rather than the Army ask him to stay.

. Monetary rewards or added incentives for the combat arms entrant are a necessity. In conjunction with an improved base pay and allowance scale, all combat arms personnel should receive a special combat arms pay of $100.00 per month while actually serving in the Combat Arms (Infantry-Armor-Artillery).

. Enlistment in the U. S. Army Combat Arms should be without a specified enlistment period, but with a commitment to serve a minimum of one year.

. A Combat Arms College should be established (the C&GSC for NCO's) and attended by the selected combat arms NCO's when they attain the grade of E-6 or E-7.

. The Army must enhance assignments of career combat arms soldiers, particularly in a peacetime environment.
In order for the Army to exercise control in attaining the desirable and most effective age group of personnel serving in combat arms, credit combat arms soldiers with increased service credit for purposes of longevity and to qualify for retirements.

A "total approach" to the problem is clearly needed and not just one or two additional isolated incentives. (BG56)

61. How can the Army facilitate elimination of undesirable personnel?

- Institute a one-year trial enlistment option to be terminated at the discretion of either party.
- Simplify procedures designated to discourage reenlistment of unqualified, nonproductive personnel.
- Decrease the emphasis on the statistical significance of achieving reenlistment quotas.
- Delegate authority for bar to reenlistment to:
  - Commanders with special court-martial jurisdiction where the bar involves individuals with less than 18 years service.
  - Commanders with general court-martial jurisdiction where the bar involves individuals with over 18 years service.
- Incorporate all administrative discharges into the category of honorable, and treat all others as punitive.
- Establish a more flexible contractual obligation to allow for freer entry to and exit from the service.
- Adoption of an indefinite career status for enlisted personnel.

(BG56)
INTERNAL COMMUNITIES

The Navy and Marines can be approached with a number of perspectives related to internal communities, e.g., old and young, officer and enlisted, aviators and submariners, the Fleet and the Shore Establishment, Regulars and Reserves, and others. Here, we confine our coverage to five internal communities: Officers, Enlisted Personnel, Women and Dependents.

OFFICERS

Today's precommissioning students are different from those of five to ten years ago. They are not as willing to accept dogma. They want reasonable answers for performing in prescribed ways. They inquire about their rights to participate in strikes, demonstrations, political campaigns, etc. Given reasonable answers, they accept necessary circumscriptions; what they resent is the response which basically tells them because it just isn't done that way. Those students no longer accept the moral imperatives in military training situations. They think for themselves and should be better officers for it. Given a reason for a principle, they will support it. (BP356)

Today's officer training programs use a combination of two approaches to discipline, but with each view applied to a different area. The contemporary view (a psychological approach, stressing permissiveness and flexibility) prevails in academic programs, while the traditional view prevails in the out of class military environment (the traditional view being rigid and stressing immediate and unquestioning compliance). The two approaches are contradictory, and today's sophisticated students find the traditional approach largely meaningless and unacceptable. If we are to improve training, we would best abandon the rigid, ritualistic approach that dominates officer training and show the students in training what we expect of them after training. (BP356)

Colone Cody, USAF, maintains that young officers must be instructed with the importance of the service aspect of the term "military service." The military service serves a social need; it is charged with society's protection and is directly responsible for the welfare and safety of the nation. Unlimited service and sacrifice is needed.
This sense of personal responsibility, duty, and commitment to society is tied to the fact that military men manage and employ a substantial amount of the national wealth, manpower, and economic production. (BM28)

5. It has been suggested that academy undergraduates and newly commissioned graduate officers should be regularly exposed to interview surveys concerning their perceptions, their expectations, and intentions about the conditions of service which they expect to encounter.

The attrition level among academy graduates suggests that they have unrealistic expectations. To alleviate this condition, it has been recommended that cadets be provided with more significant samples of reality. (BM133)

6. A graduate of the Air Force Academy, discharged on his request by order of a Federal judge over the objections of the Air Force, is being billed for the cost of his Academy education, since he did not carry out the post-graduate period of service to which he had agreed before entrance. (BN534)

7. The House Armed Services Committee is planning to examine the use of both Regular and Reserve officers on active duty. The subject came up when the Air Force went to Congress to get an extension or a waiver which allows them more officers in certain grades than the law allows. If the waiver is not granted, the Air Force may have to demote a large number of majors, Lieutenant-Colonels, and Colonels.

Usually in such a situation, Reserve officers are the ones who are dropped. Congress wants to know why Reserve duty officers had to go. Why not drop selected individuals according to their quality? (BN246)

8. The Air Force has done many studies on career indications. One study examined officers entering the service, from a period just prior to commissioning through three years of active duty. The report showed that based on expressed career intent, the most favorable sources for retention were found to be the OCS and the Airman Education and Commissioning - Officer Training School Program (OTS-AECP). The yearly responses indicate a decline in career intent, at least
through the first few years of military service.

The most important factors were indicated to be working under competent supervisors, and having a sense of accomplishment and advancement. The least important factors were travel, early retirement, and having a definite work schedule. (BG36)

9. An analysis of another opinion questionnaire administered to OTS students, to obtain information about the attitudes and career intentions of the graduates, yielded the following results: About 35% of the students planned to make a career of the Air Force, and 54% planned to apply for a regular commission when they became eligible. The chief reasons for applying for OTS were the prestige and status of being an Air Force officer and the opportunities for travel and more formal education. (BG36)

10. Based on career-intent responses, results from a study designed to determine the predictability of an Air Force officer's career decision show that OCS graduates were the most promising source for retention in the Air Force, with 83% stating they definitely intended to make a career of the Air Force. This is to be expected, however, since these subjects had prior service and would probably not have entered OCS without intending to make a career of the service. The Academies were the next most promising sources. The majority of the ROTC and OTS subjects indicated they were undecided. (BG27)

11. The results from the Air Force study on the predictability of career decisions show that career-minded officers considered the following most important in a job: have adequate job security; do a great deal of traveling; be in a competitive situation; become proficient in a specialized type of work; achieve leadership; have opportunity to fly or continue flying. In contrast, the non-career officers felt it was most important to have a say in what happens to you; obtain a good salary; settle down in a certain area; and spend a lot of time with their families. The careerists presented an optimistic attitude regarding the ability to achieve their desires in the Air Force. The non-career subjects indicated little possibility of meeting their job hopes in the service. (BG27)
12. A socio-economic pattern emerged from the study distinguishing between the career and non-career subjects prior to or at time of commissioning. More of the non-career subjects have apparently had a stable home life; they are single; desire to settle down and live in the same area as their family; attended private schools; joined a fraternity; had a specialized area of study; and were in the upper third of their class. The career subjects are more likely to be married; represent a somewhat lower economic background; a more transient, unsettled home life. More of them began working early (junior high); attended a state university; studied in unspecialized areas; and were in the middle third of their class. Their parents and wives are likely to have a positive attitude toward a service career. (BG27)

13. The combined results of a questionnaire study and follow up done on Air Force OTS Graduates yielded pertinent results pertaining to officer attitudes. The Importance-Possibility Scale was found to provide useful information about the attitudes of the officers being studied. Experiencing a sense of accomplishment was considered the most important attribute. Early retirement, frequent travel, proficiency in a specialized area, job security, and changing duties were rated as most likely to be obtained while in the Air Force. For the 22 job attributes there was a negative relationship between what is considered important and what is considered possible.

14. The study indicated that...About two-thirds of those favorably inclined at the time of graduation from OTS are still planning an Air Force career, while less than a third of those who were undecided or negative at graduation have switched to positive views...Information about an individual's educational background and the type of work he is performing in the Air Force can also be used to predict career intentions. (BG19)

15. The respondents were asked to list what they considered the advantages of Air Force life. Travel, fringe benefits, educational opportunities, and security were the most often mentioned advantages. Intrinsic or job-oriented factors such as job satisfaction and variety and challenging jobs were well down the list. That this ordering of factors is different from what is usually found in such
surveys is probably because the respondents had little actual job experience, having been in a training status for much of their Air Force careers. Low pay was mentioned by almost half as being a disadvantage. Lack of promotion and advancement opportunities and no choice of assignments or jobs were the next two most frequently mentioned. After 18 months these changes had taken place: among the advantages: 38% mentioned fringe benefits as compared to 21% before; advancement in chosen career field and chance to increase one's education were mentioned less frequently as probable advantages. Disadvantages that increased in frequency were: low pay; lack of promotion and advancement possibilities, inadequate housing; poor schooling for family; no choice of assignments. It is noteworthy that no disadvantage decreased in frequency and that several new disadvantages were mentioned as the respondents became more familiar with the facts of Air Force life. (BG21)

16. Results of a survey of 5,000 junior Air Force officers, covering demographic, sociological, and attitudinal information isolated six items which most influenced the choice of the Air Force as a career:

1. Family attitude toward an Air Force career
2. Factors influencing for and against a career
3. Challenge of the Air Force job versus a civilian job
4. Effect of the offer of a Regular commission
5. The importance and possibility of achieving certain incentives and rewards as part of an Air Force career
6. The officer's feelings about frequent change of residence. (BG26)

17. Findings of an Air Force study in Officer Motivation (new View) provided the answer to the question, What motivates an individual in the Air Force? For the officer group investigated, the motivators leading to job satisfaction in the Air Force were achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility, advancement, growth, and patriotism; the dissatisfies (those factors which are a source of job dissatisfaction) are salary, policy and administration, supervision, interpersonal relations, personal life, status, working conditions, and security. (BP381)
18. The Navy has estimated its needs for professional specialists with advanced degrees in 1979, compared with current requirements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Projected Growth of Need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Systems</td>
<td>100% (Computer science, information science, information engineering, and computer engineering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineers</td>
<td>50% (400 to 600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Sciences and Engineers</td>
<td>300% for officers; 80% for civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeronautical Engineers</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Engineers</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations/Systems Analysis</td>
<td>240%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Engineering</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>140%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Sciences</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinance Engineers</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Engineers</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence/International Relations</td>
<td>10% (Int'l Relations 10%; Intelligence 140%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>185% officers; 23% civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Engineering</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Administration/Management</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Management</td>
<td>30% civilian; 60% officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorology</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Engineering</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Science and Engineering</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Professions</td>
<td>350%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care Professions</td>
<td>80% (including nurses to bachelor degree; upgrading of all health care; increased requirement for psychologists)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19. The Army is experimenting with a new efficiency report called the Revised Officer Performance Reporting System. The rater of the report would be subject to review by the reviewee. (BP285)

20. In the past three years over 200 officers have been fired by the Army for moral and professional dereliction of duty. Causes included bad debts, excessive drinking, homosexuality, and other illicit sexual relationships. (BN57)

21. Higinbotham argues for the desperate need to get top-quality officers back with the units, as opposed to education or a desk job. (BP187)

22. An editorial on "Tenure in the Army" and how long different groups of officers are allowed to serve on active duty appeared in the Army Times. Many non- Regulars have complained about not being allowed to stay beyond 20 years. A group of Regular officers (Air Force) were irritated when they were forcibly retired before completing the normal 28-30 years. A sampling of officer opinion showed: (1) 72% of the non-Regular retired officers agreed that Regulars should face a screening board which would decide whether they be retained or retired after 20 years service; (2) 55% of the Regulars agreed with the above. (BN141)

23. An alternative solution suggested by the Times: All officers could be screened after 12 years. All chosen to stay would get Regular commissions and perhaps bonuses; those not selected would leave with severance pay (a similar system is used in the State Department). Men of high potential could be identified so that larger percentages of them could move into Regular status in early years of service. At or near 20 years, all officers, Regular and non-Regular, would face the same board to determine fitness to serve beyond 20 years. (BN141)

24. An article having to do with officer-corps reform probes a long-standing area of ambiguity: The premise (or myth?) that most, if not all, Army officers seek stars, high command, and Chief-of-Staff status. The article makes an interesting, Potential Impact

These observations suggest more probing analysis of what constitutes a career. Incorporation of physiological and psychological data might be illuminating. There are probably commonalities and patterns that would be subject to psychometric analysis. Career stages,
although not entirely new, suggestion. Designate command as a specialty (not a ticket-punching slot for all officers), select officers for that specialty at major level, and weed further at selection for lt. colonel and colonel. Command specialists should also achieve another specialty, such as operations or logistics.

Most officers should be invited to increase their specialization early, and have the option to choose civilian universities instead of the Command and General Staff College at Leavenworth. Encouragement should be provided to these people to stay in their specialty.

This will help ease the pressure on a system of giving opportunities to command, to too many people, necessarily for too-short periods, which disrupts units and does not serve the Army's interests. An analogous system should also be created for NCO's, who are not all interchangeable, either.

The authors stress that the Army should learn what every corporate structure eventually learns: identify quality early, reward it, and reinforce it.

Potential Impact

Specialization on "command" should not be attempted in an inflexible system. Provision had to be made for disposal of the early sky-rocket and for make-up development of the late bloomer. Corporation heads may come from production, sales, legal counsel, or other specialties. A great deal of incisive thought needs to be given to a concept of limiting command assignments (and hence, the highest posts in the military) to persons concentrating on a command specialty, while others have been excluded from potential access for years. People, their goals, and their powers do change over blocs of years.

25. An officer using the pseudonym of "Colonel" has commented on the new plan to select by board action those to be placed on the eligible list for command assignments, using the same data as the Personnel Assignment offices in the Pentagon possess.
The "Colonel" says the system does not recognize that individuals change over the years. He suggests that the subjective opinion of the man in the field is still more appropriate than the subjective opinion of a board or action officer in Washington, D. C., who has about five minutes to allot per record. (BN5)

26. An Air Force Study has made several recommendations on the procurement, utilization, and retention of high-quality scientific and technical officers. Their recommendations include:

1. That the distinction be made between R & D scientist/development engineer and R & D manager/administrator;

2. That a scientific grade/military rank composite for status and pay be established;

3. That a three-element, merit-based entry/promotion system be instituted, including the inputs of the affected individual, his actual or potential supervisor, and the institutional review and action body; entry would be made with the composite rank of Lt. and the scientific grade merited by his education, experience, past achievement, and manner of performance of scientific work.

4. That a three-element, feedback assignment system include exercise of judgment and choice by job supervisors, potential job incumbents, and institutional action bodies on each scientific/technical officer assignment be established.

5. That a military scientist career field be established. (BG14)

27. The Air Force Study lists the key issues derived from the expressions of affected individuals and responsible executives:

1. Promotion on merit including the components of recognition for accomplishment, both actual and potential, equity of greater compensation by the employer for greater value to the employer and increased opportunities for service or value-giving.

2. Consistent, intelligent personnel policies;

3. Voice in assignments;

4. Competent supervisors;

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5. Fairly rapid advancement;
6. Recognition for accomplishment;
7. Good salary;
8. A profession of military science. (BG14)

28. The Air Force has also done a study on the career intent for the retention of Scientists and Engineers in the Air Force:

The primary purpose of this research was to identify factors related to career intentions of Scientists and Engineers in the Air Force... Results of the survey suggested that career-oriented Scientists and Engineers may have a different need structure than their non-career-oriented counterparts. Needs for managing and applied research seemed to characterize the career-oriented Scientist, while needs for pure research and scientific achievement seemed to characterize the non-career-oriented Scientist. Career-oriented officers were generally more optimistic about satisfying important needs while in the Air Force, and they preferred a professional-officer identity to a professional-Scientist identity. Modest correlations between various aspects of active duty experience and career intent suggest that pre-commissioning attitudes, particularly their sources and relative impact on career decisions, should be investigated further. Career-oriented Scientists and Engineers may start out career-oriented and their active duty experiences simply sustain that orientation. Likewise, the non-career-oriented Scientists and Engineers may simply perceive active duty experiences as supporting their initial attitudes regarding a military career. This leaves only the initially undecided group to be significantly influenced by the quality of their active duty experiences. (BG39)

29. A New York Times article of August, 1971, looked at the impact of younger officers on the reshaping of the Navy. It expressed the view that the character of military service is largely shaped by its officer corps; and that most officers are relatively young. The young officers aren't all that different from college-educated civilians, and are more like their civilian counterparts than their seniors are to their counterparts.

Citing "Z-grams" as an example, the article claims that the younger officers are reshaping the Navy. The mood and presence of these men seem to make a difference. Since they are interested in wider society, they establish useful
contacts between that society and the Navy. Does this make a more effective Navy? It's better than no Navy at all. Further, retention of younger officers does seem to be rising. Also, it may help to produce a less-isolated Navy. But all of it will ultimately depend on the ability of the Navy to draw in officers with varied back-grounds.

The article concludes that, if we abandon the notion that we all owe the country something more than taxes, one of the prices we would pay is some slowing down of the winds of change now blowing through the armed services. (BN589)

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

30. Moskos suggests that the social unrepresentativeness of the enlisted ranks will become much more marked in the post-Vietnam period. The high probability of a curtailed draft and major increases in military pay will serve to reduce significantly the degree of middle class participation in the enlisted ranks. An all-volunteer force and a college-educated officer corps will contribute to a more rigid and sharp definition of the caste-like distinction between officers and enlisted men in the 1970's. (BM103)

31. Results from a questionnaire study administered in July, 1968 to 449 non-prior basic airmen to provide information on their reasons for enlistment: 61% of the young men believed it was every man's patriotic duty to serve; however only 7% would be willing to serve if the United States were attacked but not willing under any other circumstances, and 3% would never, under any circumstances, go into military service willingly. It should be remembered, however, that these were responses of airmen already in the service; probably these last two percentages would be somewhat higher in the general population of men in this age group. (BG28)

32. Among the reasons given for joining the Air Force the most popular choice was education. Slightly more than 30% felt they could learn more in the Air Force than in other branches of the services. The next most frequent responses had to do with self-respect: 8% thought the Air Force treats its people with more respect; 8% thought the Air Force is more likely to have comfortable, civilized living quarters and good food; 5% felt they would be more likely to live and work...
with a nicer group of people; and 3% thought people would look up to them more if they were in the Air Force. Among other responses, 11% felt the Air Force offers a wider choice of assignments, 8% were influenced by family or friends to enter the Air Force, and 6% thought the Air Force offers the best chance to travel and see the world. (BG28)

33. Avoidance of danger did not seem to be a prime reason for Air Force enlistment. There were more enlistees who thought the Navy is the least dangerous service than there were who thought the Air Force is least dangerous. Comparing the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, 88% thought the Air Force is the most like civilian life. Ninety-four percent of the respondents believed that education is more important in the Air Force than in the other services. Seventeen percent definitely would have enlisted, and 26% probably would have joined if there had been no draft. A little over 23% said they probably would not, and 13% said they definitely would not have joined if there had been no draft; 20% were undecided. (BG28)

34. From a questionnaire study of 41,098 basic airmen in their first week of training:

12.3% of the sample said they definitely would not have joined the Air Force if there had been no draft, and 20.3% said they probably would not have joined. Of those who enlisted largely to avoid the draft the least frequently given reasons for enlistment were opportunities for promotion and for learning what they would like to learn; they gave most frequently the desire to have time to themselves and to have comfortable living quarters.

Of the 4,818 subjects (approximately 10% of the sample) who intended to make the Air Force a career, 33.7% gave as a reason for enlistment the expectation of an opportunity to learn what they wanted to learn. (BG29)

35. The most frequently given reason for enlistment was education (31.6%). Next was wide choice of assignments (13.5%), followed by opportunity for travel (9.1%).

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Blacks gave travel and wide assignment choice more often than non-Blacks. Better educated subjects gave travel and educational opportunities much less often than the less well educated. (BG29)

36. Enlistees whose performance on the Armed Forces Qualification Test was in the upper percentile ranges (AFQT Category I) gave educational opportunity as a reason for enlistment more often than did those in the lower percentile ranges (AFQT Category IV). The lower ability group gave travel opportunity and wide choice of assignments more often than did the upper ability group. (BG29)

37. Another 2,107 basic Air Force trainees entered service after implementation of the draft lottery. Compared with draft-motivated enlistees, it was generally found that self-motivated enlistees tended to be less well educated, avoided advanced courses in high school, and dropped out of college at an earlier point. They represented with greater frequency racial minority groups, their homes were more frequently multi-lingual with one or both parents foreign-born, and their parents were less well educated. Their background was less affluent economically. They entered the Air Force with more positive attitudes toward military service, tending to be attracted to service primarily by the prospect of learning a trade or marketable skill. Both groups expressed the desire to choose their branch of service and the time at which they were to serve, but draft-motivated subjects expressed these feelings with greater frequency. Aptitude test performance of the self-motivated group was appreciably lower than that of the draft-motivated group. One of the most obvious implications of this finding is that, under the conditions of an all-volunteer force, there may be difficulty in adequately filling jobs with high aptitude requirements unless standards and training curricula can be revised. Redefinition of some jobs may also be required. (BG89)

38. Lt. Colonel Harrison wrote an article dealing with new recruits. He found that the majority of recruits think that military justice is fair. However, they do not think their leaders are sufficiently concerned about the trainee's personal needs, abilities, aptitudes and individual dignity. Harrison says that trainees do not
feel free to discuss personal problems with officers or NCO's. They think NCO's need more civilian education. Harrison further indicates that new recruits evidenced a lack of confidence about adequacy of training for combat. (BG22)

39. "All-volunteer-Army" training at Ft. Dix indicated that the volunteer tended to be a little slower, and lacking in leadership as compared to draftees, National Guardsmen, and reservists. It was found that the latter were older, mature and better to work with.

In the Regular Army group, you have to get some of society's rejects. Nevertheless, some in the training program said their prospects for remaining in the Army after their initial enlistments were dim. (BN318)

40. Harrison, writing on the qualifications of youth entering the military service, is positive. He states that, with the exception of the lowest mental group, who are generally products of sub-standard school systems, personnel are better educated than those of a few years ago. There is a marked improvement in the ability to analyze and think critically. Moreover, he believes that athletic records indicate youth are more physically fit than past generations. Army trainers, however, believe the opposite. (BG22)

41. The failure to adjust to military life is the primary cause of premature separation, the greatest non-casualty source of manpower attrition. Unauthorized absences, inefficient blundering, impulsive outbursts, and general maladaptive behavior are all indicators of adjustive failures. These actions consume the time of numerous others by necessitating the correcting of mistakes, investigation of offenses, counseling offenses, and disciplining offenders. (BG90)

42. Those who fail to adjust well to the Service require more schooling with less accomplishment. Such individuals return little for much outlay. Hence, the military should be interested in psychiatric and other screening devices to evaluate recruits in advance. This would save the Service and the individual from demands beyond their tolerance. (BG90)
43. Numerous studies have identified factors which would indicate those who are unsuitable for military service, but these studies are not completely accurate. This is because unsuitability is not a product of a single factor, but an interaction of several factors. The results of a report are given of one attempt to improve methods at the Recruit Evaluation Unit, Great Lakes Naval Training Center.

By 1965 Dr. Eugene Barnes had developed the Recruit Temperament Survey, (RTS), of 105 relatively innocuous questions. There was a clear relationship between the results and graduation. Also, the General Classification Test was effective. A decision was made in 1965 to follow up certain groups after leaving recruit training. Four groups were selected, one with a high predicted failure rate (the 40-40 group); a control group consisting of a random sample of 1964 recruits; and two other groups with different RTS and GCT categories. The groups were followed through Navy assignments, including separation, and its causes.

Of group one (which was suspect, both intellectually and temperamentally) only 56% completed recruit training; and 30% of the remainder failed to complete an enlistment. Only 2.9% reenlisted (and were permitted to reenlist). Twenty-four percent achieved a rating. Of the control group, 95% completed recruit training; the subsequent attrition rate was 15.5%; 9% reenlisted and 76% achieved a rating.

Of the third group (the 40-10 group, suspect only intellectually), 92% completed training; 11.6% suffered later attrition; 4.5% reenlisted; and 55% were rated. Of the 4th group, (the 70-10 group, both intellectually and temperamentally promising), 98% completed training. The attrition rate was only 5.6%; 15.5% reenlisted, and 90% were rated. (BG90)

44. A word of caution has been entered regarding the study. The test detects with extremes, and no pathology measures were included. Its results refer solely to performance in the Navy. Finally, it is useful to identify groups; it would be hazardous to use it to identify individuals, for whom clinical decisions are more appropriate.
Yet it is of use for accelerating the promising group, and possibly eliminate those of lowest potential, if those options are available. Generally speaking, those who are both bright and well-adjusted do the best, and re-enlist more often. (BG90)

45. An article by Weiss discusses several factors, both positive and negative, affecting the personal development of the young Servicemen, in the Military environment. The positive aspects of military life include:

1. Exposure to the military culture and usually a new geographical culture;
2. Opportunity to meet many personality types with various backgrounds;
3. Learning a new skill which can be used after the Service;
4. The humanizing aspects of Admiral Zumwalt's Z-grams;
5. An innovative individualized learning system, such as that provided at the U. S. Navy Basic Electronics School at San Diego. (BM149)

46. Negative factors of military life include:

1. A considerable number of people are mismatched to their job. Aptitude tests, are often administered under adverse conditions (e.g., 4 a.m. rising and then test-taking, during the first 2-3 week period when the recruits are still dis-oriented).
2. Many jobs are ill-suited to the primary development task for the 18-24 year old which is to learn and to succeed as a basis for later tasks.

According to Havighurst, a young adult is ready to select a mate, live with a marriage partner, start a family, rear children, manage a home, and get started in an occupation. Because the first five of these tasks are "impractical" in their circumstances in the military, many young Servicemen inadvertently revert to less mature behavior.

47. Further negative factors cited by Weiss include aspects of the military prison system. A study on 1500 military prisoners indicate parental problems, but also a sense of abandonment and powerlessness in the face of military authority.
This lack of freedom to set one's own goals is especially difficult for any young man who joins the service to escape the authority of his father.

Weiss sees, in the authority structure of the military, negative features influencing personal development. He claims that it can be an unnerving experience to be so susceptible to authority, when dealing with the authority of superiors with whom there is no personal relationship.

Security sometimes plays with the personal development of a career man in that he may pass the buck downward and rely on decisions from above when he should decide himself: creating "a security womb."

The authority structure often produces "rules for rules sake," and a passive rather than active acceptance of personal situations is produced. (BM149)

48. Evidence of the Marines' concern over negative influences is discussed in an article reporting the opening of a new model prison. The prison recently opened at Camp Pendleton, California, where riots had led to a Congressional investigation. The prison is now a model showplace for reform where persons work, attend classes and are provided leisure activities. The prison functions as a school where released prisoners may return to continue their education. (BN348)

49. Moskos has suggested the use of civilians in support-type military functions, i.e., administrative and clerical positions. He claims that this will significantly increase the proportion of traditional military occupations within the enlisted ranks. (BM103)

50. The Army is seeking a sharp increase in "Volunteer Army money" for fiscal 1973, in order to civilians to perform maintenance duties now done by soldiers. The aim is to upgrade the quality of NCO's through better education, and to offer bonuses for civilians joining combat areas and other skill jobs, and to improve the soldier's life style. (BN148)

51. In a very special program called "Project 100,000," in October, 1966, the Department of Defense involved all military services in lowering its entrance standards for military services-in terms of both education and physical defects.
During the peak years of 1967 and 1968, about 100,000 men were admitted per year, and of these, 90% entered with lower mental standards. That program has relevance for the future, in that each Service tested its capacity to train and use marginal-capability manpower.

During a five-year period, 350,000 men, or 10.5% of all entrants, were admitted under this program, now called "New Standards" men. As of the time of this report (1971), about 50,000 men per year were being admitted under this program. The input, however, was continually adjusted in balance with the availability of appropriate jobs. Over one-half of those admitted have been volunteers; the great majority of those entering were successful in military life. The program contributed to improvements in education, skills, and work habits of disadvantaged youth. It is now being researched whether military society raised their prospects in civilian life, in comparison to non-servers. (BM64)

52. In terms of educational background, "New Standards" men completed an average of 10.7 grades; 47% had completed high school. Nevertheless, overall academic ability was low; 28% cannot read at the 5th grade level; the median reading level is 8th grade. Other men entering the Services read at the 11th grade level.

On all measures, New Standards men do not perform as well as a cross section of men with high test scores and educational abilities: training attrition, promotions, supervisory ratings, disciplinary record, and attrition from service. However, the differences are not great; the overwhelming majority are successful. (BM64)

53. The New Standards men are not a homogeneous group. Many perform as well as or better than men with higher test scores; others perform worse. Forty percent of them went to combat jobs, 60% to others ("soft jobs"), such as auto mechanics, construction, cooks, drivers, telephone linemen, MP's, etc. Many of these jobs have their counterparts in the civilian economy.

There are several important aspects of the program which deserve mention:
There was complete integration with other men. They do not know they are New Standards men, and there is an attempt on the part of the Service to keep instructors and supervisors from knowing who are New Standards men. They are trained and assigned with other men, and there is no category-stigma attached to them because of low ability.

They must maintain the same performance standards as any others.

The program provided extra weeks of training for those who need them. However, many needed no extra help.

The training methods used were practical. Most military training is suitable for New Standards men. It is functional, job-oriented, hands-on training, not theoretical. There is an emphasis on modern equipment and audio-visual aids.

Literacy training was given before or during recruit training to about 20% of the recruits. This training, at best, raised reading ability of 85% of the men by 1-3/4 grades in six weeks. Many of them get High-School-equivalency diplomas in the service. Further, listening as a training method is as important as reading; thus, dependence on reading is minimized.

Jobs are assigned with regard to capability. There is continual study to avoid assigning these men to courses where success is not likely; now, 90% pass the available courses.

There is a link between training and utilization. Most civilian training for low-aptitude men is done by organizations which do not utilize them. The armed forces do both, and this is a strong factor in building the self-confidence of the man. He knows that there will be a place for him, in doing just what he is being trained for. There is also pressure on the trainers to produce genuine competence; they know that the field units to which the men go for their regular duty will not hesitate to criticize the trainers for incompetent preparation.

(BM64)

54. The Army Times reported that 30% of 200,000 men who entered the service under Project 100,000 have been permitted to reenlist. The program does
little to improve reenlistment rates or provide the most productive investment of the training dollar, but it does perform service in extra dimensions for society in general by the military forces. (BN115)

55. **A. U. S. News and World Report** article reported that civilian officials were more enthusiastic than military officers over the "New Standards" recruits. According to the magazine, some officers were critical because the "New Standards" recruits required too much supervision and caused too much trouble. Statistics show a higher rate of court-martial for "New Standards" people, 3%, compared to 1.4% for other servicemen. However, 90% of the "New Standards" recruits received overall ratings ranging from excellent to good; only 2% received unsatisfactory ratings.

The report adds that the military need for "New Standards" people is questionable. There are simply not enough jobs within their range. Although the end of the draft will see some decline the inflow of enlisted men capable of being trained for highly technical jobs, the gap cannot be filled by the "New Standards." Nevertheless, though their future role is unknown, the "New Standards" have proven themselves to be productive soldiers, who can give valuable service to their country. (BP436)

56. The Army has made proposals making educational opportunity a more integral part of a soldier's life by developing a system to allow the soldier to go to school while on duty. The plan is to have the soldier continue on to the next level after completing the preceding level. The idea, designed to increase professionalism in the Army, will be tried out at a stateside station sometime in FY 1973, prior to its test on an Army-wide basis. (BN156)

57. An article appeared in the Army Times dealing with the annual wastage of medically-trained personnel leaving the military service. In 1969, the Army, Navy, and Air Force released 41,510 highly trained medical personnel. The number released is expected to remain near 30,000 through 1975. Although the civilian health industry will add 150,000 new, non-professional jobs annually, fewer than 7000 of the 30,000 will enter the civilian health industry, if current trends continue. (BN114)
58. In 1964, the Department of Defense, Labor, Health, Education and Welfare, and the Veterans Administration had joined in setting up channeling of appropriate veterans into medicine. Project Remed was renamed in 1969 as MEDIHC. (Military Experience Directed into Health Careers), an upgraded program which came almost completely under HEW. One main reason cited by vets for not entering it was their lack of formal education or official certification required by the program.

A MEDEX program at Duke attempts to set up physician's assistants but offers no certification. MEDEX programs have also been set up at the University of Washington, the Washington State Medical Association, the University of North Dakota, Utah, Alabama and New Hampshire, Darmouth, Wake Forest, and the Drew Post Graduate Medical School in Los Angeles. The most aggressive programs have been set up at Cook County and Oak Forest Hospitals in Chicago. (BN114)

59. An article on how ex-military medical corpsmen are working as Doctor's assistants elaborates the useful function these men can play. They are relieving the burden on rural doctors, thus enabling the latter to provide more medical care for a greater number of people. (BN311)

60. Initial screening began in 1971 for a new Army Physicians' Assistants Program. The personnel completing the course will have an A.S. Degree and 68 hours credit at Baylor University. The program is aimed at relieving medical officers of many minor duties. As a result, military medical services will be able to handle more cases with greater efficiency. (BN126)

61. The Army program of incentive awards for approved suggestions (which is about a 30-year-old program) have not had the impact the Army expected. It has failed to generate a climate of constructive change, motivating soldiers to challenge traditional methods of accomplishing tasks. (BN139)

62. Attempts have been made to elicit the enlisted man's opinion concerning life in the Service. The Army Times carried a story concerning the enlisted man's
views on the Navy. Common complaints were low pay; prolonged separation from family; and housing. The recent relaxation of dress requirements did, however, help morale. It would appear that 60-70% of the recent re-enlistments resulted directly from the "Z" grams and perhaps the state of the economy. Race problems within the Service exist, but they are not as bad as the general society, and they are declining. (BN33)

63. An interview in Family Magazine with the enlisted men's lobby touched upon several issues of concern to the military. In regard to a volunteer army, the lobby was not optimistic; the lobby feels that the anti-military feeling has peaked, and was never strongly directed at enlisted men. (BP119)

64. The Army (CONARC) is establishing councils on the company level to give recruits a voice in training decisions. They are also continuing with a merit-point system by which recruits earn points for their daily performance. The test program's purpose is to determine whether awarding of privileges will result in improved soldier morale, proficiency, and performance in training.

Both the Navy and the Air Force have expressed interest in being kept informed on progress. (BN143)

65. A Junior Enlisted Man's Council was formed at Sondid Base, New Mexico. It is believed to be the first of its kind. Its function is to represent all men in pay grades E-1 to E-5, with the objective of improving communications between enlisted men and the unit commander, as well as recommending changes in procedures and policies to improve conditions for the junior enlisted men. Further, it provides a means for airing complaints and suggestions from enlisted men to unit commanders. Everyone's cooperation was reported, from the commander all down the line. (BN85)

WOMEN

66. Women are specifically forbidden by law (Sections 8519 and 6015 of Title 10, U.S. Code) from serving in combat as members of the Air Force, Navy, and the Marines. While no such specific restriction exists in the U.S. Code
relevant to the Army, Army directives exclude weapons training for women. Army regulation 600-200(3-11) leaves the question of where women will serve to the discretion of the Army Commander. (BP108)

67. Men do not want women in combat roles. Margaret Mead has suggested that this is because men fear that they might be too good! Legal restrictions have existed for Servicewomen, in grade levels, percentage limits on women personnel, and different provisions for retirement and separation.

However, President Johnson removed these in 1967 with Public Law 90-130, and opened new potential for the integration of women into the service community. (BP108)

68. The advancement possibilities in the service for all women was reaffirmed by the promotion of Pola L. Garrett to the rank of colonel. Presently (1971) assigned to the WAC Directors Officer in the Pentagon, she is the first black woman colonel in the Army. (BN60)

69. As of March, 1972, there were five women serving as generals in the Army and Air Force; there were no admirals, and no generals in the women's Marines. (BN101)

70. On April 27, 1972, the Navy announced the promotion of Alene Bertha Duerk, Director of the Navy Nurse Corps, to Rear Admiral. She is the first woman admiral in American history. (BN319)

71. As of June, 1971, women on active duty equalled 1.6% of the total strength of the armed forces. The total of enlisted WAF's is expected to increase from 10,000 to 13,700 by 1976. The WACs are expected to go from 16,865 to 20,000 by 1978. The WAVES and Women Marines will remain about

Potential Impact

The prospect of women in combat roles fills most men with horror, most of all, combat men themselves. Nevertheless, women have played combat roles in the past—the Amazons, Molly Pitcher, some Orientals, Russians, the Israeli forces include one-third of their strength in women, without putting them in combat jobs. Some women would welcome an opportunity to participate in combat units; most probably would not. In any event, there is room for many women in the Armed Forces, irrespective of the combat-role question.
the same, 6600, and 2100 respectively. (BP108)

72. The basic philosophy behind having women in the Service has traditionally been to free a man for combat duty. Brig. Gen. M. Bailey, Director of the Women's Army Corps, says that concept is outdated. To her the mission is "to make available to the Army the special skills of each WAC." Brig. General I. Holm, Director of Women in the Air Force has said that "we cannot man the Air Force today without women." (BP108)

73. WAC Director, Brig. Gen. Mildred C. Bailey, expects the WAC force to be about 20,000 by fiscal year 1978: 18,700 enlisted women and 1400 officers. Currently the Corps has 12,000 enlisted women and 1000 officers. Also a complete new uniform is expected within the next few years. Gen. Bailey would like to get more women into advanced schooling. Currently 33% of WAC strength works in medical jobs. Fields such as automatic data processing, intelligence and Army Security work are beginning to open up. (BN26)

74. The National Guard would like to increase its number of women. Presently there are no women in the Guard, only in the Army Reserve. The Guard received additional funds for recruits, but it hasn't a single new incentive or new program that would significantly reduce its dependency on the draft. (BN135)

75. The job fields in which the majority of women are concentrated are the traditional ones of administration, medical, personnel, and supply. Few are in management analysis and special investigations, although these fields are open to them.

Recently, six WAF's completed security police training with men and will bring unique skills to apprehend females and juveniles. Women may not serve in any combat role (viz, pilot, shipboard, etc.). By regulation, they may never be placed in command position over men in the Army. The Navy and Air Force have no similar rulings.

The ratio of high-ranking officers to officers is much lower in the
women's ranks; also, there are differences in promotion procedures. The WAVE who is a job specialist does not compete with her male peers in the restricted line, but competes for promotion with women in the unrestricted line. (BP108)

76. Women have served in the armed forces throughout American history. Although the Women's Army Corps has only been in existence for 30 years, women have served alongside their men since the beginning of the nation's armed forces. They saw service in both the Revolutionary and Civil Wars. World War II marked the greatest contribution by women to the Army in an official capacity when approximately 150,000 WAC members served in all areas of the world. Today, women can be found working beside men throughout the Army everywhere. Women have long since proved their competence in the military environment. (BS10)

77. An article in the Naval War College Review discussed the role of women in the Navy. The author feels that there is a narrow channelization of women due to a perception of the role and status of females being different from males—for example, that a woman should be used in "female-type work"; she should not deprive a male of a first-line billet.

Ad hoc aspects brought out in the article indicates that there is still a "wartime" or "emergency" phenomenon in regard to women. Dean Virginia Gildersleeve, speaking at the time of the creation of the WAVES, said: "If the Navy could possibly have used dogs, ducks, or monkeys, certain of the elder admirals would possibly have greatly preferred them to women."

Women constitute a minority position in the service; inequality is a "natural state of affairs." There appears to be an apprehension about female leadership. For one thing, social and cultural norms say that leadership must be aggressive. (BP85)

78. DACOWITS-The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service—has been set up to advise the Pentagon on problems of service women; and to publicize service women in the civilian community. Recommendations made by DACOWITS include:
1. A call for all future military housing to be constructed unit types suitable for single people or families. (BP108)

79. Congressman McDonald (R. Mich.) and Senator Javits (R-N. Y.) have nominated women for admission to the Naval Academy. Javits seeks to have the Academy strength conform to the Navy itself; 3.6% of officers are women, and this percentage should be reflected in Academy enrollement. (BP417)

80. The Navy is expected to turn Senator Javits down because it feels that it can get all the women it needs from non-Academy sources and because it needs every ship commander and pilot from the Academy it can get. The regulations and the law now prohibit women. Congress can change the law, but only the Secretary of the Navy has the final say on physical qualification. (BN249)

81. An article in Family Magazine examined what military men say about military women. Many accept women in uniform only in traditional female job roles. Liberationist activism on the part of military women is seldom admired by the military man. (BP108)

82. The Equal Rights Amendment has potential for starting a military as well as a social revolution. The Army could ask for a woman draft, permit women to command Regular units, assign females to combat units, and permit military women to have children while in service. One WAC has attempted (unsuccessfully) to challenge the Pentagon Athletic Centre Policy. Officials explain that most male command positions require officers trained in combat branches, since women are classified as non-combatants, they could not assume command roles, but could be appointed as supervisors. However, men believe that most WAC's appear to be satisfied with their traditional roles. (BN45)

83. The Army Times published the results of interviews with Army wives on Women's Lib. One respondent stated that women have become discontented because they haven't been able to pursue anything but rearing a family; but now it can be a terrific time if women take the opportunities offered.

"Twelve years ago the officer's "lady" did not feel like an independent unit from your husband, but also you don't want to jeopardize your husband's career." (BN135)
84. "An Army Wife is not passive, just silent; it is not really that different than the situation in any large corporation. There are certain constraints on time and efforts, certain measures of propriety with social obligations. (BN135)

85. There has recently been a change in policy to allow pregnant service women to request waivers to remain in the Service. The current policy on marriage does discourage marriage between women officers and enlisted men. The couple's eligibility for quarters rests on the male.

In a male officer-civilian marriage, the wife can be claimed as a dependent, regardless of her financial standing. In a female officer-civilian marriage, the husband must be actually dependent for support. Legislation, with the support of DOD, is now under discussion in the House to reform the unequal treatment of civilian spouses. (BP108)

86. The Army and Air Force have adopted similar policies allowing their married female officers and enlisted women to have or adopt children. The Navy is considering a similar move. There will also be "special cases" where single women who become pregnant will be eligible to remain in the Service if they conform to the laws for disposal of the child or their pregnancies are terminated. (BN363)

87. One fairly recent change in Marine Corps policy is that a civilian male who is married to a woman Marine is now entitled to the same privileges as a male Marine of the same rank (e.g., housing for the family, use of PX, etc.) (BN363)

88. The Coast Guard is reviewing its present regulations which "may have been the basis for unintended discriminatory practices in hiring of females for service aboard merchant marine vessels." This review includes the possibility of men and women sharing facilities (but only in the Merchant Marine). (BN239)
89. The Navy will admit women to ROTC in the fall of 1972. The Air Force did the same in 1969. (BN209)

90. Girls will be admitted to Jacksonville University’s NROTC program with free scholarships.

The Marine Corps has not closed the door to taking women if they apply. They already have 100 women in Women's Candidate Courses. (BN253)

91. The Army has inaugurated a five year experimental program in which college girls will participate with existing ROTC units at 8 to 10 institutions.

Air Force ROTC has proved to be popular; between 1970 and 1972 there was an increase in enrollment from 500 to 910 girls. However, the drop-out rate for girls between freshman and sophomore year exceeds 50%. The Army says it doesn’t really need women in ROTC to meet its requirements. (BN9)

92. Chafee defended keeping the Naval Academy male-only, but he said women had a legitimate complaint, because the route to officer status required them first to get a college degree at their own expense. Opening up NROTC and Platoon Leader classes to women will allow them to get government aid in obtaining a degree and a commission. (BN238)

93. The Review article implies that there is a built-in lack of status for women in the Navy. If command at sea is required for top status, women, who are excluded from sea duty, are barred from that top status. Further, there is a paternalistic attitude of males regarding women. Women are regarded as "defective men." General Hershey is quoted as having once said that "there is no question that women could do a lot of things in the military service. So could men in wheelchairs. But you couldn’t expect the services to want a whole company of men in wheelchairs."

Not only are there no career patterns for women officers, but there is role ambiguity: look like a girl, act like a lady, think like a man, work like a dog. The women’s program seems to have unclear objectives. Thus, why does the Navy have women officers?
Possible reasons are: as a nucleus for an emergency; utilization of part of the working force; legal requirement; the feminine touch ("women do some things better than men"); women replace men so the latter can go to sea. Senior women have been hesitant to speak out. They have had no power, except as supported by male officers. (BP85)

94. This article feels that Navy personnel appear amused by, or appear to believe that the Navy can remain aloof from, the "Women's Lib" movement. There is the feeling within the Navy that the organization is doing enough.

Women holding Navy commissions are either in line or staff positions. Line positions can take the form of unrestricted or restricted line. Unrestricted line careers are structured around command at sea, including naval aviation. The restricted line includes engineering, aeronautical engineering, special duty (communications, public information, naval intelligence, meteorology), and limited duty in technical areas. Staff positions include medical, supply, chaplain, civilian engineer, JAG, dental, medical services, and nursing. (BP85)

95. As of July 31, 1971, women occupied the following positions in the Navy: 640 unrestricted line; one JAG; two medical; one dental; 60 medical service; 1909 nurses; and 19 supply. There were no women in restricted line positions, because these fields were closed to women by law. The traditional fields of administration and communications, respectively, employed 76% and 14% of the women; intelligence employed 2%.

While there is a general trend toward specialization, women are channeled into the "generalist" category, but in the single specialized area of Administration. There are no career models for women specialists. The majority of senior women enjoy the image of managers and general line officers. There is very little opportunity for women in sub-specialties.

Women often spend more time in grade than males. A significant percentage of senior-grade women officers are in billets which are graded below their actual rank.

There have been very few new openings in such institutions as the Armed Forces Staff College and the Naval War College. 1970 was the first
time a woman was given command of anything other than administration of women.

The Navy has developed career-flow developmental patterns for unrestricted line officers, equating management of the shore establishment with operational command at sea. However, women are not eligible for command at sea. There has been a wide variety of reaction among Navy women themselves about being considered "a woman officer" rather than "a naval officer." (BP85)

96. American women are seeking meaningful and challenging careers now. There are more women than men of military age in the United States. Army Captain McKay predicts:

Women will be free, free to be home makers, scientists, astronauts, artists, ditch-diggers, soldiers, or whatever. Those in the way can either hop on the train or be run over by it. Captain McKay feels that the first official move must be to abolish the WAC branch, that anachronistic relic of World War II. Some women don't qualify for some Army jobs; but some men don't qualify for them, either.

In the face of the crisis confronting us, this man's Army cannot afford the luxury of ignoring any resource, particularly one so rich and already possessing a record of outstanding contribution. (BP270)

97. In the deliberations of a conference at Russel Sage there was general agreement that the topic of women in national service required more attention. The concept of voluntary national service clearly included women, although matters of priority and length and type of service had to be explored. The issue of an all-volunteer armed force meant that male "manpower" received some priority of attention. However, with the trend toward an all-volunteer force, no one doubted that recruitment of females would be more extensive in order to meet numerical requirements, and that the position of women in the military could become more vital, reflecting directions in society and enhancing the viability of the military establishment. Margaret Mead emphasized the importance of dealing with the sexual symbolism of national service, for she believes that images of sexual promiscuity would retard and disrupt a national service program. (BP370)
98. In the military services, Mead suggests that women can be armed defensively and given a wider medical role; men can be armed offensively and given a wider combat role. In civilian services, Mead suggests that problems with having girls away from home could be anticipated by explicit desires for a one-sex corps, for another coeducational corps, and for another corps of married young people. (BP370)

99. The CDC study "Personnel Offensive" made several recommendations regarding the question: "How can the Army increase utilization of female personnel?"

- Eliminate section 3215 title 10 (women can compose only 2% of the Armed Forces)
- Include women on interview boards for selection of recruiters
- Expand instruction for recruiters to cover the role of women in the Army
- Eliminate inequities between rental requirements for males and females
- Eliminate inequities in age requirements for initial entry of women
- Integrate WACS in all branches except combat arms
- Designate all positions for assignment of women, except Branch-Material-combat arms qualifications
- Compile and distribute information to all commanders regarding use of women in the Armed Forces. (BG56)

100. A March 1971 Retention Study recommended several changes for Navy Women:

- More overseas billets;
- Proposed legislation which would have women officers in the restricted line compete for promotions with male officers of respective communities;
- Remove the one year-on-duty station requirement before a woman can request a transfer to serve nearer her husband. Also removed was the stipulation that the transfer must permit establishment of a joint household;
- Increase enlistment age criteria for women from 18 to 19 to insure that the Navy gets more mature females.
Capt. Robin Quigley, Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Women, disagrees with this; for she feels that sociological evidence does not substantiate that there is much difference in maturity levels, and that a consequence could be that young women would join the other Services.

Career planning information has been added to curricula at Women's Recruit Training and at the Women Officer School.

Junior College Graduate Training, the Vocational School Graduate Training Programs, and the Direct Appointment Petty Officer Program in data processing are now open to women.

Female Line and Supply Corps officers now get their commission when they complete the Officer School course as males do. (BN257)

Other changes recommended by the study are the following:

- A maximum age of 35 for women assigned to the Recruit Training Command staff to keep them enthusiastic. (Capt. Quigley felt that pay-grade levels, not age, should be used as the management tool in this instance.)

- Eliminate the requirement to serve in a "B" billet (master-at arms, recruit training staff, and recruiting duty) before being considered qualified for E-8 or E-9.

- Enlisted women should not have to serve in two "B" billets unless they volunteer.

- The retention of petty officers is needed. (BN257)

The article in Family Magazine notes that women are neglected as a significant source of military manpower. Since volunteer armed forces are nearing reality, the services will probably be forced to fill draft-freed slots with women. As the number of military women increases and the range of jobs available to them widens, military men, at the very least, will have to get used to working with women, on a day-by-day basis. Eventually, they will have to treat women as equals. (BP164)
DEPENDENTS

103. Charles Moskos holds that a long standing deficiency of the armed forces has been in recognizing the needs of military families, particularly those of lower-ranking enlisted men. He maintains that the military should make it economically possible for men in the lower enlisted ranks to support their dependents with dignity and without moonlighting. (BB246)

104. The military does provide special health services for its personnel. Abortions (with the consent of 2 doctors and on grounds of mental health) and sterilizations (in accordance with sound medical practice) will be performed on all eligible military beneficiaries on military bases but only where state laws permit. (BN161)

105. The DOD has also been considering approving the Army practice of extension of active duty for soldiers with pregnant wives for the other services. The DOD plan calls for sparing military families the cost of pregnancies. (BN38)

106. As of 15 October 1971, families of service personnel (Army) making a permanent change of station will be allowed to use dining halls and eat with the troops. An action such as this blurs the lines of distinction between military and civilian life and provide greater assistance to military families. (BN86)

107. A Navy plan allowing for "homeporting" of forward naval bases will permit shorter separation from families and hopefully better morale. There is the possibility that men would stay in the service and costs in training replacements would go down.

Also, the plan would enable the Navy to cover existing commitments with fewer ships and to permit more time on patrol. (BN277)

108. Moskos reports that the military is showing a greater concern for service families. It provides legal and real estate advice, family counseling, baby sitting, employment opportunities for wives, loans of infant furnishings, linen and china. This indicates a movement toward paralleling civilian society.
However, it also augurs a diminishing of ties to civilian institutions for these services. (BM103)

109. The overall question "How can the Army help young soldiers in providing for personal and family welfare?" has been responded to under three separate headings: housing, travel compensation, and overall way of life. Suggestions on each issue have been offered as follows:

**Housing**

Use of mobile homes may provide temporary improvement and provide time for adequate housing to be constructed.

When on-post housing is clearly inadequate, the rental allowance should be adjusted to a fair and reasonable level.

Post housing personnel should be rated on service to the soldier, and not on rental and occupancy quotas.

Review and expand the government leasing program when local quarters are clearly in short supply or inadequate.

**Rate of travel compensation**

Authorize dependent travel regardless of rank or time in service.

Limit PCS movement to once each 24 month period, except for short-tours.

Raise military compensation for first-term enlisted and officers to levels that are competitive with civilian wages.

**Way of life**

During the current draw-down phase, close isolated unpopular, ineffective, or inefficient military posts, based upon human considerations such as lack of adequate housing and facilities, cost of living, and climate.

Develop a block of instruction for inclusion in basic officer courses on counseling, personal problem solving, and basic human behavior.

Develop a unit commander's guide that will provide guidance in looking after a soldier's personal and family welfare. This guide would emphasize to the commander his responsibility in assisting in the solution of personal problems.
and further, make clear that the chain of command is to be used for personal and family welfare. (BG56)
TRAINING

1. An area of pronounced change within the military is observed in the effort to institute altered training programs. This new initiative stems in part from a desire to make a substantial part of life in the Services more attractive to new recruits, as well as the desire to retain capable people. In addition, rapid changes in science and technology will probably require that greater numbers of people be engaged in education and training programs. (BM144)

2. The traditional effectiveness of the military in vocational education, especially in skill training and occupational improvement, is well-established. A range of confirmatory sources would include:


3. Janowitz has done a study on certain effects to be expected from a volunteer force. He predicts that ROTC units will be under pressure to produce a supply of officers. Emphasis will be placed on smaller numbers of successful units located in rural areas and in the South and West, where the tradition of entrance into the military profession is strongest. Often, ROTC will be at universities with more modest academic standards. In addition, there will be a trend toward increased recruitment of officers from the enlisted ranks. He foresees an increased selection from sons of military families. (An excess would contribute to further separation of the officer corps from civilian society.) Finally, we can expect a larger component of officers trained in the Service Academies. (BM81)
4. Education of officers will carry the main burden of meaningful relations with the larger society. Janowitz suggests starting professional officer education at an earlier age. (BM81)

5. In 1971, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. formed a destroyer "Mod Squad." This action was taken with the hope of revitalizing training and prospects for command, in the perspectives of younger officers.

In certain instances young officers are given command of a destroyer. Hopefully, this action would "demonstrate that the impact of early achievement of responsibility would contribute to retention of people within the unit itself; and to show that it would set up a motivation and momentum that would increase retention..." Also it would create an excitement and an aura of challenge within the Navy.

Several related Navy innovations include period of relaxed, "fun" atmosphere (crew races in port); soul food; more announcements to the crew on what the skipper is doing and why; spot-promotion of young skippers.

However, these innovations have resulted in some criticisms: The cooperation between officer and chief petty officer may become strained; the Z-grams (modernizing directives) give orders without worrying about the consequences (e.g., civilian clothes are allowed, but no storage room is provided); the new "Mod Squad" emphasis on young, high-quality officers is confined to the top 2 positions, skipper and executive officer; and spot-promotion applies only for officers, not the chiefs or other senior enlisted men. (BN607)

6. Vice Admiral Malcolm W. Cagle, Chief of Naval Training, expressed a number of concerns, including, the training for a chief who is needed in a squadron; establishment of an East Coast training center; the use of training and education as incentives for a career in the Navy; the uplifting of the role of instructors for career-minded individuals; and the modernization of recruit training so that boot-camp experiences do not damage recruiting. (BN255)
7. The Army, too, is incorporating new training approaches with the aim of making the service experience more stimulating. New unit training programs include such activities as trail-blazing in the Appalachians, scaling Mount Rainier, and canoeing down the Chattahoochee. It is hoped that these new training measures will put renewed vitality into mission-oriented tasks and thus enhance unit effectiveness. Troops of Fort Benning, Ga. are hiking in the mountains, engaging in survival school training, and undergoing underwater training in Key West. Two units at Fort Lewis, Washington trekked to Glacier National Forest for training in mountain climbing. The 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg is conducting navigation and survival training in mountainous areas. A company of a Signal battalion underwent what is called "adventure training"; 47 volunteers and their officers, with a week's rations, descended the Grand Canyon in Northern Arizona. (BN104)

8. Infantry OCS at Ft. Benning has been relaxing non-training requirements. Three specific examples include not requiring candidates to:
   1. Wear "white-side-wall" haircuts.
   2. Alter uniforms to a tailor-fit at their own expense.
   3. Buy wax and spend hours polishing floors and then removing their boots when walking on the floors. (BN80)

9. The Army is reducing emphasis on unit training scores and concentrating on individual performance and achievement. The object is to produce trained and qualified individuals. This is a significant indicator of the military's attempt to make individual characteristics and differences assets in producing the kind of unit the Army needs. A group of individuals strive to reach their highest level of achievement, contributing through their individual "bests" to a group "best." This method allows for individuality and freedom, while demonstrating that different individual attainments can build group achievements. (BN23)

10. Not all aspects of Army life have undergone complete change. After an experiment in liberalization, the Army tightened up its
8-week basic training course. Beer was no longer allowed in training barracks, or private cubicles with colorful curtains. Basic physical training reverted to tougher standards. Jogging between drill areas was reinstated, as well as the "daily dozen" exercises. The amount of classroom lecturing will lessen in favor of "hands-on, performance-oriented" training. The revision of the physical program was requested by the recruits themselves. At Fort Leonard Wood, 2 out of 3 recruits said that training had not been as physically demanding as they had expected or wanted. (BN405)

11. The Army's personnel chief said a five day training week for recruits and advanced trainees is "not only favorable but desirable." He went on to say that the Army is working to eliminate all hazing, harassment and petty tyranny in individual training. (BN61)

12. A report issued by the CDC outlines several areas in which the Army can improve its training. While this report deals specifically with the Army, the program outlined has applicability for all the Services.

How can the Army, or any Service, instill within the trainees the sense of confidence, pride, and esprit required of a combat-effective Serviceman? Several suggestions were offered:

- Inform the trainees at the earliest possible time where he will take his initial advanced individual training (AIT) and where his subsequent assignment will be.

- Teach soldiers that basic combat training (BCT) is a necessary component which all soldiers need to present a military bearing, defend themselves, and prepare for advanced individual training.

- Validate the knowledge and skill possessed by the trainees upon entry to active duty; eliminate training in which the trainee has demonstrated proficiency.

- Organize an AIT training unit in each division so that combat arms personnel can take their advanced individual training with the organization to which they will be assigned.
Develop a "unit rotation" system which includes various geographical locations overseas with one "home" or stateside location.

Design military construction to separate the working and the living environments.

Inform the trainees about the relationship between specific military training courses and later civilian jobs; how many and what types of civilian jobs utilize skills that can be acquired from a particular training course.

Solicit the cooperation of union-apprenticeship programs and employers to determine if minor modifications in military course curriculums could achieve greater transferability to later civilian jobs. (BG56)

13. How might military physical-fitness programs be adapted to make them more appropriate for the youth of the 70's?

Stress tough and challenging physical fitness training for combat soldiers.

Establish other physical fitness training programs commensurate with other requirements.

Develop especially interesting approaches for accomplishing the physical fitness requirements during peacetime, such as hiking, boating, swimming, mountain-climbing, etc.

Reconsider the Army physical fitness program requirements which are essential in peacetime, as well as in war, for each type of occupation and tailor the program to individual needs, such as age; job; and geographical location. (BG56)

14. How can the Army improve the quality and effectiveness of Army trainers and instructors?

Establish a career field for qualified and interested instructor personnel, which allows progression through basic, advanced courses, staff schools, and senior service colleges, interspersed with preparatory duty assignments to provide practical experience.
. Establish mobile cellular instructor teams requiring a high order of specialization in such areas as race relations, drug addiction, group dynamics, and human relations to conduct instruction and seminars in these areas.

. Make better use of peer group members as trainers.

. Do not hold trainers responsible for training that they personally do not conduct or do not have any authority to improve. (BG56)

15. How can the military reduce over-training and underemployment?

. Establish minimum essential requirements to satisfy fundamentals of highly diversified MOS job requirements commensurate to the grade-level responsibilities of the trainee. Provide only that training which is required at each particular phase in a service member's career.

. Review and reevaluate the policy which states that successful experience at all levels is a desirable goal for all officers and that is is particularly important for career officers, who will eventually influence the course of the Army as senior colonels or general officers.

. Minimize training for the first year of service or develop an abbreviated training program to coincide with an initial one year voluntary (temporary) enlistment. Then if the service member is interested in an Army career and the Army is interested in the service member, a more elaborate training program can be conducted to coincide with his particular career occupation.

In future social climates, the military may desire to temper the round-the-clock environment of military discipline. Investigation of other approaches may be enlightening.

For example, one of the most highly disciplined of human activities is the performance of a symphony orchestra, conducted on split-second timing (though admittedly for relatively short bursts); after the total discipline of the performance-crisis, the 150-odd performers revert to their pluralistic identities. Similarly in other disciplined groups, such as corps de ballet, surgical teams or NASA during an Apollo mission, there may be fruitful study areas here in relation to partial discipline, or part-time discipline.

Different parts of the Navy may be maintained at different levels of discipline. Such questions may reward consideration in how to maintain quality membership, yet maintain readiness to perform Navy missions.
Reduce emphasis on school selections merely to comply with quotas unrelated to operational needs of the unit. (BG56)

16. Various training experiences in other institutions may produce effects worthy of consideration by the military service. One possible relevant account, with potential significance for military training in the future, reports the experiences of Howard Earle, Chief of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Academy, who committed himself and his Academy to the stress-training system, i.e., “rigid military procedures resembling Army basic training,” for ten years (1958-1968). When the non-stress model for training law enforcement officers appeared to be gaining acceptance, Earle undertook, in the dissertation he was beginning for the USC School of Public Administration, to “show that stress-trained cadets were best, and put this question to rest once and for all.”

In 1969, Earle began training fifty recruits according to the authoritarian, stress model. He also began training fifty other cadets in the non-stress, non-authoritarian system, including a substantial proportion of the behavioral sciences in the curriculum. After comparisons made over the two years of the training, he reversed his original conviction. He said the results gave an unmistakable mandate...an undeniable verdict: cadets trained by non-stress methods performed better. They knew more about police work; they were more interested in their jobs; they followed orders better; and they got along better with their superiors. (BS27)
REDIRECTIONS

1. This is the final subsection of the final Section of this report. Many strands of future change have been interwoven throughout this report, as the major forces of change, projected from their roots in the human condition, the international context, and broad domestic society, impinge on the American military establishment, and particularly on the Navy and Marine Corps. Many of these strands come to the end of our consideration in this Section, although many extend beyond the parameters of this work, inconclusive and open-ended, into the future.

2. Subsections progress from the Military Environment, Organization, and Interaction with American Society, and Conclusions.

The Military Environment

3. We turn first to a discussion of the future by Professor Charles Moskos:

   Academic definitions as well as ideological attitudes towards the American armed forces fluctuate between two poles. One pole sees the military as a reflection of dominant societal values and an instrument entirely dependent upon dominant civilian decision-makers. The other pole stresses the differences between the military and general societal values and the "independent" influence which it believes the military has come to exert on civilian society.

4. Moskos perceived the military in World War II and Korea as divergent; but by 1968 the membership of the armed forces was again bearing some resemblance to the social composition of the larger society. However, in recent years, not only the legitimacy of the war in Vietnam, but the basic legitimacy of military service has been brought into question.

   There were undeniable signs of some disintegration within the military itself. Racial strife was becoming epidemic. Discipline breakdown and widespread vocalization of discontent was increasingly visible. Although much of the malaise...
was attributed to changes in youth styles, manifested in widespread use of drugs, it more likely reflected in large part that general weakening of morale which seems always to accompany an end of a war. (BM104)

5. Beyond Vietnam and factors unique to America, the decline may well be part of a more pervasive pattern occurring throughout Western parliamentary democracies.

As Moskos foresees the all-volunteer force, he predicts that the enlisted ranks will be less socially representative than in the present military establishment, but, with pay raises, nowhere near exclusively dependent on the lowest social and economic classes. The tendency toward either extreme will largely be determined by the eventual total manpower strength of the armed services. A smaller force (2,000,000) will have higher entrance standards, thus precluding overrecruitment from underclasses, whereas a larger force will have to draw more deeply from previously unqualified groups.

There will be significant changes in the sources of officers. The ROTC units from which the bulk of the officer corps is now drawn will almost certainly decrease in number and narrow in range. ROTC recruitment will be increasingly founded in educational institutions located in regions where the status of the military profession is highest, namely, rural areas and mountain states—admittedly, those with modest academic standards—hence, a decline in recruitment of ROTC cadets coming from upper-middle class backgrounds.

A growing proportion of officers will come from Service Academies, and military-family backgrounds will become even more prevalent among Academy entrants. Also, it is probably that recruitment from the ranks into the officer corps will decline. With increased emphasis on degrees, recruitment efforts will focus on graduates (note the decline of commissioned officers from the ranks in European all-volunteer forces). An alternative is offering college educations to motivated enlisted men. (BM104)
6. Development analysis is used to ascertain changes in both the internal organization of the military and its relationship to the larger American society. Three alternative developmental constructs are presented, as possible alternative courses for the military to take in the future: (1) the civilianized or convergent model, in which it is hypothesized that the military establishment will conform more and more to civilian society; (2) the traditional, or divergent, model, in which the military institution becomes more and more isolated, and different, from the whole of American society; and (3) the pluralistic or segmented model, in which parts of the military become civilianized, but are maintained as compartments within the military separate from the traditional compartments.

The pluralistic model is seen by Moskos to correspond most closely with contemporary trends in emergent military organization. This model foresees a military system which will internally compartmentalize antithetical civilianized and traditional features. Moreover, the pluralistic model seems to offer the best promise of a military force which will maintain organizational effectiveness, together with consonance with democratic civilian values. (BM104)

7. Nevertheless, there are some indications of all three models:
   1. The extent to which the membership of the services is representative of the broader society;
   2. Institutional parallels in social organization of military and civilian structures;
   3. Differences in required skills between military and civilian occupations;
   4. Ideological similarities and dissimilarities between civilian and military men. Moskos points out the difficulty in making distinctions because many internal aspects cut across officer and enlisted categories; Services; branches; and echelons.

8. **Model I: Convergent or Civilianized Military**

   There is ample evidence to support the model of the military moving toward convergence with the structures and values of civilian society.
The broad trends toward technological complexity and increase in organizational scales which were engendering more rationalized and bureaucratic structures throughout American society were also having profound consequences within the military establishment.

Such a trend involves changes both in qualifications and sources of leadership. The military has been characterized by a trend away from authority based on "domination," toward a managerial philosophy placing greater stress on persuasion and individual initiative.

Also, partly in anticipation of the all-volunteer force and as a result of discipline problems occurring toward the end of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon inaugurated a series of programs designed to accommodate to certain civilian youth values and to make the authority structure more responsive to enlisted needs. Human relations councils and communication channels between echelons were expanded and emphasized. The potential for unionization of military is also real, as indicated by the existence of the American Serviceman's Union (ASU) and the patterns in Germany and Sweden.

Even certain professionals within the services show greater identity with their civilian professional standards than with those consonant with military values. The Service Academies are shifting toward civilianization of students and faculty. This developmental model anticipates a military establishment which will be sharply different from the traditional armed forces. All all-volunteer membership will be attracted to the Service largely on grounds of monetary inducements and work selection in the patterns now found in the civilian marketplace.

Some form of democratization will occur, and life styles will basically be like that of civilian groups. The military mystique will diminish, as the Services come to resemble other large-scale bureaucracies.

The model of convergent military foresees the culmination of a civilianizing trend that began at least as early as the Second World War and that was given added impetus by the domestic turbulence of the Vietnam War. (BM104)
9. **Model II: Divergent or Traditional Military**

Although the consequences of Vietnam obscure the issue, persuasive evidence can be presented that the generation-long institutional convergence of the armed forces and American society has begun to reverse itself. It will be reflective of society-wide trends, as well as indigenous efforts, toward institutional autonomy on the part of the armed forces.

Some of this evidence includes the reversal of a long-term trend toward recruitment of the officer corps from a representative sample of the American population to an overproportionate number from rural and small towns; pronounced increase in number of cadets from career military families; and increasing monopolization of military elite positions by Academy graduates.

The draft infused a component of privileged youth into military rank and file. Very likely, an all-volunteer enlisted membership, coupled with an almost entire college-educated officer corps, will contribute to a more rigid and sharp caste-like distinction between officers and enlisted.

The very integration of the armed forces can be viewed as a kind of divergence from what is still a quasi-"apartheid" civilian society. The military will continue to be the most racially integrated institution in American society.

The trend toward increasing technical specialization within the military is reaching its maximal point. This implies a lessening of transferability between military and civilian skills. The use of civilians in support-type positions can be expected to increase with the advent of an all-volunteer force, again thereby increasing the proportion of traditional military occupations within regular military operations.

There is some emerging divergence between family patterns of military personnel and civilians. Assistance programs make a wide range of services available; hence the military institution encapsulates the family. Also the continuing down grading of the National Guard and Reserve components implies
the final demise of the citizen-soldier concept. Further employment of foreign-
national troops under direct American command would be a paramount indicator
of a military force divergent from civilian society.

Perhaps the ultimate indicator of divergence is on an ideological
dimension. The Vietnam "debate" has contributed to undermining the honor of
military service and fostered dissent within the ranks. In turn, there is a
spreading defensive reaction within the military community against some of the
nation's cultural elite.

In sum, there are convincing indicators that the military is under-
going a fundamental turning inward with relations to the civilian structures and
values of American society. With the arrival of the all-volunteer forces, the
enlisted membership will be more compliant with established procedures, and a self-
selected officer corps more supportive of traditional forms. Without broadly-based
civilian representation, the leavening effect of recalcitrant Servicement (usually
draftees, and ROTC officers from prestige campuses) will be no more. It appears
that while our civilian institutions are heading toward more participative definition
and control, the post-Vietnam military will follow a more conventional and author-
itarian social organization. This reversion to tradition may well be the param-
doxical quality of the "new" military of the 1970's. (BM104)

10. Model III: Segmented or Pluralistic

Moskos does not foresee a homogenous military somewhere between
the civilianized and traditional poles, but rather one internally segmented into
areas which will be either more convergent or divergent than the present, and this
segmentation will increasingly characterize intra-as well as inter-military organization.

Most likely, the armed forces will keep their overall present framework,
but bifurcate internally, along civilianized and traditional lines. The traditional
or divergent line will stress customary modes of military organization (old regimental
system). The convergent sector will operate on principles common to civil admin-
istration and corporate structure. Contemporary examples are: the Corps of
Engineers and the Coast Guard. (BM104)

11. What are the implications? (1) A military force with increasing individual rights and decreasing rigidity in social control would disaffect career personnel, while making service only marginally more palatable to resistant members. 
(2) A traditional military would be incapable of maintaining the organization at required complexity, or attracting qualified personnel. More ominous, it could develop anti-civilian values, tearing the basic fabric of democratic ideology. 
(3) The pluralistic model, with compartmentalized segments, holds the best promise for maintaining organizational effectiveness and consonance with civilian values, and may well define the quality of emergent American society. (BM104)

12. Janowitz insists that there are limits to any civilianizing tendency: 
(1) The necessity for naval and air units to carry on the hazardous tasks of continuous and long-range reconnaissance and detection, demand organizational forms that will bear the stamp of conventional formations. In the future, even with fully automated missile systems, conventional units must be maintained as auxiliary forces for the delivery of new types of weapons. 
... the need to maintain combat readiness and to develop centers of resistance after initial hostilities ensures the continued importance of military organization and authority. 
(2) Deterrence still requires an organization prepared for combat. 
(3) ... the ideal image of the military continues to be the strategic commander, not the military technician. It is the image of a leader, motivated by national patriotism and not by personal monetary gain, who is capable of organizing the talents of specialists for all types of contingencies. (BB164)

13. Likewise, leadership based on traditional military customs must share power with experts not only in technical matters but also in matters of organization and human relations. Specific organizational adaptations of the military even foreshadow developments in civilian society, since the military must press hard for innovation and respond more rapidly to social change. For example, the continued need for
retraining personnel from operational to managerial positions and from older to newer techniques has led to a more rational spreading of higher education throughout the career of the military officer, rather than the concentrated dosage typical of the civilian in graduate or professional school.

Thus the impact of technology has forced a shift in the practices of military authority. Military authority must shift from reliance on practices based on domination to a wider utilization of manipulation. Traditional or ascriptive authority relies heavily on domination, while manipulation is more appropriate for authority based on achievement. By domination we mean influencing a person's behavior by giving explicit instruction as to desired behavior without reference to the goals sought. Domination involves threats and negative sanctions rather than positive incentives. It tends to produce mechanical compliance. Manipulation involves influencing an individual's behavior less by giving explicit instructions and more by indirect techniques of group persuasion and by an emphasis on group goals. It describes the efforts of leadership when orders are issued and the reasons for them are given.

...Manipulation involves positive incentives rather than physical threats; manipulation does retain the threat of exclusion from the group as a control. The indirect techniques of manipulation are designed to take into account the individual soldier's predispositions.

Yet the long-term outcome of the current transformation from an emphasis on domination to increased reliance on new forms of authority is problematic. It is abundantly clear that present forms are highly transitional. (BB164)

Members of a military group must recognize their greater mutual dependence on the technical proficiency of their team members than on the formal authority structure. The military organization dedicated to victory is forced to alter its techniques of training and indoctrination. Rather than developing automatic reaction to combat dangers, it requires a training program designed to teach men not only to count on instruction from superiors but also to exercise
their own judgment about the best response to make when confronted with given types of danger.

The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture.

The professional soldier is also required to acquire an increasing number of skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and even political leaders. Professionalism as a measure of adaptation to social change thereby implies that the classic distinction and tension between the troop commander—the manager of men and machines and the staff officer—the manager of plans and coordination—tend to become less clear-cut.

Officers are likely to spend less time with their own organizations and an increased amount of time in extra-organizational activities. Such activities provide the officer with an area of initiative outside of specific hierarchical control, and involve evaluations by colleagues on the basis of diversified professional situations. He is thus required to develop a new set of skills in the form of committee behavior, resembling those of the political leader: evaluating the relative weight of the recommendations of various staff sections, mustering support and answering counter-arguments, and sensing an incipient consensus. (BB164)

15. Some examples of challenges demanding broadened perspectives in the military sphere might include such complex tasks as the psychological and political techniques of limited conflict, contrasted with massive applications of firepower; understanding and acting upon Vietnamese value systems; the creation, design, and social implications of ABM systems and complex electronic communications networks. (BM53)

16. From the long-range perspective of a career, however, important points of tension persist. Strains are especially prominent in the transition from the emotional and technical requirements of a combat officer assigned to duties at sea, with tactical ground units, or with air crews, to the requirements of higher command. An increasing number of those who survive the rigors of indoctrination,
training, and initial assignments, may expect to move on to positions which will require the development of general managerial skills applicable to a wide range of assignments including politically orientated ones.

17. ...scientific specialists tend to have narrow definitions of their tasks and to be relatively unconcerned with the political and social implications of the weapons systems that they promote. With an assured position in the hierarchy and steadily rising prestige in scientific matters, they frequently are permitted to pass judgment on broad professional issues for which their specialized technical experiences have not adequately equipped them. This trend produces new strains in the military establishment and may impede the development of broader perspectives. (BB164)

18. ...As the destructiveness of weapons systems increases, short of total destruction, the importance of initiative increases for the military formations that survive the initial exchange of hostilities.

The combat soldier, regardless of military arm, when committed to battle, is hardly the model of Max Weber's ideal bureaucrat following rigid rules and regulations. In certain respects he is the antithesis. The combat fighter is not routinized and self-contained. Rather, his role is one of constant improvisation, regardless of his service or weapon. Improvisation is the keynote of the individual fighter or combat group. The impact of battle destroys men, equipment, and organization that need constantly to be brought back into some form of unity through on-the-spot improvisation. In battle the planned division of labor breaks down with the occurrence of contingencies not anticipated by tactical doctrine. Persistent initiative and improvisation would, however, lead to a gradual dissipation of tactical units, unless the integrity of the larger organization was not periodically reinforced. Withdrawal to reserve locations provides opportunities for reaffirmation of the doctrine and values of the larger organization, reevaluation of improvised solutions, and realignment of personnel. (BB164)

19. But military authority, if it is to be effective, must strive to make combat units its organizational prototype, and the character of military organization can best be seen in combat units. In combat the maintenance of
initiative has become a requirement of greater importance than the rigid enforcement of discipline. Despite the proliferation of military technology, all three services are dependent on the initiative of a very small percentage of the fighting personnel, who are willing to press the attack under all circumstances. (BB164)

20. Yet what relevance will the primary group concept have in years to come? Extrapolation from present trends may leave crucial questions unanswered. Limited or unconventional warfare requires increased reliance on the effectiveness of small groups, operating alone or in widely dispersed formations, over long periods of time, with limited support from the larger organization. (BB164)

21. Much thought will have to be given to the problem of social cohesion in units using new types of weapons, such as submarines designed to remain underwater for prolonged periods, or highly mobile infantry units equipped with low-yield atomic tactical weapons, or the like. While the current interest in the human problems of new weapons is mainly physiological, it will ultimately be necessary to discover and rediscover the social elements in these weapons systems. (BB164)

22. But what is the nature of the perceived threat in the cold war establishment, and how does a sense of mission influence social cohesion under conditions that require maintaining a state of alert, rather than responding to an actual military threat?

For the great bulk of the military establishment, organizational life is an eight to four-thirty job, with interruption for field training or administrative emergencies. Residence off the military establishment, the proximity of family and the importance of civilian contacts dilute the sense of urgent military mission. In units on the alert the function of the primary group is not only to prepare the individual for the pressures of combat but also to train him to withstand the tensions of maintaining a state of operational readiness. (BB164)

23. Consequently, with the breakdown of the older forms of domination, and the emergence of indirect controls, the question of the proper degree of intimacy between officers and enlisted men, and among enlisted men of different rank, becomes an area of ambiguity and stress. (BB164)
Organization

24. Allison advocates reduction of general-purpose forces to levels that characterized the Eisenhower period. This would entail no significant reduction in the American capability to meet a major European contingency, and would leave a small force for dealing with a minor contingency. This would compel the Services and operating commands to recalculate and rejustify requirements that have escaped fundamental reexamination since 1961. (BP7)

25. The future recruitment and retention of naval personnel must be viewed in light of the possibility of a withdrawn and cooperative world—with the resultant need for smaller navies and fewer personnel. If this projection is accurate, the popular support for the military is likely to be lower. (The draft will only be needed for world conflict.) Civilian political activism will have a military counterpart. Demands may be made for the impartial adjudication of grievances, as well as collective-bargaining (Military-unions?) Military fringe benefits will be viewed as less of an advantage; and it will be difficult and costly for the military to maintain comparability with the increasing leisure of civilian employees. This may possibly lead to the use of the Blue and Gold crew concept for the majority of vessels. Upward mobility groups, such as women, minorities, and underprivileged youth, may provide important sources of Navy manpower.

26. The earlier retirement age in civilian life, and the youth orientation of American culture may bring about a younger officer corps and a shorter naval career. By 1990, for example, officers might achieve flag rank at age 35, and return to civilian life by 45. A similar pattern may emerge for enlisted men.

Technical sophistication could foster basic changes in the personnel structure. Officers will be highly educated and trained to command and manage naval forces. This can lead to a variety of career paths and further specialization. Officer systems engineers are technically trained and frequently retrained for supervision of complex weapons systems as technical specialists. Enlisted specialists will be technically trained to operate and maintain particular equipment. In
order to compete with civilian industry, it may require payment on civilian pay scales; thus abandoning pay parity within the military based on rank. Ordinary seamen will be unskilled persons, moderately paid, who will volunteer either for a few years, or in anticipation of education and training leading to an enlisted specialty or officer status. There may be exact civilian-military counterparts for specialties. This will lead to increased mobility and the possibility of lateral entry.

The Navy needs to develop seminars as well as deep further study of personnel problems, concentrating on recruitment, retention, increased leisure, the implications of increased technical complexity, training disadvantaged persons, personnel motivation, and job satisfaction. (BM43)

27. Janowitz states that the new skill structure of the military establishment is one in which specialization penetrates down the hierarchy into the formations assigned to combat. The concentration of persons engaged in purely military occupations is now a minority, and even the combat occupations involve technical specialization. The transferability of skill to civilian occupations is extremely widespread. Top-ranking generals and admirals, particularly, have many nonmilitary functions to perform which involve general managerial skills. (BB164)

28. The vestiges of ascriptive status and authority in the form of seniority as a criterion of assignment and promotion remain to complicate the incorporation of new skill groups. Thus,

for example, the close link between age and rank in the military profession, particularly in naval organization, sets narrow limits within which skill is accorded positions of authority. In short, the hierarchical features of the military establishment strengthen the ascriptive sources of authority and compound the tasks of introducing new skill groups into the military structure.... Consequently, there exists a deep source of organizational strain in military organization because the authority structure does not articulate with its skill structure. (BB164)
29. The extent to which reliance on informal channels is an acceptable norm is revealed by the fact that an overwhelming majority (77 per cent) of the officers favored direct staff intervention in a maintenance or supply problem occurring for the first time. In short, in the normal course of events, informal and unofficial staff intervention would be used. (BB164)

30. Moskos comments on the movement of the late 1960's toward greater control of institutional decisions by persons most affected by those decisions, leading toward a more participative and democratic model of social organization. In 1969, there was an agitation for this within the service. However, it probably will not be sustained beyond the Vietnam War. The military membership of a volunteer force will be more acquiescent to established procedures and organizational goals. (BM103)

Interaction with American Society

31. Janowitz has said that by custom, law, and political necessity, the professional soldier must be nonpartisan in domestic political affairs. Yet, it is clear that the professional officer requires considerable sensitivity to the political and social consequences of military operations.

The relations between troops and native civilians in overseas areas, the conduct of counter-guerrilla warfare, the management of foreign-assistance programs, the implementation of military alliances, and negotiations for arms control, are as much political and social arrangements as they are military operations. (BM164)

32. Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Bruce Palmer, observed that it is rare in American traditions to view the military in a favorable light. He maintained that the military must have pride in itself, its role, the nation, and the people. Furthermore, the Army needs to be aware of the real world and not withdraw from it. Palmer believes that the normal problems confronting the phasing-down of the Army are exacerbated by the vast social, political, and technological changes taking place within our society. He insists that the
Army has done a reasonable job, given the limitations imposed upon it, and that it must meet its problems squarely and forthrightly. (BN54)

33. Concerning the end of conscription, General Westmoreland has said on more than one occasion that the nation cannot have it both ways. If America wants a "zero draft," it will have to grant high enough respect to the uniform to ensure adequate forces sustained on a voluntary basis. (BP150)

34. One analyst foresees critical aspects turning on leadership. Within ten years, nearly all of today's general officers will have been retired. This problem must be recognized: the refinement of systems which identify and groom the most promising younger officers for the top command posts—the combination of professional military expertise with advanced education and management skills. (BP376)

35. Professor Amos Jordan, USMA, summarized the chief concerns of a recent conference of the military role in America:

(1) It is necessary to have a little more in the way of insurance, in terms of force levels and force readiness, than we are going to get with the kind of budgets and strategic guidance that will likely be politically and economically tolerable.

(2) There is growing alienation between the whole society's values, life styles, and ways of doing things, and the traditional military ethos and hierarchical, authoritarian structure.

(3) There is some preference among military men for some other organization to play the increasing role allotted to the military in law and order, because of exacerbation of civilian-Army alienation.

(4) The services do contribute to society indirectly by returning better citizens (trained in skills and attitudes).

(5) There is reason to be concerned about differences in costs, quality, distribution of skills, intellect, and education between volunteers and draftees. (BM160)

36. Professor Osgood predicts that any administration in the near future would be extremely cautious in acquiring new commitments or obligations for the use of American military forces, and even more cautious about the direct use of
American armed forces in new situations, especially in internal wars. The clearest case in which American armed forces might be used would be to oppose overt aggression against an ally of the United States. (BM117)

37. Moskos predicts that the American military establishment will be affected during the next decade by several critical factors:
   (1) The continuing racial turmoil and deprivations suffered by the blacks in the larger society.
   (2) A redefinition of its institutional role on the part of the military establishment.
   (3) The growth of anti-militarism in civilian society, along with internal agitation in the armed forces. (BM103)

38. The greater likelihood of blacks to select a service career means that the military establishment is undergoing a significant change in its NCO corps. Such an outcome reflects not only the "pull" of the appeals offered by a racially more equalitarian institution, but also the "push" generated by the plight of the black in the less egalitarian circumstances of American society as a whole. (BM103)

39. The declining role of Reserve forces is one of the aspects accompanying the accretion of power by the Executive, at the expense of Congress and state legislatures, which have been the traditional champions of Reserve forces. In addition, the need for highly-trained and operational combat units in being undercut the justification for large Reserves. This development may also be part of the "divergence" trend. (BM103)

40. Several models of standing forces have been suggested, such as the constabulary concept, developed by Morris Janowitz; the surveillance forces concept, developed by Thomas Schelling (BS2); and a number of proposals developed for peacekeeping forces in connection with the United Nations.

41. Deagle enumerates some prerequisites for a successful volunteer force: financial incentives; reform of the military justice system; development of an
independent grievance system; steps to make military working conditions comparable to
civilian conditions, such as by elimination of reveille, and a shorter garrison
work week; relaxation of regulations about hair; creation of more barracks privacy.
On the whole, a successful volunteer force will have a plummeting effect on
Reserve force levels. (BM41)

42. In the shift from conscription toward ascription, the military will have
a new role of social engineering regarding America's underclasses. This will
perhaps be analogous to "civic-action" theories applied by American strategists to
underdeveloped countries. The indicated action here is to be prepared to bring
the lower-class volunteers up to middle-class standards. (BB246)

43. Yarmolinsky does not see a direct role for the military in helping
to solve the most pressing social problems. However, the problem of the military
as a major institution of American society will remain unique. The two elements
that go to make up adequate public understanding of the military are:

(a) wider exposition of the underlying factual and
theoretical bases for the force structure we are maintaining;
and planning; and

(b) acceptance by both sides of the idea that national
security needs are not automatically to be preferred over
other needs.
The relative priority of particular needs will have to be decided on a case-by-
case basis. (BM160)

44. General William T. Sherman, addressing graduates of the U.S.M.A.
in 1889 said that our Army "may be used, and is constantly used, in connection
with the civil administration of government; yet war is its true element, and
battle its ultimate use."

45. The participation of the armed forces in civic action can be overdone
when it results in neglect of primary military missions. The armed forces are not
unaware of the experience of the 4th Division of the Indian Army. In 1960, its
commander, General B. M. Kaul, suspended training for a year and set the
division to construction work. In the 1962 brief war with China, the 4th
Division was virtually wiped out by the Chinese (and the constructed buildings were not very good). The memory rankles in the Indian Army.

46. There appears to be, however, great current interest in getting involved with non-military programs. Efforts should be made to lessen the isolation of military persons on military bases. Civic participation should be encouraged—school boards, public panels, government advisory boards, etc. The prospect of trade unions without the right to strike is a real possibility in the military.

The military must divest itself of the idea, say both Janowitz and Biderman, that it is in the "killing" business. It must reconstitute vitality by using its wide range of capabilities and facilities for coping with a wide range of national emergency functions. The military is already considerably involved in natural disasters. A future major frontier in social action involves environmental control. Extensive participation could even influence new transnational forms. (BM83; BS11)

47. The dramatic responses to the new requirements range from the creation of Special Forces to deal with guerrilla warfare, to the emergence of the civic action concept in which the military seek to be agents of social change by using their resources for economic and social welfare activities. South Vietnam is thus completing the political education of the professional military officer, a process which was initiated in the Korean Conflict. (BB164)

48. An alternative concept to a volunteer armed force is a broadened conception of national service. Alternative paths would be available: military service overseas and domestic peace corps duty, as well as a national youth corps for those needing specialized training and remedial programs in order to insure a greater equality of opportunity. Such national service could either be of two years' duration, or a scale of points such as was developed for demobilization in World War II and rotation in the Korean Conflict, could provide a workable and equitable formula for length of service. (BB164)
In reference to the concept of national service, Janowitz predicts that voluntary national service will come in piecemeal fashion. Moskos, Biderman, and Mead insist that the United States accepts incremental change but is averse to comprehensive social planning. Many elements of national service already exist in the Peace Corps, Teacher Corps, VISTA, Public Health Service, Department of Agriculture, and the Forest Service.

About 5% of each age cohort, between 18-22, now have considerable experience. A system with parallel civilian and military channels would involve perhaps 60% of each age cohort. (BP370)

A proposal by Albert Biderman is to delete the term "armed" from the designation of United States forces, and eliminate "death dealing" as the basic definitional purpose of the military. The military must stop glorifying violence. Pathologies arise from non-consummatory activities of many members, such as almost exclusive engagement in standby and practice activities, rather than real achievement.

There will be increased difficulty in maintaining the military establishment on the prevailing moral, ideological, political and economic basis; distaste for the military calling is deep in American society.

Yet collective purposes remain and some organization with military characteristics is required to build transportation systems, educate the young, develop the sciences, handle great natural disasters, cope with the crises of a multi-racial society, or space travel.

The military is the principal organization in our society which has, unapologetically, a collectivistic value orientation. For the foreseeable future, a major form of national service will continue to be in the military. (BM1-, BPC)
51. Biderman offers further concrete suggestions for military participation in social-action activities of high legitimacy:

- instead of Air Force practice bombing, perform many of the same actions in fighting fires
- the military must overcome the objections of competition with private enterprise, and union jurisdiction
- provide air ambulance service
- perform air reconnaissance for environmental, geological, and engineering data
- expand activities which are performed now, but on a small scale: haylift, exploration, cartography, public health, remote area transportation
- seek foreign-area employment: disaster relief, international cooperation

The military should regard itself as counterviolence forces; reverse the tendency to ritualize violence. Its primary role is to neutralize violence. The military should capture for peace efforts what militaristic patriotism used to do for war efforts. (BM13)

52. Without belaboring the situation here, something of the condition referred to by Janowitz as "unemployment" (and also related to civic action) can be gleaned from this brief letter to the editor of the New York Times:

Today is the first constructive day I have ever spent in the Army Reserve. Today, instead of my regular Army Reserve meeting, which is characterized by naps, card games, obsolete G.I. training films, lousy food, haircut inspections and groups of fatigue-clad G.I.'s sticking out like sore thumbs in diners and bars, I went into the slums of Arthur Park.

I went with twenty other Army reservists. We went with rakes and brooms, tru 's and bulldozers. We worked side by side with ghetto residents in an effort to convert a garbage-strewn lot into a place where the kids could play. Today, rather than complain about Army Reserve meetings, I worked straight through lunch cleaning up a vacant lot.

Tonight my muscles are tired and my hands are sore and cut. And I feel good.
53. Army Times reported that discussions are underway to allow military personnel to serve in Action Volunteer programs (perhaps for the last year of duty). (BN1)

54. Admiral Zumwalt has strongly encouraged the involvement of Navy men in community programs such as: Chamber of Commerce; social clubs; church groups; the P.T.A.; and charity organizations. He further stated that, if Navy funds were not so austere, he would subsidize more involvement in the affairs and organizations of communities. (BG93)

55. The Canadian Armed Forces are involved in what the U.S. Army calls "nation building." (It is also called "civic action," "social action," or "community action.") Both Canadian civil servants and military officers consider the armed forces one of the best means of overcoming division inherent in a bilingual society. According to one observer, it plays a "major role in promoting national unity." The Canadian Army's involvement in activities contributing to national development is analogous to the role of the U.S. Army in the 19th century.

Activities with which the Canadian Armed Forces are involved include the following:

1. environmental security
2. detection of pollution at sea
3. mineral exploration
4. survey and production of maps
5. bridge building

Resistance to these activities by trade unions or local authorities is seldom encountered in the Far North of the country. In these vast areas, "the (armed) forces are the only organization with the manpower and skill to build the airstrips and bridges that will open the frontier." (BN398)

56. Regarding proposal for national service, the following question is raised: What's in it for "certain groups?" For example, youth from privileged segments may be motivated by the concept of "good works." Youth
from less privileged segments may be interested in acquiring occupational skills and education.

The military may turn into a class and race-stratified system. Factors motivating service volunteers include: personnel reasons; patriotic reasons; draft-motivated reasons; and self-advancement. A national volunteer service program could evolve into a two-track system:

1. lower—for salvaging poverty-scarred youth;
2. higher—for resolving identity crises through altruistic activities of upper middle-class youths. (BP370)

57. During the past several years, the Pentagon has demonstrated a growing interest in taking on tasks to help solve national social problems. Initiatives taken by the military have included "Project 100,000"; civilian community service programs; summer youth employment program; and Project Transition (to find departing servicemen civilian jobs). Some Service officials feel that, due to money problems, these projects must receive less attention. However, the Services can benefit by closer relationships with the civilian world in a time of widespread discontent and occasional mistrust of the military.

58. A DOD directive defines "Domestic Action" as any activity designed to alleviate social and economic problems of the nation. These can be sub-divided into six general areas:

1. Equal opportunity
2. Manpower
3. Procurement (minority, business, areas of unemployment and underemployment)
   - Resources (equipment, facilities, property, etc.)
4. Community relations
5. Transfer of technical knowledge. (BG72)

59. The DOD's Domestic Action Council's first six-month report listed the following achievements:

1. A program of minority hiring and upgrading.
2. Pressed contractors to increase and upgrade minority hiring.
3. Project TRANSITION, a program of educational and vocational training for veterans returning to civilian life.

4. Project REFERRAL, a service for the 60-65,000 who retire each year.

5. Project HIRE, a program to train 200 citizens native to Alaska per year, for work in DOD programs.

6. Project VALUE, a program to train and place 1000 hard-core unemployed youth in DOD-related jobs.

7. Youth Employment Program, a program to get 4.2 youths per 100 as regular employees, 75% of them disadvantaged; total of 44,500.

8. Over 275,000 disadvantaged young were provided with recreation, cultural, educational and training activities on military installations during the summer of 1969; and more since.

9. Spin-off of technical knowledge to hospitals, modular housing, aero-medical evacuation, and other developments. (BG71)

60. The armed forces are attempting to prepare youth for the civilian market place; and to correct structural failures—social, educational, and economic—of American society. (BM103)

61. An article written by an Army lieutenant has urged the Army to publicize programs, like the military-advisor program, which are constructive rather than destructive, in order to encourage young officers to make the military a career. (BN62)

62. "A civilian-oriented military leadership for a civilian-oriented country" is the chief benefit the United States can reap from a thriving ROTC, according to the 1969 report of the Defense Department's Special Committee on ROTC. The committee was composed of academic representatives from six universities and officers from each of the three military services. (BP408)

63. Janowitz feels that to reduce reliance on, or to eliminate the draft, and the recruitment of a fully volunteer force with longer tours of duty for
officers and enlisted personnel, coupled with the shift from a mobilization to a standby format, will make the military much more of a self-contained establishment. (BM81)

64. The task of effective institution building will be to develop a military profession which is closely articulated with civilian society. This raises the issue of organizational vitality and legitimacy, as well as sensitivity to change. (BM81)

65. Janowitz foresees that the standby force of ground troops, with its heavy emphasis on air transportability, will become more like the current Air Force. Its organizational life will be contained mainly within the confines of a military base. Given the limited supply of uniformed personnel, the pressure will be to remove military personnel from logistical roles; and thereby opportunities for civilian contacts and experiences will be diminished. The high headquarters will be removed from metropolitan centers and placed on military bases, or in remote areas. The trend will be toward garrison life, in which each military professional will strive for the high prestige assignment of an operational role. Even residence and social contacts will be more and more garrison-based, since fewer personnel will be living off base. Preparation for military action will separate the armed forces both in residence and daily existence from the larger society. (BM81)

66. Many young people today do not believe that work is a virtue, that failure is bad, or that rational knowledge is more important than subjective experience. They tend to be anti-institution, and to feel that the person is more important than people, groups or things. They may also have little respect for historical proof. Changes to these attitudes have to be resurrected in educational institutions, as well as in the Services. (BP42)

67. A large element of the "Now Generation" that will serve in the Armed Forces in the early 1970's will hold anti-military views and doubt the correctness of United States policies.
A smaller segment will actively and openly oppose military leadership. The majority, as well as the public, will continue to be exposed to a growing, organized, sophisticated, anti-military propaganda campaign.

There will be unusually large numbers of college graduates and about equal numbers with limited education (Project 100,000) in the military. This spread in mental ability will result in special problems concerning training, job assignment, and supervision.

Individual leadership will be very important, with special problems concerning drug usage and race issues. Established leadership principles and techniques are adequate, yet special attention should be paid to problems of indifference, inconsistency, and insincerity. (BG22)

68. The changing societal values, standards, and traditions are straining relationships between the Army and society, and between the Army and the soldier. The lowering enlisted and officer retention rates, growing dissatisfaction and dissent within the Army, and rising draft evasion and racial problems within the Army all point to these changes. These occurrences may indicate return to the periodic anti-militarism of American society. (BP383)

69. The military must keep abreast of the analyses of value-forming and attitude-forming influences of American young people; and seek to participate at an appropriate level and in appropriate ways with the legitimate agencies of society acting as conditioning influences. It must, at the very least, keep aware of what attitudes are raised pro and con military forces.

Redirections

70. There is value in a research system on value change among three populations: young people before military service, Navy servicemen over time; and post-Navy personnel. An annual Navy personnel survey ought to provide some data on repeated questions over time. It could be similar to the annual
American Council on Education survey of incoming freshmen.

Jacobs suggests that we might seek to categorize composite leadership styles appropriate to different situations; for example—group memberships. Hypothesizing on the future context of military small groups, Jacobs sees them as hedonistic and individualistic. What types of leadership style and changes will be effective in this milieu? (BB161)

71. The role of women in the Navy is overdue for a reappraisal. Are women to participate in the managerial path to command and flag? There is a need for the reformulation of rationale and role definition for women in the Navy. In the context of change in the role of American women, there must be a determination of the legal and proper position of women in the Navy. Are the goals to be equality of sexes or equality of opportunity? Will the Navy provide viable career patterns, with additional career fields? There must be publicity for women's programs, while keeping in mind cost-effectiveness considerations. (BM37)

72. There is usefulness in value-study as a supplement to demographic analysis related to training, leadership, and misfits.

Systems are already in operation to use various analyses of demographic data to identify potential leaders; misfits; and successful trainees in various courses, etc. There is also a proposal to study the individual's values and systems as supplementary indicators. These must be correlated and verified.

As population-limiting programs and family-planning programs become more widespread, it may be that the military Services will find it unavoidable (or to their interest) to provide family planning advice, particularly for young enlisted marrieds. The military can possibly provide incentives and disincentives related to family limitation.

Five suggestions have been offered for how the military can demonstrate that no conflict exists between today's creative participation and the more traditional concepts of duty, honor, country:
1. Enrich the operating sphere by domestic civic-action programs, accelerating social, racial, and economic growth; exchange programs with colleges and local governments; dialogue between the military and civilians.

2. The services should offer the greatest of participative management possible, consistent with discipline and mission. Some go further and question whether the "soft core" should also be fighters?

3. Challenge bright junior men and reward their excellence. Men want and need recognition for genuine achievements—General Ferguson calls it "psychic income." Such recognition is not to be had through making a bright young man a library officer or engaging in what General John C. Meyers calls "Mickey Mouse and Bunny Rabbit programs." The elimination of outdated concepts is needed.

4. There is no need to panic yet. Vocal antimilitarism is a traditional part of America. Approximately 98 draft dodgers were killed in riots in the first few months of the Civil War. The first shots of the Mexican War were fired while Congress was preparing to abolish West Point. About 67% of the population opted against the Korean War in late 1950.

5. There must be a means for military men to register legitimate—even controversial—feelings without fear of censure. (BP226)

73. In view of reduced manpower, there may be a need for streamlined units, developed at about half of full-war strength. These need not be stripped, crippled units, but each as self-reliant in its reduced structure as its full-strength counterpart is in its larger structure. Then, develop a fully mature doctrine to fit the reduced capabilities of this structure.

74. Yarmolinsky has written on the idea of hierarchy under attack, especially in institutions and during the formative years of potential recruits. He proposes that there should be alternatives to normal career programs; earlier participation in top-level decision making; and multiple careers in a single
lifetime. The idea of profession is being eroded. The whole question of job structure is one that is bound to trouble civilians in society more and more. Most people work less and less, while a few people at the top work harder and harder. (BM160)

75. In the future, will there be a greater effort to accommodate the recruit to the Service or the Service to the recruit; or will there be a greater effort to make military service more acceptable to middle-class young men? Yarmolinsky feels that a mix of the two efforts is needed. With an increase in underclass personnel, there will be a need for greater in-service training; if there is an increase in middle-class personnel, there will have to be accommodation of the military life-style to the revolution of rising expectations. (BM160)

76. One relevant perspective is so self-evident that it may seem totally unnecessary to express it; nevertheless, there is a possibility of its being buried under the heavy weight of the preceding observations and analyses, many of which are enunciated almost exclusively from the viewpoint of the United States, as though positive and negative American judgments will determine what will and will not take place in the world.

Let us be clear on this point at least: whether or not the United States requires military forces, and whether those forces will be large or small, of one kind or another, will not depend upon the views of Americans as to the legitimacy, morality, or propriety of war, violence, or military establishments, but upon the presence or absence of external predators in the world, upon the strength and locations of physical threats to America of those in control of potentially damaging physical power.

Thus, critical determinants of the size, nature, and location of American armed forces are not subject to control by any American, but are established by other political entities in the world political context. If there are two parties to an incipient quarrel and one wants peace but the other is determined that there shall be conflict, it will not be the desires of the peace party that will govern.
Hence, many of the forces for social change identified in this project can exert influence only up to a point; beyond that point, their influence will be only peripheral on central hard realities.