THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND THE PATHET LAO:
ANALYSIS AND CHRONOLOGY

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PREFACE

This paper is a by-product of an earlier research effort on the situation in Laos undertaken by the author for The Rand Corporation. The present analysis and chronology is made available for use by interested government researchers and academic specialists.
ABSTRACT

In the last two decades, the Pathet Lao revolutionary movement has grown from its modest beginnings into a serious contender for power in Laos. As demonstrated in Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, *North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao* (Harvard University Press, 1970), this success is largely the result of the comprehensive assistance that the revolutionary forces have been receiving from North Vietnam. Ever since the inception of the Pathet Lao movement, after the Second World War, Hanoi's military, economic, and organizational support has been the critical factor in the balance of forces in Laos. But the outcome of the contest for power in that country will be greatly affected by the policies of Moscow and Peking. These policies, and the motives and objectives that inform them, are the subject of the present study.

China's policy toward Laos would appear to be governed, above all, by considerations of national security, not by territorial ambitions. The principal Chinese objective, it seems, is the removal from the area of all hostile powers and their influence: primarily of the United States but, since the intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict, increasingly also of the Soviet Union. Invariably and inevitably, Peking reacts with particular sensitivity to military developments in Laos that approach China's southern border.

In contrast to Peking's interest, which is intense and of long standing, Moscow's concern with Laos -- a country in no way vital to Soviet security -- is quite recent, and, with the exception of the 1961 crisis, the Russian involvement there has been limited. The sharpening of the Sino-Soviet conflict, however, has made it impossible for the Soviet Union to disengage itself entirely from the fate of Laos, where the aim of its policy since then has been to prevent the country from being sucked entirely into the sphere of Chinese influence. In pursuit of that policy, the Soviets have tried to extend their influence within the Lao revolutionary movement while eschewing a major commitment to the Pathet Lao cause and avoiding any situation that could lead to a confrontation with the United States.
Whereas Peking has been promoting the strategy of a "people's war" in Laos, Moscow has encouraged a political solution that would ensure the continuation in office of a government friendly to the Soviet Union. Despite their professed support for the Pathet Lao, therefore, the Soviets continue to maintain cordial relations with the non-Communist rump government of Souvanna Phouma. Peking, meanwhile, is siding openly with the revolutionary forces in Laos and providing them with direct assistance out of South China. Thus, while Moscow is pursuing an ambivalent dual strategy in Laos, Peking is actively seeking to establish itself as the avowed sponsor of an Indochinese liberation movement.

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that China has the advantage over the Soviet Union in their competition for the allegiance of the Lao Communists, whose position on the major issues dividing those two powers has been close to Peking's rather than Moscow's. Yet all evidence points to the conclusion that there is no distinctly pro-Chinese faction in the (Communist) People's Party of Laos (PPL) and that its leadership is not subservient to China. If there is a predominant foreign influence within the PPL, it is that of Hanoi. While the Soviet Union and China continue to vie with each other in North Vietnam, the Communist sector of Laos -- which remains essentially a North Vietnamese client so long as there is fighting in Laos -- will enjoy a substantial measure of independence from both Soviet and Chinese influence, within the limits set by its dependence on North Vietnam.

Nevertheless, propinquity, ideological affinity, and a number of Chinese assets in Laos (including a military presence and an expanding Chinese-built road network) do create the potential for a future extension of Chinese influence in Laos. Any attempt to exploit this potential, however, would inevitably lead China into conflict with North Vietnam, thus placing Pathet Lao leaders in a very precarious position between their two chief sponsors. And it is difficult to see, especially while the fighting continues in Indochina, what Peking could hope to gain by jeopardizing its present working arrangement with Hanoi.
CONTENTS

PREFACE ................................................................. iii
ABSTRACT ........................................................................ v
GLOSSARY ......................................................................... ix

Section
I. SOVIET AND CHINESE INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN LAOS .... 1

II. CHINESE AND SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO THE PATHET LAO .... 11
   Soviet Assistance ......................................................... 12
   Chinese Assistance ...................................................... 19

III. ·SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY AND THE PATHET LAO ................. 27
    An Assessment ............................................................. 45

Appendix
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WITH LAOS, 1961-1971 --
   A CHRONOLOGY ............................................................ 49
GLOSSARY

CCP       Chinese Communist Party
CPR       Chinese People's Republic
DRV       Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
FAR       Forces Armées Royales (Royal Lao Armed Forces)
CDR       German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
ICC       International Control Commission
KPL       Khaosan Pathet Lao (Pathet Lao Press)
LPLA      Lao People's Liberation Army (Kongthap Potpo'i Pasason Lao)
NCNA      New China News Agency
NLHS      Neo Lao Hak Sat (Lao Patriotic Front)
NVA       North Vietnamese Army
PLA       People's Liberation Army
PPL       Phak Pasason Lao (People's Party of Laos)
RLG       Royal Lao Government
I. SOVIET AND CHINESE INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN LAOS

Soviet leaders do not regard the mainland of Southeast Asia as vital to Soviet security. Yet they appear to be willing to invest in the area because they see in it opportunities for making inroads at Chinese and American expense without incurring direct military obligations. At this point, the Soviet Union would seem to have a number of particular interests in the region: (1) to undermine Chinese influence in Asia, including areas contiguous to the Chinese People's Republic (CPR); (2) to reduce the dependence of governments in the region both on the United States and on China; (3) to promote trust in the Soviet Union and create conditions for Soviet penetration that would ensure the evolution of regionalism without U.S. or Chinese domination and permit the acquisition of advantageous military positions; and (4) to discourage Asian revolutionary movements from resorting to Maoist strategy, which Moscow regards as detrimental to the interests of these movements, as weakening its own claim to ideological leadership and, more important, as enlarging the danger of a Soviet military confrontation with the United States in a region of only marginal relevance to Soviet security.

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In Peking, the threat from the Soviet Union, the potential danger from Taiwan, and the growing possibility of a militarily strong Japan probably were considered the three major threats to Chinese security today. These considerations, however, do not diminish China's attention to developments in Southeast Asia, because Peking remains sensitive to hostile military activity in neighboring countries, and because the military engagement of the United States in these areas constitutes a clear challenge to China's revolutionary interests and political commitments. These are: (1) to reduce American and Soviet influence and positions of strength so as to enhance the acceptability of the region to Chinese influence and remove any potential threat to China's security; (2) to promote governments in Southeast Asian countries that will, at a minimum, be "friendly" to Peking in the sense that they will not embark on any policy aimed at putting pressure on China, particularly in the form of military alliances or the furnishing of military facilities; and (3) to use China's influence over Asian Communist parties and revolutionary movements so as to enhance not only Peking's ideological position in Asia but also its claim to leadership in the envisaged revolutionary transformation of the world.

The convergences and divergences of Soviet and Chinese interests and objectives help shape the two powers' strategies in Indochina, as will be evident from the following examination of their involvement and policy in Laos.

The Soviet Union's involvement in Southeast Asia, and more specifically in Indochina, is of recent origin. Before World War II, it was limited to intermittent contacts with the revolutionary independence movements in the region, primarily through the Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh, who worked closely with the Communist International and was considered in Moscow the outstanding expert on Asian revolutions. Even after the defeat of Japan, Soviet interest in Vietnam at first remained slight, and there is no record...
of any Soviet concern with Laos before the 1950s. ¹

Only in the early 1950s, when the Viet Minh were seeking to oust their French colonial masters from all of Indochina, did the Soviets begin to display some interest in the fate of Laos. The widening of the civil war in Laos and the emergence of an organized revolutionary movement there -- the Pathet Lao ("Land of the Lao," or PL) -- which led to the increasing involvement of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) on one side and of the United States on the other, gradually shifted the focus of Soviet attention from Vietnam to Laos. After the military coup led by the Neutralist Captain Kong Le in August 1960, the Soviet Union moved from its indirect involvement in the Laos conflict in the form of support for the Vietnamese Communist regime to direct military intervention in the country's internal struggle, which began to assume the proportions of an international conflict, threatening to pit the Soviet Union and its Laos Neutralist and Communist allies against the Lao rightists and the United States. This dangerous development was halted by the decision of President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna, in June 1961, to avoid a military confrontation and work toward the neutralization of Laos, a decision based on recognition of the fact that neither power's vital interests were involved in that area. Subsequently, the Geneva Conference of 1961-1962 and the creation of a provisional tripartite coalition government committed to a neutralist policy, ended the American and Soviet military presence in Laos and, at least temporarily, placed the East-West conflict

¹ The volume of Soviet scholarly studies of conditions in a particular country is one indicator of Soviet interest, as Soviet academic research is based on official plans and is supervised by the Soviet authorities. It is significant, therefore, that a bibliographic survey of Soviet nonperiodical writings on Southeast Asia for the period after 1949 shows not a single item on Laos prior to 1959. See Peter Berton and Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet Works on Southeast Asia, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California, Far Eastern and Russian Research Series No. 3, University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles, California, 1967.
on a political plane. Although the Rightist-Neutralist-Communist coalition government — the Neo Lao Hak Sat (Lao Patriotic Front, or NLHS) — broke up in 1963, within a year of its creation, and the civil war resumed in earnest shortly thereafter and continues to this day, the Soviet Union has refrained from siding openly and officially with the Lao Communists, and its involvement in their struggle has remained indirect and intermittent.

At first glance, Soviet policy in Laos since 1963 appears curiously ambivalent and indecisive. The Soviets maintain correct and at times even cordial relations with Prince Souvanna Phouma and his Royal Lao Government (RLG) despite the Communists' departure from it; they provide (if only token) economic assistance to the RLG; and they treat Prime Minister Souvanna as the legitimate head of government, even though the Lao Communists have long challenged Souvanna's status. On the other hand, the Soviet Union lends limited diplomatic and full propaganda support to the policy positions and claims of the Pathet Lao in their conflict with the government, and a portion of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam reaches the Lao revolutionary forces by way of Hanoi. Laos thus presents an example of the traditional Soviet two-pronged strategy with its seemingly contradictory revolutionary and diplomatic aspects.

Since the sharpening of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960s, Soviet policy toward Laos and the revolutionary movement there has been guided by three principal objectives: to check the expansion of Peking's influence and prevent strategically important Laos from becoming a sphere of Chinese influence; to reduce U.S.

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2 The Communist position can be briefly stated as follows: The Kouprasith-Sananikone coup of April 19, 1964, destroyed the Zürich and Plain of Jars agreements on which the tripartite government had rested. Thus, the present government under Souvanna Phouma is no longer the legal and agreed-upon tripartite government, and all its acts are therefore illegal. On the other hand, the Lao Communists continue to adhere to the concept of a tripartite regime and do not contest Souvanna's claim to being its head.
influence in the area while avoiding the danger of a direct confrontation with the United States; and to strengthen the Soviet Union's influence within the Lao revolutionary movement and thereby its claims to revolutionary leadership even in China's backyard. But Soviet investment in the pursuit of these objectives has been limited by the recognition that Laos is not vital to the security of the Soviet Union and that its intrinsic importance is not such as to justify Moscow's incurring risky or costly military obligations. In these circumstances, it is difficult for Soviet policy to pursue the above objectives simultaneously and equally vigorously. In recent years, its main emphasis seems to have shifted from an attempt to weaken the U.S. position in Laos, as during the 1960-1961 crisis, to preoccupation with the China problem. The desire to curb Peking's influence is now probably the most important consideration shaping Soviet behavior in Laos.

The formulation of a consistent Soviet policy toward Laos and toward the Lao Communists is also complicated by the Vietnamese factor. Clearly, the Soviet Union must continue to support the Vietnamese Communists' efforts to gain control in South Vietnam and consequently also their use of the indispensable Ho Chi Minh trails, which run through Lao territory. Moreover, Moscow is in no position to deny the North Vietnamese their role as senior partners in their alliance with the Pathet Lao and as decision-makers for Communist policy in Laos; to do so would be to incur political losses in Hanoi and to provide anti-Soviet ammunition to Peking. Thus, Soviet options in Laos are constrained by the need to defer to North Vietnam in matters of Laos policy, especially when Hanoi and Peking show strong support for the Lao revolutionaries.

On the other hand, the continued armed struggle in Vietnam and the geographic widening of the Indochina war raise the specter of a larger military conflict in Laos requiring a commitment of additional Soviet resources without the prospect of commensurately
benefiting Soviet interests. In fact, an intensification of fighting in Laos -- and for that matter even a continuation of the present limited armed struggle there -- could only raise the cost and heighten the risk to the Soviet Union; and, if successful, it would in the long run improve Peking's opportunities for expanding its influence in the region. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union has aimed at minimizing the spillover of the Vietnam fighting into Laos and Cambodia. It has favored the reestablishment in Laos of a neutralist coalition regime (friendly to the Soviet Union), as envisaged by the Geneva Conference, in preference to China's advocacy of unremitting "antiimperialist" and anti-American struggle. Because its ends would be well served if Laos became a buffer state outside the Chinese and American spheres, the Soviet Union has encouraged the Lao Communists to seek the path of political negotiation rather than that of the Peking-preferred armed struggle. In its efforts to serve as intermediary for a political solution, Moscow has maneuvered in such a way as to avoid having to make a clear-cut choice between the two contending parties. The resulting ambivalence has, of course, provided Peking with an opportunity to accuse the Soviets of being traitors to the cause of the "antiimperialist struggle." The same unwillingness to provide forthright support to the Communist cause in Laos has cast a dark shadow of suspicion on Moscow's relationship with the Pathet Lao. The Soviet dilemma in Laos thus has tended to increase Peking's influence among the Lao Communists, an advantage not easily offset by Soviet warnings to the Pathet Lao that the Chinese are advocating a dangerous, adventurist policy. It is too early to say whether and to what extent Peking's influence may have been weakened by recent indications of its willingness to improve China's relations with the United States.

In contrast to the recency of Soviet involvement in the affairs of Laos, Chinese relations with that country reach far back in
Among other factors, their geographic proximity and the presence of related ethnic minority groups on both sides of the Sino-Lao border such as the Sinitic Meo (known in China as Miao) would make it difficult for China to ignore its southern neighbor.

At the end of World War II, in connection with Japan's surrender, China's special interests in the area were implicitly recognized when Nationalist Chinese forces, with Allied authorization, temporarily occupied the northern portion of Indochina (to the 16th Parallel), including parts of Laos and its royal capital, Luang Prabang. Later, after the defeat of the Nationalists at the hands of Mao's forces, Chinese Communist armies appeared also on the borders of Tonkin. Thereafter, Communist China provided the Viet Minh with the means for conducting a successful military struggle against the French, a struggle which took place on Lao as well as on Vietnamese soil. Indirectly, therefore, Chinese aid went into the Vietnamese effort to create a revolutionary organization and revolutionary military forces in Laos.

From the inception of the Peking regime, considerations of national security appear to have loomed large in its Laos policy, paramount among them the removal of the influence of hostile powers — primarily the United States but, after the mid-1960s, increasingly...

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3 In Chinese Communist statements on Laos, this point is often stressed. Thus, an English-language broadcast from Peking on October 3, 1962, reporting on the first National Day reception held by the newly established CPR Embassy in Vientiane, quoted Ambassador Liu Ch'un as saying that "Since most ancient time, the Chinese and Laotian peoples have gotten along with each other harmoniously like kinsmen."

In the past, China has shown little interest in imposing its rule on Laos, but for many centuries it regarded Laos — like much of the rest of Southeast Asia — as being in the Chinese sphere of influence. One reflection of this state of affairs was the relationship between China and the Lao royal court of Luang Prabang. Until the French incorporated Laos into their Indochinese colonial empire, in the nineteenth century, the kings of Luang Prabang sent tribute to the court of Peking.

also the Soviet Union. Ever since American began to replace French power in Indochina, Peking's policy statements have consistently stressed the fact that, Laos being a close neighbor of China, developments there impinge on China's security. Such statements would be particularly forceful at times when Laos was in turmoil or when Peking interpreted U.S. actions as intended to transform Laos into a hostile base against China. This was the case in the Laos crisis of 1961-1962, and it has been true again in recent years, when the U.S. military activity in Vietnam has increasingly spilled over into Laos. 5

Understandably, the Chinese have been particularly sensitive to any military developments near their southern border with Laos, as in the region from the Plain of Jars north toward Phong Saly and Yünnan. This same area is, of course, also of special significance to the North Vietnamese, whose interest in preserving Lao Communist control in that region coincides with that of the Chinese. 6

5 An article entitled "U.S. Imperialism Get Cut of Laos!" (Shih-chih Chih-shih [World Knowledge], Nos. 4-5, March 5, 1961, pp. 11-13), for example, spoke of "the war in Laos which threatens the security of our southwest borders." The previous month, an editorial in the authoritative Jan-min Jih-pac (and reprinted in Peking Review) said: "Laos is a close neighbor of China and Laos extends for more than 500 kilometres. The present development of the Laotian situation cannot but arouse the serious concern of the Chinese people." (Peking Review, Vol. 4, No. 7, February 19, 1961, p. 20.) After the dispatch of American forces into Thailand in May 1962, Peking's voice, the Jan-min Jih-pac, issued a clear warning in these terms: "The Chinese people firmly oppose U.S. imperialist armed intervention in Laos and absolutely cannot tolerate the establishment by U.S. imperialism in areas close to China of any new military bridgeheads directed against this country." (English language text in Peking Review, Vol. 5, No. 21, May 25, 1962, p. 11.) Similarly, Chinese statements at the time of the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese campaign in Laos, in early 1971, termed that action a grave provocation and of relevance to the security of China (even though, in contrast to 1961, the fighting took place in southern Laos, far from the Chinese border).

6 In this connection, it is revealing that, when a correspondent for the French Communist daily L'Humanité visited the NVA zone in the spring of 1970, the Pathet Lao escort officer referred to the Plain of Jars as "a strategic base for cutting North Vietnam in two and for menacing the People's Republic of China." Madeleine Riffaud, "Indochine 1970 -- Je reviens du front Lao," L'Humanité, May 27, 1970.
The available evidence suggests that Chinese policy in Laos has been dictated by the desire to remove U.S. influence from the area rather than by any territorial designs. The Chinese want to create in Laos a regime that at the very least will be independent of the United States and other hostile powers (i.e., the Soviet Union) and friendly toward China. In the days of the first Geneva Conference, therefore, Peking went along with a negotiated compromise settlement because it held out promise of achieving the Chinese objective of excluding American power from China's southern borders. This is clear from Chou En-lai's statement at the 1954 Conference that he thought he could persuade the Viet Minh to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia provided there were no American bases in those countries. When neither the 1954 nor the 1962 Geneva Conference brought about the removal of U.S. influence from Laos, and when Maoist policy veered away from coexistence and toward support for armed struggle, this strategy came to be advocated by the Chinese also in Laos. No doubt, China's growing ideological competition with the Soviet Union over the allegiance of Asian revolutionary movements played a role in this advocacy of a "people's war" in Laos. But much as in 1954, although the tactics may change, the principal Chinese objective in Laos remains the removal of U.S. influence. So long as this goal has not been attained, it provides a solid base for Chinese cooperation with the Vietnamese Communists.

This reading of Peking's policies also finds support in the Chinese attitude on the North Vietnamese role in Laos. One may wonder whether,
in view of China's proximity to Laos and the historic antecedents of a Lao tributary relationship to Peking, Communist China may not view itself as successor to the Chinese empire and as such may consider its interests threatened by the paramount influence of Hanoi in the Communist zone of Laos and in the Pathet Lao movement. But the available evidence in the two decades since the advent of the Communist regime in Peking does not support this thesis. So far at least, there is no indication that Communist China views North Vietnam as a rival in Laos or that it is seeking to move Laos into its orbit. Peking, it seems, considers Laos to be in the North Vietnamese sphere of influence and is willing to act accordingly so long as North Vietnam’s hostility to the United States and independence of the Soviet Union promise to advance Peking’s primary objectives in Laos. On the other hand, as we shall see, Peking has built up a number of assets in Laos over the years, which it could mobilize if ever serious differences with North Vietnam in Laos should make it desirable to bring pressure to bear against Hanoi.

Soviet and Chinese interests in Laos coincide as regards the elimination of the U.S. presence and influence in the area. They diverge, however, with respect to the desirable strategy toward this end and the relative priority of the objective. In Laos as in Vietnam, therefore, Peking and Moscow operate in a situation of both convergent and divergent interests. Thus, they are providing some military, economic, and political support to the Lao revolutionaries, at the same time that each is competing with the other for the allegiance of these revolutionaries and for adoption of its preferred strategy.

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11 This is also the view of a highly experienced U.S. diplomat with long service in Laos, former U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan.
II. CHINESE AND SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO THE PATHET LAO

The primitive state of the economy of the Communist zone of Laos and the scarcity of its resources preclude any hope of rapid modernization without substantial outside aid. Foreign assistance is even more indispensable in the present circumstances, when the Lao Communists must hold their own against the military pressures of a Royal Lao Government backed by the resources of the United States. The Pathet Lao/NVA forces operating in Laos are entirely dependent on imports for their weapons and ammunition, and in the case of the NVA units also largely for food. These supplies — as distinct from those passing through Laos on the Ho Chi Minh trails and destined for South Vietnam — enter Laos for the most part on Routes 6 and 7 (see map, p. ix). Ranging from food and tools to modern weapons, they are of varying origin — Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviet, as well as East European.12 A much smaller portion of supplies — important for the military situation in the northern sector of the Communist zone — reaches the Lao revolutionaries from Vietnam by way of South China. Additional aid is provided directly by the Chinese Communists from Yunnan Province, which is contiguous to the NLHS zone. Since North Vietnam is incapable of producing the military equipment needed even for its own forces, it must rely, for the operations of its troops and those of its allies in Laos, on external assistance furnished by the major Communist powers. Thus, the balance of forces in Laos — and particularly the military balance — is decisively influenced by the flow of U.S. assistance on the one hand and by the volume of Soviet and Chinese aid on the other.13

12A reporter for the Italian Communist paper L'Unita who traveled in the NLHS zone in the spring of 1971 stated that conditions there were a testimony to international solidarity: He encountered Soviet bulldozers, Soviet and Chinese weapons and radio equipment, Chinese and East German typewriters and teletype machines, Soviet trucks, Chinese radios and flashlights, Bulgarian, Polish, Soviet, and Chinese canned food, and North Korean and West German medicines. (L'Unita, May 7, 1971, as reported on FBIS, May 13, 1971.)

13The crucial role of Sino-Soviet aid is also acknowledged by the Pathet Lao leadership. See, for example, Prince Souphanouvong's interview broadcast by KPL from Sam Neua on October 14, 1970.
The significant role that foreign assistance plays in the Pathet Lao effort is frequently acknowledged by the leaders of that movement. For example, Phoumi Vongvichit, Secretary General of the NLHS, said in a speech at the Cairo Conference of Solidarity with Laos (May 19-21, 1970): "The victory of our people cannot be disassociated from the military solidarity and the mutual support of the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia, nor from the effective aid extended by the governments and peoples of socialist countries..."14 Similar was this tribute by NLHS Chairman Souphanouvong, in an interview with a Polish Communist correspondent in October 1970: "They [the Lao people] consider that the great victories they have won over the past years have been made possible thanks to the moral and material support of the Socialist countries, of the national liberation movement, and of the peoples who cherish peace and freedom in the world."15 A resolution adopted on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the independence of Laos, on October 12, 1970, and broadcast on October 16 by the Pathet Lao Press (KPL) News Agency also singled out the socialist countries' assistance as a key factor in the successes scored by the Lao liberation movement, using the standard formula and rank order, "support and assistance of the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China."

SOVIET ASSISTANCE

Even prior to 1960, the Soviet Union, like China, provided some assistance to the Vietnamese Communists, who in turn channeled an unknown, but minor, portion of such aid to their Lao allies. With the Kong Le coup, in August 1960, the Soviets for the first time also became directly involved in the military struggle between anti-Communist and Communist-Neutralist forces in Laos. Although separated from Laos by vast distances, they organized a massive airlift, their first since World War II. This operation, initiated in the fall of 1960 out of

15 KPL from Sam Neua, October 14, 1970.
Hanoi, provided the Souvanna Phouma regime and the cooperating Pathet Lao Fighting Units with large quantities of weapons, gasoline, and ammunition and other supplies essential for their campaign against the U.S.-supported rival government.\(^\text{16}\)

While Soviet sources avoid going into the details of the 1960-1961 support operations (as they do also ".. all matters of Soviet aid to the Communist forces involved in the current Indochina conflict), the large dimension of the airlift to Laos and the importance that was assigned to it is freely acknowledged by Soviet authors and government officials. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister G. M. Pushkin's remark to Ambassador Averell Harriman that "apart from the second World War, this was the highest priority Soviet supply operation since the revolution" has often been quoted.\(^\text{17}\)

Typical of the descriptions of the Soviet role in the confrontation in Laos is this statement by N. I. Ivanov in his book about the political and military war in Laos:

In this crucial moment for the Souvanna Phouma government and for all of Laos, the Soviet Union decisively came to the defense of the Neutralist government and its prime minister, Souvanna Phouma, ... [enabling it] to carry out a policy of peace and neutrality, and consolidation of the patriotic forces for the struggle against the internal and external reaction.\(^\text{18}\)

Arthur Dommen, basing his account of events in Laos during the Kong Le coup on U.S. Department of State releases and intelligence information, relates that in December 1960, when Soviet Ilyushin transports were no longer able to land their supplies for Kong Le at the Vientiane airfield, weapons, ammunition, and food were parachuted into a hastily created landing zone 40 miles north of the capital. Later on, parachute drops were made to the retreating Neutralists at their small base in Vang Vieng.

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\(^\text{16}\) On December 5, 1960, Hsinhua reported from Hanoi that a regular airlift of Soviet fuel to Laos had been started and that "it was being conducted according to an agreement between the Soviet and Lao Governments and with the approval of the DRV Government." "\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textquotedblleft}}}\)\textit{\textbf{\textquotedblright}}}\text{\textit{\textbf{\textquotedblleft}}}\)\textit{\textbf{\textquotedblright}}\text{\textit{\textbf{\textquotedblleft}}}\)\textit{\textbf{\textquotedblright}}}\text{\textit{\textbf{\textquotedblleft}}}\)


\(^\text{18}\) Laos Irevtesiz, Institute of International Relations, Moscow, 1963, p. 45.
(between Vientiane and Luang Prabang), while light liaison planes ferried officers and advisers back and forth between headquarters at Vang Vieng, the Pathet Lao stronghold of Sam Neua town, and the North Vietnamese capital of Hanoi. American intelligence estimated that, during the approximately two weeks between December 15 and January 2 alone, Soviet aircraft flew 184 missions into Laos.  

The conflict in Laos was rapidly approaching the dimensions of a U.S.-Soviet showdown, as C-46 U.S. transports competed with Soviet Ilyushins in supplying their respective allies. Soviet involvement deepened as a result of talks between Khrushchev and Souvanna Phouma, the latter accompanied by Souphanouvong. In a joint communiqué issued on April 23, 1961, the Soviet Union expressed readiness to provide a wide range of economic and technical aid to the Souvanna Phouma regime, then allied with the Pathet Lao, including support for agriculture, the exploitation of natural resources, and development in the fields of transportation, health care, education, and cultural relations. The Soviet supply operations in Laos were accompanied by a military presence of at least 500 Soviet personnel, including an advisory mission stationed on the Plain of Jars. It must be noted, however (because of the significance this was subsequently to have for Soviet relations with the Pathet Lao and the RLG), that the direct Soviet aid program to Laos at first benefited Souvanna's Neutralists rather than their Pathet Lao allies, who were supplied — with Russian and Chinese arms — by Hanoi.

The understanding reached between Khrushchev and President Kennedy to neutralize Laos and reduce the involvement of the two powers checked the momentum that might have led to an East-West confrontation. This accommodation, reflected in the Geneva Accords of 1962, established a new situation and new conditions for Soviet aid to Laos. In 1962, U.S. forces were entirely withdrawn, as was the Soviet military presence in Laos (while the North Vietnamese merely reduced their Laos contingents). The Soviet Union made arrangements to provide economic and military aid

to Souvanna's tripartite government in Vientiane, but within a year the coalition of anti-Communists, Neutralists, and Communists broke up. Souphanouvong and his associates returned to their strongholds in northern Laos, NVA troops reentered the country in force, and the civil war resumed. As indicated earlier, the USSR did not withdraw its recognition from the rump government in Vientiane of non-Communists under Neutralist Souvanna. But it rejected Souvanna's request for military assistance to his Neutralists (thereby forcing them to turn to the United States). Since 1963, Soviet aid to the non-Communist regime has virtually ceased, with the exception of a few scholarships and of some minor technical assistance (primarily for the development of meteorological and health services).

Soviet aid to Communist Laos forms part of the Soviet aid program for the DRV. It is unloaded in Haiphong, from where it is first shipped to Hanoi and then sent by road into northern Laos. Part of this aid reaches the southern front by the access roads from the DRV into the Lao panhandle. Although the appearance of correct relations between the Soviet Union and the RLG is being carefully preserved by Soviet diplomats at their embassy in Vientiane and through official Soviet statements, a portion of Soviet aid to North Vietnam is earmarked for use by the Communist forces in Laos. From the point of view of the Royal Lao Government, this indirect Soviet contribution to the Lao Communists' military effort constitutes a violation of the Geneva Accord, for which the USSR as one of the conference co-chairmen (the other being the United Kingdom) is supposed to be a guarantor. As far as is known, however, the RLG has never officially protested against this Soviet aid to the Souvanna regime's enemies, no doubt because it deems it essential to retain the Soviet government's official recognition.

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21 See U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, October 20-28, 1969 (hereafter referred to as Laos Hearings), p. 444.

22 See former Ambassador Sullivan's testimony in Laos Hearings, pp. 444 and 450.

and to this end tries to avoid embarrassing the Soviets and compelling them to choose sides.

At any rate, Moscow's view of the legal status of its aid to the Communist faction in Sam Neua does not coincide with that of the Lao government. At least in their unofficial statements, the Soviets contend that the tripartite government continues in office in Laos even if one of its factions, the NLHS, has been compelled temporarily to leave the capital, and their aid to the NLHS can thus be rationalized as going to a legitimate constituent element of the tripartite government. Even so, in their public handling of the aid issue, as in other aspects of their Laos policy, the Soviets face something of a dilemma. On the one hand, they continue to see advantages in maintaining the facade of the Geneva Accords. On the other hand, just as they support the North Vietnamese position in Indochina and are competing with Peking within the revolutionary movements, it is important to the Soviets not to lose the confidence of the Lao Communists. Thus, while the USSR is maintaining correct and at times even cordial relations with Souvanna and the King of Laos, Soviet visitors to the Communist zone dwell on the country's political and material support for the Pathet Lao, and official spokesmen like to remind the Communist world of Moscow's assistance to the Laos "national liberation struggle." In the fall of 1970, for example, the Chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee stated:

As co-chairman of the Geneva conferences on Laos, the Soviet Union has been tirelessly exposing the criminal actions of the American military in Laos and rendering comprehensive diplomatic, moral, political and material support to the Laotian patriots.24

Today, in contrast to the 1960-1962 period, Soviet military assistance to the Pathet Lao is strictly limited to the furnishing of essential military supplies. No Soviet military or advisory presence has

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ever been reported among the Lao Communists. Soviet personnel frequently enter the Communist zone only on temporary assignments, as visiting news-
men or cultural-political envoys, but never as individuals with official government status, since this could embarrass Soviet relations with the RLG. The same applies to the East European countries, which in the last two or three years have increased their interest in the Pathet Lao (probably at Soviet urging, so as to reduce the cost to the Soviet Union and to help balance the Chinese influence). In view of the fact that the Soviets -- in contrast to the Chinese -- do not maintain any kind of permanent representation in the Communist zone of Laos, these visits are presumably useful also as a means of keeping in touch with events there and obtaining up-to-date intelligence on developments in the Lao Communist movement through independent sources of information.

The Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA) continues to use whatever remains of Soviet weapons provided at the time of the airlift, some ten years ago. This accounts for the presence in the Plain of Jars area of some older Soviet PD-76 light amphibious tanks (several of which were destroyed by U.S. aircraft or captured by the Royal Lao Armed Forces in the fighting on the Plain in 1969). In addition, newer military imports from the USSR and Eastern Europe are reinforcing the LPLA's armament. Reports on captured weapons and other information regarding this assistance program are too scant to reveal the full scope of this flow of military equipment to the Pathet Lao, but presumably all advanced weapons now appearing on the Laos front are of Soviet manufacture.

A survey of Pathet Lao, Soviet, and East European press reports concerning Soviet bloc visitors to the Communist zone shows that hardly a month goes by without such a visit. These travelers enter invariably from Hanoi and move around the Communist areas with a Pathet Lao escort. While in Laos, they highlight the Soviet aid effort and conduct otherwise pro-Soviet propaganda. Upon their return, they report to the Soviet public about the Lao "liberation struggle." Some Soviet visitors are experienced old Laos hands. Outstanding among them is Ivan Shchedrov, who has long been specializing in and commenting on Indochina as a Pravda special correspondent and representative for other Soviet news media. He reported from Laos as early as 1963 and has returned there virtually every year since. He is also the author of a recent (1970) book on contemporary Laos.

Soviet military aid is acknowledged by the Lao Communists from time to time. For example, on the occasion of the Soviet armed forces'
Recently, military and economic aid from Eastern Europe has begun to play a growing role in Laos. From Moscow's point of view, this has the advantage of not directly involving the Soviet Union and thus not embarrassing its relations with the RIG. In line with the enhanced East European aid role, the Lao Communists reported that in late November 1970 a mission from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had visited the Communist zone for discussions with high-ranking Pathet Lao, and that the Pathet Lao hosts had expressed their appreciation for the "material support" received from the GDR. The East German delegation was headed by Horst Brasch, a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, and included a major general. That military assistance to the LPLA was discussed with the German Communist delegation is clear, not only from the composition of the mission, but from the fact that its members had talks with LPLA Chief of Staff Sisavath and with Kaysone. The latter is the Secretary General of the semisecret People's Party of Laos (PPL) and thus the most powerful Lao Communist and is also in charge of all defense matters.

33rd anniversary, in 1971, Pathet Lao Radio said: "We are deeply moved by the generous assistance which the Soviet party and state, army and people have given us to increase our strength and defeat the enemy." (English-language broadcast of February 24, 1971.)

Ordinary visitors (e.g., newsmen) do not get to see Kaysone, who remains in the background. They are received by NLHS Chairman Souphanouvong. The PPL is a Marxist-Leninist organization whose existence is not normally acknowledged either in Laos itself or abroad, except for a few references (which apparently are due to oversight). Thus, the Soviet reference work Politicheskie partii zarnubezhnykh stran: spravochnik [Political Parties of Foreign Countries -- A Reference Work], Politizdat, Moscow, 1967, lists the NLHS front organization but not the PPL which actually directs it. The reference work for propagandists put out by Izd. Polit. Lit., in Moscow under the editorship of V. V. Kortunov and A. F. Kudriashov, in its 1968 edition, lists the Communist and Workers Parties of the World but does not include the PPL. However, as demonstrated in Langer and Zesloff, Revolution in Laos, there is ample evidence for the existence of this semisecret Communist party. The latest reference to it can be found in horst Brasch's interview (Neues Deutschland, December 11, 1970) given after his return from Laos, when he spoke of that party as "subscribing to the principles of Marxism-Leninism." It is significant that Kaysone was selected to represent the Lao revolutionary forces at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, although, in line with the clandestine nature of the PPL, Kaysone was officially billed as a mere vice-chairman of the NLHS, the PPL's front organization.
CHINESE ASSISTANCE

While Soviet and East European assistance continue to play a role in the Lao Communist military establishment, the bulk of the regular military equipment used by the LPLA (such as the AK-47 rifle) appears to be of Chinese origin.

Since its inception, the revolutionary movement in Laos, like that in Vietnam, has benefited from Chinese economic and military assistance. In the early stages of the "liberation struggle," and as soon as the Communists had gained control in China, the Viet Minh received equipment and money as well as training from across the border. The Chinese Communists provided military ordnance, political workers, trained technicians, and noncombatant advisers during the fighting against the French, from 1952 to 1954. This aid had a great deal to do with the Viet Minh's ability to launch an offensive in Tonkin and Laos in late 1953 and 1954 -- the years when the Pathet Lao first succeeded in creating a base for themselves on Lao territory thanks to the conquests of their Viet Minh allies. From then on, the Pathet Lao fought not only with their simple, local equipment but with weapons made in the Soviet Union, China, and Czechoslovakia. Chinese aid was further increased as the Laos crisis flared up once again and fighting approached the Chinese borders. Although Lao anti-Communists in 1960 and 1961 repeatedly spoke of the presence of Chinese forces in northern Laos, the writer found no unequivocal evidence for these contentions. It is quite likely, however, that Chinese Communist forces did cross the Lao border from Yunnan in support of the LPLA whenever it appeared in danger of losing control over the immediate border regions. Like the North Vietnamese, such Chinese forces would have found it easy to engage in quick forays across the border and, with their objectives achieved, to withdraw.

During the years of the Laos crisis, ties were formed between the Lao revolutionaries and the Chinese Communists which have remained effective to this day. Even though the fighting between Lao Communists and the non-Communists intermittently subsided, Chinese aid -- military and economic -- has continued to play an important role in allowing the LPLA to hold its own. 30

Whereas the Soviet aid effort to Laos is strictly limited to indirect assistance through the DRV, the Chinese assistance program channels some military and economic resources directly into the Communist zone and, in addition, provides within China certain services for the LPLA and NVA forces. Extensive interviews with the North Vietnamese Senior Captain Mai Dai Hap, who from early 1964 until the end of 1966 served as a military adviser to the 408th Pathet Lao battalion and whose accounts are corroborated by other information, provide a picture of the way in which Communist China, the DRV, and the NLHS zone collaborate in the procurement and transportation of supplies for the LPLA and NVA forces fighting in northern Laos.

South China, being outside the zone of U.S. bombing, provides a safe route for communications between North Vietnam and the rather inaccessible northwest of Laos. (Captain Hap, like other Vietnamese and Lao cadres, traveled that route on his way to and from the battle zones. 31) Some LPLA casualties are sent across the border for medical treatment, and postal channels between Hanoi and Nam Tha Province, where NVA forces are stationed, take advantage of the South China route, using a transfer point on the Sino-Lao border near Muong Sing. Nam Tha Province apparently is supplied entirely from China insofar as military-related items and even some food and clothing are concerned. 32

30This is confirmed by the testimony of several former Pathet Lao whom the author had occasion to interview.

31For a detailed account of this and other aspects of Hap's experience in Laos, see Chapter 8 in Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970.

32Such supplies include canned meat and fish, fish sauce and preserves, sugar, milk, cigarettes, soap, toothpaste, raincoat of clothing,
The supply procedure has been described as follows. Both the NVA and the LPLA forces establish their requirements (arms, ammunition, and other items) for each unit down to company level, and report them through their respective hierarchies to the DRV central authorities, which forward the requests to the Chinese government. Once the lists have been approved by the Chinese and the supplies are ready, the NVA and LPLA authorities are notified, and their representatives then go to China (i.e., Yunnan Province) to take official delivery and arrange for transportation across the border into Laos. Although not enough evidence is available to give us an idea of the scope of the program, the Chinese borderlands of Laos apparently also serve for the short-term military training of LPLA units and for the training of promising young Lao in a variety of simple technical skills.33

The Chinese aid program to the Lao Communists is greatly helped by a Chinese-built road network in northern Laos, which has been intermittently under construction since 1962. The first phase of the program was marked by the completion, in 1963, of a 50-mile highway linking the Chinese border regions of Yunnan Province to the capital of Phong Saly Province in Laos. For a number of years thereafter, only feeder roads were built in adjacent areas. In 1968, possibly in connection with the LPLA/NVA offensives in northern Laos, the construction program went once more into high gear. As a result, the poorly developed communications in the areas contiguous to China have been substantially improved, although precise data regarding the capacity of the new roads are unavailable. Once completed, the Chinese-built highway network in northern Laos could link up with the North Vietnamese road system at Dien Bien Phu. In the other direction, the new road turns south toward Pak Beng on the Mekong — thus moving very

kitchenware, shoes and sandals, clothes and blankets, and mosquito nets for use by the armed forces.

33 See, for example, Laos Hearings, p. 448.
close to an area of Thai insurgent activity. 34

34 The Chinese road construction program in northern Laos goes back to the era of the Geneva Accords. An agreement inviting China to build a road linking the Yunnan border with Phong Saly was signed on January 13, 1962 (see Peking Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, January 19, 1962, p. 22). The road was reported completed in April 1963 and was turned over to the Lao (i.e., NLHS) authorities on May 25, 1963, under the name "Laotian-Chinese Friendship Highway." The Chinese work force was to have been withdrawn at the same time. Meanwhile, Vice Premier Phoumi Nosavena visited Peking, according to a joint Chinese-Lao communiqué of December 4, 1962 (broadcast by Peking on the same day), reportedly requested that the road to Phong Saly be extended to the important junction of Nam Tha in northwestern Laos. The Chinese party stated that it "would consider this request." Although the situation involving the Chinese road-building activity in northern Laos thereafter becomes murky, it appears that there was also an agreement, dating back to 1962, which involved another road out of China, linking Yunnan Province with the northern Lao community of Muong Sai. For some five years, the Chinese appear to have limited themselves to road surveys in northern Laos and to the construction of minor feeder roads on both sides of the border. In September 1968 a new phase in the Chinese road-building program got under way. Still in progress at present, it has significance for China's capacity to support both the Lao insurgency (and its North Vietnamese allies in the area) and the insurgent movement in Thailand. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William H. Sullivan stated in his testimony before Congress on October 20, 1969 (see Laos Hearings, p. 372) that Chinese construction units had begun in September 1968 to extend a road from Heng La in South China near the Lao border 50 miles southeast to Muong Sai. This road was completed in January 1969, when construction began from there toward the northeast to Muong La, where it linked up with a trail from North Vietnam. Still another road linking up with the Chinese road network into Laos at Muong Sai had been completed to the community of Muong Houn by the onset of the rainy season of 1970. Another push southward during the 1971 dry season (beginning in October) could eventually provide Chinese forces with motorable roads all the way to the Mekong and close to the Thai border. What emerges from this complicated picture of Chinese road-building in northern Laos is this: After years of inactivity, Peking has, during the past two years, made an effort to develop feeder roads into underdeveloped and sparsely populated northern Laos, providing the Chinese with substantially enhanced leverage in dealing with the Lao insurgency in that part of the country.
There has been much speculation about the objectives of the Chinese Communists in suddenly resuming their road-building in northern Laos. A number of explanations appear plausible, and the true reason is likely to be found in a combination of them. In the first place, the new roads allow the rapid introduction of Chinese forces into endangered areas of Laos -- an issue which has become much more pressing in view of the recent upsurge in the fighting and the growing U.S. air action in a region long viewed by the Chinese as important to their security. The completion of these roads also provides the Communists with greater mobility in countering the effective guerrilla activity of the Lao and tribal anti-Communist forces, which have the advantage of being able to rely on support from the air. Further, the road system will allow the Chinese to give more efficient support to the northern Thai insurgency should this become desirable, as the end of the Pak Beng road is only about 20 miles from an area in which the Thai insurgents are particularly active. Finally, one cannot rule out the possibility that Peking hopes to gain leverage over Hanoi by extending its communications into northern Laos. On the one hand, the new road system, which links northern Laos to Bien Bien Phu, helps the Hanoi regime by greatly facilitating NVA transport. On the other hand, the very existence of these access roads out of China potentially increases Chinese influence in northern Laos, an asset which could be useful to Peking in the event of a rift with Hanoi. Meanwhile, the Chinese-built roads are useful to Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese military operations in northern Laos. 35

As mentioned earlier, unsubstantiated reports regarding a Chinese Communist military presence in northern Laos go back as far as 1959, the early days of the Lao crisis. A probably very small unit of the Chinese armed forces has been, at least until recently, stationed with the Chinese Economic and Cultural Mission in Xieng Khouang Province. 36

36 See Laos Hearings, p. 412.
The resumption of Chinese road-building has been accompanied, not merely by an influx of Chinese labor teams, but also by the assignment to that part of Laos of a Chinese protective military force. The strength of these Chinese units has been variously estimated as between 3,000 and more than 10,000 men. These Chinese construction and engineering teams are said to be protected by Chinese-manned antiaircraft guns.

Interviews with Pathet Lao defectors and other available information suggest that Communist China’s assistance program to the Lao Communists also involves some military and technical training for LPLA forces and NLHS cadres, although the scope of this program is clearly minor when compared to the North Vietnamese training effort.

While no figures have ever been published by Peking or by the NLHS regarding this aspect of foreign assistance, Lao trainees in China may be somewhat more numerous than those in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, whose total number probably does not exceed one hundred. Occasionally, the presence of such Lao students in China is officially acknowledged by Chinese sources. For example, on October 11, 1970, the Chinese Communist press agency NCNA referred to “Lao experts and students in Peking,” but gave no further details. On the occasion of a visit to China by a Lao “Heroes and Model Workers Delegation,” in the spring of 1971, NCNA (on May 11, 1971) mentioned the presence in Peking of Lao students -- again without further elaboration.

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37 Former Ambassador to Laos William H. Sullivan (currently Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs), when testifying before the Symington Subcommittee in October 1969, gave an estimate of 6,000, of whom 2,000 were armed. Newspaper reports based on various locally obtained information provide other, and generally higher, figures.

38 See the Souvanna Phouma interview of September 1971, fn. 35 above.

39 Ambassador Sullivan testified that the Xieng Khouang Chinese Mission, for example, published training manuals and similar documents for the Pathet Lao.
The exact role played in the Chinese aid program by the in-country agencies of Peking, primarily the Chinese Economic and Cultural Mission in Xieng Khouang Province and possibly the Chinese Consulate General in Phong Saly, is unclear. The major decisions probably are not made at this local level but rather in Peking and, through the high-level representatives of the parties concerned, in Hanoi. Nevertheless, the presence of any representatives in the Communist zone of Laos gives Peking a clear advantage over Moscow, which lacks such representation. As Pathet Lao reports confirm, the Chinese Mission maintains close relations with the Lao Communist authorities and personnel in the zone. By its very location in the proximity of South China it is in a good position to report home about the situation in Communist Laos, and is also able to respond to Pathet Lao requests more efficiently than the Soviets, who have to rely on liaison by way of Hanoi.

It is not known what volume of foreign aid is required for the Pathet Lao to sustain their present posture and programs. No quantitative data on the flow of Soviet and Chinese military and economic assistance to the Lao Communist forces are available either from Communist or from non-Communist sources. Even an approximate estimate is difficult, as the bulk of supplies entering Laos from North Vietnam is destined to be transported over the Ho Chi Minh trails to South Vietnam. Another portion of such supplies, its quantity unknown, is meant for the North Vietnamese forces stationed in Laos.

40 Apart from its Embassy in Vientiane, which has for years been manned only by a chargé d'affaires, the CPR maintains official liaison with the Lao Communists through its Economic and Cultural Mission, which was established in November 1961 in Xieng Khouang, then the seat of the Souvanna government. The following year, Souvanna Phouma moved to Vientiane and established his tripartite government including the NLHS, but the Chinese Mission remained in Xieng Khouang for purposes of maintaining direct contact with the Lao Communists. The exact whereabouts of the Mission at present are uncertain, as the RL offensive in 1969 temporarily occupied the Xieng Khouang area, forcing the evacuation of the Mission there. The CPR also maintains a Consulate General (apparently no longer recognized by the RLG) in Phong Saly on the basis of an agreement announced in October 1961. The Lao Consulate General, opened in Kunming at the same time as a reciprocal act, is no longer operating.
The remainder, which comes in largely over Routes 6 and 7, is earmarked for the LPLA. Whatever its magnitude -- and in the view of the Pathet Lao it apparently is not entirely adequate\(^{41}\) -- it is clear that, with the exception of some village militia, who are equipped with locally manufactured weapons, the Lao Communists must rely on imports for their arms and ammunition. Even a glowing Soviet report on achievements in the Communist zone recently admitted that the entire sector could command no more than "50 enterprises of the small and handicraft industries."\(^{42}\) This meager indigenous technological base is obviously insufficient to sustain the combat capability of the LPLA, for, as a Soviet observer has confirmed, "they are no longer the primitively equipped troops of the post-1946 partisan movement, but a modern army with artillery, tanks, and armored transports."\(^{43}\) Thus, the LPLA uses the AK-47 (largely the Chinese version), and all its other military equipment is also of foreign manufacture.

The outside aid on which Communist forces in Laos are so critically dependent is provided by the Sino-Soviet powers primarily through the intermediary of North Vietnam. This heavy dependence on foreign military assistance is unlikely to change for some time to come, especially since the continuing American bombing of the Communist sector of Laos is making investments in substantial new production facilities impractical. Any cessation or slowing of the present flow of outside assistance would compel the LPLA to reduce the scope of its military operations and return to the low-level guerrilla activity of the movement's earlier days. In other words, the level of fighting and the military capabilities of the Communist forces in Laos are in important respects a function of the quality and quantity of the support they can obtain from Moscow and Peking.

\(^{41}\) In his appeal of October 12, 1970, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Lao independence (as monitored on that date by FIDES), Souphanouvong called on the socialist countries "to give greater support and assistance to our anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation."

\(^{42}\) Report by Tass correspondents S. Afonin and D. Petrov, broadcast on October 10, 1970, as reported by FIDES, October 12, 1970.

III. SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY AND THE PATHET LAO

The Sino-Soviet conflict itself has spilled over into Laos. But here, even more than in Vietnam, the rivalry between Moscow and Peking is muted by their deference to the predominant position of Hanoi. Both Communist powers have always recognized Laos as being in the North Vietnamese sphere of influence. They have therefore cooperated with Hanoi's policies and strategy in Laos even when such policies were not entirely to their liking. Although this has not prevented either Moscow or Peking from trying to move the Pathet Lao to an ideological stance and outlook reflecting its own, an examination of Soviet and Chinese statements over the years does not reveal the sharp and overt mutual recriminations we find in other contested areas.

Nevertheless, an analysis of Soviet and Chinese literature on Southeast Asia points to pronounced differences regarding the two Communist powers' preferred strategies in Laos. It also suggests that, with all due deference to Hanoi's leading role, both Moscow and Peking have been actively seeking to propagate their respective policy lines among the Pathet Lao. The available open literature, supplemented by interviews with former Pathet Lao and other observers, thus provides insights into their relations with the Pathet Lao as well as into the latter's response to the two powers' efforts to influence them. Many of the details of the story, however, will remain hidden so long as not only Moscow and Peking but the Lao Communists themselves try to avoid touching on this sensitive subject.

In the 1950s the Chinese Communists and the Soviets still were essentially in agreement with regard to their primary objective in Laos -- the removal of U.S. influence -- and the strategy that should be pursued to attain this end. One must recall that these were the years of the Bandung spirit[^44] of Chinese advocacy of the neutralization

[^44]: At the Bandung Conference (April 1955), Chou En-lai pledged that he would not interfere in the affairs of Laos. A year later, when Souvanna visited Peking, Chou reconfirmed the Chinese position, but stated that the pledge was given on condition that Laos would not permit American bases on its territory.
concept, and of Chinese nonaggression pledges. As to the Soviet Union, its interest in Laos was at best intermittent. Neither the Soviet Union nor China had yet entered into diplomatic relations with Laos, and their involvement there in the early 1950s remained slight. The available evidence suggests that Moscow and Peking were quite satisfied to see Laos transformed into a buffer state, and were not greatly concerned about the role that the Pathet Lao would play in such a state, despite their support and sympathy for the Lao revolutionaries. And, though they backed Pathet Lao claims for a seat at the first Geneva Conference (1954), both powers eventually agreed to drop that issue.45

In the late 1950s, when the situation in Laos heated up as a result of the progressive political bipolarization, and when the United States and North Vietnam became more deeply involved in the military struggle, Laos of course claimed greater attention in the Communist world. China viewed the conflict as a threat to its security,46 and

45 Even at that early date, Peking appears to have displayed a greater interest than Moscow in the nature of the political solution for Laos. Anthony Eden recalls, for example, that, at the time of the 1954 Geneva Conference, Chou En-lai was more insistent than Molotov that the settlement for Vietnam should also apply to Laos (and Cambodia). See Memoirs, p. 133.

46 This concern was intensified by the activities—obviously condoned by the Lao rightists and their Western supporters—of bands of KMT military in the Sino-Lao border area. These Nationalist troops in Laos, whose story has never been told in detail, remained for years a thorn in the side of the Chinese Communists. A Hsinhua News Agency release dated March 13, 1959, complained: "For six months past [sic] remnant Chiang Kai-shek troops operating in Phong Saly and Houă-sāi Provinces in Laos have been continually invading China’s border areas in Yunnan Province. Available evidence proves that these troops in their operations have been getting active support and material aid from the Laotian authorities." (See p. 23 in Concerning the Situation in Laos, issued by the Foreign Languages Press in Peking in 1959.) Matters were not helped by the fact that the Lao government that same year allowed the Chinese Nationalists to establish a consulate in Vientiane. In late 1970, to judge by Thai reports, some 2,000 to 3,000 KMT refugees, including substantial numbers of KMT forces, remained in the northern areas of Thailand bordering on Burma. These forces reportedly were remnants of the 93rd KMT Division (Bangkok Post, December 15, 1970).
Khrushchev, rather surprisingly, jumped into the Laos conflict in dramatic fashion by launching an airlift to the Neutralist-Communist forces and thereby engaging Soviet prestige. All indications are that Khrushchev's was an ad hoc operation, but the reasons for this strong reaction -- especially in the light of the remoteness of Laos and its lack of intrinsic significance to Soviet interests -- remain unclear. It seems quite possible that the growing Sino-Soviet rift played a role in the Soviet decision to intervene, as a way of demonstrating to the Chinese and to Communists throughout the Third World that Moscow had the power to back up revolutionary movements and was willing to use it. The Soviet intervention, on the other hand, by canceling out U.S. support for the anti-Communists, also served the interests of North Vietnam and China.

Khrushchev's subsequent decision to break off the engagement in Laos and negotiate a political settlement with the United States must have caused some opposition in Peking. If the Chinese nevertheless went along with this move, it was probably because a political settlement could put an end to both the American and the Soviet military presence in Laos and thereby serve Chinese interests even if it meant that a Communist seizure of power in Laos would have to be at least temporarily postponed. At any rate, the Chinese willingly went to Geneva in 1961, as did the Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao, to work out a compromise: the neutralization of Laos under a tripartite government. But Chinese speeches at the conference harshly denouncing the United States, and thereby contrasting with the expressed attitude of Moscow, reflected the growing conflict between the two Communist powers. Nevertheless, although Peking may have been dubious about the

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47 It must be recalled that in October 1959, when Khrushchev visited Peking, a sharp rift on strategy had developed between the Soviets and the Chinese. This was also the year of Khrushchev's visit to the United States -- the era of the "Camp David spirit" -- which provoked hostile Chinese reactions. That same year, the Soviets took India's side against Peking and renounced their secret agreement to assist China in nuclear development.

48 This was also suggested by several diplomatic observers in Vientiane.
feasibility of a neutralization of Laos, Soviet proposals to that effect continued to enjoy Chinese support. It could well be that Peking was satisfied to see the Soviets saddled with responsibility for the Laos compromise settlement, which Peking did not expect, and perhaps did not even wish, to last.

When the Laos settlement did indeed come apart, in 1963, and the civil war resumed, Peking and Moscow parted ways also on the issue of policy in Laos, and the Chinese began openly to vent their criticism of the Soviet role there. A statement issued in June 1963 in Peking Review, and thus meant for the world at large, illustrates this antagonism:

At a time when the Geneva agreements are being brutally infringed, people have every reason to pin hopes on the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference [Britain and the USSR] to defend the Geneva agreements and relax Laotian tension; the co-chairmen should have discharged their duties. . . . We hope that the co-chairmen will distinguish the right from the wrong and take effective measures to curb U.S. imperialist aggression and intervention in Laos. . . . However, U.S. imperialism has gone so far as to appeal to somebody [i.e., the Soviet Union] "to use his restraining influence" to soften up the Laotian people, "bring pressure on China, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and Poland [member of the International Control Commission and representative of the Communist side on it] and curb the sympathy and support of the various peoples for the Laotian people's patriotic and just struggle.49

Parallel with the intensification of the Sino-Soviet debate went Peking's increasing advocacy of a hard line of insurrection and political polarization with regard to Laos. In contrast, the Soviets to this day cling to the fragile structure of the tripartite coalition

government and have used whatever influence they command in Hanoi and in Sam Neua to promote a return to the Geneva formula and a political settlement.50

In October 1960, after the Kong Le coup, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Laos. The Soviet Ambassador moved to the Plain of Jars,51 where Neutralist and Pathet Lao headquarters were situated in close proximity during the last phase of the Laos crisis. The CPR and the DRV (both still unrepresented by an embassy) followed suit and each inaugurated an Economic and Cultural Mission there.52 With the establishment of the tripartite government, however, the Soviet Embassy moved back to Vientiane, where ever since it has maintained correct and at times even cordial relations with the non-Communist rump government of Souvanna Phouma. In September 1962, when the tripartite government established diplomatic relations with all neighboring countries, a Chinese embassy also was inaugurated in the Lao capital. But it is significant that Peking has refused to follow the Soviet example and has left its mission in Xieng Khouang, clearly indicating thereby its interest in lending the Lao Communists international recognition and suggesting also that China may eventually wish to shift its full support to them.53 (The same applies to the

50 While Peking generally ignores any attempts on the part of the contending parties to bring about a political settlement in Laos through negotiation, Moscow frequently endorses such attempts. As late as February 4, 1971, Tass reported a comment by its observer to the effect that "talks could pave the way to peace in Laos."

51 The Soviet Embassy was located at Pongsavan near Khang Khay.

52 Phouni Vongvichit in his Le Laos et la lutte victorieuse du peuple Lao contre le néo-colonialisme américain (Editions du Neo Lao Haksat, Sam Neua, 1968, p. 144) also mentions a Czech mission. No information about its fate has been found.

53 The Chinese and Lao governments at present maintain embassies in each other's capitals. Both are headed by chargés d'affaires. The Lao consulate which Souvanna opened in December 1961 in Kunming was closed by the Lao when full diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in 1962. However, although this act, in the Lao government's view, should have been reciprocated by the closing of the CPR consulate in Phong Saly, which no longer has legal status, neither the Pathet Lao, who control the area, nor the
DRV and its mission in Xieng Khouang.) Peking has since made its position even clearer by downgrading its embassy in Vientiane. The Chinese Ambassador did not return, even though most of the recalled Chinese ambassadors were sent back to their posts after the Cultural Revolution, and by indicating unequivocally that, since the coup of April 1964, the Souvanna government no longer enjoys legal status in Peking's eyes, a position that parallels the stand of the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese.

Whereas Peking has long since refused to assist the Souvanna government and is lending active and direct material, including military, support to the Lao Communists, the Soviet Union continues its aid program, if only a token one, to the RLG. Without a permanent representation in the Communist zone, the Soviet ties with the Pathet Lao are tenuous and the Soviets are at a disadvantage compared with Peking. Moreover, the ambiguity of this relationship, underlined by the Soviet Ambassador's frequent meetings with Souvanna and the King, must create doubts in the minds of the Pathet Lao about Soviet intentions in Laos, thereby playing into the hands of the anti-Soviet Peking propagandists. A stepped-up Viet program of dispatching delegations and individual visitors from Moscow, the cordial welcome accorded NLHS delegations there, and messages of support from the highest-ranking Chinese Communists have wished to see the consulate cease operations. In addition, the Chinese continue to maintain their Economic and Cultural Mission (established in November 1961) in Xieng Khouang, although its legal status is doubtful. At least since 1966, the Pathet Lao have stationed a representative in Peking, in addition to Mme Quinim Pholsena (the widow of the murdered Neutralist Foreign Minister, who was of Chinese extraction and was widely rumored to have been Peking's man in Vientiane). She attended most public functions for Southeast Asian visitors. Since 1970 her role has apparently been taken over by the Lao Neutralist General Heuan Muongkhonvilay and his wife, who regularly attend all official Peking functions related to the struggle in Indochina.

The USSR maintains an ambassador in Vientiane, and the RLG is represented by an ambassador in Moscow. Apparently, no official NLHS representative is stationed in Moscow.
Soviet officials cannot quite dispel the cloud over Soviet relations with the Pathet Lao that is caused by the Soviet Union's ambiguous relationship to the RLC. By contrast, the Lao Communists can be in no doubt as to Peking's sympathies.

Chinese and Soviet aid programs are handled in characteristically different ways, as was pointed out earlier. China furnishes direct military support to the Pathet Lao, whereas the Soviet Union is careful to preserve at least the appearance of neutrality by channeling through Hanoi whatever assistance it provides. Another important aspect of the Communist aid program to Laos involves the training of young Pathet Lao in the Communist countries. The numbers of such students in China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe are insignificant when compared to the scale of the training effort in North Vietnam. But it is known that Pathet Lao are receiving a variety of technical and military training on both sides of the Sino-Lao border from the Chinese Communists, who profit from the geography of the area, which allows them

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54 For example, Secretary General Brezhnev sent a message to the Cairo Conference on Laos in which he spoke of the "growing international solidarity with the courageous Laotian people" and stated that "the Soviet people and the Communist Party invariably side with the peoples of Indochina, who are waging a just struggle, and help and support them in every way." (World Marxist Review, August 1970, p. 39.) The fact that Brezhnev speaks of the people and of the Soviet party but not of its government may be due not only to the fact that his position is a party position. It appears that Soviet policy in Laos makes a fine distinction (as in the days of the Comintern) between government and party contacts: the Soviet government deals only with the Souvanna regime, but the CPSU has relations with the NLHS and PPL. (For example, as stated earlier, Kaysone appeared in April 1971 as the official NLHS/PPL delegate to the 24th Congress of the CPSU.)

55 Peking's view of Laos appears to be reflected also in the bureaucratic handling of Lao affairs. To judge by references in the Chinese press to CPR Foreign Ministry officials concerned with Lao visitors, Laos, although under an internationally recognized non-Communist government, is apparently under the jurisdiction of the Ministry's section dealing with Asian Communist rather than non-Communist countries.

56 On occasion, several thousand young Lao are at any one time receiving training in the DRV. Soviet and Chinese specialists are reported to participate in the training of young Lao, as mentioned in the testimony of the former medical chief of the NLHS Attopeu Province.
easy access to the largely Communist-controlled provinces of Phong Saly, Nam Tha, and Xieng Khouang. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is continuing its modest program of training young Lao from the non-Communist zone, simultaneously with its only slightly larger support to the other side through the advanced education of promising or prominent Lao Communists. (Several children of Pathet Lao leaders have received or are now receiving such education in the Soviet Union as well as in China. Five sons and daughters of Souphanouvong alone have had scholarships to Soviet, Bulgarian, and Romanian institutions; still others among the Prince's ten children are reportedly in Peking.)

It would be useful to know what happens eventually to the returning students from the Soviet Union and China, how much and what kind of influence they wield in Communist Laos, and whether they

57 Chinese influence appears to be particularly strong in the border province of Phong Saly, although this does not seem to result in any conflict with the Vietnamese, who, as elsewhere in the Communist zone of Laos, have a vested interest here also. About three hundred Chinese are thought to be in Phong Saly Province engaged in supply operations for Laos. An unknown additional number of Chinese troops are said to be moving in and out of the province in connection with guard service for the supply route from Yunnan. The former are reportedly also involved in training some Neutralist Lao forces in the province. Phong Saly has long been at least nominally under the control of the warlord Khamouane Houphe, who is believed to be under the domination of the Chinese Communists and among whose 1,500 men are members of the Sinitic Ho tribe.

58 Bernard Fall in his essay "The Pathet Lao" (in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965, p. 183), basing his statement on (unspecified) Soviet and Chinese sources, estimates that the total number of such students has never exceeded one hundred. Whether this estimate is accurate cannot be determined, since Moscow and Peking have made no announcements about this aspect of their aid programs. The high-level East German delegation which visited Sam Neua in 1970 promised to step up its training of young Lao, but no figures regarding the size of the agreed-on program were published.
bring back a sympathetic view of their host country. None of the persons interviewed by the author belonged to this category, and other evidence is too slim for us to venture a judgment on these points. At this point, all one can say is that no Soviet- or China-trained Pathet Lao occupy high positions in the Lao revolutionary movement's hierarchy, and there is no indication that either Soviet-trained or China-trained returnees are playing an important role in the Communist zone.

As to the Lao reaction to the Soviet Union and Communist China, interviews with former Pathet Lao produced various reactions to the question: What did you think of China and the Soviet Union during your life in the Communist zone? The results may be summarized in these terms. Those defectors who were uneducated and out of touch with the administrative hierarchy knew and cared little about China and the Soviet Union. Most of them did know that these were powerful Socialist countries. The better-educated informants were aware of...

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59 It is said that the sudden death, in 1968, of one of Souphanouvong's sons who had studied in Moscow was the consequence of hostility on the part of some Pathet Lao to his pro-Soviet orientation, but this has been denied by the Communists. It has also been suggested that the Lao returnees from China (like those from the DRV) bring back strong antichite (and thus anti-Russian) views. This raises the question of Lao reactions to their Chinese neighbors. From the author's reading, and from talks with defectors as well as with Lao from the non-Communist side, it appears that the Chinese do not loom very large in the thinking of the average Lao (this does not apply, of course, to the Chinese merchants found in Vientiane and other towns of Laos, including those of Xieng Khouang Province in the Communist zone). The wider horizon of the Lao elite understandably includes China, but opinions on the issue of a Chinese threat seem to be divided. Robert Shaplen, in Time Cut of Hand (New York, 1969), states that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma saw no particular reason to worry about the Chinese, although he added, "But don't stir the anthill!" (p. 360). Equally prominent Prince Boun Oum, on the other hand, expressed to Shaplen the view that without a white protector Laos would become a battlefield between the Vietnamese and the Thai, "and then the Chinese will walk in and pick up the pieces" (pp. 158-159). The anthropologist and Laos specialist Joél Halévy, who in the late 1950s studied the Lao attitudes toward the Chinese, concluded then: "For the present, the Lao do not feel themselves threatened by the Chinese in an active sense as they do by the North Vietnamese." ("The Role of the Chinese in Lao Society," Ann. of the Comm. Vol. 49, Part 1, July 1961.)
the Sino-Soviet split, and this was particularly true of those who had studied in North Vietnam. One interviewee stated that they were told that China was better than the Soviet Union. Another said that, while Stalin was a great leader, Khrushchev was not a good man because he worked together with the United States. He added that the same view was expressed by the Khana Khoueng (a high administrative official in the NLHS zone).

It is known that Chinese advisers and technicians assist the Pathet Lao in the writing of propaganda for radio broadcasting (and probably also for their press). This may account for the suspiciously Chinese flavor of the excessive praise for Mao, the Cultural Revolution, and the whole complex of related notions that sometimes appears in Pathet Lao broadcasts, whereas no such glorification is encountered with regard to the Soviet Union. But even if some of the pro-Chinese propaganda originates with Chinese specialists, one finds a range of other evidence suggesting that, at the very least, the Pathet Lao have a greater cultural affinity for China than for the Soviet Union. For example, Chinese (but not Soviet) stories are circulated in translation among the people, Chinese examples are quoted as models for Lao behavioral patterns, and the language of the Pathet Lao leaders' speeches has, if anything, a pro-Peking coloring.

In the Sino-Soviet controversy over the correct revolutionary formula it is not difficult to see why Pathet Lao sympathies would be on the Chinese rather than on the Russian side. The Soviets hold that revolution in the Third World must be placed in the context of the

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60 See Ambassador Sullivan's testimony on this issue in Laos Hearings (p. 449).

61 A collection of short stories translated into Lao from the Chinese and entitled "Flowers on the High Mountain" has been issued by the NLHS Central Party Press in three thousand copies (a large number, considering the fact that the total population of the Communist zone does not exceed one million and at best half of the adults are literate). The Lao preface to the book ends thus: "This is but one part of the revolutionary history of the Chinese army and people, but it constitutes an example to follow for our national liberation forces in their struggle against the American imperialists and the American aggressors."
worldwide class struggle, and that the national liberation movement is but one element in the array of world-revolutionary forces that depend on and must be led by the mighty Soviet Union. This analysis cannot have much appeal to a group of people who have been fighting for the better part of two decades and are not prepared to consider themselves as standing merely on the periphery of world events. Soviet efforts to play down the role of the national liberation movements, even when accompanied by high praise for the Pathet Lao, are unlikely to meet with sympathetic response among Lao Communists. In Laos, moreover, the Soviet Union plays the role of a cautious status quo power, ambiguous in its policies toward the revolutionary movement and using its assets to restrain armed conflict and retard revolutionary change. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Pathet Lao, when forced to make a decision, have followed the Vietnamese lead and sided with China, rather than the Soviet Union, on such issues as the Sino-Indian border conflict, nuclear testing and the NPT.

62 The Soviets also combine this theme with a rebuke to the Chinese for their stress on the self-reliance of revolutionary movements in even small countries such as Laos. A Moscow broadcast of July 22, 1970, emphasizing the need for the antiimperialists forces to unite with the Socialist forces (i.e., the Soviet Union and its supporters), criticized Peking's position in these words: "Such a policy has isolated the small countries. The peoples of small countries will inevitably be defeated in the anti-imperialist struggle because their strength is no match for that of imperialism" (as cited in the British journal Sing, Supplement B, No. 4, July/August 1970, p. 18).

63 See, for example, Pathet Lao praise of Chinese nuclear accomplishments as reported by Ph'oun on January 3 and August 2, 1967.

64 A document from the Communist zone in the author's possession also confirms the "antirevisionist" position of the Pathet Lao. These handwritten notes were taken at a training course for propagandists held in September 1965 in Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Province. The Soviet Union, China, and Albania are listed among the Socialist countries; there is no mention of Yugoslavia.
"people's war," and relations with Albania.

Lest one conclude from this that the Pathet Lao have lined up unquestioningly with Peking, it is important to remember that the Lao Communists' first allegiance is to their North Vietnamese sponsors and allies. Like the latter, only once removed so to speak, they desire the support of both major Communist powers, and it is in their interest to avoid involvement in the Sino-Soviet conflict even if their natural sympathies and the prevailing situation in Laos tend to favor a rapprochement with Peking. Pathet Lao statements, writings, and behavior toward the two contending parties reveal a conscious effort to balance their influence and retain freedom of action -- an effort that, of course, reflects Vietnamese attitudes and guidance. This may explain why there is no convincing evidence for the existence of a pro-Soviet or a pro-Peking faction in the Pathet Lao leadership.

Perhaps the recent heavy emphasis in Pathet Lao propaganda and writings on the Japanese threat in Southeast Asia is also due to Chinese influence. See, for example, the treatment of the Japan issue in the authoritative book by NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit, previously cited. Pathet Lao statements assert that the Japanese are attempting to revive their Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere and that U.S. imperialists are operating through the Japanese militarists. In line with this contention, the Pathet Lao attack the Japanese peace corps in Laos as a covert military operation.

A Xinhua report of March 12, 1966, for example, reported the visit of a Pathet Lao art troupe to Albania. In November of the same year, Souphanouvong sent a congratulatory message to Albania (reported by FBIS on November 30, 1966). In July 1968, Khamtay Siphandone, the supreme commander of the LPLA, sent a congratulatory message to Albania, and a few days earlier Albania invited a student from Laos (reported by FBIS July 18 and July 9, respectively). Cordial relations between the two regimes continue to this day, as confirmed by a telegram Prince Souphanouvong recently sent to Albania on the occasion of the 26th anniversary of its liberation. In that message, he spoke of "militant solidarity and friendship" between the two peoples (Tirana Domestic Service of December 7, 1970, as reproduced in FBIS, December 8, 1970).

It is true that André Tong, in an article entitled "Le Laos: une guerre oubliée" (Est et Ouest, May 16-31, 1969) suggests that "since several months ago, a real split has appeared among the Lao Communists. Some of them have remained faithful to the orthodox Soviet line whereas others -- and not the least of them -- have lined up with Peking." He asserts that Souphanouvong and Phoumi have always been identified with a Soviet orientation, but Kaysone and Nouhak (the latter being erroneously identified as "chairman of the Central Committee of the PPL") have
In the effort not to offend either Moscow or Peking, both are labeled "fraternal," and Pathet Lao leaders follow up visits to Peking with stopovers in Moscow and vice versa. The Soviet Union is generally accorded first place in any Pathet Lao statement listing the Socialist countries, as is its due in terms of seniority and power, but this is balanced by the special praise bestowed from time to time on the "fraternal Chinese people," as is done regularly for the North Vietnamese. Quite frequently, the Pathet Lao avoid the hierarchical issue by simply referring to "the Socialist countries." Pathet Lao textbooks that the author has had occasion to examine also make it a point to distribute compliments evenhandedly, as, for example, by referring to the technological advances of the mighty Soviet Union and balancing this by stressing the vast population of mighty China (which must be particularly impressive for the Lao, whose country barely counts three million inhabitants, not even half of them in the Communist zone).

gone over to Peking's side. However, his sole evidence for this important statement reads: "Monitoring of radio broadcasts of Pathet Lao forces in southern Laos has proved that these Communist troops had become pro-Chinese as a consequence of Nouhak's and Kaysone's adherence to Mao Tse-tung's doctrines."

This balance of Chinese and Soviet influences, which is evident in all Pathet Lao writings and statements, is carried even into the realm of pictorial propaganda. For example, the author has in his possession a pamphlet dating back to 1965 and issued by the NLHS which shows two pictures side by side: a Soviet gathering of support for the Lao people's anti-U.S. war, and a similar scene taking place in China.

In October 1969, for example, at a party for foreign guests in Sam Neua, the NLHS Secretary General said in his welcome speech: "I express deep gratitude to the socialist countries, first of all the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. . . ." (Pathet Lao News Agency [in English], October 14, 1969, as reported in FRIS on that date.) It is significant that Kaysone, speaking as the leading figure of the PPL in his article celebrating the 25th anniversary of Lao independence, put the DRV first, before the Soviet Union and China. (Pathet Lao News Agency [in English], October 3, 1970, as reported by FRIS the following day.)

See, for example, Souphanouvong's appeal, as reported by FRIS, December 12, 1970.
A comparison of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese policy positions on issues of controversy between Moscow and Peking shows that the Lao Communists have never diverged from Hanoi's stand. In view of the Vietnamese Communists' long and pervasive ideological, organizational, and material influence among the Pathet Lao, it is reasonable to assume that the latter's refusal to be drawn into the Sino-Soviet conflict is a reflection of Hanoi's policies, that is to say, that the Pathet Lao as junior partners in an Indochinese revolutionary alliance are simply following Hanoi's line. Such a policy has the more appeal as the Lao Communists themselves stand to benefit from the support of both major Communist powers and would have little to gain by choosing sides in the conflict. It is further facilitated by the fact that neither of the two contending parties appears to be pressing the Pathet Lao to declare their position and line up with one of the contestants. Although both Moscow and Peking beam a steady flow of propaganda to Laos, they have apparently refrained from interfering in the organizational apparatus of the Lao Communist movement, contrary to their behavior toward other Asian revolutionary movements.

As regards the relative weight of the world's several revolutionary forces, the Lao Communists take neither the Soviet nor the Chinese side. Phoumi Vongvichit's authoritative Le Laos et la lutte victorieuse du peuple Lao contre le neo-colonialisme americain, for example, lists the usual three major revolutionary elements: "Socialist construction" in the established socialist countries, the national liberation movement, and the workers' struggle in the capitalist states. But, contrary to Soviet and Chinese prescriptions, it avoids assigning special weight to any one of these factors. Nevertheless, it is clear

71 In the mid-1960s, Moscow broadcast 3.5 hours weekly in the Lao language. (Comparable more recent data are not available.) Peking, during the same period, broadcast 17.5 hours weekly.

that China's revolutionary stance and Mao's world view encounter more sympathy among the Pathet Lao than do the behavior and political philosophy of the Soviet Union. Characteristically, therefore, the Pathet Lao analysis highlights the CPR and the DRV as particularly relevant to the revolution in Laos and singles them out for praise as "two socialist countries which actively support the Lao revolution." In this way everyone gets his due, but China and, of course, Vietnam get a little more than the Soviet Union. The treatment of other central ideological issues conforms to this pattern. Official Lao Communist statements describe the "national and democratic revolution" in Laos as being in essence a revolution to liberate the peasantry, although they also stress the need for building a worker-peasant alliance. Particularly significant for the ideological position of the Lao Communists is the role they assign to armed struggle in the development of the revolution. Kaysone, the Secretary General of the People's Party of Laos and its most authoritative voice, has this to say on the subject: "The Party always regards armed struggle and political struggle as the two fundamental ones, the former being the most important form to win victory." In the taxonomy of the Communist parties, the PPL belongs neither in the Soviet nor in the Chinese camp, but its basic orientation is rather toward Peking's view of the world, even if the realities of the Lao situation require modifications of this radical view.


74 In 1970 Kaysone said: "The national and democratic revolution in Laos is, in essence, a revolution to liberate the peasantry." From an article by Kaysone on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the proclamation of Lao independence, broadcast in English by the Pathet Lao News Agency on October 5, 1970 (as reported by FFRS, October 6, 1970).

75 The Chinese orientation of the PPL revolutionary formula is also evident in Kaysone's account (in the above article) of the evolution of the Lao revolutionary struggle. He states that initially the Lao revolutionaries built revolutionary bases in the jungle areas, and then on the plains and around the towns -- a pattern reminiscent of Lin Piao's recommended approach.
China's until recently adamant opposition to any dealings with the "U.S. imperialists and their running dogs" (except in conditions promising their surrender) and its formula of "protracted people's war" have been ideologically attractive to the Pathet Lao. But once they had the approval of Hanoi, they did not hesitate in March 1970, despite Chinese objections, to explore the possibility of political negotiations. While Peking studiously ignored the Pathet Lao proposal to the Lao government, the Soviet Union soon endorsed the move as in line with its own preferred strategy. Evidence of this endorsement included the fact that the Polish representative on the International Control Commission (ICC), who consistently speaks for the Soviet position, was authorized to cooperate in the Pathet Lao approach to Souvanna Phouma, and the Soviet news media gave much play to the possibility of a political settlement in Laos. In short, the Pathet Lao on occasion have chosen a desired course of action even though it lacked the support of Peking. (In the past year, the Chinese and the Pathet Lao position on negotiations have come somewhat closer, as Peking has made it clear that talks with "the enemy" are not necessarily a betrayal of the revolutionary cause. Thus, when in April 1971 the Pathet Lao proposed a new set of terms for a settlement of the Laos war, Peking was at least willing to make the proposals public.)

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76 The so-called five-point peace proposal of the Pathet Lao was officially endorsed by Premier Kosygin in March 1970, while Peking failed to mention it in its statements about Laos. Only on March 8, 1971 -- a full year later -- when Chou En-lai visited Hanoi (probably to reassure North Vietnam's leaders about the changes in Chinese policy toward the United States), did a joint Chinese-Vietnamese communiqué give Peking's endorsement of the Pathet Lao proposal.

77 In July 1970, the ICC unanimously decided to do "everything possible in order that eventual negotiations on Laos take place in an atmosphere of reconciliation." Such a display of unanimity is an unusual event, because, ever since the breakup of the tripartite coalition government, the Communist representative on the ICC has consistently vetoed or obstructed his colleagues' recommendations.
It is clear that China is useful to the Lao Communists. Peking's statements addressed to Laos consistently stress that the existence of China on the northern borders of the Communist zone provides the Lao Communists with a safe rear. This fact, as well as the valuable aid received from China, is fully appreciated by the Pathet Lao, although they apparently feel that they, in turn, are making a contribution to the security of China.78

What may be less obvious is that the Soviets, in their own way, and despite their ambiguous policies, also remain an important asset for the Pathet Lao. As co-chairman of the Geneva Conference and sponsor of the Communist (Polish) delegate of the ICC, the Soviet Union can effectively give voice to the position of the Pathet Lao and spare them -- and the North Vietnamese -- much unpleasantness.79 For example, the Soviet co-chairman has consistently rejected appeals for an investigation of the NVA presence in Laos. On the other hand, Moscow has given only low-key publicity to Phoumi Vongvichit's almost weekly notes to the co-chairmen accusing the United States of violating the Accords.80 In a way, the Soviets have also assisted the Lao Communists by not pressing Hanoi to phase out its forces in Laos prior to a political settlement. Then, too, the very prestige of the Soviet Union under present circumstances benefits the North Vietnamese, and thus indirectly also the Lao Communists, as it opens

78 Phoumi Vongvichit, for example, in his previously mentioned book shows pride in the role of revolutionary Laos, stating that the success of the revolution in Laos also helps foil American attempts to encircle the DRV and the CPR (p. 189).

79 Thus it is standard procedure for the Polish delegate to refuse to endorse any report or action concerned with NVA activity in Laos. As a result of this veto, the report is deprived of official character.

80 Ambassador Sullivan, who dealt with the Russians in Laos and with Laos policy for nearly a decade, made this interesting statement regarding the Soviet attitude toward U.S. actions in Laos involving violations of the Geneva Accords: "But a senior Soviet official, for example, has said that insofar as he reads things in newspapers or hears statements and allegations about U.S. operations, he does not have to take any official cognizance of them." Lao Issues, p. 399.
up for them many opportunities for enlisting international support and contacts for publicizing their case. 81

More important, it cannot be lost on the Pathet Lao that the degree to which the North Vietnamese, their allies and protectors, dare face the enormous might of the United States is very much determined by Soviet backing, and the survival of the Pathet Lao is thus linked to the power of the Soviet Union (as i. e. to that of China). Finally, the Soviets are in a position to serve as a bridge between the contending factions in Laos. To mention but one example of this role, the Soviet Union has recently sought to act as broker between Communists and non-Communists while fully endorsing the conditions laid down by the Pathet Lao in their peace proposals of March 1970. A political settlement which might, without further fighting, give the Pathet Lao the controlling influence is not easily conceivable without Soviet support. Such a settlement would, of course, give the Soviets more than the Chinese, and more so than would a continuation of the armed struggle. Moreover, the North Vietnamese (and

81 In recent years, the Pathet Lao have emerged from their previous, virtually complete isolation to appear increasingly on the international scene. The Soviet Union as well as the North Vietnamese have played a role in this, as has the widening of the war in Indochina. But it appears that the Pathet Lao themselves have come to appreciate the political and psychological advantages of participation in international affairs, which provides them with greater leverage and influence in the Communist world and boosts their morale by demonstrating that they do not stand alone. Pathet Lao representatives have, in the last three years, traveled to many international conferences, among them the Solidarity Conference in Cairo, the special conference in Algiers in support of the Lao liberation movement, and, in November 1970, a peace congress in Stockholm devoted to the war in Indochina. Since such meetings are broadly conceived gatherings of Communist sympathizers -- rather than Communist party meetings -- the Pathet Lao usually send the top figures in the NLHS hierarchy (such as Phoumi Vongvichit and Tiao Vongsak, or, if an ethnic-minority flavor is desirable, Sithon Khommadam), rather than the men at the head of the PPL (Kaysone and Nouak). The sharp intensification of the U.S. bombing in Laos, and frequent reports of U.S. air combat support for ground fighting in Laos, have further drawn world attention to the struggle there and created greater receptivity for the Pathet Lao's side of the story. Since Pathet Lao delegates (like foreign visitors to the zone) must travel to and from their landlocked country by way of Hanoi, the North Vietnamese retain a degree of control over their Lao allies' movements.
therefore the Pathet Lao) probably believe that in Laos the Soviets are not inclined to act contrary to Hanoi's express interests or wishes. To cite but one illustration, in 1970 the Soviet Union launched the idea of an overall negotiated settlement of the Southeast Asian conflict on the model of the Geneva Conference, but quietly dropped the idea when it proved unpalatable to Hanoi.

AN ASSESSMENT

In sum, then, the Lao Communists continue to live under the tutelage of Hanoi, which spares them having to choose sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict. They benefit from a situation where they can enjoy the simultaneous support of both major Communist powers -- as evident, for example, in the reaction of Moscow and Peking to the Vietnamese incursion into Laos, in early 1971 -- and yet their freedom of action within the limits set by the influence of Vietnam. Presumably, they do not feel very comfortable when from time to time Moscow accuses Peking of advocating "adventurist" policies in Southeast Asia or Peking responds by calling Moscow's strategy toward the Southeast Asian national liberation movements "sham support, but real betrayal." But neither Moscow nor Peking presses the Lao Communists to make a final choice between them, for behind the Pathet Lao stands North Vietnam, which both powers feel an obligation to support.

62 This controversy over Southeast Asia policy is also part of the airwave war between Moscow and Peking. On July 17, 1970, for example, a Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to China accused the Chinese leaders of "intentionally trying to alienate" the Indochinese peoples from the Soviet Union. A few months later, on December 5, 1970, a Chinese-language broadcast beamed by Moscow to Southeast Asia stated: "If the People's Republic of China would join the international movement of other socialist countries for supporting the Indochinese people, the success of the task of opposing the U.S. aggression would be facilitated and support for the patriots of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia would become still more effective. However, Peking continues to pursue its previous divisive policy." On February 6, 1971, another Moscow broadcast in Chinese had this to say: "Intoxicated by their chauvinistic scheme, the Peking leaders have completely ignored the important fact that their attempt to alienate the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian peoples from the Soviet Union has objectively caused heavy damage to their anti-imperialist struggle."
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the Soviet position in Laos is relatively weak, that Soviet assets there appear to be of a temporary nature, and that Moscow's ties with Laos -- formal, ideological, and material -- remain tenuous when compared with those of Peking. Not only can Communist China point to a certain affinity with the Pathet Lao in its ideological outlook, and to its consistent support of the Lao Communist allies, but it can count on the advantages of geographic proximity. These must have been brought home to the Pathet Lao by the sudden revival of the long-neglected Chinese road-building program in northern Laos and by the successful sponsorship of the Indochinese Summit Conference on Chinese soil in April 1970. Implicitly, the Chinese hosts of the Summit Conference were establishing the role of China as an umbrella for the Indochinese revolutionary movements and were rejecting Soviet claims to influence in these areas. When a People's Daily editorial, on September 3, 1970, called for an Asian united front "from Korea to Indochina and from East Asia to West Asia," this could be seen as the Chinese answer to the Soviet concept of an essentially anti-Chinese -- Asian collective security pact.

As regards Communist China's role, Prince Norodom Sihanouk wrote in the fall of 1970: "In Laos, China does not exert a perceptible influence, and its material and financial assistance to the Lao Patriotic Front does not call for any quid pro quo, political or other." Chinese policy in Laos is likely to continue to justify this statement so long as Peking's interests coincide with those of Hanoi and so long as the North Vietnamese act, as they are now doing so vigorously, in pursuit of these shared objectives.

In the final analysis, Hanoi's intentions remain the principal factor shaping Communist strategy in Laos, and both the Soviet Union

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83 This is also the interpretation of a Yugoslav observer who said recently: "Peking is much closer to the Laotian leftist movement than Moscow is." Belgrade Domestic Service, March 3, 1970, as reported in FBIS, March 4, 1970.

and China will have to exercise their influence in Hanoi to affect the course of events in Laos. It is, of course, conceivable that they would decide to promote their objectives by employing direct leverage in Laos. Without necessarily risking open conflict with Hanoi, the Chinese might seek to use their assets, such as the new road network they have built in northern Laos and their military presence in that area, to stake out their interests in Laos. This would, naturally, place the Pathet Lao in a very precarious position between their two chief sponsors. One aim of Chinese pressure might be to deny North Vietnam easy access via Laos to the northern zone of the Thai insurgency, support for which would then be entirely up to China. But at least until the fighting ends in Indochina, it is difficult to see what Peking could hope to gain by disturbing the present arrangement with Hanoi. To Moscow, any direct and active involvement and a larger commitment of Soviet resources in Laos must appear today an even more unattractive option than it did in 1961, especially as the Soviets can no longer count on China's uncompromising hostility to the United States.
Appendix

SINO-SOViet RELATIONS WITH LAOS, 1961-1971 -- A CHRONOLOGY

This chronology supplements the discussion of Soviet and Chinese policies in the main body of the text by listing the salient events in the Soviet Union's and Communist China's involvement in Laos since the crisis there became an international concern. No such running account is available elsewhere.

The data for this compilation were extracted from a wide range of American, Lao, Soviet, and Chinese literature on the subject. The chronology assumes that the user is familiar with the major events in the history and foreign relations of contemporary Laos. (For others, the following three books can provide the necessary context: Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos -- the Politics of Neutralization, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971 (revised edition); Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao -- Partners in the Struggle for Laos, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970; and Hugh Toye, Laos -- Buffer State or Battleground, Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1968.)

The chronology is generally limited to events directly concerning Laos and either of the two major Communist powers, the exceptions being a few cases in which it seemed important to make reference also to contacts between the East European countries and Laos. (These items are enclosed in parentheses.) Moreover, virtually all travelers to and from the Pathet Lao zone pass through and stop in North Vietnam, and most Lao visitors to and from the Soviet Union have until recently traveled by way of China. Yet the compiler has not attempted a comprehensive survey of such stopovers; only such information as was readily available to him has been included in the chronology.
May 14: Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong issue Joint Statement on Laos in Hanoi, accusing U.S. of interfering in the affairs of Laos, demanding release of Prince Souphanouvong, and urging reactivation of ICC.

Sep 2: Speaking in Peking at Vietnamese Embassy's reception in celebration of 15th anniversary of the DRV, Premier Chou En-lai says that China has always adhered to the Geneva Agreement and wishes to establish friendly relations with a peaceful and neutral Laos.

Sep 3: Chou En-lai sends congratulatory message to Souvanna Phouma upon his taking office as Premier of Laos, expressing hope that China and Laos will develop friendly relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence and the Bandung Spirit. (At the Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai had declared on April 23, 1955, that China did not desire to interfere in the affairs of Laos.)

On September 5 Souvanna replies, expressing willingness to establish friendly relations with the CPR.

Sep 21: Jen-min shih-pao (人民日报, or People's Daily) publishes article
Oct: Aleksandr Abramov, first Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union to Laos, arrives in Vientiane on Oct 13, and on Oct 25 presents his credentials to King Savang Vatthana at Royal Palace in Luang Prabang.

Dec 13: Soviet Union charges U.S. with flouting sovereign rights of Laotian government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma and with extending overt support to rebel forces of Phoumi Nosavan.

Nov 16-24: Souvanna Phouma government decides to establish friendly relations with CPR. A diplomatic delegation will be sent to visit China. On Nov 20, Chinese government welcomes this decision. On Nov 24, Premier Souvanna Phouma asks CPR to suggest date for visit of Lao goodwill mission. (Visit does not materialize owing to Phoumi Nosavan's ouster of Souvanna government.)

Dec 14: Chinese government issues a statement on the situation in Laos, strongly protesting U.S. and Thai intervention in Laotian internal affairs and expressing full support for stand of Vietnamese and Soviet governments (which had previously denounced U.S. role in Laos).

Dec 15: All-China Federation of Labor Unions, China World Peace Committee, Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, All-China Federation of Women, All-China Youth Federation, and All-China Students Federation issue joint statement condemning U.S. interference in Laos.
Dec 17: In a note to the USSR, the
U.S. rejects Soviet charges of
Dec 13 and condemns Soviet airlift
of weapons and ammunition to rebel
military forces in Vientiane.

Dec: Soviet airlift in support of
Kong Le (coup of Aug 9) is stepped
up. On New Year's Eve, Soviet
planes transport Kong Le and his
men from Vang Vieng to Plain of
Jars.

Dec 18: At the banquet given by
Prince Sihanouk in Peking, Chou En-
laï states that "the Laotian problem
should be solved by the Laotian
people themselves; no other country
should interfere."

Dec 19: Chinese government issues
another statement demanding end to
U.S. interference in Laos. It points
out that U.S. armed intervention seri-
ously threatens peace in Asia as well
as China's security, and supports
the DRV government's proposal for
reconvening the Geneva Conference.

Dec 19: Joint statement is signed
by Liu Shao-chi and Sihanouk at
Peking referring to China's and
Cambodia's support of the "Laotian
people's just struggle against
foreign intervention, and for peace,
neutrality, national independence
and unity."

Dec 20: Chou En-lai replies to
erlier cable from Pham Van Dong in
which DRV Premier appealed to China
for restoration of peace in Laos.
Chou refers to CPR statement on Laos
of preceding day.
Dec 29: CPR Foreign Minister Chen Yi sends letter to Soviet and British co-chairmen of Geneva Conference, requesting their positive action to stop U.S. from expanding war in Laos, stating that China, like the DRV and the Soviet Union, wishes to see Geneva Conference reconvened, and requesting that ICC (inactive since Jul 1958) be reactivated.

1960-1961


1961

Jan 7: The U.S. State Department charges that, from December 15 through January 2, at least 180 Soviet sorties of war materiel, including personnel, were flown into Laos in support of rebel forces.

Jan 6, 9: Premier Chou En-lai, addressing rally in Rangoon on Jan 6, accuses U.S. of aggression in Laos and stresses that the Laotian problem must be solved by the Laotian people. Chu Teh speaks on same night in similar vein at reception of the Cuban Embassy in Peking. On Jan 9, joint statement issued by Premiers Chou En-lai and U Nu in Rangoon expresses deep concern about critical situation in Laos and calls for an end to foreign interference.

Feb 2, 9: Peking rallies demonstrate solidarity with Laotian people; Liu Ning-I (President of All-China Federation of Trade Unions) and Chen Yi speak at first meeting; Liao Cheng-chih (Chairman of Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity) speaks at second, which is also addressed by Sisana Sisane, head of Laotian delegation to Cairo Conference of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, in Peking on way home to Laos.

Feb 10: People's Daily reports that Chiang Kai-shek remnant troops have entered northwestern Laos, helping rebels under U.S. direction and menacing security of China. (A similar article, giving specifics, appears on Feb 27.)

Feb 11: Chou En-lai replies favorably to messages sent by Sihanouk (dated 1/20/61 and 2/1/61), which called for international conference
to settle the Laotian question and demanded U.S. withdrawal from Laos.

Feb 25, 27: People’s Daily editorializes on Laotian situation, with special reference to "remnant Chiang Kai-shek bandits ... a matter of particular and grave concern to the Chinese people ... a sinister and dangerous plot of U.S. imperialism to threaten China."

Mar 8: Chinese government agrees to Acting Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena's proposal to exchange economic and cultural missions between the two countries.

Mar 23: President Kennedy states that Pathet Lao have increasing support from outside and that Soviet planes have flown over one thousand sorties since Dec.

Apr 1: Soviet aide-memoire handed to British Ambassador in Moscow urges a cease-fire in Laos and reconvening of Geneva Conference.

Apr 16-22: Prince Souvanna Phouma visits Soviet Union and is received by Khrushchev; joint communiqué stresses peaceful approach to Laotian problems. (Souphanouvong arrives in Moscow during same week.)

Apr 2: In Djakarta, Chen Yi says that China "will not remain idle" if SEATO sends troops to take part in Laotian war.
Apr 24: Great Britain and USSR, co-chairman of Geneva Conference, call for Laos cease-fire, which becomes effective in early May.

Apr 22-26: Souvanna Phouma, Souphanouvong, Quinim Pholsena, and others visit China at invitation of Chou En-lai. On Apr 25, Chou En-lai and Souvanna Phouma issue joint statement supporting the convening of an international conference on Laos, demanding removal of Chiang Kai-shek forces from Laos, and agreeing to establish diplomatic relations.

May 3: CPR Foreign Ministry protests U.S. violation of China's air space on May 2 at Sino-Laotian border (Yunnan).

May 8: Chou En-lai in Peking welcomes DRV and Laotian delegations to the Geneva Conference. Chen Yi is appointed head of CPR delegation to the Conference. All delegations leave Peking for Geneva the following day.

May 10: Chou En-lai cables King of Laos and Acting Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena, congratulating them on Laos National Day.

May 12: Premier Souvanna Phouma cables Chou En-lai with thanks for China's aid to Laos.

May 12: Fourteen-Nation Geneva Conference on Laos opens; among participants are Soviet Union and China.

May 19: Governor of Yunnan Province gives reception for visiting delegation of Laotian First Military District headed by Khamouane Boupha.

Jun 1: Chen Yi, in speech at Geneva Conference, denounces U.S. intervention in Laos and reiterates support for Soviet proposals as basis for discussion.

Jun 5-6: Princes Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong visit Peking.

Jun 12: Chen Yi, in speech at Geneva Conference, denies need for effective international control over neutrality policy of Laos.

Jun 15: Premiers Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong issue joint communiqué in Peking attributing tension in Laos to U.S. interference and opposing U.S. attempts to place Laos under international control.

Jul 2-6: Prince Souphanouvong visits Peking (en route from Zürich to Hanoi) and issues statement (Jul 5) thanking the Chinese people for their fraternal and selfless support to the Laotian people.

Aug 9: Souvanna Phouma receives Ho Wei, representing China's Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, who came to take part in observance of Kong Le coup anniversary; Ho Wei departs Aug 12.

Oct (early): China and Laos agree to establish consulates-general at Phong Saly in Laos and at Kunming in Yunnan, China.

Nov 5: CPR establishes an Economic and Cultural Mission to Laos, temporarily headed by Chinese Ambassador to the DRV Ho Wei. On Nov 14, Ho and his deputy Liu Ch'un are received in Xieng Khouang by Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong. The following day, General Kong Le gives reception for Chinese officials.

Nov 17: Chinese Consul-General in Phong Saly, Ting Yong-ch'ang, and staff arrive at their post.

Dec 6: Laotian Consul-General arrives in Kunming.
Jan 13: At Khang Khay, representatives of CPR and RLG sign two agreements: on the building, at no cost to Laos, of a highway from Mengla, Yunnan, to Phong Saly (the "road to friendship") in northern Laos; and on air-transport cooperation.


Jan: Chinese workers and technicians arrive in Laos to begin construction of 50-mile highway from Yunnan border to Phong Saly.

Apr 26-28, Jun 10-16: Laotian military delegation, headed by Generals Kong Le and Singkao, visits China on way to and from USSR and Eastern Europe and is welcomed by the PLA Chief of Staff and other important military figures.

May 19: JNJP editorial reacting to dispatch of U.S. forces to Thai-Laos border warns against U.S. intervention in Laos and states that "U.S. aggressive moves in Southeast Asia are a serious threat to the security of China."
Jun 2-3: Khrushchev receives Generals Kong Le and Singkapo Chouzramany.

Jun 12: In messages to Souvanna Phouma, President Kennedy, and Prime Minister Macmillan, Khrushchev expresses satisfaction with formation of a coalition government of national unity in Laos.

May 23, Jun 17-19: Phong Phongsavan, accompanied by the Governor of Xieng Khouang Province, visits Peking on way to and from Soviet Union.

Jun 12: Chou En-lai sends cable to Souvanna Phouma congratulating him on reaching agreement regarding formation of coalition government.

Jun (late): CPR recognizes Laotian Provisional Government of National Union (established Jun 23); People's Daily (Jun 25) carries editorial greeting this event. Chen Yi proposes exchange of ambassadors.


Jul 3: Acting Premier Souphanouvong announces that Laos has decided to establish diplomatic relations with China, DRV, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

Jul 12: Chinese Chargé d'Affaires Liu Ch'un arrives in Vientiane and meets with Souphanouvong and Acting Foreign Minister Kamsouk Keola.

Jul 23: International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question issues

Jul 23: Chen Yi signs for China the "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos."
Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, which is accepted by Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Communist China, North Vietnam, France, India, Poland, Republic of Vietnam, Thailand, USSR, UK, and U.S. Andrei Gromyko signs for Soviet Union.

Jul 24: People's Daily publishes important editorial applauding successful conclusion of Geneva Conference, but stressing that negotiated settlement was possible only after prolonged struggle in Laos.

Jul 25 (?): Minister of Interior Pheng Phongsavan states that Laos recognizes PRC government as sole representative of China.

Jul 27- (?): Phoumi Vongvichit arrives in Peking and attends banquet given by Premier Chou En-lai.

Aug 3: Testifying before House Subcommittee on Appropriations, W. Averell Harriman says of the USSR: "They made it plain . . . that [their commitment as Conference co-chairman] meant that they be responsible for the Commit- , four Communist coun-

Sep (early): Taiwan regime severs diplomatic relations with Laos. CPR announces exchange of diplomatic missions between China and Laos.
late Sep-Oct 23: Prince Souphanouvong stays in Soviet Union for rest and treatment and is received by Khrushchev.

Sep 22-25: Prince Souphanouvong visits Peking on his way to Moscow for medical treatment: received by both Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung.

Oct 1: Chinese Ambassador Liu Ch'un holds reception in Vientiane to celebrate Chinese National Day; attendants include Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi Nosavan; CPR Economic and Cultural Mission also holds reception in Phong Savan, Xieng Khouang Province.

Oct 12: Chinese Ambassador to Laos Liu Ch'un presents credentials to King of Laos.

Oct 24: Souphanouvong arrives in Peking following visit to Moscow; received by Chou En-lai on Oct 28; leaves for home on Oct 31.

Nov: Soviet airlift terminated.

Nov 24-Dec 1: Phoumi Nosavan visits Moscow, is received by Khrushchev, and concludes a number of economic agreements.

Nov 27: Laotian Foreign Ministry announces that Khamking Souvanlasy has been named Laos' first ambassador to China. (He arrives Jan 23, 1963, and presents his credentials to Liu Shao-ch'i on Jan 31.)
Dec 2-4: A Laotian delegation, headed by Deputy Premier Phoumi Nosavan, visits Peking at invitation of Chinese government. Joint press communiqué (Dec 4), following talks between Vice Premiers Chen Yi and Li Hsien-nien and Phoumi Nosovan (Dec 2) and reception the following day by Chou En-lai; economic, technical, and trade cooperation discussed; China agrees to extend a long-term loan and further road-building in northern Laos (reportedly, the Lao side had requested extension of the road to Nam Tha).
Feb 11-18: King Savang Vatthana, Premier Souvanna Phouma, and Pathet Lao leader Phoumi Vongvichit visit USSR, and are received by Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

Mar 4: China-Laos Friendship Association is inaugurated in Peking, having been initiated by seventeen Chinese organizations.

Mar 6-10: King Savang Vatthana and a party including Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi Vongvichit make state visit to Peking; are entertained by Mao. CPR and RLG issue joint communiqué on King's visit and Sino-Laotian friendship, reaffirming China's respect for Laos' neutrality and territorial integrity.

Mar 11: Hsinhua news agency and Laotian Information Ministry sign agreement in Vientiane regarding exchange of news.

Apr 3: Chou En-lai and Chen Yi send message of condolence to Souvanna Phouma on assassination of Laotian Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena (Apr 1). JNP editorial (Apr 5) blames the U.S. for the incident.

Apr 16, 21: CPR issues official statement on Laotian situation, charging U.S. with plots to divide Neutralists and to sow dissension between them and the NLHS; suggests
**Soviet Union**  
1963

**China**  
1963

**Apr 26**: In Moscow, after three-hour meeting with Khrushchev, Averell Harriman announces that Soviet Union joins U.S. in re-affirming its support of the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos. Chou En-lai speech denounces U.S. for trying to provoke new civil war in Laos.

**Apr 27**: Madame Quinim Pholsena, widow of assassinated foreign minister, arrives in Peking for medical treatment.

**May 16**: Presidents Liu Shao-ch'i and Ho Chi Minh sign joint communiqué in Hanoi urging Geneva Conference co-chairmen to take effective measures against U.S. interference in Laos.

**May 20**: CPR Foreign Ministry issues statement opposing U.S. aggression in Laos and describing ICC as "tool for further interference."

**May 25**: Highway from Yunnan border to Phong Saly built by CPR as gift for Laos, completed in April, is officially handed over to Laotian (coalition) Government of National Union at ceremony held in Phong Saly. The remaining Chinese technicians and workers leave a few days later.

**Jun 4**: Joint message from Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos. It calls on him to propose meetings of the three parties to the conflict in Laos, and request that they assist the ICC.
Jun 3. Soviet draft message delivered to British ambassador in Moscow; charges U.S. with violating Geneva Agreements by supplying arms to Laotian troops. (One of many similar Soviet draft notes delivered during following months.)

Jun 7: Front-paged in all Peking papers is authorized NCNA statement "refuting the lie spread by the Indian and Canadian delegates to the ICC that there were Chinese troops" in Laos.

Jun 16: In long editorial on U.S. intervention in Laos, People's Daily expresses strong criticism of role of Geneva Conference co-chairmen, UK and USSR.

Aug 3: General Kong Le leaves for Moscow for medical treatment and talks with Soviet authorities.

Sep 6: In Tass release, USSR accuses U.S. of violating Geneva Accords by illegally introducing aircraft into Laos. (Department of State brands charge as "pure propaganda.")

Sep 10: Souvanna Phouma receives CPR Ambassador Liu Ch'un, who expresses grave concern about tense situation in Vientiane.

Oct 1: Voice of Laos and PL Radio greet 14th anniversary of CPR; Prince Souphanouvong speaks in appreciation of CPR's political support for Laos.
Mid-Oct: Peking hosts international Buddhist Conference; attended by Venerable Thepboary Phra Maha Khamtan, President of Buddhist Association of Laos.

Oct 21 (?): CPR Ambassador Liu Ch'un hands note to Laotian acting foreign minister, protesting act of "certain Laotian government officials in following the U.S. 'two-China' plot."

Oct 30-Nov 3: Souvanna Phouma visits Moscow and is received by Khrushchev.

Nov 12: Chinese Embassy in Laos delivers note to Foreign Ministry, protesting Phoumi Nosavan's charge of Nov 2 that China fails to respect independence of Laos.

Dec 19 (?) - Mar 30, 1964: Laotian Health Minister Khame K Keola visits Peking; recei...
Feb: Laotian youth delegation arrives in Peking (February 8). Issues joint statement (February 29) with its Chinese counterpart, pledging mutual support in struggle against American imperialism.

Apr 4-8: RLG goodwill delegation led by Souvanna Phouma visits Peking; Chou En-lai entertains at state dinner. China-Laos joint communique is issued, calling for peaceful settlement of Laotian situation.

Apr 9: CPR Political Consultative Committee sends greetings to Second NLHS Congress in Sam Neua.

Apr 21: Tass condemns military coup attempt by Kouprasith Abhay and declares Soviet Union's continuing support for the coalition government of national union headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma.

Apr 22: CPR Foreign Ministry declares that rightist coup in Laos, on Apr 19, was jointly engineered by U.S. and Laotian reactionaries and that China cannot recognize any change in the national union government made under these circumstances.

Apr 27: Pathet Lao launch heavy attacks on RLG and Neutralist forces. Britain and Soviet Union seek to arrange a cease-fire.

May: Souvanna Phouma asks USSR for military aid. Pathet Lao object to such aid, and Soviet Union rejects Souvanna's request.

May 26: Soviet draft message condemning U.S. reconnaissance flights in Laos is delivered to British Ambassador in Moscow.


Jun 11: T-28 bomb Khang Khay, hitting Chinese Economic and Cultural Mission, killing one Chinese (Souphanouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit attend funeral), and wounding five others. Chinese government lodges strong protest (Jun 13) and organizes protest rally in Peking.

Jun 24: Chen Yi warns that his country will not "sit idly by while the Geneva Agreements are completely torn up."


Jul 26: Soviet statement charges that U.S. has violated 1962 Geneva Accords by leaving military personnel in Laos and continuing to give unilaterally military aid to reactionary forces there; also charges that U.S. aircraft are conducting reconnaissance flights over the country and bombing Pathet Lao areas. Statement proposes convening of new Fourteen-Nation Conference on Laos.

Jul 29: NLHS 49-member cultural mission visits Peking at invitation of China-Laos Friendship Association; conducts performances, attended by Liu Shao-ch'i on Sep 3.

Aug 22-24: Souphanouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit, on way to tripartite talks in Paris, confer with Chen Yi in Peking.
Soviet Union
1964

Aug-Sep: Souphanouvong visits Moscow. In a number of speeches, Khrushchev accuses U.S. of being responsible for aggravation of the situation in Laos.

Sep-Oct: Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi Nosavan in Moscow.

China
1964

Sep 30-Oct 12: Prince Souphanouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit return to Peking to attend CPR anniversary celebrations. Are joined by other NLHS and Neutralist delegations (among them journalists and broadcasting personnel, who leave Peking on Oct 21).

Oct 1: NLHS Central Committee holds meeting to mark 15th anniversary of CPR; participants include Kaysone Phomvihan and Kamtay Siphadone.

Oct 19: Souphanouvong sends congratulations to Chou En-lai on China's first nuclear bomb explosion. Leader of pro-Communist Neutralists, Colonel Deuan, characterizes China's possession of A-bomb as important contribution to peace. Similar comments are made on the Pathet Lao radio and by Phoumi Vongvichit and Nouhak Phoumsavan. On October 20, Neutralist leaders Khamsouk Keola and General Neuan Mongkholvilay cable congratulations to Chen Yi on explosion of China's first atomic bomb.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964 Nov 3-5 and Dec 31-Jan 7, 1965</td>
<td>En route to and from tripartite talks in Paris, Phoumi Vongvichit stops over in Peking.</td>
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<td>1964 Nov 12</td>
<td>NLHS delegation headed by Sithon Khommpdam, which has been in China since early Oct in connection with CPR's 15th anniversary celebrations, leaves for Hanoi.</td>
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<td>1964 Dec 30</td>
<td>Replying to note of Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy of DRV, Gromyko condemns U.S. interference in Laos.</td>
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<td>1964 Dec 31</td>
<td>Chen Yi sends telegram to Souphanouvong, endorsing demand for speedy reconvening of Geneva Conference.</td>
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<td>1965 Jan 4</td>
<td>Souphanouvong sends congratulatory cable to Liu Shao-ch'i, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai on their reelection by CPR People's Congress.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965 Jan 19</td>
<td>Lin Piao sends congratulatory cable to Khamtay Siphandone on 16th anniversary of Pathet Lao Fighting Forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965 Jan 20</td>
<td>Chen Yi writes to Geneva co-chairmen, protesting large-scale U.S. bombing of liberated areas in Laos and demanding that Soviet and British governments take steps to check U.S. armed aggression in Laos.</td>
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Feb 7: Major Tass statement condemning U.S. aggression in Laos.


Feb 14: Joint Soviet-North Korean statement (Soviet delegation led by Kosygin) advocates "convoking, without any preliminary conditions" a conference of the 14 signatories to 1962 Geneva Accords in order to solve Laotian question.

Feb 23: Prince Souphanouvong sends message to USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, protesting U.S. bombing of Laos.

Mar: Article in Soviet journal Mez'dunarodnaia Zhizn' (International Life) derides U.S. claims that North Vietnamese forces are in Laos.

Mar 4: Soviet ambassador to Laos and Polish member of ICC arrive in Kheng Khay by ICC helicopter to visit NLHS Central Committee.
Mar 31-Apr 1: Mme Quinim Pholsena, at gathering in Peking on Apr 1 and in speech broadcast by Radio Peking on Mar 31, observes 2nd anniversary of her husband's assassination. (Hereafter she acts as spokesman for Lao revolutionaries in Peking.)

Apr 14-16, 22-25: Souphanouvong, General Phoun Sipaseuth, Sisana Sisane, and DRV Premier Pham Van Dong visit Kunming en route to and from Djakarta celebrations of 10th anniversary of Bandung Conference; receptions attended by Chu Teh, Chen Yi, and Yunnan Province CCP secretary.


Apr 30: Five-man Laotian youth delegation arrives in Peking.

Mid-May: Souphanouvong congratulates Peking on China's second successful nuclear test. Nouhak Phoumsavan states that this Chinese feat foils U.S. strategy of nuclear blackmail. Other Laotian revolutionary leaders term Chinese nuclear device "bombs of peace." Pathet Lao Radio comments in similar vein.
Chen Yi replies, endorsing statement. Souphanouvong acknowledges reply, thanking Chinese people for their "unconditional aid."

Jul 26: People's Daily supports NLHS demand to the Conference co-chairmen that they consider suspending activities of ICC in Laos since it has become "a tool of American aggression."

Aug 3 (?): Supreme Command of Pathet Lao Fighting Forces sends congratulatory cable to Lin Piao on 38th anniversary of Chinese PLA.

Sep 29: Delegation of Laotian Government Employees Association arrives in Peking.

Sep 29: CPR Economic and Cultural Mission in Khang Khay gives reception to celebrate 16th anniversary of CPR.

Oct 11-13: Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference sends greetings to NLHS on 20th anniversary of Laotian revolution. The following day an anniversary rally is held in Khang Khay, with representatives of CPR and DRV missions in attendance. On Oct 13 the two missions give joint reception to mark anniversary.
Nov 8: Spokesman of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference expresses full support for revolution and program of the National Political (consultative) Joint Conference of NLHS and Patriotic Neutralists (held in Sam Neua in October).

Nov: Forty-eight-member NLHS artistic troupe visits USSR, Mongolian People's Republic, and other Socialist countries.


Nov 25: Geneva Conference co-chairmen propose that ICC continue in Laos for another year if no objection is raised by signatories.

Dec 15: Izvestia states that ICC Report No. 35 (regarding DRV interference in Laos) is illegal since it does not have endorsement of Polish representative on the Commission.

Jan 19: Lin Piao sends congratulatory message to Khamtay Siphandone on 17th anniversary of LPIA.

Feb 19: CPR Foreign Ministry protests U.S. bombing, on Feb 18, of Chinese Consulate General in Paong Saly. (On Mar 24, American planes reportedly again bomb Khang Khay and residences of Chinese Mission members there, and Chinese Foreign Ministry again protests raid.)


Apr 1: Soviet Foreign Ministry distributes telegrams from Phoumi Vongvichit, dated Feb 10 and 20 to countries involved in 1962 Geneva Conference; telegrams condemn U.S. aggressive acts involving also use of Thai forces.
Apr 19: Delegation of NLHS journalists and broadcasters arrives in Peking.

May 7: A group of Chinese acrobats from Yunnan returns home, after having toured Xieng Khouang Province of Laos since Mar 13.

May 10-11: Souphanouvong sends Chou En-lai congratulatory telegram on China's third nuclear test. General Singkaeo reportedly describes event as great victory of Maoist thought. Khamsouk Keola, as representative of the pro-Communist Neutralists, also sends congratulations.

May 11: Laotian cultural delegation, led by vice-chairman of Laotian Patriotic Teachers Association, visits Peking.

May-Jun: King and Queen of Laos, accompanied by Premier Souvanna Phouma, visit Soviet Union at invitation of President Podgorny.

May 23: Soviet Foreign Ministry distributes telegrams from Vongvichit (dated Mar 16 an) Apr 18) to 1962 Geneva Conference participants, with details of intensified U.S. bombing raids, including use of B-52s.

Jun 3: Soviet Foreign Ministry circulates telegram from Phoumi
Vongvichit to participants in 1962 Geneva Conference; telegram calls attention to widened scale of U.S. bombing and use of napalm against population.

Jun 21: People's Daily, reporting from Khang Khay, claims that General Singkapo, Colonel Deuane, and other leading figures in Xieng Khouang praise China's Cultural Revolution and Mao Tse-tung's thought. On Jun 14 same paper quotes Nouhak Phoumsavan as speaking highly of Mao's thought.

Jun 27-Jul 9: Afro-Asian Writers' Emergency Meeting in Peking, attended by Laotian delegation headed by Outama Chounramany, passes resolution on Laos condemning U.S. imperialism. (Full group received by Mao on Jul 17.)

Jul 1: On occasion of visit of President de Gaulle to USSR, a declaration is issued which refers to situation in Southeast Asia and touches on the "ever more unstable situation" in Cambodia and Laos.

Jul 6: Warsaw Treaty member states, represented at Bucharest meeting, issue statement protesting U.S. bombing in Laos and American interference in Laos' internal affairs.

Jul 3: CPR Foreign Ministry charges U.S. with making preparations for sending its ground forces into Laos.
Jul 14: At Soviet-Indian friendship rally held in Kremlin, Premier Kosygin's speech includes indictment of U.S. aggression in Laos, "where the peaceful population is being annihilated."

Jul 15: Pravda publishes interview of its correspondent I. Shchedrov with LPLA Commander-in-Chief Khamtay, who stresses solidarity with Soviet Union.

Jul 24: Pravda's special correspondent I. Shchedrov accuses German armed forces of "making extensive use of the U.S. armed intervention in South Vietnam and Laos for its own barbaric experiments in using chemical weapons under 'battle conditions.'"

Jul 29: CPR Economic and Cultural Mission in Khong Khay holds reception to mark 39th anniversary of PLA. General Singkapo and Colonel Deuane attend. Reportedly, they make remarks praising Thoughts of Mao. (Similarly, Nouhak Phoumsavan is quoted by People's Daily of Sep 7 as praising Mao's concept of people's war.) On July 31, Colonel Deuane and Khamtay Siphandone send congratulatory telegrams to Lin Piao on 39th anniversary of PLA.
Aug 19: Soviet President Podgorny and Premier Kosygin thank NLHS Central Committee for an earlier message of good wishes.


Aug 29: NLHS broadcasts statement protesting Jun 14 ICC Report (accusing the NLHS and DRV) and "warmly welcoming the just and correct attitude of the Polish delegation [to the ICC] and the Soviet Government."

Aug 29: Phoumi Vongvichit sends letter to Chen Yi and encloses NLHS statement of Aug 29 condemning U.S. imperialists. Chen Yi replies on Oct 2 stating that ICC has become tool of U.S. imperialists and that Soviet and British governments are playing role of accomplices.

Oct 11: Economic and Cultural Missions of DRV and CPR hold joint banquet in Khang Khae to celebrate Laotian Revolution Day.


Oct 30: Phoumi Vongsachit, visiting Chinese Economic and Cultural Mission in Laos to extend congratulations on China's successful nuclear test, is quoted as describing test as "a brilliant example . . . in self-reliant defense build-up and development . . .".

Nov 1 (?): Souphanouvong sends congratulatory cable to Chou En-lai on China's successful nuclear test. So does Khamtay Siphandone in message to Lin Piao.

(Nov 26: Souphanouvong sends congratulatory telegram on 22nd anniversary of Albanian liberation.)

Dec 29: Souphanouvong sends congratulatory telegram to Chou En-lai on China's latest atomic explosion.
Jan 20: Ambassador Liu Ch'un is recalled from Vientiane to Peking for consultations of indefinite duration.

Jan 20: On Laotian Army Day, leaders of CPR Economic and Cultural Mission in Khang Khay call on Xieng Khouang Headquarters to extend greetings; Lin Piao telegraphs congratulations to Khamtay Siphandone.

Jan 30: Sisana Sisane and Sithon Khommadam visit Peking and meet with Foreign Minister Chen Yi.


Mar 3: MLBS Central Committee statement supports CPR Defense Ministry protest (Feb 21) against J.S. violation of Chinese air space near Hainan Island.

Mar 4: Reception in Peking marks 4th anniversary of China-Laos Friendship Society; Lien Kuan (chairman) and Mma Quim Pholsena speak.
Mar 10: Peking Review claims that Political Department of Xieng Khouang LPA has translated Mao's *Problem of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War* and assigned it for study by its forces.

Apr 21: Chinese team of cameramen, in Laos since late Dec 1966, leaves for home after having made several documentary films.

Apr 24: Gromyko issues statement calling attention to "continuing deterioration of the political situation in Laos," a "direct consequence of aggressive actions by the U.S.A."

May 6: In interview broadcast by Radio Prague, Souphanouvong makes first public statement expressing allegiance to Marxism and Communism.


Jun-Jul: Soviet journalists visit NLHS-controlled Sam Neua Province.

Jul 1: Phoumi Vongvichit visits CPR Economic and Cultural Mission in Khang Khay to convey congratulations on 46th anniversary of CCP.
Jul 8: Joint communiqué by Soviet leaders and visiting French Premier Georges Pompidou stresses that war in Indochina, especially in Laos and Cambodia, represents danger to world peace.

Jul 7: Peking Review states that the Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung are now available in the Laotian language.


Jul 28: Article in People's Daily states: "It is because they have relied on guns that the Laotian people have brought about an excellent situation in their revolutionary struggle." Accuses Soviets of acting in Laos as accomplices of U.S. and of trying to halt armed struggle of Laotian revolutionaries.

Aug 1: On 40th anniversary of PLA: Colonel Deuane and Khamtay Siphandone send congratulatory cables to Lin Piao; Phoumi Vongvichit visits CPR Economic and Cultural Mission in Khang Khay.

Sep 27: CPR Economic and Cultural Mission in Khang Khay holds reception to celebrate 18th anniversary of CPR; Phoumi Vongvichit (and several lesser leaders) attend.
Sep: Moscow stage artists tour NLHS zone and are received by Souphanouvong.

Sep 29: Laotian cultural and educational delegation visits China at invitation of China-Laos Friendship Association to take part in National Day celebrations.

Oct 1: On CPR's 18th anniversary: Souphanouvong sends congratulatory telegram to Chou En-lai expressing thanks for "selfless and generous assistance" and declaring that China's possession of nuclear bomb constitutes tremendous contribution to anti-colonial struggle; Phoumi Vongvichit attends National Day reception at CPR Economic and Cultural Mission in Laos.

Oct 4: Souphanouvong sends lengthy telegram to Podgorny and Kosygin (on 50th anniversary of October Revolution), expressing gratitude for "the sincere support and great aid of the USSR."

Oct 4: Mao, Lin, Chou, and Chen Po-ta receive foreign friends in Peking, including Laotian Cultural and Educational Delegation and Khamlieng Pholsena.

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Oct 4: Mao, Lin, Chou, and Chen Po-ta receive foreign friends in Peking, including Laotian Cultural and Educational Delegation and Khamlieng Pholsena.

Oct 11: On 22nd anniversary of Laotian Revolution: Chou En-lai cables congratulations to Souphanouvong; Nme Quinim Pholsena holds gathering in Peking the next day.
Oct 12: An article about Laos in People's Daily describes situation as excellent for revolutionary forces and claims that by "accumulating small victories" they will be able to change balance of forces between them and enemy.

Oct 31: Photographic exhibition covering the 22-year Laotian revolutionary struggle opens in Peking. Prime item is huge photo showing Mao shaking hands with Souphanouvong. Sponsored by China-Laos Friendship Association and China Peace Committee.

Nov 28: Souvanna Phouma sends letter to Chou En-lai, appealing to China as great power which has observed stipulations of 1962 Geneva Accords, and complaining about North Vietnamese violations of Laotian neutrality.

Nov 30: Izvestia carries interview with Souphanouvong by its special correspondent, M. Il'insky. Souphanouvong points to close relations between Soviet Union and Laos and to former's assistance to Lao national liberation struggle.

(Dec 9: According to a Tirana broadcast, Enver Poxha, First Secretary of Albanian Workers Party [closely linked to Peking] has received, on the occasion of 23rd anniversary of Albanian revolution, congratulatory messages from Souphanouvong and Kaysone, both of whom praise "correct leadership of the Albanian party."
Dec 14: Soviet ambassador to Laos holds reception in Vientiane for newly appointed ambassador to USSR, Phagna Bouasy.

Mid-Dec: Phoumi Vongvichit sends letter to Soviet and British co-chairmen of Geneva Conference complaining about Thai troops in Sayaboury Province.

Jan 3: New Laotian ambassador, Phagna Bouasy, presents his credentials to Soviet President Podgorny.

Jan 16: Krasnaia Zvezda (Red Star) publishes interview of Colonel O. Ivanov with Prince Souphanouvong.

Mar 3: Pravda prints interview with Prince Souphanouvong by special correspondent Yu. Semenov, who spent two weeks in Communist zone of Laos. Souphanouvong
Soviet Union
1968

states: "Naturally, the lessons of the Soviet Union, the lessons of the Russian Revolution, rendered us great assistance in our struggle. We will always adhere to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and Lenin's bust is always on my table."

Mar (early): Soviet journalists visit editorial department of Radio Pathet Lao, where they meet with its director, Central Committee member Sisana.

Mar 27: In article praising victories of the LPLA, People's Daily accuses Soviets of seeking to strangle Laotian and Indochinese peoples' revolutionary struggle.


Soviet Union
1968

China
1968

May-June: Pravda (May 28) supports Pathet Lao position that U.S. reference to the Laos issue at Paris talks on Vietnam is "completely illegitimate." Similar editorial appears in Izvestia (Jun 15).

May 31: Krasnaia Zvezda accuses U.S. military of plans to seize Laos as base of operations for war in Vietnam.

Jun: USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium appoints Viktor Minin ambassador to Laos, replacing Boris Kirnasovsky.

Jul (early): NLHS (and Vietnamese) youth delegations, on way to World Youth Festival in Sofia, stay over for several days in Soviet Union.

Jul 7: Khamtay Siphandone sends congratulatory message on occasion of 25th anniversary of Albanian People's Army.

Jul 30: CPR Economic and Cultural Mission in Khang Khay holds reception to celebrate 41st anniversary of PLA, with Generals Sipraseuth and Singkaph in attendance.


Aug 1: Lin Piao receives congratulatory message from Khamtay Siphandone on PLA's 41st anniversary.
Sep 3: Viktor Mirin, new Soviet ambassador to Laos, presents credentials to King in Luang Prabang.

Sep 4: Radio Pathet Lao editorially supports Vietnamese intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Sep 27: Souphanouvong renders congratulatory cable to Mao on CPR National Day.

Sep 27: After attending functions in North Korea, Sithon Komadam and two other NLHS-CC members visit Peking and meet with Chen Yi.


Oct 1: CPR chargé d'affaires and interim in Vientiane holds National Day celebration at Embassy; both RLG officials and NLHS representatives attend.


Mid-Oct: A Komsomol delegation led by Torsuyev (sp?), Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, visits Laotian free zone at invitation of Laotian Youth
Federation; greetings on 23rd anniversary of Laotian independence day.

Nov 8: NLLS Central Command holds rally celebrating 51st anniversary of October Revolution (participants include Faydang, Sir-une Kommadam, Phoumi Vongvichit, Phoune Sipraseuth, Souk Vongsak, Mme Khampaeng, Boupha).


(Dec 2: Albanian sources report that Souphanouvong and Kaysone have sent messages to Enver Hoxha on occasion of 24th anniversary of Albanian liberation.)

Dec 3: Vientiane officials report that, about three months ago, two CPR battalions moved into North Laos to begin work on China-Muong Sai road.

Dec 25: Souphanouvong sends greetings to Mao on occasion of his 75th birthday.

Dec 26: NCNA releases analysis of situation in Laos, cautioning against attempts on part of "U.S. imperialism
and its lackeys in Laos, with the coordination of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique" to create atmosphere for peace talks.


Jan 15: Pravda article reports on the NLHS program adopted at movement's Third Congress (Oct 25-Nov 1, 1968).

Jan 15: The Times (London) publishes interview with Souvanna Phouma, who states that relations with China are good and that Chinese road-building in North Laos relates to an aid project originally agreed on by Phoumi Nosavan in 1963. (By February, new road reportedly completed as far as Muong Sai.)

Jan 19: Lin Piao sends usual congratulatory telegram to Khamtay Siphandone on 20th anniversary of LPLA. (The previous day, LPLA had given anniversary reception in Xieng Khouang Province, attended by Yang Tse-min, a leading member of the Chinese Mission.) Another anniversary reception, also attended by a representative of
the Chinese Mission in Xieng Khouang, is held Jan 22 by Neutralist command.

Jan 28: In response to complaints to Geneva Conference co-chairmen from NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit, USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko issues statement strongly condemning increased U.S. aggression in Laos.

Jan 29: Pravda reports on NLHS memorandum detailing U.S. acts of aggression against Laos.

Jan 29-early Feb: Tiao Souk Vongsak, leading delegation of Laotian Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, visits USSR. Delegation includes Sisana Sisane, member of NLHS Central Committee, and Nouphanh Sidphasay, president of Laotian Youth Association.

Jan 30: NLHS applauds Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of Jan 28; accuses British co-chairman of trying to cover up U.S. aggression.

Feb 5: Two RLG officials return from USSR to Vientiane after completing a one-year course in climatology.

Feb 8: Yueh Tai-heng, counsellor and chargé d'affaires of CPR embassy in Vientiane, returns to Laos after two-year absence. (Yueh was posted to Laos in fall of 1952.)
Feb (early): Viktor Minin, Soviet ambassador to Laos, accompanied by Soviet military attaché, visits Pathet Lao-controlled zone carrying a personal message of Souvanna Phouma to Souphanouvong. On return to Vientiane, meets briefly with Souvanna Phouma to deliver Souphanouvong's reply.


Feb 24: Governor of Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Province, in communiqué, notes that U.S. halted bombing while Soviet ambassador to Laos visited free zone.

Mar 22: Pravda suggests that earlier exchange of messages between Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong has stirred hopes for renewal of contacts between main political forces in Laos, but that American intervention is main obstacle to such a process.

Mar 27: NLHS hails "correct stand" of Soviet co-chairman, as contrasted with his British counterpart siding with imperialists.
Soviet Union  
1969

China  
1969

Apr 1: In his report to 9th Congress of CCP, Lin Piao briefly touches on Laos, stating that armed struggle of Laotian people is steadily growing in strength and that China firmly supports this struggle.

May 11: At opening of parliament in Laos, USSR is represented by a chargé d'affaires, but Chinese and North Vietnamese diplomats are absent (to show disapproval of 1967 legislative elections, in which NLHS did not participate).

May 15: Souvanna Phouma gives banquet for M. Kapitsa, chief of Southeast Asia Division of Soviet Foreign Ministry, who is visiting Laos and nearby countries.

May: Soviet President Podgorny sends greetings to King of Laos on Laotian Constitution Day.

May 19-26: Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee delegation visits NLHS zone.

May 21-26: Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee delegation visits liberated zone. Soviet and Laotian committees issue joint communiqué opposing U.S. aggression in Laos; received by Phoumi Vongvichit.
May 25–June 13: Five high-ranking Lao monks from government-controlled areas visit USSR at invitation of Soviet government.

Jun 11–24: Fifteen-member Soviet artist ensemble tours Sam Neua area at invitation of NLHS.

Jun 24: Establishment of new air route, Moscow to Hanoi via Laos, is announced by Tass.

Jun 27: R. Khachatryan, Secretary of American CP Central Committee and leader of delegation of Soviet Solidarity Committee which has returned from Laos, reports in Pravda his impressions of liberated areas.

(Jul 12: Pathet Lao Radio broadcasts editorial hailing 26th anniversary of founding of Albanian People's Army.)

Jul 17–31: NLHS delegation, headed by Souk Vongsak, visits USSR and is received by CPSU Central Committee Secretary B. Ponomarev.

Aug 12: In broadcast to South Asia, Radio Moscow accuses Maoists of claiming much territory in Asia, including Laos.

Sep 7: Souphanouvong heads NLHS delegation to Hanoi for Ho Chi Minh's funeral; confers with Soviet Premier Kosygin.

Sep 9: Souphanouvong and Li Hsien-niea meet in Hanoi on occasion of Ho Chi Minh's funeral and have a talk described in Chinese press as "cordial and frank."

Sep 13: The New York Times reports from Laos that Chinese-built road has reached Muong La, about 15 miles from Muong Sai.

Sep 23: The Times (London) reports from Laos that CPR Economic and Cultural Mission in Khang Khay was closed just prior to capture of town by pro-RLG Special Forces.

Sep 27: Soviet military observer Col. A. Leontiev, writing in Krasnai Zvezda, charges that U.S. is turning Laos into another Vietnam.

Sep 28: Souphanouvong sends annual congratulatory message to Mao, Lin, and Chou on CPR's 20th anniversary. At reception in Peking celebrating anniversary, Chou En-lai specifically expresses support for "the laotian people in their just struggle against U.S. imperialism." (On same occasion the previous year, Chou made no direct reference to Laos.)
Oct 1: Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi, at request of Prince Souvanouvong, sounds out USSR on peaceful settlement of Laotian problem; Soviet officials are cool to this move.

Early Oct: CPR Economic and Cultural Mission, somewhere in Xieng Khouang, holds reception to celebrate CPR's 20th anniversary; General Singkappo and Colonel Deuane attend.

Oct 7: Souphanouvong sends congratulatory message to Mao, Lin, and Chou on CPR's first underground nuclear test, described as giving encouragement to struggle of peoples of the world against imperialism.

Oct 11-22: Soviet Communist Youth League delegation visits Sam Neua; received by Phouni Vongvichit and Prince Souphanouvong.

Oct 17-Nov 3: NLMS delegation, led by Tiac Souk Vongsak, visits major cities in CPR; entertained (Oct 18) by Li Hsien-nien and Kuo Ho-jo.

Oct 30: U.S. State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey reveals that U.S. has asked Soviet Union to use its influence to ease tense situation in Laos.

Oct 30: Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko sends message to Geneva Conference signatories, referring to complaints (dated Aug 20 and Sep 1) by Phouni Vongvichit and...
expressing "grave concern" at "alarming situation" in Laos, which he attributes to growing U.S. intervention and gross violations of Geneva Accords.

Nov 7: Pathet Lao Radio broadcasts editorial warmly greeting 52nd anniversary of October Revolution. It adds: "The Laotian people have always enjoyed warm sympathy and precious support, both material and moral, from the Soviet people" and "the Soviet Union, with a consistent and correct stand and an attitude of goodwill, has unswervingly supported the NLHS position. . . ."

Nov 11: Pravda reprints message from Souphanouvong to President Podgorny and Premier Kosygin, on occasion of 52nd anniversary of October Revolution, expressing gratitude for Soviet support and assistance.

Nov (late ?): Soviet-Laotian talks in Vientiane to draft agreement on airline connection between USSR and Laos.

Dec (early?): NLHS delegation, headed by Souk Vongsak, visits Moscow at invitation of Soviet Peace Committee.

(Nov 29: Souphanouvong sends greetings to Albanian leaders on occasion of 25th anniversary of Albanian liberation.)

Dec 13: Souvan Phouma publicly acknowledges presence of "four or five battalions" of CPR troops in northern Laos.
Jan 5-6: Soviet organizations (including Central Council of Trade Unions, Afro-Asia: Solidarity Committee, Peace Committee, Women's Committee, and Youth Organization of USSR) send congratulatory message to Central Committee of NLHS on its 14th anniversary. Both Pravda and Izvestia carry appropriate articles.

Jan 20: Krasnaiia Zvezda carries article on occasion of 21st anniversary of LPLA.

Jan (late): CPSU Secretary B. Ponomarev receives delegates to Third Solidarity Conference of Asian and African Peoples', including representatives of NLHS. (Souk Vongsak addresses Conference on Jan 27.)


Feb 28: Souvanna Phouma sends letters to Britain and USSR officially requesting Geneva-style consultations on situation in Laos.

Feb 28: Tass statement, plus commentaries, accuse U.S. of "considerable escalation of armed intervention in neutral Laos." Statement is welcomed by NLHS.

Mar 6, 10: NLHS five-point peace proposal is reported in Pravda and subsequently supported by USSR. President Nixon reveals he has written to Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Premier Kosygin to enlist Geneva Conference co-chairmen's efforts to end fighting in Laos.

Mar 15: Moscow Radio announces that Premier Kosygin has sent message to President Nixon (in reply to latter's of Mar 6) rejecting Geneva-type consultations on Laos, calling for halt to U.S. bombing in Laos, and supporting NLHS five-point peace proposal.

Mar 23: President Nixon sends another letter to Premier Kosygin urging international consultation to resolve conflict in Laos. Soviet response is negative.

Mar 6: People's Daily reaffirms Chinese support for liberation struggle in Laos and states that, so long as the Laotian people strengthen their unity and persist in protracted war, they will win final victory.

Mar 7: New China News Agency (NCNA) reports from Hanoi about Mar 6 statement of NLHS Central Committee, but significantly omits reference to the statement's five-point peace proposal. (Subsequent Chinese reports about Laos continue this silence until September.)
Mar 26: CPR Foreign Ministry issues statement in support of NLHS statement of Mar 21 condemning expansion and intensification of war in Laos by "U.S. Imperialism" and "reactionary authorities of Thailand." Chinese statement declares that CPR government is closely watching events involving expansion of war in Laos, Cambodia, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Warns that Chinese and Laotian peoples have common interests and that former "absolutely will not sit idly by while U.S. imperialism acts wantonly in Laos."

Apr 6-14: A delegation from NCNA visits Sam Neua Province at invitation of NLHS Central Committee.

Apr 20: NLHS Central Committee issues instructions for nationwide celebrations of Lenin centenary. States that "Leninism, with shining examples set by the Soviet Union, has been greatly stimulating the revolutionary peoples in the world. . . ." On same day, Pravda reports among arriving delegations to Lenin celebrations in Moscow that of Lao delegation headed by "Nuhak Phoumsavan."

Soviet Union 1970

China 1970
Apr 21: NLHS Central Committee Vice-Chairman, Kaysone Phomvihan speaks at mass meeting in Sam Neua honoring Lenin centenary. Expresses deep gratitude to Soviet Union and calls for strengthening solidarity with Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese peoples.

Apr 22: Nouhak, representing NLHS, makes speech (reported in Pravda, Apr 24) at Lenin celebrations in Kremlin.

Apr 24-26: An "Indochinese Peoples' Summit Conference" is held "somewhere in the Laos, Vietnam and China border area." Upon its conclusion, Chou En-lai comes from Peking and, on Apr 25, gives reception in honor of the four delegations. In his address to them, Chou En-lai speaks of China's "profound militant friendship" for the Indochinese peoples, and points to fact that vast expanse of China's territory is reliable rear area for these peoples' liberation struggle and that the Chinese people will always stand by their side. The following day, the delegations give reception in honor of Chou En-lai. (At foregoing functions, Laos is represented by Souphanouvong, Khamsouk Keola, Phouvi Vongvichit, Khamphay Boupha, and Ounheuan Phounsavath.)
Apr: Premier Kosygin sends telegram of good wishes to the Indochinese Peoples' Summit Conference.

Apr 27-May 9: Soviet TV delegation visits liberated zone of Laos; granted TV interview with Prince Souphanouvong.

Apr 28-May 5: World Council of Peace delegation, including a Soviet delegate, visits liberated zone; received by Sithon Komm. and Nouhak Phoumsavan.

May 9: Lao delegation to Cairo conference against American aggression, headed by Phoumi Vongvichit, stops over in Moscow.

May 12: Phoumi Vongvichit is interviewed by Pravda correspondent and Laos expert Ivan Shchedrov.

Apr 28: Government of CPR issues statement endorsing Joint Declaration of the Indochinese Summit Conference. With regard to Laos, it reaffirms its support for Laotian anti-imperialist struggle, and demands immediate halt to U.S. bombing of Laos and complete withdrawal from that country of "U.S. imperialism and the Thai vassal troops."

May 7: Some 100 Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese "experts, students and trainees," together with Vietnamese residents, meet at DRV Embassy in Peking to endorse Indochinese Peoples' Summit Conference. Phoumi Vongvichit, on way to Moscow and Cairo, is among Lao present at meeting.
May 19-21: Phoumi returns to Moscow, leaving there for home on May 28.


May 16: Soviet delegation to Cairo conference on Laos, headed by Secretary of Central Committee of Communist Party Robert Khachatryan, leaves Moscow.

May 17-24: The Soviet Union observes international week of solidarity with struggle of Laotian people.

May 19-21: Secretary General L. Brezhnev's message to the Cairo conference (in support of the Laotian people's fight against U.S. aggression) declares that "the Soviet people and Communist Party invariably side with the peoples of Indochina, who are waging just struggle, and help and support them in every way."

May 20: Mao Tse-tung issues statement in support of "revolutionary struggles against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys" and declares that "the situation is getting better and better in the war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation waged by the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."
May 27: Souphanouvong sends message to Mao thanking him warmly for his statement of May 20.

Jun 9 (approximately): Souphanouvong sends telegram (undated) to Soviet Premier Kosygin, thanking him for greetings regarding Indochinese Peoples' Summit Conference.

Jun 9: Phoumi Vongvichit complains to Soviet co-chairman of Geneva Conference about increased air war by U.S. and use in Laos of Thai and South Vietnamese troops.


Jun 21-28: Three-member delegation of Soviet journalists (representing Pravda, Izvestia, and Moscow News) pays visit to liberated zone in Laos.

Jun 23: A Laotian delegation headed by NLHS Central Committee member Sanan Southichak arrives in Peking, together with a Vietnamese delegation, on way to an anti-U.S. function in North Korea. Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien gives banquet in their honor. The following day, the delegations leave for Pyongyang on plane carrying...
Jul 15: Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues statement noting that "U.S. aggression against Indo-Chinese peoples has entered a new dangerous stage. . . . The U.S. military are continuing cynically to trample on the international agreements concerning the neutrality of Laos, preventing the diverse political groupings in that country from arriving at agreement on the basis of the program for a political settlement in Laos set forth in the March 5, 1970, statement of the Central Committee of the Patriotic Front of Laos."

Aug 16: Moscow Radio comments: "Preconditions are already ripe in Laos to enable the patriotic, neutralist and right-wing forces in the country to reach an understanding. . . . It is the U.S. military intervention which hinders a settlement."

Jul 5: Sanan Southichak attends Chou En-lai's banquet in honor of Sihanouk.

Jul 15: Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues statement noting that "U.S. aggression against Indo-Chinese peoples has entered a new dangerous stage. . . . The U.S. military are continuing cynically to trample on the international agreements concerning the neutrality of Laos, preventing the diverse political groupings in that country from arriving at agreement on the basis of the program for a political settlement in Laos set forth in the March 5, 1970, statement of the Central Committee of the Patriotic Front of Laos."

Jul 31: Khantay Siphandone sen's usual congratulatory message to Lin Piao on anniversary of CPLA's establishment. The following day, Chen Shu-ling, military attaché at CPR Embassy in Vientiane, gives a reception honoring CPLA. Souvanna Phouma attends, as well as Souk Vongsak, special envoy of Souphanouvong to preliminary peace talks.

Sep 25: Delegation of Khaosan Pathet Lao news agency arrives in Peking to attend China's National Day celebrations. They leave for home from Nanning some two weeks later.
Soviet Union
1970

China
1970

Sep 29: Souphanouvong sends greetings to Mao, Lin, and Chou on occasion of 21st anniversary of CPR. He refers to China's successful testing of thermonuclear weapons and completion of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. (As in previous years, the King of Laos also sends message of greetings.)

Oct 1: Pathet Lao Radio, in discussing founding of the CPR, speaks of Chinese Communist Party "armed with invincible Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung Thought." In Vientiane, Yueh Tai-heng, chargé d'affaires ad interim of CPR Embassy, gives reception attended by notables of Lao government as well as by local NLHS representative.

Oct 11: Chou En-lai sends message to Souphanouvong on occasion of 25th anniversary of independence of Laos. In Peking, the China-Laos Friendship Association and Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries give reception in honor of Lao Independence Day. The Chinese hosts include Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien; the Lao guests, apart from students, include several prominent Lao (pro-Communist) Neutralists led by General Huon Mongkhunvilay. The

Oct 4: Pravda publishes a message from Souphanouvong to Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin, in which he congratulates the Soviet people, party, and government on successful soft moon landing of Luna 16.

Oct 12-19: On 25th anniversary of Laos independence (Oct 12), several Soviet organizations send congratulatory message to NLHS Central Committee. This ushers in week of Soviet solidarity with struggle in Laos, celebrated in Moscow and other major Soviet cities. Moscow celebrations are attended by an NLHS delegation headed by Central Committee member Phao Phimphachanh. Many
movie houses show Soviet-made film "The Days and Nights in Laos."

Mid-Oct: Moscow broadcast beamed to China asserts that "the Chinese propaganda machinery is not only taking pains to distort the Soviet Union's internationalist stand on Laos and other Indochinese countries, but is attempting to alienate the struggling peoples on the Indochinese peninsula from the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries as well."

Oct 21: Komsomol delegation visits liberated regions of Laos, exchanging opinions with leadership of NLHS Youth Association. Delegation presents gifts of educational aids, laboratory equipment, and materials, and is received by Souphanouvong. At conclusion of visit, a joint communiqué of the Soviet and Lao youth organizations is issued in Sam Neua. (Souphanouvong is interviewed by Komsomolskaia Pravda on Oct 17. The interview appears on Nov 27.)

following day, People's Daily carries editorial on the occasion, promising powerful backing for Lao people's struggle and expressing once more faith in success of protracted armed struggle.

Oct 22-27: At invitation of NLHS Central Committee, a delegation of the New China News Agency arrives in Sam Neua. On Oct 27, they are received by Souphanouvong.
Oct 28: Pravda claims that U.S. ground forces are involved in the fighting in Laos and reports from LPLA headquarters that 12,000 U.S. military are active in Laos. A similar claim is made in Izvestia of Nov 5.

Nov 7: NLHS Central Committee holds rally in honor of 53rd anniversary of October Revolution. Meeting is attended by NLHS vice-chairman Sithon Kommadam and Central Committee member Sisana Sisane; the latter pays tribute to Soviet achievement and expresses thanks for Soviet support.

Nov 24: CPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues statement declaring that it is internationalist duty of Chinese people "to give all-out support and assistance to the peoples of Viet Nam and the other countries of Indo-China in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation" and that Chinese people will "unite and fight together with them till complete victory."

Dec 13: Joint statement of CCP Central Committee and CPR government reaffirms in strongest language...
China's commitment to support of Indochinese peoples' struggle: "We sternly warn U.S. imperialism: Don't misjudge the situation and miscalculate."

Dec 19: In Peking, General and Mrs. Mongkhunvilay attend Chou En-lai's banquet for delegation of South Vietnam National Front for Liberation. (In preceding and following months, the general is repeatedly listed as attending various official functions in Peking.)

1971

Jan 5: Chou En-lai sends congratulations to Souphouvang on occasion of 15th anniversary of NLHS, expressing faith in effectiveness of protracted people's war and pledging China to provide powerful backing in the war "until all the U.S. aggressors are driven out of Laotian territory and the whole of Indochina."

People's Daily of Jan 6, hailing the anniversary, carries editorial in same vein.

Jan 19: On occasion of anniversary of the LPLA, Lin Piao sends congratulations to "Comrade" Khamtay Siphandone. Message is similar to that of Jan 5.
Feb 1: At luncheon given for a visiting Syrian government delegation, Soviet Premier Kosygin (referring to South Vietnamese invasion of Laos) accuses U.S. of aggressive actions against Southern Laos and states: "The only possible solution of the Indochinese problem is in the attainment of a political settlement that meets the national interests of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

Feb 2: Izvestia, denouncing U.S. military role in Laos, concludes: "The Soviet people are siding with the just cause of the Lao patriots."

(Similar articles are published in the following days in the major Soviet papers.)

Feb 4, 8: In connection with South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, the CPR Foreign Ministry, after a first warning given on Feb 4, issues statement describing action as grave provocation not only against the three Indochinese peoples but also against China, and pledging all-out support to these peoples "to defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs."

Feb 12: CPR government issues statement about Laos, terming "U.S. imperialism's aggression" in Laos "a grave menace to China" and declaring that Chinese people "absolutely will not remain indifferent to it."
Feb 25: Tass broadcasts a Soviet government statement strongly condemning U.S. role in invasion of Laos and warns that "the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the new escalation of the American aggression."

Mar 7, 18: La Norindr, new ambassador of Laos to USSR, arrives in Moscow by regular Aeroflot flight from Vientiane. Presents his credentials in Kremlin on Mar 18.

Mar 8: CPC Central Committee, CPR government, Central Committee of Vietnamese Workers Party, and DRV government issue, in Hanoi, a joint communiqué on Laos. They condemn "U.S. imperialism and its lackeys in Saigon and Bangkok for their grave crime of massive invasion of Laos," pledge firm support for "fraternal Laotian people," and demand that U.S. unconditionally stop its bombing in Laos and withdraw "all the U.S. aggressor troops and vassal troops" from Laotian territory. Further, the communiqué specifically endorses a five-point peace proposal put forward by NLHS on Mar 6, 1970.

Mar 18: Souphanouvong congratulates Mao, Lin, and Chou on China's launching of experimental scientific earth satellite, and terms that feat a telling blow to "U.S. imperialist nuclear blackmail."
Mar 23: A delegation arrives in Peking, led by Kaysone Phomvihan and including NLHA Central Committee members Sanan Southichak and Maysjuk as well as Thongsavath Kaykhamphitoune, deputy director of General Affairs Bureau of NLHA Central Committee. The next day, Chou En-lai visits delegation at its living quarters; the day after, supported by Politburo members Yao Wen-yuan and Ch'i'u Hui-tso as well as Keng Piao and Fang Yi, he exchanges views with delegation regarding situation in Laos. On Mar 26, CCP Central Committee and State Council of CPR give grand banquet for Indochinese leaders visiting Peking. China is represented by Chou En-lai, Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, Li Huen-nien, and galaxy of other leaders. Foreign guests of honor include Sihanouk, Le Duan, Kaysone Phomvihan, and Nguyen Van Hieu. In banquet speech, Chou reaffirms China's determination to fulfill its internationalist duty toward the Indochinese as well as toward the Korean peoples, and toasts their "militant unity" with China. Laotian and Vietnamese delegations leave for Moscow on Mar 27.

Mar 27: Soviet Defense Minister Marshal A. Grechko sends message of thanks to Lao People's Liberation Army in response to their congratulations on 33rd anniversary of Soviet armed forces.
Mar 27-Apr 14: Kaysone Phomvihan, heading Laotian delegation to 24th Congress of CPSU, arrives in Moscow on Mar 27 after stop-overs in Hanoi and Peking. In opening address by President Podgorny, Laotian delegation is one of several listed in category of "delegations of friendly parties with whom the CPSU maintains and develops fruitful relations." Secretary General Brezhnev's report to the Congress declares: "The Soviet Union resolutely demands the cessation of imperialist aggression against the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Our country has been, is, and will continue to be an active champion of the just cause of the heroic people of Indochina." On Apr 8 Congress passes a resolution expressing solidarity with liberation movements in the three Indochinese countries. Kaysone leaves Moscow on Apr 14; that same day, Pravda publishes article by him.

Mar 29: Souphanouvong grants interview to Pravda special correspondents A. Serbin and I. Shchedrov, which is published next day.


Mar 29: Mao, Lin, and Chou send message to Souphanouvong and the other Indochinese leaders congratulating them on victorious battles, particularly along Highway 9 (leading into
Soviet Union
1971

China
1971

Laos). This victory is regarded as of great strategic importance and as demonstrating the might of people's war and strength of unity of the three Indochinese peoples. Souphanouvong sends message of thanks on Mar 31.

Apr 3: Souphanouvong grants interview to Soviet TV and Radio Moscow correspondents in which he expresses gratitude for Soviet Union's "great and effective support."

Apr 5: Pentagon spokesman states that Chinese forces guarding road construction projects in northern Laos have increased to about 14,000, and that they are equipped with anti-aircraft guns and radar.

Apr 14-30: Apr 14: Kayson, at banquet for Sihanouk given by Chou En-lai, speaks of "tremendous and valuable support and assistance rendered consistently" by CPC and Chinese government and people. Apr 26: Kaysone is seen off by Chou En-lai and leaves by special plane for South China, accompanied by CPR Vice Minister of Economic Relations with Foreign
Apr 24: Solidarity meeting with the Indochinese peoples organized by international youth organizations opens in Moscow, with Lao representatives in attendance.

Apr 24: Tung Pi-wu, vice-chairman of CPR, and Chou En-lai, on occasion of first anniversary of Indochinese Peoples' Summit Conference, send congratulations to Indochinese leadership including "Prince Souphanouvong" and "Comrade Kaysone Phomvihan."

The following day, People's Daily carries editorial, "The Fifty Million Indochinese People are Invincible."

On May 3, the Chinese ambassador to France gives banquet in honor of first anniversary of Summit Conference, with Khamphay Boupha representing Laos.

Apr 30: Visiting NLHS Heroes and Model Workers Delegation attends banquet given by China-Laos Friendship Association and Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Other Countries. Also attending banquet are CPC Politburo member and Deputy Chief of Staff Ch'iu Hui-tso and Kuo Mo-jo, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. May 3: Chou En-lai and Chief of Staff Huang
Yung-sheng meet with delegation.
May 6: Ambassador of Republic of South Vietnam to China gives banquet in honor of Laotian delegation; it is attended also by General Singkapo, on a visit to Peking. Subsequently, delegation visits Shanghai, Changsha, Kunming, and Nanning before returning home on Jun 3.

May 13: Tass terms recent NLHS proposals "a new important initiative paving the way for a political settlement in Laos."

May 18-31: Art troupe of Soviet youth organization Komsomol tours NLHS zone.

May 19-26: Soviet Union celebrates an international week of solidarity with Laotian people's struggle.

Jul 8-15: Lao youth delegation headed by Nouphanh Sidphasay, member of Central Committee of NLHS Youth Association, stops over in Peking after attending Sixth Congress of Socialist Working Youth League of Korea.

Jul 10: Sone Khamvanvongsa represents NLHS at Peking banquet in honor of 10th anniversary of Sino-Korean Friendship Treaty. Attends rally
Jul 13: Letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to U.S. Secretary General U Thant reiterates Soviet support for earlier proposals of Indochinese revolutionary governments and political fronts, including NLHS proposal of March 6, 1970, and its subsequent modifications.

next day celebrating the anniversary, together with Cambodian and Vietnamese representatives.

Jul 19: Premier Chou En-lai, meeting with a U.S. student group in Peking, reportedly declares that complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces and installations from all Indochina, including Laos and Cambodia, must take priority over normalization of U.S.-China relations.

Jul 30: Khamtay Siphandone sends traditional message on LPLA anniversary to Lin Piao, expressing gratitude for "extremely precious support and assistance" received from China. Chen Shu-ling, military attaché of the CPR Embassy in Laos, gives reception attended by Souvanna Phouma and other RLG officials as well as by Souk Vongsak and Soth Phetrasay representing NLHS.

Aug 3: Report by a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, cleared by U.S. Government, provides data on Chinese presence in Laos: Chinese forces along road they are building in northern Laos number
between 14,000 and 20,000, as compared to 6,000-8,000 two years earlier. About one-third to one-fourth of these are ant aircraft crews; the remainder are construction workers. Road currently ends 45 miles from Mekong River, some 20 miles from Thailand.