EFFICIENCY REPORT INFLATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF U.S. ARMY AND SELECTED FOREIGN MILITARY
OFFICER EVALUATION SYSTEMS

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by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

Efficiency report inflation has been a significant problem in the U.S. Army for more than 40 years. In 1945, 99 per cent of the officer corps were receiving one of the two top ratings on the evaluative scale. Inflation has been partially responsible for the frequent changes in officer efficiency report (OER) format in recent years. Since the inflationary phenomenon hampers accurate identification of future leaders from the standpoint of comparative value and impinges on efficient management of officer assets, any easement of inflationary pressure can serve to improve personnel management within the U.S. Army.

To gain an appreciation of the inflation problem, isolate causal factors, and develop possible means of combating the problem, research was conducted in two broad areas. First, the history of the U.S. Army OER system was studied, including a survey of contemporary thought on the subject. A large segment of the Class of 1971 of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College was asked to complete a questionnaire as part of the contemporary survey. Historical review revealed that inflation has not always been
associated with the OER system of the U.S. Army. It also indicated that measures adopted to control inflation have been largely ineffective.

The second approach to research centered on evaluation of the OER systems currently in use by eight foreign military establishments. Research in this area proceeded from the premise that the military environment acts to shape the performance appraisal process. For this reason, investigation included analysis of the military framework associated with each OER system. The systems of the Canadian Forces, the French Army, the British Army, and the West German Armed Forces were singled out for primary analysis. The other four systems, covered in less detail, were those of the Australian Army, the Israeli Armed Forces, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces, and the Yugoslav Armed Forces. In-depth interviews of senior foreign officers served as a key source of information in pursuing this portion of the research effort.

By comparison, efficiency report inflation was found to be much less pronounced in most of the foreign systems studied than in the U.S. Army's system. Almost all of the systems were found to employ measures specifically designed to control inflation. In addition to methodology calculated to reduce inflation, some less tangible factors, such as an
officer corps conditioned by tradition to accept realistic 
ratings, appear to influence the level of inflation. A 
total of basic techniques for controlling inflation were 
identified through review of foreign systems, most of them 
as yet untried by the U.S. Army.

The French Army is free of an OER inflation problem 
because of the forced ranking and forced distribution tech-
niques being used. Canadian Forces have achieved control 
over inflation through application of firm centralized 
monitorship of the OER system. All eight foreign systems 
surveyed tie rating authority to command authority. In 
addition, five of the systems limit rating authority to 
field grade officers as a means of insuring that only expe-
rienced officers are entrusted with this responsibility.

Three basic conclusions of the research are that 
inflation can be controlled, the administrative environment 
within which the efficiency report operates is at least as 
important as performance appraisal techniques used, and 
certain foreign military OER techniques should be considered 
for adoption by the U.S. Army. The more critical of several 
specific recommendations are (1) limit rating authority to 
officers occupying field grade positions, (2) design OER 
format and processing to make maximum use of automatic data 
processing, (3) impose administrative discipline through
establishment of a central monitoring office at Department of the Army level, (4) provide for adjustment of ratings at Department of the Army level based on knowledge of rating trends and rater standards, (5) require commanders to monitor all reports initiated within their immediate commands, and (6) emphasize objectivity and integrity of reporting.

If any overall lesson can be gleaned from this study, it would probably be that the key to inflation control lies primarily in the administrative sector. Rather than becoming ensconced in performance appraisal methodology, greater stress needs to be given to how an OER system is administered.
PREFACE

This thesis was based on the assumptions that the officer efficiency report (OER) should serve as a means of discriminating among successful officers and that inflation of ratings diminishes its effectiveness in achieving this objective. Comparative value is viewed as the most desirable use of the OER, as opposed to a measure of absolute quality.

Even so, the present OER can be considered a relatively effective instrument in measuring absolute quality for the purpose of identifying ineffective officers for elimination.

This research would not have been possible without the encouragement and support of a number of people. I am especially indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Francis W. Craig, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, who gave me access to his personal files and provided expert advice throughout the research effort. Mrs. Gerda L. Freeman of Military Review provided key assistance in translation of foreign documents during the early stages of the research, and without that assistance research
would have been significantly delayed.

A number of foreign officers at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College gave freely of their time in interpreting various aspects of their OER systems and military organizations. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the liaison officers for their patience in discussing innumerable items of information and in ferreting out important documentation. They were Colonel S. T. Baldry, British Army; Colonel Hans Link, West German Armed Forces; Colonels N. Matsura and Misao Matsumoto, Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces; Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Cowan, Canadian Forces; and Lieutenant Colonel M. Maze, French Army. Student officers who provided valuable assistance were Colonel Jacob Shat-Ran, Israeli Armed Forces; Lieutenant Colonel John Essex-Clark, Australian Army; Lieutenant Colonel Dusan M. Divjak, Yugoslav Armed Forces; and Captain Etienne Renard, French Army.

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R. L. D.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Phenomenon of OER Inflation

Lieutenant Colonel Rajendra Singh, in an article on efficiency reporting in the Indian Army, made reference to Red Tabs and Bowler Hats, the latter being given traditionally to those officers attending staff college who demonstrate little tactical expertise. The Red Tabs are representative of those officers who are well schooled in their profession and competent to perform field duties. The U.S. Army officer efficiency report system (OERS), as seems to have been the case with the Indian Army system, is presently feeling the strain of a chronic inflation problem. In essence, it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate the Red Tabs from the Bowler Hats.

Inflation, as applied to performance appraisal, can be defined as the tendency to rate an inordinately large percentage of a group at or near the top of the performance

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pyramid. Such inflation has been likened to the type of inflation that has beset the dollar. As it progresses, the value of the instrument, whether it be a monetary unit or an efficiency report, declines in value.

Some behavioral scientists tend to consider inflation a universal problem and an inevitable by-product of any evaluation system. A review of current literature on the subject indicated that inflation and the evaluative process tend to go hand in hand. Of 98 primary information sources used in developing this research report, sources which covered both the military and the civilian sectors, a total of 69 alluded either directly or indirectly to the inflation problem.

Inflation has not always been associated with the officer efficiency report (OER) in the U.S. Army. For example, about 75 per cent of all captains in 1922 received ratings of less than excellent. Less than 5 per cent of them received the top rating of "superior" and only about 22 per cent received an "excellent" rating (second from the top). This breakout resulted in a typical Gaussian distribution.

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(distribution) curve. After 1924 the inflation problem became more apparent year by year, and, by 1945, 99 per cent of the officer corps was receiving one of the top two ratings. The inflation situation had become so grave by the outbreak of World War II that the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, could not rely on efficiency reports to select general officers.

Many new report forms have been fielded over the years, each heralded as a panacea to the problem of OER inflation. Six different efficiency report forms have been used since 1947, each lasting about four years.

The present level of inflation is such that the ability of the OERS to discriminate between officers is largely illusory. Brigadier General J. M. Gibson, Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), has said:

> It is well known throughout the service that the current Efficiency Report System has been grossly inflated. Because there is so little difference between reports, they have become almost valueless as a tool for

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personnel management.\(^5\)

General Gibson's view receives support from many quarters and reflects the apparent lack of confidence in the system. An infantry colonel wrote a letter to Army Times last year in which he said:

> The present Officers' Efficiency Report is useless as a tool for efficient career management and meaningful assignments. In fact, I have tried hard to come up with any reason for its continued use and can't.\(^6\)

Not all officers are quite so impassioned as the infantry colonel in their assessment of the present system, but there appears to be an overwhelming consensus that the system is both inflated and in trouble. Most of those officers at the USACGSC who responded to a questionnaire on this subject in February 1971 considered inflation either a significant problem or the single most important problem.

Based on consultation with responsible personnel at Department of the Army, inflation continues to be a major problem. Because release of statistics in this area would tend to build further inflation, statistics could not be.


made available for use in this report. However, review of
- certain statistics suggested that the present inflation
- problem approaches the magnitude of past trends.

The fact that the officer corps assigns credence to
inflation creates psychological overtones that erode confi-
dence in personnel evaluation and selection procedures.
This loss of confidence in the system represents a side
effect almost as deleterious as the inflation itself.

**Purpose of the Research**

Research proceeded from the basic premise, founded
on preliminary empirical data, that the inflationary ten-
dency can be checked. Two principal hypotheses that under-
girded the pursuit of this research are:

1. A brief historical survey of U.S. Army OERS,
with focus on the inflationary tendency, can serve to illu-
minate the problem and facilitate the search for a solution.

2. Evaluation of foreign army OERS may serve to
identify principles and techniques which can be effectively

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7 LTC Roy Clark, Chief, Officer Efficiency Report
Branch, Office of The Adjutant General, Department of the
Army, telephone interview, 28 December 1970.

8 Officer Efficiency Report Systems (OERS) Study
Group, "The Officer Efficiency Reporting System, OERS" (Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, Classification and Standards
employed in combating efficiency report inflation in the
U.S. Army.

Any improvement in the OERS will benefit the Army in
terms of more accurate identification of future leaders and
also in terms of improved management of officer assets.
Officers possessing high potential must be identified at a
relatively early point in their career pattern if the lead-
ership needs of the future are to be met. The new volunteer
army concept also impacts in this area. Basically, the U.S.
Army is too large an institution not to have an effective
form of efficiency reporting. Whereas a small military
organization can effectively rely on direct observation and,
to some extent, reputation, large organizations must rely on
a more standard system to provide equity for all. Any
research that serves to ameliorate or resolve the inflation
problem can be extremely worthwhile.

**Approach Used To Conduct Research**

All available historical resources were surveyed for
information related to OER inflation, its causes, and
effects. Information relative to the present OERS, as well
as pending changes, was obtained from the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army.
A "confidence" survey designed to elicit views on efficiency
report inflation and means of countering it was administered to a random sampling of students at the USACGSC. The comments received tended to provide a profile on contemporary thinking among the officer students. Because of their value, a compendium of selected comments is appended to this research report.

A number of interviews were conducted with Allied representatives at the USACGSC from Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, Israel, Japan, West Germany, and Yugoslavia. Use of a standard interview procedure in conducting primary interviews allowed for analysis of all such data in juxtaposition. All available documentary information on specific foreign OERS was assembled. Since only limited documentation was available from local library sources, most of the documentary information developed was gleaned from foreign sources and, in some cases, entailed a translation effort.

In developing information on foreign efficiency report systems, the military framework and psychology surrounding a system were considered as important as a basic understanding of administrative procedures. After preliminary investigation, four foreign systems were singled out for primary review—the Canadian, French, West German, and British systems. Each military organization selected has a
well-developed military tradition and is presently employing efficiency report procedures designed to control inflation. Additionally, none of their control devices are presently being utilized with the U.S. Army system.

Each of the four foreign systems selected has unique qualities that contributed to its selection. The Canadian Forces use procedures designed to insure stringent centralized monitorship to control inflation. The French system was found to differ from all others in that it uses both forced ranking and forced distribution techniques. British Army policies to control inflation tend to be subtle and outside the realm of administrative policy. The West German report has been in effect only about a year and employs some innovative inflationary controls that have not been previously examined.

A brief survey of professional literature on the subject of performance appraisal was conducted to diagram common methodology associated with personnel evaluation systems. This was considered necessary to establish a common basis for understanding. Finally, a comparative analysis of efficiency report systems and historical data led to a series of conclusions and recommendations.
Performance appraisal techniques are currently used by virtually all large business concerns and military organizations. Techniques have grown increasingly sophisticated during the past 50 years, and extensive research has been undertaken to develop improved methods. The movement toward a scientific approach, with its attendant need to adopt formalized means of evaluating individual members of the work force, has paralleled the growth in size of large business organizations. The same has been true of the U.S. Army.

Many of the methods of performance appraisal developed over the years were designed to increase objectivity by minimizing the tendency to be lenient in evaluating subordinates. Some of the more common definitions and techniques associated with performance appraisal are examined below.

**Definition of Terms**

**Performance appraisal.** --Performance appraisal can be
defined as a systematic evaluation of an individual by his superior or some other qualified person to measure performance and other indicators against certain established criteria. The results of the evaluation are normally used to determine eligibility for promotion, potential value to the organization, and other factors tailored to the nature of the employment. In the U.S. Army, for example, officer efficiency reports (OER) provide a measure of an officer's overall value to the service and information essential to his career development, including duty assignments.

Validity and reliability.--Validity, as applied to performance appraisal, is the ability of the rating to measure that which it is intended to measure. If the performance appraisal system is able to deliver a consistently valid measurement over an extended period of time, it can be classed as reliable. In 1953 The Adjutant General's Office issued the following comment about validity as it applies to an efficiency reporting system:

If an efficiency report system results in ratings which truly reflect differences among the ratees in their overall performance, and if it does this in the fairest possible manner, minimizing the number of individual

1Department of the Army, Officer Efficiency Reports, AR 623-105 (March 1970), p. 1.
injustices, it may be considered a valid system.\(^2\)

Human prejudices and biases influence the validity of an appraisal system. Robert N. McMurry isolated 16 distinct sources of human error that commonly act to dilute the validity of merit rating programs. Among them are "lack of uniform criteria or standards of performance from rater to rater" and the "halo effect," wherein "if the man is liked, he is seen as excelling in every trait; if disliked, as deficient in every trait."\(^3\) Because the sources of error McMurry identified provide an insight into those human factors that produce inaccurate and inflated ratings, his complete listing is given in Appendix A.

Acceptability.—To be acceptable, both rater and ratee must be receptive to, and have confidence in, the appraisal system being used. The U.S. Army has placed great emphasis on this factor in design of all recent officer efficiency report systems (OERS).


Rating feedback.--Rating feedback refers to information that filters to both the rater and the ratee concerning the quality of the rating given. In some cases it may let the rater know how he rates in relation to other rating officials and where his ratings place subordinates on the distribution curve. From the ratee's standpoint, it provides an index as to how well he is doing in relation to his contemporaries.

Feedback can be either formal or informal. A recent case study involving a large technology-based civilian company provides an example of informal feedback. The work force quickly learned that those employees who were called into the supervisor's office on the first Friday of each month were receiving raises. They also deduced quickly that the raises were going to those rated highest by management, thus giving all an indication of where they stood in relation to others. A good example of a formal system is that used by the French Army. An officer's roster published annually indicates each officer's ranking in his branch.

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5 LTC M. Maze, French Army Liaison Officer to USACGSC, personal interviews, 12 November 1970, 10 February 1971, and 1 & 13 April 1971.
Feedback is not always encouraged. For some time now it has been a matter of policy in the U.S. Army to avoid feedback. This policy stems from the fear that if such feedback were provided, raters would become even more lenient.  

**Evaluative Techniques**

**Forced ranking.**--The term "forced ranking" as used here can also be referred to as the "rank order technique." This method of performance appraisal requires the rater to list all ratees in relative order of merit, placing the best man at the top of the list. This procedure forces the rater to assign each ratee to a different position on the rating scale, thus theoretically eliminating the possibility of rater leniency. Performance ranking has been gaining in popularity in recent years because it insures that subordinates are evaluated and rewarded differentially. 

It can be shown that in actual practice this device is not always effective. Examples of both successful and unsuccessful application of this technique to officer efficiency reporting systems are outlined in subsequent chapters.

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7 Thompson and Dalton, p. 151.
The U.S. Army eliminated the forced ranking concept from its OERS in October 1969 because it had been so highly unpopular among the officer corps. The French, Japanese, and West German officer evaluation systems presently employ the forced ranking technique.

**Forced distribution technique.**—The forced distribution technique is closely allied with that of forced ranking. The difference lies in the fact that the first-mentioned does not require an absolute ordering of ratees, only that the results follow a normal distribution curve. In effect, only a limited number of employees may be given the highest and the lowest ratings, with the preponderance of the ratees being placed at the scale's midpoint. This "forcing" of a normal distribution curve markedly reduces the inflationary tendency. A performance appraisal expert underscored the advantages of this system when he wrote:

> This method is very simple—perhaps the simplest of all merit rating systems. But its simplicity is based on the fact that very extensive statistical work with a variety of more complicated systems has shown that it not only gives all results yielded by more complicated systems but gives the results with even greater reliability.\(^8\)

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The forced distribution technique, as in the case with other methods that force discrimination between individuals, can be rather unpopular. A few years ago a large civilian company adopted it to insure that the distribution curve did not become skewed toward the high end of the scale. Managers and supervisors were instructed that the average rating in each department (about 50 engineers) was expected to remain at 40 on the reporting scale. For a number of reasons employee morale and productivity plummeted. One supervisor summed up the situation this way:

Unfortunately, under the new . . . system, we have to tell one-half of our engineers that they are below average. After we tell a man his score is below 40 [average], he won't do anything for a month. He stewed over the low rating, and he may even take a few days sick leave, even though he's not physically sick.¹

Only the French efficiency report system presently uses this procedure, and, from all indications, successfully.

Forced choice technique.---The U.S. Army introduced the forced choice method of performance appraisal following World War II, but the officer corps did not accept it. A forced choice rating scale is typically a checklist consisting of a series of blocks of short descriptive statements, two to six per block. The rater must identify those

¹Thompson and Dalton, p. 152.
statements which are the most and the least descriptive of the ratee. Figure 1 is an example from the only recent U.S. Army OER that used this method, DA Form 67-1 (1947).

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<th>Most Descriptive</th>
<th>Least Descriptive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Blames others for his mistakes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Always demands strict discipline.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Excellent at constructive criticism.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Hesitant about rendering decisions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Example of Forced Choice Technique

Much has been written about this technique, and during the period it was in vogue the Army assembled a considerable amount of statistical data on it. These statistics clearly indicate that the forced choice technique tends to provide greater discrimination than traditional systems. This appears to result from the fact that the rating official does not have complete control of the evaluative aspect of the scale. In effect, the rater does not know for sure which response in a given rating block will

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yield the maximum score. This same aspect resulted in the unwillingness of the officer corps to accept the system. Raters had no way of knowing the level of rating being given and they did not even know whether they were rating subordinates in the upper or lower half of all personnel. The Adjutant General's scoring key was a closely guarded secret.

**Paired comparison scale.** The paired comparison scale, one of the earliest systematic methods, requires the rater to list the names of all the persons he is rating and then arrange them so that every ratee is compared with all other persons in the group. The rater indicates which ratee is best in each comparison until each ratee has been compared with all other ratees. The number of times the ratee was selected as best in these comparisons is then tabulated. Those personnel evaluated are then ranked in order of merit based on the score received.

Paired comparison has rarely been used. Among its several disadvantages is the fact it is time-consuming and the rating process has been considered wearying to the rater. The involved nature of this system can be seen in

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the fact that a superior would need to make 576 separate
decisions to evaluate 25 subordinates. The feasibility of
adapting this system to a large population, such as the
officer corps of the U.S. Army, seems highly questionable.

Narrative report technique.--As the name suggests,
the narrative report technique allows for open-ended remarks.
It can take one of two forms. On the one hand, remarks can
be controlled through stipulation of what must be covered in
the narrative. The West German OERS establishes very tight
constraints in this respect. When no restrictions are
placed on what must appear in the narrative, it can be
called a "free-written rating."

The narrative technique has the advantage of allow-
ing for a candid portrait of the officer outside the bounds
of restrictive graphic rating scales. This system is gener-
ally considered to be a useful adjunct to other rating
techniques.

The narrative type report also has some liabilities.
First, the method does not lend itself to any form of
expression in numerical terms. Second, the remarks can be
subject to misinterpretation. Not everyone can write well.
Two remarks taken from actual efficiency reports underscore
this problem: "Maintains good relations unilaterally" and
"His leadership is outstanding except for the ability to get along with subordinates."\textsuperscript{12}

The Personnel Research Laboratory of the Air Force Systems Command conducted a study to see if a word-picture checklist could be substituted for the narrative portion of the Air Force Officer Effectiveness Report. The study determined that it is feasible to replace the narrative with a checklist. Initial reaction of the users (raters) on two separate administrations of the checklist instrument revealed that approximately 60 per cent of more than 1,000 officers would recommend or strongly recommend adoption.\textsuperscript{13}

**Critical incident technique.**--The critical incident technique was developed by the American Institute for Research and was once used by the U.S. Air Force as part of the officer effectiveness report. The term "critical incident" refers to means by which statements of behavior are elicited. The starting point in the process is to develop a series of behavioral statements that have meaning in terms of either effectiveness or ineffectiveness. The rating officials are then instructed to observe the behavior of

\textsuperscript{12} Lawshe, Kephart, and McCormick, p. 220.

\textsuperscript{13} HRB-Singer, Inc., "A Word Picture Checklist for Officer Effectiveness Reports" (Lackland Air Force Base, Tex., November 1964), p. 3.
subordinates and rate them on the basis of the statements.

Figure 2 shows one of the areas evaluated with this now-defunct Air Force OERS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintaining Relations with Subordinates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was unable to control his subordinates because of excessive social familiarity with them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintained discipline and the respect due an officer in his position with difficulty because of undue familiarity with subordinates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintained friendly relations with subordinates without loss of discipline or the respect due his position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated with subordinates in a manner which added to their respect for him as a superior officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attained a high level of discipline and respect from subordinates through his friendly but reserved conduct toward them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Example of An Area Evaluated by Critical Incident Technique

Advocates of this appraisal device contend it reduces rater bias since the rating official merely selects the appropriate behavioral statement and is not required to

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14 Officer Efficiency Report Systems (OERS) Study Group [hereinafter referred to as OERS Study Group], "The Officer Efficiency Reporting System, OERS" (Washington:
render an evaluation. It can be argued, on the other hand, that the rater knows the thrust of the behavioral statements and can select those which bias the result. Further, the superior's repeated observation of an employee may tend to cause the employee to alter his behavior when the supervisor is present. The most significant disadvantage, however, falls in the area of observed behavior which, over a period of time, will tend to reflect different behavioral statements. The critical incident technique would seem to be basically unsuitable for a military environment.

**Multilevel ratings.**—Multilevel ratings serve to supplement the supervisor's evaluation with information from other sources. At its extreme, this method uses a 3-dimensional rating system which includes superior, subordinates, and peers. Since the ratee tends to be perceived somewhat differently by each of them, using either two or three collectively would provide a multidimensional picture of the person evaluated.

Peer ratings for determining leadership potential have been a part of the evaluative process at the United States Military Academy (USMA) for many years and have

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Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Classification and Standards Division, 1969), p. 3-15.
proved to be quite accurate in predicting career success. One observation made by a USMA survey of peer rating in 1947 was that it takes tactical officers four months to be able to evaluate students as successfully as peer raters can after only one month.\textsuperscript{15} There seems to be a strong consensus among behavioral scientists that peer ratings have considerable value. The questionnaire survey this writer administered to more than 200 officer students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in February 1971 revealed a majority of the sampling as unwilling to accept a peer rating system.

The use of subordinate ratings garners even less support than the peer rating technique. However, subordinate ratings are considered to have some value.

\textbf{Graphic evaluation scales.}--The graphic type rating involves the listing of personal qualities or traits, with the rater checking off the appropriate adjectival or numerical value assigned to each. This is one of the most common methods of appraisal presently in use. The type of entries used reflect the nature of the occupation involved and the values associated with it. The current U.S. Army OER lists 24 personal qualities that are generally accepted as

\textsuperscript{15}OERS Study Group, p. 3-24.
attributes of leadership (e.g., initiative). The number of specific traits listed in an OER varies widely. The current West German report lists 30, whereas the Israeli report lists only 6.

Major O. J. O'Brien of the Royal Australian Infantry recently studied this aspect of performance appraisal in comparing the number and type of personal qualities used in the OERS of principal Commonwealth countries. He concluded that the specificity of such items is of high importance. The listing of too many traits in a performance appraisal tends to encourage the halo effect, but the number of qualities listed can sometimes be reduced through the use of more specific entries. The OERS study conducted in 1969 suggests that future research will strive to reduce the number of traits to be considered on a reporting form.

Some behavioral scientists argue that there is a tendency to place too much emphasis on personal qualities at the expense of criteria that measure efficiency. Care must be exercised in the selection of traits to be evaluated in order to insure balanced measurement. In addressing the

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17 OERS Study Group, p. 3-7.
U.S. Army War College 1968 class, Colonel E. D. Bryson made some rather pithy remarks on the use of personal qualities as an index to competence and future success. He said:

Many of our leadership selection procedures now are based on the personnel research done 30 or 40 years ago. At that time the "trait theory" was in vogue. We looked at characteristics or personal qualities like appearance, ambition, dependability, force, adaptability, tact, moral courage . . . Somehow, the theory went, if a man had, or could develop, these personal qualities, he should be considered for leadership jobs. There's an interesting aspect of evaluative research on this theory. It has to do with measuring the relationship between various character traits and a criterion of success. Do you know what correlates highest with fast promotion and attainment of high rank? [Referring to an evaluative research study in industry,] I hate to tell you, but it is not what we say we're looking for. It is a lack of personal integrity as reflected in family difficulties. Delinquent kids. Divorcing your wife. Having a mistress.18

Trends

As can be seen from the various techniques explained above, a number of measurement devices have been developed in the field of performance appraisal. Only the more common ones have been presented here. There are a number of new devices being experimented with in industry which may ultimately prove of value. Performance appraisal in a

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scientific sense remains a relatively new art, and a
dynamic one. The application of computer technology may
provide for the development of more advanced forms.
CHAPTER IX

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF
U.S. ARMY OER SYSTEM

Early History (Prior to 1890)

The U.S. Army did not develop a permanent efficiency reporting system until 1890. Prior to that time evaluation of officers was sporadic, for the most part informal, and principally by way of service reputation. Patronage and nepotism were much in evidence. During most of the period before 1890 the Army remained small and there was no real need to develop a formal system of evaluation. Officers could expect to stay with the same regiment almost indefinitely, and their capabilities were well known to all members of the organization, including those able to make influence promotions. It was not uncommon for several members of a family to serve together at the same post. Nine adult members of the Custer family were with the Seventh Cavalry at the time of the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The adjutant finally refused to add more.¹

General George A. Custer, two younger brothers, a nephew, and a brother-in-law were killed in the ensuing massacre.

Nonetheless, this early period was not entirely devoid of meaningful effort to develop evaluation techniques. In 1813 the combined offices of The Adjutant General and the inspector general sent a letter to 13 regiments asking that a report be provided which assigned a relative rank by grade for all officers of the command. From all available evidence, that was the first time a forced ranking technique was used in the U.S. Army. The report was to distinguish between those officers known to be meritorious and those who fell at the opposite end of the spectrum. One commander's response "expressed a hope that his communication might remain confidential in order to avoid unpleasant feelings"\(^2\) -- a harbinger of the controversy that would develop in the 20th century regarding the propriety of not showing an officer his reports.

Although the inspector general quite often incorporated in his reports remarks concerning the quality of officers in various commands, little use was made of the information. Almost all formal evaluative effort during this

early period was concentrated on elimination of the unfit rather than on identification of officers who possessed outstanding value to the service.

Even the Civil War failed to produce any significant movement in the direction of a formal efficiency reporting system. While the number of men under arms expanded considerably, the size of the Regular Army remained basically static and service reputation and patronage still played a prime role. The Confederate Army instituted a requirement for periodic reports on all combat officers, but it was never really placed in use. This action has significance in that it was the first time any requirement for periodic officer evaluation had ever been stated in an American army.

Beginnings of a Permanent System (1890-1922)

The 1890's saw the advent of a systematic efficiency reporting system in the Army. Secretary of War Redfield Proctor issued the first directive on this subject in April 1890. In laying out the principles and aims of the efficiency reporting system, the directive noted:

A record will be kept in the War Department of the services, efficiency, and special qualifications of officers of the Army, including the condition of their

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commands and the percentages of desertion therefrom, and from further reports made for that purpose. This first annual report came in two parts, the first to be completed by the officer himself and the second by his commanding officer. It was mandatory that the commanding officer's report be shown to the rated officer when it was unfavorable.

There is evidence that as early as 1891 the problem of "hard" versus "easy" raters began to be felt, a factor closely related to the problem of efficiency report inflation. A recommendation was made that the officer in charge of the "efficiency record section be of wide personal acquaintance in order that he might give proper weight to the reports in keeping with the characters of the grading officials." There is no indication that the recommendation was favorably considered. It is interesting to note that a number of the foreign efficiency reporting systems to be evaluated in this study presently employ a technique along these lines.

By 1895 the efficiency report had attained the status of a permanent system. With each succeeding year the reports tended to become more lengthy. By 1914 the report had grown to 24 pages (4 by 8-1/2 inches, opening

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4Craig, p. III-1. 5Craig, p. III-4.
vertically). For a brief period in 1914 a forced choice type technique was employed with the efficiency report. In 1917, probably as a result of war mobilization, the report was shortened to 12 pages for the sake of simplicity.

Two overriding factors seem to have more or less dictated the acceptance of an army-wide annual efficiency reporting system by the officer corps during the period 1890-1922. The withdrawal in 1890 of officer promotion authority from the regimental commands was the first step in support of an army-wide system. President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) decided that too much political influence was creeping into the area of officer selection and promotion. He clearly enunciated officer personnel management policies that ruled out use of patronage for personal advancement, and he threw his weight behind an officer evaluation system that would be impartial and would base personnel actions on individual merit alone. If any one factor can be singled out as having been of paramount importance in the development of a viable efficiency reporting system, it would have to be Theodore Roosevelt's intervention.

6 Weigley, p. 291.

Form 67

Form 67 (initially called Form 711), an outgrowth of research conducted during World War I, was inaugurated in 1922 and marked the first use of rating scales. The same basic system, except for a major change of format in 1945, was used until 1947. The "67" number series has been used ever since. The form brought with it significant improvements over previous methodology. It also represents a milestone in that it brought the U.S. Army's efficiency reporting system to the threshold of the inflation problem that would plague it in later years.

The initial Form 67 is shown in Appendix B. During the first few years of its existence, this reporting system was highly effective in controlling inflation. Most ratings clustered around the midpoint of the scale. Between the years 1922 and 1924, however, an actual "hardening" of the system can be detected in the distribution curve. That curve reflects a significant decrease in the number of officers who received one of the two top ratings. The system reached the high-water mark of its effectiveness in 1924 and then increasingly came under the influence of inflation. 8

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Figure 3 reflects the trend toward leniency in the efficiency ratings given captains of all branches during the fiscal years between 1922 and 1941. The figure clearly shows the magnitude of the problem and how it accelerated with the passage of time. The onset of inflation seems to have been triggered in large part by the establishment of minimum rating standards for certain sought-after assignments. Raters began to rate subordinates in terms of maintaining their eligibility for such assignments.

In evaluating trends during the 25-year history of Form 67, some other interesting statistics emerged. First, a tendency toward branch bias was identified. Noncombat arms officers were likely to receive higher ratings than combat arms officers. By around 1935, the inflationary spiral had largely obliterated this phenomenon. Another trend identified was in the area of grade bias; the higher the grade of the officer, the higher the rating.

While the tendency to correlate ratings and grade levels has been found throughout the history of Form 67, grade bias has not been limited to the U.S. Army. A 1956 sampling of several thousand reports in the U.S. Marine

The Trend Toward Leniency in Officer Efficiency Reporting Efficiency
Ratings—All Captains, All Branches
Regular Army—Fiscal Years 1922–1941

Figure 3
Corps shows precisely how bias tends to follow grade structure (see Table 1). This bias contributes to inflation. While it can be argued that overall competence should naturally increase with grade, it is also theoretically true that there should be some semblance of balance (normal distribution curve) at each grade plateau. This should hold true since lieutenants are evaluated against each other, not against the officer corps at large; captains against captains; and so on up the scale.

**TABLE 1.--Grade bias**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Per Cent Outstanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular Duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Lieutenant</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Form 67 was well liked by officers in the field. Familiarity with the system through long use undoubtedly contributed to its popularity. However, the primary factor
in its popularity seems to have been the high assurance of a good rating.

By World War II Form 67 had become largely useless. Personnel selection boards, including those for general officer selection, could no longer depend on efficiency reports to identify the top caliber officers. Personal knowledge of officer capabilities, by reason of necessity, became a key index in determining officer promotability. In essence, the old service reputation concept was reasserting itself. It can be hypothesized that the temporary return to a dependence on service reputation contributed to the large number of officers from the 1915 class of the United States Military Academy who became general officers, a case of success by association.

Subsequent Forms 67

As may be seen in Appendix C, DA Form 67-1, adopted in 1947, marked a major departure from previous systems. First and foremost, it used the graphic scale in tandem with the forced choice technique. This form, which received field testing prior to formal adoption, was the first efficiency report form to be validated and standardized. For the purposes of checking validity, in 1946 more than 7,700 officers were asked to complete both Form 67 and the
proposed DA Form 67-1. To establish a criterion for measuring the comparative validity of the two forms, superiors, subordinates, and associates of each rated officer rendered an evaluation. The average score resulting from these ratings became the criterion for validity. Table 2 shows the degree of correlation between each evaluation form and the established criterion.

**TABLE 2.--Comparative validity of Form 67 and proposed DA Form 67-1 in April 1946.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Sample 1 (N = 4,208)</th>
<th>Sample 2 (N = 3,563)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Form 67</td>
<td>DA Form 67-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Lieutenant</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It can be seen that DA Form 67-1 generally demonstrated a greater degree of validity than Form 67. This OERS (officer efficiency report system) also produced a distribution pattern that closely approximated a normal
Bell curve. Scores were standardized in the sense that meaning was attached to the raw scores obtained, something that had never been done with Form 67. From a validity point of view and the standpoint of improved differentiation and reduced inflation, DA Form 67-1 showed great promise. In terms of acceptability to the officer corps, it was a failure. As mentioned in Chapter II, neither the rater nor the ratee had any real way of knowing what value was being placed on a particular rating.

As a consequence, DA Form 67-2 (see Appendix D) made its appearance in 1950. Like DA Form 67-1, it was standardized, but no effort was made to validate it. Even more significantly, and in spite of the problems with the previous form, no action was taken through field testing to determine its acceptability to the officer corps.

One highly significant aspect of the system under DA Form 67-2 was use for the first time of an overall efficiency index (OEI) covering a 5-year period. The OEI was basically a method of averaging reports rendered by


different rating officials. It had been found that averaging was the best way of differentiating between officers since it offset the problem of rater differences. This procedure, of course, would facilitate the rank ordering of officers for promotion purposes; however, the technique needs to be kept in perspective. It would not serve to ameliorate an inflation problem, only to establish an arithmetic method of separating officers on the scale. The averaging of scores over an extended period of time has obvious value, but, given a highly inflated overall rating pattern, its value would seem to be somewhat limited.

Considerable fanfare accompanied the introduction in 1953 of DA Form 67-3, reproduction of which is included in this thesis as Appendix E. Since it had been determined that acceptability by the officer corps must be achieved, "it was decided to permit the officer corps to construct their own form to a large degree." The end result was that the new form represented only a modification of the preceding one. The new form was validated in a manner similar to that used before the adoption of DA Form 67-1.

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is a strong suggestion, however, that much more weight was placed on the acceptability issue than on the capability of the form to deliver an objective measurement.

DA Form 67-4, adopted three years later, was also a basic revision of DA Form 67-2 (see Appendix F). The OEI base was extended from five to seven years "to lessen the impact of extreme reports and to predict an officer's true efficiency more clearly."14

The development of DA Form 67-5 was undertaken in 1958, with the report going into army-wide use in 1961 (see Appendix G). The need for the new system paralleled the rationale governing previous changes in the "67" series. It had been determined that DA Form 67-4 was losing ground in both validity and acceptability.15 The new system did away with the OEI concept and substituted an annual numerical score, dropping the standard scoring scale in the process. The composite numerical score which the rater and the indorser entered on each form became the basis for the annual numerical score. As a safeguard against hard and


easy raters, rating officials had to furnish factual support for each award of the highest and lowest numerical rating. A mandatory counseling requirement was prescribed and it was also decided that officers would not be shown their reports. This efficiency report, like its predecessors, ultimately fell victim to inflation. The no-show policy was subject to frequent attacks by the officer corps, a factor which unquestionably lessened its acceptability.

Present Efficiency Report System

DA Form 67-6, in use since 1968, represents a departure from past policies and procedures (see Appendix II). Most of the changes were cosmetic rather than substantive in nature. As an example, the space allocated on the form for narrative remarks was reduced in size in the interest of de-emphasizing the importance of this particular element. Rating officials were enjoined to confine their remarks to the space provided, instructions a sizable number of rating officials have chosen to ignore. On the other hand, some rating officials, because of misinterpretation of the regulation, initially chose to leave this portion of the report blank. That problem, according to an Army Times

16 Department of the Army, Officer Efficiency Reports, AR 623-105 (March 1970), p. 4-6.
article in the fall of 1968, was later corrected.17

One important feature of the system initially was the use of a forced ranking scale that required both the rater and the indorser to rank the officer among officers of the same grade "performing similar functions." Rating officials were also required to show the placement of all officers being compared in one of five rating blocks ranging from "top" to "bottom 5th." This technique was designed to present a picture of the standards of the rating officials. The forced ranking system proved highly ineffective. Sample surveys showed that about 40 per cent of the raters found reasons not to complete the rank-order portion of the report and 43 per cent of the remainder ranked the officer either "1" or "2" of "x" number of officers.18 In effect, each officer, at time of evaluation, suddenly ranked at the very top of his peer group.

Forced ranking also encountered high-level resistance in the field. Major General Charles P. Stone, while commanding the 4th Infantry Division in Vietnam (1968),


refused to enter a ranking for officers he evaluated and stated in the narrative portion of each report that he considered such a ranking meaningless. According to Shoemaker, one major failing of the forced ranking technique was that "almost every rater had a different idea of which subordinates had to be grouped together for comparison." 19

Bowing to an acute acceptability problem, the rank-ordering portion of the report was discontinued in October 1969, but the requirement to list officers in one of the five rating blocks with peers was retained. Since an asterisk is used to indicate in which block the rated officer falls, this technically constitutes retention of a forced ranking technique. In practice, it does not work out that way since many raters place all of the rated officer's peers in the top block, thus obscuring the relative merit of the rated officer among his contemporaries.

Originally, the intent was to commit Part XII of the report form, which covered forced ranking, to computer tape so that a running average of annual average scores (AAS) on past reports rendered by each rater and indorser could be developed. Based on what that average turned out to be, each report rendered by that officer would be stamped to

reflect his standards (high, medium, or low). This approach never materialized.

The administrative procedures for the present report specify that the normal rating period for a company grade officer will be at least 60 days, with 90 days being the standard for field grade officers. As in the past, reports must be forwarded to The Adjutant General not later than 45 days after the ending day of the report. It is significant to note that a major problem confronting the present system is late reporting. In calendar year 1969, approximately 36 per cent of the reports received at Department of the Army exceeded the 45-day deadline, and 10 per cent of those were received 16 to 45 days late. During November 1969, the worse month, 48 per cent were received late. These figures are a sign of poor administrative discipline and they suggest that the overall environment in which the OER (officer efficiency report) operates fosters something less than conscientious reporting.

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Movement Toward a New System

Several problems have developed with the present OER. First, it has poor discrimination characteristics, that is, the inflation problem. Secondly, it lacks a scoring system. No action is presently being taken to develop trend statistics; each OER stands by itself. This poses a problem in securing operating statistics for users. Further, the present OER is considered to be overweighted in that it is used for too many purposes, such as assignments, schooling, and promotions. There is a long term move afoot to fragment the OER, specific formats being used for specific purposes. In the case of promotion consideration, an IBM card might be completed by the rating official at 6-month intervals.22

A new officer efficiency reporting system is scheduled for introduction later this year. A comprehensive study was concluded in June 1969 (OERS Study Group) which provided a synopsis of all available data on the subject of efficiency reports, including a limited review of four foreign systems—those of Canada, France, Great Britain, and

22LTC Francis W. Craig, Chief, Officer Branch, Classification and Standards Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, telephone interviews, 30 December 1970, 9 February 1971, and 19 April 1971.
West Germany. By coincidence, the same foreign systems were singled out for primary treatment in this research report. A civilian expert in industrial personnel appraisal systems voluntarily participated in the 1969 study. 23

Information prepared in late 1970 by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, outlines the principal changes to be incorporated in the revised system. 24 The indorser will be removed from the report form and optional indorsing roles will be assumed by the reviewer. This change resulted from the fact that recent studies indicate the indorser adds little or nothing to the system except processing time. The sister services already use this technique and, as shown in Chapter IV of this thesis, the general trend of foreign OERS in regard to the indorser is the same.

The new form will reduce the number of rating scales to simplify its use by raters and users. Officers will be provided with a copy of the report following action by the reviewer. This will insure that the rated officer gets


24 Department of the Army, "Revision of Officer Efficiency Reporting System," Fact Sheet (Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 12 November 1970).
feedback and a yardstick against which he can measure his
career possibilities. Automation will play an increased
role in the processing of reports and, reportedly, its use
will also serve to provide feedback data for the defeat or
minimization of inflation. The forced ranking aspect of the
report will be dropped entirely.

One of the more striking features of the new report
will be the return to a scoring system and an ORI type
annual index. There are two other important changes under
consideration. First is the establishment of one central
agency to handle all matters related to officer evaluation.
At present the effort is compartmented and lacks central
direction and control. This particular change could prove
of singular importance. The second change under considera-
tion is a revision of officer evaluation instruction at
service schools. Little has been done in this area before.

Contemporary Thought

No review of the present U.S. Army OERS would be
complete without consideration of contemporary thought on
the subject, including the views of various members of the
officer corps. A brief survey here, while not necessarily
representative of the multifarious views on the subject--
everyone seems to have his own patent remedy for inflation--
should serve to highlight the environment in which the OER is presently operating.

The OERS has been subject to much introspection in recent years by both the officer corps and army planners. Based on a survey of recent literature, there is considerable dissatisfaction with the system and many novel solutions to the inflationary problem have been offered. One officer flatly suggested that the system be discontinued. A recommendation has also been made that a copy of each OER an officer renders be placed in his own official military personnel file so that selection boards can evaluate the way he rates subordinates. This suggestion, while rather intriguing, probably is not feasible from an administrative standpoint.

The major study concluded by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in 1969, previously mentioned, presents some interesting views concerning the current OERS. It determined, among other things, that lack of confidence in the system can be traced to two factors: assumed inflation and the mystique regarding scoring and selection board


Several factors were isolated in studying possible causes of inflation. One was the best qualified promotion policy, which leads rating officials to pad the report to safeguard the future of a subordinate. A second factor was a general lack of understanding of the system and the impact of a single report on an individual's career, with an inflated report being a hedge against the system. A third factor considered was the possibility that inflation may be due in part to improvement of the officer corps.

One highly significant yet basic finding of this study was that the system is based on integrity and sincerity of the officer corps and is strengthened through confidence and acceptability.

In 1968 the Franklin Institute Research Laboratory (FIRL) interviewed more than 200 junior officers on the subject of efficiency reports and promotion policies. The interviews were quite detailed and were designed to probe the innermost feelings of each respondent. Both officer efficiency reports and promotion policies were the target of a sharp attack by the junior officers contacted. Under close questioning it became evident that they were largely ignorant of how the OERS operates. Respondents labeled the

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27 OERS Study Group, pp. 1-4 & 2-2.
system "ill-conceived and ill-executed," maintaining that OERS are meaningless because ratings are inflated. Some of the officers expressed the fear that one bad report can ruin a career. The junior officers questioned strongly favored tightened procedures to weed out incompetents, and they felt that inflation has robbed the OER of its value.28

Colonel Bergen B. Hovell commented on the repetitive failure of successive OERS. He pinpointed inflation as the key problem but did not focus the blame on the system itself. He contended that correction of inherent deficiencies depends not upon the system but upon the way officials apply it, the main cause of difficulties being lack of moral courage. He wrote:

One common cause of our troubles is an inverted sense of values. As raters, we appear less anxious to do justice than to keep our subordinates happy. This is evidenced by our tendency to award them high ratings which frequently they don't deserve.29

Another significant observation in this article is Colonel Hovell's suggestion that the administrative machinery for policing implementation at lower levels is inadequate. Specifically, commanders above the reviewing officer have no

opportunity to detect inadequate reports. This particular point can be debated. To funnel reports through the command network causes some delays. On the other hand, it places commanders in a position to be responsible for insuring that the system operates effectively.

An article by Colonel Samuel H. Hays presents several meaningful thoughts. He expressed the view that the OER as presently constituted provides a weak foundation for selection, inflation again being singled out as the basic problem. He also indicated that ratings are difficult when outstanding officers are grouped in staffs, as they often are. Colonel Hays would change the system in several ways. Above all, he would take the pressure off the efficiency report by reducing its importance as a basis for selection, using instead peer ratings and tests at different stages in an officer's career. He also suggested that the orientation of the OER be modified, with emphasis on measuring performance against a specific job rather than on subjective comparison with other officers. Colonel Hays raised an issue that is being commented on with increasing frequency when he suggested that the OERS may be causing individualists and innovators to be forced out or nonselected for promotion. He said, "Selection based on subjective efficiency reports tends to exalt conformity, pleasing personality, and the
skills of communication and interpersonal manipulation."

A recent article by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Horst pinpoints some ways of upgrading the effectiveness of an OER. The author espoused the view that "the most vexing problem with today's efficiency report is inflation." He recommended what might be considered an "end run" approach to overcoming inflation. He would allow inflation to persist, defeating it by "adjusting any single numerical raw score upward or downward based upon the rating officer's rating history or rater's index." As mentioned earlier, this method was a provision that never went beyond the planning stage under the present system. Colonel Horst also proposed that two reports be used instead of one: a performance rating and a personal evaluation. The performance rating would measure the officer's overall value to the service and would be available to Department of the Army selection boards and assignment officers. The personal evaluation, on the other hand, would cover personality trait evaluation and narrative description and would not be made available to Department of the Army selection boards.


While this particular technique might elicit a more objective appraisal in the personal evaluation sector, and therefore could be considered a means of easing inflation, its degree of effectiveness is open to question. Also, it would withhold from a promotion selection board information of considerable value in its deliberations.

A firm called Special Studies, Incorporated, submitted to Department of the Army in 1966 a draft proposal which offered to design a better efficiency report system for the Army. This proposal contained the following incisive suggestion on how the system might be improved:

One important facet in the application of any appraisal system is the climate in which it is conducted. This depends on command support and not on lip service. The rater must take the system seriously and follow the rules for administration of the system. There should be no individual interpretations and adjustments to the system. We feel that by holding the rater responsible for his ratings, many problems such as inflation of ratings will be avoided. If a rater gives a high rating to an officer who later proves to be poor, then the rater's own score on ability to judge would be affected. This would also tend to eliminate hasty ratings. 

A good deal of contemporary thought has been devoted to the subject of feedback. One recommendation is that each rating official be provided with feedback showing how his scores are distributed in the total distribution of rater's

scores. This technique is similar to that being used at certain universities to assist individual professors in keeping their grading habits in line with other grading officials. Such a system has obvious value, but it would tend to exert minimum influence in controlling inflation unless inflation were already under reasonable control when the system was placed in effect.

Another area receiving increasing attention is instruction of the officer corps in rating responsibilities. Recommendations have been made that army schools include courses in the OERS, the schools to include the Command and General Staff College. This school of thought orients on the philosophy that the key to elimination of present problem areas is thorough grounding of the officer corps in all facets of officer evaluation.

The testing of officers has frequently been discussed as one means of distributing the evaluative load, thus removing some weight from the performance appraisal. This idea has been generally cast aside as too administratively cumbersome to consider. The tendency to discount the


Feasibility of such a system can be legitimately questioned. First of all, officer tests would seem to represent no greater administrative burden than that already being devoted to the enlisted MOS (military occupational specialty) evaluation program. Secondly, the armed forces of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada (until recently) have traditionally used written tests to evaluate officers.  
This aspect is covered more completely in Chapter IV, when foreign OERS are discussed.

Application of a degree of difficulty factor to officer positions is held by some to be worthy of consideration. The raw numerical score yielded by the OER would be multiplied by a degree of difficulty factor, e.g., 4.0 for a colonel serving on the Army General Staff.  
Such a system would obviously serve to increase the spread between officers on the distribution scale although it would not necessarily reduce the tendency for the curve to skew upward. A more important aspect of such a system would be the question of equity. Those fortunate enough to draw an officer billet


carrying a high point value would have an inherent advantage over officers of equal capability not fortunate enough to be available for the position when it came vacant. Such a procedure would also relegate to a second-class status a number of positions of continuing importance to the Army, e.g., service school instructor. The resulting situation would only prove disadvantageous to the Army.

One fear that seems to permeate the entire OERS is that one or two bad efficiency reports will remove an officer's chances for career success. While various Department of the Army pronouncements have set out to disprove this philosophy, it persists. The philosophy persists, and understandably so, because officers realize how inflated the system is. No amount of cajolery is going to convince them that one or two bad reports will help them to hold their own with contemporaries when it comes time for promotion consideration. As one infantry colonel put it when discussing this aspect of the system, "The frightening thing about the whole mess is that all of the officers that I know don't trust the present system." 37

Major Peter M. Dawkins expressed the same concern in this way:

In the Army with our rigidly stratified rank and "Lord Kammelroy" outlook on efficiency reports, the punishment for failure is convenient to invoke and readily applicable to all... It would appear important, indeed vital, that a greater value be placed upon imaginative and resourceful effort, along with a diminished concern for dossiers of spotless "report cards." Only in this way can we expect men of initiative and vision to emerge in positions of responsibility and trust throughout the Army. Why? Simply because no man, no matter how talented or inspired, is perfect. If he is to pursue a bold and vigorous path rather than one of conformity and acquiescence, he will sometimes err. Greatness can ultimately succeed only if such men are granted the freedom to fail.38

Survey of USACGSC Students

A questionnaire survey was administered during February 1971 to students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC). For all practical purposes it was a "confidence" survey designed to add depth to the study of contemporary thought while providing an index of officer satisfaction with the present OERS. Some of the questions were framed to assess the acceptability of various techniques that might be used to modify the system. Students were encouraged to express their feelings on the subject of officer evaluation, and more than one-fourth of those responding availed themselves of this opportunity. This level of response can be reasonably interpreted as a

reflection of officer interest in the subject area. A copy of the questionnaire, a detailed summary of results, and a compendium of student comments are presented in Appendixes I, J, and K, respectively.

To insure a representative sampling, a questionnaire was sent to every fifth U.S. Army officer of the 1,224 in the Class of 1971, USACGSC. Names were selected from the official class roster. Since some officer branches had only one or two in attendance, additions were made to insure that members of all branches were given the opportunity to respond. While the design of the sample group could have provided for a weighted balance between branches, this was not considered necessary in that the overall group could be considered largely homogeneous in educational background, military schooling, and career experience. The sampling consisted of 247 officer students, and 208 (84 per cent) responded. All branches were covered by the response except the Chaplains Corps, the Judge Advocate General's Corps, the Veterinary Corps, and the Civil Affairs Branch (currently found only in the reserves), each having less than three officers in the class. More than one-half of the respondents had completed in excess of 20 efficiency reports during the past 10 years. The more significant results of the survey were:
1. Two-thirds felt the present OERS is effective in identifying officers of little potential value to the service.

2. Sixty-two per cent felt the present system is ineffective in identifying officers who have the greatest future potential.

3. Seventy-nine per cent considered inflation to be either a significant problem or the single most important problem, 34 per cent placing it in the latter category. Only 16 per cent considered it a minor problem, and a minuscule 4 per cent labeled it no problem at all.

4. Less than 50 per cent considered themselves to have been overrated, an interesting statistic when compared with the overwhelming percentage which considered inflation to be something more than a minor problem.

The second major area covered by the questionnaire dealt with rating techniques and broad policies. Responses indicated some rather decided "likes" and "dislikes." Peer ratings received a strong negative response, more than 60 per cent indicating unwillingness to accept such a system. Comparatively few favored the forced choice technique, but a majority would be willing to accept it. The use of periodic written examinations as one means of determining branch qualification received a similar response. More than 70 per
cent were opposed to the use of a forced ranking system. This strong negative response may reflect backlash from the recent experience with forced ranking as part of the OER.

The strongest response was in the area of counseling and whether or not to show an officer his report. More than 85 per cent wanted the counseling requirement upgraded, and almost 90 per cent felt the efficiency report should always be shown. Only two officers favored a no-show policy. A majority favored use of a rate the rater technique with the OER. Well over 50 per cent felt the officer corps is not receiving sufficient instruction in the purpose and use of efficiency reports.

If any overall conclusions can be drawn from the questionnaire results, they would be:

1. Officers do not trust the system, partially as a result of the inflation problem.

2. There is no real propensity for change. Unfamiliar techniques and those that draw a hard line between people, e.g., forced ranking, do not have popular support.

There may be a lesson in these findings from the standpoint of fielding new systems. Officer education and publicity will need to be used to condition the level of acceptability before moving to a system that breaks sharply from past methodology.
Overall Analysis

The principal objective of this chapter was a chronological in-depth survey of the efficiency reporting system in the U.S. Army. The survey has been broad in scope because neither the inflation phenomenon nor possible solutions can be viewed in narrow perspective. All facets of the system tend to be interlocking.

Several things stand out in relief when the history of the system is perceived as a collective unit. There has been a tendency to become ensconced in methodology and statistical play at the expense of basic issues. One issue would be administrative discipline to insure that all requirements associated with the system are honored (e.g., prompt submission of the OER).

Another basic issue is education of the officer corps in the purposes and responsibilities of efficiency reporting. Almost nothing has been done in this area. In fact, there seems to have been at least an occasional fear of getting heavily engaged in a sensitive issue by "stirring the pot." This is unfortunate, especially in a system where young and inexperienced officers are technically eligible to rate their fellow officers almost from the day they enter on active duty. Education of the officer corps has another important side to it, already touched upon. While the Army
has placed high value on the matter of acceptability, there
seems to have been no extensive effort "to sell" the officer
corps in advance in order to build acceptance of a new OER
concept.

Historically, the OER operation has been of a closed
type, its inner workings and scoring tables hidden from the
officer corps at large. A lack of feedback has fostered
rumors, misunderstandings, and the tendency to inflate
reports. Many devices have been tried to control inflation,
Most have failed to make any meaningful inroads. In view of
a general failure to come to grips with the problem, greater
stress needs to be placed on methods that will ease the
inflation problem itself rather than merely attack its
periphery and leave the trunk and root system unscathed.
CHAPTER IV

SURVEY OF SELECTED FOREIGN OERS

Research: Past and Present

Review of available reference material indicated that there has been only limited research in the field of foreign efficiency reporting systems. The first recorded research in this area was undertaken in 1913 at the direction of the Army Chief of Staff (Major General Leonard Wood), with the Army War College asked to perform the study. That study also reviewed the systems in use by the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. During developmental work on DA Form 67-5 in 1958, the officer efficiency report systems (OERS) used by the armies of Canada, Great Britain, and West Germany were reviewed as part of an extensive study effort.

In 1969 the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, performed a comprehensive

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officer efficiency report (OER) study. As previously indicated, it included an evaluation of the same primary foreign OERS to be evaluated in this chapter, but in much less detail. It also included a review of the South Korean system; however, no specific information concerning that country is provided. Since the OERS study was concluded, two of the primary foreign systems have been modified. The Canadian system has undergone minor modification, while the West German system has been completely changed.

Administrative procedures and performance appraisal methodology provide only a partial index to an OER system. No military system, administrative or otherwise, can be properly viewed in isolation. Many factors tend to be interdependent. As an example, if an OERS has only a limited impact on promotion and assignment policies, it must be viewed differently than a system that directly influences such policies. Some of the more significant aspects of each foreign military establishment are discussed in this chapter to provide a broader understanding of each OERS.

Much of the information in this chapter was obtained

through interview of foreign officers. To insure coverage of certain basic points, a standard interview outline was employed (see Appendix L). During the course of the research, multiple interviews were conducted with many of the foreign officers to provide for more comprehensive coverage than would have been possible in a single interview and to validate information. Those serving as liaison officers at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) were accorded the courtesy of reviewing draft versions of parts of this research report that concerned their respective country. Secondarily, that procedure was an excellent means of insuring accurate reporting.

**Canada**

Canada has just undergone a unification of its armed forces. Unification, ordered July 1964 and now largely concluded, evoked many changes in the Canadian defense establishment. Among the major changes was the consolidation of service academies into one educational system. All services now wear a common uniform and are subject to the same basic policies. The changes were not made without considerable opposition. The question of tradition versus unification still looms, and military personnel have not yet achieved as great a feeling of identification as was true
under the old system.\footnote{\textsuperscript{4}George G. Bell, BG [Director General of Plans], Canadian Forces, "Canadian Military System," Address before USACGSC, 22 April 1971.}

Unification necessitated a major retailling of administrative policies, which, of course, included modification of OER procedures. Until 1966, promotion policies and final selection methods for the advancement of officers were carried out based on individual service requirements. As the date of transition approached, it became apparent that an integrated promotion system needed to be introduced without delay. During the fall of 1966, although single service boards continued to be used, an observer from each of the other services was asked to sit in on the promotion board proceedings. The next step (1967) was partial integration of the promotion boards. To insure that officers would retain confidence in the system, boards continued to be weighted toward the service of the particular officers being considered for promotion, with the other services being given lesser representation.\footnote{\textsuperscript{5}Canada, \textit{Defense Personnel Instructions} (DPI) P5640-2, TD 7249: \textit{Officer Promotion Procedures--1967, General Service Officers} (Canadian Forces, 6 September 1967), pp. 1-2.}

A new performance evaluation report (PER) developed as part of the unification plan was introduced in 1968. A
standard policy for career management was also adopted. From the outset a central monitoring procedure was used by Canadian Forces headquarters. All reports were referred to the monitoring office before being processed by career managers. The monitors insure that reports are properly completed and that any extreme scores are fully substantiated. Another important function, this one in the area of inflation control, relates to the range of scores received. The monitors insure "that a common standard of reporting is maintained. In other words a unit's range of scores must not normally be too high or too low in relation to other units." The form monitors use is shown at Appendix N.

Various assessment systems were reviewed in designing a new officer appraisal system. It was determined that the critical performance requirements approach was the one best suited to the situation of the Canadian Forces. The OER in use by the Royal Canadian Navy was selected as the nucleus of the new system. The experience of the U.S. Air Force with the critical incident technique (1948) was one reference point used in development of the new system. Due to the press of time, however, it was not possible to

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conduct research using the critical incident technique to determine critical performance requirements. Therefore, the performance requirements to be listed in the report were extracted from a comprehensive review of technical literature and were selected on a judgmental basis. Research has been undertaken to correct this deficiency.7

Whereas the OER of the Royal Canadian Navy had a 13-level scale, the new form shortened the scale to 10 items (later to 6). Because the developers could not determine how various parts of the integrated services would use the rating scale, elaborative guidance was not passed to the field. The same basic philosophy was applied to the performance requirements cited in the report since the requirements were seen as needing interpretation consistent with the local situation. A copy of the current PER is shown at Appendix M, and some of its broader administrative aspects are discussed in the remainder of this section.

The rating official must be one grade higher than the officer being evaluated unless the circumstances are exceptional. There is no indorsing officer to the report,

7P. V. B. Grieve, COL [Director of Postings and Careers—Officers], Canadian Forces, "Extracts from a Study of the 1968 Canadian Forces Performance Evaluation Report—Officers," Attachment D to letter (1971) to LTC J. A. Cowan, Canadian Forces Liaison Officer, USACGSC, p. 3.
but at least one superior officer must review it. If he disagrees with any of the ratings given, he can indicate his own evaluation by making an entry in red ink. Annual ratings are given at times specified by Canadian Forces Headquarters. A PER is also completed upon departure of either the rated officer or his superior.

The rated officer completes the first 14 items of the report himself before it is referred to the rating officer. Although at present an officer is not shown his rating unless it is adverse in nature, that policy may be changed in the near future. When an OER is adverse, the officer must be given an opportunity to see the report and he signs the back page of the form to show that he has reviewed it. While a no-show policy is in effect, superiors are required to discuss in detail any correctable faults reflected in Section 16 (Specific Aspects of Performance) and Section 17 (Narrative Comments).

The administrative order outlining responsibilities of rating officers is quite explicit in demanding high standards. It reads:

It should be salutary to note that not only is the subject officer being judged, but the PERs prepared by an officer directly reflect his interest in and knowledge of his officers and the needs of the Canadian Forces. The indifferent assessor stands out vividly, as does the consistently high rater or the one who always rates on the low side of the scale. The reporting
officer who voices the same high praise, uses the same stereotyped adjectives, or makes little effort to distinguish between his officers, denigrates the entire system. . . . A monitoring organization at CFHQ [Canadian Forces Headquarters] will insure that PERs are completed in accordance with this order, and will return those which fail to meet these requirements. 8

Rating trends are carefully watched on the premise that it is as important to keep tabs on the raters as it is to evaluate the rated officers. An officer who habitually overrates or underrates subordinates can adversely affect his own career. 9

The entire texture of the evaluative process is designed to educate the officer corps in the importance of objective evaluation of subordinates. The system leaves little doubt in any officer's mind that the way he rates subordinates is subject to close scrutiny, thereby providing a measure of his own qualities as an officer. In giving specific instructions to rating officials in use of the rating scale for performance requirements (Section 16), the administrative order states:

It must be borne in mind that:


9LTC J. A. Cowan, Canadian Forces Liaison Officer to USACGSC, personal interviews, 1 October 1970, 11 February 1971, and 1 April 1971.
(1) over-rating of the performance of a competent officer leaves no scope for the rating of the outstanding officer's performance, and

(2) over-rating casts doubt on the whole PER, and consistent over-rating casts doubt on all PERs prepared by the reporting officer.¹

The Canadian Forces PER can be broken down into four primary assessment areas. The first, the heart of the report, is Section 16, which is structured on the basis of the critical incident technique of performance appraisal. The rater chooses from 10 possible levels on the rating scale in evaluating each of 17 requirements. While there are 10 levels on the rating scale, some are grouped, for example, "1" and "2" at the low end of the scale. As a result, there are in reality only six levels on the scale.

The second primary assessment area is the narrative portion of the report (Section 17), which is used in part to substantiate ratings given in Item 16. Administrative instructions require that certain information be covered in the narrative remarks. Low or outstanding ratings must be justified. When a "3-4" rating (low side of the "normal" range) is given, correctable minor failings and other shortcomings must be specified in order to isolate those factors which prevented achievement of a higher rating. Appendix 0, ¹

¹Canada, "Detailed Instructions for the Completion of Form CF 255," in Admin 0 26-6, Pt. II, p. 2.
an extract from Administrative Order 26-6, describes the various rating levels.

The third major area covered by the form provides for a comparative assessment of the rated officer with other officers of the same grade whom the rater has known over the years (Section 19). The rating official can choose from three basic categories, each of which provides additional sub-alternatives. These categories equate roughly to below average, satisfactory, and above average. Administrative instructions advise the rating official that the satisfactory area (midpoint) is to be the rating commonly assigned. While Item 19 does not directly relate to other rating areas, the rating is expected to be in consonance with other ratings given.

The last major assessment area is that of promotion. Until recently the rating official had three choices: yes, no, or not yet. The "not yet" category has now been deleted. If the rating official rules that the rated officer is ready for promotion, other entries are made regarding speed of the promotion and further advancement.

How successful has the Canadian system been in controlling inflation? In 1968 statistics were compiled on 5,777 PERs for officers in the grade of captain. The results of that study, the most recent to be conducted, are
presented in Table 3. It can be seen that most of the ratings cluster in the "3" and "4" levels of the 6-level scale. While the Canadian Forces do not apply the Bell curve, the range shown in each case, if diagrammed, would tend to project a relatively normal type curve. Overall, Table 3 reflects a range of ratings that can be classed as basically uninflated.

Statistics, of course, must be viewed with some caution. The statistics concerned in this case do not extend beyond the grade of captain. If a more complete picture were available, it would be possible to evaluate the presence of grade bias and other factors related to inflation at all grade levels. Another factor which must be considered as well is that the statistics were compiled shortly after the system was introduced. A performance appraisal system is most effective in controlling inflation immediately after its introduction, with a decline in effectiveness normally evidenced over time.\(^1\)

The statistics from the 1968 study are significant because of the size of the sample and what appears to be a rather rigid adherence to high standards. Based on consultation with three Canadian officers at USACGSC, two of them

\(^1\)OERS Study Group, p. 2-5.
TABLE 3, which appears on page 74, was prepared from statistical data provided by COL P. V. B. Grieve, Director of Postings and Careers--Officers, Canadian Forces, in Attachment A to "Extracts from a Study of the 1968 Canadian Forces Performance Evaluation Report--Officers," letter (1971) to LTC J. A. Cowan, Canadian Forces Liaison Officer, USACGSC.
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES:
Statistical Analysis of 5,777 Performance Evaluation Reports Processed in 1968 for Officers in Grade of Captain—Keyed to PER

Section 16—Officer Performance Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Not Observed</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Six Level Scale</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Displayed knowledge of assigned job in keeping with training experience</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Organized and directed work of subordinates effectively</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>2111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Did own work promptly and well</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Analyzed problems and situations competently and with dispatch</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>2598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Showed consideration for the well-being and development of subordinates</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>2333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td>Gave consistent support to superiors</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.</td>
<td>Showed a personal example of attention to duty</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>2151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.</td>
<td>Performed effectively under stress</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>2497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Presented ideas clearly and concisely in verbal discussions and meetings</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>2699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.</td>
<td>Prepared written work which was literate, clear and concise</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>2652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.</td>
<td>Pursued self-improvement with effect</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>2899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.</td>
<td>Adapted to changes without loss of efficiency</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>2608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.</td>
<td>Made sound decisions without delay</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>2522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.</td>
<td>Accepted full responsibility for own decisions and acts</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.</td>
<td>Took necessary and appropriate action on his own</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>2071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.</td>
<td>Worked successfully with others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.</td>
<td>Is a credit to the service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>1897</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 19—Comparative Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the Large Group of Satisfactory Officers</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
<th>Barely Acceptable</th>
<th>Top Half</th>
<th>Bottom Half</th>
<th>Better Than Most</th>
<th>Outstanding</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2894</td>
<td>1205</td>
<td>1418</td>
<td>181</td>
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Section 20—Promotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Not Yet*</th>
<th>Yes (when qualified)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>624</td>
<td>1228</td>
<td>3925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 21—Indicate how Rapidly this Officer Should be Promoted in Relation to His Contemporaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less Rapidly</th>
<th>As Rapidly</th>
<th>More Rapidly</th>
<th>Much More Rapidly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>2206</td>
<td>1406</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No longer a part of report
students, the PER has been able to maintain a comparable level of effectiveness since the 1968 study was made although there has been some evidence of inflation.

One problem that came to the forefront at the time of unification was the difference in rating patterns among the services. Army tended to rate the lowest, Air Force the highest, and Navy in the middle.\(^{12}\) This seems to have triggered a counter-trend during the 1968-69 period, with the Army beginning to up its rating pattern to compensate for higher ratings given by the other services.\(^{13}\) While the services are officially unified, mission orientation continues to maintain what amounts to service lines. Nonetheless, Canadian officers interviewed, having seen many reports returned to rating officials because of excessively high scores, personally attested to the tight control exercised by the PER monitoring group at Canadian Forces Headquarters.

In summary, the factors that seem to have contributed to the apparent effectiveness of the Canadian system in controlling inflation are:

1. Firm centralized administrative monitorship.

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\(^{12}\)Arthur L. Altwasser, MAJ [USACGSC student], Canadian Forces, personal interview, 18 April 1971.

\(^{13}\)Phillip A. Roy, MAJ [USACGSC student], Canadian Forces, personal interview, 18 April 1971.
2. Knowledge by rating officials that their own standards are being evaluated every time they render a PFR.

3. Education of the officer corps in the importance of rendering objective evaluations.

4. The veiled threat of reprisal (careerwise) against those rating officials who habitually overrate subordinates.

5. Emphasis on personal integrity throughout the system.

It is significant that not one of the points summarized relates to the appraisal form itself. If any overall conclusion or lesson can be drawn from this, it would be that the manner in which a system is administered may be of more importance than the type of appraisal form used.

France

The officer corps in the French Army has undergone many difficult periods over the past 50 years. The political pressures from without and problems within the military community itself have created serious strains for the army. The Indo-Chinese War and conflict in Algeria heightened the divisive pressures. The officer corps became alienated from French society in many ways. This was due, in part, to the fact that the average officer spent very little time in
France. A survey of 395 officers conducted in 1959 revealed that 72 per cent had spent less than 6 of the previous 13 years in France.  

Adding to the army's problems in the 1950's was a grossly insufficient pay structure for military personnel which has since been alleviated to some extent. It could be said in the 1960's that:

Material impoverishment was only one of many signs of the neglect and scorn which were . . . the officer's lot. Uniforms became increasingly rare in French cities, as most officers preferred to promenade in more respectable civilian attire. Even at the prestigious Ecole de Guerre in Paris, similar to the American War College, officers frequently changed into civilian clothes before returning home at night, perhaps through a communist working class district where a uniform might draw comments.  

A weaker institution might have buckled under the severe pressures, but an inner strength seems to have held the army together and maintained it as a viable military force. One prime source of cohesion in the face of divisive pressures was the number of Saint Cyrians (equivalent to West Point graduates) in the army. While they number only slightly more than 25 per cent of the officer corps, they wield a much greater influence than their numbers suggest.

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15 Ambler, p. 100.
They have a distinct advantage over officers who gain their commission from other sources, excepting graduates of the Ecole Polytechnic, another military school in France. The graduates of Ecole Polytechnic have an even greater opportunity for advancement, but few elect to make the army a career because of civilian job offers and lack of prestige currently associated with the military profession.\footnote{LTC M. Maze, French Army Liaison Officer to USACGSC, personal interviews, 1 & 13 April 1971.}

From the standpoint of age, Saint Cyrrians gain earlier admission to the commissioned ranks and their diploma enhances their chances for advancement. To compete with the Saint Cyrian requires a college degree or the equivalent and a 2- or 3-year period as an officer candidate. In addition, on the day of their commissioning, Saint Cyrrians are granted an advance of one year date of rank as a reward for their undergraduate studies.\footnote{Maze, 13 April 1971.}

Since service pay scales do not attract many college graduates, Saint Cyrrians, for all practical purposes, need compete only with each other. The statistical advantages of being a Saint Cyrian can be seen in the following:

Sixteen percent of a Saint Cyr class will one day become generals, and 42 percent will advance to the grade of colonel. Fellow officers who are not graduates
of Saint Cyr can anticipate that only 3 percent of their number will ever wear generals' insignia, and only 15 percent that of colonel. Therefore, the individual who is not a graduate of Saint Cyr will find not only that his ultimate rank will be lower than his Saint Cyr colleagues but also that promotions will come slower. In effect, Saint Cyrians exercise control over the officer corps and occupy the senior positions. Also of significance is the fact that close to 50 percent of the Saint Cyrians come from military families. "The French tradition of military families has continued and is growing."

The French officer corps is stratified, with the graduates of Saint Cyr representing a caste within the army. Within each strata, seniority is playing an increasingly larger role in the selection of officers for advancement. This trend tends to reduce the importance of the efficiency report as a personnel management tool.

The current OERS has been in use about 6 years and the system that preceded it, in use more than 20 years, was not much different. Rating officers must command a regiment (equivalent of a U.S. Army battalion, reinforced) or above.

A chief of staff is allowed to render ratings since he is considered to be a "commander of staff."

Immediate supervisors, as appropriate, provide input to the commander upon which he can base an evaluation, but he may or may not use this information. Since stress is placed on "knowing your men," in most cases the commander will have his own views on the officer to be evaluated. Reports are rendered on an annual basis or upon change of duty or rating official. The rating is reviewed by at least two higher ranking officers, sometimes by as many as four. The rated officer is normally shown his report.

The efficiency report system of the French Army is unique in that it employs both a forced ranking and a forced distribution system. Application of these devices is best understood within the context of the OER format used (see Appendix P). The OER can be divided into seven distinct parts. The first part (Section 7), labeled "Basic Qualities," is probably the most important. It covers such areas as appearance, character, intellectual possibilities, and behavior, with 19 separate areas to be rated. The rater can choose from among six possible rating levels in evaluating each area. A brief written observation may also be entered.

20 Etienne Renard, CPT [USACGSC student], French Army, personal interviews, 11 & 14 December 1970.
opposite each area, but rating officers must conform or keep close to the specific wording provided in administrative instructions. The local commander scores this section of the report on the basis of a forced distribution scale.

Each year major commanders (e.g., division commanders) receive from army headquarters a letter which covers policies and procedures relating to efficiency reporting, promotions, and other personnel management matters. The commander is responsible for briefing his rating officers on the contents of the letter. The letter outlines the recommended percentage of officers in the command who can be assigned, "on average," to each of the four top elements in Section 7 of the report: elite, excellent, very good, good. Any number can be assigned to the two low rating elements: below average and inadequate.

The percentages vary from year to year, but the number of officers who can be given an "elite" rating in Section 7 is normally about 5 per cent. While these guide figures from higher headquarters are theoretically not compulsory, they, in fact, are binding on individual commanders. Any commander who violates the guideline can expect to be called in and chastised. It is an unwritten rule that subordinate commanders (e.g., regiment commanders) will always rate below the assigned percentages so that the higher
headquarters (e.g., division) will have the opportunity to give a greater number of "above average" ratings without violating the overall command guideline.21

The second major portion of the OER (Section 8) concerns performance of duties. In Section 9, the officer's potential is evaluated in relation to specific type duties, such as unit commander. Section 10 covers promotion potential to the next higher grade and ranks the officer among his branch contemporaries in the unit. The circle device in Section 10 is used to indicate the forced ranking. If the officer is ranked best of 15 officers, the rating would appear as \( \frac{1}{15} \). Section 11, added to the report about four years ago, reflects the highest rank an officer can be expected to achieve. This portion of the report is not completed on junior officers since it is considered too early in their career to record a judgment on final advancement potential. Section 12 allows for general narrative remarks within set guidelines. The last portion of the report completed by the rater is Section 13, and it provides for an overall assessment of the officer which must be consistent with the ratings given in Section 7.

Each reviewing official evaluates the rating given

\[21\text{Maze.}\]
and categorizes it (e.g., too hard). He then applies his own forced ranking standard, comparing the officer with all officers of the same grade and branch at his level of command. The officer is ranked with his branch contemporaries at each echelon of command, including army headquarters.

Officers know how well they are doing in relation to their branch contemporaries. Each year an officer roster similar to the U.S. Army Register is published. This roster lists officers according to rank and branch. The ranking reflected for each officer provides meaningful feedback and is one reason officers reportedly have confidence in the system. As a legal requirement, an officer must be ranked in the upper half of his branch list to be considered for promotion. In actuality, the Ministry of Defense establishes a yearly guideline that is even more restrictive (e.g., upper one-third).22

Based on the use of both forced ranking and forced distribution, there is little room for inflation within the system of the French Army. Use of the narrative remarks does provide a limited amount of maneuver room in giving certain officers an advantage within a cluster of officers on the forced distribution scale. Selection boards

22Maze, 13 April 1971.
carefully assess all remarks that appear in the narrative, and they underline favorable comments in blue and unfavorable and "faint praise" type remarks in red. These remarks can then be tabulated along with the balance of the OER data. Commanders have a tendency to inflate remarks so as to enhance the subordinate's chances as the report moves up the command ladder.\textsuperscript{23}

To summarize, factors that seem to have contributed to the basic success of the French Army's OERS in controlling inflation are:

1. Forced ranking of an officer at multiple levels of command.

2. Forced distribution of ratings by commanders, with the next higher commander having a vested interest in adherence to percentage guidelines.

3. Efficiency reporting brought under direct command control.

4. Building of acceptability through feedback and annual indoctrination of officers in policies to be followed in the area of efficiency reporting.

5. Effective administrative control at all levels.

\textsuperscript{23}Maze, 1 April 1971.
Great Britain

The regiment continues to be the focal point of basic traditions and concepts within the British Army. While tactically of reduced significance in recent years as a result of changes in the command structure (i.e., the battalion group concept), the regiment still provides the key to an understanding of the British military system. Regiments, particularly in the cavalry and infantry, tend to closely follow county lines, and officers and men tend to spend most of their service in the same unit. This serves to foster an informality and comradeship among men that goes beyond military experience and reaches back to a common origin and upbringing.

If any concept can be singled out as most indicative of the British military outlook, it would be the "know your men" philosophy or, as it is also called, "man management." Knowing your men goes beyond mere lip service. It is considered basic to leadership, with leadership being the foundation upon which all else is laid. Name tags in the British Army are generally shunned as an unnecessary device. It is common practice, however, for platoon and troop commanders to keep a notebook on their subordinates. This notebook contains a complete sketch of each person's background, problems, courses attended, interests, and ambitions.
During a high level commander's visit to a unit it is customary for the host commander to insure that he has a subtle opportunity to either meet or observe both professionally and socially the outstanding and the weak officers. When an officer is considered to be a good candidate for the British Staff College, the visiting commander is so informed. Such a practice is not dictated by administrative policy but by custom. It acts to broaden the senior commander's knowledge of individual members of the officer corps outside his normal span of personal contact. Colonel S. T. Baldry said, "I have never known a brigade commander who has not known every officer in his brigade by his Christian name after, at most, six months in command." This emphasis on personal knowledge of subordinates by ranking officers represents a means of supplementing formal evaluation techniques with the age-old service reputation concept. Literature on the British military system is replete with reference to the man management principle. A major in a tank regiment wrote:

All ranks must be convinced that the contribution they are making to the unit efficiency is of real importance. They must acquire the feeling of belonging which makes so much difference to them. This can be helped in

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24 COL S. T. Baldry, British Army Liaison Officer to USACGSC, personal interviews, 10 February 1971, 30 March 1971, and 13 May 1971.
many ways but principally through good man management.\textsuperscript{25}

The confidential report (actually a misnomer) plays an important role in personnel management and selection, but there is little mention of it in military journals. The officer corps accepts it as a necessary device and one that probably works as fairly as any man-made system can. Also, officers get an idea relatively early in their career concerning just how well they might expect to do. This takes some of the pressure off the system. There is a clear realization that not all can be brigadiers. To an officer in the British Army, a report that represents less than a maximum rating is not viewed as the death knell to a career. He does not necessarily mind receiving a "B" or a "C" on the A-B-C-D-E scale, because he knows full well that not all officers can be rated at the top and a "C" does not automatically deter further promotion. Furthermore, the narrative remarks carry the most weight anyway.\textsuperscript{26}

For some of the more important plateaus in the officer's career, the confidential report represents only one input for selection consideration. The selection process


\textsuperscript{26}Baldry.
for the staff college is a case in point. The first "siv" or sifting is made by a commanding officer recommending an officer as a staff candidate on a confidential report. The second step involves administration of a written examination to the staff candidate. About 40 to 45 per cent of the officers pass the examination. Since further screening is necessary, a Ministry of Defence board reviews the confidential reports and makes the final Selections. Upon completion of staff college a report is prepared on each student, but he never gains access to it. Six instructors in the grade of lieutenant colonel render individual evaluations. The head of the division, a colonel, reviews these evaluations and from them produces the staff college report on the students, assigning a final grade (e.g., A, B+, B, etc.). Typical of the high standards associated with the overall evaluative process, only one officer has graduated from the British Staff College with an "A" since World War II.

The confidential report has two basic purposes in the British Army: promotion and job assignment. The officer himself is responsible for insuring that he gets an annual report. The "initiating officer" (rating officer) 

27 C. L. Straw, MAJ [USACGSC student], British Army, personal interview, 29 January 1971.

28 Baldry.
will be a lieutenant colonel, except that majors in command of an independent unit are also empowered to rate. The "superior reporting officers" (reviewers), normally two, must always be above the rank of lieutenant colonel. For officers serving in units, only commanders may render confidential reports. Staff officers at divisional headquarters and above are initially rated by colonels or brigadiers in the same staff branch. This policy elevates all reports to a relatively high place on the command ladder, thus maximizing control and insuring that only experienced officers become involved. Because they view the rated officer from a broad base of general effectiveness rather than from only the close daily contact of less senior officers, it can be contended that the rating officer's approach will tend to be more objective and dispassionate. The initiating officer will often ask for comments from the rated officer's immediate supervisor (e.g., company commander's comments on a platoon leader) before he finalizes his report.

The reporting system has built-in flexibility in that the rendering of a report falls in one of four classifications: annual, interim, advanced, or special. The annual reporting dates are staggered by grade. Rating officials have the option of advancing or deferring an annual report by up to three months. If a report is
rendered less than 90 days prior to or after the annual date, it is considered to be an annual report; if outside the 90-day leeway, it is considered an advanced or interim report. Interim reports do not negate the requirement for an annual report and are normally rendered to recognize something particularly good or bad, or prior to the change of reporting officers if there would be too long a period until the next annual report. Interim reports, then, serve a variety of purposes. The special report, on the other hand, is used only to eliminate an officer from service.

To be eligible to render a report, the rating officer must have known the officer being rated for at least six months. The counseling of subordinate officers is traditional and permissive in nature. An officer is shown his report and he must sign it. If a superior reporting officer adds remarks less favorable than those of the initiating officer, the report must be returned to the rated officer for his added initials.29

The efficiency report format is basically quite simple (see Appendix Q). Different report forms are used for captain and below and for major and above. The forms are quite similar and have remained basically unchanged for

many years. The report covers four basic areas. The first is Item 6a in Part I, which assesses 11 basic characteristics, for example, "zeal and energy." Each characteristic is measured against a 5-level scale, with "very good" being the highest.

No numerical value is ever applied to these ratings--their only purpose is to insure that, for example, a good officer who tends to be tactless at times is not assigned as say a liaison officer to a civilian department.30

The second part of the report provides for a "pen picture" (narrative) of the officer and allows for a free response. No restriction is placed on the length of this narrative. The third major area of the report covers "grading" (Item 7 of Part I), which is directed at an appraisal of the officer in relation to his duties. Five levels are provided for on the form (A through E), with "A--Well above standard required of his rank and service," representing the top rating. If the rating official desires to give an outstanding rating (for major and above), he lines through all five levels of the form and inserts the word "outstanding." When the rater makes this entry, the report must be viewed by the theater commander. Colonel Baldry said:

This rating is only given when a commander is in no doubt that the officer is outstanding and will reach

30Baldry, 30 March 1971.
high rank. Many officers reaching general rank have never had an outstanding grading in their whole career.\textsuperscript{31}

The last area in the main body of the report deserving of special mention is Item 8 of Part I, which covers recommendation for promotion. Three alternatives are offered: yes, no, or not yet.

A report receives careful review when it is received by the Military Secretary in the Ministry of Defence. While not an official practice, it is generally known that some form of listing of hard and easy commanders is maintained to temper the system.\textsuperscript{32} Major General Sir John Bates remarked:

I sat on selection boards at the Ministry of Defence for six continuous years. I could not hazard a guess as to how many confidential reports I listened to during the process. On the whole they were good, particularly after the boards had applied their weighting and balancing factors.\textsuperscript{33}

As can be seen from this limited discussion, the British Army has a distinctive approach to performance appraisal. While statistics are not available to prove the case, only a small degree of inflation seems to be in evidence.

The average grading at the major level is probably

\textsuperscript{31}Baldry, 30 March 1971. \textsuperscript{32}Baldry.

closer to "B--above the standard required of his rank and service," rather than "C--up to the standard required of his rank and service." If this is not a true grading of the average regular British officer, perhaps there is a little overgrading resulting from a tendency to write a sound chap up a bit... The task of reviewing officers is mainly to ensure that the overharshness or over-softness of an initiating officer is tempered so that the officer he is responsible for ends up with a grading that is correct relative to his contemporaries.34

The following can be considered the salient features of inflation control in the British Army:

1. Control over the system is maximized by allowing only experienced officers to rate their subordinates.

2. The officer corps is conditioned to accept realistic ratings (something less than a maximum score).

3. The system is not overweighted; other evaluative techniques (including service reputation) come into play.

4. Reviewing officials exercise positive control over the system and guard against extreme ratings.

5. Officers gain a picture of their career potential early, which causes them to pursue realistic goals while assigning less importance to individual reports.

6. Performance appraisal is a major and integral part of command responsibility.

7. Outstanding ratings trigger high level review.

34Baldry, 30 March 1971.
West Germany

It is difficult to consider the history of Germany without considering military tradition as well, so closely are they interwoven. For generations Germany led the way in development of military concepts and organization, and it is safe to say that all major armies of the world have been influenced over the years by doctrine the German General Staff promulgated. No military system has contributed more to the art of military science. The convulsion of two world wars in less than a half century has triggered a metamorphosis in military outlook within the West German State. The military establishment is no longer viewed as an entity unto itself, standing separate from the mainstream of German society, but, rather, as an integral part of the national life.

Lack of interest in political life and the presence of military self-reliance, characteristic of both the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht, supported to a certain degree the notion of the "state within a state." The democratic state, however, must rely upon the collaboration of all its citizens and their willingness to share in matters of state. The soldier, who as a bearer of arms plays an important part in the defense of the community, must also remain a citizen and not fall into a state of political apathy or consider himself merely a military specialist.35

From a highly authoritarian organization during World War II, the military system has now emerged as a democratized institution. Some members of the German military, including general officers, even belong to unions. While military tradition continues to be a factor in molding military forces, the German people no longer support militarism. The officer corps of the Bundeswehr (West German Armed Forces), formed in 1955, has demonstrated occasional disenchantment with what it construes to be conflicting goals. This problem recently flared up anew when 30 company commanders sent a memorandum to the West German Defense Minister. The memorandum indicated, among other things, that the Bundeswehr combat preparedness has been seriously impaired by the "civilian in uniform" concept, under which "reintegration into society" has received a higher priority than combat training. Further, it called attention to the shocking personnel shortage in terms of both quantity and quality. The Defense Minister admitted validity of the charges. At present the Bundeswehr is unable to fill 26,000 noncommissioned officer slots and 2,600 officer positions.

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36 Werner Von Scheven, MAJ (USACGSC student), West German Army, personal interview, 21 October 1970.

The strength of the West German military forces presently totals about 467,000 personnel, of which 28,200 are officers. This much lower ratio of officers to enlisted men than is found in other Western military forces exists, in part, because certain specialization areas such as procurement, administration, and law are almost completely civilianized.  

Historical underpinnings of the German efficiency reporting system extend far back in time. King Frederick Wilhelm I introduced a regular and continuous system of reporting on all officers around 1725. The first recorded use of efficiency reports, however, dates back even further, to Frederick Wilhelm, Elector of Brandenburg, 1620-1688 (Prusso-German Army). In 1806-1807, as a result of defeats suffered by the German Army, efficiency reporting received close review. The benevolence of the king and the adjutant general toward generals with a long period of honorable service had led to a general predominance of over-aged officers and mediocre men in the highest ranks. The system was changed in 1808 to insure that only the best qualified officers would achieve high rank.

38 COL Hans Link, West German Army Liaison Officer to USACGSC, personal interview, 16 April 1971.
39 Rudolf Hofmann, "German Efficiency Report System"
The revised efficiency report called for a complete description of the officer, his personality, character, value to the military service, and other traits, with particular stress on qualifications related to fields outside the field services (general staff and adjutant services). This system proved highly effective and remained basically unchanged for more than 100 years (until 1914). The effectiveness of the system can be seen in several facts.

The careers of the more prominent soldiers of that era prove that this profusion of military capability was in large measure directly due to the systematic selection methods in force. In the traditional Prussian sense, many of them were upstarts, were poor, and had no connections even though they may have been scions of old families; this was the case with Moltke, Roon, and von der Goltz. Others such as Mackensen, Lentze, Kluck and Ludendorff did not even have the advantage of an old name. Without the influence which the efficiency ratings exerted on their careers, none of these men would have attained the positions which they did reach.40

Strong evidence suggests that inflation of reports has been largely held in check during most periods of German history. In maintaining control, integrity of reporting seems to have been more important than the appraisal techniques employed. Field Manual 291, issued in the 1920's, stressed the importance of rendering honest and frank ratings. As one author put it:

(U.S. Army, Europe, Historical Division, 1952), pp. 3-7.

40 Hofmann, p. 8.
High standards were the rule in judging performance. To omit mention of recognized weaknesses would actually harm the officer being rated and be even more harmful to the service in general, which depended on the rating system to place valuable officers in responsible positions. Thus, complete justice and objectivity was required from every officer in the preparation of efficiency reports.41

Regulations governing the efficiency reporting system remained fundamentally the same from before World War I until the German defeat in World War II. In effect, the OER system had remained basically stable in both principle and application for roughly 140 years.

With creation of the Bundeswehr, administrative policies and the general tenor of military life broke sharply from the past. By the 1960's, the efficiency reporting system had become inflated42 and action to design a better system had to be taken. Draft proposals for a new system were prepared during 1965, and a new system was field tested in 1969. Much of the preparatory effort devoted to the new system included a review of methods used by friendly allied forces and private industry, a study of fundamentals developed by scientists, and suggestions from military personnel. The basics of personality psychology were taken into consideration for item selection and arrangement of OER

41 Hofmann, p. 15. 42 Link, 11 February 1971.
The new OER went into service in January 1970 (see Appendix R). Like its predecessor, it was to be used by all West German military forces. Additionally, it was designed to cover senior noncommissioned officers. The main objective of the new rating regulation is to attain greater evaluative justice. To do this, several major innovations were introduced. First, the rating scale for evaluating performance was expanded from seven to nine ratings so as to improve differentiation between ratees. At the top of the scale, "excellent" was added.

Provision has been made in Section G for an evaluation of the rating standard by reviewing officials. If they check either "much too good" or "much too hard" blocks, subsequent action to lower or raise the overall rating is required at Ministry of Defense level. If they indicate only a slight deviation from the norm ("a little too good" or "too hard"), notice is served to the evaluating authority "that the rating statements should be regarded with the

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The West German OER was the only system evaluated in this research that was found to have an automatic downgrading feature tied to evaluation of the rating standard by the first level reviewer.

If the reviewing official disagrees with any of the numerical scores assigned in any of the rating tables, that is, Items 1 through 9, he may enter what he considers to be the proper rating in the "ST" block of the table. Rather than having one centralized narrative, provision is made for narrative remarks after completion of each multiple-choice description table. The instructions for preparation of the OER spell out precisely the form that narrative remarks must take.

One of the overriding factors in design of the new system was maximum use of automation to manipulate statistics and to maintain positive control. Numbers and alpha characters are used extensively throughout the form to make it amenable to an ADP (automatic data processing) system. This emphasis on automation will make it possible to obtain daily readouts, as required, in monitoring rating trends.

Reports are required to be submitted only at 2-year intervals. Under the new rating concept, it is necessary to

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44 Rauf, p. 21.
submit only a statement confirming the previous report and/or a shortened efficiency report where the rating status has undergone only slight changes or no change at all.\(^{45}\) This practice is made possible by the fact that efficiency reports are prepared in duplicate, with one copy being maintained at unit level. The rationale behind this procedure is that it avoids needless repetition of comments already adequately covered. While completion of only a partial report is allowed, it is common practice for the rater to file a complete report in each instance. Preparation of efficiency reports continues to be command related starting at company level.

The new West German efficiency report is perhaps the most highly structured of all efficiency reporting systems. It is a precise instrument and, to complete it, a rating official must constantly refer to the administrative instructions. This factor militates against hasty preparation and promotes careful thought, a consideration that could well serve to improve the quality of reports rendered. It should be noted that each report provides a complete picture on the officer, including a listing of previous duty assignments back to 1956 or the first assignment. If the

\(^{45}\) Raulf, p. 29.
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efficiency reports (a requirement now), but they were told where they ranked among contemporaries.  

Aside from the forced ranking concept which is soon to be made a part of the OER, the West German Armed Forces use one other major means of evaluating officer personnel, namely, the examination. Few officers are admitted to field grade ranks prior to graduation from a staff college. Officers must pass a rigid examination to gain entry to a staff college. Approximately 90 per cent pass this examination. The top 10 per cent of those successfully completing the examination go to the General Staff College, with the remainder going to the Joint Services Staff College. The failure rate for the General Staff College is in the 5 to 10 per cent range. Almost all of those officers failing this course will still be promoted to field grade. For the Joint Services Staff College, the failure rate is 20 to 25 per cent. They can repeat the course after one year and must pass it to be eligible for promotion to field grade.

It is too soon to tell just how effective the new OERS will be in controlling inflation. However, features that stand out as having merit in the area of inflation control are:

46 Link, 11 February 1971.  47 Link, 23 April 1971.
1. Broadening of the rating scale (number of levels) to improve discrimination.

2. Evaluation of the rating standard, with provision for automatic adjustment of "extreme" reports.

3. Variety of factors evaluated and precision of the rating instrument.


5. Taking pressure off the efficiency reporting system by using multiple means of evaluation (OER, forced ranking, examinations).

6. Maximum use of automation to permit instantaneous recall of data in assessing rating trends.

**OERS of Australia, Israel, Japan, and Yugoslavia**

Four additional foreign OERS were selected for review to add further depth to the research. The military organizations concerned are Australian Army, Israeli Armed Forces, Japanese Army, and Yugoslav Armed Forces. These systems were examined in less detail than the primary systems covered by this research.

Australia.--The confidential report form in use by the Australian Army (see Appendix S) has undergone only
minor changes since 1961 and is essentially similar to the 1955 version. Reports are submitted on an annual basis.

When an officer has served under the same rating official during successive rating periods, the rater is not required to render a complete report. He may indicate "No change from previous report" in various sections of the form.

Confidential reports are currently rendered on all officers through the grade of colonel. Until recently, however, reports were not required on officers in the grade of colonel. Only officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel and above are authorized to rate officer subordinates.

Officers are shown their reports and are given an opportunity to initial them. Administrative aspects of reporting are similar in many respects to those of the British Army. Only commanders are authorized to rate.

The Australians have their own way of controlling inflation. The Military Secretary at military headquarters in Canberra grades the rating standards of every officer, and this information is used, in part, to make necessary


49 Australia, Military Board Instruction 166-9: Regular Officers--Annual Confidential Reports (Royal Australian Army, 19 August 1969), p. 2.
adjustments in the system. In Major O. J. O'Brien’s words:

In a nutshell, the Australian Army statistical techniques/controls applied to our OER system are as follows:

1. A quantitative score is assigned to each grade of endorsement of each of ten qualities or variables.

2. These scores are totalled.

3. The annual distribution of scores for all officers of the same rank is normalised by conversion to McCall’s T scale.

4. The individual’s T score for a given annual report is calculated from the formula:

\[
\text{T Score} = \frac{\text{Present Year’s T Score} \times 2 + \text{Previous Year’s T Score} \times 1}{3}
\]

5. An analysis is made of each reporting officer’s distribution of rating (across all reports he has initiated) to identify characteristically harsh or lenient judges.  

The variables discussed in the formula are unknown and would not be released in any case. McCall’s T scale is merely a standard deviation scale. It is interesting to note the absence of numerical scoring on the confidential report form itself. In any event, responses are quantified to allow for mathematical processing per the formula.

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The confidential report bears only part of the weight in the promotion selection process. Like some of the other systems examined, the Australian Army makes use of examinations in evaluating officers. Examinations are used to determine qualification for both captain and major. These are written examinations. A tactical examination for all branches, lasting eight consecutive days, determines qualification for lieutenant colonel. This examination is conducted in the field and is preceded by three weeks of preparation and coaching (refresher training).

Another factor in promotion selection is the appearance of an officer before boards of officers. Two boards of officers are involved. The first, called the Promotion and Selection Working Party, is headed by a brigadier (a brigadier is not a general officer) and his committee. This board is provided with no advance information on the officer except for any personal knowledge that may exist. The impression the board of officers gains is based purely on the officer's performance before the board. This board grades him as either "suitable" or "unsuitable." All officers progress to a second board which consists of a major general and his committee, normally three individuals. This

52John Essex-Clark, LTC [USACGSC student], Royal Australian Army, personal interviews, 23 & 24 April 1971.
is called the Promotion and Selection Committee. A complete file on the officer is available to this board, together with a career summary prepared by the Military Secretary. This board places the officer in one of three categories--"X," "Y," or "Z." Category "X" connotes suitable for immediate promotion based on the assessed number of vacancies that will occur before the board is again convened (annually). Category "Y" means that the officer is suitable for promotion, but only if further vacancies occur; and "Z," that the officer is not suitable for promotion. No promotion list is published and there is no definite sequence of promotion or priority. Promotions are made as positions suitable for the officer open up. When an officer falls in "Z" category he is not told this until shortly before termination of contract/service. The Governor General, representing the Queen, is the final promotion authority.\footnote{Essex-Clark.}

Based on positive controls exercised and adjustments made in scoring by the Military Secretary, OER inflation is being held in check.

\textbf{Israel}.—The efficiency reporting system used by the Israeli Armed Forces was selected for review for two basic reasons. First, there is no record of its having been
studied previously. The second reason relates to Israel's recent combat successes and high state of military readiness.

The same report form (see Appendix T) is used for all services, including the large reserve forces. Frequency of preparation is greater than for any other OERS examined, with reports required on a semi-annual basis. Reports are also initiated upon major change of assignment or when the officer makes a "big mess." No numerical values are assigned to the overall report and each report is considered as an independent unit. The rater is not required to show the report to the rated officer unless it is a bad one.\(^{54}\)

As with the French and West German systems, the standards of the rater are graded, in this case by a "second evaluator." He completes only a portion of the form and can be classed as something between an indorsing officer and a reviewer under the U.S. Army system. There is no reviewer per se. In Item 8 of the OER, the rater is given the following situation:

Assume you are in command of a large unit and have been given a special assignment. This officer will be made available to you. How will you use him?

The rating then assesses the officer against seven basic utilization areas, for example, command of people in battle.

\(^{54}\)Jacob Shat-Ran, COL [USACGSC student], Israeli Army, personal interviews, 2 December 1970 and 25 April 1971.
This is indicative of the simplicity of the OER form. Only six traits are evaluated; the Yugoslav OER being the only report to have fewer (three). Two of the six traits relate to the officer's ability to anticipate, react, and maintain stability under the stress of unusual and special situations. Individual achievement is stressed over methods used.

Efficiency reports are of limited importance in the Israeli Army since the OER is considered only one means of judging an officer's qualification for promotion. Personal knowledge of fellow officers serves as a prime evaluation device. Examinations are used for entrance to the staff college, but they are not too important. They are primarily designed to insure that an officer adequately prepares himself through self-study prior to attending the staff college. Also, various courses must be completed for advancement to certain grades. Completion of ranger training before promotion to captain provides an example.\(^{55}\)

The Israeli Armed Forces do not appear to have an inflation problem. One contributing factor is undoubtedly lack of importance of the report. It does not play a big part in promotion or other personnel actions.\(^{56}\)

Japan.--The present OER of the Japanese Ground

\(^{55}\)Shat-Kan. \(^{56}\)Shat-Ran.
Self-Defense Force (see Appendix U) has been in effect about 20 years. The systems used by the other services are similar. Only commanders and staff principals (e.g., G4) are authorized to rate. Japan, like Canada, has a "no-show" policy for reports.

Eight basic traits are evaluated on the form (e.g., command ability), each of which must be graded. Command ability is double weighted on the point scale in comparison with the other seven traits. The rating officer is also asked to select no more than 4 personal characteristics indicative of the rated officer (e.g., stubborn, conscientious) from a field of 32 characteristics. Collectively, this adds up to a slate of 40 traits to be evaluated, more than in any other system studied for this research. The form also uses a forced ranking system.

Inflation of efficiency reports is a significant problem with the present system. "Many commanders want to be a 'good guy.'"\footnote{COL N. Matsura, Japanese Army Liaison Officer to USACGSC, personal interview, 11 February 1971.} The Ground Staff Office, Ground Self-Defense Force Central Headquarters, located in Tokyo, maintains an awareness of how commanders rate and tempers the reporting system accordingly. There is a tendency for senior officers to get higher ratings than more junior
officers, a case of grade bias. The Ground Staff Office maintains academic information (e.g., staff college) on the more junior officers as a means of more accurately determining their abilities in relation to the type of OER they receive.

As in the case of other systems, staff college attendance is an important key to success. The Japanese Army administers an extremely difficult examination to all candidates, with only 10 to 15 per cent of them passing it.\(^{58}\) The only formal instruction given to officers on policies related to the OER occurs at the staff college.

**Yugoslavia.**--The OER used by the armed forces of Yugoslavia was selected for review because of that country's status as a communist state. While a copy of the actual efficiency report could not be provided, sufficient information was made available to construct the basic format (see Appendix V).

No one below the position of brigade commander is authorized to write an OER. The report is not referred to higher authority for review, that is, a division commander, unless it falls in one of three categories: a battalion

\(^{58}\) COL Misao Matsumoto, Japanese Army Liaison Officer to USACGSC, personal interview, 23 April 1971.
commander is being rated; a high rating is being given; or a negative rating is given. In those cases where the report is referred to the reviewer, he assigns an overall rating, selecting from one of four possible ratings: extra class, excellent, very good, or good. 59 "Extra class" can be used only if a commander is being evaluated. This apparent advantage for officers occupying command positions can be seen in other areas as well. Commanders are paid about 20 per cent more than officers of like rank filling staff positions.

Only three traits are evaluated in the Yugoslav OER: character (honesty and friendship), relations with superiors and subordinates, and political/party stability. This is the least number of areas covered by any of the nine efficiency reporting systems studied.

The Yugoslav military system reportedly fosters a spirit of openness and informality among officers of all grades—"a carryover from the revolution." 60 It is customary for the subordinate to discuss his job requirements with his superior in developing a list of things that must be

59 Dusan M. Divjak, LTC [USACGSC student], Yugoslav Army, personal interviews, 12 February 1971 and 23 April 1971.

60 Divjak.
accomplished. The subsequent efficiency report is largely based on whether these tasks were in fact performed. This "requirements" approach makes the OER largely a record of mission accomplishment. Inflation does not appear to be a problem, but in the absence of more complete documentary evidence there is no way of authenticating this.

Synopsis.--Information gleaned from study of these last four OERS serves to underscore some of this chapter's earlier findings. The practice of relating rating authority to command authority was again in evidence. Examinations were again seen as an adjunct to efficiency reports in assessing officer qualifications, especially as concerns promotion. The "rate the rater" concept was again documented (Israeli Armed Forces).

The Australian method of adjusting ratings at army headquarters provides a type of approach to OER monitorship and is probably not too far removed from methods used with some of the other systems. However, it is rare indeed when such methods are discussed openly.

One new approach materialized in reviewing these last four systems: the requirements approach associated with the Yugoslav system. This is not a new method of performance appraisal since it is already being used by some
civilian firms in the United States. It is new from an OER standpoint. This technique is sometimes referred to as the "objective-focused approach." It revolves around the principle of contrasting a person's performance against pre-established objectives and against his own prior experience. The objective-focused, or requirements, approach requires careful monitoring and seems more adaptable to small organizations or armies. Also, it would seem to be a difficult approach to tie into a combat environment, where requirements are dynamic and changing minute by minute.

Chapter 4 provides an overall comparative analysis of all nine systems, along with techniques used.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has dealt with the problem of efficiency report inflation, its impact on the officer evaluation process, and the search for acceptable solutions. Comparative evaluation is viewed as the most desirable use of the OER (officer efficiency report), especially as concerns discrimination among successful officers.

The existing OERS (officer efficiency report system) can be classed as relatively effective in identifying ineffective officers, a matter of absolute value. From the standpoint of comparative value, it has been less than optimal in differentiating between officers of outstanding quality.

Several basic assumptions that were developed earlier in this thesis gave direction to the research effort. Those assumptions can be summarized as follows:

1. The OER should serve as a means of discriminating among successful officers.

2. OER inflation reduces discrimination characteristics of a system from the standpoint of comparative value.
3. Historical review of the OERS of the U.S. Army can contribute to an understanding of the inflationary phenomenon.

4. The U.S. Army can profit from the review of foreign officer evaluation systems.

5. Performance appraisal procedures cannot be studied in isolation; they must be studied as part of the military environment in which they are used.

6. The degree of effectiveness of a particular appraisal technique depends on the military system it serves.

**Summary**

Research was conducted along two separate lines. The first phase concentrated on the OERS of the U.S. Army in order to identify the magnitude of the inflation problem, to provide clues as to the underlying root causes, and to identify methods that have been employed to combat inflation. The second phase was devoted to foreign systems. This research also inquired into causes of inflation and methods used to reduce or eliminate it. Finally, data on nine efficiency reporting systems were subjected to comparative analysis.

Historical review of the OERS of the U.S. Army revealed that a pronounced inflationary tendency has been in
Evidence for more than 40 years and that it has tended to be acute since before World War II. While several techniques have been used to improve the system, including forced choice and forced ranking (both of short duration), inflation has persisted. There has been little substantive change in the OERS over the years aside from adjustment of OER format.

Survey of the various foreign systems revealed a variety of techniques being used to curb inflation. They can be reduced to 15 primary approaches to inflation control:

1. Limiting rating authority to commanders and key staff members in a headquarters (e.g., Chief of Staff).

2. Firm centralized administrative control and monitorship.

3. Requiring that all "outstanding" reports be referred to the highest authority for perusal (e.g., Ministry of Defence).

4. Maximum use of automatic data processing to monitor rating trends and to identify problem areas.

5. Adjustment of ratings at the highest level (e.g., Ministry of Defence) based on trend information concerning the standards of various rating officials.

6. Threat of reprisal against rating officials who habitually overrate or underrate subordinates.
7. Publicizing the fact that rater standards are subject to review.

8. Expansion of the rating scale (e.g., from seven to nine adjectival levels) to encourage a more normal distribution pattern.

9. Using multiple means of appraising officer capabilities to take pressure off the OER.

10. Use of a forced ranking system of appraisal.

11. Use of forced distribution to insure that ratings conform to a prescribed pattern.

12. Officer reviewing the report to either "rate the rater" or grade the validity of the rating given.

13. Use of extremely precise reporting procedures as a means of improving the objectivity of the rating.

14. Prohibiting the rated officer from seeing his efficiency reports on the premise that the rating official will then be more inclined to render an honest appraisal.

15. Limiting rating authority to field grade officers on the premise that their ratings will be more objective than those submitted by less experienced officers.

Review of the foreign systems also served to reveal that more subtle factors producing inflation control are an inbred sense of high integrity, confidence in the system, and an officer corps conditioned to accept realistic ratings.
Table 4 compares each of the nine efficiency reporting systems in terms of inflation, administrative considerations, and evaluation techniques used. The systems are compared in 26 separate areas. This table highlights some of the principal findings of the study. It can be seen that five of the foreign systems have either eliminated inflation or appear to have it under some degree of control. It would be premature to judge the new West German system, but there are signs that it will ease the inflation problem. From a comparison point of view, the U.S. Army's system was found to be basically devoid of any real device for control of inflation.

The comparative analysis yielded some significant facts. All eight foreign systems limit rating authority to commanders or key staff officials. Three of them employ a "rate the rater" concept; four provide for adjustment of ratings at the highest level to compensate for "hard" and "easy" raters. Five of the reporting systems limit rating authority to field grade officers, four of them calling for lieutenant colonel. Six of the officer evaluation programs use examinations to determine promotion, staff college eligibility, or both. None of the systems use an indorsing officer per se.

It would be illogical to assume that performance
### TABLE 4

**Comparative Analysis of U.S. Army and Foreign Military Officer Efficiency Reporting Systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Inflation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Administrative Considerations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Officer population served by OES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Office OES used for all officers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Annual frequency of evaluations</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Inducing system similar to U.S. Army OES (continuous reporting without change in personnel)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Number of review briefs (excluding briefs)</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Officers receive regular instructions related to OES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Frankly provided for jobs requiring officer in order to perform</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Minimum grade for rate or a general rule</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Practices for advancement or regrading of report based on standards of the rate</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Number of staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Percentage of OES plans for junior and senior officers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. OES shared by officer</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Officer must serve under rate for which minimum period?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Only commanders of OES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. Efficiency instructions used</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Staff planning</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q. Staff training</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Testing on all officers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Tests evaluated (e.g., personality)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Save the report concept used (as part of OES)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
appraisal techniques that work with one system will automatically work with disparate systems. Foreign systems, even those used by a sister service, must be analyzed carefully, for they are in part a product of the military environment that spawned them. As a corollary, any foreign system or technique that contrasts sharply with the historical and psychological framework of the U.S. Army's system may prove difficult to assimilate. At the same time, pre-conditioning of the officer corps to accept change, and phasing of changes, can significantly improve the acceptability and usableness of a new system.

Is a new efficiency reporting system needed in the U.S. Army to bring inflation under control? This study has shown that a significant shift in the efficiency report form is probably not required, but if the rating instrument is to be effective, certain changes in the administration of the evaluation procedures need to be made. Few of the primary approaches currently in use by allied military forces relate directly to performance appraisal techniques. Most relate to the manner in which the program is administered and monitored.

Perhaps the most essential ingredients for an effective efficiency reporting system are:

1. Positive centralized administrative control,
automated to the maximum extent possible.

2. An environment which places high value on professionalism and integrity.

3. Limiting rating authority to experienced officers.

4. Educating the officer corps on a continuing basis in efficiency reporting procedures.

5. Exercise of command authority and supervision to guard against those officers who find it impossible to rate subordinates with reasonable objectivity.

Conclusions

The conclusions resulting from this research are as follows:

1. Inflation can be brought under control.

2. The administrative framework within which the efficiency report operates is at least as important as the performance appraisal techniques used.

3. Certain foreign military efficiency reporting techniques, especially in the administrative area, should be considered for adoption by the U.S. Army.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this research report it is recommended that:
1. Greater stress be placed on objectivity and integrity of reporting.

2. Rating authority be restricted to field grade positions and above.

3. Commanders be required to monitor all reports initiated within their immediate commands with a view to controlling inflation.

4. Tight administrative discipline be imposed through the establishment of a central monitoring office for officer efficiency reports at Department of the Army level.

5. Serious consideration be given to the use of examinations as part of the promotion selection process as an additional evaluation device.

6. OER format and processing be designed to make maximum use of automation.

7. Statistics be maintained covering the rating standard of each officer in relation to established guidelines and trends, with provision for adjustment of ratings at Department of the Army level based on established standards.

8. All officer basic and advanced courses, as well as the course at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, include instruction in the basic purposes of the OER and in policies and procedures associated with it.
9. Liaison be maintained with allied military forces so that the U.S. Army and they might capitalize on each other's innovations.

10. Officers be shown their efficiency reports at the time they are initiated in order to increase confidence in the officer efficiency reporting system.

11. Any new study of the OERS should consider the human side effects of a departure from past methodology.
APPENDIX A: SOURCES OF ERROR COMMON TO PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL*

1. A willingness to rate subordinates who may be virtually unknown.

2. An unwillingness to take the time or make the effort to analyze subordinates thoroughly.

3. Differences in rater temperament—some are over-friendly, others are overcritical.

4. The "halo effect"—if the man is liked, he is seen as excelling in every trait; if disliked, as deficient in every trait.

5. The overweighting of recent occurrences, either favorable or unfavorable.

6. The "sunflower" effect—the need to give superiors information which will not embarrass the rater ("None of my men is less than 100%—I wouldn’t keep him").

7. The need to second-guess superiors—to tell them what they want to hear.

8. The need to play politics—to use the ratings to curry subordinates’ favor.

9. The reluctance to make adverse ratings for fear they might have to be discussed with the employee.

10. The use of ratings for an ulterior purpose—to justify giving or withholding raises or promotions.

11. The lack of uniform criteria or standards of performance from rater to rater.

12. Personal prejudice or bias on the part of the rater -- "All Swedes are squareheads."

13. Extreme rater indecisiveness -- the inability to make a categorical judgment.

14. Lack of analytical ability on the part of the rater -- the inability to see causal relationships.

15. "Central tendency" -- the reluctance of the rater to rate either high or low, the wish to stick to "good" or "average."

16. A proneness to wishful thinking -- "Everyone is promotable, perhaps in five years."
APPENDIX B: FORM 67

EFFICIENCY REPORT.

A. OFFICER REPORTED UPON:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service Date</th>
<th>Length of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

B. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service Date</th>
<th>Length of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

C. STATIONS SERVED AT:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service Date</th>
<th>Length of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

D. CONSIDER CAREFULLY THESE DEFINITIONS, KEEP THEM IN MIND WHEN RATING, AND COMPARE THE OFFICER WITH OTHERS IN SAME GRADE.

1. EXCEPTIONALLY POOR: Performance of duty; exceptionally lacking in qualification considered below average; duty not performed as well as should reasonably be expected under circumstances; not entirely satisfactory.
2. AVERAGE: Duty well performed; up to standard; qualification satisfactory.
3. ABOVE AVERAGE: Duty performed markedly better than could reasonably be expected under circumstances; qualified in marked degree.
4. EXCEPTIONALLY EFFICIENT: Exceptionally efficient performance of duty; qualified in a very exceptional degree.

E. DUTIES PERFORMED:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service Date</th>
<th>Length of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

F. WHAT DEGREE OF SUCCESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED UNDER THE FOLLOWING HEADINGS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heading</th>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service Date</th>
<th>Length of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

G. RATING IS BASED ON PERSONAL OBSERVATION OR OFFICIAL REPORTS DURING PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT. (See part D above.)

H. TO WHAT DEGREE HAS THE OFFICER EXHIBITED THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATIONS? CONSIDER HIS COMPARISON WITH OTHERS IN HIS GRADE AND INDICATE YOUR ESTIMATE BY MARKING X IN THE APPROPRIATE RECTANGLE. (See part D above.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service Date</th>
<th>Length of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

I. HAS THIS OFFICER—CONTEMPORARY, MORAL, PHYSICAL, ETC.—WHICH ADVERSELY AFFECTED HIS EFFICIENCY? IF YES, DESCRIBE THE (FACT... OR OPINION. Like our one.) (See para. 7 and 8 of instructions.)

W. D. A. G. O. Form No. 91

Page 113
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of officer reported on</th>
<th>Name of reporting officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**K.** Proper authority having decided on the methods and procedure to accomplish a certain end, does he render willing and generous support regardless of his personal views in the matter?  

**L.** Since last report has he been mentioned favorably or unfavorably in official communications? If yes, list one or two.  

**M.** During the period covered by this report was he the subject of any disciplinary measure that should be included on his record? If yes, list one or two.  

**N.** Write a brief general estimate of this officer in your own words.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q. How long have you known him?</th>
<th>R. How well do you know him?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**P.** In case any undesirable services have been made by you on this report, were the deficiencies indicated herein brought to the attention of the officer concerned while under your command and prior to the rendition of this report? If yes, what improvement, if any, was noted? (See par. 2, Instructions.)  

**Q.** I certify that all entries made herein are true and impartial to the best of my knowledge and belief and are based on personal observation or official reports. (Sign.)  

**(Name typed).**  

**(Grade and Org.).**  

**(Moder. Rank).**  

**(Date).**  

**(Inc.**  

See par. 2, 10, 15, AR 200-50, and pr 11 of instructions.  

**1st ENDORSEMENT.**
APPENDIX C: DA FORM 67-1

EFFICIENCY REPORT

Section I. OFFICER REPORTED UPON

Last Name
First Name
Initial
Grade
Duty Assignment
Component
Period of Report

Section II. DATA AND SUGGESTIONS FOR USE IN ASSIGNMENT

A. DUTIES ACTUALLY PERFORMED ON PRESENT JOB. To be supplied by Rater. Be specific. Give his duty assignment and all additional duties with enough specific detail to show scope of job in each area.

B. DESCRIPTION OF OFFICER RATED AND COMMENTS. These paragraphs should cover physical, mental, moral qualities of rated officer; satisfactory or unsatisfactory; with which information in this section is to be served.

C. ESTIMATED DESIRABILITY IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES. Assume you are a commander of a major unit in war. Indicate to what extent you would choose the rated officer to serve under you in the next higher grade in each type of duty described below. Place an X in the proper box, using the shaded NA area if the duty is not applicable. If line is used, specify the nature of the specialty.

D. IMMEDIATE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CAREER DEVELOPMENT. Be specific.

E. ENTRIES ARE BASED ON NAME (Raters Will Check)

NOT REPRODUCIBLE
Section III. OFFICER REPORTED UPON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>FIRST NAME</th>
<th>INITIAL</th>
<th>SEXIFUAL SHRINKER</th>
<th>GRADLE</th>
<th>ARM OR SERVICE</th>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>PERIOD OF REPORT</th>
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<td>FROM TO</td>
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</table>

Section IV. JOB PROFICIENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sheet Carefully</th>
<th>Section V. JOB PROFICIENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

NOT REPRODUCIBLE
### Section VI. PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS

Use ELECTROGRAPHIC PENCIL, following same directions as for Section IV. Make ONE mark in EACH column for each set of items.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.</th>
<th>B.</th>
<th>C.</th>
<th>D.</th>
<th>E.</th>
<th>F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal work &amp; with his</td>
<td>honesty of the personnel.</td>
<td>Type of man everyone</td>
<td>Won't organize &amp; establish</td>
<td>cares &amp; looks forward</td>
<td>leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because of the personality.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mental concentration.</td>
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<td>Thinks only of himself.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Won't organize &amp;</td>
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<td>establish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type of man everyone</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cares &amp; looks forward</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leadership.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Section VII. PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS

Use ELECTROGRAPHIC PENCIL, following same directions as for Section V. MARK ALL SIX QUALIFICATIONS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOR RATING OFFICER</th>
<th>FOR PROMOTING OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The degree to which he is able to meet situations without loss of his cool without uncharacteristic speed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The degree to which he is able and willing to work with other officers and enlisted men.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The degree to which he can put on his own responsibility in absence of superior.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The degree to which he can adjust to sudden changes in the organization.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The degree to which he can appear to general &amp; superior officers in his rank &amp; younger.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The degree to which he can carry out orders with minimum &amp; maximum of general dispositions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Section VIII. OVER-ALL RELATIVE RANK

FOR RATEE ONLY

The number of officers in this grade rated by me at this time is ____________________________

If these officers were arranged in order, making the average of this group equal to the Army, then highest (No. 1) to lowest, the officer would be the highest, No. Of the highest rated rated.

### Section IX. AUTHENTICATION

The typewriter or pen, except for signatures.

SIGNATURE OF RATING OFFICER

SIGNATURE OF PROMOTING OFFICER

NAME, GRADE, AND ORGANIZATION OR UNIT

NAME, GRADE, AND ORGANIZATION OR UNIT

OFFICIAL STATUS OF RATED OFFICER WITH RESPECT TO RATING OFFICER

OFFICIAL STATUS OF RATED OFFICER WITH RESPECT TO PROMOTING OFFICER
## OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORT

### SECTION I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Last Name - First Name - Initial</th>
<th>2. Service Number</th>
<th>3. Grade</th>
<th>4. Control Number</th>
<th>5. Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### UNIT, ORGANIZATION, AND STATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. Unit, Office, Service Number and Organization or Unit of Rating Officer</th>
<th>7. Period of Report</th>
<th>8. Date of Entry</th>
<th>Leave Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### RATING OFFICER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. Name, Office, Service Number and Organization or Unit of Rating Officer</th>
<th>10. Name, Grade, Service Number and Organization or Unit of Rating Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION II

#### REASON FOR REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### DUTIES ACTUALLY PERFORMED ON PRESENT JOB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. Duties Actually Performed on Present Job (Give his duty assignments, and briefly describe major additional duties)</th>
<th>15. Units Actually Assigned to Rate Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### ENTITIES ARE BASED ON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. Entities Are Based On</th>
<th>17. Official Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observation of 30-50 Duty Days</td>
<td>Observation of 50 Duty Days or More</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### DESCRIPTION OF OFFICER RATED AND COMMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18. Description of Officer Rated and Comments (These paragraphs should cover physical, mental, and emotional qualities of rated officer; and any special strengths or weaknesses affecting his ability to do certain assignments not covered elsewhere in the report)</th>
<th>19. Comments of Rating Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION III

#### COMMENTS OF SUPERVISING OFFICER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>20. Comments of Supervising Officer</th>
<th>21. I Do Not Know the Rated Officer But I Have Confidence in the Ratee's Judgment</th>
<th>22. I Do Not Know the Rated Officer Very Well But I Have Confidence in the Ratee's Judgment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### RATER'S CERTIFICATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>23. I Certify That to the Best of My Knowledge and Belief All Entries Made Herein By Me Are True and impartial and Are in Accordance With an 800-150.</th>
<th>24. Signature of Rater</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### RATED OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>25. I Certify That to the Best of My Knowledge and Belief All Entries Made Herein By Me Are True and impartial and Are in Accordance With an 800-150.</th>
<th>26. Signature of Rated Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### FORMAL RELATION TO RATED OFFICER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>27. Formal Relation to Rated Officer</th>
<th>28. Initials of Personnel Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION IV

#### THIS REPORT WAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>29. This Report Was Exemplified (Initials If Appropriate)</th>
<th>30. Entered On Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX D: DA FORM 67-2

**NOTE:** DA Form 67-2 replaces DA Form 67-1, 1 April 1957, which becomes obsolete effective 1 July 1961.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section II</th>
<th>Estimated Desirability in Various Capacities</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Inference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Commands a Unit</td>
<td>Rater 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Serve as a Staff Officer</td>
<td>Rater 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Work as a Specialist, Professional Person, or Technician</td>
<td>Rater 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Teach in a Classroom Situation</td>
<td>Rater 4</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Serve in a Capacity Involving Many Contacts with Civilian Personnel</td>
<td>Rater 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Carry Out an Assignment Involving Mostly Administrative Work</td>
<td>Rater 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Represent Your Viewpoint in Liaison Activites</td>
<td>Rater 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Make Decisions and Take Action in Your Absence</td>
<td>Rater 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Responsible in an Emergency Requiring Courageous Leadership</td>
<td>Rater 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Other Specifics</td>
<td>Rater 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For technical services, administrative services, or staff, interpret this to mean managerial responsibilities commensurate with command.

**Section III**

A. Performance of Duty—Comparing Only Officers of the Same Grade and Branch with the Same Commissioned Service, Rate the Officer or Performance of His Duty Assignment, Read All Descriptions and Place a Heavy X in the Box Opposite Best Description.

1. Equals or Better Officer I Work with in Performance of This Duty
2. Typically Adequate Performance of This Duty
3. Very Fine Performance of Duty Such a Nature That This Officer Would be Hard to Replace
4. Performing this Duty in Such a Competent, Dependable Manner That This Officer is an Asset to the Service
5. Usually Performing this Duty Competently
6. Barely Adequate in the Performance of This Duty
7. Inadequate in the Performance of This Duty

If in the Event of Immediate Mobilization, What is the Highest Level of Performance You Would Expect from the Rated Officer Read All Descriptions and Place a Heavy X in the Box Opposite Best Description.

1. Would Give an Outstanding Performance at the Grade Equal Higher
2. Would Give a Competent and Dependable Performance at the Grade Same Status
3. Would Give a Fairly Adequate Performance at the Grade Lower

**Section IV**

A. What is Your Estimate of the Rated Officer's Overall Value to the Service Compared to Officers of the Same Grade, Branch and of about the Same Length of Commissioned Service, Place a Heavy X Opposite Most Appropriate Description.

1. A Very Fine Officer Who is a District Asset to the Service
2. A Competent, Dependable Officer of Great Value to the Service
3. A Typical Effective Officer Who has a Credit to the Army
4. An Acceptable Officer Whose Value is Limited in Some Respects
5. An Officer Who Performs Acceptably in a Limited Range of Assignments, But Who Could Easily Be Replaced

**Section V**

A. An Officer Who Does Not Have the Qualification That One Should Reasonably Expect in an Officer
APPENDIX E: DA FORM 67-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(APR 1970-73 and DECEMBER 1973)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAST NAME</th>
<th>FIRST NAME</th>
<th>MIDDLE INITIAL</th>
<th>SERVICE NO.</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>BRANCH</th>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, AND STATION OF RATED OFFICER

5. SERVICE NO.

6. PERIOD OF REPORT

7. DUTY DATE

8. OTHER DATES

9. REASON FOR REPORT

10. BASIS FOR RATING OFFICER'S ENTITLES

11. DUTIES ACTUALLY PERFORMED ON PRESENT JOB ASSIGNMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF DUTIES COMPLETED</th>
<th>NUMBER OF DUTIES NOT COMPLETED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

12. OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

13. OFFICER'S NAME

14. RATING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT

15. RATING OFFICER'S NAME

16. PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

DATE

SIGNATURE

I CERTIFY THAT THE OFFICER IS EFFICIENT AND CONFORMS TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GRADE ON THE BASIS OF THE RATING

17. THIS REPORT HAS

18. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 66 PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

DA FORM 67-3

REPLACES DA ADD FORM 66, I SEP 55, WHICH WILL BE COMPLETE BY OCT 80.

NOT REPRODUCIBLE
RATED OFFICER'S NAME AND SERVICE NUMBER

SECTION II: ESTIMATED DEREGIBILITY IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES

Indicate the extent to which you would desire the rated officer to serve under you in each type of duty described below. Place an X in the proper box. Consider each item in terms appropriate to rated officer's grade and branch. Use the UNCLASSIFIED column only if the nature of your contacts makes it impractical for you to grade an estimate of his probable effectiveness in a particular assignment. Nothing UNCLASSIFIED does not qualify the rated officer.

RATER

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</tbody>
</table>

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary.

SECTION III: PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

Considering only officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, what is your opinion of this officer's performance of duty assignments? Place all descriptors and place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary.

SECTION IV: PROMOTION POTENTIAL

Considering officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, what is your opinion of this officer's promotion potential? Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary.

SECTION V: OVERALL VALUE

What in your opinion of the rated officer's overall value to the service? Compare him with officers of the same grade, branch, and about the same time in grade. Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary.
APPENDIX F: DA FORM 67-4

IMPORTANT: THE PREPARATION OF AN EFFICIENT AND ACCURATE REPORT IS RESPONSIBILITY, BOTH INDIVIDUAL AND THAT OF THE SUPERVISING OFFICER. EACH INDIVIDUAL WILL HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE IN THE PREPARATION OF HIS REPORT SERIOUSLY, AND ALL INDIVIDUALS WILL BE REQUIRED TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT REPORTS TO THEIR SUPERVISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS.

SECTION I: PERSONAL DATA OF OFFICER BEING RATED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME (First Name</th>
<th>Last Initial)</th>
<th>SERVICE NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE OF BIRTH</th>
<th>BRANCH OF SERVICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>DUTY PERIOD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

DUTY ASSIGNMENT FOR RATED PERIOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTY</th>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>HOSPITALIZED</th>
<th>AMBULANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES PERFORMED

SECTION II: BEACON REPORT BEING RATED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REASON FOR RATING</th>
<th>RATING OFFICER</th>
<th>RATED OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNDER/ABOVE</th>
<th>REFILED</th>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

CHANGE DUTY RATED OFFICER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>DUTY</th>
<th>NEW DUTY</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION III: DESCRIPTION OF RATED OFFICER AND COMMENTS

Comments will reflect your appraisal of this officer and will emphasize strengths, weaknesses, behavior, personality, character or other qualities which distinguish this officer. Comment will be made on this officer's present physical ability to perform in an active and efficient manner as required by his grade and branch.

RATING OFFICER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATING OFFICER</th>
<th>INDICATING OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>REVIEWING OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>REPORT WAS SUBMITTED BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORT

(AR 321-1957)
**SECTION IV - ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF OTHER DUTIES**

Estimate the level at which the rated officer would perform in each type of duty described below, indicating for each item the appropriate number shown in the Performance Legend. The Performance Legend indicates six steps with the farthest indicating a level of performance considered unsuitable for a commissioned officer. Consider each item in terms of the general performance to be expected in rated officer's grade and branch. Use the UNKNOWN (UN) only if the nature of your experience makes it impossible for you to make an estimate of the probable performance in a particular assignment. **UN** indicates that the officer does not possess the rated officer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERFORMANCE LEGEND</th>
<th>0 = UNKNOWNS</th>
<th>1 = SATISFACTORY</th>
<th>2 = EXCELLENT</th>
<th>3 = VERY SATISFACTORY</th>
<th>4 = OUTSTANDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DUTIES</td>
<td>RATE</td>
<td>RATING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. COMMAND A TACTICAL UNIT</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. COMMAND A NON-TACTICAL UNIT</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Serve as a Staff Officer</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Serve as an Instructor</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Serve in a capacity involving contacts with other services and/or agencies of the U.S. Government</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Serve in an agency requiring appreciation of sound public relations</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Carry out an assignment involving mostly administrative duties</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Serve in an agency requiring appreciation of detail or detail</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION V - TRAITS, QUALITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS**

Describe carefully the traits or qualities which apply in some degree to all officers. These include personal characteristics, social qualities, and abilities which would be expected in the rated officer. If considered appropriate, a weakness of this kind would be listed below in the column for weaknesses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABLE TO INFLUENCE AND INVEST OTHERS</th>
<th>RATES</th>
<th>RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Able and capable and informed</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Works practical, efficiently</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Shows judgment and common sense</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Shows initiative</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Accepts responsibility</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Gets along well with people</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Can work under difficult conditions</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Launched to manage</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Will set the example</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Loyal to superiors</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION VI - PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTY**

Consider the performance of the officer in the present duty and state the time in years that the officer has served in the present duty. Also consider the performance of the officer in any other duties and state whether the officer has been promoted to the next higher grade. The officer's performance in the present duty and other duties should be stated in general terms and not in specific data or measures. The officer's performance should be rated on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest rating.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTY</th>
<th>RATES</th>
<th>RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Exceeds performance of the duty</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Performs the duty in an excellent manner</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Performs the duty in a satisfactory manner</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Performs the duty in a mediocre manner</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Performs the duty in a poor manner</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION VII - PROMOTION POTENTIAL**

Consider carefully the officer's background, branch, and the time that has elapsed since the officer was last promoted. A rating of 10 does not indicate that the officer is promotable on the basis of this factor alone. A rating of 9 indicates that the officer is promotable on the basis of this factor alone. A rating of 8 indicates that the officer is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROMOTION POTENTIAL</th>
<th>RATES</th>
<th>RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Has reached the present grade</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Has exceeded the present grade with ability</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and recommendations</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and recommendations and health</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and health and work performance</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and health and work performance and educational qualifications</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and health and work performance and educational qualifications and other factors</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION VIII - OVERALL VALUE TO SERVICE**

Consider carefully the officer's background, branch, and the time that has elapsed since the officer was last promoted. A rating of 10 does not indicate that the officer is promotable on the basis of this factor alone. A rating of 9 indicates that the officer is promotable on the basis of this factor alone. A rating of 8 indicates that the officer is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVERALL VALUE TO SERVICE</th>
<th>RATES</th>
<th>RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and recommendations</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and recommendations and health</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and health and work performance</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and health and work performance and educational qualifications</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and health and work performance and educational qualifications and other factors</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and health and work performance and educational qualifications and other factors and references</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Is promotable on the basis of this factor alone with additional qualification and references and health and work performance and educational qualifications and other factors and references and recommendations</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX G: DA FORM 67-5

**NOT REPRODUCIBLE**
APPENDIX H: DA FORM 67-6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART I: PERSONAL DATA</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIRST NAME</td>
<td>MIDDLE INITIAL</td>
<td>SERVICE NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART II: REPORTING PERIOD AND DUTY DATA</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM</td>
<td>TO</td>
<td>DAILY CONTACT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART III: AUTHENTICATION</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGNATURE OF PERSONAL OFFICER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART IV: PERSONAL QUALITIES</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOP</td>
<td>SECOND</td>
<td>MIDDLE</td>
<td>BOTTOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART V: RATING</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL OFFICER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART VI: ATTACHMENTS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. ADAPTABILITY (Adaptable to new or changing situations)
2. ABSENCE (Prompt and welcome, within bounds of military necessity, additional and more important responsibilities)
3. APPEARANCE (Possesses military bearing and is neat, smart, and well-groomed)
4. COOPERATION (Works in harmony with others as a team member)
5. DECISIONS (Ability to reach conclusions promptly and clearly in definite courses of action)
6. DEPENDABILITY (Consistently accomplishes desired actions with minimum supervision)
7. ENTERPRISE (Initiative takes his own initiative and personal initiative)
8. ENTHUSIASM (Enthusiastic action, approach)
9. INNOVATION (Creative ability in developing means to solve problems)
10. INTELLIGENCE (Uses necessary and appropriate action on his own)
11. INTEGRITY (Advances in principles of honesty and moral courage)
12. INTELLIGENCE (Acquires knowledge and gains expert proficiency)
13. INVENTION (Takes initiative and makes practical decisions)
14. LOYALTY (Fidelity and support in support and subordinates)
15. MORAL COURAGE (Courageous honesty, willingness to stand up and be counted)
16. NON-DUTY CONDUCT (Keeps the personal nature in order)
17. SELF-DISCIPLINE (Conduct himself in accordance with the high or standards)
18. SELF-EFFICIENCY (Takes action to improve himself)
19. SELFLESSNESS (Subordinates his personal welfare to that of the organization)
20. SOCIALITY (Participates fully and actively in social and community activities)
21. STABILITY (Performs successfully under prolonged physical and mental stress)
22. TACT (Tact in dealing with people)
23. UNDERSTANDING (Appreciation for the needs and viewpoints of others)

DA FORM 67-6 REPLACES DA FORM 67-6, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

U.S. ARMY OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORT (AR 623-105)

NOT REPRODUCIBLE
PART V. DUTY ASSIGNMENT FOR RATED PERIOD (Read paragraph 4-15, AR 612-102)

A. PRINCIPAL DUTY
B. DUTY REQ
C. RATING

4. Major Additional Duties

PART VI. PERFORMANCE OF DUTY FACTORS (Read paragraph 4-15, AR 612-102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEGREE</th>
<th>TOP</th>
<th>SECOND</th>
<th>MIDDLE</th>
<th>FOURTH</th>
<th>BOTTOM</th>
<th>NOT OBSERVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RATER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Exhibits a professional knowledge of assigned duties
B. Manages resources efficiently and economically
C. Establishes and achieves high standards of performance
D. Fullfills his responsibilities in the development of subordinates
E. Plans beyond the immediate requirements of assigned duties
F. Delegates authority as appropriate
G. Exercises proper degree of supervision
H. Commands confidence and respect
I. Accepts full responsibility for his actions
J. Willingly accepts and acts upon suggestions and constructive criticism
K. Expresses himself clearly and concisely orally
L. Expresses himself clearly and concisely in writing
M. Maintains an appropriate level of physical fitness
N. Has concern for the welfare of subordinates

PART VII. DEMONSTRATES PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DUTY (Read paragraph 4-15, AR 612-102)

| RATER | INQUIRY | PERFORMS THIS DUTY BETTER THAN ANY OTHER OFFICER I KNOW
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY EQUALD BY VERY FEW OFFICERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY AS GOOD AS MOST OFFICERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY MEETS MINIMUM STANDARDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY IN AN UNSATISFACTORY MANNER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART VIII. PROMOTION POTENTIAL (Read paragraph 4-15, AR 612-102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATER</th>
<th>INQUIRY</th>
<th>PROMOTE THIS OFFICER AHEAD OF CONTEMPORARIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DO NOT PROMOTE THIS OFFICER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART IX. SCHOOLING POTENTIAL (Read paragraph 4-15, AR 612-102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATER</th>
<th>INQUIRY</th>
<th>OTHER (Specify below)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART XI. COMMENTS (Read paragraph 4-15, AR 612-102)

A. INQUIRY ( ) AM UNABLE TO EVALUATE THIS OFFICER FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

PART XII. OVER-ALL VALUE TO THE SERVICE (Read paragraph 4-15, AR 612-102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATER</th>
<th>INQUIRY</th>
<th>RANKING WITHIN OVERALL GROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. RANKING OF THIS OFFICER IN COMPARISON WITH ALL OFFICERS OF THIS GRADE AND BRANCH WHO ARE WELL ENOUGH TO RATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATER</th>
<th>INQUIRY</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* OPO: 1946 0 — 300-787/611
APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ON OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORTING SYSTEM

TO: ______________________________________

SUBJECT: Officer Efficiency Reporting System--Questionnaire

1. A new officer efficiency report system is due for field testing later this year. Responses to this questionnaire survey will be provided to DCSPER, DA, for consideration in developing the new system. The information will also be used in fulfilling a student research requirement here at the College.

2. This questionnaire is more meaningful than most you will receive in that your response may influence Army thinking on this subject. Your cooperation will also be greatly appreciated by a fellow student.

3. Questionnaires should be returned to

Major Robert L. Dilworth
Section (Lucky) 13
QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Basic information:
   Rank_________ Branch_________
   Active Commissioned Service: _____years + _____months

2. Approximately how many efficiency reports have you completed as a rater (not indorser) in the last 10 years?
   10 or less____ 11-20____ 21-30____ 40 or more____

3. Which functional category best represents your primary overall career experience?
   Combat:___ Combat Support___ Combat Service Support___

4. Is our present OER system effective in identifying officers of little potential value to the service?
   Yes_____ No_____  

5. Do you feel that the present OER system effectively identifies those officers having the greatest future potential (future colonels and generals)?
   Yes_____ No_____

6. How would you rate efficiency reports you have received?
   _____Accurately portrayed my abilities.
   _____Tended to underrate my abilities.
   _____Overrated my abilities.

7. Could the OER system be improved by using one form of report for company grade officers and another for all other grades?
   Yes_____ No_____
8. Which of the following appraisal techniques would serve to improve our system of determining the relative merit and potential of army officers? Which techniques would you be willing to accept? (Circle Y (Yes) or N (No).)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Would Improve</th>
<th>Am Willing</th>
<th>To Accept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peer Rating (evaluation of your abilities by contemporaries)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Choice (select phrases most descriptive of the officer)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodic Written Examination (every two years)--as one device for determining branch qualification</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Ranking (commander or supervisor forced to rank his officers numerically from top to bottom)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading of the Counseling Requirement</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to a relative ranking in academic reports prepared by service schools</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Which of the following statements most accurately reflect your views? (You may select more than one.)

- The efficiency report should always be shown to the rated officer.
- The rating officer will tend to render a more objective appraisal if he knows the rated officer will not see the report.
- I do not object to a "no show" policy so long as I am properly counseled (know where I stand) and the report receives judicious review at all levels.

[There is more to Item 9.]
The efficiency report should never be shown to the rated officer.

10. How do you view inflation of efficiency ratings?

   ____ Overplayed, not really a problem.
   ____ Can be considered a minor problem.
   ____ Can be considered a significant problem.
   ____ The single most important problem with the present system.

11. Certain foreign officer efficiency report systems provide for rating the standards of the rater. Under this system the indorsing officer or reviewing official rates the rater in completing his portion of the report. This normally entails selection of the appropriate entry (too hard, fair, average, lenient). Do you recommend use of this technique with the U.S. Army OER system?

   Yes____   No____

12. Should there be a different type efficiency report for combat type positions as opposed to Combat Support/Combat Service Support?

   Yes____   No____

13. Is the officer corps being given sufficient instruction in the purpose and use of efficiency reports?

   Yes____   No____

14. Comments, if any (on reverse side).

THANK YOU FOR TAKING TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

/s/ Robert L. Dilworth
ROBERT L. DILWORTH, MAJ, AGC
SECTION 13
APPENDIX J: DETAILED SUMMARY OF RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE

Composition of officer sample:

U.S. Army officers attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Class of 1970-71.

A random sampling of 247 officers was selected (every fifth officer from the official alphabetical class roster). Minor adjustment in the basic sampling technique was required to insure coverage of all branches.

A total of 208 officers (84 per cent) responded.

Grade distribution: lieutenant colonels/48; majors/160.

Active commissioned service: (No indication/5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Years</th>
<th>No. of Officers</th>
<th>No. of Years</th>
<th>No. of Officers</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>12</td>
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Branch distribution: (No indication/6)

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<tr>
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<th>No. of Officers</th>
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<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>MC</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>MP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>0 (continued)</td>
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Branch distribution: (continued)

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<td>VC</td>
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<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>WA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Primary overall career interest: (No indication/6)

- Combat: 62
- Combat Support: 82
- Combat Service Support: 58

Tabulation of response information:

**Question 4**—Is our present OER system effective in identifying officers of little potential value to the service?

- Yes/139
- No/67
- No indication/2

**Question 5**—Do you feel that the present OER system effectively identifies those officers having the greatest future potential (future colonels and generals)?

- Yes/73
- No/129
- No indication/6

**Question 6**—How would you rate efficiency reports you have received?

- Accurately portrayed my abilities: 82
- Tended to underrate my abilities: 10
- Overrated my abilities: 92
- More than one answer checked: 21
- No indication: 3

**Question 7**—Could the OER system be improved by using one form of report for company grade officers and another for all other grades? ("No indication" response includes "Undecided.")

- Yes/92
- No/94
- No indication/22
Question 8--Which of the following appraisal techniques would serve to improve our system of determining the relative merit and potential of army officers? Which techniques would you be willing to accept?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Would Improve System</th>
<th>Am Willing To Accept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peer Rating</td>
<td>Yes: 55   No: 142   Blank: 11</td>
<td>Yes: 75   No: 124   Blank: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Choice</td>
<td>Yes: 78   No: 123  Blank: 7</td>
<td>Yes: 120  No: 84   Blank: 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Examination</td>
<td>Yes: 90   No: 113  Blank: 5</td>
<td>Yes: 117  No: 85   Blank: 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forced Ranking</td>
<td>Yes: 58   No: 143  Blank: 9</td>
<td>Yes: 89   No: 114  Blank: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling</td>
<td>Yes: 179  No: 28   Blank: 1</td>
<td>Yes: 189  No: 13   Blank: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Ranking</td>
<td>Yes: 33   No: 170  Blank: 5</td>
<td>Yes: 76   No: 127  Blank: 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 9--Which of the following statements most accurately reflect your views? (You may select more than one.)

- Efficiency report should always be shown to rated officer. 185
- Rating officer will tend to render a more objective appraisal if he knows rated officer will not see report. 28
- I do not object to "no show" policy so long as I am properly counseled (know where I stand) and report receives judicious review at all levels. 55
- Efficiency report should never be shown to rated officer. 2

Question 10--How do you view inflation of efficiency ratings?

- Overplayed, not really a problem 9
- Minor problem 34
- Significant problem 92
- Single most important problem 72
- Don't know 1

Question 11--Certain foreign officer efficiency report systems provide for rating the standards of the rater. Under this system the indorsing officer or reviewing official rates the rater in completing his portion of
the report. This normally entails selection of the appropriate entry (too hard, fair, average, lenient). Do you recommend use of this technique with the U.S. Army OER system?

Yes/116  No/85  No indication/7

Question 12—Should there be a different type efficiency report for combat type positions as opposed to Combat Support/Combat Service Support?

Yes/55  No/150  Don't know/3

Question 13—Is the officer corps being given sufficient instruction in the purpose and use of efficiency reports?

Yes/77  No/130  Undecided/1

Question 14—Comments, if any.

A total of 55 officers submitted comments. The more substantive comments are shown in Appendix K.

Correlation of response information for Questions 6 and 10. Q6 concerned officer's personal experience with OER; Q10, his overall viewpoint on inflation. In matching response to Q6 and Q10, 12 combinations were possible. (Multiple response to either question was disregarded.) Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination</th>
<th>Question 6</th>
<th>Question 10</th>
<th>Number Matching</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No problem</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant problem</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Single most important problem</td>
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<td>Accurate</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Single most important problem</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Underrated</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Single most important problem</td>
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<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overrated</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single most important problem</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX K: COMPRENDIUM OF STUDENT COMMENTS

Representative student comments were extracted from the returned questionnaires and were categorized according to primary orientation. The quotations presented below cover problems associated with the present officer efficiency report (OER), evaluative techniques, and general comments.

Problems Associated with Present OER

LTC, EN: The rating system in the Army is only the tip of the iceberg . . . . The crux of the problem is that we have a system that is designed to eliminate a man when he has reached his maximum capability. If an officer gets passed over successively, he will be discharged from the service. It may be that the officer has reached his peak and can't go any further on the promotion ladder, but why do we get rid of him? The Army should have a system that would allow a man to progress up the promotion ladder until he is at the peak of performance—with some officers this might be the rank of Captain or Major. With a few it will be General. . . . If this were the system, then the OER would not be as inflated as under the present system.

MIAJ, AG: ODCSPER cousin come up with a new OER system each year, but if officers inflate the system (as they/we have done on the past three forms) the new system will not serve the purpose. There appears to be a rather prevailing feeling that all officers are entitled to a good OER regardless of whether he has contributed to his organization or not. Many senior officers and large headquarters establish policies regarding just how good the report will be. We merely defeat the purpose of the system by doing this—the point is, a new form won't correct the present situation.

MAJ, FA: Based on my experience as either rater or indorser of some 40 officers/warrant officers simultaneously, I am disgusted by unending "guidance" from senior commanders who inform me of such things as follow:

1. A "2" for ability of a battery commander to command
a battalion in the future eliminates him from ever being considered for such a command.

2. A battery commander who is relieved from command in combat because of unsatisfactory performance cannot be so written up because it might be damaging to his career!

3. Anything less than a "1" in Part IV, VI, and X are permanently damaging to a man's career.

4. A score below 90 in Part XIIb is permanently damaging to a man's career, etc., ad nauseum!

MAJ, IN: [T]he biggest problem in the OER system lies in the people who use it. Most officers I have observed (including myself in a couple of instances) lack the guts to sit down with another man, tell him how they evaluate him, and try to help him improve his performance--and to the best of their ability put it in writing. Inflated reports result from the fact that most people want to get along and not make anyone unhappy. As a result the OER tends to lose its meaning. When most officers are so outstanding as their OERs say they are, the positions in which a man has served become more important than their manner of performance in these positions when it comes time for promotion. Most of us fail to fulfill this important aspect of leadership as officers.

MAJ, MI: Poor officers are not identified and eliminated soon enough. Inflation of reports contributes to this problem, as does reluctance to "hurt" a young officer. By the time the Army gets around to realizing an officer is ineffective he may have been in for 10 or more years, making it much more difficult to eliminate him from the service.

MAJ, OD: I personally know alcoholics who have been promoted to Colonel even though essentially incapable of performing after 1800 each night. I have seen the same thing happen to officers considered to verge on incompetence as leaders--all from lack of guts by raters. . . . There is a credibility gap between OPO and the field. It all goes back to a lack of candor when asked if certain things exist, such as an order of merit list. I cannot help but wonder if there is some sort of skullduggery in OPO as to use of OERs. This particularly hits me when they talk of downgrading the numbers when I know from experience that huge masses of data
on huge numbers of people defy handling efficiently unless reduced to some sort of numerical code. The OPO has a large problem and they must do it efficiently; so why try to fool the troops--just admit what is done and keep the results private. An across-the-board approach to baldfaced honesty might help the OER situation as concerns inflation, etc.

MAJ, OD: [T]he greatest danger and problem with our present OER is that we force the rater to practice quack psychology. He is asked to judge a man on a long "laundry list" of psychological traits. I submit that unless the rater is a graduate psychologist he cannot make these judgments. Moreover, if a man performs his job well, of what earthly difference does it make what the rater thinks of his tact, force, etc.? To me the gut of performance appraisal is how well did the man perform the job that was expected of him? This, of course, begs the question of did the rater tell the man what was expected of him?

MAJ, SC: The major problem with inflation exists when a given rater is not aware of, or refuses to accept, the inflation of efficiency reports and renders an honest evaluation... An average OER is tantamount to cutting an officer's throat and he is on the way out. Although the indorser and reviewer should catch such things and acquaint the rater with the realities of the system and request reconsideration of average ratings, the rater cannot be compelled to change a rating.

Evaluative Techniques

LTC, CM: A computer program could be established at DA which would categorize raters by type based on reports submitted. This would allow adjustments to be made.

LTC, FA: [T]he rater could answer a section of the OER to state "how he rates."

LTC, MI: Forms could be made more difficult to make raters have to spend more time preparing them.

MAJ, AG: The Army needs two things to improve the OER system: more instruction and information on the system and less change in OER system forms or concepts. The Army could well study the Navy system and the number of changes made in the last 20 years.
MAJ, AG: A system could be used requiring a "self-rating by the rater. Some raters pride themselves with being a "tough rater" etc. We might find more truth in the "self-rating" than in the actual rating.

MAJ, AR: [A] Xerox copy of each completed report should be sent by registered mail to the rated officer from DA. This will enable him to see the completed report, keep his own file, etc. This will also keep the raters and indorsers in line, knowing that the rated officers will be receiving a copy of the report.

MAJ, CE: I feel that 10 percent, and only 10 percent, of the officers should be rated, five percent on the top (future generals) and five percent on the bottom (eliminate from service soonest). All the rest of the officers could be promoted as their time in grade reaches the limit.

MAJ, FA: DA DCSPER would get better results if they made more effort to tell people how these reports are used.

MAJ, FA: Ratings on OERs often reflect the ratings received earlier by raters and indorsers. Those officers who have habitually received high ratings tend to give high ratings, and, conversely, those who have received low ratings tend to give low ratings. A background review of the rater and indorser might bring the OER into its proper perspective.

MAJ, IN: (1) The process of selecting officers in the secondary promotion zone leaves a great deal to be desired. Two officers with the same abilities, potential for higher command and staff positions, and performing essentially the same duties with equal reliability, may be rated at different levels. One is instructing at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, and the other instructing ROTC cadets at a university. The officer serving at the Infantry School will invariably be higher.

(2) A system needs to be established at DA to rate the rater and thus affect the results of efficiency reports he renders. The Infantry School had, and I assume still has, a policy of "If you work here, you have to be tops." This is not the case when you are working for a P.M.S. lieutenant colonel or colonel twice passed over for promotion, and on his terminal assignment.

MAJ, IN: The most significant problem is lack of a weight
assigned to a rater based upon his rating. A weight could easily be assigned through the use of the computer.

**MAJ, IN:** Performance counseling **must** be required by regulation:

1. Rating officer must be taught **how** to counsel.

2. Record of counseling (dates and content) should be attached to OER.

**MAJ, IN:** A rating index of each rating officer could be developed and maintained by including each of his reports in the computations. Additionally, a standard or acceptable deviation (both up and down) from this index could be determined. As each efficiency report is considered it could be measured against these yardsticks.

**MAJ, MI:** Although I recognize and appreciate the need for an evaluation system, I am in favor of abandoning the OER in favor of another system. Perhaps, an examination or a series of tests whereby each officer must demonstrate certain skills required for his promotion to next higher grade would be a better choice.

**MAJ, MI:** The major problem with OER's today is overinflation, that is, both rater and indorser not giving a fair or honest rating. No matter what system is established, this will always be a problem. A solution to the problem can be the counseling session. In the 10 years of service which I have, I have **never** had a formal counseling session (excluding conferences while reading an OER with the rater). At these sessions, which could be a part of the OER and individual records, the rater would be able to present shortcomings to the individual and thus when OER time came around, again, a more honest appraisal could be rendered.

**MAJ, MS:** For a period of time after introduction of a new report form, OERs are quite accurate. The movement to overinflation grows with time. . . . One reason for frequent change would be to preclude, at least partially, inflation.

**MAJ, OD:** I view the objectives of the OER to be identification of four categories of officers and the means to stimulate officer counseling and assignment. The four categories relate to promotion, i.e., (1) Should not be promoted to the next grade but retained on active duty; (2) Should not be
retained on active duty; (3) Should be promoted to the next grade along with contemporaries; (4) Should be promoted ahead of his contemporaries. The appropriate block would be checked and a justification written by choice from among numerous specified words that explain the significant performance and personality characteristics that supported the choice of a block. There should also be a job description by selection from specified words. If this report cannot distinguish among all officers, those who should be promoted and the best jobs for these officers, then I would suggest a lottery.

MAJ, SC: The OER should be a numerical or choice of a phrase type like the enlisted CER, and the rater should be evaluated by the reviewer. The narrative portion of the present system means that an officer is at the mercy of the English ability of the rater.

General Comments

LTC, IN: I don't see how we can continue to attach so much importance to the OER. In fact, I sometimes wonder if we could do without the system and develop a system only to eliminate the true misfits from the officer corps (reporting by exception maybe). First of all--as long as humans are involved the system will be only as effective as each individual wants it to--I have seen so many officers with problems (drinking, bad checks, etc.) who were considered "nice, good ole guys" by their rater or by the rater's rater and, therefore, were saved. People just don't seem to have the guts anymore to write and report the facts on an OER--it's a minority.

The present system and affairs can't be too good or effective--it appears we currently have quite a few officers under fire for conduct, incompetence, etc. Now days, I'm assuming they were some of the "nice, good ole guys" squirming their way up the ladder.

MAJ, AD: The leader is the most important element in the system. It is his responsibility to develop junior leaders. . . . The importance of the rating system and detailed procedures of completing the report should be ingrained in the junior leader by the leader.

MAJ, AD: I don't have the Great American Answer to this
problem; I hope we some day find it. Hopefully, we should be looking toward a system which includes the following goals, among others:

(1) Eliminates inflationary aspects.
   (a) Outstanding officers are recognized.
   (b) The great majority of average officers are not penalized for being average but given normal opportunities for schooling, promotion, assignments, etc.
   (c) The truly incompetent officer is identified and eliminated.

(2) Provides the individual officer with an understanding of the realities of OPO operations, not a hypocritical view.

(3) Provides safeguards for those rare instances in which incompatibility exists between rater and rated.

(4) Takes advantage of individual skills for the betterment of the Army as a whole.

(5) A system which truly accounts for the ability, performance, potential and ingenuity of the individual rather than absolute conformity to traditional but outmoded standards.

(6) Above all, a system which allows for the honest mistakes which are an integral part of the learning process in any profession.

**MAJ, AR:** The OER system seems to be able to discern the inadequate officer, the competent officer, and with increasing difficulty, the truly outstanding officer. These general categorizations are about as precise as we should expect from any system.

**MAJ, IN:** The OER is not the best system for grading anyone. I don't have the solution, but I have seen individuals of different ranks work only with the OER in mind. When these people are in command positions, they do not have proper priorities. Mission and welfare of the men take a back seat
to the commander's gain. I have seen commanders use the OER as a weapon to threaten subordinates. Is that the purpose of an OER?

MAJ, IN: All that I have done is to "nickel-dime" the present system. The present system will show the real duds and the outstanding, but the group in between is a mashed potato sandwich.

MAJ, MI: I have served as an SI and I have seen many cases where a minimum of attention was given to the preparation of the report; little or no thought to the impact of it. Many raters viewed the preparation of a report as a pain in the, and they just didn't care what they were doing to the Army (by gross overrating) and to the man (for over- or underrating). This was especially true of raters who were ready to retire or had been fully but not best several times. Almost as if it (half-baked OER preparation) was their way of "getting even" with the Army.

MAJ, MI: As long as politics are going to operate in the military you will always find people, called officers, who are impressed with getting their tickets punched. The objective and reason for the OER in this case is last. I rate up or out. In other words, if he is no damn good, say so; if outstanding, rate as such. If counseling is needed, do it regardless if weekly, monthly or by quarter. If needed, counsel. Too many raters do not take the time to help the young officer. Forget letting officers politic for 5 per cent, let DA decide. With field grade it could be satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

MAJ, WC: Honesty by all raters is needed. When a minority renders honest appraisals, they "hurt" those rated. Integrity must return.
APPENDIX L: OUTLINE FOR INTERVIEWING FOREIGN OFFICERS

1. Brief introductory comments.
2. Country____________ Frequency of Report________
3. Used by army alone, or all services?
4. Used for all grades?
5. Who may rate an officer?
6. Is there a requirement for higher level review (i.e., evaluator, reviewer)?
7. Does rated officer get to see his report? Under what circumstances?
8. Are subordinates counseled as part of the evaluation process? When?
9. How important is the efficiency report to the career of the officer being rated?
10. What other officer evaluation devices are used?
11. How many copies of the report are made? Where do they go?
12. Do efficiency reports tend to be inflated? If so, can statistical information be made available to show the magnitude of the problem? What methods are being used to combat inflation? How successful have these methods been?
13. How long has the present efficiency report form been in use?
14. What problems are currently being experienced with your reporting system?
15. Do officers in your army receive instructions related to their responsibilities in evaluating officer subordinates?
APPENDIX M

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT (PER) -- OFFICERS
CANADIAN FORCES
I CONFIDENTIAL

I.  CANADIAN FORCES

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT

OFFICERS

PART I - OFFICER REPORTED ON IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COMPLETION AND ACCURACY OF SECTIONS 1 TO 15 INCLUSIVE

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Surname</th>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>2. L.H.N.</th>
<th>3. Rank and Service, indicates CJG or SJG</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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PART II - L'OFFICIER QUI FAIT L'OBJET DU RAPPORT EST CHARGÉ DE REMPLIR AVEC EXACTITUDÉ LES SECTIONS 1 À 15 INCLUSIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Classification and Sub-Classification</th>
<th>5. Date of birth</th>
<th>6. Serial Status</th>
<th>7. Dependents Children (Sex/Age/School Grade)</th>
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PART III - EN L'INTÉRÊT DES PERSONNES À CHANGER |

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<th>8. Unit - Grade</th>
<th>9. Date FOS</th>
<th>10. Location of Dependents</th>
<th>Date Married</th>
<th>Date Divorce</th>
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PART IV - OBLIGATIONS ET OBLIGATIONS D'ORDRE, D'ÔTRE ET DE DÉVOILAGE

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<th>11. Official Appointment - Poste officiel</th>
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12. Military and Civilian Courses, Special Qualifications and Skills - Since Last Report

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<th>Course military et civil, qualifications et compétences spéciales - depuis le dernier rapport</th>
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Current Interests and Activities

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<th>Activités en intérêts actuels</th>
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13. a. Primary Language - Langue préférée

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13. c. Other Languages (P-Proficient | G-Graduate) - Autres langues (P-Profi | G-Gradu)

14. Training and Employment - Formation et emploi

<table>
<thead>
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<th>a. Military or civilian courses desired</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. Employment dates in next posting and alternative</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. Factors affecting future postings - Facteurs pouvant influer sur les futures affectations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

15. Date - Signature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CF 255 (Ed. 720)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEC 3 1981</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7220-27-037-4118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIEL
## 16. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE

Using the standard and the rating levels defined in CFAO 256 Annex A, rate the officer on each aspect of performance observed during the period covered by this report. Check YES to the "Not Observed" column if the standard has not been observed. The applicable range shall be dictated by hand in this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICER PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS</th>
<th>Low (1)</th>
<th>Medium (2)</th>
<th>High (3)</th>
<th>Exceptional (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Displayed knowledge of assigned job and keeping with training and experience.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Organized and directed work of subordinates effectively.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Did own work promptly and well.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Analyzed problems and situations competently and with dispatch.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Analyzed the situation with supervisory and trainees.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Gave consistent support to peers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Kept a personal example of attention to duty.</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Performed effectively under stress.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Demonstrated clear and concise discussions and meetings.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>j. Prepared written work which was literate, clear and concise.</td>
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<tr>
<td>k. Passed self-improvement with effect.</td>
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<tr>
<td>l. Adapted to changes without loss of efficiency.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>m. Made sound decisions without delay.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>n. Accepted full responsibility for his decisions and acts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>o. Acquired the necessary action on his own.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>p. Worked successfully with others.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>q. Provided the necessary services.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## 17. NARRATIVE COMMENTS

(To be typewritten and completed in accordance with CFAO 256-B)

a. Comment on any characteristics of conduct, dress, appearance or manner, personal conduct and general physical fitness condition, which may add to or detract from this officer’s effectiveness or acceptability as an officer. Do not comment unless you consider the matter important.

b. Report any unusual condition made by the officer or recognition rendered by him, on or off duty, which reflects credit on him, the Service, or both.

OBSERVATIONS

(should be written, completed in accordance with CFAO 256-B)

Formulate your observations on points particularly of language, of the manner, of the appearance or the manner, of the conduct and deportment of the officer in question, at the position of this officer, at his work, or in general character. In case of any outstanding particularities of the officer, make them known by reporting them, and state them in such a manner as to be published by the Services.

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(when any part completed)
6. Provide a TYPEWRITTEN narrative to illustrate the numerical description given in section 16, in particular the narrative shall:

(1) Clearly indicate the general performance superiority intended when items are rated "excellent" in section 16. In particular, the narrative shall:

(1) Indiquer clairement en quoi le rendement général est supérieur, si les items sont notés "excellents" dans le chapitre 16. En particulier, l'explication doit:

(2) Make direct reference to each section 16 item rated "excellent" and describe at least one specific example of the consistency "below standard" or "low quality" performance for EACH.

(2) Mentionnez chaque article de la section 16 qui a été noté "excellent" et donnez au moins un exemple précis du rendement conséquent "inférieur à la norme" ou "mauvais rendement" pour CHACUN.
18. TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT

State your recommendations regarding the next stage(s) of training for this officer and his next posting.

a. Training = Instruction:

b. Posting = Affiliation:

c. Employment: (For example, suitability for employment in open, army, staff positions; in Canada; outside Canada; liaison; exchange or attaché. Specifi.)

19. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

Assess this officer relative to all other officers of the same rank and approximate seniority over the years. In the same or similar employment. Mark an X in the box(es) you consider describe(s) the officer best.

COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

Rapidly promotable
Bottom Half
More rapidly promotable
Middle Inferior
Top Half
Middle Superior
Unsatisfactory
Most inferior
Most superior
Better than Most
Unsatisfactory
Most inferior
Most superior
Better than Most

20. PROMOTION

(A "NO" recommendation shall be explained; for example, by describing required improvements in performance or otherwise which should occur before the officer is considered suitable for promotion, or by making reference to comments in section 17). A "NO" shall not be used solely on the basis of race or age. The recommendation should be in general accordance with sections 15, 17 and 19.

Do you consider this officer suitable for promotion within the coming year? (Yes or No or Not applicable)

Section 15

21. If you are recommending promotion in section 20, indicate how rapidly you think this officer should be promoted in relation to his contemporaries.

22. If you are recommending promotion in section 20, do you think he has the potential to be promoted to the rank one higher than that for which he is being considered?

23. CERTIFICATION OF REPORTING OFFICER

CERTIFICAT DE L'OFFICIER RAPPORTEUR

a. If you have discussed with this officer the comparably merits reported in sections 15 and 17, (see CFAO 264 for the special requirements on adverse report),

b. This officer has served under my command or supervision for

(c) This officer has served under my command or superivision for

ALL REPORTS SHALL BE REVIEWED BY AN OFFICER SENIOR TO THE REPORTING OFFICER IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND (TOUS LES RAPPORTS DOIVENT ÊTRE RÉVÉS PAR UN OFFICIER LOIS SUPÉRIEUR A L'OFFICIER RAPPORTEUR DANS LA VOIE HÉRÉTIQUE)
PART III - (Not to be completed by the reporting officer)

24. REVIEWING OFFICER.

Review the report to ensure it is completed in accordance with CPAG 264 and if necessary return it to the reporting officer for corrective action. Provide your knowledge of the reporting officer's performance, MARK AND INITIAL in RED INK your separate ratings and recommendations where ever differ. Comment on the report and as appropriate add to it, including an explanation of your red ink changes, if applicable, explain why the reporting officer is the same rank as the rated officer. Typewriting is required.

PART IV

25. COMMENTS BY NEXT SENIOR OFFICER

Date

Typewritten Rank, Name, Assignment and Unit

Grade, name, past or unit (DACTYLOGRAPHIES)

Signature

PART IV

OBSERVATIONS DE L'OFFICIER SUPERIEUR IMMEDIATE

Date

Typewritten Rank, Name, Assignment and Unit

Grade, name, past or unit (DACTYLOGRAPHIES)

Signature
APPENDIX N

MONITORING OFFICE FORM, CANADIAN FORCES
Canadian Liaison Officer
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Attention: LCOL H.C. Pitts

CF 255 - PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORTS (PER) - OFFICERS
/00 PER 255/ - 08-06-69 - DMO

Reference: A. CF AO 26-6

1. The enclosed form CF 255 for the noted officer has been reviewed by the PER (Officers) monitoring organization at CFHQ and is returned for corrective action as indicated:

a. ☐ The scoring of section 16 must use the combinations of scores shown in the reference, and no other, i.e. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10.  

b. ☐ Please reconsider the scoring of section 16 to ensure that the levels are being interpreted as they are defined in the reference. Note that the 4/5 level indicates the high standard expected and achieved by most officers.

c. ☐ The descriptive comments in section 17c do not adequately illustrate the scoring of section 16.

(1) ☐ Specific examples of the officer's typically exceptional performance must be provided to substantiate the shaded area scores for items 16, or, alternatively, lower the scores.

(2) ☐ Please provide descriptive comments to illustrate the general level of ratings given in section 16.

Reference A

.../2
d. Completion of section 16 h.

e. Consideration of lowering/raising section 19 to achieve consonance with sections 16 and 17.

f. Please provide additional information in section 20.

g. The block "Yes (When Qualified)" in section 20 has been deleted. Please follow instructions given in the reference.

h. Consideration of lowering/raising section 21 to achieve consonance with section 19.

j. The officer reported upon is to read and sign this report because of its adverse nature.

k. Typewriting is required throughout, including signature blocks.

n.

2. In view of the importance of this PER, it is requested that it be given further consideration, revised and returned to this Headquarters within 15 days of receipt of this letter.

Encl. 1

A.L. Macdonald
Colonel
Director of Policy Implementation
APPENDIX C

DESCRIPTION OF PER RATING LEVELS
CANADIAN FORCES
These new levels require that two numbers shall be circled as shown, except that levels 7 and 8 are separate and shall not be combined by circling. The six rating levels are described in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>Outstanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td>9 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DESCRIPTION OF RATING LEVELS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Descriptive Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>Performance below standard for rank. Must be substantiated. (See para 5c of this annex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>3 4</td>
<td>Performance acceptable and meets minimum requirement. May indicate a lack of experience in rank, or a minor deficiency which can be corrected, or a lack of ability or desire to improve. (See para 5c of this annex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 6</td>
<td>Performance meets the requirement of the high standard expected of and achieved by most officers. This should be the most common rating used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Performance that somewhat exceeds the high standard expected, or performance that always meets the high standard and frequently exceeds it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Performance that obviously and consistently exceeds the requirement, highly effective and clearly superior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outstanding</td>
<td>9 10</td>
<td>Performance of a rare high quality. Must be substantiated. (See para 5c of this annex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Observed</td>
<td>Not Observed</td>
<td>Reporting officers shall endeavour to observe and assess all of the officer performance requirements. The &quot;Not Observed&quot; option should be used rarely, eg, when, by reason of the officer's particular job he has no subordinates, items 16b and e may be marked &quot;Not Observed&quot;. Since there is no summation of scores in section 16, the &quot;Not Observed&quot; assessment has no derogatory implication.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AL 4/71
## APPENDIX P: FRENCH ARMY'S OER

### FEUILLE DE NOTES E bis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>邊</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Militaire</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Territorial Command</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>Army Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Grade et Nom (во вме сто венчелову емпринаниет)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Active</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Reserve</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Notes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### QUALITÉS FONCIÈRES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualité</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prévision Apparente</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Valeur physique</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Garde de l'acquisition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ACTIVITÉS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activité</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### POSSIBILITÉS ACTUELLES de l'officier

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibilité</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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**ATTENTION**:

Les informations dans cette feuille de notes sont destinées à servir d'orientation dans la classification de l'officier. Elles ne sont pas conçues pour être utilisées comme base formelle de décision. **NOTES TACITE SERA FACULTATifs.**

---

**BE CAREFUL**

**BE CAREFUL**

**EDUC RIGOROUSM OBJECTIF est la semaine engage l'endormie du subordonné (examen, affectation, travail) et de l'équipe (qualité de l'encadrement). Pour déterminer la tâche de meneur de plus d'une, avoir avec les pour la guide, pour la sélection des officiers. Notes TACITE SERA FACULTATifs.**

**ATTENTION**

**ATTENTION**

**EDUC RIGOROUSM OBJECTIF est la semaine engage l'endormie du subordonné (examen, affectation, travail) et de l'équipe (qualité de l'encadrement). Pour déterminer la tâche de meneur de plus d'une, avoir avec les pour la guide, pour la sélection des officiers. Notes TACITE SERA FACULTATifs.**

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**ATTENTION**

**ATTENTION**

**EDUC RIGOROUSM OBJECTIF est la semaine engage l'endormie du subordonné (examen, affectation, travail) et de l'équipe (qualité de l'encadrement). Pour déterminer la tâche de meneur de plus d'une, avoir avec les pour la guide, pour la sélection des officiers. Notes TACITE SERA FACULTATifs.**
APTITUDE FOR HIGHER RANK (ONE GRADE ABOVE)
II APITUDE AU GRADE SUPÉRIEUR

En êtes-vous sûr qu'il est temps de se promouvoir au grade supérieur ?

OUI

En cas de promotion au grade supérieur, est-ce que vous êtes prêt à arrêter de travailler pour votre propre bénéfice ?

OUI

En cas de promotion au grade supérieur, est-ce que vous êtes prêt à faire un effort supplémentaire pour votre unité ?

OUI

En cas de promotion au grade supérieur, est-ce que vous êtes prêt à faire un effort supplémentaire pour votre unité ?

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RENSEIGNEMENTS ADMINISTRATIFS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Réf 16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>Origine</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

20 DATE DE PRISE DE RANG DANS LES DIFFÉRENTS GRADES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANG</th>
<th>SOUS-LIEUTENANT</th>
<th>LIEUTENANT</th>
<th>CAPITAINE</th>
<th>COMMANDEANT</th>
<th>LIEUTENANT 1ER CLASSE</th>
<th>COLONEL</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

21 INSTRUCTION GÉNÉRALE

Titre ou diplôme:

- Formation universitaire:
- Grands ecus:
- École spéciale:

22 COURS ET STAGES

(Breves et diplômes militaires ou civils - éventuellement obtenus)

23 CONNAISSANCE DES MILITAIRES NON EUROPÉENS

24 TITRES DE GUERRE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITRES DE GUERRE</th>
<th>CITATION À L'ORDRE DE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Régiment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

25 DÉCORATIONS

- Médaille militaire en 19...
- Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur en 19...
- Officier de la Légion d'honneur en 19...
- Commandeur de la Légion d'honneur en 19...
- Autres décorations:

26 TITRES DE GUERRE OU RÉCOMPENSES acquise. SANCTIONS (aux annelées) acquises depuis la précédente édition de même annéée.

Qualité de déporté résident:

...
APPENDIX Q

ANNUAL/ADVANCED/DELAYED/INTERIM CONFIDENTIAL REPORT
FOR 19___, BRITISH ARMY
ANNUAL: ADVANCED: DELAYED: INTERIM: CONFIDENTIAL REPORT FOR 19

(DELETE AS APPLICABLE)

(FOR OFFICERS OF THE RANK OF SUBSTANTIVE MAJOR AND ABOVE)

This form will not be used to report upon an officer who is considered unsuitable and whose removal is recommended. Army Form B 2079 will be used in such cases and may be submitted at any time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Number:</th>
<th>Name and Initials: (IN Block Letters):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RANK: Subs

Date

Decorations:

Type of Commission

Qualifications: (pec, etc.)

Date of Birth:

PES and Date:

Name and Initials:

Regt/Corps:

Date of present Commission:

Antedate, if any:

Married or Single:

State here if there are any special factors which would restrict this officer's next posting:

NOTE: 1. The object of this report is to provide an assessment, related to overall Army standards, of an officer's potential for promotion and employment, based on his performance during the period under review.

2. He will see and initial Part I of the Report but will only see and initial Part II where the Superior Reporting Officer downgrades any of the answers in paras 7-9 in Part I.

PART I. REMARKS OF INITIATING OFFICER. Answers will be given to all the following questions.

1. Period covered by this report? From:_________ to:_________.

2. How has he been employed during this period? (For Weapons (W) Staff appointments an outline of his duties should be given at Para 6b).

3. Does he know any foreign language? If so, state whether fluent, good or fair and give group rating (vide DCI 21/65).

4. Is he particularly suitable for selection (answer YES or NO)
   a. as an Instructor at an Officer Cadet School?
   b. for an appointment in a Junior Soldiers' Unit?
   c. As Military Attaché or Assistant Military Attaché?

5. How long is it since he served with troops? (For officers in E.R.E. or Staff employment only)

FOR USE IN MOD ONLY (To be initialled and dated by Branches concerned and CR Book passed under cover A.S.P.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS (CR) (Cards)</th>
<th>MS (SB)</th>
<th>MS4(a)</th>
<th>MS4(b)</th>
<th>MS 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AG</td>
<td>MS (TB CH)</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>DD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signature: ___________  MS(CR)

Date: ___________
6a. How do you assess the officer in the following characteristics? Indicate your assessment by a tick (✓).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
<th>Some Limitations</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Supplementary Remarks (if any)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zeal and energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common sense and judgment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leadership and Man-management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical ability (Special to Arm/Weapons (W) Staff)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical ability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power of expression</td>
<td>a. Oral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Written</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organising and Administrative ability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tact and co-operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6b. Pen Picture: Give an overall impression of this officer as you see him relating the assessments you have made at para 6a above, including any other significant characteristics, and bearing in mind his weak points as well as his strong ones.

*(NOTE: This paragraph should be in typescript other than in exceptional circumstances).*
7. Grading: Do you grade this officer as “outstanding”? If so tick (A) to (E) below and insert “OUTSTANDING” above (A). (NOTE: The grade “outstanding” should be reserved for those officers whose characteristics should bring them to the notice of General Officers—for Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels to Major-General—for Colonels and Brigadiers to Lieutenant-General or Director of their Corps. The grading will refer to the officer’s ability in the type of employment in which he is reported on—Command, Staff or Service—and will not be qualified due to lack of knowledge of his performance in another type of employment. Reports on officers so graded will be signed by the C-in-C, or G.O.C.-in-C.)

If you do not consider him “outstanding” grade him in his held rank (excluding local rank).

HELD RANK (excluding local rank).

(A) Well above the standard required of his rank and service.
(B) Above the standard required of his rank and service.
(C) Well up to the standard required of his rank and service.
(D) Up to the minimum standard required of his rank and service.
(E) Below the standard required of his rank and service.

(delete as applicable)

8. Do you consider that he is fit NOW for promotion? If “NO/NOT YET” ensure that your reasons are brought out in para 6b.

a. YES  
b. NO  
c. NOT YET  
(delete as applicable)

9. Do you consider him to be fit for an appointment in the next higher rank in his present sphere of employment? (i.e. at Regimental Duty, Staff or Service). (If a Lt Col unless you specify a Brig appit in para 6b. i.e. Inf/Armd Bde etc, a YES to this para will be a recommendation to Col only).  YES/NO

Signature ___________________________________________ Rank and Name (BLOCK LETTERS) ___________________________________________ 
Appointment and Unit (BLOCK LETTERS) ____________________________ Date of Signature ____________________________ Initials of Officer reported on and date ____________________________________________

Remarks of Head of Arm/Service at Command Headquarters

(NOTES: 1. These should cover only this officer’s potential for future employment within his own Arm/Service.

2. This section should not be completed in respect of officers employed outside their own Arm/Service during the period under review).
PART II. REMARKS OF SUPERIOR REPORTING OFFICERS

1. Have you personal knowledge of this officer? If so, to what degree?
2. Do you agree the grading and recommendations at paras 4 and 7-9?
3. Remarks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Rank and Name (BLOCK LETTERS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appointment</td>
<td>Date of Signature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Have you personal knowledge of this officer? If so, to what degree?
2. Do you agree the grading and recommendations at paras 4 and 7-9?
3. Remarks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appointment</td>
<td>Date of Signature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Have you personal knowledge of this officer? If so, to what degree?
2. Do you agree the grading and recommendations at paras 4 and 7-9?
3. Remarks:
### PERSONAL DATA
Personen Angaben:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>03 Name</th>
<th>04 Vorname</th>
<th>05 Dienstgrad</th>
<th>06 Dienstgrad seit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>08 Familienstand</th>
<th>07 Familienstand seit</th>
<th>08 Zahl und Alter der Kinder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>09 Schul-, Fächer- u. Hochschul-Ausb.</th>
<th>10 Ersterter Zivilberuf</th>
<th>11 Ausgeübter Zivilberuf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**EDUCATION**
CIVILIAN PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12 Dienstleistung</th>
<th>13 Ernennung u. Offizier</th>
<th>14 Sicherheitsstufe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15 TSK/Verwaltungs-/Fachleitung</th>
<th>16 Dienstleistung seit</th>
<th>17 Universitäts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**DUTY PREFERENCES OF RATER (OFFICER)**
Verwaltungswünsche des Raters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18 Sprachkenntnisse</th>
<th>19 Lehrgang Courses</th>
<th>20 Bekannter Dienststellungen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leistungsfähigkeit</th>
<th>Al</th>
<th>Bi</th>
<th>Mi</th>
<th>Sa</th>
<th>St</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Sprache | Leistungsfähigkeit | Al | Bi | Mi | Sa | St |

**DUTY DATA**
Angaben zur Beurteilung:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>22 <strong>ROUTINE DATA</strong></th>
<th>23 <strong>REMARKS</strong></th>
<th>24 <strong>SPECIAL</strong></th>
<th>25 <strong>TECHNICAL OR</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**REMARKS**
Hochschul-Ausbildung

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24 SPECIAL</th>
<th>25 TECHNICAL OR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*NOT REPRODUCIBLE*
### A. Persönlichkeitsbild

**CHARACTER TRAITS**

1. **Einzelbeobachtung** *Specific Observation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>nb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY TO NUMBERS:**

1 = Excellent
2 = Very Good
3 = Good
4 = Rather Good
5 = Fairly Satisfactory
6 = Satisfactory
7 = Sufficient
8 = Not Quite Sufficient
9 = Insufficient

### II. Geistige Merkmale

1. **Einzelbeobachtung** *Specific Observation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>nb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### III. Körperliche Merkmale

1. **Einzelbeobachtung** *Specific Observation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>nb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### INTELLIGENT CHRACTERISTICS

1. **Zusammenfassende Kennzeichnung** *Summary*

2. **Zusammenfassende Kennzeichnung** *Summary*

**PHYSICAL CHRACTERISTICS**

1. **Einzelbeobachtung** *Specific Observation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>nb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOT REPRODUCIBLE**
B. Dienstliche Eignung und Leistung

ATTITUDE AND PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS

1. Detaillierte Beschreibung des Gesamtbildes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>nb</th>
<th>St</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2. Fähigkeiten

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>nb</th>
<th>St</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Arbeitsbereitschaft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>nb</th>
<th>St</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

C. Hinweise zur Steigerung der dienstlichen Leistungsfähigkeit

1. Schwächen und Vorschläge zu ihrer Beseitigung

2. Stärken und Vorschläge zu ihrer Förderung

SUMMARY OF EVALUATION

1. Wie hat der Beamte seine dementsprechende Dienstleistung insgesamt eingeschätzt?

2. Bewertung der Gesamtleistung des Beamten

3. Eignung zum nächsthöheren Dienstgrad

E. Erörterung

Die Abschnitte A - D dieser Bewertung sind die zuvorfolgenden/technischen Bewertungen nicht erörtert worden.
Recommandations on the rater based on overall impression of the ratee officer

F. Verwendungsvorschläge des Beurteilenden aufgrund des Gesamteindrucks des Beurteilten

1. Verwendung in nächster Zeit

LONG RANGE UTILIZATION

II. Verwendung auf weitere Sicht

RECOMMENDATIONS RETAINING TO THE CITY PREFERENCE OF THE RATER OFFICER

III. Stellungnahme zu den Verwendungswünschen des Beurteilten

NUMERICAL VALUE OF QUALIFICATION

IV. Eignungsnennung

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of [Name 1971], the rater
not being aware of the
schedule to be used as part of the
Rater Officer Evaluation System

G. Stellungnahme der höheren Vorgesetzten

COMMENTS BY HIGHER RANKING SUPERIORS

THE STANDARDS OF THE RATER (vom Maßstab des Beurteilenden)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A - MUCH TOO GOOD
B - LITTLE TOO GOOD
C - CORRESPONDS TO
D - GOOD
E - MUCH TOO BAD

THE STANDARDS OF THE RATER (vom Maßstab des Beurteilenden)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H. Eröffnung abweichender Stellungnahmen

NOT REPRODUCIBLE
APPENDIX S

ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT--OFFICERS
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
IN CONFIDENCE

Surname ...........................................

Given names ...........................................

Corps Allotment ...........................................

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT - OFFICERS

For reporting year ended

Parts I and II are to be completed by the officer reported on

PART I—PERSONAL PARTICULARS

1. Army Number...........................................
   Rank — Substantive...........................................
   Temporary...........................................
   Date of Promotion...........................................

2. Date of Birth...........................................
   Medical Classification...........................................

3. Unit...........................................
   Posting...........................................
   Date...........................................

4. When and in what posting did you last serve with troops?...........................................

5. Marital State...........................................
   No and Relationship of Dependents...........................................
   (including ages of children)...........................................

6. Are there any factors of a domestic or personal nature which you wish to be considered in relation to your next posting? It is important for the well-being and morale of the Army as a whole that any factors of this nature be made known. (If desired, a separate submission may be attached.)
PART I - THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE OFFICER

7. Qualifications: (jssc, psc, ptsc, etc) .......................................................... ..........................................................

8. Have you any other qualifications such as ability to speak foreign languages, University Degree, Diplomas or professional qualifications which might be of importance for particular appointments?

Are you currently studying for any other qualifications? ...........................................

9. Have you qualified — For promotion? .................................................. For entrance to Staff College? ..................................................
For entrance to RMC of S? ..................................................

10. Do you wish to attend — Staff College? .................................................. RMC of S? ..................................................

INSTRUCTIONS TO REPORTING OFFICER

(i) Parts III and IV to be completed by the member's Commanding (or equivalent) Officer.

(ii) This report is an important document. The information given in it is used as a guide in determining an officer's most effective use in the Army including his suitability for promotion. You are responsible that it is accurate and informative. Consequently you should have an accurate knowledge of the qualifications of the officer and make an objective judgment of his qualities. Your liking for or dislike of an officer should not influence your judgment.

(iii) You are asked to assess the officer by placing ticks in the appropriate spaces in para 14. The characteristics you are asked to rate are defined in a choice among either three or four verbal statements for each characteristic. In making the rating you are required to consider these specific statements and to agree or disagree with them, ticking the ones with which you agree. The most favourable, statement for each characteristic has two lines one of which is marked 'S'. The 'S' line is likely to be used in preference to the other line in only about one-tenth of the cases, consequently you should exercise special care in deciding to tick this line.

(iv) You are also asked in para 15 to give a word picture of the officer as he appears to you. In writing your word picture you should remember that most people have their weak points as well as their strong ones, therefore describe both. It is just as important for the officer as for the reporting authorities that both should be recognized.

PART II — THE SERVICE OF THE OFFICER WITH THE REPORTING OFFICER

11. For how many months of the year under review has this officer been serving under you?

12. How long have you known this officer personally? ........................................

13. What duties are actually performed in present posting? (Be specific. Give normal duties and all additional duties, eg, Fire Officer, Education Officer, etc, with enough detail to show scope of work).
**PART IV—JUDGMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORTING OFFICER**

14 Put a tick in the narrow column on the appropriate line for each characteristic given in capitals. A tick on a line marked 'S' opposite a particular statement indicates a marked degree of the tendency described in that statement. COMMENTS SHOULD BE MADE IN THE RIGHT HAND COLUMN IF THEY WOULD HELP TO EXPLAIN THE RATING. Normally only one statement should be ticked for each characteristic; but the assessor may occasionally feel justified in ticking more than one line for a single statement. For example, under the characteristic JUDGMENT, you may discard the first three statements as not being applicable and may decide that the officer's judgment is faulty because he is both too rigid and too hasty. You should then tick opposite "rigid" and also opposite "other reason" and should write in the Comments column "Hasty". IF IT IS NOT FELT POSSIBLE TO PUT A TICK ANYWHERE FOR A PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTIC, STATE THE REASON. Read and consider each statement before making a tick under each characteristic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPEARANCE</strong></td>
<td>Smart and well turned out at all times</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consider what sort of first impression he makes with regard to his appearance, both in dress and bearing)</td>
<td>Pays some regard to appearance but tends to be careless</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearance satisfactory</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careless in dress and bearing</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTEREST</strong></td>
<td>Carries out his duties without real enthusiasm</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consider the interest and enthusiasm he displays in his work)</td>
<td>Takes a normal amount of interest in his work</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is thoroughly interested in his work</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>QUICKNESS OF APPREHENSION</strong></td>
<td>Not quite so fast as most of his fellow officers</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consider how readily he grasps the meaning of a question or appreciates a situation)</td>
<td>As quick to grasp a point as most of his fellow officers</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very quick on the uptake</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JUDGMENT</strong></td>
<td>Consistently sound</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consider the degree to which his proposals and decisions are sound and can be relied upon)</td>
<td>Can generally be relied upon</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apo to overlook an important factor rather often</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confused</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faulty</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rigid</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reason(s) (specify)</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORK</strong></td>
<td>Has thorough grasp of knowledge relevant to his duties</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consider how proficient for his rank and experience he is in the discharge of his day-to-day tasks)</td>
<td>Has sufficient knowledge to cope with his work</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tends not to know enough about his work</td>
<td>.............................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTENTION TO DETAIL</td>
<td>Apt to be over-concerned with detail</td>
<td>Can generally be trusted to consider all the relevant details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consider his capacity to pay attention to detail in relation to his work)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAPERWORK</td>
<td>Written work is clear, concise and to the point</td>
<td>Writes quite a good paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consider how well he can express himself in writing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCEPTABILITY AS COLLEAGUE</td>
<td>Is readily accepted by his colleagues</td>
<td>Gets on quite well with his colleagues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consider how well he works in a group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANAGEMENT OF SUBORDINATES</td>
<td>Gets the best out of subordinates</td>
<td>Subordinates work quite well for him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consider his capacity to get the best out of his juniors)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABILITY TO SPEAK</td>
<td>Speaks convincingly and argues a case well</td>
<td>Can communicate his ideas with reasonable clarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consider how convincingly he can communicate his ideas to others verbally)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERALL OPINION</td>
<td>NOT want him</td>
<td>Take a chance on him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(To what extent would you want this officer to serve under you in any future appointment?)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Summarize, in your own words, your ratings under paragraph 14 in such a way as to provide a verbal general picture of the personal characteristics of the officer and the efficiency with which he is working noting particularly his stronger and weaker points.

Have his weaker points been previously pointed out to him?

16. Are there any reasons why this officer has not performed at his best during the past year (e.g., ill health, domestic worries, housing difficulties, etc.?)

Is he getting over these difficulties?

Do you think he will do better next year?

17. Can you recall any activity, military or non-military, in which this officer has engaged during the past year outside his normal duties and how did he handle it (e.g., sports, concerts, Mess affairs, children's day, taking unexpected responsibility)?
18 **Recommendations**

What is your recommendation concerning the fitness for promotion of this officer to the next substantive rank without regard to his qualifications, by examinations, if any?

- **Strongly recommended**
- **Recommended**
- **Not yet ready for promotion**
- **Not recommended**

Place a tick in the appropriate space.

If this officer is not yet ready for promotion, or is not recommended in (a) above, state your reasons.

Without regard to qualification do you recommend his attendance at —

(i) **Staff College**?

(ii) **RMC of S**?

(iii) **Any other course**?

Do you recommend him for command of troops? (If "No" give reason).

What is the next appointment or type of employment you recommend for him?

---

**Initials of Officer reported on and date**

**Signature of CO**

**Name in Block Letters**

**Appointment in Block Letters**

**Date.**
PART V—REMARKS OF SUPERIOR REPORTING OFFICERS

(NOTE—If you disagree with any ratings made in para 14, re-tick in BLUE pencil)

19. Do you know the officer personally?

Is this report consistent with your impression of him?

Have you any further comments to make?

Signature...........................................................................................................

Name ..............................................................

Date .............................

Appointment........

20. Do you know the officer personally?

Is this report consistent with your impression of him?

Have you any further comments to make?

Signature..............................

Name..............................................................

Date .............................

Appointment........

21. Do you know the officer personally?

Is this report consistent with your impression of him?

Have you any further comments to make?

Signature..............................

Name..............................................................

Date .............................

Appointment........
PART VI—REMARKS OF HEAD OF CORPS

(NOTE—If you disagree with any ratings made in para 14 or any recommendation in para 18, re-tick in RED pencil)

22. Have you any comments to make on this Report or are there any recommendations you wish to make on behalf of the officer?

Signature.................................................................

Name...........................................................................(in block letters)

Date...........................................................................

Appointment................................................................

FOR MS USE ONLY
APPENDIX T: ISRAELI ARMED FORCES' OER

### Instructions to Rating Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instructions to Rating Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assume you are in command of a large unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you handle a special situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you act in certain circumstances?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you handle a crisis?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Special Observation of Performance in Other Significant Assignment (Achievement Stated Over)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of Unit Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Qualities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline and Self-Control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Notes

- This form is NOT reproducible.
- All fields must be filled out in ink or blue or black ink.
- Any changes or corrections must be initialed.

---

### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Additional Notes

- The form is designed for use by commanding officers to evaluate the performance of their subordinates.
- It covers various aspects of performance, including knowledge, leadership, and discipline.
- The form is not reproducible to ensure the confidentiality of the information.

---

### Footer

- Printed on official stationery.
- Approved by the commanding officer.
- Date: 1941-01-01

---

### Signature

- Signed by the commanding officer.
- Date: 1941-01-01
Table with grades and comments.
APPENDIX U

JAPANESE EFFICIENCY REPORT
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>評定項目</th>
<th>評価尺度</th>
<th>評価基準</th>
<th>記号</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>責任感</td>
<td>5 4 3 2 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>達成度</td>
<td>5 4 3 2 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>協調性</td>
<td>5 4 3 2 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>達成度</td>
<td>5 4 3 2 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>執行力</td>
<td>5 4 3 2 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>判断力</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>知識・技能</td>
<td>5 4 3 2 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>指導力</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>人間力</td>
<td>10 8 6 4 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

入札者 | |
---|---
評定書 | |

記入者 | |
---|---

NOT REPRODUCIBLE
APPENDIX V

EFFICIENCY REPORT OF YUGOSLAV ARMED FORCES
(CONSTRUCTED COPY)

Part I

1. Name

2. Date of Birth________ Place________ Republic________

3. Nationality

4. Military Schools (a)
   (b)
   (c)
   (d)

5. Foreign Language

6. Civilian Schools (a)
   (b)
   (c)

7. Health (Document from Hospital)

8. Physical Condition

9. Health of Family (Wife and Children), Problems If They Exist

10. Employment of Wife and Kind of Work

11. Conclusions Regarding Present Characteristics of Officer (After Two Years)

12. Opinion of Next Superior in Chain of Command
    (a) Character, Honesty, Friendship
    (b) Relations with Superiors and Subordinates
(c) Political and Party Stability
(d) Manner of Carrying Out Professional Duties in the Past Two Years
   (1) Positive
   (2) Negative
   (3) Conclusion
(e) Personal Inclination
   (1) Staff Duties (G1, G2, G3)
   (2) Troops
(f) Conclusions (General)

Agree (Signature of Ratee) Commander (Signature)

Part II

Opinion of Next Higher Commander

(a) Extra Class
(b) Excellent
(c) Very Good
(d) Good
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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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