SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE: ITS CONTINUUM - 1960-1970

By: Harriet Felt Scott

Prepared for:
Office, Chief of Research and Development
United States Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Under direction of:
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
United States Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

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R. B. Foster, Director
Strategic Studies Center

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This is a carefully documented review of the subject as it is presented in the writings and speeches of Soviet authorities. The study is divided into the Khrushchev Doctrine (1961-1964) and the Brezhnev Doctrine (1964-1970). The author concludes by summarizing the most important constant themes in Soviet military doctrines.
DISCLAIMER

The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by other authorized documents.

CONTRACTUAL TASK

This report is submitted in partial fulfillment of the research under Task Order 1 of Contract DADC19-71-C-0001.
FOREWORD

Soviet Military Doctrine: Its Continuity 1960-1970, is a carefully documented review of the subject as it is presented in the writings and speeches of Soviet authorities. The study is divided into the Khrushchev Doctrine (1961-64) and Brezhnev Doctrine (1964-70). The authoress, Harriet Fast Scott, concludes by summarizing the most important constant themes in Soviet military doctrines. The understanding of the continuity of Soviet military doctrine as presented here contributes significantly to the solution of the problems of continuity of various force applications in support of deterrent and war fighting strategies.

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INTRODUCTION

When addressing the XXII. Party Congress in October, 1961, Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky, the Defense Minister, used a term which scarcely had been mentioned in the USSR for many years - Soviet military doctrine. The theme of the Congress had been de-Stalinization. Military doctrine, a term Stalin had not liked, not surprisingly, was revived as the famed dictator was publicly denounced.

Marshal Malinovsky noted in particular that Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, in a speech at the IV Session of the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, had made a thorough analysis of modern war, and that this analysis now formed the basis of Soviet military doctrine. Subsequent authors, even after Khrushchev's ouster, speak of this January 1960 speech as the crucial point in the development of military doctrine, establishing a milestone that was to last for at least a decade.

The examination of Soviet military doctrine which follows will attempt to search out the very first public promulgations of this doctrine in the January, 1960 speech by Khrushchev and trace these down to the eve of the XXIV Party Congress in March, 1971.

This examination should give the reader an understanding of the military thinking that has been going on in the Soviet Union during the last decade - an understanding that is essential if the current phase is to be intelligently assessed. It also will provide a useful background from which to judge the
military pronouncements which will be made at the upcoming XXIV Party Congress.

The background also is critically important for an understanding of SALT and its implications. NATO planners must have an insight into Soviet military thinking when discussing mutual force reductions with their Soviet counterparts. Since this doctrine "represents a system of views officially adopted in a state on basic questions of war", it must also relate to Vietnam and the Middle East.

Soviet theoreticians generally divide the post-World War II period into three parts when discussing military affairs. The first part encompasses the period from the end of the war in 1945 until the death of Stalin in 1953. This period was marked by intense efforts on studying the previous war and in generalizing its lessons. At that time there was a great strain on the Soviet economy as they developed their own atomic bomb (1949) and hydrogen bomb (1953). During these years their population was at a near starvation level.

These nuclear advances in turn produced the second part of the post-war period - from the death of Stalin in 1953 until 1960. Freed from the constraints imposed by Stalin, military men began to seek ways to integrate the new weapon into their forces. It was not until 'Sputnik' orbited the earth in October, 1957 that the West realized the implications of Soviet technology; that the booster for the Sputnik could be combined with the nuclear weapon, providing a weapon of unlimited range.
In the restricted Soviet military press it became apparent that the 'software' was being developed to go with the 'hardware.' Soviet writings stressed that military science, "which investigates the laws and regularities of war" was working out questions of military art. "Military art is the basic area of military science, and under it are included strategy, operational art and tactics." As military science reached certain conclusions about the nature of future wars, new hardware was entering the weapons inventory in quantity. Marxist-Leninist military theoreticians, especially the famed young colonels such as Rybkin and Bondarenko, later noted that this quantity of nuclear hardware reached a level which caused a qualitative change to take place in the way war would be fought. In their words, "a revolution had taken place in military affairs."

It had been centuries since a "revolution in military affairs" of such importance had occurred. Soviet writers taught that this revolution affected all facets of the military, and that it was not to be compared with a 'tank' revolution or an 'airplane' revolution. The resulting changes were comparable to the discovery of gunpowder. Before gunpowder, wars were fought with cold steel weapons, or by objects thrown by mechanical contrivances. The introduction of gunpowder fundamentally changed the nature of war itself. At first, only a few guns were available. The immediate changes were gradual and small. But inexorably the changes continued until the whole fabric of feudal society crumbled as the gunpowder revolution continued.

In just this way the nuclear weapon and the rocket have ushered in the missile age, in which the old relationships and old rules simply do not apply.
The men with the gun - be it rifle, machine gun or cannon - is no longer decisive in war. The nuclear-armed missile, with its vast destructive power, is now the decisive factor.

To utilize this new weapon, a new Service of the Soviet Armed Forces - the Strategic Rocket Troops - was created in December 1959. And to go with the new hardware, software in the form of a new Soviet military doctrine had to be provided. This marked the beginning of the third stage in the post-World War II period, and it has continued for a decade. *

There appears to be a seven or eight year cycle in this post war doctrinal development. A shift of emphasis in doctrine began about 1967, which in part may have been due to the 6-day war in the Middle East, the continuing war in Vietnam and possibly the adoption of 'flexible response' by NATO. Perhaps even more important for this modification of the 1960 doctrine have been Soviet successes in matching, and in some cases surpassing, the United States in quantity and quality of nuclear weaponry. Under their nuclear umbrella the Soviet leadership may feel more confident of successfully utilizing conventional forces for limited objectives.

Are the Soviet doctrinal writings produced to inform and to teach the members of their Armed Forces, or are they published as 'dis-information', to deliberately deceive the reader? To answer this question one should look at the evidence. These writings over the past decade can be compared with the weapons systems that actually exist. The doctrine written in the first half of the past decade called for weapons such as the SS-9, FObs, ABIs and... 

* According to Soviet writers, Lenin produced their first military doctrine. The major change to this was made by Mikhail Frunze in 1924, after the Soviet 'civil war' had ended. The next change was in 1939, in preparation for World War II. The last change made was in 1960.
nuclear submarines. The doctrinal shift in the second half of the decade, while not major, called for a continuance of both strategic offensive and defensive weapons, and at the same time pointed to the need for improvements in non-nuclear warfare capability.

The evidence will be presented in the pages to follow. It will include as many references to Soviet military doctrine as can be found in major military works published over the past ten years. Side by side comparisons of various editions of the same books will be presented, showing how shifts in emphasis have taken place. Whole sections, which repeat the same basic doctrine again and again, but each with little nuances of emphasis, will be shown.
PART A The Khrushchev Doctrine: 1960 - 1964

Before beginning, the Soviet definition of military doctrine will be given so that the reader will understand the framework of the subject under investigation. According to the Soviets:

**MILITARY DOCTRINE** -- a system of scientifically based views, officially adopted on a state, on basic fundamental questions of war. It is the expression of the views of the country's leading political body on questions of the political appraisal of a future war, the attitude of the state to war, the determination of the nature of a future war, the preparation of the country for war in an economic and moral relation; on questions of building and training the armed forces and also of methods of waging war.

Military doctrine is directly dependent on the social system, on state aims in the area of foreign and domestic policy, on the economic, moral-political and cultural condition of the country. In the determination of the fundamental tenets of military doctrine, the level of science, technology, and the military technical equipment of the country's armed forces, the conclusions of military science and views of the probable enemy are taken into consideration.

This is a basic definition used by Soviet writers when discussing military doctrine. Note that there are two sides to military doctrine: the political side and the military technical side. As will be shown, the political side is the dominant side.

1. **1960 - Khrushchev's Speech to the IV Session of the Supreme Soviet: Disarmament -- the way to a Sure Peace and Friendship Between Peoples**

On January 14, 1960, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev delivered a major policy speech before the IV session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This speech later was published in pamphlet form as "Disarmament -- the Way to a Sure Peace and Friendship Between Peoples."
In this speech, despite the irony of its title, Khrushchev outlined the basis of the new Soviet military doctrine — a doctrine which was to be based on the decisiveness of nuclear weapons. The import of Khrushchev's statements was not immediately apparent. Some of his remarks, such as references to the creation of new "rocket units," were not clear at the time. It was not until Marshal Malinovsky made reference to this speech in his address to the XXII Party Congress in October, 1961, giving credit to Khrushchev for having formulated the basic features of the new doctrine, that its significance was recognized. As long as man had been the decisive force, then the enemy's armed forces had to be the main target. As the nuclear weapon became decisive, then the destruction of the enemy's nuclear weapons was added as part of the main target for military operations, along with the destruction of his armed forces, his economic base for waging war and his state government.

In 1960 Khrushchev emphasized the following points, which were to be restated by scores of other Soviet spokesmen over the next decade:*

1. As stated at the XX and XXI Congresses of the CPSU, there is no longer any fatal inevitability of war.

2. War will not begin, as it did earlier, by invasion of the frontiers; war will begin deep in the interior, and: "not a single capital, no large industrial or administrative center, and no strategic area will remain unattacked in the very first minutes, let alone days, of the war."

3. A surprise strike is possible but could not by itself win a war. Rockets would be duplicated in such a way that those surviving the initial strike would be able to rebuff the aggressor effectively.

* See appendix 1 for text in full. (p. 74)
4. The USSR has atomic and hydrogen weapons, and rockets to deliver them. If attacked, the USSR would "wipe the country or countries attacking us off the face of the earth." The USSR would suffer a great deal, sustain great losses, but would survive. The West would suffer more. For if the West starts a new war, it would be not only their last war, but also the end of capitalism.

5. Rocket units have been newly formed.

6. The Soviet Union, having better, more perfect rockets than the U.S., will do everything to keep its lead until agreement on disarmament is reached.

7. The standing army of the Soviet Union was to be reduced because a country's defense potential depends on firepower, not on the number of men under arms.

Most Americans reading this speech knew that a number of Khrushchev's assertions were inaccurate representations of the relative strategic balance at this particular time. Implementation of the new doctrine meant new weapons systems, new rules and regulations for the Soviet Armed Forces and alterations in Soviet military training. Approximately one decade is required between the time a new weapons system is initiated until it is combat ready in operational units. Therefore, it is not surprising that the full effect of the new doctrine announced by Khrushchev was not fully appreciated in the United States until its weapons -- the SS-9, atomic submarines armed with nuclear missiles, ABMs, Fr's. mobile missiles and so on, were to become terms frequently occurring in the Western press.

The most controversial point in Khrushchev's 1960 speech was the troop reduction statement. Several reasons suggest themselves as causes for these reductions: the space program which was to launch the first man to orbit the
earth in 1961, the new expensive weapons, the poor condition of agriculture and housing, and the manpower shortage in industry caused by the reduced wartime birthrate.

At a press conference in 1965, Marshal Sokolovsky* stated that the number of troops previously mentioned as the goal of reduction efforts had been reached. He noted that the time limit mentioned earlier (omitting the fact that Khrushchev had made the statement) had not been possible because of the international situation then prevailing.

There was even talk of reverting to a territorial militia system. The title of the speech should be remembered and also its theme, which was disarmament. Khrushchev used such terms as "in due course", or "looking ahead" when speaking of a territorial militia. Malinovsky's 1962 pamphlet, "Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace," made it clear that the proposal was studied in the course of writing the new Party Program, which was introduced at the XXII Party Congress. The previous program "had spoken of a peoples' militia as the long-range arm of Armed Forces of a socialist state." In the end, neither a cadre army nor a territorial militia was singled out for the Party's stamp of approval.

* Sokolovsky had been the Chief of the General Staff at the time Khrushchev made his 1960 speech. Sokolovsky was under no compulsion to bring up this rather painful subject again, especially since Khrushchev had openly been accused of 'harebrained schemes', of which this appeared to be one, unless the Marshal felt a personal interest in it. Was Khrushchev speaking for himself when he made these statements for troop reduction or had his Chief of Staff and the Marshals put him up to it?
In statements concerning Soviet military doctrine, it is not always clear to what kind of war they are referring. The speech with the Orwellian title, "Communism - Peace and Happiness for the People" made by Khrushchev on 6 January 1961, defined the types of wars which could be fought. He spoke of three possible types in the future: world war, local war and wars of national liberation. The first two were imperialist wars and therefore "unjust" from the imperialist side. The latter -- wars of national liberation -- were categorized as "just wars." Though his categories later were criticized for mixing size with political content, at the time his pronouncements prevailed.

According to Khrushchev:*

The imperialists are preparing war chiefly against the socialist countries, and above all against the Soviet Union, the most powerful of the socialist countries.

About local wars. There is much talk in the imperialist camp today about local wars, and the imperialists are even making small-caliber atomic weapons for use in such wars. They have concocted a special theory on local war:...A small-scale imperialist war, no matter which of the imperialists starts it, may develop into a world thermonuclear war. We must, therefore, fight against world wars and against local wars.

About national-liberation wars: Recent examples of wars of this kind are the armed struggle waged by the people of Vietnam and the present war of the Algerian people. These are liberation wars, a war of independence waged by the people. It is a sacred war. We recognize such wars; we have helped and shall continue to help peoples fighting for their freedom....These uprisings cannot be identified with wars between countries, with local wars, because the insurgent people fight for the right of self-determination, for their social and independent national development....Communists support just wars of this kind wholeheartedly and without reservation.

A world war in present conditions would be waged with missiles and nuclear weapons, that is, it would be the most destructive war in history.... The victory of socialism on a world scale, inevitable by virtue of the laws of history, is now near. Wars between countries are not needed for this victory....The Central Committee and the Soviet government will continue to do everything to increase the military might of our country, since the imperialists are continuing the arms drive....

* A more complete text can be found in appendix 2 on page 81.
3. 1961 - The XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

As already noted, the basic features of a new military doctrine were given by Khrushchev in January, 1960. At the XXII Party Congress, in October of 1961, this new military doctrine was explained in greater detail by the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Ya. Malinovsky. His words should be carefully studied:

All work in this area, we, the military, have conducted under the guidance of the decisions of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government. The fundamental concrete tasks of the Armed Forces and the direction of military structuring in our country in present-day circumstances was distinctly and expressively laid down by our Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev in his historical speech at the IV session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1960. In the report, a deep analysis of the nature of modern war, which lies at the base of Soviet military doctrine, was given. One of the important positions of this doctrine is that a world war, if it nevertheless is unleashed by the imperialist aggressors, will inevitably take the form of nuclear rocket war, that is, such a war where the main means of striking will be the nuclear weapon and the basic means of delivering it to the target will be the rocket. In connection with this, war will also begin differently than before and will be conducted in a different way.

The use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, with unlimited possibilities for their delivery to any target in calculated minutes with the aid of rockets, permits the achievement of decisive military results in the shortest period of time at any distance and over enormous territory. As objects of crushing nuclear strikes, along with groupings of the enemy armed forces, will be industrial and vital centers, communications junctions, everything that feeds war.

A future world war, if not prevented, will take an unprecedentedly destructive character. It will lead to the death of hundreds of millions of people, and whole countries will be turned into lifeless deserts covered with ashes.

It must be said that this is well understood also by the ruling circles of the West, and therefore they are trying to achieve their partial aggressive goals by waging local 'little' wars with the use of conventional and tactical atomic weapons.

In spite of the fact that in a future war the decisive place will belong to the nuclear rocket weapon, we nevertheless come to the conclusion that final victory over the aggressor can be achieved only as a result of the joint actions of all the services of the armed forces.
This is why we are giving the necessary attention to perfecting all kinds of weapons, teaching the troops skillfully to use them and to achieve decisive victory over the aggressor.

We also consider that in contemporary circumstances, a future world war will be waged, in spite of enormous losses, by massive, multimillion armed forces.

The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government have demanded and are demanding from us that special attention be given to the beginning period of a possible war. The importance of this period is that the first massive nuclear strikes can, to an enormous degree, predetermine the whole subsequent course of the war, and lead to such losses in the interior and in the troops that the people and the country might be placed in exceptionally serious circumstances.

Evaluating circumstances in reality, it must be taken into account that the imperialists are preparing a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR and other socialist countries. Therefore, Soviet military doctrine considers the most important, the main and paramount task of the Armed Forces to be: to be in constant readiness for the reliable repulse of a surprise attack of the enemy and to frustrate his criminal plans.

The fact is that in contemporary circumstances, any armed conflict inevitably will escalate into general nuclear rocket war if the nuclear powers are involved in it. Thus, we must prepare our Armed Forces, the country and all the people for struggle with the aggressor, first of all and mainly, in conditions of nuclear war.

Our country is big and wide. It is less vulnerable than capitalist countries. But we clearly recognize that this would be for us an exceptionally severe war. We are deeply convinced that in this war, if the imperialists thrust it on us, the socialist camp will win and capitalism will be destroyed forever.


In August 1962, the new direction of the Soviet Armed Forces, basically stated by Khrushchev in 1960 and outlined in detail by Marshal Malinovsky in 1961, was re-stated in the most significant military work of the sixties, the famous Military Strategy. This was written by a group of Soviet military

* See appendix 3 for more complete text. p. 85.
The book does not deal with doctrine, as its authors explain, but with its implementation. For:

In relation to military doctrine, military strategy occupies a subordinate position. Generally, principal positions are determined by military doctrine whereas military strategy, preceding from these general positions, works out and researches concrete questions concerning the nature of a future war, the preparation of the country for war, the organization of the armed forces and the methods for conducting the war. 6

In the chapter entitled "The Nature of Modern War," the authors of Military Strategy sum up its features thus:

This analysis of the essence of modern war, the conditions under which it arises, and the ways and means of waging it makes it possible to draw the following fundamental generalized conclusions concerning the possible nature of a future war.

In the modern era, despite the fact that war is not fatally inevitable, and despite the unrelenting struggle for peace by the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp, as well as by all men of good will, the occurrence of wars is not excluded. The bases for such a conclusion are the insoluble economic and political contradictions of imperialism, the violent class struggle in the international arena, the aggressive course of the politics of world reaction and, above all, the U.S. Monopolists, as well as the intensified preparation for war by the imperialist countries.

If a war against the USSR or any other socialist country is unleashed by the imperialist bloc, such a war inevitably will take the nature of a world war with the majority of the countries in the world participating in it.

In its political and social essence a new world war will be a decisive armed clash between two opposed world social systems. This war will naturally end in victory for the progressive Communist social-economic system over the reactionary capitalist social-economic system, which is historically doomed to destruction. The guarantee for such an outcome of the war is the real balance between the political, economic and military forces of the two systems, which has changed in favor of the socialist camp. However, victory in a future war will not come by itself. It must be thoroughly prepared for and assured.
A new world war will be a coalition war. The military coalition of the capitalist countries (NATO, CENTO, SEATO) will be on one side while the coalition of the socialist countries (WARSAW PACT) will be on the other side.

Given the acute class nature of a future world war, in which each side will set for itself the most decisive political and military goals, the attitude of the people toward the war will acquire tremendous importance. Despite the fact that large amounts of qualitatively new military equipment will be used in the war, the armed combat will be waged by mass armed forces. It will necessarily involve many millions of people for guaranteeing the needs of war and work in the economy. Therefore, the attitude of the mass populace toward the war will unavoidably have a decisive effect on its final outcome.

From the point of view of the means of armed combat, a third world war will be first of all a nuclear rocket war. The mass use of nuclear-particularly thermonuclear weapons will impart to the war an unprecedented destructive and devastating nature. The main means of attaining the goals of the war and for solving the main strategic and operational problems will be rockets with nuclear charges. Consequently, the leading service of the Armed Forces will be the Strategic Rocket Troops, while the role and purpose of the other services will be essentially changed. At the same time, final victory will be attained only as a result of the mutual efforts of all services of the Armed Forces.

The basic method of waging war will be massed nuclear rocket attacks inflicted for the purpose of destroying the aggressor's means of nuclear attack and for the simultaneous mass destruction and devastation of the vitally important objectives comprising the enemy's military, political, and economic might, for crushing his will to resist, and for achieving victory within the shortest period of time.

The center of gravity of the entire armed combat under these conditions is transferred from the zone of contact between the adversaries, as was the case in past wars, into the depth of the enemy's location, including the most remote regions. As a result, the war will require an unprecedented spatial scope.

Since modern means of combat make it possible to achieve exceptionally great strategic results in the briefest time, the initial period of the war will be of decisive importance for the outcome of the entire war, and also methods of frustrating the aggressive designs of the enemy by the timely infliction of a shattering attack upon him. In this regard the main problem of Soviet military strategy is the development of methods for reliably repelling a surprise nuclear attack of an aggressor. A satisfactory solution of this problem is determined primarily by the constant high level of combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces especially the Strategic Rocket Troops. This task, which follows from the decisions of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, is the main one for our Armed Forces and it must always be the center of attention of commanders and staffs of all ranks and of the political and party machinery.
The enormous possibilities of nuclear rocket weapons and other means of combat enable the goals of war to be attained within a relatively short time. Therefore, in order to insure the interests of our country, it is necessary to develop and perfect the ways and means of armed combat, anticipating the attainment of victory over the aggressor first of all within the shortest possible time, with the least possible losses, but simultaneously it is also necessary seriously to prepare for a protracted war.

The ability of a nation's economy to engage in mass production of military equipment, especially nuclear rocket weapons, to create a superiority over the enemy in modern means of armed combat determines the material prerequisites of victory. A decisive factor for the outcome of a future war will be the ability of the economy to assure the maximum strength of the Armed Forces, in order to inflict a devastating strike upon the aggressor during the initial period of the war.

Victory in war is determined not only by military and technical superiority, which is assured, on the whole, by the advantages of the socio-economic and political systems, but also by the ability to organize the defeat of the enemy and effectively to use the available means of combat. For this purpose, a thorough scientifically well-founded preparation of the nation for war against an aggressor and a high level of military art of the commanders and troops are required. Success in a future war will also depend on the extent to which the level of development of military strategy corresponds to the requirements of a modern war.7

5. 1962 - Marxism - Leninism on War and the Army,

In late 1962, within a few months of the publication of Military Strategy, the third edition of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, written by the Department of Dialectical and Historical Materialism of the Lenin Military-Political Academy appeared. Its authors reflected the same nuclear emphasis given in Military Strategy. They also dealt with doctrinal matters. The main ideas of this doctrine are:

In its social and political character a future war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, will be an embittered armed clash of two diametrically opposed social systems, a struggle between two coalitions - socialist and imperialist, in which each of the sides will pursue the most decisive goals.
By the nature of the means used, such a war will inevitably be nuclear rocket, and therefore unprecedentedly shattering and destructive. The main role in the war will be played by the Strategic Rocket Troops and also Troops of PVO (air defense) and PVO (antimissile defense). In spite of the fact that a decisive place will belong to the nuclear rocket weapon, final victory over the aggressor can be achieved only as a result of joint actions of all the services of the armed forces which must in full measure use the results of the nuclear rocket strikes on the enemy and fulfill their tasks. Modern world war will demand massive multimillion-man armies.

In size a nuclear rocket war will be an intercontinental war. This is conditioned both by its socio-political content and also by the presence on both sides of rockets of any radius of action, nuclear rocket-carrying submarines and also strategic bombers. War will envelop practically all our planet.

It will be waged by absolutely other methods. Earlier the direct goal of military actions was the defeat of the enemy's armed forces without which it was impossible to reach the most important strategic centers of the enemy. Now the situation is different. "The use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons with unlimited possibilities for its delivery to any target in a few minutes with the help of rockets will permit the achievement of decisive military results in the shortest period of time at any distance and over enormous territory. Objects of crushing nuclear blows along with groups of enemy armed forces will be industrial and vital centers, communications centers, everything that feeds war." (R. Ya. Malinovsky at the XXI Congress CPSU.)

Combat actions of the ground troops will be characterized by high maneuverability and dynamism, headlong movement forward over many hundred of kilometers. A solid stable front will be impossible. The borderline between the front and the rear will be in effect erased.

The beginning period of the war, when the basic nuclear strikes, which can independently decide not only operational-tactical but also strategic tasks, will be delivered, will play a special role. "The importance of this period is that the first mass nuclear strike can to a large degree predetermine the whole subsequent course of the war and cause such losses in the interior and in the troops as might place the people and the country in an exceptionally difficult position." (R. Ya. Malinovsky. Speech at the XXII Congress CPSU.)

Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the fact that the imperialists are preparing a surprise nuclear rocket attack against the USSR and the other socialist countries. Therefore, the main and paramount task of the Armed Forces is to be constantly ready to repulse a surprise enemy attack and to frustrate his criminal plans.
In early October, 1962, the United States learned that the Soviets were putting offensive missiles into Cuba. In Moscow, the printers had just begun to set the Minister of Defense's booklet into print. *Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace*, by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, was printed before the last of the missiles and bombers left Cuba. In this booklet, Malinovsky mentioned the way the crisis was settled and expanded on the theme presented the year before at the XXII Party Congress.

The second chapter of this pamphlet reaffirms the basic military doctrine of the Soviet Union. As stated by the Soviet Minister of Defense:

"Military doctrine has two sides: political and military-technical."

The political side emphasizes that the decisions of the XX, XXI, and XXII Party Congresses provided fundamental inputs for renovating and developing the political side of military doctrine. Basically, these points were that war is no longer a fatal necessity, world war has a real possibility of being excluded from life even before the complete victory of socialism, but the possibility remains of the imperialists unleashing some form of aggression.

The military-technical side is determined, according to Marshal Malinovsky, by two factors:

1. The radical changes in armaments and equipment;
2. The combat training of the troops, their moral-fighting qualities.

Soviet military doctrine is based on the superiority of the Armed Forces of the USSR over the armies of the most powerful countries of capitalism both in military-technical means and in a moral-fighting relationship.

The essence of Soviet military doctrine, stresses Marshal Malinovsky, is that:
A future war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, will be a decisive armed clash of two opposed social systems, in character of the means used, it inevitably will be thermonuclear, such a war in which the main means of construction will be the nuclear weapon and the basic means of its delivery to the target, the rocket... Now war might arise without the traditional clearly threatening period, by surprise, as a result of the mass use of long-range rockets armed with powerful nuclear warheads.

Despite the likelihood of a surprise attack, Marshal Malinovsky warns that world war may grow out of a local conflict. However, the Marshal asserts that the imperialists talk of 'preventive' war thus forcing the USSR:

To be constantly ready for the reliable repulse of a surprise attack of the enemy and for frustrating his criminal plans.

Targets for crushing nuclear strikes, along with groupings of the enemy's armed forces will be, according to the Minister of Defense Malinovsky, industrial and administrative centers, communications centers and everything that feeds war.

To escape the lethal consequences of world war, the West, including the USA, is trying, asserts the Marshal, "to achieve its aggressive goals by way of waging local 'little' wars with the use of conventional, and as the American generals say, tactical nuclear weapons." Soviet military doctrine considers such wars unjust and aggressive. Such wars at any time might escalate (pererasti) into world nuclear war. "No matter where tactical atomic weapons are used against us," threatened Malinovsky, "it will evoke a crushing retaliatory strike."

As for the duration of a possible future war, Malinovsky states that "now no one can reject the possibility of a swift war." At the same time, he added, "it might not be limited just to strikes with the nuclear weapons. It might be protracted."
Final victory over the aggressor can be achieved only as the result of the combined actions of all services of the armed forces, of all kinds of weapons.

A future war will require mass multimillion-man armies.

Since any military conflict, when the major powers are drawn into it, threatens inevitably to escalate into all-inclusive nuclear war, then we must prepare our Armed Forces, the country and all the people first of all and primarily to struggle with the aggressors in conditions of nuclear war.

In a final warning, Malinovsky declares that:

Soviet military doctrine will change and will have additions.... Even its principles might change depending on actual historical conditions. 9

This delineation of doctrine was quite complete. The statements made by Malinovsky have been quoted again and again by Soviet writers -- whether officers with degrees in military science from the General Staff Academy, the Frunze Military Academy, or by the officers with degrees in philosophical science from the Lenin Military-Political Academy, --up through 1970.


A year after the first edition of Military Strategy appeared, a second edition made its appearance. The additions and corrections made in the edition dealt mainly with the role of the Central Committee. One major change was in the sentence:

In the event of the unleashing of war by the imperialist bloc against the USSR or any other socialist country, such a war might assume the character of a world war with the participation of the majority of countries of the world.

Might replaces the word inevitably which appeared in the first edition. Four paragraphs were added which deserve our attention.

One of the fundamental questions is the problem of assuring quantitative and qualitative military-technical superiority over the probable aggressor. This requires the possession of an appropriate
military-economic base and the broadest enlistment of the forces of science and technology to resolve this problem.

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government are constantly devoting their most diligent attention to this, aiming at practical resolution of the basic questions of the build-up, not only of the Armed Forces as a whole, but also of the services and branches of service; they are also giving key attention to the development of military equipment and new weapons of war; and, the main thing, they are raising the mobilization potential of the country's economy.

The correct military-technical policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the successes of industry and the outstanding achievements of Soviet science and technology have enabled us to create, in a comparatively short period, a powerful, qualitatively new material-technical base for the outfitting of the army and navy with modern military equipment, in the first instance, rockets.

Suffice it to say that the entire fundamental reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces occasioned by the incorporation into them of nuclear and rocket weapons, and also radielectronic equipment, has been and is being effected on the basis of the decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU which made a scientific determination of the general direction of development of modern means of fighting and of the probable nature of a future world war between the camps of imperialism and socialism.

After stating that a future war will in all probability be swift, the authors, in dialectical fashion, add;

However the war may also be protracted which will demand long and maximum effort from the army and the people. Therefore, we must also be ready for a prolonged war, and prepare human and material resources for this contingency.10

8. 1964 On Soviet Military Science

The second edition of On Soviet Military Science appeared in 1964. Its authors were General Majors S.N. Kozlov and M.V. Smirnov and Colonels I.S. Baz' and P.A. Sidorov. They repeated, in a slightly different way, earlier statements on doctrine.

Soviet military doctrine, based on the data of military science, considers that a nuclear rocket war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists,
will be a short and swift-moving war. The nuclear rocket weapon, having great power, can put out of action individual countries in numbered days and even hours. Having defined a nuclear rocket war as short and swift-moving, Soviet military doctrine at the same time considers that the armed forces and the country as a whole must be also ready for waging a possibly more or less lengthy armed struggle.

Soviet military doctrine considers that a nuclear rocket war might be launched by surprise, without any kind of warning, without a declaration of war.

It is not excluded that war might begin also by way of escalation (pererastaniye) of a limited conflict into a world one, more or less gradually. But no matter how war begins, the first strikes of the nuclear rocket weapon might be decisive. Therefore, Soviet military doctrine views the beginning period of war as an exceptionally important stage in its conduct. Events of the beginning period might have a decisive influence on the further course of the war and on its final result.

This is why the efforts of the Soviet military science in contemporary circumstances must be directed toward the deep study of the nature of the beginning period of war, at determining the most effective methods and forms of armed struggle in this period.

Soviet military doctrine bears an offensive character. However, the offensiveness of Soviet military doctrine has nothing in common with aggressiveness and the predatory tendencies of the military doctrine of the USA and its allies. The Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp are not planning to attack whomever it might be. But if they are attacked, then they will attempt to conduct a war, which was forced on them by their enemies, in the most offensive manner, in order to achieve the crushing of the enemy in the shortest period of time.

Soviet military doctrine gives decisive significance in war to the nuclear rocket weapon. At the same time it considers that along with nuclear rocket strikes of a strategic and operational-tactical character the armed forces will use conventional weapons and conduct broad offensive operations on land, at sea and in the air for the purpose of the final defeat of the enemy, for his complete capitulation.

Soviet military doctrine considers that successes in contemporary armed struggle will be achieved not by any single weapon or service of the armed forces but by the combined efforts of all services of the armed forces and services branches with the leading role of the rocket troops of strategic designation. Only as a result of the armed forces and service branches, taking into account the role, place and designation of each of them in actual conditions, is it possible to achieve strategic goals in war and successes in battle and operations.
...Taking into account the features of modern mass armed forces and their colossally growing firepower, Soviet military doctrine considers that the organization of the services of the armed forces and the service branches must be sufficiently flexible and varied to answer to the different conditions of waging armed struggle.

A new important phenomenon in modern war is the development of so-called civil defense.

...In conclusion, Soviet military doctrine has great importance for the further strengthening of the defense capability of our Motherland and of all other countries of the world socialist camp. However, doctrine is not dogma but a guide to action. The principles set forth in Soviet military doctrine have the force of law and our military cadres are guided by them in all military actions. Doctrine is no substitute for actual, organized creative work. On the contrary, doctrine -- is a basis which gives the organizer's work a purposeful character, assures unity of views and efforts directed at raising the military might of the Soviet government and at achieving victory in war, if the imperialist aggressors unleash it. This is why the deep study of military doctrine by all of our military cadres, the skillful application of all its positions and regulations has great significance in the work of training and educating all personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The last copy of On Soviet Military Science was barely off the presses when Nikita S. Khrushchev, quoted so many times in its pages, departed the Soviet political scene. His ouster was thought to presage changes in the military doctrine of the country.

1. 1965 Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs

Within a week of Khrushchev's ouster, Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs went to the printers. All sixteen articles had appeared before in the pages of Communist of the Armed Forces or in Red Star. Marshals and generals abounded on the list of authors. This volume quickly set the record straight -- Khrushchev or no Khrushchev, the party's policies remained intact.

The fourth article in the collection was "On Soviet Military Doctrine" by Professor General Colonel N. A. Lomov, at that time Head of a Department of the Academy of the General Staff. The article had originally appeared in Red Star, 10 January 1964, while Khrushchev still was in power.

Lomov advanced four familiar features of a possible world nuclear-rocket war:

A new world war, if the imperialists unleash it, in its political content will be a struggle of two opposed world systems -- the socialist and the capitalist...for its waging both sides will have to use mass, multimillion-man armies. Both sides will pursue the most decisive political goals in it.

It will be a coalitional from both sides.

It will be a nuclear war. One of the most important positions of Soviet military doctrine is that a world war, if it nevertheless is unleashed by the imperialist aggressors, inevitably will assume the nature of a nuclear rocket war. Its inherent peculiarities are:

a) it is the most destructive and damaging war.

b) Industrial and economic objectives and administrative and political centers with high concentrations of population might undergo nuclear rocket strikes in the very first minutes, and,

c) The possibility of massive nuclear rocket strikes in combination with surprise of action of their delivery will give the armed struggle absolutely new features which will change the principles of using the various services of the armed forces and will pose special demands for preparing the country and the army for war.
d) It will be intercontinental because both sides have intercontinental rockets, nuclear submarines equipped with rockets and also strategic bombers.

Lomov also states that a new world war might appear as the result either of a surprise attack from the side of an aggressive bloc or by escalation of a local war. However, Professor General Lomov asserts that a surprise nuclear attack is more probable. In closing, he states that:

Final victory will be achieved by the joint actions of all services of the armed forces. 12

2. 1965 Marxism - Leninism on War and the Army

The fourth edition of Marxism - Leninism on War and the Army was one of the first books in the "Officer's Library" when it began publication in 1965. The authors were almost the same as those who had written the second and third editions. In 1966, the book was nominated for the Frunze Prize.*

In any analysis of the continuity of Soviet military doctrine between the regimes of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, this edition of Marxism - Leninism on War and the Army is invaluable. For an earlier edition had appeared in 1962, a contemporary of the first edition of Sokolovsky's Military Strategy. By comparing the early and later editions of this book it is possible to make a detailed comparison of the evolution of Soviet doctrine over the critical 1962 - 1965 period. The following analysis will show what portions of the doctrine remained unchanged, and where modifications were made. 13

* The Frunze Prize for the writing of "excellent military or military historical works", has been awarded annually since it was approved by the council of Ministers in 1965.
Comparison of the 3rd (1962) and 4th (1965) editions.
p. 357 and p. 337 respectively:

According to its social and political character, a future war, if the
imperialists succeed in unleashing it, will be a fierce armed clash of two
diametrically opposed social systems, a struggle between two coalitions --
socialist and imperialist -- in which each side will pursue the most deci-
sive goals.

According to the means use, such a war will inevitably be

- nuclear rocket
- thermonuclear

and therefore unprecedently destructive and annihilating. The main role
in the war will be played by the Strategic Rocket Troops and also the Troops
of PVO /air defense/ and PRO /anti-missile defense/. In spite of the fact
that a decisive place will belong to the nuclear rocket weapon, final vic-
tory over the aggressor can be achieved only as a result of the combined
actions of all the services of the Armed Forces which must in full measure
use the results of the

- nuclear rocket strikes
- nuclear strikes

on the enemy and fulfill their missions.

Modern world war will demand massive
multimillion-man armies.

According to its size, a nuclear rocket war

will be an intercontinental war. This is conditioned both by its socio-
political content and by the presence on both sides of rockets of any
radius of action, atomic rocket-carrying submarines and also strategic
bombers. War will actually encompass the whole of our planet.

It will be waged by absolutely different methods. Formerly the direct
goal of military operations was the

- complete and utter
defeat of the enemy's armed forces without which it was impossible to reach
the most important strategic centers of the enemy. Now the situation is
different. The use of
atomic and thermonuclear weapons with unlimited possibilities for their delivery to any target in a few minutes with the help of rockets will permit the achieving of decisive military results at any distance and over enormous territory in the shortest period of time.

In the event of war, industrial and political centers, communications centers, everything that feeds war will be the objects of crushing nuclear strikes along with enemy groups of armed forces.

Combat actions of the ground forces will be characterized by high maneuverability and dynamism, swift movement over many hundreds of kilometers. A solid, stabilized front will become impossible. Essentially, the division between the front and the rear will be erased.

The beginning period of the war will play a special role, the time in which the basic nuclear strikes which can independently decide not only operational-tactical but also strategic tasks. The importance of this period is that the first mass nuclear strike can to a large degree predetermine all the subsequent course of the war, and bring such losses to the rear areas and to the troops that the people and the country might be placed in exceptionally difficult circumstances.

Consequently, the beginning period can have a decisive influence on the final result of the war.

Soviet military doctrines proceeds from the fact that the imperialists are preparing a surprise nuclear rocket attack against the USSR and other socialist countries.

At the same time it takes into account the possibility of waging war with conventional weapons.

Therefore the main and immediate task of the Armed Forces is to be constantly ready to repulse a surprise attack by the enemy and to frustrate his criminal plans.
In the preceding comparison there are two important changes. First, the 1962 edition had the sentence, "Modern world war will demand massive multimillion-man armies" and this sentence was dropped from the 1965 edition. Second, the 1965 edition has added the sentence, "At the same time it takes into account the possibility of waging war with conventional weapons."

It remains something of a mystery why the 1965 edition dropped the requirement for "massive multimillion-man armies". Other equally authoritative books published after 1965 retain this concept as a part of Soviet military doctrine.

The addition, "...the possibility of waging war with conventional weapons", was significantly revised in a still later, 1968 edition of the same book. The statement becomes: "at the same time it takes into account the possibility of conducting military operations with conventional weapons and the possibility of their escalation into military operations with the use of the nuclear rocket weapons." This change warrants careful analysis. Note again that in 1965 there was "the possibility of waging war with conventional weapons". In 1968 this was changed to "the possibility of conducting military operations with conventional weapons" and further, this sentence added in 1968 concludes with "the possibility" of escalation to the use of nuclear rocket weapons in such military operations. (underlining added to above quotations).

As will be shown later, this formulation of doctrine in the 1968 edition was used by Marshal Grechko several times in 1970, when he spoke of "the possibility of conducting combat actions with weapons". The point made and which should be stressed is the fact the conventional weapons might be used, not because a nuclear policy has been abandoned, but precisely because a strong nuclear policy is in effect.
3. 1966 The History of Military Art

The History of Military Art, another of the books of the "Officer's Library", is the result of collaboration between the Lenin Military-Political Academy and Frunze Military Academy. Chapter 17, presented here in part, was written by the editor, Professor Colonel A.A. Strokov, Doctor of Historical Sciences. By 1970, Strokov became a General Major and served as a deputy commandant of the Military History Institute of the Ministry of Defense. In 1966 he was head of the Department of the History of Military Art at the Lenin Military Political Academy. Strokov's own words provide an excellent summary:

The Communist Party and its Central Committee, concentrating their activity on solving the problem of the reconstruction of all military affairs, worked out Soviet military doctrine. What are the basic positions which make up the content of Soviet military doctrine on the question of the nature of waging war?

A future war, if the imperialists unleash it against the socialist countries, will become a world war; the main forces of the world will be drawn into it, and it will be a war of two coalitions with opposing socio-political systems. It will be a decisive clash of two opposed socio-political systems. The basic contradiction of the modern world was is a continuation of politics. It is 'politics through and through," V.I. Lenin wrote. The nature of the political goal, Lenin noted in the margin of Clausewitz' book On War, has a decisive influence on waging war. War between countries of the capitalist and socialist systems will have a violent and an acutely defined class nature of a fight to the death; it predetermines the extreme decisiveness of goals and plans, methods, and forms of waging it...

World war will inevitably assume the nature of a nuclear rocket war with the main means of destruction in the war being the nuclear rocket weapon and the basic manner of delivering it to the target being the rocket of various types....

A future world war, in spite of the crushing power of the nuclear rocket weapon, will demand multimillion-man armies and the participation in it of the people of the belligerent countries....

Victory will be achieved by the combined forces of all services of the armed forces and the service arms, with the decisive role of the strategic rocket troops.
Soviet military doctrine takes into account that world thermo-nuclear war might be swift-moving. Now no one can deny -- Marshall of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky writes -- the possibility of swift-moving war, primarily because the first surprise nuclear rocket strike could carry unprecedented destructions, annihilate an extremely large number of troops in places of their usual quartering, and destroy a great part of the inhabitants of the major cities. At the same time, it is absolutely clear that, depending on the conditions of the way the war starts, the armed struggle -- not for life but to death -- will not be limited only to strikes of the nuclear weapon but can be drawn out and can demand long and utmost effort of all forces of the army and the country as a whole. War may assume a more or less lengthy nature....

The most acute problem of contemporary war is the problem of its beginning period in which the attacking side seeks primarily to carry out a surprise strike and to seize the strategic initiative....

The beginning to a new war will be qualitatively different. The content will be changed and the significance of the beginning period of the war will grow immeasurably. The main burden of the war will shift to the beginning period. The unlimited application of the nuclear rocket weapon and its maximum use in the very first crushing strike will encompass all the territory of the countries which are subjected to the nuclear rocket strike and will destroy and demolish their most important political, economic, and military objectives....

The massive and surprise use by the imperialists of the nuclear rocket weapon is the main danger. Soviet military doctrine considers the frustration of a surprise attack of the enemy and carrying to him a crushing blow as the main immediate task of the Armed Forces. The constant high readiness of our Armed Forces is the prerequisite for this....

Soviet military doctrine considers that world war can break out growing out of a local conflict -- a local war which is being waged in a limited territorial region (one or two countries) and with limited forces and means. It is built on the waging of war in conditions of using nuclear rocket and conventional weapons.

Soviet military doctrine correctly evaluates the ties and mutual dependence of material and moral factors, the ties and mutual dependence of man and equipment. It gives first place in waging war to man who has created the equipment and guides it. 14

4. 1966 The XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

The XXIII Congress of the CPSU was held from March 29 to April 8, 1966. Party Congresses are considered by the Communists as milestones. They provide policy guidance in the period until the next Congress. Decisions, statements
and resolutions frequently will be quoted in books and magazines as the source for some facet of doctrine. Traditionally, the most important speech at the Congress is the report of the Central Committee made by the General Secretary* (in this case, Brezhnev.) Those sections which refer to the military are as follows:

In the sphere of military cooperation, there has been a further consolidation of our relations with the socialist countries in the face of growing aggressive acts on the part of the imperialist forces headed by the USA, a strengthening and improvement of the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact is the reliable protector of the gains of the peoples of the socialist countries. The armies of the Warsaw Pact countries are equipped with the most up-to-date weapons. In field exercises, in the air and at sea, cooperation between the armed forces of the allied states is being developed, the power of modern weapons tested and the fraternity of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries strengthened. If the need arises the closely knit family of signatories to the Pact will rise solidly in defense of the socialist system, and the free life of our peoples, and deliver a crushing blow at any aggressor.

As far as the CPSU is concerned we shall continue to do all we can to extend and consolidate military cooperation of the fraternal socialist countries.

The socialist countries play a special role in the defense of peace. We are well aware of this, and for that reason the CPSU shows tireless concern for strengthening our country's defensive might and consolidating our military alliance with other socialist countries. The CPSU sees its duty in keeping the Soviet people in a state of unceasing vigilance with regard to the intrigues of the enemies of peace and does everything to prevent the aggressors, if they try to violate peace, from ever taking us by surprise and to make certain that retaliation overtakes them inexorably and promptly.

Comrades, while exposing the aggressive policy of imperialism we are consistently and unswervingly pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. This means that while regarding the coexistence of states with different social systems as a form of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism the Soviet Union consistently advocates normal, peaceful relations with capitalist countries and a settlement of controversial interstate issues by negotiations, not by war. The Soviet Union firmly stands for non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, for respect of their sovereign rights and the inviolability of their territories.

* The title of "First Secretary" was changed to "General Secretary" by this Congress.
It goes without saying that there can be no peaceful coexistence where matters concern the internal processes of the class and national-liberation struggle in the capitalist countries or in the colonies. Peaceful coexistence is not applicable to the relations between oppressors and the oppressed, between colonists and the victims of colonial oppression.

The achievements in economic development have enabled us to equip the Army and Navy with the most highly perfected nuclear rocket weapons and other armaments of the latest design. The armaments of the Soviet troops are on a level with modern requirements and their striking power and firepower are sufficient to crush any aggressor.

We must never forget the possibility of future trials that may again fall to the lot of the Soviet people. In the present strained and complicated world situation it is our duty to maintain untiring vigilance. The Party deems it essential to ensure the further development of the defense industry, to perfect nuclear rocket weapons and all other types of armaments. This is essential to the security of our country.

We must perfect civil defense, improve the patriotic work of preparing the people, especially the youth, for defense, increase the patronage of the enterprises, educational establishments, state and collective farms over army formations and units, and do more for the officers and men of the Soviet Army and their families. This is a matter for the entire Party and for all the Soviet public.

The Communist Party, the Soviet Government and our entire people appreciate the honorable and hard labor of the soldiers, sailors, sergeants, petty officers, officers, generals and admirals, show great love for their Armed Forces and are proud of their glory won in battle. The Party will in the future continue to strengthen in every way the defense potential of the Soviet Union, increase the might of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and maintain the troops at a level of preparedness that will reliably ensure the peaceful labor of the Soviet People.

Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers read the outline of the 1966-1970 economic plan which was designed to make the Party's directives a reality. The new five-year plan, according to Kosygin, fully supported the Armed Forces:

The Soviet Union's defense industry is being steadily and thoroughly improved on the basis of industrial and technological progress. While increasing the output of weapons, much attention was devoted to the development and production of new weapons and to the enhancement of the combat and technical specifications of our arms.
The Soviet Army, Navy and Air Forces now have the most powerful modern weapons.

We are proud of our talented scientists, designers, engineers, technicians and workers of the defense industry who are developing weapons of the highest class. It goes without saying that in the next five years, taking the present international situation into account, the Central Committee and the Government will continue to strengthen the country's defense capacity and maintain our Armed Forces at such a level as to crush the aggressor should he dare to encroach upon the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

The Resolutions of the 23rd Congress are most important. The Section dealing with foreign policy is vital to the understanding of Soviet military doctrine. In this section, the fourth part of the first Resolution on the world situation, it was stated that:

4. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union proceeds in its foreign policy from the basic interests of the Soviet people and its internationalist revolutionary duty to the fraternal socialist countries and the working people of all countries. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union, together with that of other socialist countries, is aimed at securing favorable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism; strengthening the unity and cohesion, the friendship and fraternity of the socialist countries; supporting the national liberation movements and maintaining all-round cooperation with the young developing countries; upholding consistently the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, firmly repelling the aggressive forces of imperialism and delivering mankind from the threat of a new world war.

To consolidate and protect peace, it is necessary continuously to build up the might of the peace-loving forces, to promote their activity and to secure the participation of the broad masses in the struggle for peace. The socialist countries play a special role in safeguarding the peace. Our Party is convinced that the conclusion of the world communist movement on the possibility to bridle the aggressor and avert a new world war is correct.

The Soviet Union has always favored, and will continue to favor, normal relations with all countries and the settlement of international issues by negotiation, rather than war. It should be firmly stressed, however, that the principle of peaceful coexistence does not apply to relations between oppressors and oppressed, between colonialists and the victims of colonial oppression.
The CPSU gives full support, and will continue to support, the just struggle for liberation waged by the heroic people of Vietnam. It will continue to give the people political, material and moral support. It is the firm and consistent view of the CPSU, of the entire Soviet people that an end should be put to US aggression in Vietnam, that US troops must be withdrawn from South Vietnam and that the people of Vietnam must be given a chance to settle their domestic affairs on their own.

Considering the aggressive forces of imperialism are aggravating international tension and creating hotbeds of war, the CPSU will continue to sharpen the vigilance of the Soviet people, and to reinforce the defense potential of the USSR, so that the Soviet Armed Forces be ever ready to defend the gains of socialism dependably and deal a crushing blow to any imperialist aggression.

The Congress fully approves the activities of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in the field of foreign policy, and supports the program of measures proposed in the Central Committee Report, to settle key problems of world politics in the interests of the peoples, to strengthen world peace and international security.

Economic achievements, reported in the second resolution, are reflected in the Armed Forces:

Achievements in science and industry have enabled the Soviet Armed Forces to be equipped with the latest weapons. It is essential to continue to perfect the production of weapons of defense, in order for the Soviet Army to have the most modern, and formidable arms.

As for the next five-year plan:

The five-year plan shall ensure a further growth of the Soviet Union's defense potential, which will safeguard the Soviet people and the whole socialist community still more dependably from the danger of imperialist aggression, and reinforce the positions of the peace-loving and liberation forces all over the world.

While steadfastly pursuing a foreign policy of peace and working for the implementation of the disarmament proposals, it is essential to keep our Armed Forces supplied with the most modern types of weapons. Growth of the Soviet Union's defense potential is a necessary condition for safeguarding peace and the security of the peoples.

5. 1966 Tactics

The book, "Tactics," written by a group of professors at the Frunze Military Academy, was heralded as the first work of its kind since 1941. Although its
main subject is the tactics of combined arms battle in nuclear rocket war, doctrine also is discussed. Tactics, nominated in 1968 for the Frunze Prize, also is one of the books in the "Officer's Library" series. Its authors state:

In contemporary conditions Soviet Army Tactics are developed taking into consideration the availability of new weapons, first of all the nuclear weapon, the changing character of armed combat and the requirements of Soviet military doctrine, the possibility of surprise attack of an aggressor on our Motherland and the role of the beginning period of the war which has grown enormously.

At the present time the presence of nuclear weapons and other powerful means of destruction, and the high mobility of troops, significantly increase the possibility of surprise attack by an aggressor, and its results might be catastrophic. Therefore the most important task of tactics is to develop and to implement measures assuring constant combat readiness of units and subunits to conduct combat actions in complicated air and ground conditions.

In modern battle the nuclear weapon is the most powerful means of defeating the enemy. Its skillful use permits inflicting major losses in men and equipment on the enemy in the shortest period of time, striking strong points, destroying fortifications and other objectives, creating zones of radioactive contamination of the locality, and also affecting the morale of the troops....

Therefore the determination of the methods of use in battle of the nuclear weapon and combatting the enemy's nuclear weapon, the methods for the most effective use by the troops of the results of nuclear strikes and protecting the troops from weapons of mass destruction is the main task of tactics. 23


Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice was written by the Department of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy at the Lenin Military-Political Academy. General Major S.N. Kozlov wrote the chapter entitled "Military Doctrine and Military Science." A second edition of this book appeared in 1969, and the changes between the two editions will be discussed later.* General Kozlov, in 1966, assured his readers:

* See p.53.
1. Military doctrine is formed from, and based on military science.

2. Once formulated, doctrine sets important problems before military science.

3. There cannot be two military doctrines within a state.

4. Doctrine is based mainly on ideas of war waged with nuclear rocket weapons.

5. Doctrine is wholly oriented toward the future, while military science studies the past as well.

6. Military science can have various and even contradictory points of view, various presentations and evaluations.

7. The main thing is to assure supremacy over the probable enemy, guaranteeing certain and full defeat for him in the event of war.

8. Military doctrine must avoid extremes and 'hare-brained' schemes.

9. With the appearance of the nuclear rocket weapon, past experience has diminished in importance and scientific prognosis of the future has increased.

10. To halt in military affairs -- means inevitably to fall behind and be beaten.

11. Within doctrine, there are divisions into strategic, operational and tactical lines, reflecting the same idea on different scales. 24

It should be noted that General Kozlov was one of the authors of On Soviet Military Science, and also Marxism - Leninism on War and the Army.


One of the outstanding books for 1967 was V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces, written by members of the faculty at the Lenin Military-Political Academy. In 1968, it won the Frunze Prize. Colonel A. A. Babakov, author of chapter 3, stresses the effect of the XXIII Party Congress on military policy:

In determining the tasks of the upcoming five-year plan, the XXIII Congress CPSU pointed out the necessity to henceforth display constant concern so that our Armed Forces will have the most modern kinds of military equipment.
In its military policy the Party proceeds from an evaluation of the nature of the modern era, from the fundamental tasks of communist construction, from the necessity of the maintenance and increase of the military superiority over imperialism which has been achieved. The Party accurately determines the tasks of the Armed Forces, the way and methods of their solution and directs the efforts of the people and of all the governmental and social organizations toward creating a reliable defense of the country.

This interesting section will be examined again when the second edition of *V.I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces*, published in 1969, is discussed.*

Soviet military doctrine is outlined in chapter 4 of this book, specifically identified as having been written by Colonel A.A. Strokov. It will be recalled that he was the editor of *The History of Military Art*, which has already been discussed. He writes:

The Communist Party has worked out a military doctrine answering to the demands of modern war and the modern stage of organization of the Armed Forces. What are its basic positions on the nature of future war if the perialists unleash it?

War will inevitably become a world nuclear rocket war and will draw into the armed struggle the main countries of the world. The bloc of aggressive imperialist states will face the countries of the socialist community. The main striking force will be the nuclear weapon and the basic means of delivering it to the target will be rockets of various types.

The war unleashed by the imperialists against the socialist countries will be a decisive clash of two opposed socio-political systems and in it will be decided the basic contradictions of our era -- the contradiction between socialism and imperialism. War will assume a fierce, acute class character which will predetermine the extreme decisiveness of goals and plans, the methods and forms of waging it. It will take on an unprecedentedly widespread scope, an intercontinental character. The strategic nuclear rocket weapon permits carrying the center of gravity of the armed conflict out of the zone of direct confrontation of troops, out of the bounds of the frontal positions into the interior, and the achieving of decisive military results at any distance and on enormous territory. The war will be characterized by unprecedented destruction and by an annihilating character.

The war will draw into its orbit multimillion-man armies. Victory will be achieved only by the combined efforts of all the services of the armed forces and the service branches. Military actions will be characterized by dynamics and high maneuverability. Solid stable fronts will be absent and also the former boundaries between the front and the rear will disappear.

* See p.61.
World nuclear rocket war might be short and swift-moving. At the same time, depending on conditions of its springing up, the armed fight to the death will not be limited only to strikes of the nuclear weapon. War may be protracted and demand long and extreme effort of all the forces of the army and the country as a whole.

Soviet military doctrine considers that a world war might grow out of a local conflict -- a local war. It gives due importance to conventional armaments and their use not only in connection with local wars. It is dangerous to underestimate the role of conventional weapons.

The unlimited application of the nuclear rocket weapon and its maximum use in the first crushing strike will encompass the whole of the territory of the country undergoing nuclear rocket attack. From the very beginning, strategic groups of all the services of the armed forces will be introduced into the war and it will assume a universal character. The war will begin with the strategic groupings available. The carrying out of a surprise strike will permit the seizure of the strategic initiative.

The most important, most central task of the Armed Forces is considered by Soviet military doctrine to be: to be in constant readiness for the sure repulse of an enemy surprise attack and to frustrate his criminal plans. A surprise attack is the main danger. Constant and high readiness of our Armed Forces is the primary condition for preventing a surprise attack.

Our military doctrine serves the interests of the Soviet government and other socialist countries and it directs all of its content toward achieving the most just goals. Bourgeois military doctrine is built on waging predatory reactionary wars. It is directed against the countries of socialism and people struggling for their independence and towards consolidating the obsolete capitalist system.

In conditions when the aggressive forces of imperialism are increasing international tension and creating new hotbeds of war, the CPSU is doing everything so that our Armed Forces will be always ready to reliably protect the gains of socialism and to give a crushing rebuff to any imperialist aggressor. 25

This section, also, will be critically reexamined when the second edition is discussed.

8. 1967 The CPSU and the Building of the Soviet Armed Forces

Edited by General Major N.M. Kiryayev, Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Head of the History Department of the Lenin Military-Political
Academy, The CPSU and the Building of the Soviet Armed Forces contains an excellent summary of Soviet military doctrine.

What are the characteristic features of contemporary Soviet military doctrine?

...Soviet military doctrine is based on the superiority of our Armed Forces over the armies of the most powerful capitalist countries both in military-technical means and also in a moral-fighting relationship. This superiority and our just cause inspires the firm belief in the victory of the forces of socialism and peace over the imperialist aggressors.

...Soviet military doctrine has a genuinely international character. It answers to the interests not only of the Soviet Union, but of all the socialist camp, of all peace-loving peoples, because it is directed against the imperialist aggressors who are hated by all mankind, in defense of socialism, freedom, democracy and progress in the whole world. Our doctrine views the defense of socialism as an international task....

...Soviet military doctrine takes into account that in contemporary conditions of world social development, there is the possibility of averting war and preserving peace between governments of two social systems. But at the same time it takes into account the fact that there also exists another possibility - the possibility of the beginning of a destructive world war, the causes for the arising of which exist in the very aggressive nature of imperialism...

...Soviet military doctrine includes a thorough evaluation of the nature of future war, that is, the socio-political essence of it. It considers that future war, regardless of whether it will arise as the result of an attack of the imperialists on the countries of the socialist camp or as a result of the unleashing by the aggressors of a local conflict which infringes upon the vital interests of the socialist camp, inevitably will become a world war because it will draw into its orbit the major countries of the world. In its political essence this war will be a decisive clash of two opposed systems -- capitalist and socialist -- and will be a coalition on both sides....

...Soviet military doctrine takes into account the latest means of armed struggle, the perspective for their development, and also changes which have occurred in military affairs as a whole....

...The Communist Party...proceeds from the fact that a new world war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, in the nature of the means used, inevitably will be nuclear. The nuclear weapon will be the chief means of destruction in the war and the basic means of delivering it on target will be rockets of different types. This war will lead to the death of many, many millions of people, the destruction of colossal material goods, to the devastation of whole countries.
Future war will inevitably assume an intercontinental character. The use of nuclear rocket means will permit the achievement of decisive military results at any distance and on enormous territory in the shortest period of time...

...Taking into account the crafty plans of the aggressive imperialist states and their possibilities for carrying out nuclear rocket strikes, Soviet military doctrine considers the most important, the main and primary task of the Armed Forces to be: to show unmitting vigilance, to be constantly ready for the sure repulse of an enemy attack, and for the frustration of his criminal plans.

Military doctrine takes into account that with the contemporary means of armed struggle, war may be fleeting, primarily because the very first surprise nuclear rocket strikes might bring unprecedented destruction, destroy an enormous quantity of troops in places of their usual quartering and destroy a significant part of the population of the major cities....

...Soviet military doctrine does not exclude the possibility that war will be protracted and will demand long and extreme efforts of all the forces of the army and the country as a whole....

For victory in war it is necessary first of all to have the most modern nuclear rocket weapons, especially strategic, PVO /air defense/ troops and antimissile means, in order to disrupt the enemy's criminal plans and to carry to the aggressor a strike of annihilating force. At the same time Soviet military doctrine considers that final victory over an aggressor can be achieved only by the combined efforts of all services of the Armed Forces.

...Our doctrine considers that war will demand mass multimillion-man armies....

Military superiority over the enemy can be complete only when, along with qualitative and quantitative superiority in the means of armed conflict, superiority in the methods of waging war also is achieved, that is, in military art....

...Soviet military doctrine, in determining the methods of waging war, considers that nuclear war will be characterized by unprecedented bitterness of the armed conflict, dynamics and high maneuverability of combat actions....

...Soviet military doctrine, while highly evaluating the combat possibilities of the nuclear rocket weapon and other latest means of armed struggle, at the same time considers that a decisive role in modern war, as before, will be played by people.
Such are the basic positions of Soviet military doctrine which the Communist Party openly puts forth. This is a sign of our strength, our superiority over the probable enemy. 26

9. 1968. 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR

1968 marked the 50th anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This was also the title of the 1970 Frunze prizewinning book published for the occasion.

The editorial commission for this book was chaired by Marshal Zakharov, the Chief of the General Staff, with the Chief of the Main Political Administration as his vice chairman. The ten remaining members of the commission included such well-known World War II figures as Marshals Konev, Rokossovskiy and Sokolovskiy. The commanders-in-chief of all the Soviet Services, (with the exception of the Ground Forces whose C in C was not reinstated until after the book was published) the chief of the Rear Services and the Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration round off this high level commission.

General Colonel K.F. Skorobogatkin, at that time Chief of the influential Military Science Administration of the General Staff, headed the group of authors of this collective work. Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences General Major Nikitin of the Lenin Military-Political Academy, along with Candidate of Historical Sciences General Major Grylev (Chief of the Military Historical Section of the Military Science Administration) were co-chairman of the group. Among the authors were two who had worked on Military Strategy.

Over 100 consultants are listed at the end of the book. They range from the well-known Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov to the Chief of Military Medicine General D.D. Kuvshinskiy. Materials for the book were also prepared by the Main Political Administration, the main staffs of the Service, the staffs of service branches and special troops, the staff of the Rear Services, and also

* General Grylev became Chief of the Military Science Administration of the General Staff in April, 1970.
by main and central administrations of the Ministry of Defense. Also assisting in reviewing the text were the Institute of Marxism-Leninism attached to the Central Committee CPSU; The Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, USSR; The Institute of Military History; the Academy of the General Staff, Frunze Military Academy, Lenin Military-Political Academy and the Malinovskiy Armored Academy, and other institutions. The statement of current Soviet military doctrine reflected familiar themes:

Our military doctrine holds that a new world war, if the imperialists unleash it, will be a decisive clash of two social systems and it will draw into its orbit the majority of the countries of the world. The powerful coalition of socialist countries, united by unanimity of political and military goals, will oppose the aggressive imperialist bloc.

It will be a thermonuclear war according to the nature of the means of armed conflict used in the war. The nuclear weapon will be the main and decisive means of waging world war, and the rocket will be the main means of delivering it on target. At the same time all other kinds of weapons and combat equipment will find broad application in war.

World war might be unleashed by the aggressor by a surprise nuclear attack directly on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, or it might arise as the result of the escalation of a local military conflict into a world war. Such escalation is more probable with the participation in local wars of states having nuclear weapons and especially when the vitally important interests of these states are affected in such a war.

The new means of conducting armed conflict has radically changed our views on the content and significance of the beginning period of war.

Before the First World War, the time from the declaration of war until the beginning of operations by the main forces was understood to be the beginning period. It was considered that in this period, troops, deployed in the border area, must conduct combat actions for the purpose of not permitting invasion by the enemy into one's own territory and assuring the mobilization and deployment of the main forces for subsequent military operations with decisive goals. And this was confirmed by the experience of the First World War.

The Second World War, as is known, began without a declaration, by surprise, with an attack of fully mobilized and previously deployed main forces of fascist German troops. Thus the role and content of the beginning period of war was changed and its influence on the course of the war grew. However, as a whole, this period because of the limited possibilities of means of destruction, did not have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war.
With the beginning of mass introduction of the nuclear rocket weapon into the armed forces, great attention was given in the theory and practice of military art to working out methods of conducting combat actions in the beginning period of war. It was considered that in this period armed forces, using the nuclear weapon, could achieve the immediate strategic goals of war and that the results of the beginning period would have a decisive influence on the subsequent course and outcome of war.

However, with the rapid development of strategic nuclear means and the creation of strategic nuclear forces, the possibilities of achieving the basic goals of war became different. By concentrating in themselves enormous destructive power and by having unlimited range and swiftness of action, strategic nuclear forces can achieve these goals in the shortest time. Now the first day of war and even the first strategic nuclear strike might have a decisive influence on the course and outcome of war. This is why Soviet military doctrine attaches exceptionally important significance to operations of strategic nuclear forces and holds that with their utilization, the main goals of war can be achieved in the shortest possible time period.

While admitting the possibility of achieving the goals of war in a short time period, Soviet military doctrine does not exclude that in specific conditions war might be protracted and demand the maximum effort of forces and weapons of the belligerents.

The nature of a future world war determines the basic principles of preparing the Armed Forces and the country as a whole for the decisive defeat of the aggressor.

The conclusion that the imperialists might unleash world nuclear war obliges /us/ to prepare the country, the army and navy for armed struggle with the aggressor in conditions of the mass use of the nuclear rocket weapon. Therefore, it is written in the Program of the CPSU that the Soviet state will see to it that its Armed Forces will have the most modern means of defending the Motherland -- atomic and thermonuclear weapons, rockets of all radii of action, and will keep all types of military equipment and weapons at the necessary level. This demand is being successfully carried out.

Taking into account the danger of a surprise nuclear attack of an aggressor, it is necessary to keep our Armed Forces in constant combat readiness for swift actions.

The role of equipment in future war is great; however, as before, man, who creates the equipment and operates it, is the decisive force. From the steadfastness, tenacity and heroism of the soldiers and their ability to use the equipment and modern means of destruction depend the success of combat operations. Therefore, the training of army and navy personnel in the spirit of boundless devotion to their people, to the Communist Party and Soviet government, the education of soldiers in thorough military technical knowledge is given exceptionally great attention.
The positions and conclusions of the military doctrine of our state were the bases for the further development and radical transformations in the theory of military art and primarily in the sphere of strategy.

As is known, in the Great Patriotic War /World War II/, the Ground Troops, in whose interest all the other services of the Armed Forces operated, played the main role. Our Armed Forces achieved the final goals of war, successively and in turn, solving a whole series of strategic tasks. Offensive operations of frontal groups were the predominant and decisive form of military operations. Along with them, independent operations were conducted by long-range aviation and naval forces.

At the present time the possibility of delivery of nuclear weapons of enormous destructive power to any target in minutes is creating different conditions for achieving the basic goals of war. The most important targets which compose the enemy's economic and military power might be destroyed simultaneously as a result of which the basic goals of war will be achieved in a short period of time.

The simultaneous achievement of the most important goals of war will find concrete expression in various forms and methods of conducting armed conflict. Soviet military strategy holds that such forms of armed conflict might be strategic operations in theaters of military actions, combat actions of National PVO /air defense/ Troops, operations of naval forces and long range aviation.

For strategic nuclear forces in all instances the basic method of operation will be strategic nuclear strikes, in the delivery of which the Strategic Rocket Troops, Naval Forces, primarily submarines, and long-range aviation will take part.

... As theoretical research, practice exercises and troop maneuvers have shown, the decisive role of the nuclear weapon does not mean that it is the sole means of achieving victory. In nuclear war also success in battles and operations can only be achieved by the combined efforts of all service branches and all kinds of weapons. Therefore the question of cooperation of troops is being given great attention. 27

As can be seen from this quotation on Soviet military doctrine, 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR traces the development of the main points of doctrine concerning world nuclear war. The book makes extensive use of the term 'strategic nuclear forces', but emphasizes that victory can only be achieved by the combined efforts of all the services and all kinds of weapons, including conventional.


To many people *Military Strategy* was a disappointment. For those who had hoped to find changes in the Soviet position, especially since the departure of Khrushchev, the book failed to come up to expectations.

In the section previously discussed entitled "The Military-Strategic Features of a Future World War," one paragraph was added:

> The XXIII Congress CPSU stressed that from the condition of the economy of a state hangs its defensive might. This is especially true in modern conditions when complicated and expensive weapons production needs a high level of science and technology. The Soviet Union is persistently developing its economy, strengthening thereby its defense capability, the might of all the socialist camp. The revolutionary gains of our people and other peoples—as pointed out at the Congress, would be threatened if they were not directly or indirectly supported by the enormous military might of the countries of the socialist camp, and primarily, of the Soviet Union.

Added also was the fact that along with the constant high level of combat readiness of the Strategic Rocket Troops, atomic rocket-carrying submarines would also be on the alert. Otherwise, the section was without change.

The book on the whole was in harmony with the other 14 books of the "Officer's Library" series. It did not depart from the general theme of giving the officer a firm knowledge of the revolution which had taken place in military affairs.

The last three books to be discussed are of special interest because they are the most recent editions of previously printed works. A comparison has been made above between the 1962 (3rd) edition and the 1965 (4th) edition of *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army*, as well as with the 1962, 1963 and 1968 editions of *Military Strategy*.

The 1968 (5th) edition of *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army* offers an opportunity for carrying this analysis still further. Significant events separate the various editions of this book. The 1962 edition was written prior to the Cuban Missiles Crisis. The 1965 edition appeared after the ouster of Khrushchev and prior to the 1966 XXIII Party Congress. The 1968 edition may reflect the Soviets' confidence in their nuclear missile buildup and their concern with China. The following comparison indicates modifications in doctrine that took place in the 1965-1967 period which can be compared against earlier changes, already shown, which occurred between 1962-1965.

Comparison of 4th (1965) and 5th (1968) editions.

p. 337 and 350 respectively:

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<td>* The military doctrine of the Soviet state is closely connected with Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army. Our doctrine represents a scientifically based and orderly system of ideas and positions which determine the basic tasks in the realm of strengthening the defense capability of the country and of military structuring. It rests on a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the modern era and the relationship of international forces and also on foreseeing the character of a future war which</td>
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The imperialists might thrust on us. Soviet military doctrine is called on, as M.V. Frunze said, to assure the unity of thought and will of Soviet soldiers not only in the community of political ideology but also in the unity of views on the nature of the military tasks, the methods of their solution and the methods of combat training of the troops. It is the solid foundation of preparing the country for defense directing the troops, their training and education.

Military doctrine finds its concrete expression in our military policy and also in the rules and regulations of the Armed Forces.

Let us recall the basic ideas of Soviet military doctrine.

According to its social and political character, a future war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, will be a fierce armed clash of two poles apart social systems, a struggle between two coalitions--socialist and imperialist--in which each side will pursue the most decisive goals.

According to the means used, such a war will inevitably be thermonuclear and therefore unprecedentedly destructive and annihilating. The main role in the war will be played by the Strategic Rocket Troops and also the Troops of PVO (air defense) and PRO (anti-missile defense.)

In spite of the fact that a decisive role in a nuclear war will belong to the nuclear rocket weapon, final victory over the aggressor can be achieved only as a result of the combined actions of all the services of the Armed Forces, which must in full measure use the results of the nuclear strikes on the enemy and fulfill their missions.

According to its size, nuclear war will be an intercontinental war. This is conditioned both by its social-political content and by the presence on both sides of rockets of any radius of action, atomic rocket-carrying submarines, and also strategic bombers. War will actually encompass the whole of our planet.

It will be waged by absolutely different methods. Formerly the direct goal of military operations was the complete and utter defeat of the enemy's
armed forces, without which it was impossible to reach the most important strategic centers of the enemy. Now the situation is different. The use of the nuclear rocket weapon allows the achievement of decisive military results at any distance and over enormous territory in the shortest period of time. In the event of war, industrial and political centers, communications centers, everything that feeds war will be the objects of crushing nuclear strikes along with enemy groups of armed forces.

Combat actions of the ground forces will be characterized by high maneuverability and dynamism, swift movement over many hundreds of kilometers. A solid, stabilized front will become impossible. Essentially the division between the front and the rear will be erased.

The beginning period of the war will play a special role, the time in which the nuclear strikes will be carried out, having not only operational-tactical but also strategic significance.

The first massive nuclear strikes can in large measure predetermine all the subsequent course of the war and lead to such losses in the rear and in the troops, that the people and the country might be placed in exceptionally difficult circumstances.

Consequently, the beginning period can have a decisive influence on the final result of the war. Nevertheless, troops having an inflexible will to victory, enthused with the high goals of a just war, can and must wage active offensive actions with any surviving means and achieve the final utter defeat of the enemy.

Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the fact that the imperialists are preparing a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR and other socialist countries. At the same time it takes into account the possibility of waging war with conventional weapons... and the possibility of their escalation into military operations with the use of the nuclear rocket weapon.
Therefore the main and immediate task of the Armed Forces consists of being constantly ready to repulse a surprise attack by the enemy and to frustrate his criminal plans no matter what means he uses.

In turn Thus

the basic positions of military doctrine play an important role in the development of military

affairs.

They come forth in their way as directing ideas in working out the principles of preparing the Armed Forces and the country for waging war. as a whole for waging modern war.

As noted in the previous analysis of the 3rd and 4th editions of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, the 5th edition modifies the phrase reading "the possibility of waging war with conventional weapons," to read "the possibility of conducting military operations with conventional weapons and the possibility of their escalation into military operations with the use of the nuclear rocket weapon." This phrasing will appear later in other texts, but interpretation remains a thorny problem.


The 1966 edition of Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice already has been discussed. This work had provided an exceptional essay on Soviet military doctrine and the premises upon which this doctrine is based. The 1969 edition offers a further opportunity to trace doctrinal shifts, especially changes that occurred as a result of the Six Day Israel-Egyptian War, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the continuing conflict in Southeast Asia.
Like the first edition, this 1969 publication was prepared by the Department of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy of the Lenin Military Political Academy. Editors were listed as General Colonel A. S. Zheltov, Commandant of the Academy, Lt. Colonel T. R. Kondratkov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, and Colonel Ye. A. Khomenko, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences. The second edition contained half again as many pages and was printed in a third again as large edition. It will be recalled that General Major S. N. Kozlov, Candidate of Military Sciences, was the author of the chapter on military doctrine.

As before, where the text has not changed, printing appears across the whole of the page. Where changes have taken place, additions inserted, or material deleted, asterisks will separate the two editions. In other words, the material in the left column came from the 1966 edition, and the material in the right column, from the 1969 edition.

It rapidly becomes apparent that most of the additions and changes concerned conventional weapons, which received more emphasis.

Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice
Comparison of 1st (1966) and 2nd (1969) editions.

p. 85 and p. 284.


"The military doctrine of any state has two sides: the socio-political and the military-technical. Both sides are closely linked together and influence each other, but in this, the chief, leading one is the socio-political side.

The socio-political side of our military doctrine determines the nature of the military tasks of the Soviet government and the main direction of the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces. V. I. Lenin laid its basis. Guided by the Leninist analysis of the predatory nature of imperialism, and on the Leninist theory of protecting the socialist Fatherland, our military doctrine condemns predatory, unjust, reactionary wars and supports wars that are just, liberating and revolutionary.
Soviet military doctrine considers that a new world war, if the imperialists unleash it, and if preventing it fails, will be an armed clash of two opposed social systems--capitalism and socialism--in its social and class character. From the side of the imperialist states, it will be unjust, predatory and a criminal war. From the side of the socialist camp, war will be just and liberating.

This war will inevitably take on intercontinental scope and draw into its orbit the majority of countries and peoples of the world. War will have an exceptionally fierce, destructive and annihilating character.

In the composition of the opposing sides, world war will be coalitional. Such coalitions in fact already exist. To wage war against the socialist countries, the imperialists have knocked together NATO, SEATO, CENTO and other aggressive groups. In answer to this the socialist countries were forced to take measures for uniting their efforts in the event of aggression. They created and are strengthening the organization of the Warsaw Pact which is a reliable shield for the gains of socialism in Europe.

The countries of the socialist camp are fighting for peace, are struggling against imperialist aggression and strengthening their armed might. In this struggle, each socialist country makes its contribution to the common goal of assuring the security of the socialist camp. The decisive role belongs to the Soviet Union. Having enormous economic and military might and the nuclear rocket weapon, and modern conventional weapons, the USSR is the powerful block on the path of imperialist aggression. It is well known that many times in the most critical moment, when the militaristic circles of imperialism placed the world on the brink of war, the Soviet Union used her international authority, her might, in order to stop the hard of the aggressor which had been raised over little or big countries, far from or close to it.

While giving special significance to the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for world war which the monopolistic circles are preparing, primarily the U.S.A.,
our military doctrine takes into account the possibility of the unleashing of local, limited wars by the imperialist aggressors.

\* with the use of conventional weapons.

\* Soviet

\* Modern

military doctrine takes into account that modern wars are waged by the people. now wars are waged not only by armies but also by the people.

The course and outcome of modern war depends on the relationship of the peoples' masses. Victory in such a war will be achieved by the gigantic strained efforts of the front and the rear, the armed forces and all of the people.

The military-technical side of our doctrine focuses its attention on the particulars of nuclear rocket war and the method of its waging. Our doctrine considers that the decisive role in such a war will be played by the Strategic Rocket Troops. They will carry out nuclear strikes on the most important targets and objectives of the enemy in his territory. Massive nuclear strikes can to a significant degree predetermine the whole course and outcome of war. Simultaneously with the nuclear rocket strikes or following them, all the other services of the Armed Forces and service arms will unroll their actions on land, at sea, and in the air.

Consequently our military doctrine proceeds from the fact that success in present-day war will be achieved not by any one means or any one service of the Armed Forces, but by the united efforts of all the services of the Armed Forces and service arms with the decisive role of the Strategic Rocket Troops.

\* This position is even more true for military actions conducted without the use of the nuclear weapon.
Taking into account that the nuclear rocket weapon possesses enormous power that its mass use in countable days and even hours might wipe countries from the face of the earth, our doctrine views nuclear war as short and swift-moving (skorotechniy). At the same time it recognizes that in definite circumstances war might take on a protracted character.

As concerns the methods of unleashing war by the imperialists, then Soviet military science considers it most likely to be a surprise attack of an aggressor without any declaration of war. Just exactly on this the imperialists are making their basic bet. They have resorted to similar methods for unleashing war many times in the past. The aggressors will resort to them also in contemporary circumstances, as shown for example, in the attack of Israel on the Arab countries.

It is not excluded that war might begin by way of the gradual escalation of a limited conflict into a world one. The imperialists may start it and for some time wage it without the use of the nuclear weapon, with only conventional weapons. In this case the wealth of experience, accumulated in the past, might be used, but, undoubtedly, taking into account those important changes which have taken place in military equipment and other determining conditions of armed conflict.

But no matter how the war begins, the first nuclear rocket strikes might turn out to be decisive. The aggressor will try for surprise.

From this comes the main task of the Soviet Armed Forces to display maximum vigilance.
to be in constant combat readiness
to decisively repulse the aggress
no matter from where and no matter
how he carries out his attack.

Our military doctrine teaches that in nuclear war, the methods of
combat actions will be different from past wars. The nuclear rocket
weapon has changed the relationship of tactical, operational and strategic
acts of armed struggle. While in the past strategic results
were achieved by a series of con-
secutive, more often efforts of
long durations, and
were built up from the sum of tactical and operational successes and strategy
only with the help of operational art and tactics might realize its plans, now strategy
using powerful nuclear strikes,
can directly achieve its goals.
In these conditions, the role
of operational art and tactics has changed. In the course of operations
(battle) troops will basically accomplish the final defeat of the enemy,
which will be achieved by strikes of nuclear rocket means
of strategic designation.
If military actions will be con-
ducted without the use of nuclear
weapons, then the former importan
t and the relationship of all parts
of military art basically remains
in force.

Soviet military doctrine has always considered the offensive as the
basic method of the full defeat of the enemy and the achieving of victory,
and defense was viewed as a forced form of struggle used when the offensive
was impossible or inconvenient. In the conditions of war the role of
active offensive actions is growing even more.

The sphere of the use of defense has
narrowed. Obviously it will be re-
sorted to only in exceptional cir-
cumstances, and then only on a tac-
tical or limited operational scale.
In nuclear war, the division between the front and the rear is being erased more and more. The combat actions might unroll simultaneously on the front and in the deep interior. Nuclear rocket strikes might be carried out on objectives in the interior. Airborne troops might be landed in the rear. All this poses special demands.

For organizing defense of the rear, in particular, for civil defense which is called upon to protect the population from enemy nuclear rocket strikes, liquidate the results of nuclear attack and to promote the uninterrupted work of businesses, administrative organs and supply.

While giving enormous significance to the nuclear rocket weapon and new combat equipment, Soviet military doctrine does not allow them to be absolutized. It views man and equipment in dialectical interdependence and gives first place in achieving victory to man, people with high moral-political consciousness joined in a smooth-running collective, excellently mastering the mighty equipment.

The might of our armed forces is in the organic combination of first-class combat equipment and in remarkable soldiers, soldiers mastering this equipment to perfection brave, steadfast, boundlessly devoted to their people and the socialist Motherland and the cause of communism.

Soviet military doctrine is the doctrine expresses the military policy of a socialist state. It is fundamentally different from military doctrines of imperialist powers.

The philosophical-methodological base of our military doctrine is dialectical and historical materialism in general, and Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army in particular. The methodological basis of bourgeois military doctrine is idealism and metaphysics.
The faulty world outlook and methodology, the unpopular goals of the wars, which are waged by the imperialists, do not assure the doctrines of bourgeois states the necessary scientific base or ideological stability. As a result of this, their doctrines suffer from one-sidedness, subjectivism and adventurism.

Soviet military doctrine fulfills a progressive role to the highest degree. It serves the cause of defending the most advanced social structure - socialism and communism. The military doctrine of capitalist governments bears an extremely reactionary character and serves the interests of imperialist aggressors, the protection of the exploiters' system.

Our military doctrine is shot through with the spirit of humanism. It rejects mankind-hating ways and means of armed struggle. Imperialist military doctrines, on the contrary, justify any ways and means of achieving the aggressive goals. A clear confirmation of this is the doctrine of "flexible response" of the American imperialists which spreads treacherousness and brigandage in international relations. Its  man-hating essence cannibalistic aspect is especially clearly revealed in the actions of the American troops and their accomplices in Vietnam.

scorning the elementary norms of international rights, the American militarists are using the most cruel and inhuman means, in this not being inferior to the Hitlerites.

Soviet military doctrine soberly and objectively evaluates the probable enemy and examines the factors of armed struggle and their interdependencies. While admitting the decisive role in war of the nuclear rocket weapon, at the same time it affirms that victory will be achieved by the combined efforts of all forces and means, by various methods and various forms of armed conflict.

The military doctrine of bourgeois states often suffers from adventurism.
the absolutizing of one service of the armed forces or branch of service or one form of struggle.

Answering to the concrete interests and possibilities of our government, Soviet military doctrine at the same time has a number of international features. These features are determined by the international nature of Soviet policies, the loyalty of the peoples of the USSR to their international duty. In connection with this, Soviet military doctrine envisages the conduct of armed conflict in defense of the interests of peace and socialism together with the armies of fraternal and friendly countries.

The importance of military doctrine for our military cadres is indeed priceless.

Our military doctrine gives the activities of the military cadres a streamlined character, secures the unity of views and practical efforts in the further raising of the military might of the Soviet government and its Armed Forces. 24


The second edition of V.I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces was published in late 1969, in anticipation of the celebration of Lenin's centennial in 1970. Presented here will be several excerpts to show that in contrast to the book Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice, this second edition dropped some of the previous references to conventional weapons. Also modified was the claim to "superiority over imperialism which has already been achieved."

In the section on doctrine, which was presented earlier (page 66), the changes in the 2nd edition were only of an editorial nature, with a few
exceptions. The fifth paragraph which had started with the words: "World nuclear rocket war..." now has been changed to read: "Modern war...". There has been one deletion in the seventh paragraph which had read: "The unlimited use of the nuclear rocket weapon and its maximum application in the very first crushing blow..." now reads: "The unlimited use of the nuclear rocket weapon in the very first crushing blow...",31 (emphasis added).

The following quotations represent some of the more important changes which have appeared elsewhere in V.I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces, with a comparison of the 1966 and 1969 editions:

In determining the tasks of the upcoming five-year plan,
the XXIII Congress CPSU pointed out the necessity to henceforth display constant concern so that our Armed Forces will have the most modern kinds of military equipment.

In its military policy the Party proceeds from an evaluation of the nature of the modern era, from the fundamental demands of communist construction from the necessity of the maintenance and increase of the military superiority over imperialism which has been achieved.

The Party accurately determines the tasks of the Armed Forces, the way and methods of their solution and directed the efforts of the people and of all the government and social organizations toward creating a reliable defense of the country. 32

*       *       *

The Communist Party approaches military construction creatively, taking into account all the changes which have taken place in military affairs under the influence of scientific and technical progress. In this it proceeds from the possibility of the unleashing by the imperialists
both of nuclear and also of non-nuclear war.

On this basis the harmonious development and perfection of all the services of the Armed Forces is accomplished. 33

These positions of the genius of political strategy fully apply to the conduct of armed conflict. They are real even now when along with earlier methods and forms of waging war, new ones have appeared. 34

Present-day Soviet military doctrine recognizes the possibility not only of a nuclear rocket war, but also war waged with conventional weapons.

However the earlier forms of fighting have been filled now with new content. 34

While giving the paramount role to the nuclear rocket weapon, the party at the same time has indicated the necessity of combining it with other kinds of armaments so that the Soviet Armed Forces would be ready to utterly defeat the enemy not only in conditions of using the nuclear weapon, but also with the use of just conventional means of fighting.

Therefore, along with the nuclear rocket weapon, great attention is being given to conventional means of destruction, especially tanks and artillery. 35

Lenin considered the maintenance of our military technical superiority over the probable enemies as one of the most important tasks of Soviet science and technology. He urgently recommended the thorough and attentive study of the latest military technical achievements abroad, the study of the tendencies of development of technical thought, the mastery of all kinds of weapons and all means of fighting which the enemy has or might have.

Lenin's ideas on the ways of strengthening the military economic power of the country and of the technical equipping of the army and navy, persistently have been and are being carried out by our Party and the Soviet government. 35

(p. 208)
14. Recent Developments.

This analysis has examined Soviet military doctrine as it has been presented in Soviet military literature over the last ten years. Many of the ideas given here were first printed in magazines or newspapers and then re-edited for book publication. If articles in the periodical press had been examined instead of books, their content would have been virtually identical.

In 1968, for instance, the Lenin Military Political Academy's Department of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy sponsored a fifth edition of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army which has already been discussed. Lt. Colonel Bondarenko, an instructor in this department, is specifically mentioned along with several others as having "made more precise" parts of the seventh chapter.

One of the sentences had been changed from the previous, fourth edition, thus:

"Our military doctrine gives the main role in defeating an aggressor to the nuclear rocket weapon. At the same time it does not deny the important significance of other kinds of weapons and means of fighting.

(1965) * (1968)

The sentence ended there * and the possibility in certain circumstances of conducting combat actions * without the use of the nuclear weapon."

In December, 1968, in an article by this same Lt. Colonel V. M. Bondarenko, in the magazine, Communist of the Armed Forces, entitled "The Modern Revolution in Military Affairs and the Combat Readiness of the Armed Forces", the author made this very pertinent observation:

In our times conditions may arise when in individual instances combat operations may be carried out using conventional weapons. Under these conditions, the role of conventional means and the traditional services of the armed forces are greatly increased. It becomes necessary to train troops for various kinds of warfare. This circumstance is sometimes interpreted as a negation of the contemporary revolution in military affairs, as its conclusion.
One cannot agree with this opinion. The point is that the new possibilities of waging armed struggle have arisen not in spite of, but because of the nuclear missile weapons. They do not diminish their combat effectiveness, and the main thing, they do not preclude the possible use of such weapons. All this forces the conclusion that the present situation is one of the moments in the revolution in military affairs. It flows out of this revolution, continuing it, instead of contradicting it.

On the basis of this, we are able to define the contemporary revolution in military affairs as a radical upheaval in its development, which is characterized by new capabilities of attaining political goals in war, resulting from the availability of nuclear missile weapons to the troops. 37 (Emphasis has been added)

The Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, picked up the theme the following year. In November 1969, in a speech to the "All-Army Conference of Young Officers", Grechko also touched upon the need to be ready to fight with non-nuclear as well as with nuclear means:

Much attention is being devoted to the reasonable combination of nuclear rocket weapons with perfected conventional classic armaments, to the capability of units and subunits (chasti i podrazdeleniya)* to conduct combat actions under nuclear as well as non-nuclear conditions. Such an approach ensures the high combat capabilities of the troops and their constant readiness for action under conditions of variously shaped circumstances. 38

The theme was continued in a subsequent article by Marshal Grechko. Writing in Communist, the theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, an article by the Marshal was published which was entitled "On Guard Over Peace and Socialism". The article, which appeared in February, 1970, for the most part dealt with the history of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The last three pages discussed the post-war period, the threat to NATO and the Soviet desire for prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and for disarmament. Marshal Grechko, in discussing military doctrine, brought up conventional weapons.

* In Soviet military usage a "chast" is a regiment of a 'separate battalion (one that is not organically part of a regiment) a "podrazdeleniye" is a subordinate unit of a "chast" either an organic battalion or a company.
"Especially high vigilance and combat readiness is necessary in connection with the danger of surprise nuclear strikes. According to Soviet military doctrine, a new world war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, will be a decisive clash of two social systems, the coalition of socialist countries, united by common political and military goals, will oppose the aggressive imperialist bloc. The main and decisive means of waging the conflict will be the nuclear rocket weapon. In it 'classical' types of armaments will also find use. In certain circumstances, the possibility is admitted of conducting combat actions with conventional weapons. These positions of military doctrine predetermine the principles of military structuring and preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces at the contemporary stage." (Emphasis added.)

Colonel I. A. Seleznev, who received his degree of Doctor of Philosophical Sciences from the Lenin Military-Political Academy in 1966, writing in Communist of the Armed Forces #6, March, 1970, in an article "V.I. Lenin -- the Founder of Soviet Military Science," stated;

"Now one of the most vital problems is the determination of the means of struggle, and consequently also the forms of combat operations of the armed forces, which might be used in a future war. According to Soviet military doctrine, a new world war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, will be a decisive clash of two social systems, the coalition of socialist countries, united by common political and military goals, will oppose the aggressive imperialist bloc. The main and decisive means of waging the conflict will be the nuclear rocket weapon. In it, 'classical' types of armaments will also find use. In certain circumstances, the possibility is admitted of conducting combat actions by units and subunits /chasti i podrazdelenii/ with conventional weapons. These positions of military doctrine predetermine the principles of military structuring and preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces at the contemporary stage." (Emphasis added.)

The similarity of this paragraph and that of Marshal Grechko is striking. In other words, this formulation by Colonel Seleznev is identical to that given by Marshal Grechko in February in Kommunist, with this exception: the words "by units and subunits" have been added.

The April issue of Communist of the Armed Forces, #7, contained another article by Marshal Grechko. This one was entitled: "Loyalty to Lenin's Behests on the Defense of the Motherland." In this article Grechko repeated essentially what he had written earlier:
"In contemporary circumstances, the most important principles of combat, operational and political training of Armed Forces' personnel have been predetermined by the positions of Soviet military doctrine, according to which a new world war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, will be a decisive clash to two social systems in which the coalition of socialist countries, united by common political and military goals will oppose the aggressive imperialist bloc. The main and decisive means of conducting battle will be the nuclear rocket weapon. In it, 'classical' kinds of weapons will find application. In certain circumstances, the possibility is admitted of conducting combat actions by units and subunits with conventional weapons. (Emphasis added)

"We have given much attention to the judicious combination of the nuclear rocket weapon with 'classical' armaments. From strategic nuclear rockets to the latest firing means of motorized infantry -- this is the range of our weaponry. Personnel of the army and navy learn to wage combat operations both in conditions of the use and without the use of the nuclear weapon. It is important to decide all study tasks so that the soldier will be always ready to successfully operate in the battlefield in circumstances that take shape in different ways." 41

In late 1970, a slim volume simply entitled Attack was published by Voyenizdat. It was written by one of the leading Soviet tacticians, Colonel A.A. Sidorenko. Its main subject is the conduct of the offensive with nuclear weapons. The author presents both Soviet and U.S. views in the book.

In the forward, Sidorenko notes that:

"As concerns other questions including the conduct of the offensive by subunits without the use of the nuclear weapon, then in view of their importance, they can be the subject of independent research."

In his conclusions, Colonel Sidorenko states:

"Inspite of the fact that the nuclear weapon has become the main means of destroying the enemy, its role and possibilities must not be absolutized, especially in reaching the goals of the combat operations of subunits and units podrazdeleniy i chasti. In a number of cases, subunits and units will have to conduct various combat operations, including attack, without the use of nuclear weapons, using only conventional regulas "classical" armaments -- artillery, tanks, firearms, and so forth. Therefore along the development of the nuclear rocket power of the Soviet Armed Forces, our Party and government have attached and are attaching great importance to the development and perfection of
On March 5, 1971, Red Star published an article entitled: "The Material Base of the Might of the Armed Forces of the USSR." It was written by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Colonel S. Baranov, of the Lenin Military Political Academy, which functions under the Central Committee's Main Political Administration. Colonel Baranov, in his article, supplies another piece to the puzzle of the current trend in Soviet military thinking, perhaps the most important piece so far.

Colonel Baranov writes:

Military theoretical thought has been enriched with new conclusions and views on the forms and methods of armed conflict with due regard for the possible utilization of the nuclear weapon.

The question of strategic objectives and scales of wars became different. The relationship of strategy, operational art and tactics changed. The nuclear weapon permits the simultaneous solving both of strategic and operational-tactical tasks. In examining these new phenomena, it must be stressed that the conduct of military operations with the use of the nuclear weapon and the conduct of combat operations by units and subunits /chasti i podrazdeleniya/ with conventional kinds of weapons are not isolated from each other, but are closely correlated and develop as a single whole.

Although Colonel Baranov strongly stresses that units and subunits will be fighting with conventional weapons in correlation with nuclear operations, he had spoken of the possible utilization of the nuclear weapon in the first paragraph. This could mean that operations of units and subunits with conventional weapons are in the framework of a nuclear war and that the possible use of the nuclear weapon is considered at all times. In his words, nuclear weapons and conventional weapons form a single whole.

Colonel Baranov is one of the authors of the prize-winning book, V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces. His particular contribution was a chapter
entitled: "Realizing Lenin's Ideas on the Technical Equipping and Organizational Improvement of the Army, Navy and Air Force."

This trend in Soviet military doctrine needs to be given close, continual attention.* It is clear that the Party, represented by the Lenin Military-Political Academy, Kommunist, Colonels Bondarenko, Seleznev and Sidorenko, seems to be in complete agreement with the military, represented by the Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko, who is himself a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

* For a more complete study of this subject, see: Evolution of USSR Military Doctrine on the Issue of Non-Nuclear War, 1960-1970 by William T. Lee and Harriet F. Scott, Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, 10 July 1970.
CONCLUSIONS

The Constant Features of Soviet Military Doctrine

The Soviet defense intellectual establishment does not consist of individual thinkers, each publicly setting forth his own ideas on military doctrine. Instead, as has already been shown, the Soviet military writers elaborate on decisions that appear to have already been taken at a higher level. This being the case, the reader of these military writings on doctrine will find constant themes being repeated by numerous authors.

The purpose of this section will be to summarize some of the constant themes in Soviet military doctrine which have been presented. By noting these constant features, one is able to follow the primary emphasis of Soviet military thought. Further, by recognizing what has been constant over a period of years, the alterations or evolutions in the doctrine can be more readily detected.

For example, as has just been pointed out, an evolution of a tenet of Soviet military doctrine has been in the process of taking place over the past several years. The basic feature of this alteration is a greater acknowledgment of the possibility of operations being conducted without the use of the nuclear weapon, although the possession of nuclear weapons remains the decisive factor. The extent of this modification can be analyzed only when the constant features of the Soviet doctrine concerning the employment of nuclear weapons are known and considered.

When examining Soviet doctrinal writings, there is a danger of being led astray by the Soviet use of the dialectic. In the United States, the
military pays little attention to formal philosophy. In the Soviet Union, some of the most significant writings in the past decade on military doctrine and strategy have been articles such as: "According to the Laws of Dialectics", "The Dialectics of Development and Change in Forms and Methods of Armed Conflict"; or chapters such as: "The Dialectics of the Objective and Subjective in Military Affairs", "The Dialectics of the Relationship of Forces in the Armed Struggle", and "The Dialectics of the Development of Methods and Forms of Armed Struggle", which appeared in the second edition of Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice, (1969).

Military Strategy noted that:

"War is an extremely complicated social phenomenon, and discovering its essence is possible only by using a uniquely scientific method -- Marxist-Leninist dialectics."

The ideology of the Soviet Union is Marxism-Leninism, and this ideology is divided into: Marxist philosophy, (which includes dialectical and historical materialism,) political economy, and scientific communism. The dialectic plays an important role in theory at all levels. In the Western world, philosophy has been primarily speculative; in the Soviet Union, philosophy is a guide to action. The dialectic, to the Soviet defense intellectual, must be considered at all times.

Essentially, the dialectic is the theory of opposites -- thesis and antithesis, -- which leads to the next higher level, the synthesis. In military terms, this finds expression in:

"The appearance of new means of struggle always brings into being corresponding countermeans, which in the end also leads to changes of military operations. The 'struggle' of tanks and antitank means, submarines and antisubmarine means, airplane and antiairplane defense..."
This is the axis around which revolves the development of military affairs, including the developments of methods and forms of armed conflict. 44

Therefore, when making an analysis of Soviet doctrinal writings, it should be noted that the 'opposite' will appear somewhere, or at least an acknowledgement of the 'opposite' will be made. For instance, a future war is usually said to be nuclear rocket, yet "the possibility is not excluded of war without the use of the nuclear weapon," or that "war may begin with a surprise attack," or it may "escalate from a local war." Too often these appear as signs of 'internal debate' and 'compromises between the Party and the Marshals' to those not acquainted with Marxism methodology.

It has already been pointed out that different points of view may be given in regard to questions of military science. In fact, at times, different points of view may be demanded by the political and military leadership. However, once the question of military art or military science has been resolved, and the matter becomes doctrine, any open publication of a differing view is not generally permitted.

Among the constant features of war, as envisaged by the Soviet defense-intellectual since 1960, the following have been noticeable:

1. Doctrine has two sides: political and military-technical.
   a. Political side
      1) against: aggressive, unjust, predatory wars
      2) for: liberating, just, revolutionary wars
      3) considers: war no longer a fatal necessity
   b. Technical side is determined by:
      1) radical changes in armaments and equipment;
      2) combat training and moral-combat qualities of troops.

2. Constant features
   a. Doctrine is for world war.
b. If not prevented, a new world war will be unleashed by the imperialists.

c. If unleashed, a new world war would be a decisive armed clash of two opposed social systems - capitalism and socialism.

d. War might begin by surprise with massive use of long range rockets with nuclear warheads. Not excluded: World war growing out of a local conflict.

e. Surprise nuclear attack most likely. Therefore primary task is: To be constantly ready to reliably repulse a surprise attack of the enemy and to frustrate his criminal plans.

f. Length of war: may be short and swift-moving. May be protracted.

g. Nuclear rocket weapon has decisive role, but final victory over the aggressor can be achieved only as a result of joint actions of all the services of the armed forces and service arms.

h. Future war will demand massive multimillion-man armies.

i. Troops must be ready to fight both with the use of the nuclear weapon and without it.

From this brief examination of some of the constant features of Soviet military doctrine, it can be seen that all writers appear to follow a set of guide-lines. Further, it is reasonable to conclude that these guide-lines must come from higher levels of the Communist Party. It is equally reasonable to conclude that the possible alterations or shifts in doctrine also come from the Party.

Speculation concerning the alterations in Soviet doctrine which appear to have taken place over the past three or four years, can be made. If the Soviets believe their own doctrine, in which they have emphasized the decisive role of the nuclear weapon, then the United States from the end of
World War II to the early 1960s was clearly the major world power, almost without significant opposition. As long as the United States was the world's major nuclear power, it could adopt any strategy desired -- flexible response, massive retaliation, assured destruction or whatever the political leadership might choose. In order to play an equal role in world politics, the Soviet leaders considered that they had to place first emphasis on nuclear weapons - both strategic and tactical. As long as the United States possessed superiority in nuclear weaponry, the Soviet leaders had no illusions that they could fight and win a non-nuclear conflict against the United States and her allies. That is, the United States would scarcely submit to a defeat of her forces in Western Europe in a non-nuclear war with the Soviet Union, if the United States at the same time had a clear-cut superiority over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons. Today, the strategic balance is different.

In 1962, Marshal Malinovskiy had written:

"Soviet military doctrine will change and will have additions.... Even its principles might change depending on actual historical conditions." 45

And General Major S.N. Kozlov in 1966 noted that:

"...The process of improvement of evolutionary changes in the framework of the existing doctrine constantly takes place." 46

These are points to remember in any analysis of Soviet military doctrine.*

* This examination of Soviet military doctrine has involved some forty books. Since these authors appear to be part of the defense intellectual establishment, a list, given in Appendix 4 has been compiled to indicate those books with which specific authors were connected and whether the book, or the author, received the Frunze Prize. Military rank also is given, when known.


5. *XXII Congress of the CPSU*, op. cit. P. 111-113


16. Ibid. P. 50-51

17. Ibid. P. 131-132.
18. Ibid. P. 173
19. Ibid. P. 187
20. Ibid. P. 287-289
21. Ibid. P. 290
22. Ibid. P. 329
27. 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Voyenizdat, Moscow 1968. P. 522-523.
32. Ibid. P. 117
33. Ibid. P. 118
34. Ibid. P. 175
35. Ibid. P. 234
36. Marxism - Leninism on War and the Army, 4th and 5th eds., op cit. p. 244, 245
38. Red Star. 27 November 1969
44. Sushko, N. Ya., op. cit., p.128
45. Malinovskiy, R. Ya., Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace, op. cit., p. 29
46. Sushko, N. Ya., op. cit., p. 85
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX 1

DATE: January 14, 1960

SUBJECT: The Report delivered at the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: "Disarmament For Durable Peace and Friendship"

SPEAKER: Nikita S. Khrushchev

(Excerpts)

... Comrade Deputies, you know that at its Twentieth and Twenty-First Congresses our Party arrived at the conclusion that in the present situation there is no longer any fatal inevitability of war and that it is possible and necessary to banish war from the life of human society for all time. General and complete disarmament is a clear path leading to the deliverance of mankind from the calamities of war...

... Subsequently, between 1955 and 1958, as I have already reported, we reduced our armed forces by 2,140,000, so that their present strength is 3,623,000.

... The Council of Ministers of the USSR is submitting for your consideration and approval a proposal for reducing our armed forces by another 1,200,000. If this proposal is approved by the Supreme Soviet, our Army and Navy will be 2,423,000 strong....

... Why is it that, at a time when our ill-wishers have not yet discarded the very phrase "policy from positions of strength", we, instead of countering strength with strength, are, in fact, willing to reduce our Army and Navy and, consequently, expenditures on armaments? What is the reason? Are we not being somewhat careless with regard to the security of our country?

We have made a detailed and comprehensive study of the matter and consulted the military, the General Staff, and we reply without hesitation: Our defense will be quite adequate and we have taken everything into account realistically....

... Soviet scientists, engineers and workers have made it possible to equip our armed forces with weapons that were unknown to man - atomic, hydrogen, rocket and other modern weapons. It is our economic progress, and the achievements of our scientific and technical genius, that make it possible to reduce the armed forces. We are also taking into account the growth and consolidation of the mighty socialist camp, which is a reliable stronghold of peace....

... Drawing on these achievements, our scientists, engineers and workers engaged in defense industry have created new modern weapons that are abreast of the latest developments in science and technology. This enables us to reduce the armed forces without detriment to the defense potential of the country....

... The Party, the Government and the entire Soviet people give their warm thanks to the scientists, engineers, technicians and workers to whose knowledge and effort we owe the great achievements in developing atomic and
hydrogen weapons, rockets and all the other means that have made it possible to raise the defense potential of our country to so high a level, which in turn enables us now to undertake a further reduction of the armed forces.

The Soviet Union has stockpiled the necessary amount of atomic and hydrogen weapons. As long as no agreement has been reached to outlaw nuclear weapons, we are compelled to continue producing them. To be sure, we have to spend a good deal for this purpose. But for the time being we cannot fully renounce the production of nuclear weapons; such a decision should come as a result of agreement between the nuclear powers.

Our country has powerful rocketry. The present level of military equipment being what it is, the Air Force and the Navy have lost their former importance. These types of weapons are being replaced and not reduced. Military aviation is almost entirely being replaced by rockets. We have now drastically reduced, and apparently will reduce still further, or even discontinue, the production of bombers and other obsolete craft. In the Navy, the submarine fleet is acquiring great importance, whereas surface ships can no longer play the role they played in the past.

Our armed forces have to a considerable degree been switched to the nuclear rocket weapon. We are perfecting, and will go on perfecting, these weapons — until they are banned.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet government can inform you, Comrade Deputies, that the weapons we have now are formidable ones, but what is in the hatching, so to speak, is still more perfect, still more formidable. The weapon that is being developed and is, as they say, in the portfolio of our scientists and designers is an incredible weapon.

You will all probably agree, Comrade Deputies, that today the question of the numerical strength of the armed forces in our country has been reduced by a third, but their fire-power has increased many times over during the period owing to the development and introduction of the latest types of modern military equipment.

In our time, a country's defensive capacity is not determined by the number of men under arms, of men in uniform. Apart from the general political and economic factors, of which I have already spoken, a country's defense potential depends in decisive measure on the fire-power and the means of delivery that country commands.

The proposed reduction will in no way reduce the firepower of our armed forces, and this is the important thing. In fact, the reason why states maintain armies is to possess an adequate fire-power, such as will be able to stand up to a probable enemy and restrain him from attack, or repulse him effectively should he try to attack.

The Soviet Army today possesses such armaments and such fire-power as no army has ever had. I want to re-emphasize that we already have such an amount of nuclear weapons — atomic and hydrogen weapons and an appropriate
number of rockets to deliver them to the territory of a potential aggressor—
that if some madman were to provoke an attack on our country or on other
socialist countries, we could literally wipe the country or countries at-
tack ing us off the face of the earth.

It is perfectly clear to all sober-minded people that atomic and hydro-
gen weapons are particularly dangerous to the countries that are densely
populated. Of course, all countries will suffer in one way or another in
the event of a new world war. We, too, shall suffer much, shall sustain
great losses, but we shall survive. Our territory is immense and our popu-
lation is less concentrated in large industrial centers than is the case in
many other countries. The West will suffer incomparably more. If the ag-
gressors start up a new war, it will be not only their last war, but also
the end of capitalism, for the peoples will see clearly that capitalism is
a source of wars, and will no longer tolerate that system, which brings
suffering and calamities to mankind.

Considering all this, the Soviet people can be confident and calm—
the Soviet Army's present armament makes our country completely impregnable.

Of course, impregnability is a rather relative term. After all, we
must not forget that our enemies— for some states avow themselves to be
our enemies, making no secret of their military and political aims— will
not mark time. If they do not yet have as many rockets as we have, and if
their rockets are less perfect, they have a chance to overcome their tem-
porary lag, to improve their rocketry, and will perhaps draw level with
us sooner or later.

The United States, for instance, has set out to overcome the Soviet
Union in rocket production within five years. It will certainly do its
utmost to help its rocketry out of its present state and raise it to a
higher level. But it would be naive to imagine that we will meanwhile
sit back and relax. Indeed, the Americans themselves are saying: Why,
are the Russians going to play dice and wait for us?

Naturally, we will do everything to use the time we have gained in
the development of rocket weapons and to keep our lead in this field un-
til an international agreement on disarmament is reached.

But a question suggests itself here. Since the possibility must not
be ruled out that some capitalist countries will draw level with us in
modern armaments, cannot they commit treachery and attack us first in
order to exploit the factor of a surprise attack by so formidable a wea-
pon as atomic rockets and thereby secure advantages that may help them
win? No. Modern means of warfare give no such advantages to either side.

It is possible to attack first. That wouldn't require much brains—
it would rather require recklessness, and we realize, of course, that some
of our probable enemies are prone to this sort of thing. It is not an in-
frequent occurrence that the advocates of the policy "from positions of
strength" become hot-headed and reckless in one country or another, al-
though it would seem that Hitler's "laurels" should have a cooling effect
on them. But, apparently, their minds are so befogged that they have forgotten those serious lessons of history.

Let us suppose, however, that some state or group of states were to succeed in preparing and carrying out a surprise attack on a power possessing nuclear and rocket arms. Would the aggressor — even allowing for a moment that he succeeded in striking a surprise blow — be able to put out of action at once all the stocks of nuclear weapons, all the rocket installations on the territory of the power attacked? Of course not. The state subjected to a surprise attack — provided it is a big state, of course — would in any case be able to rebuff the aggressor effectively.

We are aware that our country is surrounded by foreign military bases. We therefore distribute our rocket installations in such a way as to have a double and even treble reserve. Ours is a vast territory and we are in a position to disperse our rocket installations and to camouflage them well. We are developing such a system that if some means of retaliation were knocked out, we shall always be able to resort to duplication of the means and hit the targets from reserve positions.

That should be quite enough to have a sobering effect on anyone with a normal mentality, on people who are prepared to answer for their actions to the peoples and who hold the destinies of the peoples dear. There is no vouching for madmen, of course. Madmen have always existed and will probably not become extinct in the future either. The only thing is not to forget that whereas in the past the advent of such madmen to power resulted in bloody wars, it would in our day be a calamity defying comparison.

Just as a mother sees to it when going out that no inflammable material, no matches or electrical appliances are left within the reach of a child who may without knowing it cause great damage to the house and the city, so the peoples should see to it that the governments, parliaments and other offices on which the safeguarding of peace depends should not be infiltrated by people who set themselves in antagonism to the peoples' interests. The peoples must show great vigilance to prevent madmen from using the nuclear rocket weapon against mankind, until a solution is found to the problem of general and complete disarmament and, consequently, of the destruction of all means of warfare.

... Comrade Deputies, some of the Soviet citizens, as well as our friends, the peace supporters in other countries, may perhaps wonder whether the new big reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces will not stimulate activity on the part of the military blocs opposing ours. The United States will have larger armed forces than the Soviet Union....

... That being so, will not the reduction of the Soviet Army expose our country, and indeed the cause of peace, to danger? Will it not tempt the aggressive forces, the enemies of communism, to begin a war against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and thereby plunge mankind into a new carnage? Will it not undermine or lead to the loss of the Soviet "deterrent", to use the current Western jargon?
We have considered that and can report to the Supreme Soviet that the defense potential of our country will not diminish in the least. In present-day conditions, wars would not be waged the way they were before. They would have little in common with the wars of the past. In the old days the nations tried to keep their armies close to the frontiers so as to raise a living wall, as it were, of soldiers and guns at the right moment. If any country wanted to invade another, it had to attack the troops stationed thus on the border. That was how wars were used to begin. At first fighting broke out on the frontiers of the belligerents and that is where the troops were massed.

If a war were to start now, hostilities would take a different course since the nations would have means of delivering their weapons to points thousands of kilometers away. It is first of all deep in the belligerents' territory that a war would start. Furthermore, there would be not a single capital, no large industrial or administrative center, and no strategic area left unattacked in the very first minutes, let alone days, of the war. In other words, the war would start in a different manner, if at all, and would proceed in a different manner.

A reduction of the numerical strength of our armed forces will not prevent us from maintaining the country's defensive power at the proper level. We shall still have all the means required for the defense of our country, and our enemy will know it very well. In case he does not, we are warning him and telling him outright: By reducing the numerical strength of our armed forces, we shall not be diminishing their fire-power. On the contrary, their fire-power will increase many times over in terms of quality.

If our Western partners decline to follow our example, they will disappoint not only progressive people, but all nations as well. If the Western Powers persist, they will thereby reveal their aggressiveness and their desire to continue the arms race and preparations for a new war. By their policy of arms race, they will be exposing themselves still more in the eyes of the peoples.

Economically, this policy will overload the budgets of the capitalist states and lead to an increasing tax burden.

It goes without saying that we shall have to spend a certain amount on defense, pending agreement on general and complete disarmament. But this expenditure will be cut down as the armed forces will have been reduced. Besides, this money will be used more effectively.

... If there are those in the West who imagine that the state of the Soviet Union's economy does not permit of keeping an army strong enough to assure our country's defense, so much the worse for those who think so....

... The reason why we are reducing our armed forces is that we want no war, do not intend to attack anyone, do not wish to threaten anyone and have no predatory aims....

... We expect that the implementation of this measure will require from twelve to eighteen months, or even two years....
... The men and officers to be demobilized must be given time to get used to their new life. It might be advisable to set up special courses for them to acquire new skills. We shall be developing civil aviation and some of the airmen will be able to use their knowledge and experience as fliers. Some of the artillerymen and fliers will be used in the newly formed rocket units; many of them will be used in the appropriate branches of the national economy....

... The Government and the Central Committee of our Party are now deliberating and studying the question of adopting, in due course, a territorial system of organization of our armed forces. It may prove a repetition of what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin did in the early years of Soviet rule, but it will be in different conditions and in a somewhat different way. We believe that the territorial system will be able to provide the necessary personnel and contingents of population trained in the art of war and in handling modern weapons.

Looking ahead, we can visualize the possibility of our military units being formed on the territorial principle. The men will get their military training outside their working hours and, whenever necessary, appropriate means of transportation, such as aircraft and other military equipment, will make it possible to mass the forces in the appropriate area of our territory. I am saying this so that, in deciding on the present reduction of our armed forces, you will also bear in mind the problems that may arise in the future, failing agreement on disarmament....

... As it is, however, there exist two camps in the world today, each with a different social system. The countries in these camps shape their policies along entirely different lines. In these circumstances, the problem of peaceful coexistence, that is, of safeguarding the world against the disaster of a military conflict between these two essentially antagonistic systems, between the groups of countries in which the two systems reign supreme, is of paramount importance. It is necessary to see to it that the inevitable struggle between them resolves solely into a struggle between ideologies and into peaceful emulation, or competition, to use a term that the capitalists find easier to understand. Each side will demonstrate its advantages to the best of its ability, but war as a means of settling this dispute must be ruled out. This, then, is coexistence as we Communists see it. We are upholding such coexistence with might and main, and will continue to do so. We consider that it is indispensable and inevitable in the present conditions, unless, of course, one heads deliberately for the lunacy of nuclear rocket war.

Some Western politicians are now trying to mislead and intimidate unenlightened people who as yet know little about communist theory and to whom our communist philosophy is not clear. They seek to talk them into believing that since the Communists proclaim their faith in the victory of communist ideology and the ultimate triumph of socialism and communism throughout the world, it follows that the Communists harbour aggressive designs, that they want to conquer the world, to rule all peoples, and so on. Need we prove that these allegations are nothing but brazen lies and slander?
The enemies of communism misrepresent our aims because they are afraid of the influence which the peace policy of the socialist countries exerts on the peoples. We have never said, of course, that our aim is to conquer the world or a part of it. What does "conquer" mean? It means forcibly to impose one's terms, one's political system, one's ideology, on the other side. But then that is not coexistence, it is interference in the internal affairs of other countries, it is war. It is something we are most emphatically opposed to....
DATE: 6 January 1961

SUBJECT: For New Victories of the World Communist Movement

SPEAKER: N. S. Khrushchev

(Excerpts)

... All peace-loving people waited for the answer the Meeting [of Representatives of Eighty-One Marxist-Leninist Parties] would provide to the most burning question of the day - how to prevent a world nuclear war and establish lasting peace on earth and friendship among all nations, and how to ensure the peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems....

... The Appeal to the Peoples of the World contains a fervid call for unity in the struggle to solve the most pressing problem of our time - to prevent a world war. The Appeal shows once again that it is we, the Communists, who are the most consistent champions of the interests of the people, and that it is we who are showing the only correct way to preserve and strengthen peace....

... Now that a world socialist system exists and there is a marked upsurge of anti-imperialist national-liberation revolutions, we have had to determine the further course and outlook of world development. And this is impossible without a profound understanding of the essence, content and nature of the decisive tasks of the present epoch....

... The Statement of the Meeting defines the epoch in these terms:

"Our time, whose main content is the transition from capitalism to socialism initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution, is a time of struggle between the two opposed social systems, a time of socialist revolutions and national-liberation revolutions, a time of the breakdown of imperialism, of the abolition of the colonial system, a time of transition of more peoples to the socialist path, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world-wide scale."....

... Imperialism has built up a gigantic peacetime war machine and a ramified system of blocs, and has subordinated economy to the arms drive. The U.S. imperialists are bent on bringing the whole world under their sway, and are threatening mankind with nuclear missile war. Modern imperialism is increasingly tainted by decay and parasitism.... The facts indicating that the imperialists are pursuing a policy of outrageous provocations and aggressions are countless. That is no novelty. The novelty is that all the intrigues of the imperialists are not only being conclusively exposed, but also firmly repelled, and their attempts to start local wars are being frustrated.

The present balance of world forces enables the socialist camp and the other forces of peace for the first time in history to set themselves the entirely realistic task of forcing the imperialists under pain of the downfall of their system, to refrain from starting a world war....
PREVENTION OF A NEW WAR IS THE QUESTION OF QUESTIONS.

Comrades, the Meeting centered its attention on the issues of war and peace. All of us at the Meeting saw clearly that prevention of a world-wide nuclear war was the most burning and vital problem facing mankind.

The Meeting charted ways and means of making still more effective use of the new possibilities of averting world war afforded by the emergence of the socialist camp and its increased might, by the new balance of forces in the world. The peoples trust that the Communists will use all the might of the socialist system and the enhanced strength of the international working class to rid mankind of the horrors of war....

... Our Party remembers Lenin's words to the effect that capitalism, even while disintegrating and dying, is still capable of causing mankind great misfortunes. Our Party, always vigilantly on guard against the danger emanating from imperialism, is educating the Soviet people accordingly and doing everything to prevent the enemy from ever taking us by surprise. We alert the peoples to the danger of war in order to heighten their vigilance and rouse them to action, to rally them to the struggle against world war....

... Wars arose with the division of society into classes. This means that the ground for all wars will not be completely eliminated until society is no longer divided into hostile, antagonistic classes. The victory of the working class throughout the world and the triumph of socialism will destroy all the social and national causes of war and mankind will be able to rid itself of this dreadful scourge.

In the present conditions we must distinguish between the following kinds of war: world war, local war, and war of liberation or popular uprising. This is necessary in order to work out the proper tactics in regard to each....

... The imperialists are preparing war chiefly against the socialist countries, and above all against the Soviet Union, the most powerful of the socialist countries....

... Now about local wars. There is much talk in the imperialist camp today about local wars, and the imperialists are even making small-caliber atomic weapons for use in such wars. They have concocted a special theory on local wars.... A small-scale imperialist war, no matter which of the imperialists starts it, may develop into a world thermonuclear missile war. We must, therefore, fight against world wars and against local wars....

... Now about national-liberation wars. Recent example of wars of this kind are the armed struggle waged by the people of Viet Nam and the present war of the Algerian people....

... This is a liberation war, a war of independence waged by the people. It is a sacred war. We recognize such wars; we have helped and shall continue to help peoples fighting for their freedom....
...Can such wars recur? Yes, they can. Are uprisings of this kind likely? Yes, they are. But they are wars in the nature of popular uprisings. Can conditions in other countries reach the point where the cup of popular patience overflows and the people take up arms? Yes, they can. What is the Marxist attitude to such uprisings? It is most favorable. These uprisings cannot be identified with wars between countries, with local wars, because the insurgent people fight for the right of self-determination, for their social and independent national development; these uprisings are directed against corrupt reactionary regimes, against the colonialists. The Communists support just wars of this kind whole-heartedly and without reservations, and march in the van of the peoples fighting for liberation....

...A world war in the present conditions would be waged with missiles and nuclear weapons, that is, it would be the most destructive war in history....

...The victory of socialism on a world scale, inevitable by virtue of the laws of history, is now near. Wars between countries are not needed for this victory....

A sober consideration of the inescapable consequences of a nuclear war is indispensable if we are to pursue, with due consistency, a policy of averting war and mobilizing the masses for this purpose. Because the very realization of what a nuclear war implies strengthens the resolve of the masses to fight against war. It is necessary, therefore, to warn the masses about the deadly consequences of a new world war and to arouse their righteous anger against those who are plotting this crime. The possibility of averting war is not a gift from above. Peace cannot be got by begging for it. It can be secured only by active purposeful struggle. That is why we have been waging this struggle, and will continue to do so....

...The Central Committee and the Soviet government will continue to do everything to increase the military might of our country, since the imperialists are continuing the arms drive....

...The fight for disarmament is an active fight against imperialism, for curtailing its war potential. The peoples must do their utmost to secure the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of wholesale annihilation....

...Lenin pointed out the need of establishing contacts with those circles of the bourgeoisie who gravitate towards pacifism, "be it even of the palest hue."...

...The Communists consider it their sacred duty to make full use of all the available opportunities to bridle the warlike forces of imperialism and prevent a new war....

...Recognition of the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into socialist society is axiomatic for us Soviet Communists, the sons of the October Revolution. The road to socialism lies through proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.
... Unity of our ranks multiplies the forces of communism tenfold. Unity, unity, and again, unity — this is the law of the world communist movement.

... It should be noted that at the Meeting the delegation of the CPSU expressed its point of view concerning the formula that the Soviet Union stands at the head of the socialist camp and the CPSU at the head of the communist movement. Yet the CPSU delegation suggested that the formula should not be included in the Statement or any other document of the communist movement.

... It is a great reward for us Communists that the potent force of communism is now realized not only by the peoples of the socialist countries, but even by people who do not accept the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. They cannot help acknowledging the great results of the development of our countries, achieved on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist theory. And that, comrades, is immensely important.

Marxist-Leninist theory is a guide to action, the guiding star for us Communists. Being the front-rank contingent of the working class, the Communists have always regarded it as the scientific programme of their struggle for victory. They have always put implicit trust in it, and have always fought perseveringly for its realization. Today, when, guided by this doctrine, the socialist countries are attaining major successes in the economic competition with the capitalist states, the masses see that socialism, communism, is the greatest force of our time, and that the future belongs to communism......
DATE: 23 October 1961

SUBJECT: Report to the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by the Minister of Defense

SPEAKER: Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky

(Text)

Comrades! The XXII Congress of our Communist Party is indeed a great step in the heroic history of the Soviet people. Like a bright sun, it lights up whole future decades of our Motherland, the future of all mankind.

Permit me, in the name of the personnel of our glorious Soviet Armed Forces, to give you, the delegates of this historical Party Congress, ardent fighting greetings!

The communists and all the servicemen of the Armed Forces together with all the Soviet people fully approve the foreign and domestic policy of the Party, inscribed by it in the projected new Program plan of building the most bright and just communist society. These majestic plans have evoked an unprecedented creative upsurge in the army and navy. A pre-Congress competition was widespread in the troops. It encompassed the personnel of all the services of the Armed Forces and brought excellent results. In the army and navy, the ranks of excellent soldiers, class specialists were significantly increased and new beacon fires were lit, which will bring advanced experience into the very center of the army masses. All this promotes the raising of combat capability of the Armed Forces.

Comrades! The results of the selfless labor of the Soviet people in the period after the XX and XXI Congresses CPSU, the grandiose outlook for development of our country on the path to communism was thoroughly and deeply illuminated in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was given by that true Leninist, that outstanding leader of the Party and the government, dear Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. They are clearly revealed in the projected new Program of the CPSU. With Leninist wisdom, in it is related the fundamental problems of modern social life and the urgent questions of Party and government organization, and the goals and tasks of all our activities are clearly defined.

The contemplated Party plans of communist building, and the first results in their fulfillment already achieved, are startling in their grandeur and scale. They are clear testimony of the superiority of the socialists system over the capitalist system, of the invincible force of communism. There is nothing to contrast in the capitalist world with the progressive movement of communism. Capitalism has no ideas, no future which could attract and draw the people after it. The history of the last decades graphically confirms the conclusion of Marxism-Leninism of the doom and inevitable end of the decrepit capitalist system. However, capitalism, which is being got rid of, in its deathbed convulsions, threatens mankind with frightful calamities.

The imperialist powers are nurturing mad plans for armed attack on
the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Under various hypocritical slogans, they reject Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament and constantly build up the power of their armed forces. They threaten to answer with force our just proposals on concluding a German peace agreement and liquidating, on this basis, the unnatural situation which has built up in West Berlin. President Kennedy speaks of the resolve to preserve the vitally important interests in Berlin. But where is the USA and where is Berlin? What vitally important interests of the United States of America can there be there? Nevertheless, the President of the USA is increasing the military budget by more than 6 billion dollars, that is, by 14 per cent. He promises by the end of 1964 to increase by 50 per cent the number of atomic submarines with 'Polarises'; by 50 per cent the number of those strategic bombers which must be on runways ready for take-off fifteen minutes after the warning is given; by 100 per cent the number of 'Minutemen' missiles. He is increasing the ground troops; he is bringing rifle production from 9,000 to 44,000 a month; he is increasing by 150 per cent the armed forces for conflicts with partisan movements in oppressed countries. And all this is done, as he expresses it, "to achieve parity with the Soviet Union."

Speaking in North Carolina on 12 October, President Kennedy had to admit that times have changed and that the USA was living through "an unusual time. Angola and Algeria, Brazil and Bizerte, Syria and South Vietnam, Korea and Kuwait, the Dominican Republic, Berlin and even the United Nations, all are problems which 20 years ago we could not even imagine. And all this is happening when the two opposed powers can destroy each other."

We agree with the President of the United States, Kennedy: Much has changed in the last 20 years and that time has not yet come. If one adds to this other burning problems, for example, the Congo, the Republic of South Africa, Cyprus, Iran, Western Irian, Cuba, the Palestine question, the lynching of negroes, chronic unemployment, the impending US deficit, exceeding 5 billion dollars, then in fact the American imperialists have unhappy prospects!

Although now the fatal inevitability of war no longer exists, as long as imperialism remains, the danger of war will exist. Mankind had not yet managed to breathe freely after World War II's nightmares, when the sinister clouds of war again gathered in the West because of the aggressors, threatening to darken the cloudless sky with mushroom-shaped atomic whirlwinds of death. Now the imperialists have seized on Soviet proposals for concluding a German peace pact as an excuse for new criminal war hysteria. In answer to the peaceful initiative of the Soviet Union, the Western powers have still more steeply turned the wheel of their politics toward preparations and unleashing of a new war. They have brought international tensions to white heat.

As an answer to the increased practical preparations for war being carried out by the Western countries under the guise of 'the Berlin crisis', the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government have had to instigate a number of measures known to you for strengthening the
defense capability and security of the USSR. Our plan for curtailing the Armed Forces, which was being carried out, has been temporarily suspended; our expenditures on defense have been a little increased; the regular discharge from the army and navy into the reserves of soldiers, sailors, sergeants and starshinas, who have served out their term of active military duty, has been temporarily held up; tests of the nuclear weapon are being carried out.

It goes without saying that a number of necessary concrete measures directed at bringing the Armed Forces to a higher level of combat readiness have been carried out directly in the troops. By strengthening their defensive might, we thereby fulfill our international duty before the peoples of all countries. We are not preparing to attack anyone, but at the same time we firmly say that we will destroy any aggressor who lights the torch of world war.

The social and political essence of modern wars has been thoroughly disclosed in the Program of the Party; the relationship of communist and workers' parties to these wars is pointed out in it. The positions of the Program on these questions have primary significance for correctly determining the path of our military construction and for solving problems connected with preparing the people and the army to defend the socialist Fatherland.

All work in this area, we, the military, have conducted under the guidance of the decisions of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government. The fundamental concrete tasks of the Armed Forces and the direction of military structuring in our country in present-day circumstances was distinctly and expressively laid down by our Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev in his historical speech at the IV session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1960. In the report, a deep analysis of the nature of modern war, which lies at the base of Soviet military doctrine, was given. One of the important positions of this doctrine is that a world war, if it nevertheless is unleashed by the imperialist aggressors, will inevitably take the form of nuclear rocket war, that is, such a war where the main means of striking will be the nuclear weapon and the basic means of delivering it to the target will be the rocket. In connection with this, war will also begin differently than before and will be conducted in a different way.

The use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, with unlimited possibilities for their delivery to any target in calculated minutes with the aid of rockets, permits the achievement of decisive military results in the shortest period of time at any distance and over enormous territory. As objects of crushing nuclear strikes, along with groupings of the enemy armed forces, will be industrial and vital centers, communications junctions, everything that feeds war.

A future world war, if not prevented, will take on an unprecedentedly destructive character. It will lead to the death of hundreds of millions of people, and whole countries will be turned into lifeless deserts covered with ashes.
It must be said that this is well understood also by the ruling circles of the West, and therefore they are trying to achieve their partial aggressive goals by waging local 'little' wars with the use of conventional and tactical atomic weapons.

Inspite of the fact that in a future war the decisive place will belong to the nuclear rocket weapon, we nevertheless come to the conclusion that final victory over the aggressor can be achieved only as a result of the joint actions of all the services of the armed forces. This is why we are giving the necessary attention to perfecting all kinds of weapons, teaching the troops skillfully to use them and to achieve decisive victory over the aggressor.

We also consider that in contemporary circumstances, a future world war will be waged, in spite of enormous losses, by massive, multimillion armed forces.

The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government have demanded and are demanding from us that special attention be given to the beginning period of a possible war. The importance of this period is that the first massive nuclear strikes can, to an enormous degree, predetermine the whole subsequent course of the war, and lead to such losses in the interior and in the troops that the people and the country might be placed in exceptionally serious circumstances.

Evaluating circumstances in reality, it must be taken into account that the imperialists are preparing a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR and other socialist countries. Therefore, Soviet military doctrine considers the most important, the main and paramount task of the Armed Forces to be, to be in constant readiness for the reliable repulse of a surprise attack of the enemy and to frustrate his criminal plans.

The fact is that in contemporary circumstances, any armed conflict inevitably will escalate into general nuclear rocket war if the nuclear powers are involved in it. Thus, we must prepare our Armed Forces, the country and all the people for struggle with the aggressor, first of all and mainly, in conditions of nuclear war.

Our country is big and wide. It is less vulnerable than capitalist countries. But we clearly recognize that this would be for us an exceptionally severe war. We are deeply convinced that in this war, if the imperialists thrust it on us, the socialist camp will win and capitalism will be destroyed forever.

Let me now remind you of a few facts. In one of the official documents of the US Congress, it was stated "that in the beginning period of war, 263 thermonuclear strikes, with an average TNT equivalent of 5 megatons each, might be carried out on the most important objectives of the USA." According to the calculations of the Americans, 132 major military objectives and many different industrial enterprises will be destroyed by these strikes and also 71 major cities. The general area of radioactive contamination because of this will be almost half the
territory of the country. As a result of all this, half the population will be subject to destruction by the nuclear weapon. According to calculations of the US Health Service, as a result of a nuclear strike on American cities, "out of 188 million population, the dead alone will number 53 million." In addition, a number of calculations have been conducted, similar to those given above, but concerning other countries. For example, they calculate that to put West Germany out of action, not more than 8 nuclear bombs with a power of 5 megatons each are necessary.

We are especially surprised by the militaristic position and threat of war from Chancellor Adenauer and his Defense Minister Strauss. And what is this threat of the lord keeper of the press, speaking in the British House of Commons in the name of the government, the conservative, Heath?

Remember, madmen, that to destroy your thickly-populated, small countries, only a few nuclear bombs of megaton power are needed to kill you in a flash in your own lair!

On 21 October of this year, that is, not long ago, before the Business Council of Virginia, apparently not without the knowledge of President Kennedy, the Deputy Secretary of Defense of the USA, Roswell Gilpatric, made a speech, which, brandishing the might of the United States, threatened us with force.

What can be said to this regular threat, to this petty speech? One thing can be said: This threat does not frighten us!

We ardently approve the proposal of our Party and government on concluding a peace agreement with Germany and we are ready to carry out any task which will be placed before the Armed Forces. We warn our enemies that if we have to fight, then we will find quite sufficient means to carry out nuclear strikes and on a significantly large number of the most varied objectives of any aggressor!

American specialists have taken for calculations a unit charge of only 5 megatons. But, as you already know, we have nuclear charges from several dozens to a hundred megatons, and our ballistic rockets, which have splendidly recommended themselves, so that no one can have any doubts about their ability to lift off and deliver such charges to any point on earth, no matter whence an attack on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is made.

Obviously, in light of these corrections, the American specialists should make substantial corrections in their calculations both as to the power of the nuclear charges and as to the number which the Soviet Union has. Those countries which offer their territory for military bases and for the building of rocket launching areas for the aggressor should also think seriously about this. These countries have small territory, high density of population and the starting up of a nuclear war would be a complete catastrophe for them.

Now, permit me to present to the Congress the state of combat readi-
ness of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Five-and-a-half years have passed since the time of the XX Party Congress. For our Armed Forces this has been a period filled with important events connected with the rearming with new modern equipment and with the wide introduction of the nuclear rocket weapon into the troops. This was a genuinely turning point in the development and accumulation of forces of our army and navy. In recent years, on the basis primarily of the broad introduction of the nuclear rocket weapon, all, as they say, of the old services of the Armed Forces have undergone serious improvement. But the most important thing is, that on the initiative of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev and by decision of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government, a new service of the Armed Forces has been created— the Strategic Rocket Troops. These comrades, are troops of constant combat readiness. They already have such a number of launchers, rockets and charges for them of megaton power, that we, if necessary, can exceed by far the calculations of American scientists and the military, which I spoke of before, and carry obliterating defeat to the aggressor and his country.

It must be stressed that the Strategic Rocket Troops were created in conditions of a considerable curtailment of the numbers of the Armed Forces as a whole. By curtailing, where expedient, the number of troops and especially of directing apparatus and organs of maintenance, we simultaneously significantly strengthened and continue to develop in every way such services of the Armed Forces as National VVO and PRO Troops (anti-air and missile defense.) Completely up-to-date in their technical equipment are our Ground Troops, Air Forces and Navy, and military transport aviation, which will be called upon to play a very important role in future war.

The carrying out of the radical reorganization of the Armed Forces demanded the remodeling of the theory of military art, rules, regulations, retraining personnel, especially officers and generals. Now this stage of rebuilding is basically completed. As a result of this, the might of the Soviet Armed Forces has immeasurably grown.

The leading and organizing role in rebuilding the Armed Forces belongs to the Leninist Central Committee of our Party headed by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. The correct military-technical policy of the Central Committee, the successes of industry, the outstanding achievements of Soviet science and technology, have permitted the creation, in a comparatively short period of time, of a powerful, qualitatively new material-technical base for arming the army and navy with modern military equipment, and primarily, rocket equipment.

I consider it my duty, in the name of the soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces, to give deep thanks and gratitude to all laborers, our wonderful workers, engineers, technicians, constructors and scientists, whose creative, selfless work made it possible to equip the army and navy with the most modern and powerful equipment, and allowed us to be the first in the world to launch a sputnik of earth, a space ship, and to carry out successfully the launch of a rocket with startling exactness, at a great distance, to an area of ocean.
I must report to you that the volume of production of rocket armament in recent years has so increased that we are supplied not only fully but also with a large surplus with rockets of various types and designations. Our rocket troops are now fully at a state of high combat readiness. They carry out a constant combat alert and can successfully fulfill the tasks given them. I can add that practice combat launches of rockets carried out in 1961 by the rocket troops gave convincing results: of all the launches of medium range rockets more than 90 per cent were made with a rating of "excellent" or "good". And as for intercontinental rockets they fulfilled all their tasks with "excellent" or "good". It may seem strange, but the rockets landed with more exactness at the greater distance than at the nearer.

These, comrades, are real graphic facts about the might, about the exceptional combat possibilities of our rocket troops, and we make no secret of them. The soldiers of the rocket troops correctly understand their tasks and tremendous responsibility to the Motherland. They constantly raise their combat mastery. In the pre-Congress days a socialist competition broadly unrolled in these troops. I think that the delegates of the Congress would be interested to know that at the present time in the rocket troops there are about 1,800 excellent subunits, and they are great masters of their business, masters of hitting without a miss, any point on earth. Good results in the socialist competition in honor of the XXII Congress CPSU were achieved by a great number of units and formations in other services of the Armed Forces also.

The Ground Troops in recent times have been significantly reduced. However their combat possibilities have grown by far. They can wage active highly maneuverable combat actions at unprecedentedly high tempos to a great operational depth in conditions of use by the enemy of the nuclear weapon. The Ground Troops, especially in border areas, are in constant combat readiness. The basic force of the ground troops now are the rocket formations and units of operational-tactical designation, armed with nuclear and other rockets with a range of from several to many hundreds of kilometers. Exercises with combat shots confirmed the high combat possibilities of these rocket troops: Good exactness of hitting the target, rapidity of deployment from the march for rocket launches, and the ability to move themselves to a great distance without loss of combat capability.

We have not slackened our attention to conventional kinds of weapons, in particular to artillery. Our motorized infantry divisions in numbers of personnel are significantly less than divisions at the end of the last war. But in this the weight of one salvo, without counting rocket weapons, has increased more than four times. If you take tanks, then in our modern motorized and armored divisions, there are more in the mechanized and tank corps of the period of the Great Patriotic War or in corresponding divisions of any NATO country.

Our Ground Troops, celebrated in battles of the Great Patriotic War, are ready with honor to fulfill any task which the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government places before them.

[The rest of the speech has been omitted.]
KEY TO MILITARY BOOKS (AUTHORS' LIST)

Political Books:

1. 1960 Party Political Work 1st edition
4. 1962 Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army 3rd edition
*11. 1965 V. I. Lenin on War, the Army and Military Science
*12. 1966 The Basics of Soviet Military Law
13. 1966 Psychology of a Military Collective
*14. 1966 Military Pedagogy
*15. 1967 Military Psychology
16. 1968 Bases of Scientific Communism
17. 1968 Political Organs, The Building of
18. 1968 Military Economic Questions in the Course of Political Economy
19. 1969 The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union

Military Books:

*22. 1968 Military Strategy 3rd edition (N)
*23. 1965 Dictionary of Basic Military Terms
*24. 1965 Organization of the Armies and Navies of Capitalist Countries
*25. 1966 History of Military Art
*26. 1966 Tactics (N)
27. 1966 Combined Army in the Attack
*28. 1967 M. I. Kalinin, Speeches
*29. 1968 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union (FP)
*30. 1968 Officer's Guide for Quartermasters
31. 1939 Army of the Soviets
32. 1969 Methodological Bases for Military Science Research

Additional Books

40. 1963 History of Military Art
41. 1964 The Bases of Military Pedagogy and Psychology
42. 1964 On Soviet Military Sciencee
43. 1964 War and the Ideological Struggle
44. 1965 The Program of the CPSU on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland
45. 1967 March and Encounter: Battle
46. 1968 March and Encounter: Battle
47. 1969 The Naval Factor in Modern War
48. 1969 Overcoming Anti-tank Defense

* These books are part of the Officer's Library series.
(N) Received nomination for Frunze Prize.
(FP) Received Frunze Prize.
AUTHORS OF MAIN SOVIET MILITARY WRITINGS (BOOKS)*

Adenin, A. S. Col. 1/2
  Candidate Historical Sciences
Akhmetshin, Kh. M. Col. Justice 12
  Candidate of Juridical Sciences
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* The key to book titles corresponding to the numbers given is on page 93.
  Numbers 1 through 19 are political books, 20 through 32, military.
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Frunze Prize Nom.