IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
MARINE COMBINED ACTION CONCEPT
IN FUTURE CONTINGENCIES

Joseph C. Story
Herbert H. Vreeland, 3rd

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6. ABSTRACT
The purpose of this report is to provide guidance to U. S. Marine Corps planners for the implementation of Combined Action Operations (CAO) in probable types of contingency situations, in particular types of environments, likely to develop in the midrange period (1974-1983). The report consists of six chapters, Chapter I relates the subject of the report to past HSR research on the Combined Action Program, and describes the Naval Amphibious Force, the Marine Amphibious Brigade and the Combined Action Unit in terms of characteristics, functions, resources and capabilities; Chapter II provides a realistic appraisal of the milieu of future insurgencies which might require the introduction of the Combined Action Units. Chapter III relates the missions and operational doctrine of the CAP to historical situations where the introduction of CAUs would have been appropriate, and to future situations which might require the deployment of CAUs. Chapter IV develops model scenarios of CAP involvement in hypothetical future insurgency situations in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Chapter V gives training and support requirements for future Combined Action operations and the final chapter presents conclusions and recommendations.

Havron, et al., Constabulary Capabilities for Low Level Conflict (1969)
Almott, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience (1969)
| KEY WORDS                                      | LINK A | | | | LINK B | | | | | LINK C | | | |
|------------------------------------------------|--------|---|---|---|--------|---|---|---|---|--------|---|---|---|---|
| Insurgency/counterinsurgency                   |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Stability operations                           |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Constabulary forces/operations                 |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Combined action program/forces/units/operations/ support |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Naval amphibious force                          |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Marine amphibious brigade                       |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Amphibious task force                           |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Battalion landing team                          |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Future contingencies                            |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Training/USMC units/local defense forces/requirements |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Security                                        |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Intelligence                                    |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Civic Action                                    |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Psychological operations                        |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Scenarios                                       |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Vietnam, Republic of                            |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Greece                                          |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Colombia                                        |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
| Thailand                                        |        |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |        |   |   |   |   |
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Submitted to:
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JCS
HHV

McLean, Virginia
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose and Scope of the Study

The purpose of this report is to provide guidance to U. S. Marine Corps planners for the implementation of Combined Action Operations (CAO) in probable types of contingency situations, in particular types of environments, likely to develop in the mid-range period (1974-1983). By extrapolating current political, economic, and social trends in the developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and relating these projected trends to current capabilities and future potentialities of the Marine Combined Action Program (CAP), it is intended to:

1. provide a broad outline of the critical elements of rural insurgency, as they relate to Combined Action Operations;

2. develop model contingency scenarios which may be used and/or adapted by CAP planners in the construction of specific regional or country training exercises; and,

3. refine current CAP training and support requirements to accord with the needs of the future, as reflected in the report's conclusions and recommendations.

The report consists of six parts:

Chapter I: Introduction
Chapter II: Preparing for Future Operations
Chapter III: Maximizing the Combined Action Potential
Chapter IV: Combined Action Operations in the Future
Chapter V: Training and Support Requirements for Future Combined Action Operations
Chapter VI: Conclusions and Recommendations.

In the first chapter, the subject matter of the report is related to past HSR research on the Combined Action Program; and the Naval Amphibious Force, the Marine Amphibious Brigade, and the Combined Action Unit (CAU) are described in terms of characteristics, functions, resources, and capabilities. The second chapter is concerned with a realistic appraisal of the milieu of future insurgencies which
might require the introduction of Marine CAUs. Chapter III relates the missions and operational doctrine of the CAP to historical situations where the introduction of CAUs would have been appropriate, and to future situations which might require the deployment of CAUs. Chapter IV develops model scenarios of CAP involvement in hypothetical future insurgency situations in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Chapter V gives training and support requirements for future Combined Action operations and the final chapter presents conclusions and recommendations.

B. Background

This report is the fourth in a series on the Combined Action Program prepared by HSR. The first report1 reviewed examples of American military involvement in five overseas constabulary operations undertaken during the twentieth century.2 Detailed examination of these case histories uncovered general principles and lessons relevant to the modern combined action concept. In addition to providing a solid body of evidence to confirm the effectiveness of constabulary forces in the past, the study points out several recurring shortcomings and tactical errors which should be remedied if Marine constabulary capabilities are to be maximized in the future.

The second report,3 an intensive review and analysis of the Marine CAP in Vietnam, confirmed the overall success and cost effectiveness of the program as a special counterinsurgency measure. Covering the development of the CAP concept from its beginnings in 1965 through mid-1969, this report is one of the most incisive evaluative descriptions of the Marine CAP experience in Vietnam available.


2 Philippine Constabulary (1901-1946), Fita Fita Guard in American Samoa (1900-1951), Garde d'Haiti (1916-1934), Guardia Nacional Nicaragua (1927-1933), and the Combined Action Program in Vietnam (1965-1971).

A synthesis of the first and second reports provides a broad overview of U.S. Marine combined action capabilities, past and present. Based on a detailed evaluation of the evidence of the past, the third report provides a basis for institutionalizing the experience of the Combined Action Force concept in Marine Corps training. In addition to affixing a firm CAP mission, the report spells out in detail both the training and support requirements of future combined action operations. Thus, since 1969, the historical antecedents of the Marine CAP have been examined, the CAP experience in Vietnam has been analyzed and evaluated, and out of this research, a general combined action mission, including training and support requirements, has been developed. Hence, combined action operations are projected into future hypothetical situations and physical environments in order to provide a baseline for Marine CAP contingency planning.

C. Combined Action Operations

Marine experience in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) serves as convincing proof of the merit of Combined Action Operations (CAO) in any future operation in which the operational and environmental characteristics are generally similar to those encountered in Vietnam. Further, the inherent readiness of Marine forces to conduct operations in a wide variety of situations and environments offers special opportunities and reasons to plan and prepare for the conduct of operations that incorporate as many of the combined action features as practicable. Counterinsurgency operations and those operations and deployments in the general category of "expeditions short of war" provide the most obvious opportunity to exploit the CAO potential. The unified, integrated aspects of CAO tend to improve the individual effectiveness of the forces of each nation, and the combined effectiveness provides one method to achieve a more favorable balance in the relative combat power. Further, the CAO forces, living and operating in the populated areas, bring security to the population and resources; deny those resources to the insurgents and provide

---

a basis for the development of procedures to identify and eliminate the insurgent infrastructure.

In consideration of the CAO potential in the variety of operations and deployments conducted by Marine forces, it seems worthwhile to explore the feasibility of some adaptation of CAO in virtually all situations except those that require an amphibious assault to defeat/dislodge an enemy. If an amphibious assault is then extended into operations to secure operating bases, it may become feasible to include operations generally along the line of combined actions in the populated areas within the area of operations.

The Combined Action operational concept was formulated by Marines in I Corps, RVN in 1965. The concept through growth and development became a binational program, organized and operated by mutual agreement and common directives under the control of the Commanding General, III MAF, and his Vietnamese counterpart the Commanding General, ARVN I Corps. The primary purpose of the program was to provide security to the people in hamlets and villages. At the operational level an integrated (binational) platoon, composed of a Marine rifle squad (augmented by a Navy hospital corpsman), and a platoon of RVN Popular Forces, was assigned to a village where it operated under the control of the district chief. The district chief, in turn, operated in a close relationship with the company commander of the Marine component of the CAP.

Within the framework of the Marine experience in RVN, as projected into future employment probabilities, likely future objectives and tasks for an integrated combined action force are as follows:

1. Provide external security.
   - Destroy or capture the insurgent enemy within the assigned area of responsibility.

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5 See *ibid.*, for a fuller discussion of the general mission and these mission elements.
• Protect friendly structure of government, local leaders and other elements of population which are enemy targets.
• Protect designated key installations and physical assets from enemy activity.

2. Provide internal security.
• Destroy or capture enemy infrastructure within assigned area of responsibility.
• Help maintain law and order.

3. Upgrade local forces.
• Conduct training for members of the paramilitary force to improve and enhance their knowledge and military skills and make them capable of independent performance of the security and pacification mission.
• Motivate and instill pride, aggressive spirit and confidence in local paramilitary forces, by instruction, example and the conduct of combined operations (joint patrols and ambushes).

4. Provide intelligence.
• Collect local intelligence for immediate use in local combined operations.
• Organize and operate intelligence networks for higher echelons.

5. Assist Community Development.
• Stimulate and assist in local civic action projects.
• Emphasize psychological operations to enhance community cohesion, political stability, and image of the local forces.

In a broad sense the kinds of situations and environments addressed in FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations, offer potential for some type of CAO—or some adaptation of the operational concepts of combined action. The summaries of conditions and environmental characteristics to follow, provide more specific criteria guidelines.

From the standpoint of operational feasibility, the basic conditions that should exist for the conduct of CAO are:
1. A friendly host country government that desires U. S. support and assistance in control or in a contest for control.

2. A host country military, or paramilitary, force with knowledge of the situation in the area of operations and some capability to provide security to populated areas, to integrate with the designated Marine force.

3. A U. S. counterinsurgency force capable of providing combat and logistic support to combined action forces within acceptable factors of time of response and reinforcement.

Some of the salient characteristics of the situation and environment that tend to make combined action operations feasible are:

1. A generally underdeveloped country of no fixed pattern of physical features, but likely to be marked by mountains, jungles, lowland crop areas and poor roads. Industries will be simple and the communications and commerce will be relatively unsophisticated. However, there may be elements of modern development throughout the structure, such as radio, telephone, roads and railways.

2. The population may be made up of any combination of ethnic backgrounds and histories, but is unlikely to be English speaking or of a culture similar to the U. S. Likely to be agrarian with homes grouped in villages. Education and literacy, while highly variable, will normally be low for the bulk of the adult population.

3. There will be a friendly host country government in being whose control is likely to be minimal. Degree of control and allegiance at levels comparable to the American state, county and town will vary. However, there must be a structure of some authority and responsibility at the town (village) and county (province) levels as an essential to a combined action mission.

4. The locale of combined action employment must have a paramilitary force with a local security mission as the basic structure with which the combined action unit fuses and integrates.

D. The Amphibious Task Force

The Amphibious Task Force (ATF) performs essentially the same tasks in CAO as in other operations in the general category of counterinsurgency. The assignment of operational elements, ships and support means is made in the same
The task organized force for a CAO force will be generally comparable to that of any other landing force of similar size in a similar operational environment. The normal arrangements for command, control, communications and support, between the ATF and the CAO landing force will be adjusted as appropriate in a spirit of cooperation and unity as prescribed in amphibious doctrine and developed through practice and experience. A summary of the types and operational capabilities of the elements of the ATF is set forth in paragraphs to follow.

The typical ATF contains the following amphibious shipping to transport, land and support the CAO landing force:

1. LPA (Amphibious Transport) with a troop capacity of approximately 1650; 22 landing craft; a helicopter platform that will accommodate all Marine helicopters up to CH-53; and communication facilities that can be used in any of the landing force communication nets.

2. LPH (Amphibious Assault Ship) with a troop capacity of approximately 1700; flight deck with an operating capacity of 7 medium helicopters (CH-46) or 4 heavy helicopters (CH-53), or a mix of light, medium and heavy helicopters; hangar deck with a stowage capacity of 19 medium or 11 heavy helicopters, or mixes of all types; communication nets for all troop uses, with special capabilities in fire support coordination and the monitoring and control of helicopter movements.

3. LSD (Dock Landing Ship) with a troop capacity of approximately 325 and the capability to transport and launch preloaded landing craft and amphibian vehicles. This ship can partially submerge the well deck and become a "floating dry dock" for docking and repair of small ships and craft. It also contains a helicopter platform.

4. LST (Tank Landing Ship), with a troop capacity of 390, for use mainly to transport amphibian vehicles, conventional vehicles and forces to the objective area.

Supporting task elements will perform the following tasks and functions to assist the CAO landing force to become established ashore and in the conduct of subsequent operations:
1. Mine sweep.

2. Guidance of landing craft and helicopters along specified lanes/routes to designated landing sites.

3. Delivery of all classes of equipment and supplies to designated beach areas and helicopter landing zones.

4. Coastal and riverine surveillance and intercept.

5. Anti-aircraft support.

6. Fire support by naval gunfire and fleet air.

7. Helicopter landing platforms for follow-on use to include landing and evacuation of personnel and supplies and the maintenance of helicopters.

8. Maintain a mobile sea base in readiness to provide support and/or assistance that may be needed and appropriate for the CAO landing force, with priority for readiness:
   a. Supporting fires.
   b. Movement of tactical reinforcement elements.
   c. Evacuation of casualties.
   d. Support and augment command, control, liaison and communication of the CAO by rotary and fixed wing aircraft and/or electronic communications facilities.
   e. Delivery of priority items required by the landing force: ammunition, rations, water, medical supplies, health and comfort items.
   f. Retraction of the CAO landing force.

E. Organization for Combined Action Operations

The organization for Combined Action Operations will normally consist of a Battalion Landing Team with a Basic T/O as shown in the Model Organizational Structure for Combined Action Operations (see Appendix A, page 167). The mobile sea base provided by the Amphibious Task Force enables the CAO landing force to exploit the ATF's mobility and full combat power, if necessary, and at the same time give proper attention to the integrated, unified combat and security actions conducted with the local paramilitary force.
The CAO landing force is assigned to four vessels for movement to the objective areas. In landing a reinforced battalion sized force, the headquarters, a reconnaissance platoon, and one combined action company might be carried by an Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH), and deployed by helicopter. A Dock Landing Ship (LSD) could be used to transport and launch an artillery battery and a tank platoon in preloaded landing craft and amphibious vehicles. A second combined action company and an 81 mm. mortar platoon could be carried in an Amphibious Transport (LPA), and the third combined action company and an Am Trac platoon might be assigned to a Tank Landing Ship (LST).

By 1975-76, a new multi-purpose Navy vessel, designed to replace several separate vessels now in use, is expected to be in service. This ship, the LHA, will handle all Marine vehicles, helicopters, and with some reinforcement of the flight deck, vertical take off and landing (VTOL) aircraft as well.
CHAPTER II
PREPARING FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

A. Building on the Past

The Tradition of Combined Action Operations

The use of combined action forces in operations against both regular and irregular opponents is a practice almost as ancient as organized warfare itself. In the broadest sense, combined action operations encompass mixed or independent, large and small unit ventures of coequal nations against a common enemy, or unified military efforts undertaken by principal and client states, such as the use of Nepalese Gurkha units incorporated into the army of Great Britain. The most common application of the combined action concept, however, has been during post-war military occupation and in colonial situations, since language and manpower constraints usually preclude effective control without local police, administrative, and often, military support. Large colonial powers, from Rome to France and England to the Soviet Union, universally have relied heavily on the use of indigenous police, paramilitary, and military forces to maintain order and control in conquered territories.

Because the United States has never aspired to be a colonial power, the range and breadth of such overseas combined action experience has been limited. Still, many examples may be found in American history of cross-cultural military cooperation. For example, from the days of the Pilgrims through the Indian Wars of the late 19th century, the importance of Indian allies and scouts in campaigns against hostile Indians has been documented by scholars and historians. Thus, far from being a recent innovation, combined action operations, in one form or another, have been common historically.

1Despite the contentions of some historians, the acquisition of the Philippines and other territories after the Spanish-American War cannot be compared to the rush for colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Americas by European powers in the 16th-19th centuries.
The U. S. Marines have by far the most extensive experience with combined action situations of the American military arms. The record of the Marines in combined action and constabulary type operations in such places as Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Haiti is well known, and has been studied intensively in recent years.

Particularly in view of the accomplishments of the Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam, considerable attention has been paid to mining the experience of the past. Some lessons which appear to be most appropriate in considering the requirements of future combined action operations are the following:

1. In terms of attaining or maintaining civil order, the Marine record has been consistently good—even under very adverse military, political, and climatic conditions.

2. In terms of accomplishing the goals and objectives of specific missions, the speed and efficiency of Marine operations have been a direct function of the guidance supplied by the U. S. civil and military hierarchy. For example, the initiation and development of the Philippine Constabulary was a much smoother operation due to the firm policy guidelines provided by Commissioner Taft, than was the case in either Nicaragua or Haiti where such guidance was lacking.

3. In terms of planning and tactics, Marine involvements of the past have shown the absence of an institutional memory in some areas. Such important tools of counterinsurgency warfare as amnesty programs, grievance systems, and the establishment of intelligence networks have been at times forgotten or ignored, or have been introduced only at a late date by some innovative individual.

4. In terms of Marine relations with local sources of power, confusion and lack of information has often tended to disrupt or delay operations, especially in the early stages. Improved liaison and predebarkation briefings may alleviate this problem somewhat in the future, but local jealousies and power struggles are an accepted fact in most rural, economically backward locales.

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Havron, et al., op. cit. Also other relevant works listed in bibliography.
5. In terms of civil affairs activities, there appears to be a propensity for Marines and American administrators to introduce such local improvements as roads, public works, and educational and health facilities, particularly if the Marine involvement is an extended one. Although the schools constructed in Haiti apparently were under-utilized, such efforts, particularly medical assistance, were important factors in the overall success of the long-term programs in the Philippines and American Samoa.

6. In terms of adjusting to different cultures and acquiring a knowledge of local customs and languages, the record of Marine expeditionary forces has varied with the amount of official emphasis and the length of the stay. Because combined action Marines will be totally immersed in a foreign culture at the local level, the better their preparation for such conditions, the higher will be their effectiveness.

7. In terms of carrying out combined action and constabulary operations with efficiency and dispatch, the quality of leadership in squad and platoon commanders repeatedly has been singled out as a critical element of success. Such evidence indicates that special training for CAP leadership positions would pay dividends.

This listing, gleaned from recent analyses of past combined action operations, reflects some of the factors which should receive special attention in planning for future contingencies.

One significant element common to all past Marine combined action involvements has been the high degree of control exercised by the United States. In every case, excepting South Vietnam, the Marines were either occupying a conquered territory, or were attempting to restore order to an area without an effective government. Even in Vietnam, American military influence at the local level was considerable, and de facto control and management of combined action forces was in the hands of the Marines.

Considering the nationalism and pride of many of the newly independent nations of the underdeveloped world, a future request for assistance may specify that the Marines either share command responsibility or be subordinated to a local commander. This is a distinct possibility since the landing force requested may be
relatively small numerically in relationship to the size of the military resources of the requesting nation. Although this question involves a policy issue outside the scope of this paper, the possible problem of command responsibility in future combined action operations should be considered by Marine policy planners.

The Vietnam Experience

Again, by drawing on recent research on the combined action experience in South Vietnam, some judgments may be derived bearing on future contingency situations. Although the Vietnam Combined Action Program (CAP) probably provides a good overall view of what to expect in the conduct of future combined operations, some aspects of the involvement in all probability are atypical. Here, the general milieu of the Vietnam experience as it relates to possible future insurgency environments is examined briefly.

The setting of possible future operations will approximate the conditions found in South Vietnam's I Corps in many respects. Rural areas of the underdeveloped nations, with innumerable minor variations, are much the same the world over. For example, the climate will be uncomfortable, and the people will be organized in extended family units and live in small hamlets or villages adjacent to their fields and flocks. Levels of income, education, health, and nutrition will be low by American standards. The central government will be far away and little understood or appreciated by the local people.

On the other hand, some factors which affected the Combined Action Program as it evolved in Vietnam are not likely to recur. For example, the CAP was initiated in July 1965, long after the intensity of the insurgency had reached a high level in both the country and the area of operations. Marine combined action platoons around Danang, however, achieved an enviable record, and late entry into the conflict did not seriously affect CAP capabilities in Vietnam. Still, most

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3 Bruce C. Allnutt, op. cit. Also see the Bibliography on the record of the CAP in South Vietnam.
authorities agree that the odds for success against an insurgent enemy are multiplied if counterinsurgency forces can be introduced early in the game. Considering the special nature of the CAP approach, it is probable that requests for CAP assistance in the future will be limited to relatively low level conflicts.

As a corollary, there will probably be a difference in scale between Vietnam and future assignments. CA forces will be deployed as part of the spectrum of capabilities built into, and in most cases limited to, the Marine Amphibious Brigade. Hence the CA force mission as well as the type and level of support accorded thereto will be constrained by the overall mission and air and ground support capabilities of the parent force.

A third element not apt to be encountered again in the coming decade is an enemy of the tenacity, experience, and durability of the Viet Cong. The point here is that the Viet Cong and its predecessor organizations have been in action almost continuously since the early 1940's and have built up an impressive organization and village infrastructure over the years. Historically, only the insurgents in Malaya and the Hucks in the Philippines have had the time and the ability to build up fighting forces of comparable quality in the post-World War II era. Marines should not underestimate the quality of future opponents, but since CAP forces have been effective against the Viet Cong, there is good reason to believe that combined action operations will be successful in future insurgency situations.
B. Anticipating the Environment

The Physical Setting

With the exception of the landing in Lebanon in 1958, the physical setting of Marine overseas operations consistently has been harsh, uncomfortable, and hazardous to the health. The future holds no promise of any change in such conditions. In all likelihood, the future arena of combined action involvement will be somewhere between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn, wherein lie over 80 percent of the countries of the economically undeveloped world.

Climatic conditions will be too hot, too humid, too wet, or too arid in comparison with the temperate zones of the earth. However, historically, Marines have always fought well despite extremes of weather. To a large extent, harsh weather is assumed and countermeasures, to the extent possible, are built into the Marine training, logistical, and support systems. Considering the number and incidence of diseases endemic to the underdeveloped areas and the low levels of health care and nutrition, these harsh weather conditions probably will burden insurgent forces just as much, or more than the Marines.

As with the climate, the terrain to be encountered may be assumed to be difficult. Since one of the primary CAP responsibilities will be to protect and control population and resource concentrations, combined action forces will operate mainly in and around rural settlements. This will entail some degree of care in the movement and deployment of forces in order to minimize damage to crops and property. Subsistence farmers have few material goods and their sympathies will tend to turn to the side that causes them the least harm and inconvenience. The lack of rural roads (usually only cart tracks and footpaths), means that there will be almost always some measure of vehicular damage to local lands, and plans should be made to provide prompt restitution for such damage.

Aside from the problem of roads, terrain is an important factor in locating and engaging insurgents during offensive operations. The classical guerrilla approach has been to conduct operations from safe havens located in inaccessible areas such as mountains, swamps, and deep forests, and to date, guerrilla forces
I apparently have found no viable alternative to this strategy. The exception to this rule is the use of cross-border sanctuaries. Although terrain difficulties can present serious logistical and supply problems, the Americans in Vietnam, the British in Malaya, and the Philippine Constabulary during the Huk Rebellion have proven that no sanctuary is secure in the face of a determined opponent.

Marine combined action forces relying on sea-based support will operate in or near coastal areas within effective range of that support. Although designed to handle a fairly large job with a relatively few men, optimal effectiveness of these forces demands close support of and reliance on artillery components of the BLT, as well as the Marine air arm and naval gunfire. Unless CAU units are deployed as part of a larger, more conventional Marine involvement, as was the case in Vietnam, special caution should be exercised in mounting raids or operations in interior areas. However, if an accurate estimate of the strength of enemy forces can be determined, Marines may be deployed up to the limit of the range at which they can be transported and supplied by supporting air.

**Political Factors**

In the developing countries national politics tend to be centered almost exclusively in the national and provincial capitals. There exists a large political gap between the modern oriented subsocieties of the urban political centers and the large undifferentiated mass of rural villages. However, there is a definite correlation between the degree of economic development and the level of political awareness and competitiveness in the rural areas of a given country. For example, it is to be expected that the villagers in Argentina or Colombia would be much more politically sophisticated than those of Thailand or Afghanistan.

Political organization at the village level is based usually on personal and group loyalties much more than on political ideas and programs. Large numbers of people follow the political lead of particularly influential personalities such as clan and tribal chiefs, large landowners, caste or religious leaders, and many lenders. The highly personal and interdependent relationships of village society may help to account for the high rate of voter participation in national elections in some underdeveloped countries. Of course, during periods of stress and
uncertainty, rebels and insurgents move into the political arena and become a competing force. Thus, host country political and government representatives at the village level should not be considered the sole guardians of legitimate political power. Although by no means an easy task, Marine commanders should seek to determine the true holders of political power in a given locality and seek their support and assistance in attaining the objectives of the CAP mission.

Political competition and the growth of new political institutions reflects modernization and a break with the past, and such changes often are an indirect cause of insurgency movements. Peasants have been conditioned to a life of poverty and repression over the centuries. However, in the past two decades new political parties have sprouted all over the underdeveloped world promising a better life for the peasantry in exchange for their votes, and claiming that the opposition political parties are responsible for the problems of the nation. Often these new parties cater to special sectional, caste, religious, economic or language groups, rather than to the broader electorate. As a result, differences between groups have been accentuated, and a trend toward violent confrontation has accelerated.

Real political power at the village level is usually diffused rather than concentrated, in most parts of the world. Most often, the business of the community, including the adjudication of disputes and relations with the outside world, is managed by a council similar to the five-man panchayat of India. Council membership is determined by such factors as influence over a large family or clan, land ownership, age, and moral standing. Of course, the council may in large measure be dominated by some powerful politician or landowner living outside the village. Unfortunately, due to the illusions created by Hollywood and the habit of dealing with responsible administrators, Americans almost always demand to treat with the village "chief." As a rule, this demand is acceded to even if the proposed chief has no real decision-making powers or is only an agent of the village council. Confusion, conflicts, and misunderstandings in dealing with village communities can be minimized if combined action Marines can locate and establish contact with the actual center or centers of political power in a given village. Of course, this is not always easy to accomplish under combat or emergency conditions. The main
point is that the village political system is complex and diverse, and that Marines should not place too much reliance on the authority or pronouncements of the "chief."

Economic Factors

The chief occupation and preoccupation of rural peoples is primary production, which includes agricultural and pastoral production, fishing, forestry, and hunting. About three-quarters of the people in the underdeveloped nations live on and work the land. In these countries approximately ten percent of the people live in large towns and cities as opposed to the ten percent of the populations of the developed nations who work and reside in the countryside.

Per capita annual income is the most common indicator of the level of a nation's economic development. The general rule of thumb is that countries having per capita incomes lower than $300 a year are considered underdeveloped. Some examples are the United States, $3,900; India, $73; Thailand, $170; Saudi Arabia, $329; Jordan, $263; Tunisia, $228; Ghana, $213; Guatemala, $264; and Colombia, $262. However, such estimates do not reflect the distribution of income within a country, and even though the gross national product of an underdeveloped nation may be rising, levels of living in some rural areas may be stagnant or even declining.

Agricultural production in the poor countries is relatively stable, at low levels of production and productivity. In other words, in good years there is a small surplus and farm prices fall, and in bad years there is hardship and want. Wealth, status, and even survival is vested in the ownership and control of the land, and land reform has been and will continue to be an important factor in the fomentation of rural rebellions and insurgencies.

A combination of concentrated land holdings, limited arable land resources, and high birth rates has resulted in rapidly growing pressure on the land in many parts of the underdeveloped world. For example, in India some 60 percent of the rural households own and work a bit over six percent of the nation's agricultural

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4 Note the relatively high per capita income figure for Saudi Arabia.
land, while less than one percent of all rural households own over 15 percent of all agricultural land.\(^5\) According to the Inter-American Committee on Agricultural Development, in Peru 1,985 large farms out of the estimated 808,000 farms in the country take up 68.5 percent of the arable land. Compounding the problem, land inheritances are usually shared equally by all the sons and sometimes all the children, making for a rapid increase in the number of very small, uneconomical farm units.

Land reform programs are complex and expensive operations and due partly to the political and economic influence of large landowners, the governments of most underdeveloped countries are loathe to implement such programs. However, the social injustices and economic hardships suffered by tenant farmers and landless laborers make a ready audience for the propaganda of communist, socialist, and other anti-government political parties. In 1970, South Vietnam finally seriously undertook a $600 million land reform program. Its value in countering such propaganda could presumably have been greatly increased had it been undertaken at least five years earlier.

Rapid population growth and the lack of employment opportunities in the countryside have created an unemployment problem which will become considerably worse over the next ten years. In those few areas where agricultural modernization is introduced, including mechanization and the use of tractors, larger crops are being grown with fewer hands. As a result of the general labor surplus on the land, a large scale migration to the already overcrowded cities of the underdeveloped countries has developed, and may be expected to continue. A possibility that has not been widely discussed to date, is that governments may attempt to stem and reverse the population movement to the cities. Programs to return people to the countryside\(^6\) would relieve pressures on urban housing and services, and would


\(^6\)Communist China achieved some success with such a program in the early and mid-1960's after the population of Shanghai had swollen from about six million to over nine million.
be intended, at least in part, to reduce the likelihood of urban insurgencies. However, unless strenuous efforts to multiply employment opportunities in rural areas were undertaken, levels of living would fall further, and the conditions which foster discontent, rebellion, and insurgency would be intensified.

This brief overview of the economic factors influencing the type of environment in which combined action units probably will operate in the future emphasizes some of the root causes of rural unrest. The problems cited are of long duration and are likely to persist well beyond the decade of the 1970's. Considering the nature and seriousness of the problems, it is not reasonable to expect Marine combined action forces to much alleviate rural economic difficulties in the short run through civic action and similar programs. However, Marines, as neutral observers serving at the local level, could help to pinpoint critical economic sore spots, such as oppressive tenancy relationships, usurious rates for farm loans, or exceptionally high levels of unemployment, and pass this information on to the central government through the U. S. Country Team or their local counterparts. Often, due to the poor quality of local administrators and inadequate information systems in the underdeveloped countries, top government officials are unaware of the true conditions prevailing in remote areas until trouble breaks out. Taking an interest in the economic problems of the local population and moving to remove some of the underlying causes of unrest and rebellion could go a long way toward winning over the confidence and support of the local people.

Social Factors

As with economic development, the level of social development varies considerably from one poor country to another. However, the universal rule is that the extent and pace of social development is always more pronounced in the urban areas than in rural regions, and this division is not likely to change soon.

The family, in the broadest sense, including even very distant kin, is the keystone of rural and village society. Individuals are tied to this group economically, socially, and ritually. Other than members of the extended family, the villager depends on people he knows well in a personal way, or on the basis of face-to-face contacts. Impersonal relationships, the rule rather than the exception in
the industrial, urbanized nations, are unknown and almost incomprehensible to most villagers. As a part of this personal approach to life, religion is so completely integrated into the villager's daily routine, that he seldom thinks of it as a separate entity. Rural people, be they Buddhist, Moslem, Hindu, or Christian, tend to follow the forms of the religion automatically. For this reason, outsiders should know enough about the religious laws of a given area to avoid accidentally giving offense to the local people, particularly in matters pertaining to dietary rules.

Levels of living in rural areas generally are low. Most of the energies of village people are devoted to food production. Fortunately, the procurement of clothing and housing in tropical and subtropical regions usually is not overly difficult or expensive. Although progress is slow, modernization is taking place at a fairly rapid rate in some places. Probably the best village indicators of modernization are a fairly good road network, telephone communications with the outside, some bicycles, and a few transistor radios.

Improved health has been a major factor in the population explosion in the underdeveloped countries. However, control of a few killer diseases such as malaria and smallpox has been the most important improvement, and a host of other endemic diseases together with poor nutrition keeps general levels of health low. Most medical doctors and health personnel work in the towns and cities. Poor health and low stamina can adversely affect the efficiency of military personnel recruited from villages. Although some underdeveloped countries pose very high health standards for their regular military forces, the health requirements for rural police and paramilitary forces almost always are much lower.

Language is a critical issue for CAP planners. Around 118 major non-European languages and innumerable minor languages and dialects are to be found in the underdeveloped world. It is common for people of the same country not to share a single language. Whether a country has only two major languages as in Thailand or Afghanistan or fourteen as in India, people have a vested interest in the language they speak, and social conflicts may be generated if particularly

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7 Major languages are defined as those spoken by over one million people.
large groups of citizens are discriminated against on the basis of language. CAP operations in the future may be impeded if the language of the host country or the area of operations proves to be an exotic one and good interpreters are difficult to obtain.

Aside from language, communications at the village level generally are poor, with news most often being spread by word of mouth. However, radio is beginning to bring the outside world to the village, and this may be the single most important factor promoting social change and modernization in rural areas over the next decade.

Education has received a high priority in most underdeveloped countries and primary education at the village level has increased significantly since 1945. However, general poverty and lack of motivation deters a high percentage of rural children from completing a primary education and it is difficult to attract good teachers to work in rural areas because of low pay and lack of amenities. Consequently, although rural illiteracy rates are slowly falling, few young people obtain high school or higher level training, and those that do are prone to leave the village in search of non-farm employment opportunities.

Intercultural Relations

Every country, and often different regions within a country, has a stock of institutions, values, experiences and customs which determine the local or national self image and world view. Thus, especially among people who have little knowledge of or contact with other countries, cultures, or life styles, ethnocentrism (seeing only the viewpoint of one's own culture) is always present. Since winning the willing support of the population to the cause of insurgency is of critical importance to guerrillas, they usually take great pains to speak and act in terms totally comprehensible to local peoples. Marine forces must expect to expend some effort in the same direction in the interests of meaningful communication, understanding, successful cooperation, and friendly relationships. That this is feasible has been proven by CAP units in Vietnam.
Although variations in thought processes and approaches to life around the world are innumerable, some attitudes are common in the rural areas of the underdeveloped world. For example, time is viewed most often in terms of crop seasons, rather than in hours, days, or weeks by the peasant farmer, and there is rarely any urgency about accomplishing given tasks or planning for the future. American advisors in the underdeveloped countries find the general lack of a sense of responsibility, work discipline and a strong consciousness of time frustrating traits, but it should be remembered that such traits were developed only slowly, over many generations, in the industrialized nations of the West.

A similar problem affects the intercultural relationships between Marines, host country officials and military officers and local populations. The nationalistic sensitivities of senior officials and officers of the underdeveloped countries in their dealings with Westerners are well known, and understandable in view of the relative economic backwardness and/or recent colonial status of most of these nations. However, it is not so widely understood that a large percentage of the leadership of the developing world, due to urban backgrounds, education and travel and training in the West, have attitudes and views more akin to those prevailing in the developed, industrialized nations than in the rural areas of their own countries. Because of widespread economic and military assistance training programs abroad, this tendency probably will become more pronounced over the next decade. As a result of this unconscious Western bias among higher level host country leaders, communications and cross-cultural understanding with U. S. country team and Marine decision makers may be facilitated, but it may be difficult to obtain a comprehensive and accurate overview of conditions in the countryside. To counteract this situation, Marines should be alert to the necessity of winning local support and confidence through objective appraisals of the attitudes and motivations of the particular rural populations encountered.

Since CAP units must be ready to land in virtually any country in the world, no amount of foreign area or cross-cultural training can prepare them adequately for such a broad assignment. This stricture, however, does not remove the importance of achieving good intercultural relations in carrying out the combined action mission. Probably the most effective approach would be to give CAP trainees...
an appreciation of the special characteristics of the American experience which make American society and culture in many ways "unique" in the world, and which often create problems in our dealings with other peoples. A firm understanding should be given of the fact that foreign attitudes and motivations, and the assumptions on which they are based, all derive from distinct streams of historical experience and cultural tradition, which have as much validity for other people as our own historical experiences and cultural traditions have for us.

Also, the best substitutes for expert knowledge of another culture are the exercise of common sense and good manners. Patience, honesty, friendliness, and courtesy will go far toward fostering good intercultural relations.

C. Host Country

The Host Government

A basic assumption underlying the use of combined action forces in the future is that such assistance will be requested by a friendly government. Also, past Marine overseas involvement, e.g., in Nicaragua, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Lebanon, usually has been in relatively small underdeveloped countries. There is good reason to believe that this pattern will continue and considering the extent and degree of nationalistic feelings throughout the underdeveloped world, especially among former colonies, it is probable that requests for the introduction of Marine combined action forces will be limited to countries which are least able to defend themselves against internal aggression. Large nations, such as Brazil, India, or Indonesia are not apt to request Marine combined action forces due both to nationalistic self-esteem and to pride in their ability to handle their own problems, and because domestic military resources are relatively large.

Another characteristic of the host government probably will be an inadequate administration. Since many underdeveloped countries have been self-governing for only a decade or two, and others are only beginning to break out of
a semi-feudal social system, governmental administration is undeveloped in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of organization and operation. The colonial system of administration which still prevails in the underdeveloped world emphasizes the protection and control of rural, traditional societies through the judicial, police, and taxation departments of the central governments. Despite strenuous efforts at social and economic development by some countries, new government programs are often little known or understood at the local level in the countryside.

As a rule, top government administrators and executives in the developing countries are highly educated, well trained, and able. However, at the middle and lower ranks of the civil service, especially in rural areas, the average quality of officials is quite low and graft and corruption are common phenomena. The inability to find and train good people, precedence and tradition, and very low salaries all help to explain this situation. Also, the absence of merit promotion, nepotism, and often, a preoccupation with paper work, tends to retard the work of government.

Considering the problems of public administration facing the underdeveloped countries, it is not likely that the quality of government procedures or personnel will improve noticeably in the next decade. The lesson for CAP planners is not to rely heavily on host governments for material support. Host country agreements made in good faith can prove to be very slow in implementation due to ineffectual administrative machinery. Difficulties encountered by Marines in dealing with the civil apparatus in Vietnam do not reflect an isolated case. Such problems can be expected and should be anticipated in operations in other underdeveloped countries.

The Local Population

As pointed out previously, rural peoples tend to be conservative and traditionalist. It is very rare for politically oriented insurgencies to erupt spontaneously in the village environment. In order to gain the support of villagers in an anti-government campaign, insurgents must carefully cultivate individuals on a face-to-face basis over time. Although some individuals, particularly the young, those with some grievance against the authorities, and some with little to lose
materially will be converted easily, the village community as a whole will not be quick to accept a new or radical ideology.

The ideas of insurgency, except in cases of traditional ethnic, racial, or religious conflicts, are carried to the villagers by strangers or by former residents who have been exposed to the outside world. Although anti-government ideas may be more appealing than some other ideas, rural people in the underdeveloped countries generally are resistant to any new idea. This is due not only to inherent conservatism, but because villagers live so near the edge of survival that they cannot afford to take chances on new ideas. The fact that only larger, richer farmers will try the new improved seeds and fertilizers espoused by foreign aid advisors, because they have an economic cushion against possible crop failure, illustrates this point. Also, despite strong cultural or religious laws in many regions governing hospitality toward strangers, outsiders are almost always looked upon with suspicion. This is because the appearance of strangers in villages throughout the world is usually associated with unpleasant or unsettling events, such as the induction of the young men into the national army or the collection of taxes.

The approach of the insurgents probably is more important than their ideas. It is standard procedure among insurgents of all brands to treat villagers with courtesy and respect, and not to tamper with local traditions or taboos. Also individuals are dealt with honestly and provisions are paid for in cash. On the other hand, it is widely publicized that troublesome or uncooperative persons will be dealt with harshly. Self interest dictates that villagers support the activities of the insurgents—to the extent that there is no effective government counterforce.

Although government objectives such as "winning the hearts and minds of the people" may be valid on a national scale, it is possible that most rural peoples would prefer to be left alone and not have to support any outside "power." However, conditions of insurgency and internal conflict tend to destroy the traditional fabric of rural life. For this reason it is necessary that Marine combined action forces and host country forces be able to compete with the insurgents in terms of honest dealings and non-interference in village life. The record of the Marine CAP in Vietnam provides an excellent example to follow in the future. It is a fair
supposition that the sympathies of most rural people will go ultimately to the side that inconveniences them least.

**Indigenous Military Forces**

The military occupies a pivotal position in the developing world in terms of promoting orderly change and progress. Over one-fourth of the heads of states of developing nations are military men. In many developing countries, the military establishment represents the best organized, most highly disciplined, and most Westernized (particularly in terms of technical and engineering capabilities) elements of society. Due to the relatively small numbers of responsible and skilled civilian politicians and well trained civil servants, the military has come to represent an important resource stock.

By and large the military represents one of the stronger anti-Communist, although not necessarily pro-Western, influences in most emerging nations. For some time the nature of the officer corps in many developing countries has been undergoing a process of change, and it is likely that this process will continue into the 1970's. In a growing number of countries, the military has been recruiting able and ambitious men from all strata of society, and it can no longer be assumed that officers are always aligned with traditional or conservative forces. Military leadership oriented toward political, economic and social reform is becoming more and more common.

The United States contributed about $14.5 billion in foreign military aid to underdeveloped countries in the period 1950-1969, and other Western countries and Communist nations also have made substantial contributions. Although the criticism has been levied that many developing nations have spent too much on overly sophisticated hardware at the expense of social and economic development programs, a good portion of assistance funds have gone for military education and training. Foreign assistance has been instrumental in allowing the military in the developing countries to engage in a wide range of activities. In many countries such activities include riot control, counterinsurgency operations, civic action, civil defense and disaster work, education and literacy training for the populace, and the operation of government agencies and bureaus. In some underdeveloped
nations, the army has made impressive contributions to economic development through public works, agricultural, and public health projects.

The developing world as a whole is much better prepared to resist insurgency than it was in 1960—largely due to American assistance and training. In the next decade, it is probable that the countries requiring Marine CAP assistance will be the smaller, weaker nations that have not participated fully in foreign military assistance programs or that have not been able to make good use of the benefits of such programs. Based on past experience and the trend to intensified nationalism, countries with influential military leaders are likely to resist moves to request outside military forces from a friendly country. If there has been substantial improvement in the developing country's military forces over the years, commanders will be loath to admit that they cannot handle their own insurgency problems. For the same reasons, commanders probably would prefer to operate independently rather than with combined action forces, if American forces were requested.

**Police and Paramilitary Forces**

In perhaps a majority of developing countries the police are more numerous than the military forces. To a large extent, this situation reflects the priority of internal security over external security as perceived by government leaders. On the other hand, in many places the relative importance of the police reflects a colonial pattern which has not been altered by a country following independence.

The use of the police as a counterinsurgency force in the underdeveloped countries has both advantages and drawbacks. Because rural police are posted in the countryside they tend to have a good knowledge of the local terrain, the habits and customs of the people, and important political, social, and economic considerations. Also, police work usually entails the establishment of an intelligence network of sorts to keep track of local personalities and current events in the area. Unfortunately, too often rural police are unpopular as individuals with the local populace. As with other civil servants in the developing countries, very low wages and the temptations of power tend to make rural police susceptible to graft, corruption, coercion and bribery. Although recruitment, training, and
pay for rural police is being upgraded in many countries, the quality of the police remains considerably below that of the military forces on the average. Also, the potential counterinsurgency value of the police sometimes is recognized only belatedly. For example, the strength of the national police in South Vietnam is now almost 120,000 men as compared to only 16,000 in 1964.

Because rural police are spread rather thinly over a country, in most cases there would not be a sufficient number in a given area to work with Marines in combined action units. However, enough rural police reserves from relatively quiet regions often could be supplied in order to overcome this problem. On balance, rural police would be more appropriate than regular military units for combined action operations on the basis of their rural background and orientation. Also, police forces usually would benefit more from the close contact with Marine units than the more highly trained host country military forces.

Paramilitary forces in various forms ranging from armed and unarmed home guards to youth groups, to tribal and religious organizations, and political auxiliary groups, are common in the underdeveloped countries. Although these organizations are rarely armed or adequately equipped, and seldom receive much military training, they amount to an important, but underrated reserve force for counterinsurgency operations. In a large number of the serious insurgencies of the post World War II era, paramilitary units have been used against guerrillas and insurgents.

If the achievements of the poorly armed, poorly organized, and poorly led Popular Forces of South Vietnam working together with a handful of American Marines can be replicated in other underdeveloped countries, the use of paramilitary forces probably is the best organizational structure for future combined action operations. This approach would allow the Marines to bring into play the full range of CAP capabilities, building and upgrading a virtually new counterinsurgency force, while at the same time allowing the host country to devote all already trained military and police resources to the counterinsurgency effort.
D. Hostile Forces

Communist Insurgency

By one definition, almost all insurgencies and internal wars are Communist insurgencies in that both the Soviet Union and Mainland China adhere to the doctrine of "wars of national liberation." Certainly the Communist countries have been major suppliers of arms and equipment to rebels of many different persuasions over the years.

Marines who have faced Viet Cong, North Vietnamese regulars, or North Korean guerrillas will attest that the Communist enemy is tenacious, well organized and wily. One of the main reasons for the effectiveness of these enemies has been the fact that they bordered on large Communist powers that were able to offer moral and material support. Although it would be foolhardy to completely rule out another Communist insurgency closely approximating the Vietnam model in the next decade, such an event is unlikely. This is because the two Communist superpowers, the Soviet Union and Mainland China, are deeply divided on ideological issues, and each appears to be absorbed in domestic problems. At any rate a large Communist insurgency would be beyond the capabilities of an independent Marine combined action operation.

However, future insurgencies, whether or not they are strongly Communist dominated, influenced, or supported, may be expected to adopt much of the Communist doctrine, organization, and tactical approach developed in past conflicts. It is important that Marines and counterinsurgent forces do not assume that an internal conflict in a given country is a Communist insurgency because it has most of the outward trappings of one. Rather the underlying causes of the conflict should be probed. This is because the reasons for revolt may involve negotiable and soluble grievances of various minority groups, and not the usually un-negotiable ideological reasons of an orthodox Communist insurgency.
Rural Anarchy and Banditry

Rural anarchy reflects a serious breakdown of central government control and influence in the countryside. The main feature of this type of internal conflict is the formation of autonomous groups of men, sometimes ostensibly for political purposes, but actually for power and profit. The classical case of such rural anarchy occurred in Colombia during 1948-1960 (and is still in progress at a reduced level). However, such activities are common in many underdeveloped countries on a small scale, and tend to multiply when the central government is preoccupied by serious internal or external difficulties.

Combined action forces are well suited to deal with conditions of rural anarchy because being the main victims of bandit gangs, the local populace likely would be quick to offer full assistance and cooperation to any who would help them. Two conditions are apt to facilitate the growth of rural anarchy in the future. One is the possibility that insurgency conditions in another part of the country might draw off military and police forces and entice lawless elements of a community to take advantage of the situation. The other concerns the growing numbers of underemployed and unemployed landless laborers in some countries who may be tempted to turn to banditry out of economic desperation.

Somewhat similar to operations against rural bandits, in terms of working in a relatively friendly host country environment, would be the use of Marine combined action units as elements of United Nations peace keeping missions or foreign disaster relief units. Such unorthodox uses of combined action forces should be considered by Marine planners.

Religious and Ethnic Conflicts

Another serious form of internal conflict which has been important in the past and which may require the dispatch of combined action forces in the future is the religious or ethnic conflict. Probably the greatest bloodlettings of the twentieth century, such as the Hindu-Moslem clash after Indian partition, Nigeria in 1967-1969, the Sudanese civil war, the Communist rebellion in Indonesia, and East Pakistan in 1971, basically have been wars between different races, creeds, and religions.
It is very doubtful that the United States would sanction the use of American forces in conflicts such as those mentioned above except as part of a multilateral peacekeeping mission. However, some situations may be envisioned wherein combined action forces might play a positive and useful role. For example, in relatively small, low key disputes between racial, ethnic, or religious communities, a host government might request Marine combined action forces to help maintain order and protect vital installations, while the dispute was being settled.

As with the case of rural anarchy, ancient disputes and hostilities tend to break out when the governments of underdeveloped countries are not in a position to exercise effective control in the countryside. To the extent that U.S. Marine forces can be used to help cool inflamed passions and restore order until the host government can arrange an equitable settlement between warring factions, without actively supporting any faction, such assignments should be considered for combined action units. Of course, where the host government is a principal supporter of one belligerent group, U.S. assistance usually will not be appropriate.

**Nationalism, Revolution, and Change**

Nationalism, revolution, and change sum up and characterize the condition of the underdeveloped world. These words reflect the reasons for most of the insurgencies and internal conflicts experienced in the recent past, and provide a rationale for the ones to be expected in the future. To a great extent, these words mean the same thing.

Nationalism, a concept borrowed from the Western developed nations, is associated with modernity and domestic pride, and the internal adjustments needed to bring a better, richer life to the people. Revolution is viewed as a more violent version of change, and is associated with throwing off the colonial yoke, and more currently, with doing away with those institutions thought of as exploitive by various groups. Change is the concept generally favored by leaders and elites in the developing countries, as the path to political, social, economic, and cultural progress, and the antidote to the stagnation of the past. Basically these concepts are still the property of the urban educated elites. But slowly, through expanding education, rapidly improving communications, and a growing political awareness, these ideas are sifting down to the rural areas—and at an accelerating rate.
Tradition and conservatism die slowly in the countryside, but probably certain elements of rural society will tend to become more susceptible to new, radical ideas in the coming decade. Growing numbers of students and graduates will become discontent if sufficient employment opportunities are not forthcoming. Small farmers and tenants with insufficient land and large families will be under increasing economic pressure unless land reforms are instituted and improved farming practices introduced. The lot of the rural dispossessed, the landless laborer, will grow critical unless there are enough jobs at high enough wages to meet subsistence requirements. Finally, racial, ethnic, caste, language, religious, and tribal minority groups will grow progressively resentful if they believe that the government is ignoring their rights and needs.

Although many of these groups may be faced with serious difficulties, recourse to civil violence and insurgency only retards progress and constructive change. It will be the job of Marine combined action forces to help contain and control outbreaks of rural violence.

E. Summary

This chapter has presented an outline of probable conditions and circumstances expected to prevail in the underdeveloped world in coming years, which have some direct bearing on planning for combined action operations. There has been no attempt made to draw up a comprehensive view of all possible trends in the developing nations, nor to provide a complete picture of all the types and forms of insurgency situations which may evolve over the coming decade. Rather the emphasis has been on trying to relate an array of possible environmental factors to the present and potential capabilities of the Combined Action Program (CAP). Throughout, the analysis is directed to the rural environment in which CAP operations actually will be conducted.
First, a brief review of the historical record confirmed that the overall Marine experience with constabulary and combined action type programs has been extensive and successful.

In the most recent reincarnation of the Marine CAP in South Vietnam, several atypical features, such as the relatively late start of the program in the face of a high level insurgency and the exceptionally good friendly fire support available to CAP units, were examined and analyzed in relation to future prospects.

Next, a survey of the general environment in which CAP counterinsurgency operations are likely to be carried out was conducted. Marines can expect an unpleasant, unhealthy climate for all CAP operations. Political, social, and economic factors which affect village life, although often differing from place to place, also vary significantly from those affecting urban dwellers in the same country. For example, the true holders of village political power are not necessarily the elected or appointed officials of the government. In economic and social terms, village life almost universally is hard and unrewarding, and these factors are among the root causes of rural unrest and insurgency. To the extent that Marine CAP forces can master the art of understanding the attitudes and motivations of the rural people they live among, and establish friendly relationships, the task of insurgency control and suppression will be much simplified.

An examination of host countries likely to request CAP assistance indicates that the governments of these countries probably will be relatively weak, and relatively disorganized. The people at the local level, as a rule, will tend to support the side which is stronger, and which causes the least disturbance and inconvenience to the community. In terms of overall operational efficiency, it is suggested that first choice for Marine combined action partners be host country paramilitary forces, second choice be rural police, and third choice be regular military forces.

In reviewing types and varieties of hostile forces likely to be encountered, the chances of CAP involvement in a Communist insurgency similar to that in Vietnam during the next decade are considered small. However, various degrees of Communist control, influence, or support probably will enter into most of the
insurgency situations that develop in the future. Quite possibly the Combined Action Program will be needed to control rural anarchy and banditry situations, and religious or ethnic conflicts in coming years. In considering some of the common social and economic causes of insurgent behavior, unless rapid economic progress is achieved in the near future, the incidence of rural insurgency is apt to rise over the next decade.
CHAPTER III
MAXIMIZING THE COMBINED ACTION POTENTIAL

Introduction

In this chapter we consider, in a reflective hypothetical sense, how the CAP might have been used in actual historical situations. We are assuming a great deal when we assume that an armed, uniformed U.S. force of battalion size might have been requested, or accepted, by host governments in any of these situations; on the other hand, with a few exceptions, there is little evidence that a U.S. force might have been requested or accepted in any of the numerous other conflict situations around the world. Furthermore, given the current climate of U.S. foreign policy, the assumption that a Marine force of battalion size might have been called upon in these past situations, is no less plausible than the assumption that such a force might be asked somewhere sometime, in the foreseeable future.

The historical situations which we have selected are as follows:

- Greece, June-December, 1948.
- Thailand (South), May-December, 1966.

In conformity with the CAP concept of low profile, short-term deployment we have identified in each case a limited time period, of relatively low intensity conflict, during which we consider that a CAP force might have been maximally useful.

While the countries we have selected have been well reported from the standpoint of internal conflicts, the particular locales and periods we have picked are not the ones usually dwelt upon or emphasized in standard sources. This is because we have deliberately searched through the running footage of conflict for those single time-space frames which would provide the most credible context for a CAP-type operation. This, of course, requires justification from a number of points of view and we will provide this justification in each case.
It appears from the historical evidence that, in the periods from which our particular time frames were selected, the U.S. was more or less committed to the situation in some way (by treaty, by filling a power vacuum), was already involved to some extent in military assistance to the host country, and more importantly, was considering or implementing expansion of U.S. involvement generally with the encouragement of the host country, and that while this did not specifically call for U.S. combat units inside the host country, in each case there was an existing U.S. advisory organization which did specify needs and functions definitely falling within the capability of a CAP-type activity. Thus, the USMC would have entered the picture not as the first hint of American intervention, but as a timely adjunct to a large U.S. military assistance presence, providing, at some place for some period, a stopgap of some sort, in a way which would serve notice that the U.S. was concerned enough to send troops. Such an entry is less likely to attract attention than one in which the U.S. Marines appear as the first sign of a foreign presence.

There are interesting parallels between the selected historical situations and the possible or probable kinds of future contingencies in which a CAF might be deployed. All historical cases are post-World War II, and involve civil disorders in which Communist-supported insurgency serves as the prime mover or is a major threat. In short, all cases are "Cold War" cases. By the same token, all are situations in which the American presence is always subject to note and question not only by local or regional powers but by the major communist powers. Our being "invited in" to these situations presumes some willingness on the part of the host country to discount unfavorable reactions in the communist world and this, in turn, presumes some prior commitment, however low key, to the fortunes of the West.

In two cases--Greece and Thailand--the U.S. presence was clearly seen as interventionist from the outset; by the time of our hypothetical USMC landings, we had sizeable military missions in both countries, involved in logistics, training and operations, with American advisors being killed in combat. In Thailand, the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit, consisting of 5,000 Marines had been deployed from May to July of 1962, to counter the threat of communist pressure from outside.
In the case of Colombia, while U. S. intervention was not an issue, U. S. interests were concerned about Colombian national stability and U. S. military advisors were involved in military planning, including training, materiel and operations; U. S. combat units were the only form of support we did not provide.  

As will be presently demonstrated these three cases provide between them a backdrop for display of all of the CAP capabilities in a variety of situations where the use of a CA force seems entirely plausible from an operational standpoint. The geographical settings include tropical lowlands and uplands (Thailand), Mediterranean plains and surrounding mountains (Greece), and high interior valleys in a continental mountain range (Colombia). All are readily accessible by sea and land, and the air distances from coast to deployment area range from 25-150 miles.

Problems of logistical support of host country forces working with the USMC units are minimal in all cases because of the prior existence of rather large-scale U. S. military assistance and a U. S. advisory structure which has been working for some time not only on procurement but in seeing that equipment and supplies are delivered to the units that need them.

The mission emphases shift from one situation to the next and to some extent within each situation though the whole gamut of missions is present in each. For those who feel strongly that USMC Combined Action experience points to one and only one mission--shooting guerrillas--there is no dearth of this element in any of the situations; all of these cases involve an immediate need to provide local security from armed predatory bands bent on recruiting and provisioning by force, if necessary, from among rural populations. The Greek guerrillas of the KKE, the Chinese rebels of the Malaysia-Thailand border, the Colombian bandits are all experienced in the hit-and-run tactics and extortionary

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1 It is noteworthy that at the very time we have selected for a hypothetical insertion of a USMC CA unit in Colombia, the U. S. Navy was holding a conference on the Navy's role in Latin America in which one of the principal topics of discussion was ways and means of involving Navy personnel directly in counterinsurgency programs, and of getting Latin American governments to request U. S. Navy assistance and personnel.
practices we saw in Vietnam. In all cases, there is a mission to upgrade those counterguerrilla forces closest to the people themselves, and these vary in type and quality; in the case of Colombia, a local paramilitary force may have to be created on the spot using carabineros and the armed peasantry. Intelligence gathering is an important component of the mission in all cases, and is dependent on the ability of the Combined Action forces to protect the local population from retaliation for informing. Psyops and civic action are explicit mission components of the regular armed forces in both Thailand and Colombia, mainly because by the time these situations occurred, counterinsurgency doctrine was more fully developed than it had been during the Greek insurgency. Hence, in Thailand and Colombia the psyop and civic action activities of the CA force is seen as an extension of or adjunct to the existing psyop and civic action programs of the national army and police. In Greece we see any psyops or civic action on the part of CA units as spontaneous rather than doctrinaire and programmatic.

In none of these situations do we see the USMC CA force deployed mainly to engage in nation building, or institution building. They are not there for that purpose, they do not have that kind of training, and in any case would not be there long enough to do anything of any lasting value. They are there mainly to provide a catalyst to the local security capabilities of the rural population and a link between local and area security operations; hence they are inserted at the point when there is general recognition (1) that guerrillas or bandits must be denied access to villages, (2) that the army and the police cannot be everywhere at all times to do this, and (3) that some form of local paramilitary forces must assume the responsibility for continuous, aggressive local defense, hopefully with the support of mobile army and police units. When the USMC CA component has served its "catalytic" function, it is withdrawn from the scene.

We turn now to the three cases, and more specific detail.
The Greek Insurgency
(June-December 1948)

Setting

Bandit activity broke out in the Greek mountains in the spring of 1946. The KKE, the Greek Communist organization, launched a planned program of terrorism to disrupt the economy, and secure recruits and supplies. Initial attacks were on isolated officials and right wing citizens. As gendarmerie units were dispersed to protect citizens, isolated detachments were attacked, and the gendarmerie was forced to consolidate its personnel, thus again exposing small villages to bandit plunder and forced recruitment. In the fall of 1946, guerrilla activities were coordinated and expanded.

In February 1947, the British announced that British Aid to Greece would terminate on 31 March 1947, and on 3 March the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister appealed to the U.S. for assistance. On 12 March 1947, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine for military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey.

It was apparent by this time that the U.S. was taking over Britain's role in the Mediterranean. The U.S. had already begun to expand into the Mediterranean. The battleship Missouri had paid a courtesy call to Greece in April 1946. A naval task force with the carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt visited Greece in September 1946. By the end of 1946 a permanent naval task force had been assigned to the Mediterranean, the nucleus of the soon to be formed Sixth Fleet.

Had the USMC, deployed as a combined action force, been present in Greece in 1948 they would have been in on the ground floor of a major new departure in U.S. cold war strategy. According to one source:

From the military point of view the Anti-Bandit War would prove to be the genesis of our significant trends in United States strategy: (1) the provision of large-scale military assistance to a foreign government in "peacetime," (2) aggressive use of U.S. military personnel as advisors to indigenous forces in the conduct of active military operations, (3) the development of counter guerilla tactics as a paramount requisite of the Cold War era, and (4) the acceptance
of U. S. involvement in military hostilities without the commitment of maximum resources. 2

The U. S. Army Group Greece, authorized under PL 75, was organized in April, 1947, and began operations in Greece in May. Its mission was to determine requirements for supplies and equipment and arrange for procurement. Although PL 75 gave the War Department authority to detail military personnel as advisors with right to observe military assistance and also provided for training of Greek military personnel, the War Department, concerned over opponents and critics of the aid program, and reluctant even to send a military mission as such to Greece unless it proved absolutely necessary, chose to restrict authority of USAGG to the basic mission of assisting the Greek military by furnishing supplies and equipment. Hence no observers were to be attached to units in the field, and training and advice on the organization and operations were left to the British mission.

When the USAGG arrived in Greece the Greek Armed Forces consisted of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek National Army (GNA)</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Police</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The insurgent forces maintained a terrorism campaign throughout all of Greece during 1947, attacking isolated villages to obtain supplies and recruits and fleeing before government forces could arrive. Through terrorism and propaganda, the Communists extracted subservience, concurrence or at least non-resistance from the inhabitants of a considerable number of villages. Operating from base areas across the border, by spring of 1947 bandits had grown bold enough to attack small isolated detachments of the gendarmerie and Greek Army frontier posts along the northern border.

In August-September 1947, it became apparent that U. S. military aid could not be limited to supply. The Greek Government employed inadequate and inappropriate counterinsurgency strategy. Government forces were widely dispersed and reduced to a static defensive role. Rapid expansion of these forces had occurred but at the expense of training, and guerrilla forces were better equipped and trained. During these months the USAGG found itself working more closely with the Greek General Staff (GGS) on future organizational and operational matters.

In October 1947, the KKE issued a call for general revolt and the character of the Greek insurgency changed dramatically. The scope of U. S. military assistance expanded to advice on and observation of military operations. With U. S. assistance the Greek General Staff formed the National Defense Corps (NDC), its mission being to take over the static defense of towns, villages and installations, thus relieving the GNA; its secondary role was to clear certain areas of bandits. In January 1948, the NDC forces were brought to full authorized strength of 50,000 and dispersed throughout the provinces of Greece.

In December 1946 the JCS authorized establishment of the Joint U. S. Military Assistance and Planning Group (JUSMAPG). Its mission was to assist the Greek Armed Forces in achieving internal security at the earliest possible date by providing "stimulating and aggressive assistance in the form of operational and logistical advice." Ninety officers and eighty enlisted men were assigned to the group in January 1948 to serve in advisory capacity to GNA units. The British military mission continued its role as advisor on organization and training.

In areas of active conflict advisory teams were attached to the Field Army, the three Corps Headquarters and the seven Divisions of the GNA, and the U. S. military mission now began to assume responsibility for military operations, while retaining responsibility for logistical support. JUSMAPG was not, however, prepared to engage in training and advice on organization of the Greek armed forces and the British Military mission continued to furnish advice on these matters.
Situation

In June 1948 the JUSMAPG called on the Greek General Staff to form the Home Guards for village defense. This action sprang from requests made by a great number of refugees for weapons for self-protection in order to enable them to return to their former homes in isolated villages and resume farming. JUSMAPG was instrumental in working out a plan with the Greek Government whereby selected village families would be armed and permitted to return to their villages, where they would be organized into army approved and supervised units under the command of the local tactical unit commander. During the rest of 1948 the program of arming civilians for defense was continued and British rifles were issued to a total strength of 14,000. In late 1949 a program was initiated to gain closer control of Home Guard units. While JUSMAPG trained the GNA and NDC units, it is not clear who trained the Home Guard units.

Counterinsurgent campaigns conducted in 1948 revealed the lack of training and low quality of leadership of Greek forces and in July 1948 training officially became a joint U. S. -British responsibility with the U. S. taking responsibility for infantry training which in effect meant that the U. S. military assumed full responsibility for GNA training. Thus, the U. S. military mission for the first time was advising the GNA on all aspects of military activity—plans and operations, organization and training, and logistics.

From June 1948, when the Home Guards were formed, until December 1948, when the Communists began to mount large-scale counteroffensives against some of the larger towns in northern and central Greece, a combined action force deployed to work with Home Guard units in critical areas would have had an opportunity to train and upgrade these forces with a minimum threat of large-scale attack. During much of this period the GNA was still carrying the fight to the guerrillas in their major strongholds along the Albanian and Yugoslav borders and in the Pindus Mountains.

3 By the end of 1947, 420,000 refugees had fled to large towns and cities. In large part this resulted from GNA efforts to clear certain areas to deprive bandits of support.
The Home Guard units have many of the characteristics of the Popular Forces with which the USMC developed the Combined Action Concept in Vietnam—i.e., they were armed local villagers who were essentially providing security for their own families; they were organized in units and were under the control of the local tactical commander. It is not clear from the available sources who provided training for these Home Guard units: the U.S. military advisory effort appears to have been tied up with training the GNA and NDC units. Since Home Guard units would presumably have to be trained on the job—i.e., in their own villages while in the act of defending them—presumably a CA effort would do much to upgrade these local forces and speed their re-establishment of security in critical areas, thus speeding the recovery of productive activity. There was apparently no U.S. advisory effort with the Home Guard units, and a USMC CA unit could have provided direct contact between the Home Guard and the U.S. assistance effort. Since the Home Guard units were in theory under local GNA commanders and a chain of command which could be influenced by the U.S. advisory chain, the major problems of command and control and logistical support would have been solved.

A USMC Combined Action force deployed could not hope to work with all units of the Home Guard since these would be spread through all villages in remote areas. They could, however, concentrate in villages along some major communication artery, providing local security for the artery as well as for villages in the vicinity.

The most likely areas for deployment of a combined action force are the eastern coastal plains and river valleys where the surrounding mountains were infested with guerrillas. Of these probably the most likely area would have been the coastal plain near the town of Katerini and the interior plain stretching west of Thessalonika toward the towns of Edhessa and Naousa. This area is readily accessible by sea.

The emphasis in this mission would be security, upgrading local forces and intelligence. The USMC would work with Home Guard units to provide adequate village defense against guerrilla raids, and to protect local officials. They
would train Home Guard units in aggressive anti-guerrilla tactics as well as local defense measures and see that they were properly equipped and supplied for this purpose. They would also be on the lookout for collaborators and could provide intelligence on the movements and intentions of guerrilla forces.

Psychological operations and civic action would be minimal components of the mission, since the members of the Home Guard were already highly motivated to return to their villages, secure them and resume productive activity. Thus, civic action might be limited to assisting the Home Guard units in repair of local communications and transportation facilities, and in providing medical assistance.

In Greece, a USMC combined action effort might have had two episodes of somewhat different character. The one we have just described for an operation around Katerini and Thessalonika is geared to the fact that the conflict in the north, near the borders with Albania and Yugoslavia, was largely a conflict between strangers or at least unrelated people. Villagers in the north could be victimized more by overt threats to their safety and treasure than by appeals to personal loyalties and family ties. Northwest of Athens, however, in the Parnassus area, many of those who joined the guerrilla forces in the mountains were local people and here the conflict was more likely to involve kinsmen, and hence some vulnerability of both sides to appeals based on kin ties. Conceivably once the USMC CA units were withdrawn in the north—i.e., once the full-scale counteroffensives were begun by the Communists—the same or other USMC units could be deployed subsequently in the region northwest of Athens and here their mission might include a much heavier component of psychological operations directed toward the insurgents, tied into some form of amnesty program, and supported by civic action programs designed to appeal specifically to potential defectors.
Thailand
(May-December 1966)

Setting

Communist activity was stepped up in Northeastern Thailand in the early and mid-60's. In May 1962, President Kennedy dispatched 5,000 U. S. Marines to Thailand to meet the Communist threat from Laos in the NE. The USMC contingent consisted of a Marine Expeditionary Unit which was landed at Bangkok and flown north to Udorn. (There is disagreement among sources as to whether or not the U. S. was requested by the Thai government to send these troops. However, there was some precedent for the move: In February, 1955, at the SEATO council's first meeting in Bangkok, delegates representing Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines had urged the establishment of a unified command, a joint mobile striking force and token U. S. troops stationed at strategic posts within the treaty area.) Token forces also were sent by Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. U. S. troops were withdrawn in August 1962 but a permanent U. S. military headquarters remained in Bangkok.

In January 1965, Peking announced formation of the Thailand Patriotic Front and threatened guerilla war throughout Thailand before the year was out. In May 1965 the SEATO council, at its 10th meeting (in London) expressed concern over increasing Communist subversion in the NE. In November 1965, the first Communist Thai unit was formed and in January 1966, the second such unit was formed. In March and April 1966 there occurred the first attacks on police stations in the northeast. Thus, by mid-1966, the insurgent situation in the northeast had been drastically stepped up and was severely taxing the resources and capabilities of the Thailand police forces in the NE border area.

At the same time the situation in the south required attention ever since the end of the Malaysian Emergency in 1960. Before the Emergency ended several thousand Malaysian communist insurgents, mainly ethnic Chinese, had taken refuge along the Malaysia-Thailand border and between 1960 and 1965 these rebels enjoyed almost undisturbed sanctuary in the four southern border provinces of Thailand.
In March 1965 Thailand signed an agreement with Malaysia to strengthen their joint counterinsurgency operations along the common border. Two centers for joint operation were established in southern Thailand and the Malaysian police were given the right to chase insurgents ten miles into Thai territory.

The brunt of the counterinsurgency effort in 1966-67 fell to the Thai National Police, particularly to the Provincial Police and the Border Patrol Police. Special support to these forces was provided through USOM/Thailand in 1966-67. The Provincial Police were based on some 4,928 tambon (commune) police stations, a tambon comprising a number of villages. In April 1965, in an effort to counter the "hit-and-run" tactics of the insurgents, the station complements in the northeast were augmented by 90 mobile police patrols each based in a village in a particular tambon and under the command of the local tambon police station chief. Each patrol, consisting of six men led by two Provincial Police NCOs, was responsible for the security of four to six villages in their tambon.

The Provincial Police also included fifty 50-man Special Action Forces, deployed throughout the country. Trained for quick reaction, the SAFs were used in counterinsurgency and crime suppression, however, the general shortage of police manpower resulted in their being used too frequently as static forces.

The basic operating unit of the Border Patrol Police (BPP) was the Line Platoon of 30 men, commanded in most cases by an NCO because of the shortage of officers and including a medic with at least six months of training at police headquarters. In 1966-67 there were 122 of these platoons. Backing these up were the Mobile Line Platoons, Mobile Reserve Platoons and Special Weapons Platoons. The Mobile reserves, consisting of 24 platoons based at the various BPP headquarters, were trained specifically in counterinsurgency and were designed as quick reaction forces for combat deployment. The BPP was trained in paramilitary as well as police techniques.

The general mission of the BPP was to work directly with villagers in remote areas and to attempt to win their confidence, ensure their loyalty to the Royal Thai Government and develop information sources. In this they were assisted by the Remote Area Security Project, mounted in 1966, which provided them with
the means for developmental activities in cooperation with the villagers as part of their border surveillance activities. Development Platoons were formed to engage in civic action and construction with help from USN Construction Battalions (Seabees).

Under USOM assistance a new concept was developed for counterinsurgency training of the Thai National Police Department (TNPD). Plans called for a National Counterinsurgency Training Center and for reorientation of courses in four existing area training centers, one of which is at Songkhla in the south. Area centers would provide unit-level training for all tactical units of the TNPD operating in rural areas. U. S. Special Forces personnel would train a permanent instructor cadre and phase out over a two-year period.

Situation

By mid-1966, insurgent operations in the northeast had passed beyond the propaganda, recruitment, organization and training stage and were now directed toward overt confrontation with the forces of law and order, principally the Provincial and Border Police. With U.S. assistance, these forces undertook to restructure themselves for a more flexible and aggressive response and to retrain themselves in more effective counterinsurgency tactics and techniques. A cadre of U. S. Special Forces personnel was considered as a device for injecting the proper training.

The seriousness of the situation in the northeast in the last half of 1966 suggests that the Thais could have used some relief along their southern border, if not to shift some of their police forces from that region to the northeast, at least to assure themselves that the situation along the Malaysia-Thailand border would be sufficiently under control for them to be able to devote their full attention to the northeast. Since most of the USOM effort to upgrade the Thai police appears to have been concentrated in the northeast there is reason to suppose that the police units along the southern border lagged behind in development and could have used some special assistance from some other U. S. source. Furthermore, although not as apparent then as now to the Thai government, the Malaysian rebels were beginning to establish closer links with the Thai rebels in the northeast.
As part of the overall U. S. assistance effort from mid-1966 to 1967, a USMC CA unit could have been deployed at strategic points on the Thai-Malaysia border with the mission of working directly with Border Patrol Police Line and Reserve Platoons. The east coast of the Thailand peninsula is readily accessible by sea, and such a force could have been based at Songkhla, the capital of Songkhla Province, or at Pattani, the capital of Pattani Province. Both of these towns have ports and airfields. Songkhla is also the locus of one of the four area training centers for police in the country. Most parts of Songkhla Province are within 50 air miles of the capital.

The Border Patrol Police line platoons appear ideally suited as counterparts in a CA force, at least in organization and mission. The CA formula developed in Vietnam—a squad of U. S. Marines with a platoon of local paramilitary forces—would seem to work as well or perhaps even better with these BPP platoons, and the fact that they were commanded in most cases by NCOs and included a medic makes them appear generally compatible with the USMC CA concept. Further, the mission of the BPP appears to have been almost parallel to the USMC CA mission concept: area surveillance, local security, and intelligence, working directly with villagers to ensure their confidence, loyalty and divulging of the information, and the use of civic action as a means of winning support from the local people.

The main rebel forces along the border are Chinese and their principal efforts have been directed toward the local Malaya populations in Malaysia. Since 1965, however, there has existed some potential for the Malaysian rebels along the Malaysia-Thailand border to play a direct role in Thailand's own insurgency problems, particularly the threat that with Peking's urging they might extend their "armed propaganda" tactics to the Malay population on the Thai side of the border, ambushing Thai police units or raiding villages and police stations, and thus creating a serious "secondary front" diversion at a time when the Thais had their hands full in the northeast.

4 There is recent evidence of a linkage between the Malaysian rebels and the rebels in the northern and northeastern provinces of Thailand, a linkage fostered by Peking. See The Economist, January 30, 1971, p. xxxvi.
Such a threat appears to have been more potential than actual in the latter half of 1966. The Malaysian rebels appear to have been interested in the Thai side of the border as a base for recruiting drives in the adjoining Malaysian states and the Thais, aside from allowing the Malaysian police to pursue rebels ten miles inside Thai territory, seemed to feel that the rebel movement was oriented solely toward Malaysia and posed no immediate threat for the Thai government.

In this situation the primary mission of the USMC CA unit would be upgrading of the local forces. Local security and subversion do not appear to have been serious problems at the time—i.e., the rebels were not actually ambushing Thai police units, or raiding villages or police stations, or actively propagandizing or terrorizing the local population on the Thai side of the border. However, they well could have after Peking's announcement of the Thailand Patriotic Front (January 1965), and the 1965 agreement between Thailand and Malaysia. Hence, the BPP in that area should have been well-trained in the early detection of insurgent operations among the Thai Malays, and in the tactics of counterinsurgent operations, including intelligence, detection of agents and the conduct of psychological operations and civic action. All of these things in principle appear to have been included in the mission of BPP but there is evidence that as late as 1971 the Thai forces in the border region were considerably less well equipped than their Malaysian counterparts to tackle the problem. 5

While equipped to conduct simple practical exercises in information gathering, PsyOp and civic action, the USMC CA unit generally does these for its own purposes, is dependent on professional guidance and assistance from higher echelons, and is not really equipped to teach these skills explicitly to counterpart forces at the level of the deployed units. Hence, in this case one of the functions of the USMC CA unit support components in intelligence, PsyOp and civic action would be to provide training in these activities to BPP units, particularly to the Mobile Reserves, which were specifically trained in counterinsurgency techniques, and to the Development Platoons.

5 Ibid.
One of the intriguing aspects of this border situation, and the mutual involvement of both the Malaysian and Thai police forces, is the possibilities of training the Thai police in the combined action concept itself.

Thus the scenario for introduction of a USMC CA unit in southern Thailand in the latter half of 1966 would involve the following: the deployment of USMC rifle squads to work with BPP line platoons; the detailing of some support components in PsyOp, civic action and intelligence to work with the BPP Mobile Reserve units and with the BPP local headquarters in the field; close liaison between the USMC CA command and the top of the Provincial Police structure, to include a coordinating function with the area counterinsurgency training center at Songkhla. The deployed USMC CA units would concentrate on upgrading BPP line units in paramilitary skills including local defense, ambushing and patrolling, and practical experience in counterinsurgency tactics and combined operations could be gained by both BPP and USMC elements if in fact a three-way combination could have been developed—i.e., area surveillance and quick response operations handled by mixed teams of Thai BPP, Malaysian police, and USMC units, supported by Marine air. Providing that the command and control systems could be adequately coordinated among these three elements, such a force might well have established a model for joint counterinsurgency operations along borders. This suggests that in deploying the USMC CA units in the above scenario, they might well have been concentrated in or near the two areas where the Thais and Malaysians had already agreed to conduct joint operations against the rebel sanctuaries in Thailand.
Colombia
(May 1962-January 1963)

Setting

From 1948-58 the Colombian countryside was torn by anarchy, banditry and armed conflict between elements of two major political parties. Basically political in origin the conflict became endemic in the rural areas, perpetuated in the form of retaliatory blood feuds between peasants or between armed bands and law enforcement agents. Frequently, the political issues were forgotten and retaliatory raids replaced by simple banditry, and wanton killings as a way of life. Known as "La Violencia" this phenomenon in Colombian history drew international attention particularly between 1948-58, because of its senseless brutality and excesses, the incredibly high death rates on all sides, and the intensity and persistence of the conflict over large areas of the country for such a long period of time.

In the years after 1958 there was noticeable abatement in this rural anarchy, mainly as the result of the establishment of the national front and an agreement between the two major parties that they would share equally in government by a system of quotas and alternating control. This took much of the steam out of the politically based conflict; however, organized and sporadic banditry and criminality of all sorts remained a serious problem in some locales, particularly in the departments of Tolima, Huila, Caldas and Valle. Furthermore, in the early 1960's, communist organization and direction began to manifest itself in guerrilla type attacks on public targets both in the rural areas and in the towns.

Considerable improvement in the military measures to control the violence were carried out under Presidents Lleras Camargo (1958-62) and Leon Valencia (1962-1966). Both were concerned with isolating and eliminating the remaining pockets of banditry and guerrilla warfare and moved vigorously and generally effectively, despite opposition from some political groups which tried to exploit the remaining violence to disrupt and discredit the national front.
Both Lleras and Valencia enjoyed considerable public support in the United States and both appear to have been very receptive to U.S. military assistance and advice.

December 1961 marks the beginning of the National Front's efforts to mount a full-scale assault on the problems of anarchy and disorder in the countryside. In an article appearing in the December issue of the Army magazine, Major General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, Commander of the Army, expressed the Army's realization that bolder tactics and better training were needed, particularly in counterguerrilla operations, and he promised that in 1962 all training would be increased.

In January 1962, the army and police combined in an assault on Marquetalia in southern Tolima and northern Huila and shortly thereafter a semi-autonomous command—the Quindio Command—was created to increase military effectiveness in the Quindio—a triangular-shaped frontier pocket area enclaved between the departments of Caldas, Tolima and Valle. Generally underdeveloped and neglected by the adjacent departments, this area had attracted some of the worst bandit elements in the country. In 1962 it was considered the prime example of a "remaining pocket of banditry" to be eliminated. Headquarters of the Quindio Command was at Armenia, in Southern Caldas.

In early 1962 the Army began to distribute firearms to the peasants for self-defense, and about the same time was hard at work, with U.S. assistance, on a broadly conceived and comprehensive plan for control of violence throughout the country. Known as Plan Lazo, it included special training in anti-guerrilla operations, training in operational intelligence techniques, psychological operations, and civil defense indoctrination for civilians in affected areas, and military civic action programs. The plan was issued to the Army in May 1962.

In August 1962, President Valencia succeeded President Lleras in office. With his endorsement of Plan Lazo, Major General Novoa, now Minister of War, began to implement it immediately, a task which was accomplished by the end of 1962. In September 1962 the Army prepared to expand its single battalion of
special mountain troops, the Lancers, to eight battalions, within a period of twelve months. The Lancers were trained in mobile counterguerrilla operations using helicopters.

In October, the governors of Caldas, Tolima and Valle departments, surrounding the Quindio area, agreed to unite their departments into a unified territory for the express purpose of suppressing banditry.

Notable successes were achieved under Plan Lazo and the operations of the armed forces changed the situation in the Quindio for the better soon after the Plan was implemented. Two major local bandit chiefs were eliminated in late 1962 and early 1963.

One of the central efforts in Plan Lazo was military civic action assistance to rural communities, both to reconstruct communities damaged by the violence and to detach local inhabitants from bandits who might have been preying on them. This was difficult because it was common for bandits to portray themselves to rural people as their protectors, politically aligned with the rational government. If convinced that the bandits were not their protectors, families then became apprehensive about bandit retaliation should they cooperate with the military and accept assistance.

**Situation**

Plan Lazo, issued in May 1962 and implemented by the end of that year, was drawn up with the assistance of U. S. military advisors and carried out with U. S. military assistance in training and equipment. As a comprehensive plan, employing a variety of mutually reinforcing CI techniques, it could well have included the combined action concept as an adjunct to the army and police search and destroy tactics particularly in the Quindio where the Army and police had previously had minimal contact with the local population. Between May 1962, when Plan Lazo was first issued to the Army, and December 1962, when the plan began to pay off in the Quindio, a USMC CA unit deployed among the villages in the Quindio could have provided an essential element of support to the combined Army and police effort--i. e., they could have assured the local people that it was the
government, not the bandits, who ultimately would protect them. The concern expressed about retaliation by bandits for cooperation with the government suggests that the whole thrust of the Army's plan was bandit-chasing supported by local intelligence, encouraged by local civic action. Since the Army and police appear to have been fully occupied in area-wide mobile counterguerrilla operations, some local units, comparable to the Home Guard in Greece, could have been formed in the Quindío. We know that arms were issued to the peasants in 1962 for self-defense and that Plan Lazo included civil defense indoctrination for civilians in affected areas, but we have no information as to how local defense was actually organized at the local level, or how it was related to the actions of the Army and police in their bandit "search and destroy" missions. Although these missions appear to have been successful we do not know whether the Army or police left in their wake the sort of local defense institutions that would make the area extremely difficult for bandits to reclaim.

In this situation, we visualize a three-fold mission for the CA force: (1) creating and training local defense forces, possibly using the ca. abinieros as a base, or a model (these forces had been augmented in 1959, when additional carabinieros, some or all of whom were mounted, were assigned to rural areas of violence), (2) providing local defense including regular patrolling and ambushing, and (3) gathering of local intelligence for transmittal to the Army and police units operating in the area.

As in the case of Thailand, civic action programs are already in effect so that this mission would be minimal. Psychological operations would be more important but limited to convincing the local population that (1) the government meant business, (2) in the long run the government would win out, (3) the government was the true protector of the peasantry and not the bandits, (4) it was to the peasants' advantage to cooperate with the government and to accept their assistance in return for providing information about the movements of local bandit gangs, and (5) the purpose of the CA force was to see to it that villages which cooperated with the government could protect themselves against the retaliation by bandits, until the bandits were eliminated. Experience has shown that the continuous presence of the CA force in local communities, plus its demonstrated
intent to stand and fight, are probably the strongest psychological messages of all. These could be reinforced by the simplest and most effective form of psy-ops--i.e., talking directly with the people on a regular basis, explaining to them what the Army and police are doing and why, and promoting situations in which local people may prove to themselves that they can withstand exploitation by bandits, and that siding with the government would in the long run be more to their advantage than siding with the bandits. Combined action, using the politically neutral USMC units as a core, would have done much to allay fears that armed peasants would themselves turn to banditry. The injection of deployed USMC units into a situation where intense political factionalism and retaliatory raiding had been endemic would probably go a long way in and of itself toward reducing this kind of tension and toward making it possible for communities to focus their attention, defensively, on their true enemies.

While a USMC CA force could not be deployed generally about the country, its use in the Quindio in late 1962 would have had a much broader impact than is suggested by the size of the Quindio area itself. Combined action was explicit in the operational elements of Plan Lazo, and operations by the Colombian Army and police in the Quindio were a particularly dramatic demonstration of the effectiveness of combined action and military-civil cooperation and mutual assistance. Further, the fact that the governors of the three adjoining department—(Caldas, Tolima and Valle) had unified their departments for a kind of regional attack on banditry meant that what happened in the Quindio had a special significance for the region as a whole.

The Quindio is accessible from the Pacific Coast of Colombia, through the department of Valle. The capital city of Valle, Cali, is located inland some 100 miles by air from the port town of Buenaventura. From Cali, a road runs northward through a valley into the heart of the Quindio. We visualize the USMC CA unit having its logistical base in Cali, and its main operational and liaison base at Armenia, the headquarters of the Quindio Command. Armenia is 200 road miles from Cali. Air and road support to the CA units could be provided from Cali, with backup support coming from Buenaventura.
CHAPTER IV

COMBINED ACTION OPERATIONS IN THE FUTURE

Projecting and Predicting Through
the Use of Scenarios

This chapter mainly is devoted to the construction of three scenarios depicting the use of Marine combined action units (CAUs) in possible future contingency situations. The hypothetical foreign settings for these narrations are mythical countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. These scenarios, although generalized and speculative, are based on an integration of the descriptive materials concerning relevant foreign environments and insurgency case histories as presented in Chapters II and III, and a projection of socio-politico-economic trends likely to require limited Marine involvement to protect U. S. interests in the mid-range period (1972-1982). The emphasis in these scenarios is military and tactical rather than diplomatic and strategic. Hence issues are not fully addressed at a level that would concern the U. S. Ambassador or senior military members of the Country Team. For a full discussion of roles and responsibilities at this level the reader is referred to FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations.

In addition to presenting an estimate of the future evolvement of the combined action concept, the scenarios are intended to provide raw materials for Marine structured training studies and exercises. Following the three narrations, training and support requirements for likely Marine combined action operations of the future are specified. Finally, conclusions and recommendations concerning the Marine combined action concept in future contingencies are presented.

One organizational model, similar to the present Marine Battalion Landing Team, suitable for all three scenario situations has been developed. This organizational chart, together with indications of the operational tasks typically to be assigned to different components, is presented as Appendix A.
Scenario 11--Latin America

Introduction

A U.S. Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), as part of a larger Organization of American States (OAS) force, was requested by the Republic of Carta Blanca in February 1978 to counter and neutralize active insurgency in the southernmost province of Cabeza de Vaca. The other elements of the OAS force were to be concentrated in the national capital, San Miguel, in order to help quell large scale disorders aimed at overthrowing the newly elected government. The MAU, organized to be deployed as Combined Action Unit (CAU), arrived in the country on February 22, 1978.

Located in central Central America, Carta Blanca is 4,768 square miles in area and had a population of 1,705,760 at the time of the last census (1975). Shaped roughly like a rectangle, mountains cover most of the northern two-thirds of the country and lush, jungle lowlands and developed farmlands make up the lower one-third. The national capital is situated inland about 70 miles northwest of the country's only deepwater port, the provincial capital of La Izquerida. Being only a few degrees north of the equator, the climate is hot and humid all year long, except in mountainous areas above 6,000 feet. The country is bounded on the north, west, and south by the Republic of El Pobre, and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean.

The economic foundation of Carta Blanca over the past century has been the production and export of bananas. However, international demand for bananas has fallen sharply since the early 1970's and a serious effort to diversify agricultural production has been undertaken. Moves toward industrialization have resulted in increasing outputs of cement, electricity, and wood products. Banking and insurance have long been important commercial enterprises. Transportation and telecommunications remain relatively primitive, in large part due to the rugged physical features of the country. Carta Blanca has only one telephone for every 700 inhabitants.
The social structure of the country is reflected in the ethnic composition; 17% of European ancestry, 70% mestizo, 9% Negro, and 4% Indian. Educational opportunities are rapidly improving, especially in the capital city. There are over 2,500 primary and secondary schools, with a combined enrollment of 305,990. The illiteracy rate is about 50% for the whole country. Similarly, health standards are low, but improving. There are about 550 inhabitants per hospital bed, and 2,360 persons per physician. The infant mortality rate is now about 103 per 1,000 births. Carta Blanca has excellent social welfare measures on the books, but they are routinely unimplemented.

The politics of Carta Blanca traditionally has been the province of the landed gentry, the former aristocracy, the church, and the military elite. Until around 1960, an especially close bond, in terms of interests and family ties, had existed between the wealthy landowners and the military leadership. However, in recent years an accelerating change has been taking place in the national balance of political power. At the expense of the landowner class, the church, and the old generals, new industrialists and entrepreneurs, professional people, and a new type of military man have been in the ascendency. Probably the best example of this change has been General Alvarez, who in promulgating the Constitution of 1970 passed control over the government and the economy from the hands of a relatively small elite, into the hands of the voting public. Traditionally, the Republic of Carta Blanca has been pro-United States.

Origins of the Disorder

In the period between 1964 and 1974, Carta Blanca had seen eight governments form and fall without benefit of national elections. However, when the junta led by General Hector Alvarez seized power in May 1974, many significant changes ensued. In response to stagnant economic conditions and mounting public discontent, a series of long postponed reforms were introduced between 1974 and 1978. The most important reforms included a loosening of restrictions on freedom of the press and assembly, freedom to form political parties, the promise of a land reform program, and a pledge of free elections to be held on 7 January 1978 (for the first time in 16 years).
In the two years preceding the 1978 elections, three large political parties were formed, the Party of the Right (POR), the Party of the Center (POC) and the Party of the Left (POL). Some 33 additional parties were registered with the government, mostly representing small elements of the left and right, but as the elections were to show, these splinter groups represented only about 3 percent of the population.

The elections, to seat a new legislature in addition to a chief executive, were won by Senor Pedro Gonzoles and the Party of the Center, by an impressive plurality of 62 percent of the popular vote. Unfortunately, both the Party of the Right and the Party of the Left contested the elections immediately on the grounds of voting irregularities. The week after the elections, several prominent members of the Party of the Right attempted a coup d'etat to unseat the newly elected government and install their own man as president. However, the former Chief of State, General Alvarez, rallied the bulk of the nation's armed forces to protect the new government and prevent the coup attempt.

A more serious threat to the Gonzoles government developed two weeks later on the 29th of January. A coalition of three minor parties of the radical left announced a campaign to topple the government because they claimed that the panel of judges that conducted the investigation of voting irregularities and certified the legality of the results of the elections had been bribed by Senor Gonzoles. Although the charges of election fraud had no foundation in fact, the anti-government campaign struck a responsive chord among the citizens of San Miguel for other reasons.

The national economy had been stagnant for over two years and conditions in were particularly difficult. Food shortages, serious inflation and an unemployment rate of over 35% brought urban dwellers into the streets to demand government action, and violent confrontations with the police followed. On 30 January, 16 workers and students, and 7 police were slain. At the same time,

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1 The Party of the Radical Left, the Freedom Army of Carta Blanca, and the Movement Mao and Che.
taking advantage of the confusion and intensifying it. Marxist and other radical
groups launched a program of terrorism, burning and bombing public buildings
and kidnapping government officials. The students at the National University
went on strike and reiterated their longstanding demands for educational reforms
and more jobs for graduates. President Gonzoles ordered the entire rural police
force, the Rural Guard, to the capital to reinforce urban police and the army, but
was unable to calm the situation.

Meanwhile, in the important banana producing province of Cabeza de
Vaca, groups of peasants had illegally occupied over 2,000 acres of unfted
plantation lands in anticipation of the expected land reform. Landowners bega
to mobilize their workers in order to evict the peasants by force. Also, reports
were received in the capital that several small plantations had been attacked and
raided by guerrillas and/or bandits. Other rural and mountain areas throughout
the country, however, remained relatively quiet.

Under these conditions, President Gonzoles on 5 February declared a
national state of siege and requested assistance from the Organization of American
States to restore order to the nation. The Organization of American States
acted promptly on the request, agreeing to send to the Republic of Carta Blanca
one battalion of Marines each from Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and the United
States. The Latin American contingents were immediately dispatched to the
capital to help local forces restore and maintain order, while because of their
special capabilities, the U. S. Marines were assigned to the Province of Cabeza
de Vaca.

The MAU Mission

The U. S. Marine Amphibious Unit (in reinforced battalion strength)
was assigned two primary and two secondary objectives by the Commander,
General Jones, of the Organization of American States Expeditionary Force to
the Republic of Carta Blanca. The first and most important objective was to
quell the growing rural anarchy and maintain the peace in the province. In order
to accomplish this objective, Marines were to prevent further peasant encroach-
ments onto privately held plantation lands and at the same time dissuade landowners
from attempting to evict peasants from private lands already occupied pending judicial review. Also, armed raids on individual plantations and ranches were to be stopped and the raiders apprehended. As a secondary objective, the Marines were to gather intelligence concerning all aspects of the disturbances in the province in order to prepare effective countermeasures and to inform the OAS Command and national authorities. Information coming into the capital from Cabeza de Vaca was extremely confused and contradictory prior to the arrival of the OAS Expeditionary Force.

The second primary objective of the U. S. Marine contingent was to assist provincial authorities to form and train a provincial constabulary force of 2,000 men capable of assuming the main burden of local security as soon as possible. The virtual absence of police forces in the province since the central government had recalled the Rural Guard from the countryside on 31 January to help put down disturbances in San Miguel had contributed significantly to provincial unrest. An average of only one police officer per village had been left behind and these few men chose not to take an active role in the settlement of local disputes.

The other secondary mission of the MAU was to determine the scope and composition of possible community development activities in the area of operations, and carry out such activities where feasible. Of course, this last objective was not to be undertaken until a full measure of law and order had been achieved in Cabeza de Vaca.

Description of the Area of Operations

The Province of Cabeza de Vaca covers the extreme southern tip of the Republic of Carta Blanca and is 1,060 square miles, or approximately the same size as Rhode Island. On the west and south the province is bounded by the Republic of El Pobre. To the north is the mountainous province of San Miguel, near the center of which is situated the national capital of San Miguel. The eastern border of the province is edged by a 40-mile strip of the Atlantic Ocean, with the nation's only good deep water port, the provincial capital of La Izquerida. The
Zone of small private farms and communal lands
Belt of small trading towns
Zone of banana plantations

Legend:
- City or Large Town
- Small Town
- Mountains
- Major Road
- National Boundary
- Provincial Boundary
southernmost three-quarters of the province are rich agricultural lowlands which rise abruptly in the north to craggy volcanic mountains 9,000 to 12,000 feet high.

The total population of the province is about 420,000 persons or 35% of the national total, if the 510,000 urban residents of the nation's capital are excluded. A bit over half of the population, 215,000 persons, resides on the province's 36 large and medium-sized banana plantations. Of the remainder, about three-quarters or 140,000 persons, live on small plots of private or communal farmland and 42,000 live in and around the 17 small towns lying along an east-west line dividing the plantation lands and the small peasant farms. With 22,000 persons, the provincial capital of La Izquerida is by far the most important commercial center of the region, and has a much larger population than any of the 17 small towns which average only about 2,500 persons each.

The racial composition of the province is approximately 73% Mestizo, 6% Negro, 9% White, and 12% Indian.

Despite a birthrate approaching 3.5% per annum, the size of the total population of the province had remained virtually unchanged for more than two decades. This anomaly had been the result of a continuous outmigration, almost entirely to the national capital, due to the stagnation of the local economy.

A long-term slump in the banana industry, the chief cause of the province's high rate of unemployment, became critical in 1973. After the U.S. Concerned Consumer Council published a report in June 1973 proving that the consumption of bananas was a prime factor in inducing obesity among teen-aged girls, sales to the U. S. fell sharply and never recovered. As a result of the lower demand, most of the plantation owners allowed part of their lands to go out of production and lie fallow. By 1978, approximately 9,000 acres of good land lay idle, most of it just to the south of the belt of small towns.

This idle land provoked much resentment among the poor mestizos and Indians who grew only maize and beans on a subsistence basis on the mostly dry, rocky soils of the region between the mountains and the plantation lands. Most

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<sup>2</sup> All population figures are based on the 1975 census.
of the plantation lands to the south had been owned by these peasants and Indians some 100 years before, but had been lost through legal chicanery and open seizures by roving filibusters. By 1975 the average peasant holding in the province was five acres of agricultural land as opposed to an average of about 900 acres for each plantation owner. The three largest plantation owners, Gomez, Sanchez, and O'Tool, owned a total of 57,000 acres or almost 20% of the arable land of the entire province. Of course, these ownership figures do not reflect the fact that about one third of the non-plantation rural families were headed by landless, unskilled, agricultural laborers or sharecroppers. On the plantations, no sharecropping arrangements were allowed, but almost every family was rented a small plot of land in order to grow vegetables for home consumption. Following the sharp decline in banana exports, most plantation workers worked the equivalent of only two or three days per week and their already low levels of living were further depressed.

The government of the previous regime headed by General Alvarez had been aware of the land problem in Cabeza de Vaca for several years. After a careful analysis of the land reform problem by teams of U. S. economic consultants and United Nations experts during 1976-77, a draft Land Reform Program was submitted to the junta of General Alvarez and approved just prior to the elections of January 1978. Although the Land Reform Program, which provided for the purchase and transfer of fallow plantation lands through long-term loans to small holders and landless peasants, was a sound document, no funds were set aside to erect the implementation machinery or to purchase the appropriate fallow lands.

Unfortunately, much publicity attended the preparation and approval of the Land Reform Program, and the land hungry peasants of Cabeza de Vaca assumed that the inauguration of President Gonzoles would coincide with the long-awaited return to them of the lands of their forefathers. When one week after the new president had assumed office and no fallow plantation lands had been redistributed, some members of the landless community began to occupy these lands without authorization. This practice became increasingly popular and more widespread after the Rural Guard was withdrawn from the province at the end of
January 1978. By February 5th, the F--s of some 300 small farmers, landless tenants, and agricultural laborers had occupied over 2,000 acres of unused plantation lands.

Of course, the plantation landowners had no intention of giving up any of their lands without due process of law and adequate compensation. Although initially caught off guard by the audacity of the land hungry peasants, the plantation owners soon began to organize their workers to evict the usurpers. The plantation overseers quickly mobilized teams of workers to oust the squatters, but as only bamboo staves were used as weapons, violence and bloodshed were minimal. At night the peasants would return to reoccupy the same lands they had been driven from the previous day. Under these circumstances, tensions between the two groups gradually heightened. The landowners had decided to use firearms in order to remove the peasants from the occupied plantation lands by the time the U. S. Marine Amphibious Unit arrived on 14 February 1978.

The Opposing Forces

In addition to the potentially explosive situation relating to the peasant land grabs, the province of Cabeza de Vaca had been subjected to an unprecedented amount of violence since the January elections due to the activities of roving guerrilla and bandit gangs. Two guerrilla bands, and four bandit groups masquerading as guerrillas, caused considerable damage during the period just prior to the arrival of the U. S. Marines. The chronically poor communications of the region, the state of national unrest, and the rapid spread of local rumors, however, tended to exaggerate the seriousness of widely scattered acts of violence.

Of the two guerrilla organizations operating in the province, the 36-member Cosa Nuestra group led by Carlos Juarez was the older, the larger, and the more efficient. Originally founded and funded by the Party of the Left in 1973, Cosa Nuestra established itself as a three-man cell in the provincial capital.

Operating covertly at that time, as were all other political parties in Carta Blanca.
soon after the economic pinch caused by the banana crash began to be felt locally. For almost five years the guerrillas built up their strength slowly, taking great care to maintain the secrecy of their activities and their membership. Because 34 of the 36 guerrillas were local men, they were more readily listened to, trusted, and protected by the highly suspicious peasantry. The guerrillas were scattered in terms of three and four men in the small trading towns located along the geographical line separating the plantation lands and the small peasant holdings, and often were unaware of the identities of one another. The membership was made up of small landholders, tenants, and agricultural laborers, with a sprinkling of clerks, storekeepers, and school teachers.

In the five years prior to the elections of January 1978, the Cosa Nuestra gang limited its activities almost exclusively to proselytizing among the peasantry against the government, the large landowners, and the national oligarchy, under the guidance and direction of the parent Party of the Left in San Miguel. Only occasionally, seven times in five years, did the group kidnap or murder a government official or landowner, and then only when the individual was guilty of obvious crimes against society, such as beating or torturing employees. However, in the fall of 1977, on orders from the Party of the Left leadership, the Cosa Nuestra began an intensive campaign to persuade the local peasantry "to exercise their rights" and move onto unoccupied and unused plantation lands. This propaganda was largely responsible for the subsequent takeover of some 2,000 acres immediately following the national elections. On the other hand, many family and village elders stood against any hasty moves against the landlords, remembering that a series of similar incursions in 1964-65 had resulted in harsh punitive measures in retaliation against the peasant communities of the province. The vast majority of the peasantry, perhaps 70 percent, remained apathetic or were confused about the nature of the events occurring around them. During the entire four-month period the Cosa Nuestra performed no acts of violence, but energetically urged the peasants to arm themselves and to fight any landlords who opposed their actions.
The other guerrilla band operating in Cabeza de Vaca Province had been active only since November 1977 and was sponsored by the ultra extremist Party of Mao and Che. Calling themselves the Workers Peasants Army (WPA), the band consisted of seven heavily armed former students and workmen from the capital city, only one of whom was native to the province and able to speak the local version of Spanish properly. Their leader, Pancho Libros, was the party's chief theoretician on rural rebellion, but had never resided in the countryside.

Because the WPA had no local contacts in the province and were bent on an action program of terrorism and disruption, they were transported covertly to the rugged, sparsely populated, northern region of the province and began attempts to recruit among the local population. Forced to move every day or two for security reasons and because the small hill communities were unable to feed and house seven extra men for long, the guerrillas spent their first two months in the hills without success. The guerrillas mistook the hospitality and friendliness of the hill peasants for approval of their revolutionary doctrines and could not understand why they could enlist no recruits for their band. Although the peasants were willing to hide and feed these men who professed to be friends, the dialect of the guerrillas was difficult to understand, and their ideas were incomprehensible. The peasants reasoned that the better they treated the armed strangers, the sooner they would go away. Repeated attempts to establish liaison and begin coordinated operations with the Cosa Nuestra Guerrillas were rebuffed by Carlos Juarez, who considered the WPA to be a group of irresponsible amateurs.

Frustrated by their lack of success, the WPA decided to show the peasantry, by example, the road to revolution. At the beginning of December 1977, the band began a series of raids on relatively small, isolated, cattle ranches and banana plantations, burning and killing indiscriminately. Although the raiders moved constantly, police forces had killed one of their number and were closing a net around the WPA, when orders were received on 30 January requiring the immediate withdrawal of virtually the entire Rural Guard to the national capital. Finding themselves free of police opposition and pursuit, the WPA guerrilla band moved their operations to the heavily populated plantation lands in the south.
of the province. By the middle of February, the WPA had attacked two large and four medium-sized banana plantations and killed 114 people.

Adding to the general confusion in the province were the four groups of highwaymen that came into existence almost magically on the day following the departure of the Rural Guard. Each group called themselves guerrillas, but their only objectives were robbery for profit and the settling of old grudges under the banner of the revolution. These gangs, averaging about 15 men each, were made up of professional thieves, local brawlers, and young landless peasants looking for adventure. These were the men who always appear during periods of crisis, such as earthquakes or floods, when the forces of restraint and authority are temporarily removed. Interested primarily in easy prey, the bandit groups struck mostly at defenseless individuals, small unprotected plantations, and country stores (tiendas). Appropriately, the bandit "guerrillas" covered their faces with masks during raids. Also, unlike the other guerrilla groups, these bands traveled by horseback, making them highly mobile and their work quite profitable. The people were far more terrified of the bandits than of the WPA guerrillas because the bandits struck at random, according to whim, and no one was safe from them. During the two weeks before the arrival of the U. S. MAU, these bandits had looted and burned 15 plantation buildings and private residences, and 4 country stores, and indiscriminately murdered 6 people. Almost all of the killings were brutal and without cause.

The Arrival of the Marine Amphibious Unit

On the morning of 15 February 1978, ships of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Forces carrying the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) specified in President Alvarez's request to the Organization of American States arrived off the provincial capital of Izquerida. The MAU consisted of a fully equipped, reinforced battalion of 1,800 officers and men, and an air arm of 25 armed helicopters.

The four ships of the Naval Amphibious Task Force provided a flexible and efficient seabase for the Marines. As all aircraft, logistical support, and maintenance services were sited on the ships, the "rear" was both safe and
unobtrusive for the duration of the operation. Relieved of former burdens such as road and airfield building and maintenance, the Marine Commander would be able to concentrate his efforts on finding and engaging the enemy.

The Marine commander had been briefed on the situation in Cabeza de Vaca by the OAS commander, General Jones, and by the military leadership of Carta Blanca on the previous day. The briefing revealed that, although relative calm appeared to prevail in the town of La Izquerida, most telephone lines were down and almost nothing was known of what was happening throughout the rest of the province. Information from widely scattered outlying areas ranged from reports of utter anarchy to intelligence indicating mild peasant unrest. The national government was anxious to have news of the true state of affairs. After a careful helicopter reconnaissance, the MAU made an unopposed landing in La Izquerida and set up a skeleton headquarters there, while the commander directed overall operations from the seabase.

The most pressing task upon arrival was overcoming the language gap. Although communication with residents of the province was essential if successful operations were to be carried out, the central government in San Miguel had been able to provide the MAU with only 22 civilian and 14 military interpreters. Fortunately, the quality of these interpreters was universally high. The MAU was able to supplement the contingent of 36 indigenous interpreters with 90 Marine riflemen having some degree of fluency in the Spanish language. In this way, every combat unit and every headquarters was able to commence operations with at least one good interpreter.

Population and Resources Control

Immediately upon arrival, the MAU sent out platoon-sized patrols and helicopters to gather information on which to base an estimate of the situation. It quickly became apparent that, although guerrilla and bandit violence was a serious problem, the chief threat to peace and stability was the confrontation between the peasants squatting on unused plantation lands and the paid employees of the landlords. Tension was running high, and the situation contained the makings of a minor civil war.
Orders received from the OAS headquarters in San Miguel directed the Marines to maintain the status quo in all cases of illegal seizures of private lands, pending juridical review and the implementation of the Land Reform Law. No further encroachments were to be allowed, and those peasants already in place were to be protected from landowner countermeasures. Simultaneously, the Marines were to stop all forms of rural violence, banditry, insurrection, and anarchy. Also, as it appeared that the Rural Guard would be occupied in San Miguel for some time to come, the Marines were directed to recruit and train a local constabulary (to be armed, equipped, and supported by the national government) to take part in combined action operations and later, to replace the Marine presence.

Two days after their arrival, the MAU deployed about half of its forces (26 squads, averaging 15 men each) into the area separating the peasant holdings and the plantation lands. Squad sized units took up positions in 11 of the largest of the 17 small marketing towns which formed a boundary between the two factions, and the remaining 15 squads camped on peasant-held plantation properties.

Both the peasants and the landowners were highly impressed with the mobility and armaments of the Marine units, and independently of each other, decided that it would be unrewarding to attempt to improve their present positions. As time passed, both groups became more resigned to the situation; the peasants because their "rights to the land" were being protected, because the landowners had not been allowed to retaliate against them, and because the government had reiterated its promise to distribute all unused plantation lands to the needy; and the landowners because they were saved the expense of a full scale "war" against the squatters, because their collective honor was saved in that it would be impolitic for them to attack the overwhelmingly superior Marine forces, and because the government was offering to pay handsome prices to them for pieces of their land for which they had no use.

The Cosa Nuestra guerrillas, in the first few days after the arrival of the MAU, were uncertain as to the intentions or the whereabouts of the Marines. The initial reaction of the Cosa Nuestra was to attempt to induce the entire peasant community to repulse the "foreign imperialist invaders." However, the peasants
could not be stampeded, and almost universally chose a wait and see policy toward the Marines, particularly since the Marines treated the local people with respect and cause little trouble. The aggressive and effective Marine patrolling of the province soon made any type of overt guerrilla activity extremely hazardous, and the Cosa Nuestra leadership decided to go underground and temporarily cease all operations.

The Workers and Peasants Army (WPA) guerrillas were equally in the dark about the intentions of the Marines at the beginning. This group continued its raids against the banana planters, attacking "good" and "bad" landowners indiscriminately. Peasants and plantation workers thought the violence of the WPA senseless, and considered them to be bandits rather than friends. On the fifth day after the Marines landed, a tenant farmer on his way to visit relatives in the south central part of the province observed the six remaining members of the WPA band on their way to raid a small plantation, and reported his observance when he ran into a Marine patrol a short time later. The Marines quickly cut off the guerrilla band, and after a brief fire fight (one wounded on each side), captured the entire group. Much to the relief of the local population, after interrogation, the WFA was turned over to the military authorities in the national capital.

The fate of the four bandit gangs was similar. On the third day of operations, a Marine helicopter spotted 20 mounted men approaching the central hacienda of a large plantation and reported their location to mobile Marine patrols in the area. Three squads converged on the bandits and surprised the gang as they were mounting their attack on the hacienda. The bandits resisted and suffered 17 casualties (13 dead and 4 wounded), as opposed to one wounded for the Marines. Three bandits escaped. News of this encounter spread quickly, and the local people soon realized that it would be safe to inform on the bandits. As a result, the other three bandit groups dissolved as quickly as they had formed. Over the following two months, 20 bandits were captured and jailed as they tried to make their individual ways from the plantation area to the rugged mountains in the north. It was relatively easy for Marine patrols to identify these men, as most of them retained their arms and horses as they attempted to escape. Also, information supplied by
local citizens was an important factor in the apprehension and identification of many of the bandits.

A problem which occurred with some frequency at first was the apprehension of innocent peasants on the mistaken assumption that they were bandits. These mishaps were partly due to language difficulties, but mainly were the result of the extreme passivity and strong sense of fatalism among the peasantry. Usually these men soon were identified by the local priest or trustworthy citizens and released. As the incidence of banditry decreased and the Marines became aware that the innocent were the least likely to resist arrest, the number of such occurrences fell off sharply. On the whole, the Marines quickly won the confidence of the public because they treated all citizens with respect and civility and did not disrupt the local way of life unduly.

By the middle of March 1978, order had been restored throughout the province of Cabeza de Vaca. The Marine presence and aggressive patrolling had driven the main guerrilla forces underground, and eliminated the lesser guerrilla threat and the bandit gangs. Helping to stabilize the situation was the fact that the local people, under the protection of the Marines, felt secure enough to deny food and shelter to roving guerrillas and bandits. However, the level of violence in the national capital had not abated, and in order to maintain order and prevent fresh guerrilla assaults from the north, the Marines were to remain in Cabeza de Vaca for another five months.

**Intelligence Collection**

Intelligence collection proved to be one of the most effective contributions of the MAU. After only one week, the Marines were able to provide the OAS command and the national government with vital information on the true state of affairs in Cabeza de Vaca Province. This information, primarily the result of first-hand Marine observations from all parts of the province, enabled the authorities to complete their plans for a nation-wide pacification program, and to begin the implementation of that program.
Similarly, tactical intelligence concerning the whereabouts and identity of marauding bandits and guerrillas was a critical factor in allowing the Marines to restore order so quickly. In the beginning, the collection of this vital intelligence came about through the actions of resident individuals in communicating information to small Marine units, rather than through the efforts of a formal intelligence gathering apparatus.

As soon as the local residents determined that the Marines would not be a disruptive force, members of all sections of the community volunteered information concerning renegade bandits and guerrillas. Probably the most important factors in gaining the confidence of the local population were that the Marines treated all citizens with dignity, did not molest the local girls, and paid cash for goods and services required.

During the second month of their stay, the MAU intelligence collection system was formalized. The system, based on fragmentary data concerning sources and reliability gathered at squad level over the hectic first few weeks, was collated and analyzed by company level officers and NCOs. These activities were coordinated and managed by the MAU S-2 in La Izquerida, who relayed finished intelligence and reports back to originating units and other interested clients. Building blocks of the system were the intelligence logs maintained by each unit from the first day. With few exceptions, voluntary information proved to be more useful and reliable than intelligence supplied by paid informants.

Although a key element in the destruction of the WPA guerrillas and the bandit gangs, intelligence operations were not an effective tool in uncovering and apprehending the Cosa Nuestra guerrillas. Sensing that the people of the province were disenchanted with bloodshed, violence, and political agitation, Carlos Juárez, the leader of the group, ordered his men to cease all guerrilla activities

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Footnote: 4 Intelligence reports were sent to the national and provincial offices of the Carta Blanca Intelligence Service and to the CAS command, on a reciprocal basis.
and go underground soon after the arrival of the Marines. As the members of the Cosa Nuestra were all either natives or long-time residents of the community, it proved relatively simple for them to drop out of sight. Although the membership of the guerrillas was fairly widely known, public opinion deemed it inappropriate to turn them over to the Marines, since the Cosa Nuestra had caused little trouble in the past and currently were behaving themselves. In addition, family members, colleagues, and friends of the guerrillas were apt to take personal revenge on informers. During their stay, the Marines turned up very little information on the Cosa Nuestra and made no captures. On the other hand, the Marine presence completely neutralized the Cosa Nuestra as an effective guerrilla organization.

Recruiting and Training a Local Constabulary Force

The task of recruiting and training a local constabulary force, which would take over full responsibility for all operations at the earliest possible date, was a major objective of the MAU. Aside from a 20-man police contingent stationed in La Izquierda, only one man each had been left at the 29 rural police posts scattered throughout the province when the Rural Guard was recalled to San Miguel. With three exceptions, who were hidden by relatives, all of the police manning these isolated outposts had taken annual leave during the period of rural anarchy and temporarily departed from the province. It is possible that Marine operations were not hampered unduly by lack of police assistance in the early stages, as the Rural Guard generally was considered to be dishonest, cruel, and incompetent, and was held in low esteem by the local population.

In compliance with the instructions of the OAS command, the MAU began the recruitment of a 2,000-man provincial constabulary force immediately upon arrival in Cabeza de Vaca. Starting from scratch, 175 men were enlisted during the first week. Recruitment was carried on both by combat units active in the field and at a central recruiting office located in the provincial capital. Marine officers and NCOs, in deference to their professional competence, were given responsibility for the selection of recruits, but were assisted and advised in the
task by local officials, teachers, priests, and rural elders. Over time, the high rate of unemployment and the good reputation earned by the Marines among the people provided a steady flow of good quality recruits from the countryside. By the end of two months, 1,300 recruits had been selected, and at the end of four months, the Cabeza de Vaca Constabulary had reached its authorized strength. The central government announced that this constabulary force would be a permanent organization, as the Rural Guard units previously transferred to San Miguel had been integrated into the national army.

A serious problem at the outset was poor coordination with the national government in terms of arming, equipping, and paying the Cabeza de Vaca Constabulary. After three weeks, Marine headquarters in La Izquerida dispatched a unit to San Miguel which returned the same day with the required arms, uniforms, equipment, rations, and backpay for the Constabulary. Support for the Constabulary proved to be a continuing problem, and the Marines were forced to spend an inordinate amount of their time expediting requests for supplies from the central government. This difficulty did not stem from any lack of enthusiasm and support on the part of the new Gonzoles government, but rather, was a result of the ineffectual administrative machinery inherited from previous regimes.

With the rapid reduction in rural violence, training of the Constabulary became the main occupation of the MAU. As quickly as recruits were enlisted, they were integrated into Marine squads in the field and commenced on-the-job training in the military arts. Training, of course, was informal. With minimal assistance from interpreters, recruits learned through observation and constant repetition about the care and use of weapons and equipment. The tactics of day and night patrolling, and ambushes were practiced with such ardor, that they soon became very familiar to the new soldiers. A tendency among the recruits to copy the actions and attitudes of the Marines seemed to accelerate the learning process.

There were, however, numerous cases of misunderstandings and disputes between the Marines and the Carta Blancans based on the differing customs and cultures of the two groups. For example, soon after beginning their training, new recruits would often present their Marine superiors with gifts of fresh fruit,
vegetables, or even chickens. The Marines accepted such gifts as a sign of friendliness and admiration, and in order not to hurt the feelings of the givers. The recruits, however, gave the gifts in order to receive duties or special favors—a custom long practiced by members of a rural Guard. Thus, the recruits were unhappy when no favoritism was shown toward them, and the Marines became very indignant when they came to realize that "bribery" was being attempted. This particular problem was solved easily by simply banning all gift giving and receiving. Although such misunderstandings between individual students and teachers were fairly common, the overall relationship was consistently good.

Officers were supplied by the central government in sufficient numbers to keep pace as the Constabulary grew. However, regular army NCOs were in short supply, and the Marines promoted promising local recruits to NCO slots as training progressed. By August 1978, largely as a result of a positive Marine evaluation of the effectiveness of the Cabeza de Vaca Constabulary, the MAU was able to depart from the country leaving behind only a small liaison detachment in the Headquarters of the OAS mission in San Miguel.

Community Development Activities

The Combined Action Unit (CAU) proved to be an important catalyst in the community development process merely because it was there. As past operations in similar circumstances had shown, the members of a Marine squad serving in a CAU unit are not adequately trained to become prime movers in a rural community development effort. However, the CAU can provide a critical service by acting as a conduit of information and ideas between government authorities and the local communities.

Fortunately, the new Gonzoles government was anxious and eager to improve conditions in Cabeza de Vaca Province. Although altruism played some part in this concern, agricultural stagnation in the south had drastically reduced the level of foreign exchange earnings and was seriously threatening the country’s ability to feed itself. Also, the heavy tide of unemployed rural workers moving to the capital city was in large part responsible for the outbreak of urban violence there.
Experience had shown the USMC that careful observation, investigation, and planning were necessary if community development projects were to produce the optimum and desired impact. Therefore, through interviews and discussions with rural leaders, the perceived needs having the greatest potential payoff for the larger community were identified. For example, the pressing need for more farm credit, improved roads, better marketing facilities, a safe and reliable water supply, and a great expansion of health and educational services came to light almost immediately. The CAUs, with the assistance of Marine Civil Affairs units, were able to help pinpoint where the needs were greatest and where new investments and services would be used to best advantage. This information was then processed and forwarded to the responsible national economic and social development offices. One result of this information was that the central government had been able to form six new agricultural producers' cooperatives and two fishing cooperatives even before the Marines departed from the country.

Although the Marines were careful to make explicit that full responsibility for all community development projects lie with the national government and the local peoples the CAUs also supplement these activities in several ways. The medical care rendered to local citizens by the U. S. Navy corpsmen attached to each CAU platoon was by far the most popular and deeply appreciated initiative undertaken. Also, the CAUs acted as agents for CARE in distributing seed and small farming implements to those local residents who seemed more interested in using such items than in selling them. Of course, the most immediate stimulus to the economy came from the constabulary payroll, by far the largest in the province. Dozens of beer and coke dispensaries, laundries, and barber shops sprang up instantly.

As with the Civic Action aspects of community development, the psychological operations (Psyop) elements were carried off easily and unselfconsciously. For example, although flag raising ceremonies and inspections soon became routinized, Marines entered enthusiastically into celebrations of saints' days, presidents' birthdays, and other festivals to which they were invited by members of the constabulary and local citizens. Probably the most effective Psyop exercise consisted of informing the public through periodic open meetings of the progress being
made by the government in the implementation of the Land Reform Law. By proving that lack of action was the result of slow progress rather than no progress, the public became much more willing to give the new government an opportunity to produce.

Epilogue

On August 31, 1978, the U. S. Marine Amphibious unit was relieved of its responsibilities in Carta Blanca by the Organization of American States Commander, General Jones, and embarked for Norfolk, Virginia and a well-deserved rest. Two months later, the military situation in the rest of the country had stabilized enough to allow the other OAS fighting units to return to their home lands. Although the domestic scene was far from serene, the timely support of the OAS had enabled the Gonzoles government to survive a period of extreme civil disorder. Also, this military support provided time for the new regime to launch its avowed program of economic and social reforms.

In the capital city, San Miguel, where opposition had been most fierce, President Gonzoles instituted the construction of a subway system and other large-scale public works to reduce the ranks of the unemployed. He also decreed compulsory education to the age of 19 years in the capital in order to improve the quality of the labor force and to keep idle youths off the streets. A crash program to improve the quality and quantity of health and social welfare services was inaugurated. The president launched an industrial expansion program and invited direct foreign investment and foreign aid contributions from friendly nations. To placate the socialist political parties, diplomatic relations were established with several socialist countries.

In the agriculturally important province of Cabeza de Vaca, the new regime began serious efforts to rationalize production and bring social justice to the peasants. The log jam on land reform was broken in November 1978, when the government agreed to pay landowners half the total cost in cash and half in 20-year government bonds for excess plantation lands. By the end of 1979, more than 6,000 acres of medium quality plantation lands had been distributed to 710 peasant families. Fortuitously, the Carta Blanca Agricultural Research Institute had
determined that these rather sandy soils were perfect for peanut cultivation, and a peanut butter factory was being erected in La Izquerida. The formation of agricultural cooperatives continued, and the use of improved farming practices and a better distribution system brought the country close to self-sufficiency in food by 1980. Unemployment and underemployment were reduced by almost half, and outmigration from the province decreased even more sharply.

Although sporadic guerrilla activity continued for several years in San Miguel and in the mountains of the north, the guerrilla threat in Cabeza de Vaca Province became nonexistent in the period 1979–1982. As the government succeeded in land reform, agricultural development, and other social and economic reforms, the community no longer saw a need for violent rebellion, and the Cosa Nuestra guerrillas lost their reason for being. Carlos Juarez, the former Cosa Nuestra chief, went into politics and became a provincial representative. Other members of the group retired or moved on.

The Cabeza de Vaca Constabulary became a proud provincial institution. Judged by the criteria of general popularity, public support, and military effectiveness, the Constabulary approached the standards set by the Armed Forces of the Philippines under Ramon Magsaysay at the height of the Huk Rebellion in 1950–54.

Although the immediate danger of violence had subsided, the government realized that the implementation of the Land Reform Law was a sensitive operation, and the Constabulary was maintained at full strength for many years after the departure of the Marines. Because their military duties were not overly burdensome, the Constabulary became engaged in Civic Action (CA) duties. As an integral part of the provincial community development program, the Constabulary helped to clear farm lands, to improve and build new roads, and to dig field channels for the new irrigation systems. Adding to their popularity was the fact that almost all of the Constabulary were local men and not nearly as prone to venality and corruption as had been the members of the Rural Guard. The fact that most of the NCOs and many of the officers held their posts on the basis of merit probably was the main reason for the high level of efficiency and effectiveness of the Constabulary.
In terms of the mission assigned to the U. S. Marine Amphibious Unit, operations in Cabeza de Vaca were an unqualified success. Without doubt, the assistance of the U. S. Marines and other OAS forces were an important factor in establishing political stability and an environment conducive to economic and social progress.
Scenario #2--Middle East

Introduction

In December 1975, the Tashnab Republic requested the U. S. Government to provide military assistance in order to stem and overcome an open rebellion existing in the northern half of the country. Specifically, a U. S. Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) able to operate as Combined Action Units (CAU) was requested to supplement the forces of the undermanned Tashnab National Army and the National Gendarmerie, and to protect the economically important Markhab Manganese Mines from attack. Sailing through the recently reopened Suez Canal, the MAB arrived off the country on December 29, 1975.

Located near the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, the Tashnab Republic is about 85,000 square miles in area, or approximately the size of the State of Utah, and has a population estimated at 2,200,000 persons. Approximately 370 miles long and 260 miles wide, the country is roughly bisected by the Tashnab Mountains, which cover much of the eastern part of the nation and rise to a maximum height of 6,000 feet. The remainder of the country consists of barren, sandy desert in the far northern portion, marginal lands often suitable for dryland farming or grazing, a number of oases, and a fairly fertile strip along the seacoast. The capital city of Bisyar Marise is in the southwestern corner of the nation, but the best harbor is at Kharboosa, located about 110 miles to the east. The climate is generally hot and dry, but quite low temperatures have been recorded at higher elevations during the winter months. The Tashnab Republic is bounded on the north and west by the Peoples Republic of West Tashnab, on the north and east by the ancient Kingdom of Knod, and on the south by the Arabian Ocean.

Until recent years, the economy had been based almost entirely on subsistence agriculture. Traditionally, wheat, millet, and sorghum have been cultivated, and sheep, goats, and camels grazed in the arid regions. Some melons and citrus fruits are grown along the more fertile coastal strip. However, manganese deposits were discovered in 1957 and a consortium of American, Dutch,
and Irani mining interests was retained to exploit the find. By 1972, the Tashnab Republic was producing 560,000 tons of manganese annually, about seven percent of total world production. Despite the rapidly growing foreign exchange earnings accruing from manganese exports, however, economic development efforts have proceeded slowly and the Tashnab Republic remains one of the most backward of the Arab nations. There are 847 telephones in the entire country.

The foundation of the Tashnab social system is Islam. The Moslem religion permeates every facet of political, economic, and social life. In family life, the male is dominant. Women are almost never seen at large in the towns and villages. Up to four wives are allowed, and marriages are arranged. Life expectancy is 30-40 years. There are 508 primary schools (usually the village mosque doubles as a school house), with an estimated enrollment of 30,000 pupils. The country has seven high schools and no institutions of higher learning. The illiteracy rate is around 90 percent. Health standards are equally low. There are about 3,300 inhabitants per hospital bed, and 55,000 per physician. The population is predominantly Arab, though Negroid strains are present along the coastal strip.

Politics in Tashnab have been dominated since the 8th century by the Baywahkoof dynasty, which claims direct descent from the Prophet. Although the last reigning member of the dynasty, Sultan Mir Amhed, had been deposed and publicly beheaded by a group of progressive young army officers in 1970, this family continues to be a very strong political entity. Lineal and collateral relatives of the late Sultan are numerous and well dispersed over the country, and most often, they continue to hold positions of power and/or wealth. Even the young captain who engineered the overthrow of the Sultan and is now president of the nation, Ibn Akbar, was a grand nephew of the former ruler. Although the military government established Tashnab's first political party, the Militant Republican Party (MRP), soon after assuming power, and a constitution has been in effect since 1968, traditional and not modern political institutions prevail. Personal, family, clan, and tribal loyalties and disagreements are the basic ingredients of Tashnab politics. The nation has never witnessed a general election.
Origins of the Disorder

The military government of President Ibn Akbar had seized power from the old Sultan in 1970 "in order to bring Tashnab out of the middle ages and into the 20th century." President Akbar accurately enumerated the shortcomings of the previous regime in public statements following his assumption of power. No one could deny that Sultan Mir Ahmad had headed a corrupt, greedy, and inefficient government, or that the Sultan personally was responsible for the imprisonment, torture, and execution of large numbers of political prisoners over a period of 30 years. Because the Sultan had made many enemies and a few friends during his reign, very few hands (excepting two companies of the Royal Bodyguard) were raised against the clique of army officers responsible for his ouster.

Compared to the previous regime, the military government under President Akbar did a commendable job between 1970 and 1975. The officers who replaced the ministers and bureaucrats of the former government were almost always more efficient and often less corrupt than their predecessors. In moving toward modernization, the foreign consortium was encouraged to triple the size and the production of the manganese mines. A modern hotel was built in the capital and a television transmitter erected. Old roads were resurfaced and a new road built to connect the mines with the capital and the port of Kharboosa. Also, the president decreed compulsory education for all children through the 6th grade of primary school, and stated that the 1968 law abolishing slavery would be enforced. Most important of all, President Akbar declared that by 1980 a bicameral republican government based on free elections and universal suffrage would be established, and the Tashnab Republic would become a republic in fact as well as in name.

Indirect effects of modernization included the appearance of cinemas, restaurants, night clubs, gas stations, and shops selling imported goods in the large towns and at the site of the manganese mines. As new, nontraditional jobs opened up in these areas, the influx of underemployed labor from the provinces accelerated.
Important elements of the society, however, were displeased with some of the changes taking place. The Moslem mullahs were especially disturbed by the concept of secular education for girls. Since Tashnab children commonly do not commence their schooling until the age of eight or nine, compulsory education for girls through grade six would mean that thousands of marriageable young girls would be forced to leave the safety of their homes daily and run the gauntlet of the ravenous males of Tashnab in going to and from school. For high school girls the situation would be even more shocking. Considering the historical incidence of daughter stealing (in order to avoid the marriage price, rather than for romantic reasons), the mullahs were on fairly firm ground.

Also, the mullahs condemned the spread of cinemas showing shameless Swedish, American, and Hindi films throughout the country. Other grievances blamed on the permissiveness of the Akbar government included the open drinking and drunkenness occurring nightly at the manganese mines and at several night clubs in the capital and at Kharboosa, and the brazen, uncovered, public appearances of the women of the foreign...s. Probably the chief reason for the opposition of the mullahs, however, was a fear that they would lose status and a measure of control over the people if time honored tradition were flaunted.

Although generally the mullahs were more respected in the towns and villages, they found many allies on these issues among rural tribal groups. The tribes, of both the sedentary and the nomadic varieties, agreed with the mullahs that schooling for girls would be an unnecessary and dangerous innovation. Very conservative and highly independent, tribal chiefs were upset by the idea of universal suffrage and the possibility that their black slaves might be freed by the new government. Also, there were rumors that President Akbar intended to settle the nomadic tribes in order to prevent their seasonal crossings of international boundaries. Most unpleasant of all, the government had announced that the collection of land and livestock head taxes would be enforced at some future date.

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5Mullahs are the teachers of the laws and dogmas of Islam.
Discontent among the various sections of Tashnab society came to a head on 13 December 1975. A group of 12 senior army officers, representative of the old army officer corps, the mullahs, and the more important tribes met on that date to plan the overthrow of the Akbar government. Colonel Kalaan Sag al Baywahkoof, a cousin of the late Sultan, was chosen to lead the revolt.

As it is very difficult for the people of Tashnab to keep a secret, news that a revolution was brewing reached the ears of President Akbar the following morning. An immediate search was launched to uncover the ringleaders of the plot, and Colonel Kalaan Sag determined that the half-completed plans for the revolt would be put into effect at dawn on the following day, 15 December.

With control of about one-third (3,000 men) of the national army and one-fourth (6 light tanks and 8 armored cars) of the nation's armored force, the rebel forces concentrated their dawn attack on the radio and television stations, the Bisyar Marise airport, the main garrison of the National Gendarmerie, and the Presidential Palace. Complete surprise was not achieved as the army and the gendarmerie fought well and held its ground, many regular army units were confused and offered only token resistance to the rebels. At the end of the first day of the revolution, the radio and television stations had fallen, but loyalist forces still held gendarmerie headquarters and the airport, and President Akbar was directing the defense from the Presidential Palace.

Ignoring the content of rebel radio and television broadcasts, loyal forces numbering about 2,000 soldiers and 3,000 gendarmes, some from points as far away as the port city of Kharcosa, rushed to President Akbar's assistance. Arriving on 17 December, these reinforcements enabled the President to drive the attacking forces out of Bisyar Marise before nightfall of the same day. Suffering losses of 360 dead and wounded, vs compared with only 48 for loyal military units, the National Gendarmerie was clearly the savior of the regime.

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6 Originally formed by Sultan Sher Khan in 1923 as the Royal Bodyguard, the National Gendarmerie historically has had the dual function of acting as the national police force, and as the personal military arm of the national executive, i.e., as an effective counterfoil to any overweening ambitions of the National (Footnote continued, next page)
In honor of their steadfastness and loyalty, President Akbar presented the gendarmerie with a Presidential Unit Citation the very next morning.

Colonel Kalaan Sag, chagrined by the stout resistance offered by the Akbar government, gathered his scattered rebel army and headed toward the town of Bhokari, about 200 miles northeast of the capital. The march would take several days as only half of Colonel Sag’s army of 2,600 was motorized. In Bhokari, the rebels would regroup their forces and seek the assistance of the northern tribal groups, in accordance with the original plans of the revolutionary council.

During the following week, between 17 and 24 December, the position of President Akbar deteriorated badly, even though no further military clashes had occurred. Many mullahs and groups of ulema had begun calling for a jihad (a religious war or crusade against infidels) against the "irreligious" government of President Akbar, and as a result, another 3,000 soldiers of the National Army deserted to the rebels. In addition, five important northern tribes, the Khawlan, Awalek, Bani Hajur, Merdeh, and Kafkas had pledged 12,000 fighting men for the rebel cause—however, largely for political rather than religious reasons. Thus, in a very short time the balance of power had shifted, and the government found itself with only 3,000 regular army men and about 3,500 gendarmes facing a rebel force consisting of almost 6,000 former National Army men and 12,000 irregular tribesmen.

On 24 December, the Tashnab Republic requested unilateral assistance from the United States, primarily on humanitarian grounds, in order to protect the lives and property of foreign nationals (including Americans) residing at the

(Footnote 6, continued)

Army. On an approximate par in terms of pay scales, numbers (the army and the gendarmerie each had about 9,000 men in 1975), and equipment, the two forces differed chiefly in their primary missions—external as opposed to internal defense. One important difference, however, has been that the officers and men of the army have been drawn mostly from the cities, towns, and villages, while the gendarmerie has been recruited from the tribal groups of the north. The gendarmerie has a very strong tradition of loyalty toward its leaders.

7 An ulema is a body of scholars trained in Moslem religion and law.
Markhab Manganese Mines. The Tashnab government emphasized that it could spare only 1,500 gendarmes to protect the 478 foreign residents (including women and children), and greatly feared the possibility of a rebel attack on the mines. The United States Government announced the following day its intention to help protect the mines, and a U. S. Marine Amphibious Brigade arrived off the port of Kharboosa on the morning of 29 December 1975.

The Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) Mission

Instructions issued by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Marine Landing Force to protect the Markhab Manganese Mines from external assault, to prevent sabotage or other forms of internal disruption at the mines, and, if necessary, to assist in the evacuation of American citizens and other foreign nationals requesting evacuation from the country. Although the primary mission was to be defensive in nature, the MAB was to collect intelligence concerning the whereabouts, activities, and intentions of the rebel forces through aerial surveillance and ground patrols.

The Marines were to be deployed as Combined Action Units (CAU), working with the 1,500 members of the Tashnab National Gendarmerie stationed in the vicinity of the mines. This was particularly important because about half of the effective strength of the local gendarmerie had been drawn off by President Akbar to protect the national capital, the port of Kharboosa, and the important road junction at Qat. In addition to supplementing the strength of the local gendarmerie, the MAB was directed to upgrade the military effectiveness of these police forces to the extent feasible and necessary.

Also, the MAB was to pursue actively a search for possible economic development activities which might help to reduce the dissatisfactions underlying the unrest of the local population. Of course, community development efforts would have to wait until a full measure of security had been attained in the Marine area of operations.
Description of the Area of Operations

The Marine Amphibious Brigade area of operations was located in Markhab Province, which covers most of the southeastern quadrant of the Tashnab Republic. Approximately 22,000 square miles in area, the province has a population estimated at 550,000 persons. Bounded on the west and north by Qat and Bhokari Provinces, respectively, Markhab Province abuts the Kingdom of Knod in the east, and edges the Arabian Ocean on its southern shore. With mountains and desert covering 30 percent of the province, only about 13 percent of the total land area is arable. However, the mountain valleys of the east are important for winter grazing.

The population of the province is concentrated along the coastal strip, at Kharboosa, at the Markhab Mines, and around the larger oases. However, well over 300,000 persons eke out a living farming and grazing around the small oases and in the fertile mountain valleys. Tashnab has no permanent rivers.

Agriculture, of course, is dependent on water, and there is never enough water in the Tashnab Republic. Some areas depend on the light spring and winter rains to grow particularly hardy strains of millet and sorghum. As is true all over the Arab world, however, centuries of overgrazing by sheep and goats has caused widespread erosion and deterioration of the soils. The peasant farmers of the province live in villages and small towns and tend the outlying plots of land, usually depending on well irrigation. These farmers depend more on agriculture for their livelihood than on livestock raising, and their mode and manner of life has changed little in 2,000 years.

The sedentary tribal peoples of the province occupy a position somewhere between the peasant farmers and the nomadic tribes. As a rule the sedentary tribes have been settled by force, either by an occupying power such as the Ottomans, or by the Sultan for backing the wrong man in a revolt, or other internal disturbance. This process has been going on for many centuries, and these groups are more or less adjusted to a settled way of life and the need to grow grain to feed their animals and themselves. However, the sedentary tribes to a large extent still cling to the social and organizational systems of the nomadic tribes.
The nomadic tribes, which account for about 30 percent of the population of the province and about 45 percent of the population of the country, are actually semi-nomadic. Their migrations take place in the spring and in the fall and the distances covered may be from 20 to 30 miles, or may be several hundred miles. Usually, permanent settlements are maintained at each end of the route.

The organization of the nomadic tribes may be divided into tribal federations, tribes, subtribes, clans, and families. A stern, authoritarian figure governs each group and subgroup, and discipline is strict. The hard life and the nomadic tradition has bred a tough, proud, aggressive individual. War has been a time-honored avocation, and thievery is looked upon as a test of one's daring and cleverness. Conversely, loyalty and generosity are the rule within the tribe, and hospitality toward strangers and travelers is scrupulously observed. The tribes value independence above all else, and deeply resent the efforts of governments to tamper with their customs and laws. The Moslem religion is universally recognized among the tribes, but the dogmas and rules of Islam are taken less seriously than in the villages, towns, and cities. The tribal peoples tend to look down on peasant farmers and town dwellers, and attempt to minimize their contacts with the outside world. Somewhat surprisingly, the per capita income and wealth of the nomadic tribesmen is considerably higher than other elements of the rural society, on the basis of assets held.

In a more restrictive sense, the main area of operations centered on the Markhab Manganese Mines. The mines, surrounding the old market town of Markhab, covered several square miles and included 16 separate workings and 47 company buildings, excluding executive and worker housing. The foreign consortium, called the 3M Corporation (for Markhab Manganese Mines), employed 213 foreign experts and about 3,600 local workers. In 1975, there were 179 United States citizens, including dependents, resident at the mines. Representing a total investment of over 85 million U. S. dollars, the mines exported most of their output to England, the United States, and France.
Although the mine properties were fenced to discourage pilferage, the widely dispersed nature of the enterprise made it a difficult place to defend from a determined military assault. Also, the location of Markhab was unfortunate strategically, in that it lies about equidistant from rebel-held Bhokari and the port of Kharboosa, and adjacent to the foothills of the jagged Tashnab mountains.

The Opposing Forces

By 28 December, Colonel Kalaan Sag had regrouped the former National Army men who had retreated from Bisyar Marise with him, and renamed this force the Liberation Army. Hundreds of new deserters were arriving daily in response to the mullahs' calls for a holy war against the government, and eventually the Liberation Army was to number over 5,800 men. Although several trucks had broken down during the march to Bohkari, the rebel forces could muster four light tanks, eight armored cars, and 68 heavy trucks and jeeps, plus a few pieces of light artillery and some anti-tank guns. The main armaments of the Liberation Army were light machine guns and rifles.

Although the rebel army appeared to be poorly armed and equipped to do battle, they actually were a good match for the government forces. This was the case because, although President Akbar had a small edge in armor and artillery, he had divided his forces to defend not only the capital, but the towns of Qat and Kharboosa, and the Markhab Manganese Mines. In retrospect, the large-scale defections from the National Army and the rebellion itself were caused in part by the obsolescence of Tashnab's armaments. The neighboring countries of the Peoples Republic of West Tashnab and the Kingdom of Knod had much more modern equipment and arms than the Tashnab Republic, largely as a result of the foreign assistance programs of the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. Although no one in the Tashnab military establishment had ever contemplated any form of foreign military aggression, officers and enlisted men alike felt slighted that their neighbors should be better prepared than themselves. The reason for the old-fashioned armaments, of course, was that the late Sultan had not trusted his army, and President Akbar had carried forward this tradition. Probably even
more important than religious fervor in inducing defections to the Liberation Army was the prospect of new equipment, easy promotions in a much expanded army, better pay, and new uniforms, in a new regime headed by Colonel Kalaan Sag.

In an attempt to bolster his position, Colonel Sag had sent a message requesting military aid to King Abdullah Scma, the ruler of Knod, as soon as the rebellion broke out. The King, although related to the late Sultan by marriage and sympathetic with the goals of the rebellion, delayed his answer to the request in anticipation of some firm indication as to which side might be the ultimate winner of the conflict. No request for help was made by Colonel Sag to the Peoples Republic of West Tashnab because the socialist philosophy of that nation was considered to be in opposition to Moslem orthodoxy. Although West Tashnab offered military support to President Akbar, he too considered the intentions of West Tashnab suspect, and declined the offer.

In accordance with the agreement between Colonel Sag and five of the larger nomadic tribal federations, armed nomads, both afoot and mounted on horses, donkeys, and camels began moving into Bhokari in large numbers. By common consent, the nomads camped separately from the Liberation Army and were directed by their different tribal military leaders, under the overall command of Colonel Kalaan Sag. The nomads brought their own weapons, most commonly, single shot Mauser rifles, and with the exception of the light machine gun, they showed little interest in learning the use of any of the other weapons in the Liberation Army armory.

Although the nomad recruits represented only about ten percent of the nation's tribal population, Colonel Sag believed that many tribes would drop their neutral status and join his ranks as soon as the rebel forces achieved a victory or two. This optimism was based on several long standing tribal grievances against the Akbar government, such as tribal opposition to broadened educational opportunities for females, the introduction of universal suffrage, and enforcement of the ban on slavery. In addition to distrust of government reforms and the stimulus of the mullahs' call to revolt, tribal leaders felt that President Akbar
had excluded them from the councils of government and thus, degraded them politically and socially. Also, the tribal chiefs hoped that a new government might reinstitute the ancient and honored tradition of paying tribute or subsidies to the tribes in order to buy their allegiance and cooperation.

From the beginning, Colonel Kalaan Sag found the tribal military chiefs to be difficult to deal with, in terms of strategy and goals. The five nomad military chiefs demanded and received the right to participate in the rebel councils of war as equals. Backed by the mullahs, a majority of the tribal chiefs wanted to attack the Markhab Manganese Mines immediately. They reasoned that militarily the mines were a vulnerable target; that in a religious sense the mines represented the decadent and blasphemous ways of the Akbar regime; and, that economically, the mines were the nation's foremost financial asset. Also, the tribal leaders knew that the mine workers and foreign experts were very rich, and that there would be much loot to gather. Opposing this view, Colonel Sag argued that the mines were too important to the nation to be damaged or destroyed needlessly, and demanded that the entire army march on Bisyar Marise and capture the seat of government. This critical issue was to be debated continuously until 7 January 1976.

While the rebel leadership could not decide on their primary objective, they did manage to dispatch a number of small guerrilla bands to the south to harass exposed government troops and to disrupt communications. Twelve bands of nomads, averaging 20 members each, moved south and traveled along the main, graveled, all-weather Bisyar Marise-Qat-Markhab road, laying a few land mines and attacking military targets of opportunity. Although these harassing actions were poorly coordinated and executed, road traffic diminished greatly and government forces tended to take up static defense positions around established strong points.

The Arrival of the Marine Amphibious Brigade

On the morning of 29 December 1975, ships of the Naval Amphibious Forces, U.S. 6th Fleet, arrived off the coast at Kharboosa carrying the Marine Amphibious Brigade requested by President Akbar. The MAB consisted of a
reinforced battalion of 1,750 officers and men, and an air arm mix of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) jet attack aircraft and helicopters.

An unopposed landing was made at Kharboosa and preparations were undertaken to proceed to the Markhab Manganese Mines, 162 miles to the north. A briefing of the Marine commander by President Akbar and his military staff revealed that the government was unaware of the exact positions or plans of the rebel forces. Although travelers and loyalist spies had reported that Colonel Kalaan Sag’s army was concentrated around Bhokari and planning to attack either the capital or the mines, the appearance of armed bands along the nation’s main highway had caused a good deal of uncertainty and anxiety. Both the loyalists and the rebels were more or less in the dark due to a minimization of probing actions and the complete absence of any aircraft in the country. Marine aircraft and helicopters were able to solve the enigma of the rebel’s location and order of battle by the end of the third day of operations.

Before proceeding to Markhab, the Marine commander, together with the commandant of the National Gendarmerie, agreed upon the organizational structure and working relationships most conducive to efficient Combined Action Operations in the local context. In brief, the Marine commander was to be in charge of the defense of the mines for the duration of the emergency. The provincial governor, Khan Mohammad, the mine’s management, and the local gendarmerie would provide civil, technical, and military assistance as required. It was agreed that due to language difficulties, cultural differences, and culinary taboos, the Marines and the Gendarmes would work together as self-contained, cooperating units rather than as fully-integrated Combined Action Units.

From the start, the single most important impediment to efficient operations was language. English and other foreign languages are almost unknown in the Hashemite Republic, and only four Marines, previously with the embassy guard in Amman, knew any Arabic. In the entire government, 17 men could understand English, and two of these were cabinet ministers. Still, ten English-speaking government officials were assigned to the Marine Amphibious Brigade, and later, at the manganese mines, an additional 32 local workers and foremen were added to the interpreters’ pool. Unfortunately, the quality of the interpreters ranged from
fairly good to very poor, and communications between Marines and Gendarmes were haphazard during the first weeks. Also, the civilian interpreters proved to be unreliable in times of stress. However, as time passed, many Marines learned enough Arabic words to take care of their minimum needs.

**Combined Action Operations**

When the main body of the Marine Amphibious Brigade arrived in Markhab on 31 December, conditions were calm. Some land mines had been uncovered on the Karboosa-Qat-Markhab road, but no guerrillas were encountered, and no casualties occurred. The Marines were to wait almost two weeks for any major hostile action.

Enough reports, from many different sources, concerning the desire of the nomad rebels to attack Markhab had accumulated by 1 January 1976, to prove that the danger to the manganese mines was very real. As the town and the surrounding mines are situated in a very exposed position, and the rebels possessed some tanks and artillery, it was decided to establish the first line of defense at some distance from the town in order to reduce the opportunity for night bombardments or a surprise attack. Therefore, outposts were set up at four small and medium-sized oases southeast, southwest, northeast and northwest of Markhab. These oases were roughly equidistant from each other and were from six to eleven miles out from the mines. The occupation of these four oases denied access to rebel patrols and larger units, and provided a base from which patrols could detect and report the approach of rebel main forces.

One platoon of Marines and two squads of local gendarmerie were assigned to each of the four oases. Constant patrolling of all the tracks leading to Markhab was carried out from these outposts. The outpost patrols were supplemented by long-range patrols originating in Markhab, and by daylight aerial surveillance. More than half of the total Marine contingent and almost two-thirds of the gendarmerie remained in and around the town of Markhab and the mines.

Both at the outposts and in the main area of operations around the mines, the gendarmerie were organized into ad hoc squads of 15 men, each commanded by
a sergeant. The gendarmes were small but rugged men, and proved to be adept at patrolling and base security duties. Discipline among the gendarmerie was good, and although their arms were dated, the Marines had little to teach them in terms of the maintenance and use of their weapons. Although the care and cleaning of uniforms and personal equipment of the gendarmerie left something to be desired, soap and other cleaning materials were scarce and expensive commodities in the Tashnab Republic.

The Marines did manage to upgrade the fighting effectiveness of the gendarmes on outpost duty by running informal courses on the care and operation of machine guns, mortars, and 106 mm. recoilless rifles. During the first week, the Marines sent a message to the Tashnab Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending that in the future a small number of select gendarmerie units be equipped with such heavier weapons.

Although the attitudes of many gendarmes were open and friendly, most avoided the Marines during off-duty hours. Interpersonal relationships were improved somewhat after the Marines explained to the gendarmes that the rations issued for the mission included no pork products (pigs are unclean animals to Moslems and to touch or eat cooked pork is a serious breach of religious law). On the other hand, despite predeployment briefings, the Marines were shocked by the incidence of implied homosexuality among the civilian population and the gendarmes. It was especially difficult for the Marines to adjust to the exchanges of amorous looks and constant hand-holding among up to 20 percent of their counterparts. Homosexuality, of course, is prevalent in Arab and Moslem countries, largely due to the strict controls the society imposes on the freedom of movement and availability of women. However, the Marines were to discover that such personal habits had no effect on the individual gendarme's fighting efficiency.

**Internal Security and External Defense**

As the main responsibility for external defense was assumed by the Marines, most of the burden for internal security was carried by the gendarmerie. Although the majority of the local population was assumed to be loyal to the
government and fairly immune to the subversive urgings of the mullahs, the local authorities invoked stringent security measures in the area of operations. Gendarmerie units, sometimes supplemented by Marine squads, regularly patrolled the perimeter of the mines complex, and permanent guards were stationed at all major mine installations and buildings, and at the homes of foreign technicians. In addition, squads were posted in all of the outlying villages where most of the local mine workers lived, checkpoints were established on all roads leading into Markhab, and a dusk to dawn curfew was put into effect. Undoubtedly, tight internal security discouraged attempts at sabotage and terrorism in the vicinity of the mines. Only one serious act of violence occurred during the entire operation, when a particularly fanatical mullah managed to throw a hand grenade into the office of the managing director of the mining consortium. The office was unoccupied at the time, and the mullah was quickly apprehended.

External defense against nomad guerrillas proved to be a problem of relatively short duration. Of the 12 bands sent south by Colonel Kalaan Sag at the beginning of the revolt, only two were still active by 5 January 1976. Although a serious threat to road communications and an effective psychological weapon when they first arrived in the south, these bands soon disintegrated due to lack of direction and poor planning on the part of the rebel leadership. The guerrilla groups were not resupplied, and after using up their small supplies of land mines, ammunition, and food, the guerrillas often simply returned to Bhokari—usually after paying an extended visit to their homes to see that their families were well and their affairs in order. Guerrilla bands attempting to take food and ammunition from the local population by force, found that their victims quickly reported their whereabouts to the gendarmerie, and so, the guerrillas soon discontinued the practice. As the nomad bands returned to Bhokari and rejoined their tribal units, no one informed the rebel high command. Thus, due to poor communications, Colonel Kalaan Sag thought that the guerrilla bands were still carrying on harassing operations in the south long after most of them had returned to headquarters. The departure of the guerrillas from the south had been accelerated greatly following the introduction of Marine air and ground reconnaissance along the main roads.
In Bhokari, the stalemate between Colonel Kalaan Sag and the nomad military chiefs over whether to attack Bisyar Marise or the manganese mines was broken on 7 January. Because food supplies for the 18,000 men camped in and around Bhokari were running low, and because the army was growing restless due to the long period of inactivity, Colonel Sag agreed to compromise and attack both objectives simultaneously. The compromise battle plan called for Colonel Sag to lead 5,000 men of the Liberation Army, supported by 3,000 nomad tribesmen, against the capital city of Bisyar Marise, while the Merdeh tribal leader, Garm Sag, directed 9,000 tribesmen and 800 Liberation Army men against the Markhab Manganese Mines.

Twelve days were allowed for the slowest element of the rebel army, the foot soldiers, to reach their positions outside Bisyar Marise and Markhab. The attacks would be launched at midnight on the 20th of January. Fully cognizant of the dangers of USMC aerial surveillance, the rebels traveled only at night and were very careful to camouflage their movements and camping places. Also, all tribal tents were left standing at Bhokari in order to give the appearance that the entire army was still encamped there. It was agreed that, with the exception of two armored cars and two anti-tank guns, all armor, artillery, and other modern armaments would be used by the Liberation Army in the assault on Bisyar Marise. Although the tribal leaders realized that the Marines and Gendarmes would probably have superior firepower, they counted on vastly superior numbers and the element of surprise to gain a quick victory. The nomads were heartened by the fact that the Marine observation aircraft had not bombed them while they were encamped at Bhokari and assumed that the Americans must be weak-willed.

The nomad strategy was to attack Markhab from the west with 2,800 men and the two armored cars, and shortly after, to attack from the east with the main force of 7,000 men. The east was chosen for the primary assault because the mountain side approach provided good cover and concealment up to within almost two miles of Markhab, whereas the western approach was mostly desert and pasture lands and very open. Both rebel forces were in position and began their moves...
on the mines at midnight on the 20th of January. This good timing was somewhat surprising, since the rebel forces attacking Markhab had no radio communications.

The advance guard of the nom force moving in from the west encountered a gendarmerie patrol about seven miles outside the Markhab, and a fight developed immediately. Although the patrol was quickly silenced, the westernmost Marine outposts and headquarters in Markhab were warned of an impending attack by emergency flares and the sounds of firing. As they became aware that the Marines had been alerted, both rebel forces pressed the attack. The area before the mine's perimeter was illuminated and the rebel forces were met by very heavy, concentrated ground fire, and a hail of bullets, rockets, and bombs from the VTOL attack aircraft and helicopters. Despite several brave charges by the nomads, on camels, horses, donkeys, and afoot, the rebels were repulsed with very heavy casualties just before dawn. The nomads had briefly penetrated the eastern perimeter of the mine's complex, but little damage had been done and the Marines suffered a total of 6 killed and 36 wounded in the engagement. The rebel forces lost 1,228 killed and wounded, and almost 3,000 captured. Completely routed, the remaining rebels retreated into the eastern mountains, where it was known that pursuit would be difficult.

At about 0230 hours, the Marines had received word from President Akbar that his capital was under rebel attack also. Despite radio communications and some motor transport, Colonel Kalaan Sag's Liberation Army had been tardy in launching its attack. Although the Marines were not authorized to take offensive action while in the Tashnab Republic, they had been instructed to render assistance in repulsing rebel attacks on other government positions, if feasible. Therefore, after the rebel army before Markhab had been thoroughly immobilized, the Marine attack aircraft were refueled and rearmed and sent to relieve the capital, Bisyar Marise.

The Liberation Army had not been able to breach the walls of the capital, and when the Marine aircraft arrived, they were caught in the open. As in the attack the night before at Markhab, the 3,000 pounds of rockets and bombs carried by each attack aircraft caused great damage among the ranks of the rebel army.
and soon the tide of battle turned. President Akbar mounted a counterattack and the Liberation Army and nomad forces were routed with very heavy losses.

As the rebels had been soundly beaten and were scattered and disorganized, President Akbar prepared to take the offensive against them. At the same time, the government sent emissaries to the chiefs of the main tribal confederations using Marine aircraft to make the initial contacts and provide swift liaison, requesting a peace parlay. A meeting took place at Fardoh, a market town about 100 miles north of the capital, on 31 January 1976 and the tribes agreed to lay down their arms and pledge fealty to the legitimate government of the Tashnab Republic.

With the loss of their tribal allies, the Liberation Army disintegrated. Almost half of the remnants of the Liberation Army, with Colonel Kalaan Sag leading in the sole remaining armored car, fled to the Peoples Republic of West Tashnab and received asylum. The others surrendered to their erstwhile colleagues of the National Army, and for the most part, were very roughly handled.

With this unexpectedly abrupt ending to the rebellion, the Marines were relieved of their responsibility to defend the Markhab Manganese Mines. On the morning of 12 February 1976, just six weeks after their arrival, the Marine Landing Force, less Company A, quit the Tashnab Republic and sailed off to rejoin the U. S. 6th Fleet.

Company A was assigned the task of recruiting and training a paramilitary defense force, to be called the Mines Defense Militia, from among the indigenous workers of the Markhab Manganese Mines. Early in February, President Akbar, the Marine Commander, and appropriate U. S. officials in Washington agreed that it would be beneficial to build up a supplementary defense capability to protect Tashnab's chief economic asset, the Markhab Mines. This move was particularly appropriate because the Marines had been trained to impart military knowledge to indigenous paramilitary forces, and because additional security forces were needed to replace army and Gendarmerie casualties and defections resulting from the recent hostilities. In all, 1,220 mine workers between the ages of 18 and 32 were trained in counter-subversion tactics, such as patrolling, intelligence collection,
ambushes, and the detection of booby traps, and military arts, such as the care and cleaning of weapons, and marksmanship. After three months, the Marines had completed this training task, and Company A returned to 6th Fleet Headquarters via commercial airliners from the neighboring Kingdom of Knod.

Epilogue

President Akbar very wisely concluded a generous peace with the northern tribes. Instead of demanding reparations and high-born hostages to insure future good conduct, the government invited several prominent tribal chiefs to become cabinet ministers and help to determine national policy. Also, many of the tribal grievances against the government were removed when the President declared that for the next ten years, through 1986, the leaders of the tribal confederations would be responsible for the enforcement of national laws, such as those pertaining to education, universal suffrage, and the holding of slaves, in their own territories. Incidentally, this generous treatment of the tribes prevented a long, costly, mountain-based guerrilla war.

With the mullahs and army deserters, the government reacted more sternly. Many of the more serious offenders were jailed or beheaded. However, President Akbar made it clear to all that the Tashnab Republic would remain a Moslem state in theory and in fact. For example, proclamations were issued stating that no law would be passed allowing unveiled indigenous women to appear in public, and that henceforth no immoral Swedish or Hindu films would be shown in the country.

In short, President Akbar came to realize that he ruled a very conservative nation, and that economic and social development would have to come about slowly, if at all. By working on relatively noncontroversial programs, such as improved transportation, irrigation, and telecommunications systems, and more schools and medical facilities in the towns, attitudes and living conditions would begin to change.
Two recommendations passed to the government by the Marine Amphibious Brigade were acted on almost immediately. The first was to secure more modern armaments and train select elements of the National Gendarmeries in the use of heavy mortars and machine guns, and recoiless rifles. This was especially important while a new, more reliable, National Army was being recruited and formed. The other recommendation concerned the provision of medical assistance, particularly in the tribal areas. The Marines noted that the prevalence of tuberculosis, gastrointestinal diseases, glaucoma, and diphtheria could be reduced greatly by the introduction of mobile medical units. President Akbar promptly requested 20 such mobile medical units from the United Nations and the United States, on a priority basis.

Several of the latent skills and capabilities of the Marine Amphibious Brigade were not called into play in the Tashnab Republic affair. Not enough time was available to allow the Marines actively to attempt to upgrade the effectiveness of the National Gendarmerie, or to institute a more modern, efficient intelligence system. Similarly, a little time could be spared to develop together with local authorities civic action, psychological operations (Psyop), or community development programs for the future benefit and cohesiveness of the nation.

However, the Marine Amphibious Brigade did carry out its primary mission efficiently and effectively. The traditional Marine discipline, training, mobility, and firepower undoubtedly were crucial factors in destroying the rebel forces, and preserving the legitimate government of the Tashnab Republic. A solid grounding in the principles of combined action operations had enabled the Marine Amphibious Brigade to enter a strange environment and work together successfully with a very different people, to achieve a common victory.
Scenario #3--Asia

Introduction

In September 1973, the Royal Government of Bhad Doc asked the United States Government to provide military assistance in order to counter hostile guerrilla incursions originating from the territory of its southern neighbor Waytaya, and to neutralize a low-level insurgency existing in the same geographical area, along the southern border. This request was made because a large-scale rebellion, requiring the engagement of virtually all of Bhad Doc's military forces, had erupted along the nation's northern and northeastern borders. In response to this emergency, the provision of a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) trained to operate as Combined Action Units (CAU) was approved, and this force arrived in the country eight days later.

Located in south central Asia, Bhad Doc is 146,330 square miles in area, or about the size of the State of Montana, and has a population estimated at 23,350,000 persons. Saucer shaped, with mountains, rugged hills, and dense jungles covering most of the border regions, a broad, flat, fertile plateau extends over much of the central portion of the country. The capital city of Noh Lam is situated on the Gulf of Bhad Doc, and two good deep water ports, Lucs and Taide, are located on the Pacific Ocean coast. Being near the equator, the climate is hot and humid year around, with the rainy season lasting from March to September. Bhad Luc is bounded on the north and northeast by the Kingdom of Kota Ruc, on the northeast by the South Khai Republic, and on the south by Waytaya. To the west lies the Gulf of Bhad Doc, and the long eastern shoreline is washed by the Pacific Ocean.

Over 77 percent of the total population resides in the countryside, and the economy is based chiefly on agriculture. Rice cultivation is the single most important economic activity, and traditionally, Bhad Doc has been a primary source of rice imports for neighboring countries. Other important agricultural products, either for home consumption or for export, are maize, cassava, coconuts, rubber, tobacco, and sugar cane. The chief outputs of mining and manufacturing are tin, tungsten, and cement. Great strides in the improvement of
transportation and communications have been made since 1957, but almost 60 percent of the country remains covered by dense vegetation and wild, barren hills. By 1972, the country could boast over 6,000 miles of surfaced roads, and one telephone for every 400 inhabitants.

The social system of the Royal Government of Bhad Doc is dominated by the Bhad peoples, who claim to be the original settlers of the land (in the 4th century, A.D.) and who make up about 69 percent of the population. Next most important, in terms of numbers, are the Rucian peoples of the north who account for about 18 percent of the total population, and the Glom peoples, who make up about 8 percent of the nation's population and who reside mainly in the southern border regions. The remaining 5 percent of the population consists of a large number of different ethnic and tribal strains, of which the most numerous are the Chinese and the Indians. It is noteworthy that although the Bhads and the Gloms of the south are very similar racially, the Gloms are usually found to occupy lower social and economic stations. The Gloms are easily identifiable in that they have much larger ears and much smaller noses than the Bhad peoples.

Levels of living in Bhad Doc are considerably higher than in most Asian nations, in large measure due to the predominance of small agricultural freeholders. However, a high birth rate and a low death rate over the past two decades, with subsequent higher food consumption and fragmentation of land holdings, has impeded rapid economic development. Although there are now over 20,000 primary and secondary schools in the country with a combined enrollment of about 4,000,000 pupils, another 1,000,000 children are outside the educational system. It is estimated that the illiteracy rate is 32 percent. In the health field, there are about 1,100 inhabitants per hospital bed, and 4,241 persons per physician.

Although Bhad Doc is the oldest constitutional monarchy in Asia, real political power has been in the hands of the military since 1948. The king, Bhum Rap Tam, is a figurehead and appears in public only on his birthday and other national holidays. The constitution of 1931 has never been amended, and in practice is ignored. Buddhism is the state religion, and religious leaders, as well as academicians, the old nobility, and members of the new entrepreneurial class
advise the military, and share political power to a degree. The government has tended to be progressive and has acted repressively only on occasions when its authority has been directly challenged. Traditionally, diplomatic relations with the United States have been close and cordial.

**Origins of the Disorder**

The immediate cause of the emergency in Bhad Doc was an unexpected and explosive civil insurrection along much of the nation's northern frontier. Fostered by a group called the Rucian Tribal Council (RTC), the revolt was the result of a long term dispute over local autonomy for some four million people of Kota Rucian descent residing along the sparsely populated northern border. For several years the RTC secretly had been importing weapons, and when the Royal Government of Bhad Doc finally, after five years of negotiation, denied the request for a degree of local autonomy, the RTC declared unilateral independence and ignited the revolt. At the beginning of the insurrection, it was estimated that the Rucian rebels had 26,000 men under arms.

The Rucians, most of whom had been expelled from Kota Ruc at the end of the last century, had several grievances against the government. That most of the immigrant Rucians had been converted to Christianity by French and American missionaries in the 1800's was an important reason both for their expulsion from Kota Ruc and the poor treatment accorded them by the Bhad peoples. Because the land along the northern border was poor and unpopulated, the Royal Government of Bhad Doc had allowed the Rucian Christians to settle there. However, over the years, their Christian zeal and proselytizing activities had made the Rucians unpopular with both the government and the Bhad community at large. Because the government still considered the Rucians to be "temporary" immigrants, they were forbidden to own land or to move or travel outside the border areas. As the Rucians were also barred from government jobs, their main occupations were tenant farming and the production and sale of opium. When in early 1973, under pressure from the United States, the government stopped the production of opium, the economic base of the Rucian community deteriorated quickly. In the first days of the rebellion, several thousand Bhad officials, police, and land owners were murdered.
The insurgency in the south along the narrow border with Waytaya had been long smoldering, but burst into flames as a direct result of the large northern insurgency. The situation in the southern border province of Glom Nhu was in fact similar to that in the north in several respects. Specifically, the disorders in the south were largely the result of Bhad persecution and indifference toward a minority group, in this case the Glom peoples. However, this insurgency was abetted and intensified by trained, communist guerrilla units, also Gloms, operating from safe havens in neighboring Waytaya.

Also a minority people in Waytaya, making up about 40 percent of the total population, the Gloms had conducted a desperate but futile insurgency against the Government of Waytaya in the early 1960's. The remnants of the defeated Insurgent Glom Army (IGA), numbering about 900 armed effectives in mid-1973, had been living off the land in the sparsely populated, heavily forested area just south of the Bhad Doc border for over 10 years. Continuing political and economic stability in Waytaya had neutralized the appeal of the communist propaganda of the IGA for the people, and since the IGA remained quiet and inactive in the remote forests of the north, the Government of Waytaya did not press them militarily. However, since 1965 the IGA had been making periodic small-scale forays into Bhad Doc, attacking police stations and military patrols and extorting funds from Bhad landlords and merchants. Despite several requests over the years by the Royal Government of Bhad Doc to punish the IGA raiding forces, Waytaya chose to ignore the problem and instead claimed that the IGA no longer existed, and that perhaps the alleged incidents were perpetrated by Glom nationals residing in Bhad Doc.

In fact, rural discontent with touches of violence had been present among the Gloms on the Bhad Doc side of the border for many years. The underlying cause of local unrest was a virtual monopoly of Bhad economic and political power over the Glom people living in the southern border area, where the Gloms made up almost 90 percent of the population. Practically all government, police, military, agricultural, industrial, and commercial activities were administered by Bhads. Only employment as tenant farmers, laborers, and small retailers traditionally had been open to Gloms of the region. As a result, with few avenues of
upward economic or social mobility open to them, the Gloms, especially the young people, became increasingly sullen and discontent until a situation approximating low-level insurgency was reached. Loosely organized into the underground Glom Self-protection Society (GSS) under the leadership of a dynamic small grain merchant named Phon U, the hard-core dissident membership numbered about 4,000 persons by the time that anti-government resistance became overt in September 1973.

The GSS largely limited its activities to passive resistance to government programs, policies, and laws, particularly those pertaining to military conscription and taxation. Open acts of violence included the seizure of a few small government grain storehouses, infrequent and uncoordinated acts of sabotage, such as the cutting of telephone and telegraph lines and the slashing of tires of government vehicles, and the assassination of several unpopular landlords and government officials.

The size and scale of the rebellion of the Rucians in the north came as a surprise to the Government of Bhad Doc, but the nation's leadership reacted to the emergency promptly and decisively. Almost immediately, due to the intensity of the uprising, the government found it necessary to order approximately three-quarters of the police and military forces stationed throughout the country, including those in the southern border province of Glom Nhu, to the northern part of the country to oppose the Rucian rebellion. This action was taken with some trepidation, as many government leaders believed that the weakening of garrisons in the provinces, particularly in Glom Nhu, might lead to one or more additional violent, anti-government uprisings.

Three days after the onset of the emergency, the Prime Minister of Bhad Doc met with the Ambassador of the United States to request American assistance to cope with the unexpected national emergency. Specifically, the Prime Minister asked for United States help to prevent, and if necessary quell, an anticipated uprising in the southern province of Glom Nhu, since the government felt itself unequal to the task of opposing rebellions in the northern and southern parts of the country simultaneously.
Following consultations with the Country Team and a full report on the situation to appropriate officials in Washington, the Ambassador received an affirmative answer to the Prime Minister's request for American assistance. The Marine Amphibious Task Force attached to the U. S. Seventh Fleet immediately was informed of the decision in a message relayed through CINCPAC, and instructed to proceed to the southern border region of the Royal Kingdom of Bhad Doc and render all necessary assistance.

The Marine Amphibious Brigade Mission

The U. S. Marine Amphibious Brigade was assigned, as its primary mission, to assist local military and police forces to establish and/or maintain peace and order in the Province of Glom Nhu. In order to accomplish this objective, the Marine Commander was directed to bolster the effectiveness of the local forces by deploying a portion of his command as Combined Action Units (CAU’s) and to assist the local military commander to recruit and train additional indigenous forces to supplement the relatively small government force available.

In addition to the protection of life, property, and the authority of the legitimate government, the Marines were charged with the destruction or capture of active insurgent groups and their supporting infrastructure. Although increased activity by elements of the Insurgent Glom Army operating out of neighboring Waytaya had been reported in the period immediately preceding the arrival of the Marine Landing Force, the level of violence remained relatively low in Glom Nhu.

The Marines were to work with approximately 500 police and 400 soldiers left behind in the province to maintain security. Although a few dozen members of the local forces manned outlying posts near the border with Waytaya, the majority had moved into the Provincial Capital of Glom Nagar and the surrounding area. As most of the local police and military forces were considered to be relatively well-trained and equipped, officials of the Royal Kingdom of Bhad Doc determined that it would not be necessary for the Marines to attempt to improve their military knowledge or skills. However, the government did request that
The Marines undertake the important task of raising and training additional defense forces from among local Glom paramilitary organizations and school and sports clubs. The Prime Minister of Bhad Doc and the Council of Ministers placed special emphasis on this task, as the government had decided to place more reliance on the use of the local Glom People in the military and civil administration of the Province of Glom Nhu in the future. The Marines were requested to provide the main effort in the organization and training of up to 3,000 local Gloms to serve as a permanent defense force. This task was to be fulfilled when and as the local security situation allowed.

In addition, the Marine Amphibious Brigade was instructed by higher authority to help the host government to estimate the magnitude of the insurgency in Glom Nhu on a continuous basis through the support of local intelligence gathering activities, and the conduct of frequent ground and air reconnaissance of the area of operations. Also, the Marines were to seek out actively possible economic development activities and needed social reforms which might help to reduce the dissatisfactions underlying the unrest of the local population. This last assignment was to be carried out only after a large measure of peace and security returned to the area.

Description of the Area of Operations

The Marine Amphibious Brigade area of operations was located in Glom Nhu Province at the southern extremity of the Royal Kingdom of Bhad Doc. About 8,700 square miles in area, the province is approximately the same size as New Hampshire. The population of the province is estimated at a bit under three million persons, and the population density, at 345 persons per square mile, is the highest in the country. To the north the province is bounded by one of the nation's nine other provinces, Glom Xu. Glom Nhu Province is bordered on the east by the Pacific Ocean and on the west by the Gulf of Bhad Doc, and the southern border forms the 80-mile long international boundary with Waytaya. Low, heavily forested hills cover much of the eastern and southern parts of the province. The provincial capital of Glom Nagar is the center for commerce, transportation, and administration in the area, and the only large town.
The Glom Peoples make up the bulk of the population of the province, amounting to about 2,460,000 persons or 82 percent of the total, as compared to only about 14 percent Bhad Peoples, and four percent other minority groups, mostly Chinese. Well over half of the population resides in the southern one-third of the province, with the most dense concentrations centering around the provincial capital and the rubber plantations located near the Waytaya border.

Rubber production is the mainstay of the provincial economy, and provided approximately nine percent of the nation's foreign exchange revenue in 1972. Although the proportion of the province's labor force employed on the plantations had fallen from 47 percent to 42 percent since 1969 due to the increasing competition from synthetic rubber in world markets, unemployment and underemployment in other sectors of the local economy, such as handicrafts and commercial agriculture stood at close to 50 percent. Since the large English, French, and Bhad owned rubber plantations covered the most fertile lands of the province, small Glom subsistence farmers had a difficult time eking out a living for their expanding families. Only about 27 percent of the arable land of the province was planted to food crops, and historically the province had been a large net importer of rice from the central regions of the country.

Political divisions of the province are the district, the subdistrict and the village. Administrators, at all levels, excepting villages, are Bhads, and are appointed to their positions by the central government. Even at the village level, where headmen are elected locally, and usually are Gloms, the government pays a monthly stipend to headmen to ensure the loyalty and cooperation of local leaders. Aside from village headmen, elections are held every six years for provincial representatives to the national assembly. Although Gloms are always elected from Glom Nhu Province, due to the general weakness of the national assembly (three-fifths of the membership are appointed by the king), and the minority status of the Glom Peoples, the Gloms never have wielded any political influence on the national scene. Thus, no effective political channels had existed for the airing and possible resolution of legitimate economic and social grievances of the Glom Peoples.
The social structure of the Glom community is not unlike that of the Bhd peoples to the north, in that most of the people live in extended families, are patriarchal, and center their lives around the functions of agricultural production and the Buddhist Religion. However, because of the shortage of arable land and the high population density in the province, more than 200,000 males leave their villages for part of the year to work on the large rubber plantations. Absence from the villages and exposure to new ideas for so many has tended to erode traditional authority and cause mounting unrest in the province.

The Opposing Forces

The danger in Glom Nhu Province, as perceived by the Government of Bhd Dac, lies in the possibility of a combined attack on government forces and institutions by invading units of the Waytayan Insurgent Glom Army (IGA) and an expanded and more militant Glom Self-protection Society (GSS). It was felt that an offensive by one or the other organization might be contained, but that a local popular uprising, supported by a trained, well-armed guerrilla force could cause large-scale destruction of property and loss of life.

Of most immediate concern was the possible course of action of the IGA. Although aging (the average age of the hard-core fighter was 46 years), the IGA was a disciplined, experienced, and fairly well-armed organization. Historically, the IGA was an Asian Communist guerrilla organization in the tradition of the Viet Cong, the Huks, and the Maylayan CT's. However, over the past ten years, as contacts with Communist sponsor nations (primarily Mainland China and North Korea) sharply diminished, the IGA progressively became more independent and nationalistic in their outlook and activities. For example, by 1973 the chief goal of the IGA was to establish an independent Socialist Glom state in northern Waytaya.

Numbering about 900 effectives and 1600 women, children, and noncombatant service personnel, the IGA maintain four secret base camps near the Bhd Dac border. Organized into companies of around 225 men in each camp, squad, and rarely, platoon-sized units staged raids across the frontier every few months to secure cash, foodstuffs, and arms. Effective military retaliation by the
Government of Waytaya had caused the IGA leadership to discontinue guerrilla operations in that country in 1965 in order to conserve manpower. Since about that time, because the IGA lost much of its power to coerce the local population and could not present itself as a credible alternative to the legitimate government, pressing and persistent inability to recruit new men had developed.

Other weaknesses stemmed from the fact that the IGA operated more like freebooters than a military organization. Overall morale was not high, and little in the way of intelligence or material support was volunteered to the IGA by the local peoples on either side of the border, even though raiding parties practiced "armed propaganda" and "selective" terrorism on forays into Bhad Doc. On the other hand, the IGA was well-versed in the tactics of guerrilla warfare, including ambush, the placement of booby traps, and other terrorist activities, and the knowledge among the veteran insurgents that each carried a price on his head created a certain esprit de corps.

The IGA was fairly well-armed in terms of small arms, including automatic weapons, mortars, recoilless rifles, explosives, and ammunition. All told, the IGA had a sufficient stock of weapons to arm a force approximately twice their number, although a large portion were obsolete or captured weapons of various calibers. In the early 1960's the Mainland Chinese had been an important source of modern armaments; but in recent years, only a few small cash donations and some propaganda materials had been made available by sympathetic Communist nations.

In comparison to the IGA, the Glom Self-protection Society (GSS) in Bhad Doc was a very loosely knit and amorphous organization. With a membership formed largely along clan and community lines, and goals stemming from emotional needs for political equality and economic betterment rather than a fixed ideology, the GSS was held together in large measure by a widespread respect for the chief of the organization, Phon U. Basically conservative, reformist, and non-violent in approach, the primary goals of the GSS were economic; to obtain more government jobs for local Gloms (including commissioned positions in the military and the police), to reform the land tenure system in the province, to reduce taxation, and to break the economic power of local Bhad moneylenders.
through the establishment of a government credit facility for Glom farmers and small merchants. However, a minority faction of the G&G, composed mostly of unemployed high school and college graduates, disaffected younger rubber plantation workers, and landless tenant farmers had grown impatient and used violent methods on occasion (including the seizure of government property, sabotage, and assassination), contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Society. This younger element, numbering about 500 of the organization's 4,000 membership, had only a small supply of arms, mostly hunting pieces, and no central leadership. The local population of Glom Nhu had little sympathy with the actions of this militant minority group, but was well disposed generally to the goals and aspirations of the GSS.

For several years the IGA had been attempting to form an alliance with the GSS, and on several occasions had offered assistance in the form of arms and ammunition, and guerrilla training for a select GSS cadre. However, these offers were not accepted by the GSS leadership because it was felt that their reformist objectives were not consistent with the revolutionary ideology of the IGA. In particular, the GSS and the Glom community of Glom Nhu Province were indifferent to Communism and had no desire to create a separate Glom nation.

Following the outbreak of the Rucian rebellion in the north, however, the relationship between the two organizations shifted somewhat. Reacting swiftly to the news of widespread disorders in northern Bhad Doc, Kow Tung committed two platoons from the most experienced IGA guerrilla company to enter southern Glom Nhu and determine the chances for a local uprising against the government of Bhad Doc by the Glom community.

Operating in small units of three to ten men, the IGA forces penetrated the border areas easily. However, several skirmishes developed with government police and military patrols, and evidence of a fairly large IGA presence soon persuaded the Government of Bhad Doc that the invading guerrillas would attempt to ignite a rebellion in Glom Nhu Province. The guerrilla units found the local Glom community to be greatly agitated by the happenings in the north, and for the first time, many of the younger Gloms in the villages openly were calling for an uprising against the government to gain redress of their grievances.
Several spontaneous anti-government demonstrations to demand more and better employment opportunities had broken out in villages, on rubber plantations, and at the provincial capital. The knowledge of encroachments by the IGA combined with the eruption of popular demonstrations led the government to believe that a large, coordinated revolt was about to begin. This was the situation when the U. S. Naval Amphibious Task Force arrived off the provincial capital of Glom Nagar on 23 September 1973.

The Arrival of the Marine Amphibious Brigade

The Naval Amphibious Task Force (ATF) dispatched to Bhad Doce had been returning to the home port of the U. S. 7th Fleet following amphibious exercises conducted in neighboring Waytaya when the new orders were received. The Marine Amphibious Brigade, consisting of 1,840 officers and men of a reinforced battalion, supported by a compliment of helicopters and jet attack aircraft, was transported on one each Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH), Amphibious Transport (LPA), Dock Landing Ship (LSD), and Tank Landing Ship (LST).

On the morning of the arrival of the ATF, appropriate officials and military officers from the national and provincial governments of Bhad Doce met with senior naval and Marine officers on board the ATF flagship to plot strategy and tactics for the operation at hand. As only a relatively small number of violent public disorders had occurred during the period following the transfer of police and military forces to stem the Rucian rebellion, it was decided to land only one company of Marines, Company B, and a skeleton command group from the headquarters staff of the Marine Amphibious Brigade. A base camp would be set up at the Police Barracks, a few miles to the west of Glom Nagar. The remainder of the Marine Amphibious Brigade would stay with the ATF at sea, some 40 nautical miles northeast of Glom Nagar, in a position to reinforce the landing party as needed, or, if ordered, to move to provide emergency support to the Royal Government of Bhad Doce forces engaged against the Rucian rebels in the northern part of the country.
In determining the ground rules for the operation, it was mutually agreed that as the prevailing level of violence in the province could be controlled in the main by local forces, the first order of business for the Marines would be to recruit and train a local Glom militia. This task had a high priority because replacements for the police and military forces drawn off to meet the threat in the north were needed urgently, and because the central government had decided to emphasize the rights and responsibilities of the Glom community in local and national affairs. The Minister of Interior for the national government formally assumed responsibility for the equipping and supplying of the local militia, and appropriate government officials at the provincial, district, sub-district, and village levels were designated as counterparts to assist the Marine Amphibious Brigade. A liaison officer from the American Embassy was attached to the Marine Amphibious Brigade to provide a link with the American Country Team.

In order to overcome the language barrier, the central government was able to provide 30 army interpreters, fluent in the Glom and Bhad languages as well as English, to assist in combined action operations. These troops had trained and worked with the American Military Assistance Advisory Group in Nbo Lam, the capital city of Bhad Doc, and they were proficient both as soldiers and as interpreters. In addition, there existed in Glom Nhu Province a fairly large pool of educated youth having some knowledge of English, and this group could be used for interpreter/translator services if the need arose.

**Combined Action Operations**

During their first few days in Bhad Doc, the Marines of Company B spent much of their time assisting and reinforcing local police and military units in attempts to locate and determine the strength of opposing forces. Few contacts were made, however, as during this period the many small IGA patrols that had penetrated Bhad Doc territory to obtain information and military intelligence were then returning to their headquarters in Waytaya to report. Although the Marine helicopters were not very useful due to the heavy jungle foliage covering most of the area, government combined action patrols determined that the IGA guerrillas had been present in considerable strength compared to past incursions.
and that several bands (totaling 75 to 100 men altogether) were still operating in the areas immediately adjacent to the border with Waytaya. Because of the relatively small numbers of government forces available and the large geographical area to be patrolled, military leaders of the national government decided that, until conditions became more stable, police and army patrols would probe no closer than ten miles from the Waytayan border. Although this ruling gave enemy forces almost complete freedom of action within the ten mile buffer zone, government forces were then able to exercise much closer control over the remainder of the province. In mounting these first reconnaissance activities, the presence of the Marines was particularly appreciated in view of their personal skills, firepower, communications equipment, and modern armored vehicles.

At the same time, the Marines had begun to recruit members for a local Glom defense force, to be called the Royal Glom Militia (RGM). The chief purpose of the formation of the RGM was to provide an emergency paramilitary force at the village level to back up the much depleted regular police and military forces. The authorized strength of the RGM was to be 3,000 officers and men, and the organization would be maintained in the province following the conclusion of the emergency. An important secondary reason for forming the Militia was to show the Glom community that the Royal Government of Bhad Doc had begun to pursue a policy of opening new jobs and new opportunities to minority citizens. Recruits were informed that at the end of the emergency, up to fifty percent of the RGM would be encouraged to join the local police service, and that those who were physically and educationally qualified would be trained for police and military commissions.

At the end of the first week of recruiting, over 1,000 young Gloms had been enlisted, and sufficient arms, ammunition, uniforms, vehicles, and other necessary equipment for the full complement of 3,000 men had arrived from central government stocks. About 80 percent of the recruits came from small villages and hamlets. During the recruiting process, which to a large extent took place concurrent with patrolling activities, the Marines, assisted by local interpreters, used loudspeakers in the villages to announce the establishment of the Royal Glom Militia. The government interpreters attached to the Marines also were
able to explain to villagers the enlightened new policies of the central government toward minority groups and to provide news of the status of the conflict in the northern part of the country. In this way, many of the rumors and falsehoods spread by the IGA and anti-government elements were corrected or refuted.

Due to the prevailing emergency conditions, preliminary training for the RGM was limited to two weeks for the first group of 1,000 recruits. Of necessity, training was abridged and simple; a large part of the time being devoted to weapons familiarity and care, and marksmanship. About 40 Marines, or one for each twenty-five recruits, and most of the host country interpreters took part in the crash two-week training programs.

The first 1,000 members of the RGM completed preliminary training on 26 October 1973. As conditions in the province at that time were relatively quiet, almost all of these men, in platoons of 40 to 60 each, were assigned to key villages strategically located about midway between the border and the provincial capital. To the extent possible, the men were posted to their home villages. One squad of Marines and a Navy hospital corpsman accompanied each RGM platoon assigned to the 20 villages. These Combined Action Units (CAUs) were intended to promote local law and order, to provide a screen against a possible IGA offensive, and to collect intelligence concerning all types of anti-government activities. At the same time, the Marines would continue to impart practical training in counterinsurgency warfare, such as ambushes, patrolling, and guard duty to their RGM charges. Meanwhile, back at the Marine base camp just outside Glom Nagar, a two-week training cycle for the second batch of 1,000 Glom recruits had commenced. By this time only a few Marines were still working with the regular government police and military forces.

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8 Two additional platoons of Marines from Company C were air lifted in from the Naval Amphibious Task Force to handle these extra manpower requirements.
Special emphasis was placed on intelligence collection in the 20 villages initially occupied by the Combined Action Units. To add concreteness to the intelligence training and to help to gain the support of the local community, an innovation called the National Unity Incentives Program (NUIP) was introduced. Based on past Marine experience in similar circumstances, this program had been discussed and approved by national and provincial officials and their American counterparts in the days immediately following the arrival of the Marine Landing Force. Under the program, a system of financial rewards was offered to Royal Glom Militia members and to the Glom community at large for information concerning the whereabouts, objectives, and operations of the Insurgent Glom Army or other anti-government forces. All rewards were to be paid following the confirmation of such information. Other elements of the NUIP included an amnesty program for those guerrillas (foreign or local) surrendering to government forces or Combined Action Units, and a system of cash payments for arms, ammunition, and equipment captured from or surrendered by anti-government insurgents. The skills and the special equipment of the Marine psychological operations (Psyop) team was critical in spreading news of the introduction of the NUIP widely and rapidly.

The attitudes of the Glom peoples residing in the province, and in particular members of the Glom Self-protection Society (GSS), were undergoing rapid change. Following the first feelings of sympathy with the Rucían uprising in the north, and the attendant spontaneous demonstrations and other manifestations of hostility toward the government, cooler heads began to prevail throughout the province. The people were impressed by the determination of the Bhad Doc police and army in the province after the bulk of their forces had been rushed off to help suppress the northern rebellion, and there was some concern about the arrival of the Marine Landing Force. Most importantly, however, the Gloms began to realize that a take-over by the Insurgent Glom Army (IGA) from Waytaya would be more unpleasant than a continuation of life under the present Bhad Doc regime.
After the formation of the Royal Glom Militia (RGM) and the posting of combined action units throughout the central part of the province, feelings toward the government improved and the number of acts of anti-government vandalism and sabotage, such as the cutting of telephone lines, dropped off sharply. Another factor contributing to the relative calm in the province was the absence of a clear trend toward victory for either side in the fighting in the northern part of the country. Although government forces were containing the spread of the Rucian rebellion, the insurgents continued to hold large portions of the northern provinces and pacification was proceeding slowly. The leader of the underground Glom Self-protection Society (GSS), Phon U, urged caution among his followers, but indicated that individual village cells might or might not continue anti-government activities as dictated by local conditions. These instructions reflected the prevailing uncertainty among the GSS membership.

Meanwhile, the IGA leadership in northern Waytaya had digested the intelligence reports brought in by their scouting parties and had decided to exploit the unsettled conditions in southern Bhad Doc by mounting a bold military offensive. The plan was to attempt to recruit as many young Gloms from the border region villages as possible, through persuasion or force, and if conditions seemed favorable, to make a surprise attack on the capital city of Glom Nhu Province, Giorn Nagar. The reasoning behind this maneuver was that if Glom Nagar could be taken and held, even for a few days, the power of the Bhad Doc government would be severely undermined, and large numbers of Gloms would rally to the cause of the IGA.

On this basis, preparations for the offensive were begun and two hundred IGA guerrillas moved into the ten-mile buffer zone just north of the border to recruit and organize as many Glom youths as quickly as possible. By 9 November, the IGA had collected 290 young Gloms to be used as a supplementary force in the attack on Glom Nagar. Although there was no time to train these young men to any extent, it was felt that they would serve as "bait" to attract other Glom recruits as the attack progressed.
However, on 11 November, just two days before the IGA planned to commence the offensive, the Government of Waytaya launched a well-coordinated land/air surprise attack against all four IGA base camps. Long unmolested, the IGA insurgents were caught unaware, and with only a short forewarning before the arrival of the Waytayan forces, large numbers were forced to flee across the Kingdom of Bhad Doc border in some confusion. Large stocks of weapons and provisions, and most of the IGA dependents, hangers on, and support personnel, were captured by the Waytayan military forces. Only about 150 hard-core IGA fighters were captured, however, as the Waytayan forces were under orders not to pursue the guerrillas beyond the border.

This surprise attack was the result of official requests by both the United States and the Royal Kingdom of Bhad Doc to the Government of Waytaya to take action against the IGA insurgents. Although receipt of these requests had been confirmed by the Government of Waytaya in late September, no other word on the matter had been forthcoming. Waytaya had organized the campaign against the IGA in the following weeks in the greatest of secrecy, and in order to maintain security had not informed its northern neighbor of its intentions until the day before operations against the guerrilla was to begin. Unfortunately, the central government in Nho-Lam had been tardy in passing this information on to the government forces and Marines in Glom Nhu Province. As a result, the Marines and local counterinsurgency units were as surprised by the Waytayan action as was the IGA.

Forced out of their sanctuaries, and finding themselves in a relatively inhospitable environment, the IGA leadership decided to press the attack on Glom Nagar in the hope of sparking a large-scale Glom uprising throughout the province, or, at the least, to put themselves in a position of strength from which to bargain amnesty terms with the Bhad Doc Government. After quickly regrouping, the IGA forces, in three columns of about 340 men each, began the march on Glom Nagar on 15 November.

Intelligence concerning the whereabouts and intentions of the IGA guerrillas was not hard to come by during this period. Many refugees had been moving north from the border areas to escape the arrogations of and the possibility of
conscription by the IGA, and following the expulsion of the main body of the IGA from Waytaya, the flow grew heavier. A full two days before the IGA was to begin its move against Glom Nagar, some 85 miles distant, the Marines had received intelligence from refugees, local citizens, and the Royal Glom Militia concerning the general disposition and plans of the IGA forces. After appraising the situation, the Marine commander in Glom Nhu sent a message to the Naval Amphibious Task Force at sea requesting immediate assistance to meet the emergency.

As soon as the request was received, the Amphibious Task Force steamed back to Glom Nagar. Preparations to repulse the IGA offensive were well under way even before the guerrillas had advanced north of the 10-mile border buffer zone. Two companies of Marines were air lifted into the strategic towns area to integrate with and reinforce the combined action units already in place, and the remainder of the Marine Landing Force debarked at Glom Nagar, along with armour, vehicles, and heavy equipment, and prepared to move south.

The ambitious plans of the IGA to assault Glom-Nagar were based on faulty intelligence estimates which placed the strength of opposing forces at approximately 450 Bhad Doc police and soldiers, about 200 U. S. Marines, and a few hundred ineffectual Glom recruits. Since the U. S. Amphibious Task Force reportedly had left the area some two months previously, the IGA assumed that the Marines in Glom Nhu were only an isolated token force and could be dealt with easily. Thus, the IGA forces moved into the relatively open country about 55 miles south of Glom Nagar with feelings of confidence and impunity.

Government forces and Marine combined action units had sufficient time to arrange for the reception of the IGA offensive, and on the afternoon of 18 November, ambushes were sprung on all three advancing IGA columns. The ensuing conflict was short and decisive. Almost half of the forces of the Insurgent Glom Army were killed, wounded, or captured, and the remainder routed in confusion. Government forces and Marine casualties were light. Over the following two weeks, practically all of the IGA stragglers were captured or surrendered themselves.
Marine combined action units played an important part in mopping up actions. Local Gloms proved to be willing to cooperate with and provide intelligence to Marines and members of the Royal Glom Militia, and remnants of the IGA were more willing to turn themselves into fellow Gloms than to the predominantly Bhad members of the police and military forces.

**Epilogue**

On 9 December 1973, just three weeks after the decisive action against the IGA, the Marine Amphibious Brigade left the Royal Kingdom of Bhad Doc and the U. S. Naval-Amphibious Task Force rejoined the U. S. 7th Fleet. By this time, although a few pockets of resistance remained, the government had brought the Rucian rebellion in the northern provinces under control. In Glom Nhu Province, the threat of subversion and terrorism by the IGA had been eliminated, and anti-government demonstrations and acts of sabotage by the local Glom population were no longer a problem. Local Gloms had adopted a "wait and see" attitude, which would give the government an opportunity to implement a program of reforms and new opportunities for minority peoples in Glom Nhu, and throughout the country.

Two platoons of Marines remained in Glom Nhu to complete the work of the training and organization of the Royal Glom Militia (RGM). Only the first class of 1,000 RGM trainees, operating in Marine combined action units, had taken part in the action against the IGA and in the subsequent mopping up operations. The second class of 1,000 RGM recruits had completed two weeks of training, but had been considered too inexperienced to take part in combat operations, and had been held in Glom Nagar. The remaining Marines supervised the combined action orientation of this group, and stayed to see the final class of 1,000 RGM recruits through their entire training cycle. As promised by the Government of Bhad Doc, half (1,500 men) of the authorized strength of the RGM were offered permanent positions in the national police and military services. The Marines played an active role in helping to nominate the best qualified recruits and officer candidates for the national services. The remaining half of the Royal Glom Militia were posted to their own villages and towns to serve as
a permanent, paid, paramilitary reserve force. The last Marines departed on 1 February 1974.

The Government of the Royal Kingdom of Bhad Doc, shocked by the size and intensity of the Rucian rebellion in the northern provinces, and the narrowly averted difficulties in Glom Nhu Province, adopted a new, strictly monitored, egalitarian policy for minority peoples throughout the country. As large numbers of formerly submerged peoples began to participate actively in all phases of national life, the rate of national development increased perceptively.
CHAPTER V

TRAINING AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR
FUTURE COMBINED ACTION OPERATIONS

The material presented in this chapter is an abstract of a more fully
developed discussion of training and support requirements presented in the re-
port on the previous phase of research. They are reproduced here so that the
reader can immediately relate these requirements, distilled from actual experi-
ence, to the scenarios of hypothetical experience laid out in the preceding chapter.

Training Requirements

A. Structure of a USMC Combined
Action Training Program

There are three training syllabi necessary to prepare a Marine squad
for a combined-action capability of a general sort. First, a general orientation
toward operations in the kind of environment delimited in Chapter II. Second,
special training, to be given to all members of the smallest detachment, to pre-
pare them for what they are likely to encounter in this environment. Third,
special training for the squad leader, who will be operating semi-autonomously
and assuming a good deal of the responsibility for the conduct and successful
completion of the mission.

The training concept suggested here is conducted upon two occasions,
each of which covers the same range of materials, but has differing emphases.
The first part is a package to be given to Marine Corps squad members, squad

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leaders, and Naval Hospital Corpsmen in CONUS to get across the general notion of a combined action mission. The second part will involve, immediately prior to predeployment, presenting the content of the particular situation into which the ready-units are about to be placed.

In the general training portion of the curriculum, there would be three major techniques which are channels for communicating necessary information. First, human relations training in how to get along in general with members of strange and exotic cultures is very desirable. The content of this training should be varied, and simulated experience with a variety of cultures differing in general characteristics should be provided. Second, in addition to this rather didactic orientation, role playing experience should be provided members of the squad as well as squad leaders. By assuming the stance of a member of another culture, some appreciation for the real differences between the experiential backgrounds of a Marine and a member of another culture, can be achieved with this experience in a way that no other technique can duplicate. Third, some rudimentary language training should be given. Training in a specific language will occur immediately prior to deployment, but in general training some useful guidance for learning any language in the field can be presented.

The general thrust of training should be to inoculate the men against responding negatively or fearfully toward strangeness and differentness. Accompanying the formal syllabus and daily routine should be exposure to strange and exotic foods, toilet habits which may differ radically from their own, child-raising practices, which, though offensive to their values, they should leave alone, and mannerliness in general. What should be continually encouraged is the notion of a flexible response to a changing situation, and the idea that there are ultimately no right or wrong ways to deal with a culture that is different from one's own. It is well to emphasize from the beginning, that insincerity and duplicity contain within themselves the seeds of the destruction of the success of the mission. Against this background, we can now suggest the content of the curriculum to provide a general constabulary/counterinsurgency capability for use in most situations, to be added to the already excellent military capability trained into the squad.
B. Training in CONUS Prior to Deployment
   (Twelve Days)

1. Unit Training Package (Nine Days)

   This material is to be given to all Marine Corps squad members, squad
   leaders, and Naval Hospital Corpsmen attached to them. The purpose is to com-
   municate the fundamental concepts and principles of combined action operations--
   its missions and required skills.

   a. General Orientation (Two Days)

      (1) The Combined Action Concept (One Hour). This is an intro-
          duction to the total combined action training program. It
          concentrates on the big picture in which a combined action
          concept is embedded--the what, the whys, and the wherefors.
          The point of this introductory hour is to widen the student's
          horizons, to let him know that he is about to learn something
          different from tactics and ordinary military operations.

      (2) Counterpart Relations (Four Hours). A detailed discussion
          of the organization and operations of the support structure
          and the counterpart structure is included here. The issues
          of command and control, in a combined action operation,
          should be contrasted with the usual command structure of
          Marine rifle squad deployment. Differences should be
          pointed out with respect to the following classification of
          support functions.

          (a) The bandwidth of command and control functions.

          (b) The necessary modification of staff functions when
              a combined action operation is involved.

          (c) The particular nuances of the special logistical sup-
              port requirements when counterpart as well as Marine
              units are involved.

          (d) The forms of combat support available to a Marine
              squad in a combined action operation. In particular,
              here the variety of support facilities available, and the
              various likely combinations of support likely to be a-
              vailable for particular missions should be made explicit.
              Air/artillery support, naval gunfire, MEDEVAC, and
              other standard forms of support available should be de-
              scribed in some detail as to their purpose, function,
              and availability. The circumstances under which each
              can most effectively be used in a combined action op-
              eration should be detailed, based on past experience and
              based on contingency planning.
(e) The problems of liaison and coordination with counterpart structures should be touched upon. The more common pitfalls of this kind of arrangement should be cited, but the ultimate and long-range strength of the initially sometimes clumsy counterpart situation should also be presented in some positive detail.

(3) **USMC Experiences in Combined Action Operations (Three Hours).** This should include a detailed discussion, though in summary form, of previous Marine Corps experience in combined action. It is intended to sharpen the student's perception of what he is being taught to deal with, and to impress upon him the fact that such operations are traditional in the Marine Corps. At the present moment, it can also be used to put the inevitable scuttlebutt about the CAP program in Vietnam in proper perspective. This is a good place to straighten our institutional mythology about CAPs from the actual operational successes and failures of the program. It is an excellent place for knowledgeable, well-balanced, and respected individuals with such experience to talk to the rifle squad members.

(4) **Mission, Organization, and Operations of a Combined Action Unit (Four Hours).** A detailed presentation of potential structures for various kinds of unit missions. The thrust of this part of the syllabus should be a description of the various larger units from which the squad may be committed, depending upon the demands for deployment presented by the environment.

(a) The deployment of squads under varying environmental conditions should be presented fully for the commitment of a battalion. The distribution and the number of squads committed for combined action operations should be discussed along with likely contingencies leading to the particular arrangements used as illustrative. Deployment down to platoon and squad level should be described in detail for several environmental situations.

(b) The objectives and operations of the smallest detachment, depending upon whether the deployment is for constabulary or for counterinsurgency combined operations, should be explicitly stated. This should be tied directly to the battalion deployment structure as described in (a).

(c) To widen and enrich the content of this part of the syllabus, Marine Corps experience in past constabulary and counterinsurgency combined operations should be analyzed in order to present both a rationale for the deployment suggested in Part (a), and to induce critical thinking about the various possibilities of deployment of squads.
(5) The Foreign Environment (Four Hours). This is a general discussion of the kinds of situations combined action operations may confront, and provides a general basis for the specific country orientation that units will receive just prior to debarkation. It makes it easier to get over the specifics that will be contained in that last-minute orientation. By focusing on local communities as a class of phenomenon, both the communality and the differences between the world's different regions can be meaningfully presented to give the Marine a notion of the kinds of social structures he will be working with. For each culture area, or class of community, three kinds of materials should be presented:

(a) The geography, history, society, culture, and values of the different regions. Common institutions should be focused upon, such as kinds of food, varieties of religions, the concept of children within the culture, and the nature of male-female role relationships. In addition to this, the complexities of the language environment should be dealt with formally.

(b) The present political-military situation. The consequences of the existing political structure in the potential intervention areas should be detailed for the local rural communities where the unit will be operating. In particular, the environment of the local community, both socially and physically in terms of natural barriers and resources, should be detailed for the region differentiated in the prior historical section.

(c) Identification and description of the enemy. The nature of insurgency occurring in the various regions should be detailed. If there is no insurgency at the moment, the most likely kind of insurgent activity should be suggested. There should be a focus on the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of the grievances that allow an infrastructure to exist to support the insurgency; there should be a description of the strategy and tactics of the insurgent; there should be a description of the arms and resources which the insurgent has at his disposal; there should be attention paid to the extent to which the insurgency is indigenous or supported by an outside agent; and there should be a specification of the detailed nature of the rural operations for each insurgency.

b. Specialized Training (Seven Days)

At this point, an attempt is made to introduce specific techniques and procedures that are relevant to a general combined action capability.
(1) **Insurgent Operations (Four Hours).** A discussion of common tactics and techniques used by guerrillas and insurgents should be conducted. Particular attention should be paid to their methods of harassing, controlling, and exploiting the civilian populations. The likely form of their political propaganda efforts should be described. The pacing and timing of the escalation and de-escalation of these efforts in the face of a Marine Corps presence, should be anticipated, and presented to squad members.

(2) **Counterinsurgent and Counter-Guerrilla Operations (Four Hours).** Particular attention here should be paid to the assets and liabilities of local forces, particularly as these affect combined action or constabulary efforts. Indicators to look at when assessing the progress of a combined action operation should be briefly described.

(3) **Military Police Operations (Six Hours).** Instructions should be given differentiating between policing activity and pacification activity. In particular, these instructions should concentrate on the kinds of skills that one would be able to teach to indigenous police personnel.

(4) **PWs, Defectors, Agents, and Double-Agents (Two Hours).** Various programs, depending upon circumstances, should be detailed for dealing with all these categories of insurgent personnel. Circumstances, both hypothetical and historical, which relate to the utility of, say, an amnesty program, should be presented and the possibility of the effective use of such a program should similar circumstances arise should be a part of the Marine combined action capability.

(5) **Intelligence Operations for the Detached Unit (Six Hours).** A variety of clues to look for, related to the infrastructure supporting an insurgent activity, should be presented to squad members for use in combined action insurgency operations. Anecdotes from past Marine experience, in particular that in Vietnam, should be used to suggest the variety of techniques available here to indirectly, by observation, gain information about insurgent capabilities. The focus here should be on objective techniques since it is obvious that good relationships with villagers will eventually provide for informant modes of intelligence. While recognizing that informants will be the most common source, both for their protection and as a check on the validity of their information, objective measures should be used as well whenever possible.
(6) **Communication and Liaison Problems (Two Hours).**

(a) Instruction in the use of communications equipment, including a variety of communication nets and procedures for effectively implementing them, should be thorough.

(b) Procedures for calling for air/artillery support, that result in the most effective use of this capability, should be explicitly worked out and suggested for a variety of environments.

(c) Ground management of helicopter service should be part of the capability of every squad member, since, given the nature of a combined action operation with detached units, it may be the case that at some particular time every member of the squad will find it necessary to be responsible for these operations.

(d) Liaison and coordination with counterparts with respect to these activities should be dealt with. In particular, attention should be paid to the circumstances under which the counterpart should be allowed to suggest, or allowed directly to invoke, or required to invoke, these kinds of support.

(7) **Combined Operations and the Training of Local Forces (Five Hours).** The emphasis here should be upon training by example. A useful device in training the Marine squad in how to conduct these activities is role playing of various kinds where the squad member first takes the role of teacher and then of learner. As a minimum, role playing should embody two kinds of training:

(a) Training in the maintenance, use and repair of various weapons systems.

(b) Training in the planning and conduct of various missions appropriate to the maintenance of an effective combined action unit.

(8) **Civic Action and Psyop Operations of the Detached Unit (Three Hours).** The emphasis here should be on a recognition of the fact that the Marine squad, operating as a detached unit, is too small to include the specialists necessary to carry on successful civic action/psyop activity. For that reason, an effort should be made to spell out in detail the resources available to the squad, which they can invoke when appropriate. In particular, the following topics should be thoroughly presented:

(a) The S-5 function of the Marine Corps battalion.

(b) The appropriate role of the detached squad in supporting and drawing on S-5 functions and functionaries and capabilities for CA operations.

(c) The S-3 function of the Marine Corps battalion.

(d) The appropriate role of S-3 for psyop.

(e) The limitations of the CA/psyop functions at the detachment level.
(9) **Map Making, Map Reading, and Its Uses (Five Hours).** Members of a Marine combined action squad should have a rudimentary knowledge of how to construct a map of their area of operation. In addition, it should be emphasized that this is a valuable activity to use to begin establishing relationships with counterparts. It is also something that should be taught to the counterparts as a routine matter.

(10) **First Aid, Field Sanitation, and Personal Hygiene (One Hour).** In addition to the skills of the Naval Hospital Corpsman, who will be available to the squad, each member of the combined action squad should have a better than average working knowledge of elementary first aid and sanitation procedures that are likely to be necessary in a rural environment in a less-developed country. Inoculations, latrine building, and the recognition of the severe symptoms of the severer forms of disease processes common in such areas should be presented.

(11) **Field Maintenance (Two Hours).** Instruction should be given in the maintenance of equipment, on the assumption that ordinary support may not be forthcoming for minor needs. In particular, maintenance of weaponry, transportation facilities, radio equipment, and personal gear should be stressed. The possibilities of using local resources to provide some of these services should be explored, and the advantages and disadvantages should be expressly dealt with. Among the advantages are the opportunity for psyop by behavior, since involving local personnel in necessary services to the detached unit should both enhance the esteem in which the detached unit is held and convince the citizenry of real possibilities for interaction as equals.

(12) **Relationships with Local Civilians (Eight Hours).** Here, as was the case with local forces, role playing should be used as a device to allow the men to develop some skill and empathy in dealing with rural peasants from strange cultures. Throughout this activity the following four kinds of relationships should provide the focus:
   (a) Working with local people in general.
   (b) General principles of the Marine Corps Personal Response Program.
   (c) Face-to-face communication as a device for learning both language and about a culture.
   (d) The most effective times and situations in which to use local interpreters.
(13) Use of Language (Eight Hours). The emphasis here should be on familiarization with the ways one goes about learning a language at a rudimentary level. Since language specialists can be expected to be available in most operations of this kind, a good portion of the training should deal with how to use interpreters. The difference between using Marine Corps personnel as interpreters and indigenous interpreters should be highlighted. The problems of trust, validity, and checking on translation accuracy should be highlighted. An effort should be made to underscore the importance of attempting to learn the language while in the field. Familiarity with elementary linguistic structures so that some of the strangeness in any situation is lessened should be emphasized.

2. Leadership Training Package (Three Days)

This material is to be presented to all squad leaders and attached Naval Hospital Corpsmen. The purpose is to alert the squad leaders in particular to the special problems of operating a small, isolated, independently functioning combined action unit in a foreign environment. It also attempts to provide supplementary or special training to help them handle some of the peculiar problems that they can reasonably anticipate in this kind of an operation. Though specifically for squad leaders and attached Naval Hospital Corpsmen, it would be useful for all squad members as well to attend and share in this training since, given the exigencies of the field, one of them is very likely to be elevated to squad leader on very short notice.

a. Special Leadership Responsibilities and Requirements (Four Hours). Some of the special problems of an isolated detachment, such as discipline, morale, stress, personal adjustment, and recreation should be emphasized. In particular, suggested modes of dealing with squad members who are not working out in this special kind of operation should be suggested, and procedures for dealing with these outlined in some detail. Attention should be paid here to the particular problem of race relations, especially as it is relevant to the different racial origins that the indigenous population is likely to have, from the racial origins of squad members.

b. The Role of the Attached Naval Hospital Corpsman (One Hour). Here should be emphasized the ability of the Corpsman to be effective in establishing rapport with the indigenous people, rather than a routine review of his medical capabilities which
he has already mastered in his naval training programs. It should be emphasized that the Corpsman is not just to be another Marine, but is to be a doctor in the setting in which he finds himself when operating with a detached unit. Most of the advantages that accrue to his special role come from the fact that he is not defined as a military operative, but as a more nurturant figure who offers universally valued services (that is, services related to the maintenance and restoration of health).

c. Working with Support Structures in the Marine Corps Chain of Command (Three Hours). Detailed support capabilities and where they are located in staff billets should be presented, and examples and exercises given of their use. In particular, MEDEVAC procedures and resupply procedures should be dealt with in great detail.

d. Working with Counterpart Chain of Command Structures (Three Hours). The usual advisor roles that can be expected in combined action operations of different kinds should be detailed. Who plays them, when they are played, and the degrees of freedom within each should be noted. A useful kind of differentiation between three kinds of advisor impact can be made here. The first advisor relationship is a single advisor to his counterpart. A second advisor relationship includes advisors plus operatives. A third kind of advisor relationship that is involved in civic action and in general dealings with the civilian population, particularly on the part of Corpsmen and S-5 operatives.

e. Intelligence Systems (Three Hours). The organization and control of local intelligence systems, based on current military doctrine, should be presented in a form adapted to the independent unit operating in a combined action mission. The use of informants, indirect indicators, and intelligence provided by other U. S. forces should be outlined.

f. Civic Action and Psypop Functions (Two Hours). It is very important that the squad leader be aware of the resources that he can call upon in his chain of command to implement civic action procedures, and to attempt psychological operations where he thinks they are necessary. The possibility of assigning a civic action NCO within his squad should be considered. The thrust should be that his squad acts at most as a broker between the needs of his village and the resources of the Marine Corps chain of command. It should be emphasized that tasks beyond the scope of his squad need not be foregone, but can be carried out by wider resources in the Marine Corps chain of command.
that he can call upon. However, note that the ultimate goal is to procure resources from the indigenous chain of command.

g. Communications Discipline (Two Hours). Steps to insure the security of communication networks, whether radio networks or other forms of communication, should be presented, and their importance emphasized by vivid example.

h. Legal Consideration (Two Hours). The issue of war crimes, particularly in a counterinsurgency operation, should be dealt with explicitly. Since the squads will be acting in detached fashion, and must make decisions quickly to respond to insurgent activity, there will be little time to call on the appropriate staff to determine whether their acts are legal or illegal before it is necessary to make a decision. This material should not only be presented in training, but should be available in easily understood language as part of the FMFM guidance available to the squad leader.

i. Administrative Detail (Four Hours). The importance of institutional memory in the total combined action operation should be emphasized. The keeping of adequate field records, the timing of briefing and debriefing sessions, and the kind of report requirements that will maximally enhance the mission should be thoroughly familiar to the squad leader, and to other members of the unit.

C. Pre-Debarkation Training
(Three Days)

The purpose of this block of training is to provide the units, immediately before commitment to a combined action operation, with the details of the particular situation that they will be entering. It is practically and operationally oriented, and against the background of the general CONUS training that they have already received should prepare them for a situation which is going to be, by definition, fluid and unstable for some time. Without the context and background of the CONUS training, the time required to present the amount of material necessary for an understanding of a particular situation in a lesser developed country would be impossible to arrange at a point in time just before actual deployment. The CONUS training should prepare the squad members, now about to embark on
a combined action mission, for the kinds of things that will be presented in
more detail during this final phase.

We here outline the form of the training package, but the details of any
particular contingency are too numerous to anticipate in the design of the form
for a general curriculum. Contingency planning for future combined action opera-
tions should include the preparation of predeployment training packages of the
kind we are suggesting for likely areas and locales of intervention. With this
preface, we shall now briefly sketch the essential components of the "last instruc-
tions" to be given to U. S. Marines before their commitment to a constabulary/
counterinsurgency combined action operation.

1. Military Orientation (Two Days)
   a. Military Situation (Two Hours)
   b. Mission and Plan of Operations for the Total Force (Four Hours).
   c. Mission, Organization, and Deployment of the Combined Action
      Component of the Force (Four Hours).
   d. Coordination and Liaison with Other U. S. Forces and the Host
      Country Counterpart Structures (Six Hours).

Sections a. and b. of the military orientation present a "big picture" of
the operation and how it fits into United States policy and interests. The points
that should be touched on here that are particularly important for a combined
action operation include:

1. The history of the U. S. involvement with this particular
country and particular area of the world;

2. The most recent relationships of the U. S. with the host
government leading up to the present crisis situation;

3. The range of potential Marine Corps missions, the ration-
ale for the choice of a combined action operation, and the
specific way in which such an operation is preferable to
other possible responses by the United States Government.
Sections c. and d. of the military orientation should involve the detailed planning on the part of the command structure down to the squad leader level of the actual commitment of forces, with particular attention paid to the counterpart relationships which are expected to be established. These must be tailored to the particular situation and are appropriately left to the command decisions of the force officers.

2. Area/Country Orientation (One Day)

This material will probably be presented before Sections c. and d. of the military orientation. It is set aside here as a separate unit for purposes of keeping the content areas of predebarcation training integral.

a. Physical Characteristics of the Deployment Site (One Hour)

For each independently detached unit, down to the squad level, the topography, climatic peculiarities, settlement patterns, communication routes (both natural and artificial), useful and harmful flora and fauna, local diseases, and population distributions, in their area of operation, should be spelled out in great detail. The implications of these factors for field living conditions and operations of the unit while deployed should be anticipated as much as possible.

b. Society and Culture (One Hour). A brief presentation of the characteristics peculiar to this society should be given, including the following topics:

1. Governmental and administrative structures.
2. The typical organization of local communities.
3. Important social and political groups.
4. Status, ability and leadership patterns, particularly at the village level.
5. Basic values and beliefs of the people, especially as these may differ from basic American values and beliefs.
6. Ordinary patterns of daily life, and customary mannerisms used in interpersonal relations.
7. Economic activities and conditions.
8. Social communication patterns, particularly as these are at odds with ordinary American patterns.
9. Social and political alignments and conflicts that are traditional in the society.
c. Identification and Description of the Enemy (Three Hours).
A brief history of the insurgency or banditry that the combined action operation is designed to counteract should be presented, with particular attention paid to grievances in the local population that provide support for the infrastructure which has to the time of deployment insured the survival of the insurgency. Social and political origins of the insurgency and its leaders, as known, should be presented. The ideology, strategy, tactics, arms and resources of the insurgent operation should be detailed. The impact on the civil population, particularly with respect to public order and political stability, should be presented in detail. The consequences for operations in the rural environment where the units will be deployed should be presented in specific detail.

d. Characteristics of the Indigenous Armed Forces (Three Hours).
Attention should be given to the counterpart constabulary operatives whom the Marine Corps unit will be expected to work with, if such a force exists. Its origins, mission, organization and deployment should be presented. Kinds of training it has had, the history of its relations with the civil population, the extent and nature of its real control, and its assets and liabilities in coping with the insurgency or banditry should be detailed. It is critical here that accurate information, and not idealized propaganda from the host government, be available to the units about to be deployed. In particular, the feelings of the civil populace toward the force that is to be the Marine counterpart are critically important, since bad relations between the civil population and an indigenous constabulary force create particularly difficult problems for intelligence operations, particularly operations designed to root out infrastructures.

3. Training Exercises

The purpose of these exercises and devices is to provide the units with practical experience in adapting the generalized predeployment training to the specifics of local conditions, as these conditions have been outlined in Section 2 above. It is expected that these devices and procedures will be used throughout predeployment training as necessary. They are intended as adjuncts and aids, not as ends in and of themselves.

a. Sand Table Simulation of Operations in Rural Environments.
Adaptations of standard combat training to local conditions should be visually illustrated by use of a sand table display. In particular, this display should be able to simulate terrain,
settlement pattern, communication pattern, and enemy tactical pattern, in a variety of hypothetical rural settings. The optimum forms of local defense, patrols, ambushes, reconnaissances, surveillance measures, etc., should be demonstrated in practical exercises with this table. In particular, the techniques of deployment as they evolve while the counterpart forces are becoming upgraded should be visualized in a series that is related to increasing capability on the part of counterpart forces. The flexibility of the table should be such that environments with coastlines, rivers, heavy forests, desert environs, etc., can all be adequately presented. An emphasis should be placed on problem presentation and solution on the part of individual squad members in order to begin to simulate experiences for them with the kinds of independent judgments called for which they will have to exercise in a field situation.

b. Map and Aerial Photo Familiarization and Interpretation. As many maps and aerial photos of the areas where a particular unit is to be committed should be used as are available. Specific locations of various sites where activities will go on should be pinpointed, and details of operations at the site at the earliest phases of entry should be worked out. Characteristics of terrain, settlement patterns, and resources available for local defense should be pointed out and inferred from the maps and photographs.

c. A Review of Communication and Logistical Support Capabilities Available. Communication and logistical exercises should be conducted, to ensure that the squad leaders in the detached units are capable and conversant with procedures for calling in air/artillery support. The relationship to the helicopter service and MEDEVAC procedures should be stated in specific detail. At this time, the literal procedures and the units to be worked with should be specified, and relationships between them should be established.

d. Language. As much as possible, a rudimentary ability in the language of the country to be entered should be developed. Road signs, street signs, and other public displays of information should be made available for interpretation, and members of units should practice with one another rudimentary social intercourse in the host country language. The language capability available to the unit should also be specifically defined and procedures for calling upon it worked out in detail. Since interpreters may be in short supply, the coordination between different separate units for the use of the interpreter capability, particularly in the early stages of entry, must be worked out at this point.
D. Summary

To indicate the relationships among the different parts of the training package, Table 1 has been prepared. Here, in summary form, is displayed the timing and the content of the various parts of the training curriculum necessary to establish a combined action capability as a part of the general Marine Corps operational competence.

Support Requirements

Depending upon the size of the combined action operation, particularly in regard to the number of squads deployed, support requirements should be read into a company, a battalion, a regiment, or a division support system. From case to case they will differ in magnitude and kind.

A. General Command and Control Requirements

1. The general requirement on the support staff is to anticipate problems of command and control created by the employment of units committed as small detachments, which may be widely dispersed and operating in relative isolation from one another over indefinite periods of time. Considerations of the extent of the dispersal, the number of units that are operative, and the characteristics of the area of operation should be used to plan for maximum efficiency in the command of such dispersed units.

2. This implies that necessary decisions about several command factors must be made. Among the more prominent of these are:

(a) The model of delegation of authority and responsibility to lower echelons, including the amount of discretion in command decisions that commanders at lower echelon levels are allowed to exercise.

2 See MCO 3120.3A, 18 August 1970, for current organizational doctrine.
Table 1: Combined Action Training Program Framework

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<tr>
<td>3 hours</td>
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<td>3 hours</td>
<td>d. Characteristics of the Indigenous Armed Forces</td>
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(b) The coordination of staff functions to insure the operation of a unified mission-oriented effort. The allocation and coordination of staff functions will make for a smooth operation, dependent upon the adequacy of prior knowledge of the situation into which the small isolated detachments are being committed.

(c) There must be assurance of both adequate feedback and an adequate reporting system to facilitate the coordination of these separate units operating in relative isolation from one another. Knowledge of the area of operation, level of development of the indigenous forces and government, and similar factors about the environment to which the independent units are committed is a prerequisite for adequately designing a system with adequate feedback characteristics.

3. Arrangements must be made for an appropriate form of command liaison with other regular U. S. units, if there are any, in the area of operation. The experience in Vietnam has shown the potential enhancement of a combined action mission through cooperation with army and navy units in the provision of, for example, fire support and MEDEVAC.

4. Arrangements must be made for command liaison with counterpart structures, appropriate to the structures that exist, and appropriate to the mission and area of operation. This task is extremely complex, and its content depends upon the nature of the total situation to which the small detachments are committed.

H. Staff Functions

1. S-1: Personnel

(a) The critical function at staff level is to establish realistic procedures for the identification of, removal of, and reassignment of individuals who do not work out in the isolated detachments. Several options that have been used in the Vietnam experience should not be adopted. In particular, the practice of sending washouts from the squad
into another should be avoided at all costs. It is anticipated that, to a certain degree, unit integrity will operate in opposition to this requirement. Procedures that differ according to anticipated differences in circumstances should be elaborated beforehand, and a command choice made of the appropriate one for the particular contingency at hand.

(b) Complementary to this is the necessity to establish procedures for the replacement of washouts, as well as replacement of casualties that will occur. There is the option of replacement by individual or replacement by unit. An optimum degradation of the table of organization strength should be established below which replacement of unit occurs, and above which replacement of individuals occurs.

(c) Rotation procedures which maximize the probability of continuity in the combined action operation should be established. An assessment of the characteristics of an optimum tour of duty, as well as an optimum phasing in of a new unit should be worked out in detail in advance.

2. S-2: Intelligence

(a) A thorough situation and intelligence briefing is necessary for units at the time of their deployment. This applies to replacement units as well as units going into a situation for the first time.

(b) Standard operating procedures on identification of both enemy and friendly agents should be worked out. Where relevant, units can be provided with blacklists, or "stranger" patrols can be suggested as a mode of identifying potential and actual insurgents. In general, there should be a set of alternative plans which may be modified by the unit in the field but which can, nevertheless, provide the independent detachment's commander with an array of alternatives to use in coping with the problem of how to deal with agents.

(c) Before deployment, an intelligence plan that is particularly suited to the contingency involved should be worked out and instructions to detachments should be given in detail. This plan will embody most of the elements noted in this section, and will pay particular attention to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the host country environment.

(d) As the combined action units are operational in the field, a regular procedure for intelligence briefings to and from
each of the squads should be set up. Enemy activities, to the best of the knowledge of the command level S-2 should be immediately reported to the independent detachments.

(e) In order to make the use of intelligence most effective, the activity of the various units should be coordinated. This involves at a minimum (1) the free exchange of intelligence information, (2) immediate feedback of the consequences of intelligence information fed in, and (3) immediate feedback on the consequences of intelligence information sent down.

(f) Maps and aerial photographs should be provided to each detachment, one of elaborate detail concerning its particular area of operation, and another which locates it in the general geographical setting of the total parent unit from which it has been committed. These should be updated on a regular basis, depending upon the level of activity. Weekly updating in a Phase II insurgency is desirable; biweekly updating in a Phase I insurgency is desirable.

(g) Interpreters and interrogators should be provided to detachments as they need them. It is desirable to have one man in each unit who is sufficiently conversant with the host country language to be able to carry on conversations of some degree of complexity with counterparts. However, since this is an unreasonable expectation for many situations, there should, at least at staff level, be interpreters and interrogators available on demand to facilitate operations.

(h) An extensive debriefing procedure of detachment personnel on location should always be undertaken. The information so obtained should be maintained in an institutional memory vehicle in order to facilitate continuity and effectiveness of the total operation, which might ordinarily be expected to extend beyond the service tour of a particular Marine.

(i) Standard operating procedures for handling prisoners of war, defectors, and agents taken by detachments should be established. There should be a wider variety of options available than simply imprisonment or repatriation.

(j) Interrogation of PWs, defectors, and agents taken by detachments should routinely and systematically be carried out. In addition, information gathered from the interrogation should be immediately forwarded to the relevant detachment. If no useful information is
forthcoming, the fact of the occurrence of an interroga-
tion should be made known to the detachment who cap-
tured the enemy personnel.

(k) An amnesty program, if appropriate, should be estab-
lished. Particularly if the host government is strong, the op-
tion of offering amnesty to all defected insurgents
should be implemented.

3. S-3: Operations

(a) The strategy for the initial deployment of detachments,
and the criteria for subsequent redeployment and move-
ment depending upon contingent developments, should be
worked out in advance of commitment in the host country.
In particular, the criteria for subsequent redeployment
and movement are critically important. A balance be-
tween staying long enough to become confident of one's
knowledge of an area, yet responding by movement to the
insurgent's movement throughout the countryside, must
be struck.

(b) Priorities and procedures for air, ground, and sea com-
battle support detachments should be worked out. The prob-
lem of coordination with other U. S. presence and with
local support capabilities should be agreed upon explicitly
in advance. Reaction forces should be clearly defined,
and procedures for calling them to an area where they
are needed on very short notice should be established.
Reaction forces include other U. S. presence and the
available counterpart forces in a general area, as well as
other Marine Corps units.

(c) Communications plans and procedures must be worked out.
The timing of communications, the assignment of radio call
signs and frequencies, and the providing of additional com-
munications personnel and equipment must be arranged in
advance.

(d) Military operations with indigenous forces should be co-
ordinated at the command level. It is assumed that the
isolated detachment will be able to work with the constab-
ulary or counterinsurgency forces of indigenous areas at
the squad level quite effectively, but for larger scale oper-
ations in line with the general strategy of the total mission,
procedures must be coordinated at a higher command level.

(e) Standard operating procedures for surveillance and super-
vision of the deployed detachments should be worked out.
These should be not so demanding that the command struc-
ture is doing nothing but going into the field to look over the
tactical moves of each squad, nor so loose that there is
little notion of coordinated activity in support of the basic strategy which can only be apparent at higher command levels.

(f) Staff liaison with regular Marine Corps or other U. S. forces, involved with the operation, in regard to support of combined action detachments, should be maintained.

(g) Training for the combined action units, of the predeployment type described in Chapter III, and retraining as needed, should always be a possibility in the operation. As the situation changes, and the nature of the insurgency and the counterpart relationships evolve, new demands and new procedures become more important. Flexibility, here as everywhere, is the key to the planning that is necessary to effectively implement the operation.

(h) The training of local defense forces, and especially the selection of outstanding individuals for possible advancement from these local forces, should be planned for. The appropriate level of military skill necessary for such advancement, depending upon the nature of the insurgency and the strength of the infrastructure, should be taken into account when such training demands are placed upon combined action squads.

(i) The organization, training, and deployment of Mobile Training Teams, where the skills taught are not present adequately at the squad level, should be anticipated as a possible adjunct to upgrading efforts of the squad.

(j) A security evaluation system, noting the progress of the strategic mission, should be applied regularly. It is critical that this system be responsive to exigencies and realities of the field, yet not allow overall strategy to be obscured by the tactical fluidity of such a complicated situation.

(k) Civic action and psychological operations ideas, suggestions, and requests initiated by detachments should be received and carefully evaluated. Since these detachments are responding to the nature of the particular situation in which they are moving, they should have highest priority in any case, but particularly in those cases where materiel is in short supply. One of the critical consequences of the USMC squad being in the field is their ability to realistically assess what is desired as well as what is needed by the counterpart peoples.
(1) The coordination of civic action and psychological operations as they impinge on the detachments in a total area should be carefully worked out. Inadvertent interference because of lack of coordination should be avoided at all costs.

4. **S-4: Logistics**

(a) Logistical operating procedures should be established, and all detachments should be aware of them.

(b) Detachments in the field should be supplied regularly, and on time.

(c) The arming and supplying of indigenous defense forces should be worked out with counterpart command structures. In particular, the extent to which the Marine Corps is responsible for this, and the extent to which the counterpart is responsible for it, should be explicitly stated. In addition, as demands change over time, that is, as the counterparts become stronger or weaker, as the case may be, a shift in the arming and supplying responsibilities should appropriately occur.

(d) Logistical support for civic action projects requested by detachments and approved by command should be provided. Among the more common demands made in this way will be transportation, construction materials, tools, sports equipment, technical advice, and technical personnel. The myriad of problems associated with the provision of all of these factors at appropriate times in places where requested should be anticipated as much as possible.

5. **S-5: Civil Affairs**

(a) An area orientation to detachments in predeployment training, of the kind suggested in Chapter III, should be available for areas of likely commitment of combined action units.

(b) Detachments should be oriented with respect to the kinds of S-5 activities possible. The support capabilities and the requirements for the detachments should be made clear to them.

(c) [See S-3, k.]

(d) Procedures for the requisitioning of goods and services to meet these requests as approved should be worked out and implemented with as little red tape as possible.

(e) [See S-3, 1.]
(f) Since S-5 activities are, in large part, a product of S-2, 3, and 4 activities, the coordination among these staff functions is particularly crucial in a combined action operation.

(g) Staff liaison with the counterpart structures, particularly with regard to civilian or noncombatant populations, should be established and rigorously maintained. Feedback from counterparts on the relationships between the squads and the civilian populations among whom they are living, should be encouraged and should be given careful consideration in the ongoing structuring of the mission. If the civilians are lost, then the mission is lost. This is the criterion which must remain uppermost in the minds of all personnel connected with combined action counterinsurgency operations at all times.

(h) A grievance system should be set up that is coordinated with the counterpart structure. An attempt should be made to deal promptly with grievances by either USMC personnel or counterpart personnel. The emphasis must be on objectivity and honesty, neither an obsequious yielding to the counterpart's side nor an arrogant usurpation of power on our side. The occurrence of grievances should be used as an opportunity to gain fuller understanding of the differences between the two cultures rather than solely an occasion for punishment and blame assignment.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions and recommendations presented in this chapter cover the entire scope of this research project and draw on the findings and conclusions of the two preceding volumes as well as on the substance of the present volume. Our trail has led from past cases of USMC constabulary forces and operations, through the recent Vietnam experience with the Combined Action Program, and thence out into the world of tomorrow’s conflicts and contingencies. We have moved from historical documentation, to direct observation of a living case, to conjecture about future situations and future roles.

Despite the sometime murkiness of the record, despite the understandable doubts and reservations held by many Marines who served with the CAP program in Vietnam, and despite the obvious uncertainties of the world of the future, there is no doubt in the minds of the authors of these conclusions and recommendations that the USMC Combined Action concept is the most effective and defensible capability yet devised by any U. S. military component for low key constabulary type operations in foreign environments. Its principles are sound and only need to be wisely interpreted and applied.

Conclusions

1. The historical record of USMC Constabulary and Combined Action operations, as reviewed and assessed in the present study, shows that the Corps has developed and battle tested a highly effective capability for low profile response to low intensity conflict situations.

2. The experience with the Combined Action Program in the Republic of Vietnam not only demonstrated the success of that particular program but also provided convincing evidence of the merit of the USMC CA concept in future contingencies where such a response is required.
3. There will be a need for, and opportunities to use, the Combined Action concept in the future. Revolutionary ferment and the incidence of internal violence in the underdeveloped countries of the world probably will remain high in the medium term future, but large-scale Communist revolutionary insurgencies, such as those in Vietnam, in Malaya, or in the Philippines probably will not dominate the scene in the future. More likely, smaller insurgencies, in the Level I-II range and with a more pronounced nationalistic flavor, will prove to be the rule and combined action operations of the future will probably be conducted in the relatively small, lesser developed nations. However, due to the intense nationalism prevailing throughout the world, even small nations usually will be loath to call in outside assistance unless the security situation is critical. This, plus the projected decreases in U.S. overseas involvements and commitments, and the shift toward low intensity, low visibility postures, strongly indicates that combined action operations most likely will be conducted with little or no support from large U.S. or indigenous conventional military forces.

4. Hence the Amphibious Task Force appears to be a most plausible and effective framework for a Combined Action Operation. The Combined Action concept is fully compatible with sea basing. It is an additional capability providing the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) with an option he can utilize in the event that the situation calls for low profile, low visibility projection of influence ashore, but it does not place added burdens on a sea base and it does not detract from the full use of the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) capability should this be subsequently required. Furthermore, since Combined Action Force units would be trained in addition to, not in lieu of, regular training, deployment on a CAP-type mission would not detract from the ATF capability to conduct standard types of ship-to-shore or land-based operations.

5. Since the USMC will probably have a use for this capability in the future, the Corps should proceed immediately to institutionalize Combined Action, both in doctrine and in training, to the extent that it can afford to do so.

6. A comprehensive, written basis for Combined Action doctrine now exists in the Interim Technical Report covering the previous phase of research. This document lays out the generic mission, objectives, component tasks and support requirements of CA operations and details training
requirements for CA forces at the platoon and squad level. It should be transformed into a standard FMFM and distributed to all commands ASAP.

7. The most effective, least expensive and least radical way of accomplishing the training objective is to build the CA capability into the regular rifle units. Here it will be reinforced by its universality in the Corps, its continuing close association with the more traditional roles of the USMC raider, and its regular inclusion in otherwise routine training programs and exercises. The USMC cannot afford separate standing units for this purpose, and such specialized units are contrary to the Corps tradition that any Marine squad should be able to do what any other Marine squad does with the same random distribution of personality types and individual experiences and skills. The foregoing, RVN experience and current threat projections indicate that more to be gained from the training and use of the standard USMC rifle platoons and squads in CA operations than in trying to put together a special CA force.

8. Formal combined action indoctrination and training should be directed to all command and staff levels of the Corps, so that all ranks and all commands are infused with the same basic concept and have a common understanding of the potentialities, limitations and intended uses of the USMC CA capability.

9. Field training should be developed and programmed for all USMC units. The focus for intensive training in CA operations and support functions should be the battalion, which as a BLT, will provide the basis for a combined action landing force. In addition to unit training at the squad and platoon level there should be special individual training for squad and platoon leaders, for company commanders and for the BnCo and his staff since the success of the CAO will depend in large part on the way in which the special command and control and support functions are handled. Hence three levels of field training, each coordinated and integrated with the other should be developed as follows, using the FMFM as a basis for POI and course content:

a. Unit Training. A CA training program should be instituted for all rifle squads. This should be a part of traditional USMC rifle squad training.
similar in concept to Basic Training and AIT, and should be designed as a natural follow-on to AIT. Refresher training at regular intervals should also be provided to all units.

b. **Individual Training for Unit Leaders and Corpsmen.** Unit leaders and Corpsmen should receive additional special training to prepare them for their augmented responsibilities in their roles as CAU leaders.

c. **Individual Training for Battalion COs and Staff Officers.** Officers responsible for the deployment of a USMC combined action force should receive indoctrination and training in the special command, control and staff support requirements for the conduct of CA operations.

The field training program outlined in Chapter V above is designed for optimal conditions. It is recognized that all training normally operates under less than optimal conditions and that other requirements, including other kinds of training, will compete for the available time. Hence we do not assume here that the predeployment package will in all instances be administered as a complete unit; more likely sections of it will be introduced into training schedules as priorities permit. The designated days and hours for each portion of the training program should be understood as indicating relative weights to be given to the various training subjects rather than absolute time allocations.

10. Training and support requirements cannot be usefully developed or refined without some form of exposure, practical exercise and experimental field testing. We have found, contrary to our original expectations, that our hypothetical scenarios of past and future contingencies served more to display the training and support requirements developed in the prior phase of research than to put them to the test. Research efforts without further experiential inputs have reached their natural limits and must be followed now by classroom discussion, and by the use of CA scenarios in field training exercises, preferably as full scale and as realistic as possible.

11. The inherent readiness of Marine forces to conduct operations in a wide variety of situations and environments offers special opportunities and reasons to plan and prepare for the conduct of operations that incorporate as many of the combined action features as practicable. Counterinsurgency operations and those operations and deployments in the general category of "expeditions short of war" provide the most obvious opportunity to exploit the CAO potential. Provision for a USMC combined action capability, as described in the severe reports of this project, should be made in USMC mid- and long-range
planning. Planners should study these reports for guidelines as to (1) the most appropriate ways of including the overall combined action capability in future contingency planning, (2) the most plausible uses and mixes of the component capabilities, and (3) the most effective force structures for bringing these capabilities to bear.

12. Our historical review, and our projection of a hypothetical Combined Action operation into historical cases, suggest that the Combined Action capability should be examined in the light of its potential for multi-lateral operations—e.g., CA units as elements in UN peace keeping mission, as part of combined force operating under a regional defense treaty such as SEATO, OAS, or a bilateral arrangement between two neighboring countries.

**Recommendations**

1. Prepare and publish a basic manual for USMC Combined Action Operations.

2. Establish both the formal and field training base for the CA capability.
   a. Formal indoctrination and training in CA concepts, capabilities and operations should be programmed at all levels, in all Marine Corps schools.
   b. Field training in all phases of CA operations should be programmed for both deployed and non-deployed units. Under optimal conditions all of the unit training outlined above should be administered as recommended. Recognizing that other requirements compete for available training time, at least the mission-oriented portion of training should be implemented in whole and, consonant with other priorities, every effort should be made to introduce as much as possible of the remainder of the optimum training package on a continuing basis. With these qualifications in mind, it is recommended that:
      (1) All deployed units should be exposed to the CA concepts immediately and should begin to acquire the capability, through the allotment of portions of the annual training cycle to CA subjects and through participation in training exercises in which the CA concepts and operations are included.
(2) Units programmed for deployment should receive the full CA curriculum as part of their predeployment training.

3. Continue to develop and refine CA doctrine through testing of principles, practices, techniques and requirements in routine training exercises, employing scenarios with a variety of situations and operational formats.

4. Incorporate combined action concept, capabilities and requirements, as developed in this study, in mid-range plans and plan for probabilities and potentialities of employing the combined action concept on a multi-lateral as well as a bi-lateral basis.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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APPENDIX A
MODEL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
FOR COMBINED ACTION OPERATIONS

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**CAC** A

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*Combined Action Company*
1st Plat, Co A, 4th Recon Bn
Combined reconnaissance/surveillance

Btry A, 14th Mar
Fire support

1st Plat, Co A, 4th Tk Bn
Direct fire missions, prepared support on order.

81mm Mort Plat
Fire support

BLT Ready Force
Prepared support/reinforce anywhere in BLT area on order; conduct security/combat patrols as assigned

Co D

The above model organization is a generalized format for a generic mission; it could be task organized for known missions in which specific objectives and activities were emphasized--e.g., it could include more Military Police or more Civic Action support personnel.