INCREASING PEACETIME UTILITY OF CIVIL DEFENSE

FINAL REPORT

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SUMMARY

INCREASING PEACETIME UTILITY OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Materials Employed

The recommendations expressed in this report are based on (1) familiarity with the basic mission and operations of civil defense; (2) an analysis of U.S. public opinion poll data, with emphasis on 1969-1970; (3) investigation of current peacetime services being performed by local civil defense offices. Information about current peacetime activities was obtained from newspaper clippings forwarded to us by OCD and from interviews with state, county, and municipal civil defense officials. Five civil defense offices were visited: Washington, D. C., Danbury, Connecticut, Morris County, New Jersey, Union Township, New Jersey, and Scotch Plains, New Jersey. In addition, the Director of Civil Defense for the state of Oklahoma spent a day at Hudson Institute for the purpose of assisting in the study. Also, some effort was made to obtain information suggestive of ways in which OCD might work cooperatively with other Federal agencies, but this was not a major emphasis.

General Conclusions

Changing public attitudes about civil defense have created a situation to which energetic local CD units have responded by developing a variety of peacetime services to their communities. Often, perhaps usually, responsibilities of this kind multiply in an unplanned way. The community comes to rely on them, but they are not effectively used by the CD office to obtain stronger support for its basic functions.

In the face of the same problem of public indifference, other CD offices have lost the vitality they once possessed, swelling the ranks of local units that exist "in name only" or little better. In this situation,
The Emergency Operations Center Concept

The Emergency Operations Center concept provides one blueprint for remedying the decoupling of peacetime services from basic mission at local level. We believe that this blueprint could be much more widely employed than it is today, but it is not enough to suggest that a local unit call its physical facility an "EOC." Skills of planning and coordination are required, and also the ability to establish one's credibility with the municipality's elective leadership and with the agencies whose activities require coordination in an emergency.

Local CD groups which aspire to a coordination role thus require special tutelage and attention. This should entail visitation programs, both to show aspirants how other people in similar situations have succeeded in this effort, and to open channels for obtaining practical advice. Coordination model CD offices should be regarded and encouraged to regard themselves as something of an elite.

A Differentiation Policy

So long as OCD was overseeing a network of local units pursuing a narrow mission by traditional means, the effort to impose and enforce "standard standards" of performance was sensible. Today, when the basic problem is obtaining local support, OCD (and state CD) should recognize that no single means to this end is appropriate for all situations. We differentiate among three models: the coordination model (described above), the resource model, and the intermediary model. Briefly, the resource model describes those more or less active local units whose leadership lacks the qualities of mind and personality to play a coordinating role. These people need advice on how to do what they can do better, and they need a feeling that the people down in Washington (and Trenton,
even a highly qualified and ambitious new CD director would start his job with two strikes against him; much more commonly, of course, the appointment in such communities goes to someone who, while he has a vague desire to do something, has been chosen for traits which suggest that he won't rock the boat.

These conditions define two objectives for OCD and state CD. The first is to upgrade local emergency preparedness skills and organization across the board, but especially where serious deterioration has occurred (or where these capabilities have never been developed). The second is to assist local units in increasing public support for their basic mission.

Public Opinion Data

Current OCD thinking on how to operate in the present climate of opinion has probably been influenced by the often reiterated theme that public concern is shifting from international issues to domestic ones, such as pollution, "crime in the streets" and the problems of urban slums. If this is so, it would be appropriate for OCD to concentrate on developing cooperative arrangements with other Federal agencies concerned with such problems. We suggest an alternative theory: that is, that public sentiment is as disillusioned about grandiose, centrally directed "wars" on poverty or pollution or crime as it is about "policing the globe." The shift in interest and concern, we would suggest, is toward localism, not toward a national commitment to get at the root of various societal problems. Civil defense, as a network of strongly autonomous local units, would seem very well situated to profit from this situation, but concentrating on possibilities for inter-agency cooperation would not seem the best approach.
etc.) appreciate the limits on what is possible for them. Upgrading CD in resource model communities is a matter of improving other capabilities than planning and coordination. In an emergency, this type of CD office will be a valuable resource; it will not direct the community's response.

The intermediary model is addressed to the problem of how to assist CD directors who are poorly situated to help themselves: that is, those who head a moribund or undeveloped organization. A formula to serve this purpose should meet the following criteria: (1) materials should be supplied from above, not drawn (e.g. volunteers) from the community; (2) the functions involved should be considered useful and noncontroversial by the beneficiaries; and (3) the functions should bring the CD director into contact with the key figures and agencies in his community ("key" in connection with civil defense needs) in order to lay the groundwork for developing true CD capabilities. The model we suggest as meeting these criteria involves an emphasis on the dissemination of "safety" information of various kinds, with CD serving as the standard channel for this purpose for many Federal agencies.

Possibly, intermediary model CD offices should be assigned a provisional status. Whatever the best arrangement may be, it seems clearly counterproductive to offer them advice they are not able to follow and to present them with standards of performance that are impossible for them to meet.

In Chapter V of our report, we offer brief illustrative scenarios for our three models and suggest means for implementing a differentiation policy.
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By

JANE NEWITT AND MAX SINGER

For

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HUDSON INSTITUTE, INC.
Quaker Ridge Road
Croton-on-Hudson
New York 10520
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SCOPE OF THE STUDY--INCREASING PEACETIME UTILITY OF CIVIL DEFENSE (2615A)

I. Contract, Article I, Scope of Work

"A. The Contractor, in consultation and cooperation with the government, shall furnish necessary facilities, personnel, and such other services as may be required to perform a study for Increasing Peacetime Utility of Civil Defense. The work and services shall be performed as specifically provided for herein.

"B. The study shall be done in the light of changing military strategy and technology and international conditions and shall emphasize possible peacetime applications beyond those already recognized as, for example, in natural disasters.

"C. Specific work and services are as follows:

1. The contractor shall review civil defense programs and current plans for development of these programs in the future as well as the needs, concerns, and priorities of the American Public and the U.S. Government, especially those that have grown substantially in recent years, to determine whether possibilities exist for applying more intensively the capabilities already developed or usefully altering future Civil Defense programs to accomplish more peacetime benefits as well as better preparations for the possibility of enemy attack.

2. The Contractor shall explore, develop, describe, and make recommendations of alternative possible modifications of the civil defense programs designed to accomplish peacetime functions and to meet the concerns of the public."

II. Description of Research Effort

Two types of information were collected and analyzed for this study: public opinion poll data, with particular emphasis on Gallup Poll surveys for 1969-1970; and information about the current peacetime activities of local civil defense units. Information of the latter type was obtained from a collection of newspaper clippings supplied by the Office of Civil Defense and from visits to civil defense offices in Washington, D.C., Danbury, Connecticut, Union, New Jersey, Scotch Plains, New Jersey, and Morris County, New Jersey. In addition, the study benefited from a visit to the Institute by the director of civil defense of the State of Oklahoma.
The principal questions addressed by the study were as follows:

A. What characteristics of U.S. public opinion are relevant to the undertaking of peacetime services by civil defense?

B. How, in fact, have local CD units been acting to improve public support of their basic mission?

C. How effective have these program modifications been?

D. What are the general areas and levels of peacetime civil defense activity?

E. What specific activities may be appropriate for some/all CD units?

F. What are the pitfalls and drawbacks of peacetime activity, and how do these differ from the problems of "traditional" civil defense?

G. In what ways can the Office of Civil Defense advise and assist state and local civil defense in assuming peacetime responsibilities, and, again, what are the risks entailed?

III. Limitations of Scope

Because of the limited scale of the study, a number of subjects relevant to answering these questions were touched on only in a cursory way, or not at all. While caveats are included, where appropriate, in the body of the report, it seems desirable to list at the start what we consider to be the major weaknesses of the data base on which our recommendations rest. These are:

A. Inadequate information about the peacetime activities of civil defense offices in large cities.

B. Only a sampling acquaintance (utilizing the Department of Commerce) with possibilities for inter-agency cooperation at the Federal level.
C. No investigation of the evolution and current state of OCD's relationships--policies and procedures--with state and local CD offices.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In this study we have explored ways in which the Office of Civil Defense could increase the peacetime utility of civil defense. There are of course two reasons for this effort to increase the peacetime utility of civil defense. The first is a recognition that there has been some change in the domestic situation since CD started, therefore there may be new opportunities for CD to be of service to the general community. At the same time there is a strong current of thinking that a "shift in priorities" is desired by many people in the country. It is obviously appropriate for OCD, as for any government agency, to seek to respond to the changing situation, although of course it must be careful not to follow the merely "fashionable" and not to sacrifice its basic mission or exceed its authority.

The second reason for OCD to be concerned about increasing the peacetime utility of CD is the idea, with which we strongly concur, that only by doing so will OCD be able to do the best job possible toward achieving its basic mission, maximizing the readiness of the country for nuclear war.

If a war started out of the blue, as a result of a surprise attack by the Soviet Union, or an accidental war growing out of a very sudden crisis, the country would have to cope with the nuclear attack on the basis of the preparations as they exist at that time, that is, in a normal peacetime state of civil defense. Preparing for this contingency is one of the responsibilities of OCD. However, as Hudson Institute has pointed out in the past and

as many other people have recognized, a war out of the blue is relatively improbable, and extraordinarily difficult to prepare for. Much more likely than war out of the blue is a war that has been preceded by a period during which there has been substantial increase in the willingness of the country to carry out civil defense-oriented preparations or programs.

But of course it is not possible to know whether the period before war during which extensive civil defense preparations will be made will be a week, a month, a year, or several years. Presumably the size of the funding and the intensity of the civil defense effort during the period preceding a war could vary as broadly as the length of time of accelerated preparations. There would be tendency for shorter periods of preparation to involve more intense efforts. In fact, the size of the effort that is feasible is much greater for a shorter period of time than for a long. For a week, increasing passive defense preparations could be the major activity of the country, which one could think of as 1% of the annual GNP (¼ x 1/50th of the year) inefficiently spent in a week. If there were a nuclear war in Europe—and perhaps at sea—one could imagine such a civil defense effort. Obviously the country could not devote so much of its efforts to civil defense for the period of a year. Furthermore the kind of change in the international climate which is likely to precede a nuclear war by a year or two, and to lead to increased defense expenditures, including increased civil defense, is less likely to lead to a really major concentration on civil defense, although it might.

Virtually any pattern in the relationship between length of preparation period and intensity of effort during that period is possible. For example, one reasonable pattern might be a really intense crisis during which major passive defense efforts are made, quite inefficiently, following which war
is averted, and the crisis ended, although it is followed by a period of substantial tension and a major civil defense effort over a period of a year or two. But it is not terribly helpful to speculate over which pattern of increased preparedness is most likely or, which patterns are more likely. The best that OCD can do is to have a general sense of increasing its ability to respond to an increased commitment to civil defense needs by the country. Therefore the point of view of this report is to focus on the ways in which the increase in the peacetime utility of civil defense can help civil defense to accomplish its primary mission.

The primary mission of the Office of Civil Defense is to reduce the loss of property and lives in the event of nuclear war. If one looks at recent history, the economic success of Japan stands out. Japan's tremendous success is certainly not based upon natural resources or the physical capital available in 1945. Japan's success is based upon the quality of her people and the way in which their values and traditions support effective organization for economic productivity. Japan's success illustrates a more general point that is applicable to the basic civil defense mission. This point is that in general it is more important to focus on men and organization than on material factors. (Of course this is not to deny any importance to material factors. Very few people can rise to the occasion and measure radiation levels without an instrument designed for that purpose.)

In the period before, during, and after attack on the United States people will take action to reduce damage to persons and property and to restore productive activity. We are concerned with what the civil defense organization can do now to improve effectiveness of the actions that will be taken at that time. There are a number of components to the capability
that each area or jurisdiction will bring to its operations during this period. These components include the material, equipment and skills available, the knowledge of appropriate actions, etc. In this discussion we would like to focus on two particular components of the capability to respond to nuclear attack: the capability of the civil defense organization itself, and the community's capability to respond to emergencies.

By the community's capability to respond to emergencies we mean its ability in advance of the emergency to make intelligent preparations, and, in an emergency, its ability to effectively coordinate its resources and operations. In effect, we are talking about two kinds of community skills: (i) planning for unusual contingencies and (ii) coordinated emergency action. It is our belief that one of the most important areas of civil defense activity is to do what is possible to increase these skills in as many communities as possible.

Let us summarize the argument to this point. One of the key things the civil defense organization should be doing (and is doing) is to improve the organizational capability of the communities of the country to respond to nuclear attack. While civil defense can not do much to influence the general strength of the police departments, fire departments, medical services, etc., in our communities, it can do something to strengthen the ability of communities to put together their resources and apply them effectively in an emergency. In effect, we are suggesting, that there is such a thing as a community ability to operate in a coordinated way in an emergency, that some communities have more of this ability than others, and that one of the most important things that civil defense can do is to strengthen this ability in as many communities as possible.
There are two ways in which civil defense action now can strengthen the community's ability to coordinate its responses to a nuclear attack. One way involves creation of a civil defense organization that will perform the coordination function, or a major part of it, when a nuclear attack approaches. The other way is for the civil defense organization to help the community to develop the emergency coordination skills that would be used in responding to nuclear attack. We argue that these skills are at least as important a part of civil defense preparedness as shelters, radiation protection equipment, etc.

The next question is how can communities develop better emergency coordination skills? It is obvious that this question is a "soft" question, that there will not be any simple answer, that different communities will need different techniques, that results will be hard to judge, and that it is difficult for a small agency in Washington to get a big effect all over the country on this issue. These are all excellent reasons for staying away from this question and avoiding the task of trying to increase America's communities' ability to respond to emergencies. We would suggest, however, that because of the importance of this task, these reasons should not be allowed to turn civil defense away from this question.

Many communities are quite good at responding in a coordinated way to emergencies. These communities benefit from two kinds of skills, which are not always available to be applied to this kind of work and which are generally not necessary for the ordinary operation of a community. One of these skills is the ability to plan and make preparations--which requires sustaining motivation--for unlikely, or at least infrequent, events. The other is the ability for various components of the community--such as the police, fire department, school system, political authorities, etc.--to
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work together and quickly. Often the most effective community agencies are the ones that are least capable of working together with other agencies. For many purposes the typical inter-agency rivalries that exist may be productive, or at least not significantly harmful. However, in an emergency situation requiring coordinated action, the ability to work together which is ordinarily not required, can become of critical importance. An important task of civil defense therefore can be seen as helping to supply to or stimulate the development of these two skills in communities where they are relatively lacking.

The point of all this discussion is that it is very difficult to over-emphasize that the vitality of the civil defense organization is perhaps the critical output of peacetime civil defense, and that therefore anything done that helps to maintain the vitality of these organizations is an important part of civil defense. Furthermore, organizational vitality is not a function of how many forms have been filled out, how many people are on salary, etc. Organizational vitality depends upon continued performance of useful functions. This is particularly true of civil defense where one of the key roles involves coordination of other agencies of government. People will not be in a position to carry out this mission, or even to help others carry it out, unless they and their organization have built up relationships and trust beforehand. Coordination of organizations, while it is undoubtedly partly a matter of systems and procedures, is very often dominated by personal factors and relationships. Unless mayors, governors, agency heads, etc, have learned to know and respect and to work with civil defense organizations in peacetime, they are not very likely to work with them effectively in a crisis.
In this report we are looking at how OCD, and the CD offices throughout the country, can increase their ability to perform the basic CD mission by increasing their utility during peacetime. We have followed several paths toward this end. The major focus has been upon various activities that CD can engage in and functions that it can perform. Here we have followed two courses. First, we have looked at what various CD offices around the country are actually doing. Second, we have considered how the natural strengths—both actual and desired—of CD could be appropriately applied to other activities. We have used both of these methods to develop a long list of possible peacetime activities for CD. In this essentially "listing" activity we have tried to cast our net broadly so that as many possibilities can be considered by OCD as possible. We have not tried to make more than a very preliminary evaluation of the wisdom of each of the ideas discussed. They are "ideas" and "possibilities," not "recommendations." Nor have we tried to evaluate the extent to which the various possibilities are already being done, or have been evaluated. While of course we have tried to exclude foolish or obviously unfeasible ideas, we have tried to err in the direction of including too much, rather than too little.

Out of our look at what CD organizations are doing and our consideration of what CD organizations might do, we developed a second major approach to the problem of increasing the utility of CD organizations. This approach might be called a strategy of dealing with the problem. It became clear to us that none of the possibilities were appropriate for all CD organizations, or even all CD organizations at any particular level (e.g., local,
county, state). Some ideas that were clearly very desirable, equally clearly could not be used universally. Therefore we felt that it would be useful for OCD to use a diversified set of models of local CD activity as the most effective strategy for increasing the peacetime utility of civil defense, and we proposed a preliminary set of possible models which are defined and discussed in some detail in Chapter V.

One point we would like to use this introduction to emphasize is our belief that the Emergency Operating Center concept has tremendous value and potential. Of course this is not our idea, nor a new idea. It is just that in our looking at the problem we were strongly impressed with how strong this concept is. One point is that for many jurisdictions it is something that civil defense can give to the Government, particularly to the Chief Executive, which will be really useful. In these areas it is in effect a civil defense "invention." As we point out in the report, civil defense will benefit even if CD organizations don't run and are not even represented in EOC's, because the EOC will strengthen the ability of the Government to respond to civil defense as well as other emergencies. But, obviously it is better if civil defense officials can perform this function themselves or play a major role. This will be easier to achieve in communities where no such function is now being performed. Therefore it is our feeling that any state or city CD organization that has prospects of successfully introducing this idea should be given maximum support by OCD.
CHAPTER II

ASPECTS OF PUBLIC OPINION RELEVANT TO CIVIL DEFENSE

1. Introduction

The factor of public opinion is important in a number of ways in connection with consideration of peacetime roles for civil defense. First, it would be useful to know what people think about civil defense—or if they think about it at all. Second, we need to know about attitudes regarding U.S. foreign policy and the Department of Defense, international relations, and fears or expectations about this aspect of the future, because we would like to be able to compare the degree of such concerns with the degree of concern about various domestic issues that touch on the peacetime roles that civil defense might play. Finally, with regard to all of these questions, it would be helpful to go beyond national data and to note such significant differences as may exist, in particular, regional differences and differences among communities of various sizes.

We are interested in these kinds of data for two reasons. The first is that, as an expression of felt needs, they are an important part of the context in which changes in the activities of civil defense take place. While it is true that organizations (and their advertising agencies) sometimes succeed in manufacturing "needs" or in making the public aware of needs it didn't know it had, part of the problem with civil defense in recent years has been the difficulty of "selling" the public on the importance of being prepared for a nuclear attack. A major element of the argument for an expanded CD role is to circumvent this problem: that is, to improve attack preparedness by devoting some efforts to peacetime activities that will improve attack preparedness, even though
in many people's eyes, that will not be the basic justification. Consequently, the costly, time-consuming, and sometimes dangerous job of convincing officials and the public not only that CD is the appropriate agency to do a task but also that the task is important enough to need doing ought to be avoided as much as possible. Certainly, it cannot be avoided entirely, nor should it be. Thinking big—for instance, arguing the case for the emergency operations center concept or other active coordinating roles—may be very valuable for many situations. But civil defense is and presumably will remain an institution characterized by a great deal of grassroots initiative and autonomy. Realistic advice and assistance has to be responsive, by and large, to the felt needs of the local communities.

Second, opinion poll data is germane to our subject because it helps us know what not to do, where to move cautiously, what pitfalls to beware of. The polls available to us involve their own pitfalls, principally the sampling errors that are unavoidable when public opinion is broken down into the detailed categories that are of especial interest to civil defense. Nonetheless, studying polls based on different samples but asking similar questions, it becomes clear that the conventional wisdom about "who thinks what" is sometimes highly questionable. It would seem important for policy-makers to be aware of these areas of discrepancy between what "everyone" knows and what the polls consistently indicate.

II. Attitudes about Civil Defense, International Relations, and the Future

Probably the most important single point to be made in this part of our discussion is suggested by the fact that almost a decade has passed
since the Gallup organization asked anybody anything about civil defense. This subject was a vital public concern ten years ago. Concern about foreign affairs focused on the Soviet Union and on the danger of nuclear war. In the ensuing decade, foreign affairs have remained in the spotlight with fewer and briefer periods of displacement by domestic problems than is generally appreciated, but the focus of concern has shifted to Vietnam. The problem most Americans perceived as most important has been Vietnam ever since August 1965, except for a short time in 1967 when the urban riots made race relations seem more important, and last summer when campus unrest captured the top position. But Russia and China are not directly involved in the Vietnam war. The thoughts and fears this war arouses appear to be quite different from those evoked by Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis, and the differences are detrimental to public interest in civil defense.

According to a poll taken in 1968*, the public divides evenly, 44% to 44% on the question of whether a nuclear war seems "likely" (very/fairly) or "unlikely." However, it would be incorrect to conclude from this evidence that 44 percent of the American people are seriously concerned about civil defense. In the first place, no time period was specified in the question, and someone who regards a nuclear war as fairly or even as very likely some time in the dim future will not necessarily consider it important to prepare for this eventuality now. He may be quite content to suppose in a vague way that someone is doing something, and this, indeed, is the attitude that the University of Pittsburgh study strongly suggests is typical. That is, not only had more than half the respondents never

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heard anything about local civil defense activities; nearly three quarters were unwilling to venture an opinion on the subject. As was noted in the accompanying text,

"That so many people refuse to do any evaluating is revealing. If the public felt strongly about the absence of known local civil defense activity, they would presumably evaluate the situation...in terms of given response categories as 'inadequate'...In most cases where there was a failure to evaluate, we suspect that the perceptions of the presence or absence of activity seemed so remote from the individual's life and concerns that he simply had no opinion about the situation."^{7}

A second reason why civil defense gains little practical assistance from the fact that 44 percent of the public regards a nuclear war as likely (or did so in 1968) is indicated by the socio-economic breakdown of this attitude included in the University of Pittsburgh study. Expectation that a nuclear war is likely is the majority position only for the "lower class"--51 percent affirmative, 29 percent negative. For the "middle class" the percentages were respectively 44 and 48; for the "upper class" 31 and 63. While this classificatory system assigned 37 percent of the population to the lower class, 44 percent to the middle class, and 18 percent to the upper class, it is the middle class which disproportionately provides the political pressures, the organizational ability, and the reservoir of volunteer workers that permit services such as civil defense to exist and thrive. The limited credibility of the nuclear threat among such people is subversive to the vitality of civil defense. Moreover, even among respondents who rated themselves as community leaders (269 cases out of a total sample of 1508), only a minority offered an opinion of the local program.

Let us now look more generally at the attitudes about foreign affairs that underlie this atmosphere of apathy and nonmilitant disapproval. In this effort, and also in the following section, we will rely primarily on poll data acquired by the Gallup organization in the past two years. While scholarly analyses of public attitudes about national security matters occasionally appear in the journals, these reflect what a recent article in *Science* termed a major flaw in the procedures of the social sciences: that is, the great lag (compared to the natural sciences) between the conduct of research and its publication. It is our feeling that for our purposes here current Gallup data is, by and large, preferable to careful analyses of public opinion published in 1970 and 1969 but based on polls taken five or more years earlier.

As indicated above, the Vietnam war has in recent years been far and away the most important foreign policy issue to most Americans. In Gallup polls conducted during the winter and summer of 1969, 40 percent of the respondents listed Vietnam as the nation's top problem. The first half of 1970 saw a diffusion of public concern. By June, Vietnam (with Cambodia) was displaced from first position by "campus unrest," and was regarded as the nation's most important problem by only 22 percent of those polled. However, in the preceding six months, other (unspecified) international issues had risen from fifth place on the list, with 6 percent of the "vote," to third place, with 14 percent.37

While Gallup has not published data regarding this particular question of the nation's top problem since June 1970, pre-election surveys suggest that concern about Vietnam has not diminished further and may well have

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increased. The public was asked in October, "When people around here go to vote on November 3 for a candidate for Congress, how important will Vietnam be in their thinking?" The same question was asked about pollution and about student unrest. Seventy-two percent of respondents considered Vietnam "extremely important," by comparison to 58 percent for pollution, and 57 percent for student unrest. However, the dominant sentiment with regard to Vietnam appears increasingly to be that we should get out. While only a minority favor immediate withdrawal, the size of the minority jumped from 21 percent to 35 percent of the total during the winter of 1969-70. In October 1970, 61 percent of the public favored the more moderate aim of withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam by the end of 1971.

Several polls conducted in 1969 reflected a more general sentiment in favor of reduced foreign commitments. To the question, "If a situation like Vietnam were to develop in another part of the world, do you think the U.S. should or should not send troops?" 25 percent replied that we should, 62 percent that we should not. Whereas 82 percent of the American people wanted the U.S. to "work closely with other nations" in 1963, six years later the proportion was down to 72 percent. During the same period, those who wanted the U.S. to "keep independent in world affairs" increased from 10 percent to 22 percent of the total. Half of this increase occurred in the last two years of the period, when the main influence was a two and a half times rise (from 11 to 28 percent) of go-it-alone sentiments among people in their twenties.


Perhaps a better indicator of growing "isolationist" sentiments are the results of a July 1969 poll on military and defense expenditures. Two questions were asked: (1) How much of each U.S. tax dollar goes for these purposes?, and (2) Is the current level of military and defense spending too high, too low, or about right? The results were somewhat ironic. While 71 percent of respondents refused to hazard a guess about actual expenditures, 52 percent felt that we were spending too much. (31 percent thought we were spending the right amount; 8 percent that we were spending too little; 9 percent expressed no opinion.) Among the minority who attempted to estimate our actual military and defense expenditures, two and a half times as many (15 versus 6 percent of the total) guessed too high as guessed too low.

The most conspicuous influence on the percentages for estimates of actual military expenditures was the extreme difference between the sexes. Expressing no opinion were 83 percent of the women respondents, compared to 58 percent of the men. Offering reasonably correct estimates were 13 percent of the men, but only 3 percent of the women. However, while women were notably less well-informed than men, they were also less critical of our present level of military and defense expenditures. Forty-eight percent of women, 55 percent of men felt that these were too high. On a more recent poll (July 1970), in which respondents were asked to "rate" the Pentagon, 30 percent of men and 29 percent of women were listed as "highly favorable"; 6 percent of men and 3 percent of women were "highly unfavorable."

In summary, looking at opinion polls for the past two years (and at the University of Pittsburgh data for the previous year), we see a pattern...
of attitudes in which serious concern about the Vietnamese war combines with a strong sentiment (intuitive rather than fact-based) for reducing expenditures for military and defense purposes. While a majority of the electorate continues to favor close cooperation with other nations, a growing minority, amounting to more than a fifth of the total, holds views reminiscent of the 1930's, when three out of four Americans opposed joining the League of Nations.

Quite obviously, concern about Vietnam does not translate into a felt need for a stronger military arm or for better civil defense. Rather, for most people it appears to reflect nothing more than a growing revulsion at sacrificing the nation's sons in a foreign land whose inhabitants have not greatly evoked the ordinary American's sympathies or admiration. (Perhaps these personal sentiments account for the fact that about 60 percent of women respondents, compared to only 65 percent of men, considered Vietnam an "extremely important" issue in the November 1970 elections?)

Fear of nuclear war, as an operative socio-political factor, appears to be much less common than one might conclude from the 44 percent of the University of Pittsburgh sample who considered such a catastrophe very or fairly likely. Toward the end of 1969, Gallup posed this question in a twenty-year expectations context, along with a number of other possibilities. Only 7 percent of those polled regarded a nuclear war as likely in this time period, with the range for all demographic categories tabulated running from 3 to 10 percent. Those groups which rated nuclear war more likely than the average were almost uniformly, in one sense or another, the fringe groups, the outsiders, of our society: 10 percent of nonwhites and of people with a grade school education, 9 percent of manual laborers and of people with

*Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 54, December 1969, pp. 20-23*
incomes below $3,000. Other catastrophic expectations for the next twenty years—"our way of life will have collapsed," "present civilization will be in ruins"—also characteristically elicited higher than average belief from peripheral groups including, in addition to the foregoing, farmers and others in sparsely populated areas and people whose political classification was "Independent." By regions, it is interesting to note that the South and West ranked above average regarding all three of the catastrophe questions. Compared to a national average of 11 percent, 17 percent of southerners found it credible that our "present civilization will be in ruins" (whatever that may mean) twenty years from now. Also of interest is that the youngest group polled, ages 21-29, conformed rather precisely to the national averages of 7, 9, and 11 percent in finding the three disasters credible.

However, the range of views on all three questions is so narrow that emphasis should not be placed with any great confidence on variations among the demographic categories. The salient point is that only a very small minority of Americans has the sort of view of the twenty-year future that would tend to provide strong support for traditional civil defense activities, and, second, that this small minority appears to be composed disproportionately of the "wrong" people, in terms of the capability to act responsibly and constructively on their fears. Indeed, it seems fairly plausible that taking a very dark view of our society and its future is very often a symptom of a sense of not belonging rather than a reasoned view of actualities or probabilities. When we discuss fear about "crime in the streets," we will suggest further evidence for this thesis, but it seems worthwhile to mention here that, across the full range of evidence, the typical "non-belonger," the typical alienated American,
is not the young person but, if we must have a stereotype, the elderly, relatively poor, Protestant inhabitant of a small town or rural area in the South or West.

Let us look now at a few other expectations for twenty years hence. While 7 percent of Americans expect a nuclear war, an equal proportion see "no Russian communism" by 1990; 15 percent see no passport necessary for world travel; 15 percent see no more atomic weapon production, 20 percent expect Russia and the U.S. to be "living together peacefully." Outside the area of international relations, 26 percent of respondents anticipate an average life expectancy of 100 years, 32 percent foresee a three day workweek, 42 percent expect that our standard of living will have doubled, and 72 percent think we will have found a cure for cancer.

Except for the last, these are all minority expectations, and they far from establish a case that the current mood of the American people is basically optimistic, with pessimism restricted to the near-run future or to the "intellectuals". Also, while it is unfortunate that no question in the series dealt with the twenty-year future of race relations or, more generally, of "urban problems," however, the questions that were asked yielded responses which suggest that, first, a very large majority of Americans do not expect a catastrophic debacle in either international or domestic affairs in the next twenty years, and, second, that most Americans see the domestic sector as a more promising arena for progress in this period than the international sector. No optimistic prognosis for our international position yielded more than a 20 percent "vote"; no desirable domestic achievement seemed probable to less than 26 percent of those polled.
This configuration of attitudes may help to explain the growing tendency of Americans to desire some degree of withdrawal from involvements abroad and to feel some degree of disinterest in our military and defensive preparedness state. While Americans are far from anticipating global tranquility—for instance, 65 percent of us regard "another full-scale war between the Israelis and the Arabs as likely to occur in the next five years"—the predominant sentiment appears to be that external events do not seriously imperil us.

This sentiment augurs ill for the future of a traditionally oriented civil defense program. Recognition of the sentiment and its impact is, of course, nothing new. Except as regards certain details and comparisons, we have not in this chapter been telling OCD anything it does not already know. Less well understood is how public opinion and public support are likely to be affected by a civil defense "image" which stresses peacetime services to the community as well as nuclear attack preparedness. Here we may gain some insight by looking at a roughly analogous idea: transformation of the military draft into a more general form of national service. Gallup took the public pulse on this idea early in 1969 and in July 1970. While the question in the second poll was more detailed than in the first,

January 1969: "Would you favor or oppose requiring all young men to give one year of service to the nation—either in the military forces, or in non-military work here or abroad, such as VISTA or the Peace Corps?"

July 1970: "Congress is now considering a proposal to replace the Selective Service System—that is, the draft—with a national Service System. Under this system a young man of 18 could choose to do any one of these three things: (1) He could volunteer for military service. (2) he could volunteer for civilian service—for example, helping in hospitals, teaching school, working in programs like VISTA, or (3) he could take his chances on being drafted. How does this plan sound to you? Would you like to have your Congressman vote for or against this proposal?"
basically the issue was the same: should a period of public service be required of all young men, and should they have a choice between military service and work of the VISTA or Peace Corps type?

On the basis of our discussion so far, it might be expected that over the 18 month period between the two polls public sentiment would have become more receptive to the idea of partially "civilianizing" a war-oriented institution like Selective Service (or civil defense). However, the opposite occurred: support dropped from 79 to 71 percent, with opposition rising from 16 to 20 percent, and the proportion of undecided people almost doubling.

It is interesting to note where the changes did and did not occur. Support increased only among Republican respondents. It remained constant (and high) among young adults--80 percent ages 21 to 29 favored the proposition on both occasions--and among women (who of course would not be directly affected). Considerable numbers of people shifted from favoring to undecided in a number of categories: Protestants, southerners, college-educated people, and those in the white-collar and professional-and-business occupational groups. Outright opposition increased conspicuously for male respondents (from 14 to 25 percent), for people with a high school education (14 to 24 percent), for manual labor (14 to 24 percent), for farmers (19 to 26 percent), and for residents of all communities with population over 50,000, the greatest change being in the largest cities. An 11 point drop in approval was registered for these cities, and also for Catholics, Democrats, and respondents ages 30 to 49; a 12 point drop for westerners and white collar workers; a 16 point drop for farmers; and, most intriguing of all, a 13 point drop in support for the idea occurred among all male respondents.
Clearly, there is no single explanation for these changes; clearly, "national service" must mean very different things to different people. This is a problem we also encounter in evaluating "anti-Establishment" sentiments among the young. In that connection, a careful study of poll responses indicates that those who call themselves anti-Establishment include not only "New Left" types but many young people from the states'-rights South who favor George Wallace and aspire to military careers.*

The shifts in attitude toward national service appear to be much more complex, and we will not try to interpret them here. However, we would like to suggest a hypothesis which may be useful in explaining the over-all shift in opinion and in relating these polls to the prospects for civil defense. There is an important difference between an abstract idea—the subject of the first national service poll—and an idea which "Congress is now considering." The world is full of bright ideas, of ideas which sound good when we hear about them for the first time. It is when such ideas are spelled out in detail, and especially when Congress—or our local school board—or the local office of civil defense—is known to be seriously considering implementation that our conservative intuitions come into play. We may then think of ways in which implementing the proposal would inconvenience us (or worse); we may feel that the good idea has been captured by a political faction, and thereby compromised; or we may simply feel that the enthusiasts are moving too fast.

This hypothesis does not explain why the people closest in age to the 18 year olds who would be directly affected by National Service did not back off at all from their 80 percent approval between January 1969 and July 1970. Also, an emphasis on the decline in approval tends to obscure

*Unpublished research by Frank Armbruster and Doris Yokelson, Hudson Institute.
the fact that seven-tenths of the adult population continues to like the idea of this expansion into peacetime services of what has always been a war-oriented institution. However, the cautionary message still seems valid. It seems quite clear that the American mood is inward-turning. While foreign affairs remain very much on the public mind, the operative urges focus on disentanglement, not on improving preparedness, much less on policing the globe. While our decline in patriotism has been overstated to the point of serious distortion, Americans are, in important numbers, tired of Great Power responsibilities and disillusioned about the results of heavy expenditures of men and money abroad.

In this situation, it is one of those almost universally appealing "bright ideas" to suggest that civil defense pay more attention to domestic emergencies and problems. But it would be wrong to undertake implementing the idea with the expectation of short-term benefits to the CD "image" and its practical manifestations. As we will discuss further in the following section, popular concern with "domestic problems" involves more than meets the eye--and more than we or anyone else are able to fully explain.

American attitudes about the foreign-affairs context in which civil defense has traditionally operated are much easier to identify and understand than are attitudes about the domestic context.

III. American Attitudes about Domestic Problems Relevant to an Expanded Peacetime Role for Civil Defense

A. Public Awareness of Civil Defense Peacetime Activities

Four percent of the people polled in the 1968 University of Pittsburgh study had heard something about peacetime activities of local civil defense units. What they had "heard about," in most cases, was related to one kind
of natural disaster--tornados--or to the development of emergency hospital facilities.

Almost certainly, public awareness of peacetime civil defense roles has increased in the past two years. On the other hand, a substantial increase from 4 percent--say, a doubling or tripling--still would represent an impact on only a very small minority of the public. Certainly in our own suburban New York area popular awareness of civil defense activities of all kinds remains at a very low level. (It may also be of interest that the New York Times Index for 1969 includes not a single listing in its category labeled "civil defense," nor could we find any civil defense sub-heading under "New York State" or "New York City." While five articles were listed under U.S. Government--Armaments--Civil Defense, only one of these had to do with New York City, none with the state organization, and none with peacetime activities.)

This situation of disinterest and lack of knowledge could, of course, change for either the better or the worse. Probably the odds that a change will be for the better would be strongest if expansion of the civil defense role were restricted to natural disasters, but, as we suggest in the next chapter, this kind of limitation flies in the face of "policy decisions" many local CD units have already made: that is, they have already involved themselves in a wide range of services to their communities, and many of these services have no connection with disasters, natural or nuclear, except in the important sense that activity is preferable to inactivity.

In conformity with this maxim that activity is preferable to inactivity, CD units could, of course, restrict their schedule to training programs.
"housekeeping," and disaster simulations focused narrowly on preparedness for a nuclear attack. From a "psychology of scarcity" perspective, this approach has a good deal to recommend it: funds for civil defense are limited, people who feel a serious sense of responsibility to prepare for a nuclear attack are also in limited supply; therefore, both ought to be reserved for their proper purpose, and this becomes more, not less, important (so this argument goes) if the general public is becoming more apathetic and incredulous about nuclear war.

But this orientation would entail a considerable and probably increasing disjunction between official policy and common practice. In smaller communities and where dynamic leadership exists, it may be very uncommon for a vital civil defense organization to operate for any considerable period of time without opportunities and desires arising for the performance of peacetime services for its neighbors. Also, for every participant in civil defense activities who is solely or mainly motivated by the importance of the basic mission there are doubtless many, especially among volunteers and part-time workers, whose motivation is primarily that they are civic-minded or that they are "joiners" or simply that they have time to spare. Preparing for a war that very few people expect to occur in the next twenty years is, as an exclusive mission, a task that is poorly suited to attracting and sustaining the commitment of such people. Especially is this unlikely when the negative perception is coupled to a positive moralistic public attitude that we have been spending too much of our taxes and talents on DoD and NASA, too little on domestic problems (variously defined).

In short, the strategy generated by the "psychology of scarcity" may well be self-defeating, a formula for continuing attrition of popular
support (and of Congressional support) for civil defense. In order to conform to the statutory mandate, it may be requisite to engage in activities unimagined by the statute-makers. This may be essential not only to sustain popular approval and support but also to sustain a desirable rate of participation in civil defense activities and a desirable level of staff morale.

However, it is important to see this alternative course not as a formula for popularity and virtue but as an investment of risk capital, literally and figuratively. Preparing for natural disaster and, at the opposite extreme, directing the traffic at the annual county fair may be, in terms of popular reactions, relatively safe activities. On the other hand, perhaps preparing for a natural disaster encroaches on the domain of existing organizations. Perhaps the fair at which one is directing traffic attracts deliberate traffic-disrupters because, say, the management allegedly discriminates against Negroes, or because a major exhibitor is accused of polluting the air or water. Then CD may find itself in an embarrassing position, with the wrong sort of picture on the local paper's front page.

A very important distinction between traditional and innovative civil defense services is that the former, but not the latter, created controversy only on relatively simple and predictable lines. (In many areas of the country, they created no conflicts at all. Like God, motherhood, and hard work, civil defense was self-evidently virtuous—and remains so.) But, as we shall try to specify, responsiveness to peacetime needs for the capabilities civil defense possesses places local CD units, and, by extension, OCD in a context where alignments are not clear-cut and problems are much less reliably predictable. While this cautionary note may seem humorously
paranoid to many of the local offices of civil defense that already include some peacetime services in their schedule, there is a crucial difference, in the performance of such services, between operating autonomously and operating in conformity to a policy enunciated at the Federal level.

B. Limitations on the Usefulness of Poll Data

It would be nice if opinion poll data could be used to develop a reliable blueprint of what the nation "wants." Several recently published and widely discussed books have, of course, attempted to do precisely this. Possibly hindsight will show some of these analyses to have been correct, but we have several reasons for not placing much emphasis on such secondary sources in the present discussion. The first reason is simply the familiarity of the material: there is limited advantage to identifying the sources and detailing the argumentation for hypotheses that are already in general circulation. The second reason is that poll data, like the Bible, is varied and ambiguous enough to provide strong support for a variety of hypotheses. A skilled and knowledgeable social scientist in whose objectivity we have faith can perceive patterns of attitudes and trends; he can present the evidence to us so that his case seems as plausible to us as to him; and yet his thesis may be importantly wrong. The basic problem here is that polls tell us what people think but not why they think it. Of course, why people think something is often a mystery to them, and often this kind of causation is not at all simple and direct; an attitude may be symptomatic not only of personality problems and differences—these we need

not worry about in dealing with statistical aggregates--but also of problems and differences that are common to a group.

Here we encounter two kinds of interpretive problems. The first derives from the decline in reliability that occurs when statistical samples are subdivided as much as they need to be subdivided for us to obtain a sound idea of who thinks what and why. The second is simply the perils of the inductive leap. Marked differences in attitudes follow simple, "reasonable" lines--city versus country, white versus black, rich versus poor, and the like--much less commonly than one tends to suppose. The complexities of what one is called upon to explain--and the uncertainties introduced by sampling error--are well illustrated by a poll we shall here describe in some detail.

The question asked (October 9-13, 1970) was: "How would you describe yourself--as very conservative, fairly conservative, middle of the road, fairly liberal, or very liberal?" The results clearly indicate that the nation at large trends toward conservatism at this time. Fairly conservative people were nearly as numerous as middle-of-the-roaders--31 and 35 percent--and almost twice as numerous as those who regarded themselves as fairly liberal (16%). Moreover, more than twice as many people (9 versus 4 percent) were very conservative as were very liberal.

This is not surprising nor are the major exceptions to the norm, so far as distribution across the five categories is concerned. For instance, heavier than average representation toward the liberal side of the scale is notable for non-whites, college-educated people, 21 to 29 year olds, Easterners, people with incomes over $15,000, and the residents of larger cities. This "figures"; it conforms to our commonsense knowledge. We only

begin to get into trouble if we want to answer a question such as, "Why are people in big cities more liberal than others?" Then it is awkward for us to confront an anomaly like the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Size</th>
<th>Very Conservative</th>
<th>Fairly Conservative</th>
<th>Middle of the Road</th>
<th>Fairly Liberal</th>
<th>Very Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000 &amp; over</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000 - 1,000,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 - 499,999</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of this data, it would appear that our commonsense ideas of how the experience of big-city life is reflected in political philosophy apply to a much greater degree to cities of the second order in population size than they do to cities of the first order. It is in these "smaller" cities that the general bent is most liberal, the middle of the road least interesting, the extremes most attractive. Indeed residents of our largest cities more commonly find a middle of the road political philosophy congenial than do members of any of the groups distinguished in the Gallup surveys—sex, race, education, occupation, age, religion, politics, region, income—with the sole exception of inhabitants of the Midwest region.

Possibly this is the product of sampling error. Possibly sampling error also accounts for the "fact" that nonwhites more often than whites regard themselves as "very conservative." But what about the finding that people with $3-5,000 incomes are more than three times as likely (16 versus 5 percent) to call themselves "very conservative" than are people with incomes in the $10-15,000 range?

Clearly, opinion polls are, at their present state of refinement, poorly suited to be an aid to an organization like OCD in advising and assisting its local offices in identifying local attitudes and needs. Their principal value is precautionary: that is, they suggest that wide variations in
relevant general attitudes and felt needs may exist among groups of people in varying situations and that our commonsense notions about who thinks and wants what may, in some cases, be importantly incorrect.

C. Poll Data as a Guide for OCD

The policy recommendation that flows most logically from these considerations is that, in enlarging the officially approved range of activities for local civil defense, OCD (and probably the state-level organizations as well) will be best advised to leave as much leeway as possible to the grassroots offices in determining what their emphases shall be. That is, while it may be appropriate and necessary to state across the board that local offices of civil defense should not engage in certain types of activities, there are probably few if any activities in connection with peacetime services that should be mandatory or even strongly recommended in the way that has been usual for nuclear attack preparedness. (For instance, the routine distribution of instructional materials for courses on drug abuse or riot control might be construed as a "strong recommendation." Having such materials available on request would be much safer, and might be desirable.)

However, certain more specific precautions are also suggested by a careful look at the opinion polls. It may be somewhat misleading, for instance, to regard the dominant trend in the nation's "mood" as a shift in concern from foreign to domestic problems. While the evidence is quite varied and conflicting, an interpretation that deserves serious attention is that the shift is, rather, in the direction of "privatization": that is, away from concern with domestic social problems as well as with foreign
affairs. Americans are somewhat concerned about "crime in the streets" but the proportion who considered crime our most important problem declined from nearly 30 percent to 4 percent between the end of 1968 and the middle of 1970. Americans are somewhat concerned about race relations, but this seemed our most pressing problem to only 13 percent in July 1970, and pollution was seen as having this degree of urgency by fewer than half a percent of respondents to this poll. More recently (October 1970), while over 70 percent of those polled considered Vietnam an extremely important issue in the election, only a narrow majority saw either pollution or campus unrest in this light.

These figures are not necessarily incompatible with the thesis that Americans want to rechannel, in order to solve our domestic problems, a significant proportion of the resources that have been flowing into the military area and to NASA, but they do recommend some skepticism. Indisputably, a large majority would like to see expenditures for certain specific purposes. Ninety-one percent, in October 1970, wanted "more Federal money" for law enforcement and 79 percent favored equipped all new cars with a $100 anti-pollution device. Also, some specific domestic issues elicit a very strong response: for instance, 78 percent of respondents oppose bussing school children to achieve a better racial balance in the schools (regional range = 71 percent in the East to 82 percent in the South and West). But it would be clearly incorrect to generalize on the basis of any of these figures. Are Americans becoming more "racist"? On the contrary--all opinion indices show a continuing reduction in the proportion who oppose integrated schools or neighborhoods. Are Americans reverting to a harsh attitude toward criminals? Possibly, but in a poll conducted shortly before the 1970 Congressional

Gallup Opinion Index, Nov. 1970, Report No. 65, "Referendum Results."
elections, 58 percent of respondents expressed the opinion that society is more to blame than the individual "for crime and lawlessness in this country," while only 35 percent considered the individual primarily to blame. (On the other hand, the proportion of poll respondents who consider the courts "not harsh enough" has risen, since the mid 'sixties, from 48 to 75 percent, and those who favor the death penalty for murder have increased from 42 to 51 percent.)

Clearly, American attitudes about "domestic problems" involve many inconsistencies, anomalies, and ambiguities. As we suggested above, one way to explain the contradictions and confusions is by the idea that the current American mood is as strongly "isolationist" with respect to domestic as to foreign affairs. Because this thesis has important implications for OCD policy, we have selected for consideration in detail a recent Gallup poll which seems to us especially useful in this connection.

D. "Reordering our National Priorities" Versus "Law and Order"

As OCD considers additional functions for civil defense, certain possibilities seem more logical than others in terms of, in combination, public interest and CD capabilities or associations. Sometimes the "associations" border on the whimsical: e.g., that "waiting for the bomb" qualifies CD to keep track of bomb threats (it would be nearly as "logical" to assign this job to playwrights!); but the issue of what jobs are and are not appropriate for CD is probably less important, on balance, than the identification of public interest and concern. For CD to break new ground, in terms of its own traditions, in areas where most people don't really want action, or want a different kind of action than they say they want, would seem to be the surest recipe for trouble.

*For views on crime and penalties, see Gallup Opinion Index, November 1970, p. 15, and March 1969, p. 15.
In October 1970, Gallup asked the public which of two major action areas the Congress should emphasize most. The question was phrased as follows:

"When the new Congress takes office, which of these two things would you prefer to have it do, if you had to make a choice: (1) Try to improve the lot of poor people and try to get at the cause of social problems, or (2) give more support to the police and get tougher with lawbreakers?" (Emphasis added.)

Note that the second choice basically makes the same point twice—support the police, get tougher with lawbreakers—while the first focuses initially on a single social problem, "poor people," and then invites a wide range of interpretations. Who doesn't think we should "get at the cause of social problems"? Apparently a majority of the American people do not. Only 38 percent preferred this emphasis for the new Congress, while 59 percent favored the law and order emphasis. Of equal interest, only 3 percent expressed no opinion on a question so formulated that one might have expected a common reaction of resentment that it was "rigged." A majority rejected the social problems emphasis in every geographical region, in communities of every size, in all occupational groups, in both political parties and among Independent voters. Perhaps most surprising, nearly 40 percent of nonwhites assign top priority to "support police," and so do 48 percent of Americans with incomes below $5,000.

Nonetheless, there are fairly convincing reasons for reading this "vote" symbolically rather than literally. In the first place, the phrase we underlined in the question, "if you had to make a choice," sets up an artificial opposition. On another Gallup poll, conducted during the same month, where this either/or constraint did not exist, 91 percent of

*Complete poll is appended to this chapter.*
respondents favored "more Federal money for police," but 61 percent also favored "more Federal money to help the city poor." Second, evidence internal to the either/or poll itself suggests a strong symbolic or symptomatic aspect to the preference for a Congressional emphasis on law enforcement. If this were not so, if a simple need were being expressed, we would expect a close correlation of this preference with community size, since it is in the cities, and especially the larger cities, that increasing numbers of people are afraid to go out at night, or even to stay home alone. Also, it has been with a focus on the cities that soaring crime rates have been publicized by the media.

But the actual distribution, by community size, of those who favored a law enforcement Congressional emphasis was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Size</th>
<th>Favoring Law Enforcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000 and over</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000 - 999,999</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 - 499,999</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500 - 49,999</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 2,500, Rural</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note also the occupational distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Favoring Law Enforcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Business</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of Gallup's data it would appear that the person who is most concerned about crime in the streets (and elsewhere) is an elderly male Protestant Republican farmer. And the fictional individual who is least concerned is a young, nonwhite, college-educated, professional or business woman, Independent in politics, and living in a large Eastern city; in other words, an individual who might be supposed to have an especially great concern with the effectiveness of law enforcement and greater than average reasons for judging that it needs to be improved.
The most obvious explanation of these apparent anomalies is that the "vote" is not really on specific policies but on their ideological associations. This explanation is somewhat supported by the marked differences among Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, and among age groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Problems Emphasis</th>
<th>Law and Order Emphasis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-29 years old</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49 years old</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But the term "ideological" is almost certainly far too dramatic in its connotations to adequately explain the variations on this either/or choice. To a substantial degree, these variations probably reflect relatively timeless attitudes: the naive idealism of young people, rural America's disapproval of the city, the self-conscious social consciousness of the college educated, a compassion of women and the "hard-headed realism" of men. And while the variations among groups are unusually large on this question, it is important to note that, with the few exceptions we noted, they are not majority-minority variations, but have to do with how large a majority supports the law and order emphasis, how large a minority favors getting "at the root of social problems." Rather than an ideological explanation of these poll results, it is probably more valid to speak of a very prevalent disillusionment with the concept of the U.S. Government as a knight in armor that can and should sally forth to slay dragons and rescue hapless maidens either at home or abroad. "Support the police" is not, in this interpretation, a code-word for racism or for repression of
nonconformists, but simply a desire for peace and quiet, for reason and reasonableness and civilized behavior, for attention to homely concerns rather than to those that invade the home via the television screen.

As we discuss more fully elsewhere, many of our domestic problem areas—pollution, health care, poverty, race relations, drug abuse, the elderly—offer opportunities for civil defense. However, as we read the public mood, the major resource that civil defense has to contribute—manpower, mostly volunteer, with applicable skills and interests, and an existing organization for tapping and deploying this resource—will not necessarily be any easier to marshal for these allegedly more popular projects than for the allegedly less relevant traditional purpose. An approach that begins by asking, "What are our major domestic problems, and what can civil defense do about them?" would seem an unpromising approach to recommend to local CD units in the climate of the 'seventies. The preferable approach would seem to be "Study your city," "Study your county," "Talk to everybody," "Find out the felt needs." Here are two semi-hypothetical illustrations of volunteer-attracting projects that might emerge from this approach:

(1) City A has a charitable organization that has for many years sent a large number of poor children to summer vacations with families in the suburbs and country, but this program is now jeopardized by the discontinuation of passenger service by the local railroad. Local CD offers to organize an 'evacuation exercise' to solve the problem, using idle school buses and supplying drivers.

(2) On the rationale of acquiring the know-how to feed large numbers of people in the event of a natural or nuclear disaster, local CD offers to administer a hot lunch program that School District B will otherwise have to drop due to rising costs.
It stands to reason that there are a nearly infinite number of activities such as these which are quite appropriate for civil defense activity under particular local conditions but quite inappropriate for general recommendation. Probably the vitality of local civil defense will be enhanced if OCD and the state-level organizations tend to eschew general recommendations—e.g., "What can YOU do to solve the pollution problem?"—and emphasize instead some such slogan as "Know Your Town" in their relations with local units. It was possible, not so long ago, to capture the imagination of a significant part of the public with such a grandiose concept as a War on Poverty; probably this is not true to a useful degree today.

What about "law and order" activities? In the following chapter's brief survey of what local CD units are doing today in the way of peacetime services to their communities, we note many that more or less belong in this category—Halloween patrols, park patrols, traffic direction, communications services, intelligence services. The prevalence of these activities, many of which have a much more tenuous relationship to the basic CD mission than do other activities that we did not find performed, is probably explicable in terms of casual associative reasoning. Also, of course, retired military men are often prominent in local civil defense work.

The naturalness of this kind of extension of CD work, together with the public mood evidenced by the opinion polls, warn that this is one area in which local CD units may be very likely to go overboard if they are left to their own devices. There are a wide variety of surveillance,
crisis-planning, crisis simulation, instructional, and auxiliary police roles that would represent a legitimate and useful response to the strongly felt needs of many communities. Some of these activities are singularly appropriate for civil defense, in terms of its skills, equipment, and the interests of its personnel. This is perhaps most strikingly true in the area of contingency planning for our larger cities: e.g., for strikes by the uniformed services, for power failures, for fuel shortages. But in this and other similar areas of possible activity there is no way to avoid controversy. While it is correct, for example, that three-fifths of the residents of our larger cities feel that police and firemen should not be permitted to strike, it is also true that a third think that they should. Moreover, this third which might resent CD "meddling" in police matters has as its "typical" member, not surprisingly, the middle-income, non-college, educated, urban manual or white collar worker. In other words, there would not be a great deal of overlap in the bad effects generated by this activity and those generated by other types of contingency planning which civil defense does today or might consider doing.

The basic question might be phrased as how to gain new friends without antagonizing the old, or as how to "beef up" the enthusiasm of traditional supporters without, in the process, polarizing one's community. Probably the second formulation is preferable, but probably it is the first that needs greater emphasis from above. The reason for this is that local civil defense is very strongly a "Middle American" institution in its personnel as well as its principal public support. If it undertakes to expand its

functions, it will naturally look to "Middle American" institutions--the church, volunteer firemen, American Legion, gun clubs, the Elks, etc.--for suggestions and advice. On the other hand, there are probably few local civil defense groups that will do this in ways or to extremes that will tend to have a serious polarizing effect. Rather than issuing strong warnings about this danger, the Federal and state organizations would probably do better to stress the "new friends" approach and, in particular, the importance of attracting young adults into the organization. It is not unimportant, in terms of the continuing (or reviving) vitality of civil defense, that a majority of Americans in the 21-29 age group chooses the "social problems" over the "law and order" emphasis. If a choice has to be made between forming or improving a CD auxiliary police unit and coordinating and assisting volunteer efforts to clean many years' accumulated debris out of the local lake or river, it is very possible that the latter is the preferable choice, but also that most local CD units would choose the former if the choice were only affected by local influences.

In the coming decade the number of Americans who are in the age group, 25-34, is going to increase more than three times as rapidly as the number in any other adult age group (this of course reflecting the post-war baby boom). These young people are much more conventional in attitudes and beliefs than is generally contended. If this were not so, civil defense might have to ignore them, cast its lot with the elders, and hope that they will improve with age. But the general acceptance of "the system" by youth is an invitation to pay special attention to projects, particularly in the "environmental crisis" area, that are attractive to young people but do not antagonize their elders. In addition to clean-up and paint-up
campaigns, local civil defense might associate itself in various ways with the waste recycling projects many high school groups are undertaking. This general area, which lies in between the poles of "help the poor" and "support the police", is one which local CD may need and profit from encouragement to explore.
Question: "When the new Congress takes office, which of these two things would you prefer to have it do, if you had to make a choice: (1) Try to improve the lot of poor people and try to get at the cause of social problems, or (2) give more support to the police and get tougher with lawbreakers?"

<table>
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<tr>
<th>OCTOBER 9-13, 1970</th>
<th>Improve Lot of Poor People</th>
<th>Support Police</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
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<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under 2,500, Rural</td>
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CHAPTER III
PEACETIME ACTIVITIES OF LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE

1. Introduction

In considering appropriate peacetime functions for civil defense, we must distinguish among the Federal, state, and local organizations. In this section, we will look at the local civil defense units, and, in particular, at peacetime activities which they have initiated on their own.

This is a subject which deserves thorough and systematic attention, since what is actually being done is an important indicator of what might be done. Probably what might be done varies significantly by geographical region, size of unit served, and population density. The provision of advice and assistance to local CD units needs to be informed by a sophisticated sense of these differences. It is important not only to categorize and analyze existing activities, as we shall attempt below, but to understand which types of activities are appropriate for given situations.

Because the bulk of the data upon which our analysis is based derives from local newspapers, we are describing predominantly what is being done in small cities and in suburban and rural counties: it is in such areas that CD activities qualify as "news." It is entirely possible that larger cities are using their civil defense organizations in as many ways, either similar or dissimilar to those we have encountered. The failure of such activities to obtain newspaper coverage most certainly does not
mean that they do not exist. On the other hand, it seems "logical" that a small organization in a small city will find it somewhat easier to meet a variety of local needs than a larger organization in a larger city. What occurs spontaneously in, say, Woonsocket, Rhode Island, may be equally appropriate for Providence, but more difficult to initiate. This is partly a matter of differing responsiveness: for example, the casualty rate for requests that must be made through "channels" will be higher than for those expressed in an informal small town setting. In addition, at some point, an increase in scale wholly alters planning, organizational, and budgetary requirements for implementing such a "simple" idea as using civil defense volunteers to augment the police on Halloween or to assist in cleaning up after a blizzard. However, as we suggested above, these "logical" thoughts may be incorrect. It may be that larger cities are interpreting the CD mission in as many and varied ways as small ones. Alternatively, failure or reluctance to enlarge their services to the community may involve obstacles that would not be difficult to surmount, if civil defense policy at the national and state levels were to have this as a goal. In either case, a systematic analysis of the range and variations in peacetime activities of big-city civil defense organizations would seem an essential supplement to what is offered here.

*Whether activities like these are appropriate for CD is of course an important, separate question.
11. **What Is Being Done?**

A. **Instruction, and Dissemination of Educational Materials**

Local civil defense units have all along engaged in instructional activities that are useful for peacetime purposes as well as to prepare the community to cope with the event of a nuclear attack. There are, first, first aid and medical self-help courses, typically offered with the goal of training one member of each local family. In addition, there may be instruction in more advanced emergency medical care procedures and in use of medical equipment, offered perhaps in cooperation with a local hospital. Second, training is often offered in ham radio operation, at the beginner's level and sometimes above this. Third, special seminars on emergency procedures may also be conducted for public officials, and for school administrators and teachers. These may but need not be narrowly focused on the area of nuclear attack. Fourth, firemen and others may be taught rescue techniques. Finally, in one community, an educational meeting on the subject of narcotics and dangerous drugs was conducted by the women's auxiliary of the local CD organization.

Our impression is that, to date, dissemination of educational materials tends to center on the location of fallout shelters and the more general provision of information relevant to minimizing hazards to the recipient in an attack or post-attack situation. What materials are distributed (by mail or otherwise) is obviously largely a function of what materials are made available to the local CD group by the state and Federal authorities, except where local CD officials wear other "hats," (e.g., Traffic Safety Coordinator).
B. Rehearsal for Emergencies

Even a nuclear attack simulation exercise has side-benefits for operating agencies that participate in it. In addition, simulations of natural disasters seem to be common. We also have reports of civil defense cooperation with hospitals and businesses in exercises simulating multi-injury accidents of various kinds, and of CD "script-writing" for elaborate fire drills.

C. Emergency Preparedness

Civil defense groups often have, or share with the police, responsibility for maintaining warning systems for use in the event of floods or tornados as well as for a nuclear attack. The civil defense communications capability may also be used to monitor weather reports and to gather and disseminate information about bomb threats, incipient riots, and the like. Also in the category of emergency preparedness is keeping inventory of local medical and food supplies, generators, etc.; arranging for their availability; and acquiring and maintaining equipment useful and available for peacetime as well as wartime disasters. Finally (as in Washington, D.C.), the usual forms of civil defense planning may develop a capability to draft contingency plans for such domestic crises as power failure or shortage, or a policemen's or firemen's strike.

D. Emergency Operations

"Emergencies" in which civil defense groups have made themselves useful run the gamut from major natural disasters to a visit by the President. The activities range from rescue work to directing traffic.
By "emergencies," we mean in this section one-time or rare and irregularly recurring events that require special action by the community to keep order and to prevent or minimize harm to people and property. An emergency, so defined, does not call merely for an increase in the scale of normal social services, but also (or instead) for their redirection and often for the provision of services that do not exist on a continuing basis. In connection with this type of event, probably the most important single advantage possessed by the "typical" local CD organization is its ability to marshal volunteers. These may be people specially trained in medical or rescue procedures or radio operation, or they may be simply additional manpower for search parties or for clean-up activities after a hurricane or riot.

E. "Peak Load" Problems

While there is no crystal clear line between "peak load" problems and "emergencies" as defined above, in any community there are crises, not necessarily minor (e.g., floods in a flood-prone area) that occur regularly or frequently enough so that the means to cope with them are institutionalized in a way that the means for coping with a tornado, a train derailment, or a gas explosion are not. Local civil defense organizations have grown into varying roles in this area. They may assume responsibility for coordinating and directing activity when a flood threatens or occurs. They may organize a corps of volunteers to supplement police capabilities on Halloween and other special occasions. They may provide ambulance service, or supplementary drivers. In addition, where other community agencies have the primary responsibility for dealing with
snow and ice storms, power failures, traffic accidents and tie-ups, crowd problems, routine medical emergencies, and the like, there may be formal or informal agreements incorporating some CD capabilities—skilled or unskilled manpower, equipment, physical facilities—into the normal mechanisms of response.

F. Routine Functions

Again, there is some overlap between the preceding category and this—e.g., is providing supplementary ambulance drivers a peak load or a routine function? Nonetheless, some local CD organizations are clearly providing community services on a continuing, routine basis. Much of the intelligence gathering and dissemination activity of the Washington, D.C., organization belongs under this heading. Civil defense in Tulsa, Oklahoma, has a routine, continuing function in connection with safety procedures and accidents involving municipal workers. Civil defense auxiliary police in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, regularly patrol the parks and look for stolen automobiles, and CD auxiliary units are active in many New Jersey communities.

III. The Six Categories of CD Peacetime Activity: Commentary and Suggestions

A. Instruction, and Dissemination of Educational Materials

Instruction is an area where the kinds and degree of expansion of local activity will be determined very largely at the state and Federal levels. Symposiums, teacher-training workshops, development of syllabi, provision of instructional materials are the prerequisite to any major
diversification of CD work in this area. Clearly there are a number of Federal agencies who are capable of these tasks but do not have readily available a "retail delivery system" for their educational tasks. This is thus an important potential area for inter-agency cooperation.

The other considerations relevant to expanding the instructional role are (a) suitability of subject matter, in terms of the CD mission; (b) the supply of interested students and (c) other evidence of a need to be met. Because this type of local-level activity depends so heavily on decisions and assistance from higher up, the issue of suitability is especially sensitive; most local CD educational activities are sponsored by the Federal or state organizations in a much more direct way than most other local activities are. Nonetheless, suitability may sometimes depend on local conditions. Competent drivers may be as important in a civil defense emergency as competent radio operators, but in most areas the supply of qualified driving instructors and drivers is adequate to obviate the need for supplement by CD. On the other hand, there may be a need--relevant to the CD mission--in many areas to provide advanced driver training for volunteer operators of ambulances and other emergency vehicles. Such an activity would lend itself to multiple sponsorship, as do the medical self-help courses CD groups now run. Similarly, in some circumstances, it might be appropriate for CD to cooperate in training weather-watchers and pollution-monitors.

Assuming volunteer teachers, donated classroom space, and multiple sponsorship, instructional activities are a particularly attractive means, in terms of monetary costs, for enlarging the usefulness of CD to the local community. However, the sensitivity issue is a very real one. For instance, the general impression that we are experiencing a "drug crisis"
of "epidemic" proportions might seem to place drug education within an enlarged conception of CD's domain. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, at least one CD-affiliated group has ventured into this area. Moreover, Hudson Institute's work in the drug problem area has yielded a strong conclusion that drug education programs are extremely desirable for adults; to direct drug education at the schools is to some degree to aim at the wrong target.* On the other hand, such programs are difficult to design because they are controversial and because the main objective is to get people to avoid hysterical over-reactions in either direction.

Probably there are a number of instructional areas where the logic of CD activity may be persuasively argued, but CD's interest dictates staying aloof. However, the factor of political sensitivity should not prevent a careful survey of educational needs.

While the educational materials now distributed to the general public under CD auspices tend to be much more narrowly concerned with nuclear attack than are the instructional programs, the possibilities and perils of extending and diversifying this type of activity are the same for both types of activities.**

* See also discussion of the "Intermediary Model" for civil defense in Chapter Five.

B. Rehearsal for Emergencies

Disaster simulation can, among other things, be fun, and we were not surprised to find more newspaper articles reporting the adaptation of this practice to peacetime purposes than any other single activity of civil defense. However, as a serious contribution to the public welfare, a major additional role that simulation exercises might play is in testing the capability of the community to respond to more complex scenarios than a tornado provides. Suppose, for example, that the "Great Blackout" of 1965 had occurred two years later, during the major ghetto riots, or today in a city plagued by bombings and sniper attacks on policemen and firemen. In such a situation, the public authorities would have to contend not only with the manifestations of a much greater tendency toward public hysteria than existed in 1965 but also, at least initially, with a reasonable probability of deliberate sabotage and of additional terrorist actions.

Developing a scenario along these lines (or adapting and using one supplied by OCD) and staging a simulation exercise might well be one of the most constructive "peacetime" activities that could be undertaken at this time by the CD organization of any large or medium-sized city. Doubtless, also, other configurations of misfortunes or combinations of an emergency and a prevalent public mood represent a serious potential threat to particular cities. Identifying and evaluating such situations is an appropriate activity for local civil defense. An advisory role for OCD is suggested by the likelihood that the larger the city (and hence the larger the population at risk) the less likely it is that this process
will be carried through to the point of staging a simulation. In addition, of course, the issue of political sensitivity has to be considered for some types of scenarios and some cities.

C. Emergency Preparedness

It is only in connection with peacetime services that any civil defense activity, at least to date, belongs outside the "emergency preparedness" category. However, preparing for peacetime emergencies is different in an important way unless (and even this exception should be qualified) civil defense and disaster control have been linked by statute for many years, as in New Jersey. The difference is that civil defense occupies a monopoly position vis-a-vis nuclear attack preparedness. The habits of thought encouraged by this monopoly position may be an obstacle to planning for peacetime emergencies, where it is much more important to learn from other community agencies, not merely to instruct them and gain their support. A civil defense agency which wants to move into a peacetime role of this kind should be explicitly warned that "academic" planning in isolation is very likely to prove a waste of time. We will discuss this type of danger in more detail in the following section.

D. Emergency Operations

For the purposes of this discussion we have defined emergencies as one-time or rare and irregularly recurring events that require special action by the community to keep order and to prevent or minimize harm to people and property. Our cross-cut look at local CD peacetime activities showed us few "emergencies" for the same reason that a cross-cut look at
women of child bearing age would find very few of them actually in the delivery room. However, in our discussions with CD personnel the point was made that, in an actual emergency, the governor or mayor will tend to turn for aid to individuals he knows and trusts, and to organizations that work with him on a day to day basis. If the local civil defense unit or, at least, its key personnel lack a continuing role in the community (other than the role of "waiting for the bomb"), it may often happen that this resource will be overlooked, underused, misused, or resented when a disaster strikes.

This is certainly not inevitable. One may readily imagine situations in which the disaster planning, the human skills, and the rescue and communications equipment and emergency supplies of a local CD unit could spell the difference between a relatively orderly and a much more anarchic response to a disaster. In some such situations, civil defense would be prepared and qualified to fill a power vacuum; in others, for instance a hurricane, the warning period might be adequate for elective officials to take a careful inventory of response resources, and to decide to assign a coordinating or specialized role to civil defense.

However, it does seem likely that in a large number of emergencies, as we have defined them, a CD group that has concerned itself primarily with preparing to meet nuclear attack and with non-coordinating peacetime roles will not be given the opportunity to exercise its full capabilities but will be relied on primarily as a source for equipment and manpower.

See discussion of the 'Resource Model'; Chapter Five.
This does not mean that peacetime emergency preparedness activities are largely a waste of time. On the contrary, they provide an important supplemental means for exercising the capability to respond to a nuclear attack. But it does mean that certain dangers may lurk in a strong emphasis on preparation for a role in which one may be rebuffed or frustrated if, in the event, one tries to play it. In some circumstances, trying to play the role may be doubly counterproductive: it may produce a bad public relations effect on the community's political leadership, the police, and some elements of the public at large, and it may also demoralize CD personnel, especially the volunteers upon whom most CD organizations depend heavily if not entirely.

Probably the idea of developing the capability to respond to major peacetime disasters is more congenial to a great many CD people than is the idea of performing more mundane peacetime services, simply because such people differ from much of the general public in a degree of importance they assign to preparing for the most appalling disaster possibility of all, nuclear war. The Federal and state civil defense organizations should regard this orientation as an asset, not a handicap. Policy should be designed to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of this type of activity. Probably the best approach is to present the risks of preparing for peacetime emergencies as a set of tactical problems: it is not enough to plan and to acquire and maintain equipment and supplies; it is equally important, in George Rodericks' phrase, to "know your city" or your county, and to establish the contacts and advertise the capability. Ideally, if a tornado strikes a town, and local CD is bypassed or underused
In the response, the local CD people should react by concluding that they had neglected an important part of their homework, and should set about remedying the omission. This is an attitude that can, to some degree, be inculcated from above. Some efforts of this kind are being made, but it seems important to stress that those "above," at both the state and Federal levels, should recognize that the expansion of CD interest to peacetime emergencies is far from a foolproof formula for popularity. Do-gooders are not universally loved. How new services are offered and provided affects very importantly the emotions of the recipients.

One additional possible pitfall for local civil defense peacetime emergency operations is suggested by a news story from Manchester, Connecticut, where confusion arose over whether the local CD unit had to obtain approval from the state organization before making its emergency hospital available to meet the needs of a local peacetime disaster. Underlying the simple jurisdictional aspect of this problem is the policy aspect: that is, the possibility of conflicting doctrines on the definition of peacetime emergencies at various levels of the civil defense hierarchy. This is a very complicated issue. Where a locality obtains emergency equipment and supplies on a grant or matching funds basis, the general public has a legitimate interest in how these materials are used. On the other hand, in many emergency situations it will be desirable for local civil defense to have immediate access.

There are several possible ways to resolve this dilemma. One would be to develop and distribute an exempt list of peacetime emergencies: should any of these emergencies occur in the community, normal procedures
for obtaining authorization to draw on CD stockpiles would not apply. A second approach is, as in New Jersey, to develop and distribute general guidelines, to place responsibility with the local CD director and to provide procedures for after-the-fact accountability. This second possibility is probably the more desirable of the two if the basic aim is to encourage vitality and initiative at the local level. In any case, the principal point is that widening civil defense concerns to include peacetime events provides a useful test of the functioning of the organizational machinery. Over a period of several years, communities in every state should experience emergencies where the use of civil defense resources is reasonably appropriate. This means that, preferably before but assuredly after the fact, an important additional incentive is supplied to identify and correct "bugs in the program."

E. "Peak load" Problems and Routine Functions

We have suggested that, while, it is logical and desirable for local civil defense to play a role in the community's response to genuine emergencies, this role is highly problematic. Central to these problems is the unavoidable improvisational element of a community's response to a "one-time or rare and irregularly recurring" crisis, be the crisis a massive power failure, a major urban riot, the first serious hurricane in fifteen years, or a policemen's strike. In such situations, the personalities and personal relationships of local CD personnel may often have a much greater bearing on the assumption of an effective operational role than do the best of plans and equipment.
One way to increase the likelihood that CD resources will be fully and intelligently exploited in an emergency is for the organization to make itself part of the mechanisms by which the community copes with what might be called "normal abnormal" situations: that is, those regularly or frequently recurring events, such as Halloween, ice storms, and special-occasion crowd and traffic problems, that strain a community's response resources. A second means is for local CD to assume certain continuing responsibilities that mesh more or less clearly with its basic mission or with accepted supplements to that mission. These might include training programs of various kinds; monitoring and/or maintaining various kinds of supply inventories; gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information regarding (e.g.) pollution, bomb threats, weather, and upcoming political rallies, sports contests, or other potentially trouble-causing events; and providing manpower on a continuing basis for specific tasks such as supplementing police patrols, running an ambulance service, or providing a quick referral service for citizens with "off-hour" medical and other household emergencies.

Virtually any CD activity of this kind and virtually any activity that responds to a "peak load" problem can be justified in terms of a need of "exercise our muscles." However, many people concerned about civil defense are very wary, and correctly, about playing these kinds of operational roles. The principal objection may be that a close involvement with police, politicians, and local problems may be detrimental to the capability to perform CD's primary mission. It may be said that the nature and importance of this mission are such as to dictate a consistently
aloof and nonpartisan posture, avoiding any commitments that may tend, fairly or unfairly, to identify CD with a particular political faction or position in the public mind. Alternatively, the main objection may be an intuition that "one thing leads to another." The funds available for civil defense are very limited, and, in this view, it is essential that they not be frittered away on activities that are properly the responsibility of other community agencies.

These arguments are not quibbles; there is much merit to them; and our reason for combining our discussion of "peak load" problems and "routine functions" is to avoid subverting their forcefulness by a fragmented and repetitive treatment of them. At a theoretical level, it is certainly possible to look at civil defense in such a way that meeting a peak load problem—e.g., supplying auxiliary manpower to cope with potentially rowdy post-game crowds—lies within the CD mission but policing the parks on a routine basis does not; or that providing peak load ambulance drivers differs decisively from running the ambulance service every night. However, we share the intuition that these distinctions will tend to blur in practice. In any community, one activity, especially if it is well and reliably performed by people who consider their work important, will very often tend to lead to other activities that are, in sequence, logical but bear an ever diminishing relevance to the principal missions of civil defense. Moreover, in medium-sized and large cities, "normal abnormal" situations such as vandalism or bomb threats may occur daily or several times a day. For organizations as for individuals, acting on the impulse to be helpful often if not invariably yields more than one bargained for.
IV. General Remarks

The hypotheses offered in the foregoing discussion leaves us with several paradoxes to resolve. We assume a national policy, not of enlarging the OCD mission to comprehend an array of as yet imprecisely defined peacetime emergencies, but to use a capability to help with these as an essential tool to performing the basic OCD mission. The first paradox lies in our conclusion (or strong suspicion) that the expanded role cannot be realistically limited in this way. In many, perhaps most, situations, local CD units will not be able to act effectively in a disaster situation unless they are already part of the community's response mechanisms for normal or, at least, "normal abnormal" situations.

Let us now assume that we don't fight this paradox but live with it. Our second problem, as suggested above, is that the very activities that prepare our neighbors to call upon us and respect our expertise in the event of a peacetime emergency simultaneously diminish our disaster-response capabilities in one or more ways: they siphon off funds that decidedly are not surplus; they may make us "political" and controversial where we were not so perceived before, and they may reinforce pre-existing tendencies to see us in this way, where such exist.

The first point to be made about such irresolvable dilemmas is that they are scarcely unique to civil defense. In today's contentious cultural climate, it is difficult to identify any general-welfare activity that cannot, with some plausibility, be assailed as detrimental to the people it intends to help. Every helping agency is almost automatically controversial today; every effort to be useful involves a very real danger that the person
or organization which makes the effort will be branded, in articulate, influential quarters, as racist or reactionary or revolutionary. Nor can the problem be solved by sticking close to a strict and narrow and traditional interpretation of what, as an individual or an organization, one is "supposed to do." Attempting this yields the withering accusation that one is "irrelevant," "noninvolved."

There are, of course, parts of this country, such as Texas and Oklahoma, where civil defense could preserve a reasonable degree of public approval and support by adhering, at least formally, to what it is "supposed to do." In such areas, the only problem CD faces is to strike a balance between responsible bookkeeping procedures and reasonable toleration for live-wire CD units which construe their mission rather broadly. This problem will not be solved by enlarging the mission. The new limits on acceptable activity will almost unavoidably be vaguer than the old; the question of when to withhold funds will become more problematic; conflicting interpretations will be likely to complicate the relations of state and local organizations even if OCD itself should at least tacitly adopt the position that nearly any local CD activity is better than inactivity. Moreover, it is in the "pro-CD" areas—which certainly account for a majority of American acres, and perhaps for a majority of people as well—that the danger of political entanglements needs to be taken most seriously, because it is a new danger. In the more densely populated sections of the country there is less reason to be concerned about bad effects on CD's image from involvement with people and problems that have political connotations, because, in these areas, civil defense already has controversial ideological connotations for many
people. The argument that an expanded civil defense role is likely to have significant net good effects is much sounder for areas like parts of the Northeast where CD is not especially popular than for areas where the only clear advantage of a formally enlarged role is to give locally respected organizations a freer hand to perform the kinds of peacetime services that already appear logical both to them and to their communities.

In the preceding section of this report we considered the popular attitudes, as measured by recent opinion polls, that seem to us to have an important bearing on the enlargement of tactics used to perform the civil defense mission. Here we would merely observe that, as is already appreciated by OCD, the exercise of initiative in the overall organization characteristically occurs at the local level. Our crosscut survey of local activities provided abundant evidence that many local units have preempted the policy making role. It has been "decided" in many communities that the skills, equipment, manpower, and organizational assets of civil defense should have multiple uses. These uses range from the casual and commonsensical all the way to the costly, highly organized, continually manned Emergency Operations Center we visited in the District of Columbia.

Probably it would not be feasible for OCD and its state-level counterparts to clamp down on these mavericks. Even if it were feasible, it might well prove counterproductive. The question is rather how far approval and encouragement should go, what forms it should take, what cautions and precautions are needed, and what kinds of assistance OCD might provide. In this section, we have approached these questions from the starting point of what is actually being done today. Our discussion has been organized
in terms of the distinctions among peacetime services that are operative at the local level. While we were not fully consistent here—it seemed important to treat educational activities separately—our general emphasis was on degrees of involvement. It was a policy emphasis, a "what-is-appropriate?" emphasis, differentiating emergency preparedness activities, emergency operations, "peak load" services, and strictly routine functions.

This method of organization was intended to bring into focus the issues involved in an enlargement of the CD role. To many people in civil defense these issues are very important. Even if we exclude from consideration those who are very reluctant to have civil defense depart at all (at least officially) from its original single focus, we are left with major divergences of opinion. At one extreme are those who hesitate to approve any operational responsibility or role for civil defense; at the opposite extreme is the contention that any form of participation in services to the community improves the organization's capability to prepare for a nuclear attack (and, in addition, perhaps that peacetime functions are more important, in some senses, than preparing for a war that may never occur.)

These issues are important not only as matters of principle and of strategy but also because how they are treated will influence the morale of many individuals and the vitality of their organizations. However, because an expanded CD role also raises more practical questions about allocation of funds, provision of equipment, provision of educational materials, leadership instruction, and the like, it is also worthwhile to set the policy issues aside and to consider possible CD functions apart from their appropriateness. We consider our subject from this point of view in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV
PEACETIME FUNCTIONS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

I. Assets and Liabilities

In the preceding chapter, we considered the appropriateness, in terms of statutory mission, of various degrees and types of local civil defense involvement in peacetime activities. This approach is correctly considered very important at the Federal and state levels. At the local level, the approach is typically much more expedient, and this again is as it should be, at least in the circumstances of today. Given a decentralized operation, largely run by nonprofessionals and volunteers, neither approach is "right" to the exclusion of the other; the goal is rather a healthy tension between them: that is, between two standards of appropriateness—"Is it legitimate?" and "Is it workable?"

Having looked at what people are actually doing from the point of view of its legitimacy, we will now look at what they might do, using the standard of workability, and beginning by cataloging civil defense's advantages and handicaps.

On the credit side of the ledger, the following items appear:

- Emergency planning viewpoint and skills
- National network for disseminating information, funds
- Decentralized organization (well-suited to respond to local needs and conditions)
- Established relationships with local agencies and leaders
- Volunteers
- Skills: planning, moving people, monitoring, radio, medical
- Educational role: special groups, general public
- Emergency equipment: warning systems, other communications, medical, rescue, shelters
- Emergency information
- Inter-community ties
- Good will.
These are impressive assets, even when we recognize that some of them have complementary drawbacks, and that some are possessed to a meaningful degree only by a minority of local offices.

On the other hand, we must note the following liabilities:

- diminished and uncertain funding
- association with the "military-industrial complex"
- habituation to a monopoly position
- conflicting interpretations of what peacetime activities are compatible with the basic mission
- necessary degree of reliance on volunteers
- many local variations in attitudes and needs (liability in enunciation of Federal policy).

These liabilities place or suggest certain limits on peacetime activities of civil defense. Many kinds of labor-intensive work, such as census-taking, would be logical for civil defense in terms of its assets and not illogical in terms of its mission. For instance, census of manufacturers or other special groups might be an area of joint action with the Department of Commerce. But, with limited funds and heavy reliance on volunteers, not only do choices have to be made; also a calculus of reliability comes into play whenever new activities, however "logical" are added on. In many situations, the risks of over-extension may be worse than the risks of standing pat, in relation to the essential asset of local "good will."

"Mental sets," psychological and cultural, also may limit or handicap civil defense activities. The strong "middle American" flavor of the organization is probably almost always an asset in dealing with the personnel of governmental and other service agencies in small cities and towns, but in larger cities some of the service bureaucracies with which civil defense would like to establish good working relationships are characterized even at the lower levels by an "upper middle class" orientation and a "liberalism" which tends to be very illiberal toward middle
American values and organizations like civil defense. But, as our li.t indicates, all "mental" problems are not external. Civil defense, where it has adhered to a narrow mission, has been a singular type of work. Moving into a peacetime services role inevitably means unlearning some old habits and learning some new ones. For some old-timers, this may not be congenial or possible. Also, adaptation at the grassroots level, where the need has more of a sink-or-swim urgency, may occur much more rapidly than at the state or even county level where policy and policy changes have a higher degree of abstraction. Certainly, there is a general feeling among local CD people we have talked to that this has been happening. Probably this should be regarded as an important present liability.

II. Possible Peacetime Functions for Civil Defense

In considering what activities civil defense units might appropriately be engaged in, apart from direct preparations for nuclear war, one of the important questions to ask is what skills or strengths would we hope that these activities would develop in the civil defense units which would make them better equipped for preparing for nuclear war. As far as O.O.D is concerned, the basic purpose of having CD units participate in any activity is that directly or indirectly that activity will increase the country's ability to respond to the dangers of nuclear war. So we ask, "What strengths should we want to try to help the CD units gain?" And we note that this question is very similar to the question, "What strengths do we believe CD units have that they can turn to other uses, and by exercising further develop and improve?"
A. Emergency Planning Viewpoint and Skills

The basic idea here is that the process of preparing in advance in detail for unlikely or rare events is a special kind of activity that has relatively constant characteristics whether the event being planned for is a war, a storm, a riot, a fire or anything else. Most people aren't particularly good at this kind of activity and don't like it. That is why most things don't work well until they have happened a number of times and the responses have been partly routinized. Some of the reasons why most people are not good at--and don't like--contingency planning are that it requires dealing with hypothetical events. This means a great elaboration of paper quasi-reality. It means a great concentration on detail. It means that your work is not tested. There is little or no feedback. There are no short-term rewards. Imagination is required about petty details. All the work is treated as low priority by everyone else.

If plans are to be kept up-to-date and meaningful, they require a great deal of "maintenance" work which has all the disagreeable (difficult) features without having the advantage of being creative.

Preparing effective contingency plans, including their inculcation in an operating system requires special bureaucratic skills and techniques. It is not clear how many CD units possess the skills and motivations to be effective contingency planners. It is clear that these skills are needed to the nth degree to do a good job at CD. The point we are making here is that a CD unit that can do a good CD job must have contingency planning skills that can be used by most parts of government at any level. To some extent the CD people, if they are good, can provide "technical assistance" in their contingency planning skills or can to some extent "take over" the dirty job of contingency planning for the agencies. And
by providing service to other agencies a group within government becomes more effective at its own mission.

B. Information Dissemination

In the period before, during and after a nuclear war, most of the response will be made not by civil defense units, but by others. A major part of OCD's job during this period will be getting information out to a great variety of categories of individuals and groups so that their activities will be useful and so that their desire to do something to protect themselves, or the country, will be appropriately channeled.

The concept of "getting information out" is intended to be very broad. It includes elaborate training programs for relatively small numbers of specialists, but also massive distributions of simple information for use by ordinary citizens. The OCD structure can be viewed as a distribution system for information and training, and needs to develop all the kinds of skills and experience that any distribution system needs in order to be effective. Among other things, these include the skill of knowing the various specialized "markets" and how to reach them with information which they are supposed to receive.

Using this view of one of the strengths that OCD is trying to develop, other Federal agencies can be regarded as producers of the information that needs to be distributed. Of course a number of Federal agencies have their own distribution system but in many cases it seems possible that OCD could be a useful supplement to them.

C. Moving People

Turning to more specific requirements for civil defense, it seems clear that before, during and after nuclear war, one of the problems that civil defense will have to be good at is handling the movement of people
in large numbers and often in crowds. Any peacetime activity that strengthens the ability of CD units to understand and be prepared to handle this task, a task for which actual experience is almost absolutely necessary, is of great value.

IV. Coordination of Emergency Operations

It is of course an understatement to say that nuclear war will put a great stress on various governmental systems. Perhaps the primary goal of getting ready for nuclear war is to increase the ability of our governmental systems to operate under shock and stress. The basic resources we bring to meeting the requirements resulting from the attack can be viewed as a combination of three things. One is material resources; a second is organizational resources, composed of the great body of specialized institutions and organizations—both private and governmental—which will put people and resources together to meet the needs resulting from attack; and the third is the emergency coordination function which is the skill and ability to put various organizational resources and material resources together effectively in an emergency. It is in this third area that perhaps the greatest improvement can be made by civil defense action. It is perhaps the most subtle and difficult to measure of the components of our response to nuclear war, but it may well be the component for which the greatest leverage is available, that is, the one from which the greatest percentage of change can be made.

While CD organizations may develop the skills and relationships necessary to play a major role in the emergency coordination job, this is by no means the only way civil defense can help to improve the country's emergency coordination capabilities. In many situations it will be more feasible to use civil defense units to help the other elements of the
community develop and improve their emergency coordination capabilities. This would mean the CD unit performing what might be thought of as a "catalytic" function. In an actual emergency one can imagine certain communities where the CD personnel have only a peripheral role to play, but that the whole quality of the response of the community was the result of influences exerted and exercises held over the years before the emergency by civil defense operations.

E. Bringing Resources Together

This skill is closely related to the emergency coordination function mentioned above, but has a different emphasis. There the emphasis is on the stress of emergencies and the pressures of coordination, with great time pressures. Here the stress is on knowing where things are and where the people and organizations that know how to handle the situation are. It is a slightly more slow-motion skill, although the two often merge at the edges. What the civil defense organization needs to know in a crisis is who can get things done that need to be done, and where the equipment and facilities that exist in the community are so they can be brought together and applied to the war preparation task.

III. Specific Illustrations of Peacetime Functions

A. Planning

1. Develop contingency plans for natural disasters, power failure, power shortage, fuel shortage, flu (or other) epidemic; or for strikes in key municipal services. police, fire, sanitation, public transport, vital supplies transport.

2. Develop prototype plans for general categories of peacetime crisis, such as strikes in key municipal services.
3. Stage and analyze simulation of complex intra- or inter-community peacetime emergencies.

4. Simulate simple emergencies such as a surprise drill for fire department, industry, ham radio club, etc.

5. With respect to scheduled special events:
   a. Develop, or assist in developing, plans for coping with such events as conventions, fairs, championship games, celebrity visits, parades, Halloween.
   b. Assume role in preparations: intelligence, lining up volunteers, training, setting up communications.
   c. Stage and analyze rehearsal of public roles.

B. Coordination

1. Supervise or advise in implementation of peacetime emergency plans.

2. Supervise or advise in implementation of plans for scheduled special events.

3. Coordinate "environmental" activities, such as collecting waste paper, etc., for recycling, cleaning up the local lake or river.

4. Develop a general, on-request, contact-and-coordination role for public and private community organizations that wish to work with each other on some special project or problem.

5. (rare) Develop role as arbiter of inter-agency operational problems (as distinguished from policy problems).

C. Communications, Intelligence, Monitoring

1. Maintain emergency operations center as evening and weekend office for top municipal or county officials.
2. Develop continuing uses for EOC equipment and staff on a shared-funding basis; for instance:
   a. Acquire, circulate information about upcoming special events.
   b. Monitor weather reports; develop weather-warning service.
   c. Conduct locator service for key public officials.
   d. Provide off-hour quick referral service for citizens in distress.
   e. Maintain and analyze records of bomb threats, suspected arson.
   f. Other forms of "armchair sleuthing" aimed at pattern identification, perhaps for health department, pollution control agency, etc., as well as for police.
   g. Train equipment operators.
   h. Conduct an employment service, matching skilled and unskilled volunteers with organizations that need them.
   i. Pollution monitoring (NB: However, there is some evidence that offers along this line may get a frigid rejection now that "there's money in pollution" and an empire-building psychology among the people who have the money.)

3. Many of the foregoing services do not require an elaborately equipped facility or fulltime paid staff. They are thus feasible for small towns, which might additionally be interested in:
   a. Assuming or sharing responsibility for a comprehensive warning system, with different aed alarms--sirens, broad-
casts, telephone chain, signal flags—to alert the public (or appropriate individuals or groups) to
storms, brush fires, "snow days," contagious diseases, thin ice, lost children.

b. Supplementing state monitoring of controlled drugs at local pharmacies.
c. Gathering evidence for evaluation of citizen or neighborhood requests (e.g., for a traffic signal) and complaints (e.g., about drag-racing, loose or barking dogs, vagrants, rude or negligent public employees).
d. Sponsoring a service-oriented amateur radio club.

D. Acquisitions and "Housekeeping"

1. Acquire, maintain, and use or lend, for peacetime emergencies, communications equipment, rescue equipment, emergency medical and food supplies.

2. Locate and make arrangements for the availability of supplementary emergency equipment and supplies.

3. Run or assist in fund-raising efforts to improve community's preparedness for emergencies (e.g., to purchase sirens, ambulance, respirator).

4. Sponsor a shelf or section in the local library for materials relevant to peace and war emergencies.

5. Develop a circulating inventory system for emergency medical and food supplies, with old stores sold to charitable organizations at reduced rates on a regular basis.
E. Training, Public Education, Information

1. Serve as the standard "funnel" for informing, educating, and training local people wherever a Federal agency wanted to 'get the word out,' for instance, about pesticides, diet, consumer advice, medical advice.

2. Expand joint-sponsorship training and educational programs; present and possible subjects include medical self-help, ham radio operation, crowd management and traffic control, drug abuse, meteorology, small arms use, pollution monitoring, equipment maintenance, teacher-training, mass feeding, public speaking, and building code enforcement.

3. Conduct annual or twice-yearly open house to acquaint community with current CD programs and invite suggestions.

4. Initiate and participate in physical fitness programs.

5. Co-sponsor with a local college or junior college a symposium on emergency preparedness geared to local conditions.

6. State level: supplement local capabilities with mobile instruction units.

7. Run a speaker's bureau.

8. Work with young volunteers--form junior police, junior firemen, etc.

F. Manpower Organization and Deployment

1. Minimally enlarged role: recruit, train, equip, and use volunteers for extended concept of emergency preparedness activities.
2. Assume primary or secondary responsibility for maintaining a reservoir of volunteers to augment normal city/county manpower for specified types of "peak load" problem, such as traffic direction, stand-by ambulance drivers, snow removal, search parties, Halloween patrols, paramedic work in flu epidemic.

3. Provide manpower on a continuing basis to improve or supplement the work of existing agencies; examples are:
   a. Auxiliary police or firemen.
   b. Regular night-time ambulance drivers.
   c. Traffic monitoring for the local radio station.
   d. Administering a hot lunch or hot breakfast program.
   e. Transportation in connection with programs for poor children or for the elderly or handicapped.

4. As briefly mentioned under "Communications," establish some form of clearinghouse for volunteers and jobs. The scope of this could range from maintaining a bulletin board or circulating a newsletter to an elaborate service involving active recruiting, files on volunteers by skills, advertisement of positions available, and possibly some training. Participation in some civil defense training programs might carry an obligation to contribute a certain number of hours' voluntary labor to civil defense or some cooperating agency.

5. Develop mutual assistance program with other volunteer-dependent groups such as PTA, League of Women Voters, fraternal and service organizations. They can assume some responsibility for (e.g.) recruiting shelter managers in exchange for
assistance on mailings and projects and/or use of some civil defense equipment.

IV. Possible Roles for OCD

In earlier chapters of this report we have suggested that the involvement of civil defense in peacetime service places the organization in a much more complex and unpredictable context than it has traditionally occupied and that OCD should itself move very slowly into this area. We acknowledged that many local CD units which have engaged in assorted peacetime activities for many years would consider our concern somewhat paranoid, but we stressed the distinction between autonomous local actions and high level policy. We believe that OCD should proceed very cautiously in affiliating itself with other Federal service programs. Insofar as this seems desirable, the safest course might be to provide state organizations with information about Federal programs with which they might wish to cooperate—and to find out with which areas they are cooperating already—deferring any direct action by OCD until state-level action has tested the ground and identified some of the variables and hidden hazards.

However, it is possible, as we indicated earlier in this chapter, that a number of Federal agencies would be interested in using civil defense as a funnel for getting cautionary information of various kinds to the general public (or possibly of collecting information from some dispersed but special publics). Certainly there is an argument that exposure of such information will be more effective given a single known location, such as a civil defense bulletin board or shelf or section of the library. Similarly, in any effort to increase and vary the materials for educational and training programs OCD makes available to local CD, it would be worthwhile to investi-
gate co-sponsorship possibilities with other Federal agencies. Initiative in either of these areas would seem a risk-free venture.

Possibilities for cooperation of the kinds we are skeptical about are unquestionably numerous. The issue, apart from risks, is the trade-off of benefits and costs. What civil defense has to offer is a fairly comprehensive network of largely volunteer-staffed, rather autonomous units. This network might appear attractive to any Federal agency which desired to extend its own field apparatus, or perhaps, to acquire one. But the nature of the civil defense network is such that a general assimilation of an additional function cannot be reliably obtained at what would seem a reasonable investment of funds by the interested other Federal agency. What would have to be done is to offer the local CD offices an opportunity to participate in co-sponsored programs. Probably any guaranteed participation rate that OCD would responsibly promise would be much too low to interest any Federal agency except as a cheap way to do part of the job. If the job needed to be done uniformly the other Federal agency would have to have some way of filling the gaps where the local CD units did not adequately participate.

However, this leaves a considerable area to explore, one far exceeding the scale of the present study even if our skepticism had not led us to emphasize other aspects of our study. Our sense of the size of this field derives from a quick sampling of materials obtained from the Department of Commerce. Commerce has at least three programs that might be of interest to OCD. The first is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which is explicitly charged, in the President's reorganization plan, to "coordinate its own scientific and technical resources with the technical and operational capabilities of other government agencies and private institutions." Civil
defense, especially but not only in coastal states, might conceivably play a role here to mutual advantage.

Second, Commerce has, affiliated with its field offices, 700 business organizations which disseminate its materials and extend its services. The far larger network of civil defense units could extend this coverage. In this way, the often substantial cooperation of local businesses with civil defense activities might be reciprocated and improved.

Third, the Overall Economic Development Program (OEDP) of the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration involves procedures for qualification and participation to which civil defense might make a meaningful contribution on the basis of its factual knowledge of the areas in which it operates and its existing contacts with local leaders in the public, private, and voluntary sectors and at the state level. The program entails the designation of economically distressed areas as Redevelopment Areas and the development and implementation of redevelopment plans. Initial action is the formation of an OEDP Committee with representation from "each major economic sector of the local economy, each principal political faction, and each significant minority group," and from "the field of education and pertinent skills such as economics, sociology, and engineering that are needed in Area analysis, planning, and project development." Much of the early work of the Committee is of a demographic and resource inventory nature; some of this will duplicate work that local CD has (or should have) already done. The request for designation as a Redevelopment Area must be made by the Governor; again, civil defense has the organization to facilitate this procedure.

Funding and other assistance for local OEDP Committees may be obtained via HUD's "701 urban planning grants," with further assistance from
Commerce's Economic Development Administration, from the Office of Economic Development Administration, from the Office of Economic Opportunity, from the Department of Labor's U.S. Employment Service, and from the Department of Agriculture, through its Technical Action Panels. In addition, numerous other potentially helpful Federal programs are described in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (available from OEC).

However, to repeat, we are not enthusiastic about OCD "officially" expressing interest in this type of program, despite the fact that in many potentially qualifying areas, "local civil defense may be a very logical organization to initiate and coordinate such actions. (We would not be surprised to find that this has happened somewhere.) It would seem preferable to restrict OCD action to acquainting state-level offices with the existence of this type of program.

Similarly with Federal "environmental" and "law and order" programs, but here there is an additional problem: not merely that participation could embroil CD in ideological and ethnic issues, but also that simply making inquiries and overtures may mean courting embarrassment. At the local and Federal levels and everywhere inbetween the general expectation is of high and rising funding for environmental and law and order programs. Many organizations that have some logical or tangential interest in these fields want to jump on the bandwagon, and those who are there already often and not unnaturally tend to resist this. A county CD coordinator with whom we talked has already been rebuffed by the local pollution control agency. A very canny CD official in a small city smiled when we asked him about pollution monitoring, and said, "We don't want to touch that. It belongs to Public Health."
However, as we have already mentioned, local environmental projects are a good arena for civil defense coordination and assistance. This is probably particularly true where the projects are conceived by high school or college students or adult service groups, rather than being bureaucratically sponsored. To an even greater degree, much greater than we realized before undertaking this study, local civil defense already participates in law and order efforts, sponsoring auxiliary and junior police corps, offering small arms instruction, serving communications roles. Where such activities are potentially eligible for Federal funding, the information should be available, but we would not consider it wise for OCD to conspicuously "push" this information, much less to enter into any kind of conversations or negotiations with the top level agency people in Washington.

We do feel that the changes that have occurred in the character and environment of civil defense in the past decade call for responsive changes in OCD's procedures, but we believe that the initial changes called for are internal to the organization, not in its relations with other Federal agencies. Our sense of what internal changes might be desirable is not based on an over-all study of CD's organizational structure but on a cursory study of the peacetime activities in which the lower levels of the organization are engaged. What we know best at this point, and we would not claim to know even this well, is local gripes and problems regarding OCD and, even more, state CD.

This research has resulted in the idea for a differentiation strategy which we present in the following chapter. It is perhaps in the nature of any bureaucratic structure that the people at and near the top derive a great deal of satisfaction from a combination of two in-nuts: (1) statistics showing how many units, how much equipment of various kinds, and how many
personnel in various categories; and (2) anecdotal information, derived from personal experience or newspaper clippings, etc., which "fleshes out" the bare statistics. Unfortunately, extrapolation from anecdotal data very often produces a very erroneous idea of the strength and characteristics of the mosaic as a whole. While an intelligent person will sense this, the size and unwieldi-ess of the organization will inhibit him from thinking about action on the suspicion, especially if the organization is as decentralized as civil defense is.

But, in a situation where funds and public support have been dwindling, a danger arises that the more vital components of a decentralized organization will spin off on their own, and that the less vital will atrophy entirely, unless there are demonstrations that the people at the top are au courant of events and know what they are doing. Simply enlarging the list of "officially" approved and assisted activities is not, per se, going to provide this reassurance and discipline. On the contrary, it may (1) harmfully blur OCD's local image; (2) seem lax and permissive "like everything else nowadays"; and (3) give additional evidence that OCD (or state CD) is out of touch--"We can't do half the things they already want us to do, and here they are wanting us to do more!"

What is needed additionally is reassurance that OCD (and the state) are aware of the major differences among local units with respect to what it is feasible in the short run for them to do toward achieving an optimal capability level. If local people have a feeling that those above them understand what is going on, and if they receive advice and assistance appropriate to their circumstances, then the organization will be much better situated to use peacetime services for leverage to obtain increased public support for the performance of its basic mission.
CHAPTER V
SUGGESTIONS FOR A DIFFERENTIATION POLICY

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we intend to develop the idea that more than one model for civil defense operation is needed in the present climate of public opinion. Local CD units differ very greatly in their degree of preparedness to cope with a nuclear attack. So long as public sentiments appreciated the need for preparedness, it was appropriate for OCD (and the state-level agencies) to follow a uniform policy toward the local units, establishing and attempting to enforce a single set of standards.

The local CD job is much more difficult today. Many communities have to be sold on the usefulness of the organization. Nuclear attack preparedness has to be presented as part of a larger emergency services package or as something the community is willing to partially fund because CD people require this as a quid pro quo.

There are various means by which a local CD unit might gain the support of an apathetic community. To date, emphasis has been on the Emergency Operations Center concept. We would agree that the coordinating role is the most satisfactory solution to the problem, and we have visited places where it works well. However, we strongly question that the coordination model is feasible for most local CD units at this time, although it may be feasible in more places than now realize it. In Sections II and III of this chapter, we use a "pocket scenario" to look in a speculative way at CD offices which have successfully become EOC's.
Our purpose is to cast light on this type of transformation and to suggest the limits of its extensibility.

In Section IV, we identify two alternatives, the resource model and the intermediary model, which seem to us more promising for many actual situations as a means for upgrading civil defense capabilities. These situations are of two kinds. First, there are CD agencies that have for many years existed "in name only" or little better. Here the best hope for improvement lies in establishing an understanding and helpful relationship with a new CD director during the initial period when, whatever the circumstances of his appointment may have been, he has at least a mild desire to "do something." The second group of local agencies is, in varying degrees, actively providing services to its community, but its leadership lacks the qualities of mind and personality to assume or to be accepted in a coordinating role. While a future option to attempt this role should be available to agencies like this, they need different kinds of advice and assistance today with regard to doing better the kinds of work they are doing and with regard to improving their bargaining position with local government. Failure to differentiate along these lines results in feelings of isolation and alienation: the people "up there" (in Washington, Trenton, Hartford, etc.) don't know what it's really like down here and, what's more, they don't even care. While some feelings of this sort are inevitable in large, decentralized, bureaucratic organizations, it seems especially important to try to do something to counter them when an organization is in process of adaptation to changing circumstances.
II. The "Anytown" Scenario

The civil defense organization of "Anytown" has been in existence for nearly twenty years. For many of those years, its basic mission seemed important enough to enough residents to sustain an adequate level of interest and activity, but this level gradually deteriorated. People found the idea of a nuclear attack in the "foreseeable" future less credible—or they felt that there was no adequate protection against thermonuclear weapons. Increasingly, civil defense work devolved upon a small group of people who enjoyed each other's company. Some people saw this group as a clique and were inhibited from offering their services; others assumed that the work was being adequately done, and did not bother to check their assumption.

However, Anytown differed from many communities in the quality of its civil defense leadership. Probably, in the cultural climate of the early 'sixties, it could not have attracted energetic, gregarious, committed individuals to this type of largely voluntary work, but it had been able to attract such people a decade earlier, several local businessmen with deep roots in the community and a sense of responsibility that waxed rather than waned with the growing disinterest of the general public. These people took pride in their operation. They spoke scornfully of neighboring towns where the CD director was "the Mayor's brother-in-law," whose principal instruction was to "keep out of the Mayor's hair." They also prided themselves on fiscal responsibility. Aware of a growing drought in civil defense funding, they did not want to put in for more than they were entitled to, but increasingly they needed supplementary
funds. In addition, while it was possible to get good cooperation for activities that were generally useful, such as first aid courses, or for a special event like a nuclear attack simulation, there were growing problems in filling and keeping filled such an essential, but 'narrow' and time-consuming, post as blast shelters coordinator.

Consequently, without consciously formulating a new policy, Anytown's civil defense leaders began to try to sell the town fathers and the general public on the usefulness of their organization. This started as a matter of emphasizing the fringe benefits the town derived from many conventional civil defense activities, but this was not adequate to obtain the budgetary appropriations from the town council that were needed. Nor was it sufficient to point out how civil defense people had "pitched in" to help in local emergencies in the past. While these forms of assistance had involved CD personnel, and had profited from the CD organization and equipment, they had not been official functions. Indeed, sometimes it wasn't really clear that they were proper functions for civil defense.

What was required additionally was to demonstrate that civil defense was singularly well qualified to perform certain services to the community, services which the community would be willing to pay for. The service which seemed most logical and salable to Anytown's CD officials was an extension to other types of emergencies of the coordinating role they were accustomed to play during nuclear disaster simulations. In discussions with the Mayor, the town council, the police and fire chiefs and heads of other municipal agencies, it was easy to obtain agreement that it was logical for CD to play this role in the event of natural disasters. It was easy not only
because civil defense obviously possessed this capability but also (1) because the CD director, his second in command, and the woman who was in charge of CD medical activities were contemporaries and friends of the town officials who needed convincing, and (2) because "natural disasters" were nearly as uncommon in Anytown as nuclear attacks. The town was not on a flood plain, had never experienced a tornado, and, while it received five or six Weather Bureau storm warnings each year, had not suffered a major hurricane in a number of years. Thus there was something abstract to the agreement on the new CD role. No one saw it as cramping his style in the exercise of his own responsibilities.

But this abstract quality did not persist very long. Within a few months, an airliner crashed on a nearby hill. While this was not a "natural disaster," no one had time to think about whether the coordinating role that had been defined for civil defense could appropriately be used in this event. It was used because it existed, and, after the emergency was past, the CD director requested a meeting with all the town officials involved to discuss what had been done right and wrong. The feeling at the meeting was unanimous that the town's response to the disaster had benefited greatly from civil defense coordination, but that important weaknesses had been revealed. For instance, it had not much mattered, but it might matter in other situations, that lines of communication with a number of relevant organizations--the power and telephone companies, the Forestry Service, the town's own Department of Public Works--had not been carefully spelled out and mutually understood in the initial disaster planning effort.
In view of this experience, it seemed sensible to stage a simulation of a similar emergency, and the town council agreed to pay the costs of this operation. The disaster decided upon, at the CD director's suggestion, was one that would "really test" the system: that is, a natural gas explosion which would demolish police headquarters, necessitating a shift in the "nerve center" of the town to civil defense headquarters. This suggestion was not entirely off the cuff. The concept of an emergency operations center was already being discussed in civil defense circles by this time, and a reference to it had caught the eye and interest of Anytown's civil defense director.

The results of the gas explosion simulation were several. First, people were impressed with the usefulness of bringing together, in their official and professional capacities, to tackle a shared problem, so many of the town's leadership group. It was felt that annual exercises of this kind would be very desirable. Second, CD headquarters were recognized to be wholly inadequate for a function of this kind, most clearly in terms of space but also with regard to communications equipment and connections, not to mention incidentals like maps and blackboards. By good luck, it was at this time that Anytown was beginning seriously to address the need for a new city hall. While it had been intended all along to provide civil defense with space in the basement of this new building, there was now a heightened interest in planning the design of this space and a heightened receptivity to "pet ideas" of the CD director which would formerly have been amiably shrugged off as frills.
Finally, the success of the simulation was still fresh in people’s minds the next time a sizable fire occurred. Anytown suffered at least two or three such fires annually, and they were typically followed by citizen complaints and letters to the paper—there had been live wires lying in the street for several hours, or someone had slipped on the ice from the fire-fighting water and broken a hip, or the gutted building had not been boarded up and children were playing in it. If civil defense is going to coordinate the response to local emergencies, several people suggested, here is an emergency that happens all the time and badly needs for someone to play this kind of role.

Thus, by the late ‘sixties, Anytown’s civil defense agency had been transformed from a single-purpose organization, largely aloof from the everyday functioning of the town, into an emergency-response coordinating agency, well understood and respected, with a secure and reasonably adequate local financial base, and with a near-run prospect of greatly improved physical facilities in the new city hall. This transformation had not involved any compromise with nuclear attack preparedness. While there was still a problem with rapid turnover of blast shelters coordinators, and a shortage of shelter managers, this situation was no worse than a decade earlier; in most other respects, preparedness was greatly improved. Training programs had been expanded; volunteers were better organized (some serving as auxiliaries trained and directed by the local police); and capabilities were being regularly exercised. All this and more was being done by an agency whose only fulltime employees were two secretaries, both of whom doubled as first aid instructors and in other capacities.
III. Analysis of "Anytown"

Anytown civil defense is a success; now let us ask why, and to what degree the formula could be used in other towns, and what are the qualifications, if any, of the success. The first and far and away the most important reason for Anytown's accomplishment is the characteristics of its civil defense leadership. They are local people, and gregarious, out-going people who practice good public relations as second nature. Moreover, they are people for whom commitment to job and family is not enough; they need some active social commitment as well. If they had not become active in civil defense work, they would be the pillars of other community organizations; to some degree, they are this anyway. They are the sort of people for whom it is more stimulating than annoying to have the fire alarm ring in the middle of dinner, the sort of people who have wide-ranging interests and hobbies, the sort of people who take pride in and cultivate friendly and "equal" relationships with townspeople of all socioeconomic classes, so long as they are "good people." Most important, they are able to plan, and to see the "big picture" and its interrelationships.

These qualities are not rare. They exist in every town and city. But attracting them to civil defense in the climate of the 1970's poses something of a chicken and egg problem. The EOC concept, with its wide-ranging human contacts, social applications, and serious responsibilities is attractive to this type of person. On the other hand, if a "traditional" CD agency is successfully to transform itself into an EOC, it needs this type of people to engineer the transformation: people who are good at community relations and knowledgeable about them, easy to talk to and work with, able to think ahead, and so forth.
Second, the success of an "Anytown" requires luck. Of course, it also requires being prepared to take advantage of luck, but the luck factor itself should not be underrated. In Anytown's case, the plane crash came at just the right time. Too improbable for a scenario is the actual case of Danbury, Connecticut, where a bomb actually did destroy the police station, and where, somewhat earlier, a simulation of a train-schoolbus collision preceded by several months an actual, similar accident. However, the requisite kinds of luck (bad luck, from other perspectives) are probably, like the requisite kinds of personnel, common enough. A spectacular coincidence or "lesson learned" may accelerate public and official acceptance of an enlarged CD role, but there is no particular reason why a more plodding progression cannot yield as satisfactory results in the long run, assuming that CD work offers enough other gratifications to sustain the morale of those engaged in it.

Third, Anytown's success hinged on the use of simulations. More than any other single factor, it was the process of acting out the response to a make-believe local emergency which took the concept of "coordination" out of the category of opaque abstractions for Anytown's key people, and convinced them that a need existed which civil defense was uniquely qualified to fill. As we illustrated with our serious fires example, once this coordinating role is understood, an in-flow of ideas for applications may be expected. At this point, the nature of the CD problem radically changes. The basic struggle to gain public acceptance is largely won: as civil defense or as an emergency operations center, the organization is perceived as a multi-purpose component of the community's service structure. From
here on, its jobs are those of any such agency: to do its work competently, to keep its fences mended, and to refine the definition of its domain.

Are there any qualifications to Anytown's success story? At the moment, there appears to be one: an aging CD leadership. We have already suggested that the transformation into an EOC makes civil defense more attractive to energetic, civic-minded people, so, in one sense, this is probably a problem that will solve itself, although there would certainly be nothing amiss in a deliberate effort to bring younger people to positions of responsibility within the organization. However, there remains another, perhaps important, personnel problem. The "old guard" embraced the concept of an emergency operations center not only as a means for meeting peacetime community needs but, even more, as a strategy for reversing a downward trend in public support and funding that was imperiling their ability to perform their basic mission. In other words, the EOC was a means as well as an end, and this was no mere matter of lip-service.

Thus the problem of an aging leadership is not wholly solved by the development of a more appealing organizational format. In the planning for the new EOC, Anytown's civil defense director was able and motivated to fight for the inclusion of certain features which will probably never prove worth the money unless a nuclear attack occurs. Because he was arguing from a new position of strength, he had the best of it over the objectors to such "frills," but it is not clear that the outcome would have been the same, had the planning and arguing been the responsibility of the younger man who is his probable successor. Nor is it clear that, in a few years, after the present director and his chief of operations retire, there will
be anyone left in the organization willing to shoulder the thankless drudgery of keeping up the shelter program. Similarly, serious study of the subject of nuclear attack is likely to seem academic and a waste of time to the second generation of Anytown EOC people.

These developments are probably unstoppable, barring a major international crisis, but we do not consider them very important. Most plausible pre-attack scenarios involve weeks or months when substantial incentives will exist for Anytown's CD people to remedy their sins of omission in the preparedness area. What they are doing now is much the more difficult part of preparedness: establishing their credibility and their lines of communication, exercising their skills at planning and coordination, and absorbing a great deal of relevant information that cannot be obtained from books or courses. While it is important to keep reminding Anytown that there are minimal standards it is expected to meet as a condition for receipt of Federal funds, it would be unfortunate if an organization that is doing the difficult part of its preparedness mission very well should slip into a poor relationship with its overseers because of "insufficient" attention to details.

IV. Alternatives to the 'Anytown' Model

A. The Traditional Model

Some people, of course, feel that the tendency to 'forget why we're here' constitutes a major objection to Anytown's kind of evolution. Consequently, we need to ask: Can a local civil defense organization remain "pure," adhering to a traditional construction of its mission, and do a
better job with that mission than Anytown seems likely to do? The answer would seem to be, "Yes, if we're willing to spend enough money." A centrally funded civil defense system, involving salaried, highly trained professionals with paid full and part-time assistants, and funds to buy the assistance of municipal agencies, utilities, etc., would still have community relations as an important part of its job, but it would not have to dissipate its energies recruiting and keeping volunteers and wheedling money from tight-fisted town councils. Probably the most essential forms of cooperation could be required by law, and compensated, as with jury duty.

But this alternative is wholly unrealistic today. "Pure" civil defense must depend heavily on volunteers; it has a staggeringly difficult sales job; and it would appear to be much more vulnerable than Anytown to the leadership-replacement problem. Whether there are many effectively-run, traditionally-oriented local civil defense offices in operation in 1971 is a question worth investigating. We have gained the impression that "traditional orientation" is generally a euphemism for lack of enterprise and ability, but our contacts have been predominantly with CD people who have chosen to perform peacetime roles (or, in New Jersey, are required to do so by statute), and we may have been somewhat unduly influenced by their natural bias against traditionally run operations.

Let us suppose, then, that a substantial number of local CD offices are being more or less adequately managed along non-innovative lines. In terms of the analysis offered in this report, we would nonetheless have to say that such apparently healthy agencies may be living on borrowed time.
While any differentiation policy that OCD may choose to adopt should recognize their existence and avoid antagonizing them, probably nothing short of a marked deterioration in our international relations would make it productive to encourage organizations to stick with this model.

B. The Resource Model: Jonesville

The pharmacist, the tractor salesman, and the junior high English teacher who run the Jonesville civil defense office operate out of a shabby, sparsely furnished, barn-like room in the basement of the town hall. They call this room an Emergency Operating Center, but they will tell the visitor or frankly, without any hint of self-deprecation, "Primarily, we serve as a community resource."

While Jonesville CD has a thick card file of commodities and equipment available for community emergency use, what it means by "resource" is mainly manpower. Civil defense officials have the responsibility for recruiting auxiliary police, "junior police," and auxiliary firemen. They also maintain a corps of "callmen" who man the municipal ambulance service during the night hours. Another kind of resource that Jonesville CD supplies is its emergency simulation capability. They do the planning for surprise drills for the fire department. At the request of several local industries and hospitals, they also stage unannounced multiple-injury accident simulations.

These activities are the result of a very different type of evolution than Anytown's. The similarity extends only to the initial awareness of

"See Section V below."
dwindling public support for the traditional CD role. While Anytown's response to this situation developed into a strategy in which peacetime services were used to provide leverage to secure adequate public support for the basic CD mission, Jonesville's response involved no such concept or result. Ironically, the immediate effects on community welfare, should civil defense magically disappear overnight, would be much more pronounced in Jonesville than in Anytown, but Jonesville CD derives no benefit from its peacetime services other than the vague good will one feels toward a utility one takes for granted. Both communities have a population of about 50,000, but Anytown CD tells the Mayor how much money it needs, and the estimate is generally accepted; Jonesville settles for a grudging hand-out. And yet in both communities CD personnel will tell you, "Nobody around here is really interested in civil defense any more." The difference is a matter of success in coping with a similar problem.

Is Jonesville CD a failure? It certainly measures up poorly by comparison to Anytown, but calling it a "failure" on the basis of the comparison may be unwise as well as unfair. Jonesville's office is, like Anytown's, directed by people who were attracted to civil defense in the era when preparedness seemed important, but, of the original leadership group, one died, several moved away, and others lost interest and shifted their emphasis to other community services. The present leadership has come up through the ranks. Its members have some of the qualifications to run an effective operation, but neither they nor anyone else in the community thinks of them as possessing "leadership qualities." They are reliable, hard-working
people who know the ropes, know the community, get along well with everyone, but, in the event of a serious disaster, it is quite clear that it would be the chief of police, not the civil defense director, who would assume command, advise the Mayor, and coordinate the response of all concerned agencies, including CD.

This is not as desirable a situation as Anytown's. Ideally, this kind of coordination should be a specialized function exercised by a nonpartisan agency, but obviously neither exhortations nor rebukes nor calling a drafty basement an "EOC" is going to produce the desired result in Jonesville. In Jonesville, we see the "chicken and egg" problem very clearly: It takes sharp, sophisticated people to develop a true EOC capability; but, in the present climate of public opinion, you cannot attract such people into civil defense work unless you already have or are rapidly developing this capability. There are men and women in Jonesville with the requisite abilities, but they aren't in civil defense, they aren't interested in civil defense, and nothing that has happened in Jonesville in the past ten years (here enters the "luck factor") has suggested to them that Jonesville needs a genuine EOC. Other municipal problems--pollution, people on welfare, an inadequately staffed hospital, drug abuse in the high school--seem far more important. Other specific projects: a performing arts center, a community mental health center, have far higher priority. Describe Anytown's EOC operation to people in Jonesville, and you are likely to get a slightly negative reaction, somewhat condescending. Jonesville prides itself on being a "small town" where everybody pitches in in an emergency. "You don't need a complicated apparatus like that. The same things get done here. We just don't make a big thing about it."
By this point, we hope that the reader has begun to share our sense that the Jonesvilles are not, for the short run, potential Anytowns but are a distinctive and, for all practical purposes, a permanent component of the civil defense mosaic. This is, of course, a probabilistic statement, but policy has to be based on probabilistic statements. Jonesville is intended to illustrate the resource model CD units that need different kinds of advice and assistance, perhaps even a different style in communications, than are appropriate for the coordination model units such as Anytown.

C. The Intermediary Model: Smithburg

This model differs from the others in that the name we have given it is prescriptive rather than descriptive. There are coordination model, traditional model, and resource model civil defense offices, but probably the sum of these represents a minority of the communities which have a civil defense office. (This is hearsay information, but we have only once heard it contradicted.)

The remaining local units are a very mixed bag. Many exist only because of a statutory requirement: in some, the Mayor "solves" this problem by naming himself CD director. Sometimes the post of civil defense director is a political or honorary appointment. Sometimes a formerly active unit has atrophied not only because of dwindling public support but because of too much turnover at the top, or because of too little. Probably a common result of public apathy is the retention in office of "dedicated" but incompetent people.
Looking at this aggregation of do-nothings, do-littles and do-poorlys, we want to know how their organizations might be upgraded. Probably there are none in this group for which the coordination model is immediately appropriate. The resource model holds more promise for some. Given energetic leadership by people who know and are favorably known by the key individuals and organizations in their community, a currently moribund civil defense office should be able to develop gradually along the Jonesville pattern, assuming it gets the right kinds of advice and assistance.

But the resource model is not, at present, appropriate for Smithburg. Smithburg has had five civil defense directors in the past eight years. The first one resigned for reasons of health. The second, also an "old-timer," filled in for a year and a half but was then transferred by his employer. The third, promoted from a RADEF job, was an "electronics nut" who lavished his time and the office's budget on communications equipment for the rescue truck and his own car. During his three year tenure, all other aspects of the job were neglected; this was regarded more with relief than as a problem by municipal officials.

The post next fell to the wife of a local clergyman. She had for many years been prominent in child-related community activities, but her children were now grown, and civil defense seemed a nice thing to give her to do. Unfortunately, she felt she should take the job seriously. There ensued an uncomfortable period during which she antagonized not only everyone in local government whose cooperation she demanded, but the county level and state level CD organizations as well. When she made the
front page with a fiery speech linking the need for civil defense to Communist infiltration of the community college, there was finally a "respectable" reason to request her resignation.

Her successor, the present director, took the job because no one else would. Twenty years before, he went to high school with the Mayor. He is now an insurance salesman whose company has a policy of encouraging community service by its employees. The title of civil defense director is thus of some value to him, but he has no clearer sense of why Smithburg needs civil defense than does anyone else. All he knows is that his immediate predecessor was a pain in the neck, and that what he's inherited is a shambles, not an organization. His "EOC" is a room in the basement of the public library, which he shares with several fund-raising groups. His directive from the mayor, which he isn't inclined to dispute, is "Keep a low profile," but he feels that he ought to do something.

Smithburg civil defense is theoretically an intermediary between OCD and state civil defense, on the one hand, and the local community, on the other; but actuality belies the theory: Smithburg CD is a terminus. The mail flows in. Whenever there is a new CD director, the mail is opened and filed, and some effort is made to answer it or to obey directives. Later it is often thrown away unopened. And why not? Nothing in it is ever relevant to Smithtown's situation.

This situation requires us to define a fourth model. There is a set of communities where today, tomorrow, or next year there is or will be a (probably new) CD director who would like to "do something" but is starting from worse than scratch. His only real asset, apart from an office in
an out-of-the-way place, is his membership in a national organization
which ought to be able to advise and assist him in the long upward trek
toward competence and public acceptance.

He is starting from 'worse than scratch' because his office has a
past which has created negative attitudes, mild or strong, in the minds
of the people with whom he needs to develop constructive relationships.
Not only will it do him no good to inform him about the emergency operations
center concept; it will do no good to tell him about all the useful services
the Jonesvilles are performing for their communities. It may be that Smith-
burg's rescue squad was originally a CD 'baby,' but its parentage is an
academic point now. He can't claim credit for it. He can't marshal volun-
teers. He can't conduct training courses. He can't stage simulations.
He can draw up beautiful plans, but since he can't get anyone to read them,
he certainly shouldn't be encouraged to spend his limited time in this way.

An intermediary model for civil defense, designed to help the Smith-
burgs, would concentrate on developing one resource as a basis for the
future development of others. This resource would be information. All
the materials would be supplied from without; the local responsibility
would be dissemination. Civil defense would be defined as the standard
channel for Federal and state communications to local communities regarding
emergency preparedness and general safety. Minimally, local CD would be
required to maintain a bulletin board in a prominent place on which
interesting information would be displayed, concerning (e.g.) pesticides,
dangerous drugs, new vaccines, and relevant announcements of meetings and
courses. Optimally, the distribution of materials would take a more
active form, and bring the CD director into desirable forms of personal contact with city hall, local hospitals and businesses, etc. It would be from him, for instance, that public officials would learn about certain kinds of Federal programs in which they might be interested in participating.

One way to look at the intermediary model is to say that what the Smithburgs need is a way to get a foot in the door. OCD creates a function which is within the capabilities of every civil defense director in the country, however little time he has and however little local support. It presents this function to the director as a useful service to his community and as a means to start building up his own prestige and that of his office. He is not encouraged to regard civil defense primarily as an information service, but neither is he harassed by directives regarding shelter programs, radiation monitoring, and the like which it is quite impossible for him to follow. A possible mechanism for implementing a realistic relationship with the Smithburgs would be to assign them a provisional status in the CD network. While there would be incentives to qualify for nonprovisional status, there would not be a blanket pressure to pretend to meet impossible standards, but rather a program of friendly assistance specifically designed for CD people in situations similar to Smithburg's.

It is not at all clear that the intermediary model, as we have described it, would work very well. There may be better ways, short of the infusion of large amounts of money, to put life into moribund or "in name only" organizations; certainly, some thought should be given to alternatives. We are suggesting one possible way to work with CD offices which cannot meet "standard standards." A nondifferentiated approach is counterproductive for this group.
V. Implementing a Differentiation Strategy

A. Choosing a Model

A central element in the instruction of new civil defense directors could be the election of a model—coordination, resource, or intermediary—appropriate to their situation. Rather than placing most emphasis on doctrine and procedures, initial instruction would stress familiarizing oneself with one's own organization, defining its capabilities and weaknesses. This procedure is suited to the correspondence course OCD offers new CD directors. It would give those taking the course a less passive role in the learning process than the present format permits. They would start out doing independent "research" of a sort. Following the selection of the appropriate model, a branching process would restrict their subsequent instruction to data and concepts relevant to their situation.

We recognize that this will not work perfectly—a new CD director, if he approaches his job with enthusiasm, may be very likely to make an unrealistic choice—but the differentiation effort will pay off, other things being equal, if all it does is to reduce the new CD director's resentful feeling that OCD (and his state) don't understand and don't want to understand what things are like in Smithburg or Jonesville.

B. Reforming Communications

While we feel that differentiation is the key to better relationships within the civil defense network, there are two types of communications reform that could, if one wished, be separated from this concept. The first of these has to do with style, the second with quantity.
If the local CD office is often headed by the mayor's brother-in-law, the state (and perhaps county) office is often staffed by "retired colonels." There may be some local understanding of this situation—"When they're paying $5,000 salaries, who else can take the job?"—but this kind of sympathy does not compensate for the bad effects of communications couched in "military gobbledygook." On the other hand, we were also shown excessively "folksy" communications which the recipients found silly or insulting. Thus, while improving the style of communications deserves more thought, the great prevalence of complaints of these kinds may be regarded primarily as symptomatic of a more general feeling that the people "up there" don't really know what it's like "down here."

Second, there is sheer quantity. Local CD offices get too much mail. This complaint is voiced more often about the state than about OCD, but it will become more importantly an OCD concern if, as we recommend, civil defense becomes a funnel for emergency and risk information from a number of Federal agencies.

From the OCD or state point of view, mass mailings are probably much more attractive administratively than supplying the same materials on a request basis or differentiating among categories of recipients. But if an effort is to be made to develop a genuine civil defense capability where it exists "in name only," it is important to simplify and rationalize contacts with the people involved. Also, if more active local units are to be aided in performing peacetime services in their communities and in using these services as leverage to enhance public support of their basic mission, it is important to work toward a situation in which the expectation, when
one opens an envelope, will be that the contents will be readily intelligible and germane to the recipient's situations and needs.

Thus, if differentiated mailings are administratively unattractive, it would be worthwhile to consider alternatives, such as color-keyed envelopes. In this system, for instance, our Smithburg CD director would know that he needn't pay particular attention to mail color-keyed for coordination or resource model offices. Indeed, color-keying might be a preferable mechanism during the transition from an undifferentiated system. OCD could use it without waiting for the states to fall into line, without (one would suppose) antagonizing anyone.

C. A Few Suggestions on Differentiated Assistance

The scale of our study has not permitted us to develop a differentiation strategy in any detail. We have done no more in the way of research on this particular idea than talk to half a dozen people, mainly in our own area, who, whether they felt they were doing well or poorly, shared a sense of being excessively on their own in trying to do a job about which their communities were apathetic. Moreover, the differentiation concept grew out of the conversations; it was not the reason for them. We have not asked anyone which model he would choose, and what kinds of assistance would be appropriate in terms of this choice. Suggestions we make here merely reflect our own thoughts and our own adaptations to the differentiation strategy of general complaints and suggestions by the people we've talked to.

With this caveat, we would suggest that for the intermediary model offices, the emphasis should be as nearly exclusively as possible on the information-dissemination role and means of using it to establish community
contacts, build up the status of the organization, and lay the groundwork for development of true civil defense capability. Such offices should not be burdened with directives they cannot follow, and OCD should try to persuade the state organizations on this point. The states might also devise means for bringing together CD directors of intermediary model communities. According these groups a provisional status could help take them off the hook or, to mix metaphors, bring them out of the woodwork. Special workshops could be conducted for them, thematically oriented toward their information service role, with emphasis on social issues, environmental hazards, and the like, rather than on nuclear attack preparedness. They would, in short, be courted rather than shamed, and shown opportunities rather than lectured to about goals.

What resource model CD's need is two things. They need practical assistance in doing what they are doing—and in learning how to do it as well as Jonesville does—and they need simple instruction on how to get better mileage, more political advantage, from the services they provide. Our impression is that simply tallying up what one does is an unfamiliar exercise for the Jonesvilles. When a visitor requires them to do it, they are genuinely surprised at how active they are. This results not only from the limitations of this type of mind but from the fact that peacetime services are extracurricular: OCD wants to know how many shelters, etc., they have, but not how many auxiliaries, how many peacetime simulations, and so forth. This omission would be remediable by an OCD that regarded peacetime activities as part of the CD mission. While the general complaint in dealing with Federal (or state) bureaucracies is that there are too many forms to fill
out, here is a case where having to fill out a form might have a useful effect on a local office's ability to argue with the town fathers.

By contrast, helping the resource model office to do what it's doing better would seem a straightforward matter. A newsletter would be a good device, emphasizing (with pictures) what other people are doing, solutions to practical problems, bargains in surplus equipment, etc. New Jersey CD-DC puts out a magazine with this general orientation. (Of course, New Jersey has the advantage of several decades' official association of civil defense with peacetime emergency preparedness and related services.)

Assistance to coordination model CD offices would have to entail recognition of the great difference and distance between aspirants and successes. Aspiring coordinators should be brought in contact with CD personnel in cities and towns which are already accepted in the coordinating role. While formal instruction on coordination strategies and tactics is useful, we feel that a visitation program--to and by the "successes"--would be a very worthwhile investment if it were designed to show those electing the coordination model that people like themselves are making the model work in situations with no more advantages than their own. Also personal visits open up channels for obtaining informed advice on "petty" problems. This type of information source may be a major unmet need for many CD offices.

In our Anytown scenario, we suggested that simulation of plausible local emergencies is a useful means for helping the participants to understand what "coordination" means, to appreciate that a need for it exists, and to see CD as a logical agency to assume the role. However, a peacetime emergency simulation that draws into play all the major community
service agencies—and this is the kind that can best teach the value of
a CD coordinating role—is difficult to plan and stage; and this is one
area where it definitely is not true that 'anything worth doing well is
worth doing badly.' One of the local CD officials we visited described
to us the bad effects on the morale and interest of participants in a
recent state-wide nuclear disaster simulation when they found that the
materials supplied them were internally inconsistent. ('How could we
have 'no injuries' when the fire damage line and the glass breakage line
cut right through the town!') Similar mistakes are likely to occur when
inexperienced local people try to write elaborate scenarios. Thus it
would be useful to provide coordination model offices with special assistance in preparing for complex peacetime emergency simulations.

Here, too, referral to communities with relevant experience would be useful. We recognize that OCD cannot very well run a referral service
and visitation programs. However, OCD could commend this to the states,
provide some initial funding, serve to some degree as an information clearinghouse among the states, and make certain generalized or case-study
materials available directly to coordination-model CD units.
VI. Summary

So long as civil defense was solely concerned with a narrow mission, pursued in a context of strong popular support, the undifferentiated approach to the local offices made sense. But as support has declined, the fruits of undifferentiation have increasingly become the following: (1) a "paper strength" sadly at odds with actual strength; (2) an obstacle to upgrading "in name only" offices (we have several times heard an estimate of 3 out of 4 as in this category); and (3) a reinforcement to other demoralizing factors for people who are trying to do their job well.

Individualized treatment is not feasible or necessary. While local situations differ in innumerable ways, a small number of models is adequate to accommodate these differences. We have suggested three: the coordination model, the resource model, the intermediary model. Each of these may be appropriate to some communities of every size and every region; the differentiation is not based on demographic considerations but on past performance and present leadership. Clearly, the intermediary model is satisfactory in terms of the basic CD mission, but it seems to us to present a better potential for improvement than the local agencies which would choose this model have today. The resource model also leaves something to be desired, but the particular example from which we derived the model had become so well integrated with other community services as to suggest that, in the event of a nuclear attack, while it probably would not assume a leadership role, it would be used knowledgeably and efficiently by those who did. The principal shortcoming of this particular agency seemed to be a taken-for-granted status. Its considerable usefulness as
a peacetime emergency resource seemed decoupled from its struggle to maintain a wartime capability. This struggle seemed characterized by genuine commitment but also by "tunnel vision," and we suspect that this disability is fairly common. Differentiation of a resource model would and should enable attention to this problem.

While our understanding of how the nondifferentiated system works is severely limited, perhaps distorted, by the limited scope of the present study, our impression is that a (de facto) resource-model agency has available to it, in the way of advice on strategy, only the emergency operations center concept. While it may call its physical facility an "EOC," it is not such a center in any useful sense of the term, nor does it seem likely in the near future to become one. It needs a different type of advice on strategy and tactics. Precisely, it needs to be urged to tally up the services it is actually performing for its community, to become aware of and impressed by this total itself, and to become aware that, in its capacity as "resource," it has important bargaining power with the community.

While it would be nice if everyone who heads an active CD agency were capable of appreciating and implementing a "grand strategy," this is far from being the case. The EOC concept, while it is a formula for the best nuclear attack preparedness possible in the present climate of opinion, is not universally appropriate even for CD units with dedicated, dynamic leadership. Where this leadership is of an intellectual, temperamental caliber that cannot perceive activities as interrelated in the rather sophisticated way the EOC concept requires, a differentiation of advice and expectations would seem preferable to "democratically" pretending that the problem does not exist.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR OCD

1. Context for Innovation

In this report, we have suggested that two trends in public opinion are relevant to OCD policy. The first, which is generally recognized, is a long-term attrition in public support for civil defense. The same problem here is not that more people are actively opposed to civil defense activities than a decade ago but rather that fewer people are actively interested. This trend has played a large part in the initiation of peacetime services by local CD units: that is, it has created pressures to justify the organization otherwise than by reference to its basic statutory mission. Probably CD would have moved in this direction anyway. Because of the substantial autonomy of local units, there would have been other reasons and opportunities to apply CD capabilities to the felt needs of the local communities; but public apathy about preparedness for nuclear war has unquestionably accelerated the movement.

The second trend in public opinion appears to be away from heroics. While it is frequently said that dissatisfaction about the conduct of the Vietnam War is coupled to a desire to "reorder our national priorities," we feel that this interpretation misconstrues the public mood. The American people seem also to be disillusioned about the efficacy of grandiose "wars" on domestic social problems. The primary interest today is in decentralized approaches, in tax-sharing, in local problems, and in the personal or class problems of those who are neither affluent nor impoverished.
II. **Pitfalls of Innovation**

We have encountered no evidence of harmful effects resulting from the assumption of peacetime activities by local CD units. Doubtless a random survey would uncover such effects (and it would be useful for OCD to conduct such a survey, if it has not done so already), but we think that the pitfalls of an expanded CD role are incomparably greater at the Federal than at the local level. The basic mission of civil defense is controversial in many parts of the country, but the alignments, the concepts, the arguments of the controversies are well understood. If, for instance, a nuclear attack simulation is held, one can anticipate with a high degree of reliability which groups will oppose and support it, and what they will say and do. Not so for CD activities in connection with domestic problems such as pollution or the redevelopment of economically depressed areas or "crime in the streets." Here local variations in attitudes are great and poorly understood. This diversity and uncertainty is a major obstacle to enunciation of CD policy at the Federal level.

III. **Cooperation with Other Federal Agencies**

Generally speaking, we feel that OCD should move very cautiously in establishing new formal program relationships with other Federal agencies. In addition to the danger of becoming embroiled in political controversies, there is perhaps some danger of rebuff and ridicule. OCD should be wary of making overtures which look like an expedient effort to get a slice of the latest political plum. To a large degree this is, of course, a matter of style, but the risk of rebuff as well as the risk of controversy can be circumvented if OCD starts out with a role restricted to the provision of information to the state CD organizations about Federal
programs they may wish to investigate. OCD might then make contacts and inquiries responsively to state requests. Such a middleman role would reduce OCD's vulnerability to unfavorable public opinion. Insofar as inter-agency cooperation connoted a policy position, the policy-making would be decentralized.*

IV. Focus for Innovation

We feel that a wide variety of peacetime services are appropriate for local civil defense, and that the services which are appropriate will vary greatly with local conditions, with the present characteristics of local CD units, and with the qualifications of local CD officials. By and large, decision making and accountability in such a situation should lie with the people on the scene, and OCD's role should be supportive.

OCD should give serious thought to the internal organizational modifications required for transformation from a single-purpose network into one that has (as you will) multiple purposes or multiple means for improving preparedness for a nuclear attack. It is important to appreciate that the decision to undertake this transformation has already been made, and that it has not been made in Washington but at the local level, where the need to adapt to changing conditions has had a sink-or-swim urgency. Moreover, we suggest that the transformation at the local level is evolutionary. Barring renewed popular concern about nuclear attack, we may expect the "second generation" of local CD leaders to increasingly think of their peacetime activities as self-justifying.

*Cooperation with other agencies in information dissemination is discussed in Sections V-A and V-C below.
The basic problem of OCD and state level civil defense thus appears to be to maintain an adequate influence in an organization that has strong centrifugal tendencies. We reiterate that our sense of this problem derives from conversations with local CD officials, not from a study of OCD procedures. It is from this perspective that it appears important to modify these procedures in ways that reassure local workers that the people "up there" know what it's really like "down here." It is entirely possible that this is overwhelmingly a problem in state-local relations with OCD only peripherally involved. It is also possible that OCD has been aware of the problem and has been taking steps to combat it for some time. Our investigation has been focused very narrowly on activities and felt needs of local civil defense respecting peacetime services. We fully appreciate that impressions and recommendations emanating from this perspective cannot be judged in isolation.

V. New Activities and Emphases for OCD*†

A. Differentiation

In Chapter V, we developed the argument that there are markedly different types of local CD units, in terms of capabilities, and that these types require markedly different treatment with respect to (1) what is expected of them, and (2) advice and assistance. We see differentiation as serving two purposes. The first is to combat the centrifugal tendencies referred to above: that is, differentiation is a means for

*In the following summary of suggestions made in this report, we will not differentiate between direct assistance to the local CD units and assistance via advice and services by OCD to state CD.
countering local feelings that Federal and state officials have unrealistic perceptions of the network they nominally head. The second purpose is to make the upgrading of local organizations more efficient by tailoring advice and assistance to their existing capabilities.

Minimally, a differentiation policy would assign a provisional status to local CD units that cannot meet minimal capability standards. These units would receive special assistance in the elementary work of establishing contacts and demonstrating their usefulness within their communities. Necessarily, in today's cultural climate, this assistance would strongly emphasize peacetime services. Because initially these services would have to require very little input of resources from the local community, we suggest emphasis on an information dissemination role, with civil defense serving as a funnel for Federal agencies that want to "get the word out" regarding safety programs and hazard warnings of various kinds. In addition, Federal and state relations with provisional, or "intermediary model," CD units should pay particular attention to combatting problems of low morale. Provisional status should not seem shameful, and special courses and programs should be used as a means for bringing together CD officials in this group, to show them that their problems are shared and to give them a sense of belonging to a larger organization.

We also consider that some distinction may usefully be made between two types of relatively healthy CD organizations: those which serve primarily as a resource for the community's leadership, and those which have assumed or aspire to a role of coordinating the community's response to emergencies. Probably the principal argument for this differentiation
relates to the difficulties in acquiring and playing the coordinating role. In terms of preparedness to play this role in the event of a nuclear attack, prior experience in peacetime emergencies appears very desirable. On the other hand, there are unquestionably many dedicated, energetic local CD leaders who lack leadership qualities; in a peace or war emergency they will be helpers, not coordinators. If OCD and state CD assume not only that this helper role is legitimate but also that many people find it the most comfortable, congenial role, then it becomes possible to concentrate attention and assistance on the perhaps smaller group which has greater ambitions.

The members of this latter group should be encouraged to regard themselves as an elite. As we suggested for the provisional CD units, special courses and visitation programs would be useful to develop a sense of belonging and to open channels for the exchange of information and advice.

These ideas are developed in more detail in Chapter V. Our recommendation to OCD is that the concept of differentiation should receive serious attention. Our specific suggestions regarding categories and implementation of the concept are intended to serve as a starting point for discussion.

B. OCD Communications With Local CD Regarding Peacetime Activities

We suggested in Chapter II that Americans are disillusioned with grandiose national aims, including not only policing the globe but waging "wars" on poverty and other domestic ills. This cultural climate affects the type of themes or slogans OCD should stress in encouraging peacetime
activities at the local level. The emphasis should be on identification of local needs and problems. Rather than, for instance, "What can YOU do about the pollution problem?" the more promising slogan for the 1970's would be "Know Your Town."

Second, OCD's relations with local CD should be such as to encourage or require a regular accounting of peacetime activities, perhaps in terms of manhours per year. In this way the local units will acquire information that will be useful in obtaining better local financial support. Our impression is that, in the absence of such bookkeeping requirements, local CD officials may often fail to appreciate, themselves, the extent of their organization's contribution to the community.

Third, OCD communications with local CD (direct or indirect) should stress efforts to interest young people in the organization and to bring younger adults into positions of responsibility. Our own observation that local CD officials (and even their clerical help) are rather elderly is based on very little evidence, but this weakness or potential weakness of civil defense seems a logical accompaniment to declining public interest in the organization. Hence, local CD should be encouraged to cooperate with service activities that are fashionable with youth (such as recycling projects and clean-up campaigns), and also to sponsor junior police and other traditional "Middle American" youth service auxiliaries.

Fourth, very common complaints of local CD officials are that communications from "above" are either couched in military gobbledygook or are offensively folksy, and that there are too many directives, information bulletins, and so forth. We are inclined to consider these complaints largely symptomatic of a general feeling of being misunderstood.
but the complaint about too much mail deserves attention in itself. Even without instituting a differentiation policy (under which each type of CD unit would receive only mail relevant to its capabilities and needs), it might be possible to develop some means, such as color-keyed envelopes, to provide quick identification of types of mail by subject matter, or degree of importance. If OCD should decide to serve as the standard channel for dissemination of safety information by Federal agencies, the problem of unmanageable quantities of mail would assume greater practical importance.

C. Information Dissemination and Instructional Programs

Educational activities of local CD are largely determined by what materials OCD makes available. Assuming rent-free classrooms and volunteer teachers, education is a low-cost area for expansion of peacetime services. In Chapter IV, Section III-E, we list possibilities in this area. Regarding both the dissemination of information and the development of instructional materials, OCD should look into possibilities for cooperation and co-sponsorship by other Federal agencies. In addition to serving as a channel for safety information of various kinds, OCD might, for instance, want to consider offering to supplement the outlets by which the Commerce Department distributes information to businessmen. This would be a means for repaying and encouraging the cooperation of local businesses with civil defense efforts.

However, our general caveat about formal OCD affiliation with organizations which are addressing themselves to domestic problems applies to the sponsorship of courses, symposia, and the like, if not to the role of distributing information from other sources. Since OCD's primary interest
is to improve public support for its basic mission, the measure of controversy has to be weighed with the measure of usefulness and appropriateness in selecting additional educational programs.

D. Assistance With Local CD Peacetime Projects

In Chapter IV, Section III, we list a large number of present and possible uses for civil defense volunteers and equipment. Throughout this report, we have stressed that local needs and conditions are far and away the most important factor in determining which such activities are appropriate. However, some of the ideas in our list may be worth publicizing, if not promoting. OCD might, for instance, wish to circulate sets of ideas, such as our list of peacetime activities that EOC's may choose to perform, or our list of services that may be feasible for small town CD units. Also, a particular idea may seem noncontroversial and worth circulating: e.g., our suggestion that local CD may develop a clearinghouse role for would-be volunteer workers and organizations needing their services. (As we suggest, such a "clearinghouse" could be a bulletin board, or it could be a much more ambitious operation.)

VI. Research Needs in Connection With Peacetime Services

During the course of our study, several questions arose that we lacked the means to answer. Possibly OCD has the answers to some of these questions, but we wish to place on the record our sense that they need to be answered.

First, as we stated at the beginning of Chapter III, our information about local CD peacetime activities is heavily weighted toward small cities and towns. It needs to be balanced by data on the larger cities.
The particular question that needs to be asked is whether there are serious problems of scale in developing peacetime uses for CD capabilities, and whether OCD can or should offer special assistance to larger cities in overcoming such problems.

Second, our contacts were restricted to CD units which are already engaged in peacetime services. If, in fact, there are considerable numbers of local units which retain a narrow construction of their mission and are effective in performing that mission, the picture we present in this report would require modification.

Third, OCD should be studying actual cases of CD response in local peacetime emergencies. The argument that exercise of capabilities in peacetime improves preparedness for a nuclear attack has as a companion-piece the argument that theoretical knowledge about responding to a nuclear attack can be enhanced by careful study of response to peacetime emergencies.

A second type of research involves development of materials useful to local CD in performing peacetime roles. In Chapter V, we suggested that well-staged simulation of complex peacetime emergencies is a useful means for persuading local officials that an agency for coordinating emergency operations is desirable. We also suggested that CD units which aspire to an emergency operations coordination role need careful instruction, and that they should perhaps be taught to view the pursuit of their goal as a campaign involving a definable set and sequence of tactical problems. The development of instructional materials of this sort (and of prototype scenarios for various complex peacetime emergency situations), may deserve more attention than it has yet received.
VII. An OCD Invention

Our study has been addressed to the question of how OCD can assist local CD in improving its capabilities by the performance of peacetime services. However, in the course of our work, we developed a strong appreciation of the concept of the Emergency Operations Center. While this concept may be regarded as an OCD "invention," we suggested in Chapter I that perhaps adoption of the invention need not be restricted to cities and towns whose civil defense officials have the qualities of mind and temperament that are required to turn the concept into an actuality. In addition to giving maximum support to local CD leaders who appear qualified to assume the role of coordinating their community's response to emergencies, OCD may wish to consider means for giving this "invention" to the governments of states, cities, towns, or counties where the CD units are clearly not competent to assume this role.
ERRATUM

The title of the abstract on the last page just before the back cover page should read:

INCREASING PEACETIME UTILITY OF CIVIL DEFENSE

instead of the title now printed.
Using opinion poll data and information about current peacetime activities of local civil defense units (primarily in smaller cities), this study lists, categorizes, and evaluates possible peacetime roles for civil defense, considers potential risks in assuming and performing these roles, and suggests appropriate supportive functions for OCD. The study tentatively differentiates 3 types of local CD units on the basis of present capabilities, and suggests that upgrading these capabilities requires a responsive differentiation strategy for OCD assistance.
Scenario for postattack social reorganization.
Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y. 31 March 71.
DAHC20-71-C-0217. Work Unit 2615A.

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