Chair in the Military

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Nearly twenty-five hundred years ago, the Greek Philosopher Heraclitus put forth the principle of ceaseless change or as he said, "all things flow." Although Heraclitus was referring more to the universe than society, this principle can well be applied to the modern social environment which is characterized by rapid change. Society shows the many signs of stress which such a period of change creates.

Over the past decade there has been a gradual and notable change in the nation's attitudes and opinions and the values which underlie them. Although the national structure is bureaucratic in nature, there has been a steady loosening of social control at the lower levels which has led to a progressive rise in individualism. Major emphasis has been placed on individual autonomy with stress on self-fulfillment, self-actualization, and self-development at the expense of the former social values of obligation, duty and responsibility. This emphasis in individualism has led to a growing erosion of attitudes toward existing standards and mores with an accompanying decline in respect for authority.

As the society becomes more mobile and instable, the community has less influence on the attitudes and behavior of the emerging generation. This new generation of youth, rather than turning to the older generation for values and ideals, turns inward towards their peers for guidance. In fact, as Hayes & Rehm point out, "much of the enthusiasm, idealism, energy, and increased intellectual preparation of youth seems to be focused on experimentation, protest, and various forms of revolt against existing social standards."
Patriotism - the attitude of citizens toward their nation and government - also appears to be slowly eroding as citizens become less nationalistic in nature. There is more emphasis on world affairs than a focus on American patriotism and historic virtues with a marked decline in the outspoken sentiment of patriotism.

These are but a few of the problems which face society today. In addition, there is the continued resistance to conscription into the armed forces, civil disturbances and disobedience, increased use of drugs, racial unrest, and on and on to ad infinitum. These problems which face society as a whole are also manifest within the military establishment of the nation.

As Hays and Behm state in their article, "the character and quality of a military establishment are intimately related to the society that provides it. The value systems of that society provide the basis upon which the more demanding value system of the military ethic is developed. The current absence of value consensus in society at the local community level created problems for military socialisation."

The intent, therefore, of this paper is to examine how some of these problems facing society impact on the Army and what changes they are creating within the Army. In order to provide a meaningful analysis, the writer also provides insight as to the current methods of effecting organizational change within the Army and to the Army's current and possible future missions and roles in support of national objectives.

Prior to launching into the major aspects of the paper, it may well be advantageous to note the similarities and differences between military and business organizations. Needless to say a comparison is difficult in that, no single organizational unit can be said to be typical of either industry or military organizations, even though most military organizations do have
common format. It is quite evident that many of the concepts now used in industry, such as line of command, staff and line relationships, etc., were basically derived from military experience.

There has been very little empirical study accomplished in the area of comparing business and military organizations. However, a summary of one of the more prominent studies conducted by Oscar Grusky is provided here to lay the groundwork for the remainder of the paper. Grusky found that all organization officials in our society share certain characteristics. They occupy well-defined positions in a hierarchy; interpersonal skills are critical to their career advancement; they are concerned with salary and prestige as measures of worth; and they seek to maintain ties to the local community and to society as a whole. It should be noted, however, that these similarities should not hide the fact that organizations have different objectives and structures which form the basis for entirely different patterns of expected behavior among their executives.

The study also found that, typical of highly bureaucratic systems, there is a more constant and rapid turnover of personnel in the military than in civilian industry. For example, study results reflect that personnel stability in a military organization is almost the inverse of a business organization. With approximately half of the military officers (45.5%) being in their current organization less than a year while only about 2% of the business managers had been in the organization less than a year. Conversely, almost 90% of the business managers had been in the organization over five years, where only 5.6% of military officers had been in their current organization over five years.

It was because of this rapid turnover that Grusky conducted the study. He wanted to determine what effect this rapid and routine turnover of military
officers had on the organizations and the individual members. He examined this in relation to four distinct problem areas: executive homogeneity, control, commitment, and community involvement. The findings in each of these areas, as summarized by Grady, is shown below.

Because bureaucratic control necessitates the extensive application of rational criteria for selection and promotion of personnel, homogeneity among executives with respect to numerous social characteristics tends to result. Accordingly, we found at each rank level greater uniformity in age, length of time in the organization, and seniority among the military officers than among business managers.

Routinized succession conditions the exercise of organizational control. Rapid succession in the military inhibits strong identification with the chief executive. The data collected for this study indicated that length of tenure at the military base increased the perceived authority of the officers, including those at the highest ranks. Length of tenure also increased perceived authority in the business setting, but not at the top ranks. Thus it appears that in the military, bureaucratic forms of rotation, regardless of the organizational objectives they serve, weaken personal executive power and encourage the development of a general orientation toward organizational authority.

More favorable orientations toward the organization and the specific department were found in the military setting than in the business organization. In the military system, and unlike the business firm studied, length of experience in the particular installation was not systematically related to the strength of these attitudes. Instead, the more favorable orientations to the organization and the subunit could be seen as tied closely to the greater standardization of assignment and greater strength of professional commitment in the military.

Evidence supporting the hypothesis that frequent succession inhibits extensive participation in community life was not found. Instead, the opposite pattern prevailed. Military officers, despite their short time in the community, were found more likely to be members of various community voluntary associations than were business managers. The findings were viewed as suggestive of a pattern of adaptation to bureaucratic succession. Military officers, knowing full well that their assignment to a given base was temporary, apparently responded by rapidly integrating themselves into the local community through memberships in numerous voluntary associations.
Thus, it can be seen that although there are many similarities between business executives and military executives, the divergent objectives which each are committed to create a disparity between them. In many areas, this disparity is widening significantly. Where the business executive is striving for self-fulfillment and personal gain, the military officer must remain guided by three small, but extremely meaningful, words which General of the Armies Douglas MacArthur so well immortalized in his farewell speech—Duty, Honor, Country.

2. Ibid., p. 35.


4. Ibid., pp. 89-90.

5. Ibid., pp. 107-108.
CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Robert Frost once observed that, "Most of the change we see in life is due to truths being in and out of favor." The more closely one studies the concept of change from the behavioral science point of view, the more one comes to realize a ring of soundness in Frost's observation. A great body of information has been accumulated over the years on many aspects of change, yet there is no real theory of change. O'Connell (1968) on this point has stated that, "Obviously, it is too early for a general theory of organizational change. The social scientists involved can have faced only a narrow range of situations in application of their restricted techniques." R. R. Blake (1962) supports this report with his statement that, "the behavioral sciences have accomplished little of systematic character in the direction of achieving change in situations of organized human activity."

Despite the absence of a theory of change, the work to date by behavioral scientists can offer many sound observations about the process of change and most important, can provide managers with several conceptual schemes for thinking about change. The scope of this section of the paper is to examine some of the general schemes and considerations that have been offered as ways of thinking about change and to provide some definitions of terms that will be used throughout the paper. Application of change concepts to the military, only briefly considered in this section, will be discussed more thoroughly in later sections.

Open System View

The open system concept of organizational analysis provides one framework for viewing the process of change. All organizations are open
systems that must function within the larger environment. It is this larger environment that provides the energic inputs that allows an organization to function and survive. When any organization fails to react positively to a critical change in its environment and continues this type of behavior over a period of time it is most likely to atrophy and perish. The successful organization is one that continually adapts or adjusts to the changes in its environment. The organization that fails to respond appropriately to its environment can be labeled as a closed organization.

In studying the process of change, however, one other important source of change requirements must be considered. These are the requirements generated from within the organization itself. The source of these requirements can stem from any number of things; for example, differing needs of employees, internal strain or imbalance between different levels or subsystems within the organization, or even conflict within a department as to goals or objectives. An organization cannot neglect the requirements for change resulting from within, for failure to do so is almost a guaranteed route to internal decay and eventual downfall of the organization.

Types of Change

Planned change, as outlined by Bennis (1966) is the use of social technology to solve problems of society. Planned change is the application of systematic and appropriate knowledge to human affairs for the purpose of creating intelligent action and choice. The critical elements of the planned change process are valid knowledge and a deliberate and collaborative relationship. By way of definition, the actors in the process are the change agent who is the one that directs and assists the client system—the target of the change. Planned change entails mutual goal setting, an equal power ratio, and deliberateness on the part of both parties.
In studying change, one must be careful to differentiate planned change from other types of change. Bennis (1966) has outlined seven other types of change that could easily be confused with planned change, but which are actually different in some significant aspects. These types of change and their significant characteristics are as follows:

**Indoctrination:** Here there is an imbalance in the power ratio between the change agent and the client system.

**Coercive Change:** The major characteristics here are a nonmutual goal setting, an imbalance power ratio, and only one-sided deliberateness.

**Technocratic Change:** This is an engineering approach to change. The goals of the change are set by the client when he defines his knowledge requirements. The change agent, engineer, simply provides the required data.

**Interactional Change:** Here there is no deliberateness on either side of the relationship. This process is best observed among good friends or married couples.

**Socialization Change:** The parent-child relationship is the best example of socialization.

**Emulative Change:** Here change is brought about through identification with and emulation of, the "power figures" by the subordinates.

As Bennis states, this typology of change is crude, but it does provide a good perspective for differentiating planned change from other possible types of change.

One of the key variables in a successful planned change is the deliberate and collaborative relationship established between the change agent and the client system. Bennis stipulates that a planned change program will optimize only when it fulfills the five following criteria with respect to the collaborative relationship.

1. A joint effort that involves mutual determination of goals.

2. A "spirit of inquiry" stemming from a relationship that is governed by data, publicly shared.
2. A relationship growing out of the mutual interaction of the client and the change agent.

4. A voluntary relationship between the change agent and the client, with either free to terminate the relationship after joint consultation.

5. A relationship where each party has equal opportunities to influence the other.

Could this theory of planned change be put to use within a military organization? To answer this question, one must understand the context in which Bennis has offered this scheme. Bennis, as do most behavioral scientists, tend to view the role of the change agent almost exclusively as filled by someone outside the organization, usually a consulting behavioral science expert brought in to assist the organization in implementing some innovation. And it is in this light that he has offered these five criteria for the collaborative relationship. The traditional role of the organizational manager or military officer in implementing changes from within the organization has largely been ignored. This consulting change agent role seems to be an inherent bias in the writings of most behavioral scientists. Most managers would appreciate a more detailed study of the process of internally managing and implementing planned change than has been offered to date.

In the manager-subordinate relationship one would have a difficult time fulfilling all or any of Bennis' five criteria for a collaborative relationship, especially when this relationship is placed in the context of a military organization. Seldom in a military organization will one find conditions such as mutual determination of goals, voluntary relationships, or equal opportunities for each party to influence the other. Certainly these conditions could be fulfilled in some small degree, but by the very definition of an organization which demands a certain degree of conformity and restriction of personal impulses, most of these conditions are precluded from consideration.
Having been precluded from using the theories of planned change, what does the practical, every day manager do to implement required changes in his organization? Again using the Berns typology, it is clear that most managers must rely on intuition and flexibility in sliding back and forth on a continuum of change techniques that would include indoctrination and coercion at one end and socialization and emulation at the other.

**Organizational Changes: Systemic versus Individual Approach**

Katz and Kahn (1966) suggest that the systemic change process as developed in the Morse-Reimer (1955) experiment is the most valid concept available to effect change within an organization. This concept of change attempts to produce change in organizations through manipulation of its systemic variables rather than through attempts to change the behavior of individual members of the organization. The important characteristic of the concept of change is that it recognizes the behavior of individuals within an organization as being largely determined by the climate of the organization and the related system of roles and expectations. Many previous attempts to produce change in an organization were directed at the individual and have failed because they didn't consider the overall system of roles and their expectations throughout the organization. The systemic variables (those that cannot be changed at one level without affecting the whole organization) are the key to this concept. Katz and Kahn point out though, that the modification of major processes by working with less relevant variables is still possible, but is an infinitely more difficult task. Once the objective and the critical systemic variable are identified, Katz and Kahn recommend four steps to be taken by the change agent to implement the change. These are as follows:

1. **First**, top management must be fully appraised and sold on the desirability of the change.
2. Second, the members of the organization must be prepared for the change. An example of this process would be group discussions and training.

3. Third, the change must properly and officially be legitimized as a new role requirement by the authority structure.

4. Finally, the change must be implemented by the members of the organization, using the most participative and democratic means appropriate.

Two additional methods of change discussed by Katz and Kahn are the Floyd Mann Feedback and Group Discussion process and the use of Group Therapy within organizations as utilized by the Tavistock Institute in England. In the proper context and in their own right these methods of change have achieved significant and worthwhile results. (These two methods are fully explained in Katz and Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations*, Chapter 13.) However, in the context of a planned change as applied in military organization, these methods would not be appropriate. The major drawback is that both of these methods by choice avoid identifying in advance desired changes in organizational structure and functioning. By its very nature the military organization requires strict control to ensure that its functions and missions are fulfilled. So, as Katz and Kahn point out, the great difficulty with the therapy and feedback approach is that we do not know if any significant organizational change will occur.

The experience to date with these two concepts is that any change achieved is likely to be in the direction of more efficient functioning, but not in the direction of basic structural change. In this context, and especially when military organizations are viewed at different levels of organizational hierarchy, the use of group therapy or feedback procedures might prove beneficial to military organizations on the higher end of the continuum. This process offers little risk of radical departures and an excellent chance for a general increase in efficiency. However, in considering
this approach one must account for the fact that the military is a large complex organization, and a change in any one branch or organization might have severe and unintended side effects on other parts of the structure.

The military organizational hierarchy described above can best be depicted with the continuum analogy. This relationship is illustrated in the following diagram. Combat battalions would be the bottom or the highly authoritarian end of a continuum of organizational structure, while high level staffs of the Pentagon type would be located at the top level or the more participative end of the organizational continuum.

Illustration II-1: Military Organizational Hierarchy Continuum

The greatest amount of confusion and frustration in the application of change concepts to organizations has come from the failure to recognize that changing individuals will not always change the organization. The theories of individual change, though important in certain specific and limited applications are an oversimplification of the organizational change process which neglects the interrelationships of people in an organizational structure.

The use of information as a method of individual change provides the necessary rational for the change but fails to provide the required motivation. Individual counseling and therapy, and sensitivity training have proved
successful in changing individual behavior. However, the individual usually returns to his former ways of behaving once he returns to the job, because these change attempts failed to consider the realities of organizational structure. When taken out of context of the work situation, the individual has the problem of transferring his insights and individual changes back to the organization.

The implementation of change through influence of the peer group offers a potent but limited method of application. Only when the peer group is taken directly from the organizational setting and only when the role relations and the authority structure of the group do not greatly inhibit its interaction, then will the peer group influence approach offer some chance for success.

Lewin's Scheme of Organizational Equilibrium

One of the soundest schemes proposed as a concept for thinking about change, and especially useful for managers, is Lewin's Scheme of Organizational Equilibrium.

This scheme, sketched in the diagram below, describes the behavior in organizations as a dynamic balance of forces working within the social-psychological space of the organization. Lewin uses a given level of production to describe his scheme and states that any tendencies to raise the level of production are usually offset by equal forces tending to depress it. The forces tending to raise the production level are the driving forces, and the restraining forces are those that offer resistance.

Organizational Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restraining Forces</th>
<th>Equilibrium</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level of Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration II-2; Lewin's Scheme of Organizational Equilibrium
How does change take place within this scheme? Lewin suggests that first there must be an imbalance between the restraining forces and the driving forces. This imbalance can occur by changing the magnitude or direction of any of the forces in the situation. The role of the manager requires that he be able to manipulate the situational forces to unfreeze the present equilibrium, direct the movement in the desired direction, and rearrange or refreeze the situation so that it does not backslide to its old level.

One big problem of management in implementing any change is to prevent backsliding. Lewin offers one solution that can help prevent backsliding: that is maximum participation. In other words, the greater the degree of participation in planning and implementing a change by all affected parties, the less the chance for backsliding.

Benne (1966) discusses the Lewin scheme as presented above and more precisely defines the role of the change agent as one of a "planned, deliberate intervention into the processes of change under way in and around the client system to influence the direction, tempo and quality of the change which takes place." One important consideration which Benne offers concerning the role of the change agent is that he must constantly be aware of his own motivations in order to approach any change objectively and to build the important element of trust and confidence in his integrity as a change agent. He must not allow his perceptions to be clouded and distorted by personal motivations and needs.

Benne believes that this admonishment applies equally to either the outside change agent (the consultant) or the manager change agent. Yet in the case of the manager change agent, this concept points up one of the strong dilemmas of organizational life, which is equally true for the military officer-manager. The officer as a change agent is held strictly accountable for the success or failure of his assigned operation. All promotions and rewards are based on how well one implements a change, if
that is part of his job. In this situation it is almost impossible for an
officer to retain the degree of objectivity implied by Bunne. Because of
organizational necessity and self-survival, he must continually consider
his own motivations and needs. One alternative reaction to this dilemma is
extreme conservatism which can also lead to organizational decay and self
destruction.

**Lawrence Two Component Scheme**

Lawrence (1961) has offered another excellent scheme by which the manager
can approach change, especially in individual change where the resistance
factor is expected to be high. Lawrence divides change into two components,
the technical side and the social side. The technical side is simply the
making of a measurable modification in the physical routines of a job. The
social aspect is more complicated and refers to the way those affected by a
change perceive it as altering their established relationship in the organiza-
tion.

The social aspect of the change, which grows out of the interaction
process between the change agent and the client, must not violate the
customary methods or ways in which the client relates himself to the organi-
sation. If the client is accustomed to being treated as a person with some
valuable skills and knowledge, this is how he must be approached in order to
implement the technical side of a change. If one doesn't use this type of
approach, he will generate resistance to the change regardless of its
technical merits. This process can also work in the reverse. Take for
example, the client that is accustomed to receiving harsh and impersonal
orders and directions. If he were approached by a change agent that used
overly flattering appeals and platitudes, he would most likely perceive the
agent as insincere and manipulative and therefore form an immediate resistance.
The important variable in this process then is to sustain the customary working
relationships of the individual or groups.
Zetterberg "Something Else" Requirement

Zetterberg (1962) stated that, "It is a rather common observation that scientific findings do not by themselves influence any policy decisions: it is always findings plus something else that seem to be operative in any instance where it is claimed that applied science has helped the shaping of policy." It is this factor of "something else" that has long been the concern of the Human Resources Research Office, of George Washington University. As a contract research organization working directly for the Department of the Army, HumRRO is vitally concerned with the degree of success they experience in implementing changes based on their research findings. In a study of this problem in 1966, J. D. Lyons concluded that while timeliness, command interest, concreteness, Zeitgeist and personal interest were all important "something else" factors, by far the most important key to the successful implementation of a technical research finding was the continued and intensified involvement of the client system throughout the entire process.

Chin's Levels of Change

As one last consideration of the concept of change, Chin (1965) offers a very useful scheme of distinguishing among levels of change. He differentiates five degrees of change which can be placed on a continuum that would also describe the degree of amount of change required by the client system. The levels, described below, range from substitution to value orientation change and can be directly correlated with factors inhibiting innovation because the scale seems to range from easiest to the hardest to accomplish.

1. **Substitution**, is simply one insulated segment exchanged for another.

2. **Alteration**, is a minor change but one that can have unforeseen systemic effects.

3. **Perturbations and Variations**, are temporary oscillations in the client system, but they still represent variations within the equilibrium of a system.
4. **Restructuring** represents a fundamental change in the structure of a system.

5. **Value Orientation** is the most complex of all and involves deep intrinsic changes of personality and character both for the individual and the organization.

From these change distinctions it becomes quite obvious that there will likely be different principles of change to use according to the different levels of change involved.
FOOTNOTES


CHAPTER III
CURRENT METHODS OF CHANGE IN THE ARMY

This chapter describes the current methodology used by the Army for developing new doctrine, equipment and organizations for the Army in the field. The chapter concentrates mainly on organizational change (e.g., changing structure and modes of operation) rather than on individual change as is accomplished through sensitivity training and similar activities. Needless to say, the Army is a large complex organization which is structured along the classical school of thought. While Katz and Kahn consider these schools of thought to be closed in nature, the writers of this paper do not consider the Army a closed system even though it is normally considered bureaucratic in nature. In studying the various paragraphs below, it will be noted that each major topic (e.g., formal structural change) is discussed separately. This is done mainly for convenience and the reader should consider all the topics together in that each impacts on the other and, for the most part, change is accomplished in a systematic and orderly fashion within the Army.

Formal Structural Change

The overall defense establishment undergoes reorganization more or less on a continuing basis in order to effect economy measures and to adjust to the ever changing missions of the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition to this, there are major recommendations which are proposed by Presidential Blue Ribbon Committees such as the recent recommendations of the Fitchugh Committee on the reorganization of the Department of Defense.

The Department of the Army (DA) is affected, of course, by any defense department reorganizations. DA also undergoes internal change or reorganization to meet the challenges of its many and varied missions. The last major reorganization of DA was in 1962 and this was the first major reorganization since 1903. This reorganization was necessary to eliminate areas of overlapping responsibilities and diseconomies of operating with the existing structural framework.
These higher level changes, while interesting, are quite complex and would lend themselves to a most thorough analytical paper individually. Thus, this paper will deal primarily with developing and implementing organizational change for the Army in the field. The reason for this concentration can best be summed up by quoting General William Tecumseh Sherman when he told the graduates of the U. S. Military Academy in 1869, that an Army "may be used, and is constantly used, in connection with the civil administration of government; yet war is its true element, and battle its ultimate use."

The job of insuring that the Army in the field is designed to meet current and future threats is assigned to the U. S. Army Combat Developments Command (CDC). In the period following World War II, rapid advances in science and technology coupled with changes in national policy and strategy, placed increasing emphasis on the need for being able to predict and develop new doctrine, tactics and organizations to meet new requirements. During this period, the task of developing changes for the Army was fragmented among approximately 30 different organizations. Needless to say, this led to problems when attempts were made to incorporate and standardize changes Army-wide. This, then, was the situation which brought about the establishment of CDC in 1962 with the centralized responsibility for all combat developments functions within the Army.

CDC realizes, as does the military establishment as a whole, that there is no ultimate Army. Therefore, its mission is to recommend changes which will make the Army the best for a given time period and then improve or that organization as required to maintain overall combat effectiveness. With this background, let's look then at how the CDC recommended changes come about and how they are implemented.

The key to the combat developments program is CDC's Army Concept Program which is designed to facilitate the integration of new or improved doctrine,
materiel, and organizations into the Army during a specified implementation period. CDC's concept program is correlated with the overall Department of the Army planning system. Under the Army planning system there is a family of strategic plans which outline the principal force objectives and resource requirements of the Army staff, identify future threats to the security of the U. S., and plan for the effective use of forces and resources which will be available. Within the constraints of the Army plans, CDC then plans for changes which are required for the Army in the field during the next twenty-five years. In reality, of course, the twenty-five year prediction is "a prediction" in the true sense of the word, and as such is updated continuously as the implementation dates become near.

In the CDC Concept Program, the developmental cycle is broken into five year time frames. As an example, the Army which CDC envisions for the 1995 time frame would follow a developmental plan similar to that described below. The target date or T-date is that date by which it is envisioned that the Army in the field will be fully operational under the new doctrine, materiel and organizations.

T minus 25 to T minus 20. During this period a concept study which includes the broad guidance and general objectives which determine the direction of combat developments for the 1995 time frame is developed. The study considers all the functions of land combat and is aimed at making the fullest use of current and future technological advances. It must consider all future threats to national security.

T minus 20 to T minus 15. The concept study is now broken down into doctrinal studies which examine the functions of land combat more fully (e.g., the function of mobility is broken down into air, ground and sea mobility). Material requirements are also identified. If the development of these requirements are beyond the current state of the art, they are
developed as a qualitative materiel developments objective (QMDO). A QMDO is a statement of the need for an item the feasibility of development for which is unknown. Thus, at this point, Army research and development or civilian industry will attempt to develop the required item without knowing whether or not they will be successful in meeting the required need.

T minus 15 to T minus 10. During this period, doctrine is developed in greater detail and redefined as necessary. Also at this time, qualitative materiel requirements (QMR) are identified. A QMR is a statement of need for an item of materiel for which the feasibility of development is known.

T minus 10 to T minus 5. On the basis of approved doctrine developed in previous periods, field manuals (FM's) and tables of organization and equipment (TOE's) are produced. A field manual is the means by which the doctrine for the given period is promulgated to the Army. A TOE is a list of the men and equipment authorized in a given organization and also contains a proposed organizational structure. There is a TOE developed for each given type of unit in the Army in the field (e.g., Division Maintenance Battalion). The FM's may be new or revised but must consider all details as to how the Army will fight, be equipped and be organized during the pertinent time frame.

T minus 5 to T-date. During this last five years, the concept program which began as a broad idea twenty years earlier, is put into effect to the extent allowable by the Chief of Staff of the Army (usually based on budget and manpower constraints imposed on the military by the government). It is during this period that troop tests are conducted by units of the Army organized, equipped and trained in accordance with the new or revised doctrine. These troop tests are evaluated and form a basis for making any required change to the doctrine, TOE's or FM's. Following this, there is then an Army-wide transition to the new doctrine, materiel and organizations as directed by the Chief of Staff.
Throughout the whole developmental cycle (25 years), computer wargaming, simulation and other operations research techniques are used to determine if changes are required to the envisioned concepts. Also, throughout the life cycle, cost effectiveness studies are made to help select the best alternatives and to assist in formulating materiel requirements. Four things are involved in considering what programs to design and what to change or improve:

1. the national objectives;
2. the nature and urgency of the threats faced;
3. the capability of science and industry to deliver the required materiel on time; and
4. the anticipated costs of the program as opposed to the expected gain in combat effectiveness.

From the foregoing discussion it would appear that the combat development cycle is almost a closed system in that feedback is always generated in relation to the system or concept being developed. This is far from true. Major Army commands (such as the U. S. Army Vietnam) constantly provide feedback to DA and CDC as to difficulties being encountered in the field. In addition, CDC has liaison offices and special teams in the field (especially in Vietnam) to examine deficiencies in current doctrine, materiel and organizations in order to provide feedback to the planners within the CDC developmental agencies. Over and above this normal feedback, CDC also has a Vietnam returnee debriefing program which allows the command to obtain additional information as to shortcomings and inadequacies which these personnel found to exist under combat conditions. All of this feedback serves the major purpose of allowing CDC to incorporate the experience gained from operations in the field so that future doctrine and concepts will be viable in the time period for which they are programmed.
It would also appear from studying the above text that this is a smooth, problem-free development cycle. This, too, is far from reality. Since CDC has only been in existence for eight years, all of the problems have not yet been worked out of the system. These problems are far too complex to detail here but it should be pointed out that they are currently subject to thorough analysis within the Army to determine the best method of "changing" the Army’s method of introducing organizational change.

Throughout the developmental cycle, close coordination is maintained with the Army Material Command (AMC) who is responsible for the development of the material which is envisioned to be needed in the 1995 time frame (material development is discussed under Technological Change later in this chapter). This close coordination is necessary to insure that the equipment developed will fulfill the needs of the Army in the field. In addition, this inter-command coordination allows for continuous development and update of the companion doctrine and organizations.

Although ideally material is developed in support of new doctrine and organizations, it is often the case that a technological break-through in material, or new utilization of existing equipment, will cause a need for change in doctrine and organizations. Two prime examples of this are the helicopter and the air cushion vehicles for use in Vietnam. Until the early 1960’s, the true value of the helicopter as a tactical vehicle was not fully recognised. Recognition of its capabilities for rapid deployment of troops and the provision of tremendous firepower to the combat elements led to the new air mobile concepts being so effectively used today in Vietnam. These concepts were developed, fielded and tested in a few short years and are now undergoing refinement based on Vietnam experience. In this case the equipment already available to the Army has created a whole new concept which will have far reaching effects on determining how the Army will fight, be equipped
and be organized in the future. The adoption of this concept will, therefore, impact on concept programs which are already under development and will necessitate change in many cases.

During the last ten years of the developmental cycle, CDC must also work closely with the U. S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) who is responsible for training individuals and organizations within the Army. This coordination is necessary to insure that the new doctrine promulgated in the field manuals can be incorporated into the program of instruction for all CONARC schools in a timely manner. In addition, CONARC is often required to provide the Army organizations and personnel which test the new concepts and thus must be aware in advance as to what changes are required so that plans can be made to support the necessary tests.

In summary, it can be seen that keeping the Army's doctrine and organizations up-to-date and ready to meet all contingencies is a rather awesome job. It must be remembered, too, that these organizations are envisioned and designed by man and, as such, are not perfect. Therefore, the military, like most social organizations tend to breakdown and require constant patching and change in order to meet its ever changing mission and environment.

Technological Change

Although CDC was organized in 1962 to insure that long range plans would be the guiding force in all new equipment development, this is not the only method used to identify changes required to Army materiel. CDC has the major mission but it has not been in existence long enough to identify and develop all the requirements necessary to support its long range plans. Because of this, many of the new equipment requirements are generated outside the established system.
A large number of new material developments are a product of the research and development agencies under the control of the Army Material Command. In fact these agencies account for approximately ninety percent of the Army's research and development effort. Other Army agencies also engaged in development of new equipment are the surgeon general's office and chief of engineers office.

Often times, new equipment requirements are generated within the Army staff itself or within the office of the secretary of defense. An example of this procedure is the main battle tank (MBT-70) which was initiated within the secretary of defense's office to promote joint development by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of a radically new and improved main battle tank.

Major Army commands, such as the U. S. Army Vietnam (USARV), may originate requirements to meet unforeseen and urgent needs of the troops in the field. The Army has a program known as ENSURE (equipment non-standard urgent requirements for equipment) which is designed to satisfy this type of need. The Huey Cobra, which is a gunship with improved capability over the UH-1C armed helicopter, is but one example of an item developed in response to an ENSURE request.

Occasionally, civilian industry will develop new equipment which, with minor modification, is deemed suitable for military use. Examples of such off-the-shelf items are the M-16 rifle and the CH-54A helicopter (flying crane) both of which are extensively in use by the Army.

The above discussion is presented merely to show that new equipment can be generated by many sources, both from within and outside the Department of the Army. In either case, this new equipment will most likely create a need for change in the existing doctrine or organization of the Army in the field. As an example, the introduction of a new type of equipment
alter the service support structure in varying degrees. If the item is similar to existing equipment, then the current maintenance structure may be adequate to support the equipment with only the addition of one or two personnel to existing organizations or even cross-training of personnel already in the organization. However, if the item is radically different it may create a need for a whole new organization or ideally it will be maintenance free and a whole echelon of support could be eliminated.

No matter how the item is introduced into the Army, the Army Materiel Command has responsibility for development, test, procurement, and disposal of the item or in Army jargon, it has responsibility from "the cradle to the grave". Records are maintained on each item from its inception to its ultimate death whether it be in combat or by normal disposal. To illustrate this concept, the following discussion will concentrate on the formal combat development cycle means of developing a new item of equipment.

Under this method, CDC identifies a piece of equipment which will be required in some future time period. For sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the item is within the current state of the art and development of the item is feasible. CDC then prepares a qualitative material requirement (QMR) which states (among other things) the requirement for the item, what it is to be designed for, and the military specifications (e.g., In the case of a tank, one of the specifications may be that it is capable of firing either conventional ammunition or missiles from its primary gun tube,) which are required to make the item acceptable for use with the new concepts envisioned.

This QMR is then taken by the appropriate agency within AMC for systems development (e.g., For a new vehicle, the Army Tank and Automotive Command would be the developmental agency.). If the Army has an in-house developmental capability, such as one of the arsenals for producing ammunition, the item would go through the developmental cycle in-house. In the case of a vehicle, the responsible agency would negotiate a contract with civilian industry for development of the item.
Throughout the developmental stage, in-process reviews are held to insure that the item being designed does in fact meet the specifications outlined in the QMR. If not, either the contractor must change the design or, if this is not possible, the QMR may have to be modified to make the specifications less critical. This can often be done, in that the QMR often states specifications which are unrealistic or not attainable with the state of the art.

As the item is developed, it undergoes a series of tests—engineering, service and troop tests. Within AMC there is a special command, U. S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) which was created to control and coordinate the test and evaluation of new Army equipment. Engineering tests are conducted during development to determine if subsystems or components (e.g., the engine) of the item are performing as required and changes are made if necessary. The service test is the first place where the new item is tested as an entire system, performing in the environment and under the conditions for which it was developed. CDC monitors these tests to insure that the stated requirements are, in fact, being met. Once the service tests are completed and the results compiled, a decision is made by the Department of the Army as to accept or reject the item for use. It may be necessary at this time, to incorporate changes or modifications to the item before it is acceptable. If this is the case, further testing may be required. If the item is accepted, it then undergoes actual troop tests. Here the item is married up with the doctrine and organizations for which it was designed to insure that it can do the required job. This is the final stage of the developmental cycle and, if successful, the item will be introduced into the Army world-wide along with the appropriate doctrine and organizations.
This is not to say the item is now perfectly acceptable and that the item will be problem free from this time on. Once the item is used extensively in the field, or in combat, performance of the item may indicate that the item needs to be changed or it may point to the necessity for a whole new item of equipment. The Army has a continuous feedback system for all major items of equipment in that each user of the equipment can submit what is known as an EIR or equipment improvement recommendation at any time. An EIR pinpoints a specific problem or design deficiency that the user has encountered. If a particular item is consistently encountering the same problem, the developmental agency will analyze the item to determine what change is required to correct the problem. Once the problem is analyzed, a modification work order is published. This MWO is a description of how the configuration of the item must be changed in order to correct the deficiency.

As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the Army must closely watch the development of an item from its very inception until its disposal in order to ensure that items introduced into the Army are the best available and yet economically justifiable within the constraints of the national military objectives. Introducing these new items and maintaining them in a large complex organization like the Army involves continuous review and updating of the equipment itself and the doctrine for which it was designed. Often times, the equipment has capabilities beyond the doctrine for which it was designed and, thus, to effect full utilization of the item, doctrine and organizations must be changed to take advantage of this extra capability.

Human Factors Analysis

While it is true that the doctrine, equipment and organizations are an important part of the military establishment, the individual soldier has
always been the focal point for waging either hot or cold war. Of all the
elements of war, the human element is probably the most complex and difficult
to understand. Because the individual soldiers actions, capabilities, and
attitudes (whether it be a part of a fire team or in interacting with the
local population) are critical to the success of any military mission, the
Army must consider human factors in the design of equipment and organizations.

Army research and engineering in human factors is concerned with the
discovery and development of principles and techniques for effective use of
military personnel. This includes the application of these principles and
techniques concerning human physical and psychological characteristics in
the design of equipment, so as to increase speed and precision of operations,
provide maximum maintenance efficiency, reduce fatigue, and simplify organizations.¹

Three separate organizations under the control of the Chief, Research and
Development (an office with the Department of the Army) accomplishes much of the
scientific work in this area. These agencies are:

1. The U. S. Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory (BESRL),
which conducts psychological research in the areas of personnel
selection, classification, management and utilization.

2. The Human Resources Research Office (Hum HRO), formerly of
George Washington University, which conducts research in
training, motivation, leadership, and man/weapons systems
analysis.

3. The Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS), American
University, which conducts research in the field of psychological
operations, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and other
social sciences in support of Army requirements.
In addition, the Human Engineering Laboratories (HEL) which is a part of the Army Material Command, ensures proper human factors engineering of Army material and integration of personnel and training requirements for support of any new equipment or system. Many of the commodity commands (e.g., Army Tank and Automotive Command) of AMC also have human factors research and development facilities.

The human factors and behavioral science area, of course, is a very broad subject and a thorough analysis of this area is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in order to have a basic understanding of how the Army uses human factors analysis in the realm of military operations research, a generalized model of human behavior in military situations which was developed by the Combat Operations Research Group for the Combat Developments Command is presented below:

The Human Behavioral System

1) Characteristics

a) Behavioral characteristics in combat follow a reasonably discernible pattern. For example, if one considers a conflict between two armies (it also could be between individuals or small groups), the sequence of behavior would most likely evolve as follows: information inputs to each Army concerning the situation at a common point in time; the recognition by each Army of immediate goals to be achieved; the selection of one or more goals for achievement; the decisions concerning how best to achieve these goals; and the execution of available action mechanisms for achievement. Graphically, this sequence in its simplest form would appear as follows:
Stimulation
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Perceptions

Decisions

Responses

Note that each of the Army's "responses" creates its own self-stimulating feedback.

b) The behavioral pattern outlined above can be described in terms of the transfer of energy or information through an individual; through a group of people; or through a larger state, including the individual and the small group. Most social scientists tend to focus their study of human behavior on only one of these levels of behavior. However, significant behavior effects occur at all three levels simultaneously, and these effects can be accurately predicted only when all three levels are taken into account.

2) The Individual Behavioral Pattern

a) Any human activity depends ultimately on one or more individuals perceiving stimuli and making responses. The variables which affect individual behavior come from all three levels of organization (see Figure 3-1). All behavior, however, is initiated by stimuli which must be perceived by the individual. Terrain and weather conditions are examples of external stimulation, as are external activities such as enemy fire. An externally established goal may be the requirement from a higher headquarters to take a given military objective. In addition to external stimuli, the
Figure 3-1. The Human Behavioral System
individual may also be stimulated by the behavior of the group of which he is a member. For example, if all the other members of his platoon break under fire he is likely to do the same. Finally, he is self-stimulated. Past decisions and actions, his level of training and experience, and his current psychological and physiological states will affect his behavior.

b) Not all perceived information is acted upon. There is a dynamic interchange between the perceptual processes and the internal state of the individual. For convenience, this internal state may be separated into three interdependent although not clearly differentiated states: the psychological state, the physiological state, and the storage state which may be expressed in terms of experience or training. Only a small part of this storage state can be classified as memory, that is, subject to voluntary recall. Although most experiences are not directly accessible as memory, most psychologists and psychiatrists agree that these "nonavailable experiences" do influence behavior, and that they are in dynamic interaction with the physiological and psychological states of the individual. The physiological state consists of, among other things, health, fatigue, and physical trauma. The psychological state includes emotions, motives, attitudes, values, and belief systems. Some of these psychological systems are quite stable and others are extremely transient and dependent upon momentary changes in stimulation. The psychological, physiological,
and storage states are dynamic interplay with each other and they influence what stimuli may be perceived by the individual. Thus, a fatigued observer with a set (predisposition) to search an area for tanks might remain alert for any sign of tracked vehicles, but he might not see or hear the infiltrating enemy infantry which he could have detected if his set had been different.

(c) It should be recognized that investigations leading to the production of individual behavior patterns are frequently less applicable to Operation Research (OR) problems than those studies portraying behavior of the group or extra-group levels. It is at these levels that behavior patterns become most significant and are most amenable to operations research techniques. However, important exceptions, which may well demand insights on individual behavior, do exist. For example, the ability of a forward observer to detect a particular target of opportunity is a function of training, alertness, fatigue, and other individual factors. It is known, for instance, that the probability of an observer detecting and correctly interpreting the meaning of an object decreases as a function of the length of a watch period. From this knowledge an estimated decrement of probability of target detection as a function of the duration of visual search can be made and used in the development of reconnaissance flight plans.

3) The Group Behavioral Pattern

Group behavior is more than a simple summation of individual behaviors. In group action the individual behaviors must be
considered as part of the behavior patterns of the group.

As viewed by the social scientist, the objective of military action is to render the enemy ineffective by breaking down his group function. This is done by destruction of the enemy's cohesiveness. Group cohesiveness is sustained by a dynamic balance between the organizational structure, leadership patterns, and perceived proximity of the individual. Inputs to cohesiveness are the actions of individuals in the group. A soldier who is alone in a foxhole on a moonless night in jungle terrain, and who cannot communicate with others in his squad lest he be detected by the enemy, loses his sense of cohesiveness and his ability to function as part of a group. Not only the social environment, but also the politico-cultural facets that make up the social environment affect group cohesiveness. As a result, tactics designed to destroy cohesiveness based on one type of culture may be ineffective when applied against another type.

4) The Extra-Group Behavioral Pattern
a) The extra-group level is concerned with behavior of the group in the external world that impinges on the group through the agency of the individuals who compose the group. Any consideration of human factors must take into consideration both the physical and the social environments. The physical environment refers to the terrain and weather which influence both individual and group behavior. Over the years, military science has developed ways to utilize and control the physical environment. The social environment, however, is less familiar and more poorly controlled. It consists of those social,
political, and economic forces which influence the behavior of an individual in relation to his immediate group and the culture of which he is a member. The social environment, as much as the physical environment, determines what individuals and groups may or may not do, and how they will do it. It determines the leadership patterns, the organization structures, internal communication modes and meanings, and the supports for the cohesiveness of the groups.

b) In summary, it can be seen that the extra-group level impinges upon the individuals in the group. The casual relationship and interaction pattern among the three levels (individual, group, and extra-group) is shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 does not include man-machine (or material) interactions signifying the recognition that tools and other equipment implement human behavior.2

In summary, human factors analysis plays an important role in designing new material or organizational structures and also serves as a basis for changing existing items of equipment and organizations to operate more efficiently and effectively.

Societal Interrelationships

In addition to all of the methods of internal change previously discussed, the Army often acts as a change agent for the larger social system of which it is part. As Chin points out in his article, the military services provide social improvement type functions for society.3 These functions can either be a spin-off from the Army's primary roles or as part of its ever changing role in support of society as a whole. Some of these functions are detailed here due to the on-going nature of the projects while others are discussed later in the paper as expanding or future roles of the Army.
A very important societal function performed by the military as a spin-off to its own mission is the provision of a training base for critically needed work skills. In fact, in some industries such as electronics, the military serves as the major skill base. In many of these hard skill areas, the military sends personnel to schools of approximately a year in duration before utilizing the man on a productive, wrench turning basis. Because these skills are often critically needed by civilian industry, which is paying a much higher salary, the military loses the trained technician after his service time is fulfilled. This constant turnover of personnel returning to civilian life provides a school-trained, skilled work force far in excess of what civilian industry could afford to train itself.

In addition to this normal training of individuals for the needs of the military, the Army has recently initiated a program called Transition. This program is built around the objective that no man who honorably completes military service should return to civilian life without a marketable civilian skill. In addition to the military occupational skill (NOS) training that a man received for his military job, Transition offers to all men who have from one to six months remaining on their tour of service the training, education, and counseling necessary to prepare them for productive roles in the civilian society. This program was initiated in 1968 to provide the best in-service training available for individuals leaving the Army who were not yet headed for a civilian occupation. While maximum use is made of civilian-related military training courses and facilities, the Army has sought maximum participation from private and public agencies. Additionally, coordination is maintained with industry and employment officers in an effort to insure that job opportunities are available for those who are trained. One of the most active corporations is General Motors which, in late 1968, was conducting training at approximately 30 sites throughout the country. One of the more
spectacular successes in the public agency area took place at Ft. Irwin, California. Here, a law enforcement training course was designed by the Los Angeles Police Department with instruction provided by Barstow Junior College. Funds to support the program were provided from the Manpower Development and Training Act. The first class graduated 39 new police officers who went to various police departments across the nation.

A third training program which has societal impact was initiated by the Department of Defense in October 1966 and is known as Project 100,000. This program was designed to give men previously disqualified from military service an opportunity to serve as fully satisfactory military personnel. Prior to October 1966, approximately one-third of the nation's draft-age youth were rejected for military service because of physical or mental standards. This resulted in 600,000 rejections a year with approximately one-half of them failing due to educational deficiencies. Under this program the military services accepted 100,000 young men who otherwise would have been rejected because of low test scores or minor physical defects. During the first 21 months through June 1968, a total of 118,163 men were accepted into the program. Of these, 40% were non-white and 38% were unemployed. An additional 18% earned less than $60 per week and more than half had not completed high school. The results of this project have been very encouraging with 96% of all the personnel entering into the service through this program successfully completing basic training. In addition, most of these men are making their promotions on time.4

The above programs are designed to improve the capabilities of the individual through remedial and special programs patterned toward developing potential that has been frustrated by social, economic, or educational deprivation and to assist him in becoming effective, worthwhile soldiers and citizens of the United States.
A recent example of doctrine developed for the Army being used as a vehicle for change in society, is the use of Army medical evacuation helicopters and teams in support of local communities. In the San Antonio, Texas area, the doctrine and equipment which has proved so effective in saving countless battlefield casualties in Vietnam is now being applied to assist in evacuation of seriously injured automobile accident victims. While this is seemingly a change which is highly beneficial to the society as a whole, there is opposition to the program. The private ambulance operators in the local area are objecting that the Army is interfering with their livelihood by providing this service and they cannot compete due to the high cost of operating such an air ambulance service on a private basis. Also, there is a legal problem as to the liability incurred by the government and the crew members when an accident victim is moved in this manner. This is the same problem that doctors and nurses face today in stopping to help an accident victim at the scene of the accident. Thus, what appears on the surface to be a change which is beneficial to society may not in reality be valid in the long run.

Summary

This chapter has briefly touched on various aspects of the current methods which the Army uses for effecting internal change to its doctrine, materiel and organizations. This brevity was necessary in that many volumes could be written on each of the subjects alone. Such detailed coverage is beyond the cursory scope of this paper. The brief discussion on societal interrelationships was provided to illustrate how the military establishment is currently used as a change agent for elements of society as a whole.


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CURRENT SOCIETAL FORCES CAUSING CHANGE IN THE MILITARY

In the past few years, one has hardly been able to pick up a newspaper of a periodical without seeing some reference to the great changes that are occurring in the society of the U. S. Old value systems and traditions are being overturned and in their place, we have a new individualism taking place. Recent Supreme Court decisions have placed a new dimension on civil rights and justice. A rapidly changing technology and new attitudes toward such things as drugs and protests are only part of the changing social environment of the U. S.

It is currently popular to consider all these changes as having a far-reaching effect on the military and how it operates. Military and civilian alike are concerned over the affect that these changes will have on our military establishment. At the second annual colloquium on the American military profession, Dr. Russell F. Weigley of Temple University stated, "$\text{The values of the military are very much at odds with those of civilian society, and, in one sense, the military has ceased to be part of America and become part of a worldwide military profession.}^1$, p. 66. This viewpoint, however popular and widespread, leaves a great deal to be desired in explaining what the affects of these changes have been and how the military organization is reacting to them.

To lapse into the position that the military profession will withdraw into an entity unto itself, distinct from the social forces and ideologies present within society, seems an oversimplification. S. P. Huntington stated, "$\text{The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which reflect only social}\)
values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. The interaction of these two forces is the nub of the problem of civil-military relations. Huntington attacks the idea that the pattern of civil-military relations evolve from American liberal democratic values. Instead, he states that the real problem before our society is to establish a pattern of civil-military relations that will best provide for the security of the nation. Certainly now, the U. S. is faced with a crossroads situation. There are indeed forces in society which seem to be pushing the military establishment away from many of its time-honored traditions and roles. By the same token, the military remains the primary vehicle by which society can promulgate violence in support of the state. Whether this support be rendered within a limited or unlimited concept (as discussed below), it is obvious that these forces from society will affect the balance of civil-military relations. Not only are military traditions, roles, and practices under fire, but there is a persistent force on the part of society to socialize the military along civilian patterns. Actually, with today's liberal attitudes, it is often difficult to defend such policies as short haircuts and some of the barracks restrictions often decreed. It seems that the controversy over whether or not a man can have a bottle of whiskey in his wall locker is trivial when looked at against the problem of a fighting force so attune to social inanities, that it develops all the fractionalization, compromise, and waste of our political system today. Huntington stated that, in a liberal society, the power of the military will detract from its professionalism—that society must endure some political power in the hands of the military if national security is to be maintained during periods of threat. "Unless a new balance is created, the continued disruption of American civil-military relations cannot help but impair the caliber of military professionalism in the future. A political
officer corps, rent with faction, subordinated to ulterior ends, lacking prestige but sensitive to the appeals of popularity, would endanger the security of the state. A strong, integrated highly professional officer corps, on the other hand, immune to politics and respected for its military character, would be a steadying balance wheel in the conduct of policy.2, p. 464.

Here now we have the basic contradiction. Society in current times requires that the military be attune to changes in the civilian component of society and that it adapt to these changes. At the same time, society demands that the military continue in its role of a legitimate source of violence, and the caretaker of national security for that society. Here, then, we arrive at the crux of this paper. Society and the military must define an equilibrium point between the two positions. Much has been said and will continue to be said about the problems of civil rights, military justice, racial equality, drugs, individualism, the draft, and a host of others prevalent in the military establishment today. Most of the literature agrees that changes need to be made either by the military or by society. A question then evolves: If the military does adapt to our changing mores, will the present structure and system still be able to function within the objectives prescribed by society? This section will not attempt to review all the pro and con arguments. What follows is merely a sampling of the widely conflicting views of each of the most common issues. In this way, perhaps it will be seen that society must give as well as take; must compromise on some of its ideals if we are to maintain an adequate military organization.

**Limited vs. Unlimited**

Clausewitz, as the preeminent military thinker of western society, defined the essence of war in *Vom Kriege* in 1831. "War is thus an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will."2, p. 56. Here he stresses the use of force without limit; that war tends to become absolute unless inhibited by a policy
to which it is subordinate. He held that war is never an isolated act and is always subordinate to external political ends. "In this way the whole field of war ceases to be subject to the strict law of forces pushed to the extreme." p. 57. This concept of war is theoretical in today's world since "absolute war" would result in mutual annihilation. Instead, we have the situation where battle and bloodshed can in fact be avoided or controlled at a given level. Such is the concept of the limited war to achieve specific political goals. With the evolution of limited war, the problem becomes sociological in that change must occur in the military organization as it adopts to the unique mission assigned. Janowitz labels this the "constabulatory concept." "The military establishment becomes a constabulatory force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations rather than victory because it has incorporated a protective military posture." p. 418. This concept is designed to facilitate creative innovation in military organization and doctrine. Since 1960, the U. S. has relied on a policy of flexibility and modification to meet and resolve a crisis short of general war.

This concept of limited war creates a sociological problem in itself. "When the U. S. is cast in the role of supporting world order, of supporting anti-Communist government and viable economics in underdeveloped countries far from its shores, and when the clear and present danger to American society is far from obvious, the lag in enthusiasm for the sacrifices entailed is pronounced." "Developing enthusiasm for such tasks among soldiers, some of whom were reluctantly inducted in the first place, provides a substantial and continuous challenge in the face of public or outright opposition to the conflict from many people." p. 34. If the threat to a social organization is distant and not perceived as clear and urgent, then group solidarity toward elimination of the threat will not be strong. Patriotism and support for national purposes
does not develop sufficiently to provide the group cohesion necessary in any military organization. In short, the very concept of limited war in itself will inhibit the nationalism that is desired in the socialization of military recruits. "Limited warfare implies that the survival of the society is not immediately threatened, and accordingly, only a fraction of the available resources, including men, must be committed. Yet ideals must be formulated for which some few men will be willing to make a total sacrifice. With the manpower pool supporting the conflict far exceeding the demand for replacements there are relatively fewer who must bear the battle, and correspondingly less motivational support from the larger society."5 p. 221. If change is necessary, what direction should it take? Perhaps a clue lies in what Shils called "A set of generalized moral predispositions or sense of obligation . . . ." Lang states that "If this condition (Shils) is met, primary-group cohesion can be expected to support behavior directed toward formally prescribed goals, even when this exposes members of the group to danger and constitutes a threat to its integrity."6 p. 872. Stouffer7 presented data showing that World War II received very little verbal support from American soldiers and that only a small fraction of the men actually thought that the war was worth fighting. "Shils argued that the tacit patriotism of soldiers in the form of broad communal loyalties promoted a generalized readiness to accept commands even under dangerous conditions."6 p. 872. This experience was extensively tested by Sobel (1947) and especially of interest, was his study of the reactions of sergeants with records of outstanding performance in over 180 days of combat. They eventually became incapacitated despite a strong conscious motivation to carry on. The first motivational support to give way was the individual's commitment to ideological goals. After that, short term goals of a break or respite became predominant. When these went unfulfilled, hope disappeared and self ideals of manliness and soldierly conduct,
became undermined. The last defense against anxiety was the primary group. Breakdown came when the group dissipated. Dr. R. W. Little further stated that under prolonged external stress, the deviate or isolate does not emerge reaching for his own survival. Instead, "The group response is the persistence and emergence of two person systems as the minimum social units of interaction which make possible the survival of the functional group and its ability to operate at at least a minimum level."8, p. 24.

With this in mind, how then can the much lauded high morale of fighting units in Vietnam be explained? The tool has been a straight, across-the-board, one year rotation system. It is argued, and reasonably so, that even though the rotation system prevents extended primary relationships from developing, the intrinsic knowledge of certain relief makes the lack of national purpose and support bearable. Even combat units who have spent relatively prolonged periods in the jungle and have suffered nearly complete turnovers of men due to casualties fail to become ineffective. Perhaps the practice of rotation and succession is a more effective tool for use in maintaining effectiveness in the face of change than is preservation of the primary group. Grusky, in his empirical study, stated: "Thus it appears that in the military, bureaucratic forms of rotation, regardless of the organizational objectives they serve, weaken personal executive power and encourage the development of a general orientation toward organizational authority."9, p. 108.

Individualism and Discipline: Are They Compatible?

Much has been written and said of late about the raw individualism and personal freedom becoming dominant in our society. These trends seem to run laterally through our societal structure at the level of the young, maturing adult. Since this age group makes the largest manpower contribution to our military force, then certainly their value systems must be considered by military leaders in the design of military organizations and environments.
"Consider the following:

'The People' are in—Heroes are out.
Love is in—Money is out.
Butter is in—Guns are out.
Art is in—Athletics are out.
'Peace' is in—War is out.
'Scul' is in—Pomposity is out.
Doing your thing is in—'Hard work is good for you' is out.
Participation is in—Orders are out.
Challenging authority is in—Automatic respect for authority is out.
Skepticism is in—Gung Ho attitudes are out."\(^{10}\), p. 228.

Yes, these are overstated facts, but they do indicate some of the societal forces apparent in the U.S. today. It is also true that these trends are not restricted to the young. They will, and have, spread to the other segments of our society to varying degrees.

Moskos\(^{11}\) points out that the image and style of life of the enlisted man has been distinctive in each of four periods of conflict: World War II, Korean War, Cold War of 1955-60, and Vietnam War. Although the military establishment has usually responded with changes which, to some extent, transformed traditional military attitudes and duties, enlisted life has retained those characteristics which set it apart from civilian life, i.e., level of pay not commensurate with authority, responsibility, and/or rank.

What then will be the reaction of the military to this recent wave of individualism? The answers are conflicting and often reek of grave fears of the results of a loss of discipline. However, some changes have already occurred. Take the case of the military haircut. For years, the military has decreed a closely cropped hair style for its members, ranging from medium for senior members to nearly all for recruits. The emergence of a current fashion for long hair, sideburns, and mustaches caused much soul searching on the part of permissively-oriented leaders. What is the acceptable limit became the question of the day? The Afro style even further complicated things. Instead of simply mandating a "close cut" for all, unit commanders and MO's had to evaluate each case separately. One commander found that once he permitted hair to be longer than the traditional style, the men soon developed a reluctance to
wear their caps—either because it messed the hair, or looked foolish resting precariously above a formidable Afro pom. Finally, after much consternation, an official formal change was made which may or may not be an acceptable compromise. "The Army does not describe or distinguish among styles of haircuts. There are a wide variety of hair styles that if maintained in a neat manner are acceptable. The determination of hair style is not a determination of command."12, p. 1. However, in the same breath, the Army set a minimum and maximum length of 1 inch and 3 inches. Here we have formal concession to change but still constrained within the perceived goals of the organization, namely, maintenance of some measure of uniformity.

The problem lies in that not all the situations can be so readily resolved. Controversy does exist as to just how far the military should go in recognizing this individualism. The overriding objection is the very valid point that permissiveness may result in a loss of discipline. Since discipline has always been the unique feature of a military organization that developed high levels of integration—the ability to maintain organizational structure under prolonged stress—then a relaxation of this discipline could easily result in unit disintegration during conflict.

At one end of the continuum are those who insist that the military "doggedly persists in maintaining some obsolete trappings of the past." Col. S. Q. Lepias states; "If the U. S. Army does not alter some of its hoary traditions, it is going to face up to some of the more drastic forms of social unrest plaguing the civilian community."13, p. 44. It is true enough that many Army practices "bug the hell" out of the men who make up the ranks and are looked on as archaic and harrassing. Among these are the traditional uniformity and the cold starkness of the barracks. Why not a dormitory atmosphere where a man can live undisturbed and enjoy some measure of privacy? Also high on the list are the "house rules" such as bed checks, restrictions on liquor, and restrictive pass policies.
At the other end of the continuum we have the very valid argument that constant discipline is required for all facets of the soldier's life in order that he will respond to command when the going gets rough. To some, this argument is so strong that the new permissiveness becomes completely unfeasible and ridiculous, and consequently, the subject of considerable humor. Said the new Willie and Joe in a recent satire, "Bedcheck, Saturday morning inspection and all that crap is gone, man. Yeah, we built a new Army in tune with the times. We can even wear colored neckties. Now all we need is to organize some sit-down strikes to get the uniform abolished, or at least get some clothes that reflect individuality. That's us, individualism. And who means 'rugged individualism' because we ain't rugged anymore. We're just individual."

But aside from the humor, the matter is of dire concern to many. General Bruce C. Clarke (Ret.) was particularly concerned at a recent symposium when he replied to Dr. R. Little's likening of the military to General Motors Corp. "When General Motors makes a mistake you don't bury anybody. Let's not equate a company commander leading troops against yonder hill in Vietnam with a Chevrolet salesman. The problem's not the same."

Well, most people tend to agree with Gen Clarke. The disagreement comes in when it is proposed that under less than a wartime situation, the U. S. soldier should be allowed to live under the same rules as his civilian counterpart. The matter at hand then becomes whether or not the force can in fact transform itself into a uniform, responsive tool of war when the need arises. The predominant feeling is a fear of loss of control when it is most needed by military leaders. Obviously, the standards of discipline are going to change and evolve into some new form. There exists an even greater fear that this evolution will be haphazard and at the whim of a misinformed and misguided public. What will be the compromise? A logical outcome was put forth reluctantly by S. O. Aquarius, an anonymous author in "Army" magazine. "It may be that what we require today
is an 'operational discipline,' that is, obedience and a high order of discipline primarily during the battle or during the campaign. Perhaps the emphasis on the historical military courtesies, on appearance, and on obedience is misplaced. Most commanders, however, will insist that this is not true, that soldiers will do in battle what they have been taught and required to do in training. 15, p. 27.

Many unit commanders today express the feeling of "I'm damned if I do and damned if I don't." Take the recent case of the 27 soldiers who, while in the stockade for a variety of offenses, mainly Mutiny and desertion, sat themselves down in a circle and refused to obey a repeated order to cease and desist and report to their designated places for work. They refused in protest of the death of a prisoner who had recently been shot and killed while attempting to escape. The commander of the base preferred charges of mutiny against the men under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. His action was proper in every legal sense of the word. However, the public outcry was loud against the action taken. Much of the commentary held that the soldiers were just "misguided youth" and "mixed up" and that the charge was much too severe. This sympathy goes back to the deep rooted fear on the part of the citizenry of the extensive summary prerogatives of the commander in the field in administering military justice. All this adds to the contradiction a commander must face when he acts as both leader and magistrate of a unit. Here we have 27 men who blatantly refused to obey a reasonable order, and were charged by a commander who was legally and morally (in the military) correct in doing so. Of the 27 soldiers, 22 were found guilty of mutiny, one of a lesser charge of willful disobedience, and one of failure to obey a lawful order. The other three are still absent without leave. The sentences varied from a dishonorable discharge and 16 years confinement to a dishonorable discharge and 3 months confinement. All sentences were reduced to 2 years confinement within 43 hours of the approval by the convening authority.
The aim here is not to judge the severity of the charge or the sentence but to distinguish the transition our society has made toward permissive military jurisprudence. A reasonable military man today would consider the disciplinary practices of a century ago inappropriate today. Punishments such as flogging, drumming out, and certain death execution are a thing of the past. There is no national crisis of merit to merit severity and therefore, the social structure of the Army community must undergo a change.

Herein lies the problem. It is fashionable to apply civilian mores and standards to the military in an effort to transform long standing military structure. The military is an open system and is extremely sensitive to the demands of its sponsor—American society. No one can deny that the U.S. military has willingly accepted its mission and done its best to reach the assigned objective, whether or not it was in accord with the decision. The problem now is that military leaders, down to the unit level, are finding it difficult to maintain some semblance of military bearing and still remain within the new emerging societal standards. Along with these standards, the military must cope with the same forces that are causing such consternation in our country these days. Dissent is now in fashion. Race relations are causing disharmony in all social organizations. The popularity of drug usage and its questionable legality is causing numerous problems. Civil rights have taken on new impetus.

**Participative Management in the Military**

One viewpoint to take is that the military leadership can largely cope with these changes by emphasizing special sensitivity to the needs and norms of subordinates. The participative approach has received considerable support in certain quarters and in fact, research has borne out that the human relations, persuasive, equilitarian-oriented leadership style has positive effects on subordinates. The results of these tests have shown lower AWOL rates, fewer
hostile reactions, fewer disciplinary infractions, and higher reenlistment rates. (Capboll, 1953; Harmqvist, 1960; Spector, 1960; Medalia & Miller, 1955; Selvin, 1960). All this is just fine until you consider Adams' 1954 study which showed that extreme egalitarianism on the part of aircraft commanders resulted in decreased crew efficiency. Halpin (1957) too showed that "in a military setting consideration of subordinates' needs may be much more closely linked with behavior that defines roles and tasks for subordinates than among the group of civilian school administrators who provided the base for comparison." So then, the controversy rages on. It is pretty obvious that when it is time to assault a fortified position, a vote on the issue would be out of place.

Dr. R. W. Little brings up the point that as the legitimacy of collective protest such as strikes and riots and mutinies emerges, there will be a forced change on the management style of the military. He goes so far to forecast that the military would soon have to tolerate some form of collective protest. His argument is the familiar one that less than 10 percent of the troops in a combat situation are under fire and that it is "utterly ridiculous" to say that protests cannot be tolerated and that rigid discipline is needed in rear areas. A vision of the development of a collective bargaining organization in the military tends to stagger the imagination of most military officers. The feasibility of such an organization would be a study in itself, but it certainly can be said here that any change in that direction would cause far reaching changes in present military procedures and doctrine.

There have been some distinct efforts in the direction of instilling some amount of participative procedures in the stateside military organization. Recently, at Ft. Carson, Colo., there was established a base wide Junior Enlisted Men's Council (JEMC) for the purpose of improving communication between enlisted men, grades E-5 and below, and the post commander. The overall objectives in addition to improved communications, are "to recommend changes in procedures,
techniques and policies which would improve conditions for the junior enlisted men, and to provide a means for airing complaints and suggestions from the enlisted men to the unit commander.\textsuperscript{17}, p. 37. These councils have arisen only out of the initiative and interest of concerned enlisted men and encouragement from their commanders. There has been no official policy published on this procedure.

However, officially and Army wide, there has been promulgated "The Field Command Junior Officer's Council (JOC) at separate posts, camps, and stations throughout the Army. These groups are to represent the junior officer, as a body, in making suggestions, recommendations, and otherwise providing a channel of official communication to the top commander. The success of this type of participation is questionable, but does offer a fruitful area for research. A quick analysis would readily indicate that these councils have no real power in and of themselves. The policy formulating procedures remain unchanged within the basic organization and the council usually becomes ineffective as an influence on unit policy.

The very initiation of such groups tends to imply a breakdown in the channels of communication normally open to those levels of the organization. Certainly displayed is a trend in the younger members of the military to demand a more democratic process and at least some influence in the decisions that affect their daily lives.

The Military Caste System

The classical military officer-enlisted relationship has its roots deep in the history of aristocracy. As the vestiges of aristocratic power, wealth, and influence were stripped away by society during the 19th and 20th centuries, the more affluent members sought to prolong their position of superiority by membership in the officer corps. Traditionally, the officer corps was manned by not only the educated and wealthy, but by those whose credentials included so-called lineage and aristocratic breeding.
As the demands for military power grew in the early 20th century, the officer corps was, of necessity, opened to those of less wealth but appropriate leadership and education credentials. Still, through the second World War, the enlisted man held a second class position in the military caste system, largely by virtue of his lack of education. Such positioning was accepted by the enlisted ranks for the most part and in fact, the officer was considered another breed of person altogether.

Now, with the advent of higher education for large portions of our society and the emphasis on specialized skills in technical areas, the manpower pool from which enlisted personnel are drawn has undergone a considerable upbringing. This, coupled with the fact that membership in the officer corps has been made available to the less educated members of society through OCS and warrant officer commissions, has resulted in the education gap between officer and enlisted being less predominant a factor. Now it is not unusual for the high school graduate with an OCS commission to be leading a group of men who, for the most part, are college educated.

Traditionally, soldiers are supposed to gripe. The officer-enlisted cleavage has often been considered a healthy situation in the past. Often in the past, however, society has become disillusioned with the military conditions and sought to usurp the system. A good example of this was the appointment of the Doolittle Board after World War II which studied complaints and criticism of the "caste division" between officers and enlisted men. In fact, this was a good example of change in the military, since the board substantiated many of the complaints which led to modification of several practices by the Army. Dr. C. C. Moskos raises the question of whether or not this cleavage has become even more pronounced today and enlisted dissatisfaction even more passionate due to the comparative levels of education. Enlisted men no longer view themselves as subservient and it is blatantly obvious that officers can no longer depend on
their rank and insignia alone to generate enough power with which to conduct efficient leadership.

Maskos goes a step further and states that the various conflicts always present in the military, i.e., the officer-EM division, the line-staff separation, the rear echelon and front line break, are causes of friction between the levels in the hierarchy much more serious than the traditional complaining. He attributes part of the problem to the fact that the military attempts to practice true social equality among its ranks. "Part of the problem is that soldiers from privileged segments of American society object not to the authoritarianism of the military but rather to its egalitarianism. Unlike civilian life, which is committed to democratic practices in theory alone, the Army has a place in the organization for everyone, regardless of prior social status. It is possible for those less privileged to compete realistically and successfully for the rewards and advantages in the military system, particularly in the lower enlisted ranks. This is what the more educated—the more advantaged—soldiers resent."18, p. 59.

An interesting by-product of the new draft policies which eliminated graduate deferments, is that the college graduates usually do not filter down to the front line combat units anyway. The administrative hierarchy of the military in Vietnam has become so top heavy that a great wealth of capable enlisted skills are needed to operate the logistical and intelligence base. The demands of this bureaucracy are so great that no longer can the rear echelon officer corps (lovingly called "Straphangers" by the front line troops) and a few enlisted clerks carry the administrative load. The result is that the personnel pipeline is informally scanned for the better educated men with which to man the staff and logistical functions. So then, the end result is that the less educated troops tend to end up in combat units in spite of the increase in the overall educational level of the manpower input. The unique feature of this
phenomena is that it is not at all a result of discrimination for any reason except ability. College trained enlisted men are simply much better equipped to handle the increasingly technical and automated logistical and administrative systems of the military bureaucracy.

A Demanding Dilemma

These forces in society are demanding a shift in the balance between socially acceptable and unacceptable military organizational structure and procedures. A handy crutch that many academically minded analysts have taken to is the systems approach. Many take the approach of Bennis in contending that bureaucracy's gradual replacement will be: "... temporary systems of divine specialists, linked together by coordinating and task-evaluating executive specialists in organic flux."19, p. 74. Howard Carlisle, in his study of functional organizations, described the concept of systems theory in the popular sense. "Under such a theory the whole is primary and the parts are secondary; all parts are interdependent so that one cannot be modified without affecting others; and the whole represents more than a summation of the individual parts."20, p. 7. These concepts of systems theory are popular and evolve as the topic whenever the forced change of military organizations is brought up. However, it is not a panacea and the transfiguration of the military organization to an integrated system is a long way from reality. Furthermore, the systems approach seems to ignore one of the primary forces of change that the hierarchical military structure of today must contend with; that is, responsiveness to the needs of the individual. Granted, the military is an extremely structured and hierarchical system but at the same time, its responsiveness to the desires of society have caused it to lead the way in such matters as equal rights and privileges for all. It has even gone so far as to define the latitudes of dissent to be permitted in the U. S. Armed Forces. In fact, Congress expressed
concern that the Department of Defense had gone too far in the allowance of dissent. (Actually, the guidelines were a boon to local commanders, because now for the first time they had a limit beyond which they could take action to curtail further activities. Previously, conspiracy groups had been able to capitalize on the confusion that arose for local commanders when they attempted to define their authority as to control of dissent activities.) So therefore, it can easily be seen that the military has gone a long way toward adapting to change within the confines of its own structure and legal limits.

The people of the U. S. must not permit these change forces to so change the military so as to render it ineffective as a fighting force. Vietnam offers a classic example of what a small, disciplined force can do against a formidable, well-trained and equipped Army.

You cannot buy effectiveness and all the equipment and money in the world will not make a loosely defined, undisciplined "bunch" into an organization that will respond with the "rapid, devastating" force the U. S. likes to think of having at its disposal.

General Wheeler, in an interview described in U. S. News and World Report, April 20, 1970, stated that he was convinced that much of the conflict over the military today has arisen from a hostility created by forces dedicated to the weakening of the armed forces of the U. S. Whether or not there is a conspiracy afoot to undermine our military effectiveness is not really the issue at hand. The U. S. military will respond to society's wishes and society will get "what it pays for." The problem is that society continues to demand compromise with all these forces at loose concurrent with effectiveness as an instrument of violence (whether active or as a deterrent). In a recent article in Look magazine, a commander of an armored cavalry regiment on the eastern German border was described as being completely overwhelmed by race relation problems.
Within his unit, black groups were imposing the same strife and conflict that is being manifest in civilian organizations today. His actions in response to the demands of the black groups have been fair and seemingly well considered as described. Obviously, he is not going to make everyone happy. The sad thing is that he must even try to. The military is not designed for the purpose of giving all its participants a meaningful and satisfying existence on earth. This commander, like most others, must spend most of his time dealing with social problems that are usually created only to disrupt. What extraordinary leadership he will have displayed if he can take his strife-ridden organization and respond to an external threat quickly and decisively when the time comes to do so.

The question has been posed: How should the military best respond to these forces of change in order to reestablish equilibrium both within itself and between itself and civilian society? The most popular answer to be put forth seems to be some sort of change of leadership behaviors and styles to adopt to the new situations. Certainly, leadership will have to change if a new Platonic equilibrium is going to evolve. These changes are discussed later in this paper but are certainly not going to be presented as the final answer to our current state of flux.

If the military is going to truly react only as a tool of society's desires, then society must regard it in a more rational manner and less as a scapegoat in every emotional crisis that erupts. The use of drugs is a problem in Vietnam and will continue to be so. In fact, it is a tribute to the caliber of the young American over there that the problem is not worse than it is. Marijuana is easily available and the price is within every G. I.'s means. When I asked every new assignee to my unit if he had ever tried marijuana, the answer was yes more often than not. Here the youth are free to experiment with and use drugs as civilians. Magazines report that at current rock festivals throughout the U. S. "Grass" is sold by vendors soliciting throughout the crowd...
prohibiting drugs are as ineffective in the military as they are in our civilian communities. The requirements to make a search legal and subsequent charges binding are so restrictive, that convictions for the use, possession, or sale of marijuana are increasingly hard to obtain—just as hard as they are for our civilian police who do that sort of thing on a full-time basis. Why then is there such shock expressed by our citizens when they hear that drugs are used by our soldiers in Vietnam? The answer lies on both sides of the fence. Both society and the military must resocialize within its members the purposes of having an armed force in the first place. Once that definition again becomes clear to both, then we can start rebuilding our organization to maximize both efficiency and satisfaction of participants.
FOOTNOTES


CHAPTER V

MISSIONS OF THE ARMY

In order to study change as it applies to the missions and functions of the military institution, it is important to understand correctly the functions it is assigned under the Constitution and by the Congress of the United States. An explicit statement of these functions as taken from the proper legal documents should leave no room for misunderstanding or misinterpretation.

General Functions

Army Regulation 10-1, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 5 April 1968, and Army Regulation 10-5 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 31 July 1968, provide the current specific objectives and functions of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army respectively.

Based on the authority of the Constitution, the Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947 which sets forth the objectives and functions of both the Departments of Defense and Army. These basic objectives are as follows:

Function of the Department of Defense

As prescribed by the Congress, the Department of Defense shall maintain and employ armed forces;

1. To support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

2. To ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest.

3. To uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

4. To safeguard the internal security of the United States.

Functions of the Department of the Army

The Department of the Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as
otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

The Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic thereto.

1. Primary Functions of the Army
   a. To organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land—specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.
   b. To organize, train and equip Army air defense units, including the provision of Army forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
   c. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Services and to provide Army forces for joint amphibious and airborne operations, and to provide for the training of such forces, in accordance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
      (1) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations and not already provided for by Navy and Marine Corps forces.
      (2) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army and Marine forces in airborne operations. The
Army shall have primary interest in the development of those airborne doctrines, procedures, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

d. To provide an organization capable of furnishing adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for the Army.

e. To provide forces for the occupations of territories abroad, to include initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

f. To formulate doctrines and procedures for the organizing, equipping, training, and employment of forces operating on land, except that the training, and employment of marine corps units for amphibious operations shall be a function of the Department of the Navy.

g. To conduct the following activities:

(1) The administration and operation of the Panama Canal.

(2) The authorized civil works program, including projects for improvement of navigation, flood control, beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States, its territories, and its possessions.

(3) Certain other civil activities prescribed by law.

2. Collateral Functions of the Army

To train forces:

a. to interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land.
Civil Disturbances

The civil activities prescribed by law as mentioned above are those necessary for the Department of Defense to fulfill its functions of safeguarding the internal security of the United States. Specifically, the Constitution and Congressional legislation have provided for governmental intervention with federal military forces in cases of domestic violence, disaster, or for other specific purposes.

Other than for major disasters or civil defense purposes, there are three general authorizations for the use of federal forces by the President for protection of the internal security of the country. These three authorizations and a short description of each are as follows:

1. To Aid a State at Request of That State. Section 4, Article IV, of the Constitution makes it the duty of the federal government at the request of the legislature of any state (or of the governor if the legislature cannot be convened) to protect a state against domestic violence. Congress has authorized the President to intervene with federal military forces for this purpose (10 U.S.C. 331).

2. To Enforce the Laws of the United States. Section 3, Article II, of the Constitution makes it the duty of the President to see that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed. Whenever, in the judgment of the President, it is impracticable by reason of unlawful obstruction, combinations, assemblages of persons, or rebellion to enforce the laws of the United States within any state or territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he is authorized by Congress to intervene with such federal military force as he deems necessary for such enforcement (10 U.S.C. 332).

3. To Protect the Civil Rights of Citizens Within a State. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution forbids any state to deny the equal protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction. In
implementation of this provision, Congress has provided that whenever insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies in any state so obstruct or hinder the execution of the laws of that state and of the United States, as to deprive any of the people of that state of rights, privileges, immunities, or protections named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that state are unable, fail, or refuse to provide such protection, it will be deemed a denial by that state of the equal protection of the laws. Thereupon, the President shall take such measures, by intervention with federal military forces or by any other means, as he deem necessary to suppress such disturbances (10 U.S.C. 333).

One legitimate function of the military is to engage in several types of warfare to protect the country from foreign enemies. This role of the military is an accepted one and has not been subject to much change over time. Another of the legally legitimate roles of the military has been to protect the country from domestic enemies and safeguard the internal security. However, the legitimacy of this important role has been increasingly questioned, especially by minority groups that have been the cause for military action to control their activities. Whether or not this questioning of the use of military force to protect the internal security of the country is part of the evolutionary process of change toward improvement or is a part of a more dangerous path toward decay and revolution cannot yet be answered. Is the country experiencing a process of change that will require the military institution to adjust to minority forces in the environment? If so, why would this happen?

One critical element in the change process identified by almost all authors on the subject is that of communications between the change agent and
the client system. Could it be then that technological improvement in
communications have allowed this one element in the change process to over
shadow all the others? Will those change agents that control the communica-
tions channels really have control of the future shape of the government and
especially the military institution?

Precedent alone does not justify any single action. All events, be they
riots or peace marches must be judged in context. But while precedent alone
does not justify, it does help to place events in perspective and remove
some of the irrational and emotional trash. Since the use of military to
control civil disorders is now under question, let's take a quick look at the
history of this country in this regard.

In 1786, while the country was still only loosely confederated under the
Articles of Confederation, federal troops were used to counter Shay's Rebellion.
This rebellion concerned the debt laws of Massachusetts, and before it was
put down by General Lincoln and 4,000 soldiers, much blood was shed.

One of the first crises that President George Washington faced was the
Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. This rebellion was waged by farmers over a newly
imposed excise tax on whiskey. Alexander Hamilton, acting both as Commander
of the Army and Secretary of the Treasurer, lead the federalized militia of
four states to quiet the uprising.

In 1857, the Mormons, who had settled near Salt Lake City continued to
defy the government and disobey the laws of the land. Two Infantry Regiments
and two batteries of artillery were used to march against the Mormons to subdue
them.

The Pullman strike in Chicago in 1894 eventually caused President Grover
Cleveland to use federal troops to protect the mail and to restore order.
One Army historian in this period observed that, "In this connection it should
be noted that the soldiers were used between 1886 and 1895 in 328 different
civil troubles extending through 49 states and territories."
In 1932 President Franklin Roosevelt assigned the Army the very unpleasant duty of evicting the Bonus Marchers that had descended on the city of Washington, D. C., during this depression year. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Douglas MacArthur personally led the troops to ensure that no blood was shed.

History then, does provide a precedent for the use of military force to quiet civil disorder and protect the internal security of the country. But the question remains—Are the new social pressures, that seek to improve society, based on the removal of the military institution, really a change toward improvement?

Changing the Missions of the Military

How do the functions of the Army change? What process of change agent, client system analogy could be applied to this situation? First, it must be explained that the four specific functions of the Department of Defense, as set out above, are only general objectives, and real meaning can be applied to them only when they are fleshed out with specific national objectives. It is probably safe to say that these four general functions will remain the same for many decades to come and the things that will change are the specific national objectives.

Policies, organizational structure, technological goals, manpower objectives and materiel procurement objectives for the Department of Defense are all determined based on specific national objectives which are translated into defense policy. For example, the need for the Sentinel, Anti Ballistic Missile system was first put forth as a result of a national objective of defending the country from a possible nuclear missile attack from China.

How are these national policies decided? In answering this question, about the only element that is clear, is that there are no real clear cut lines of a change agent, client system type relationship. One important governmental body that does decide a number of important national policy questions
The National Security Council (NSC). This council is composed of the president, the vice-president, the secretaries of state and defense and the director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Ad hoc members of the council include the secretary of the treasury, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the directors of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This body, excluding the important influence of the Congress, makes the decisions on major national objectives. The President, who has veto power over the NSC, then directs the implementation of these policies through the various executive branches of the government. In a crude sense then, the NSC could be accorded the role of change agent for it is their responsibility to scan the environment for problem areas and to correctly interpret any environmental pressures calling for change. In this scheme, forces calling for change can originate directly from the environment, as for example when citizen groups call for a change, or forces can be generated internally as when the Department of State, for example, recommends some new policy change. Congressional forces for change are most relevant to the roles and functions of the Army, but have been excluded from this scheme only because their influence is usually felt most directly through the budgeting and appropriations process.

This then, is one scheme for looking at how the functions and roles of the Army might be changed. Others might consider the NSC and the Department of Defense combined as the client system and the general public, with its many factions, as the change agent. However, this approach would seem to lack the direction and guidance normally accorded the role of the change agent.

**Future Roles and Missions of the Military**

What are some of the possible future roles of the Army? As has already been outlined earlier in this paper, Projects 100,000 and Transition are two
examples of a growing trend in the military institution to perform the services of a social betterment role. Whether or not this trend will grow and increase will depend upon future policy guidance of the NSC and the President, and most especially on how the military interprets the forces for change coming from the environment. Secondary missions of this nature will only be assumed by the military as ways and means of achieving the primary military objective of being able to function as an Army and defend the country in time of crises. It is clear that in time of war, society would not require the military to perform a secondary mission of this nature.

Two other important and significant future roles of the military are the military assistance program and the use of the military to police arms control and disarmament treaties or agreements. Both of these roles are good examples of the use of some of the concepts of change. In the military assistance and advisory program a growing body of knowledge on the process of cross-cultural change is developing. And the field of arms control offers an excellent analogy of the change agent, client system process of developing new roles.

MAG Missions and Cross-Cultural Change

The military assistance program is a direct implementation of the national policy objectives of checking the spread of communism and providing free world governments with the means of defending themselves against communist aggression. This program seeks to provide free world governments, at their request, the military hardware and the advisory assistance necessary for their defense. The materials and assistance provided are in the form of grants, and are not a part of the military sales program. An example of the military sales program would be sales of F-4 Phantom aircraft to the Israeli government. The funds to provide this military assistance are appropriated under the foreign aid program and are distinct from the regular Department of Defense Budget.
The implementation of this assistance is conducted through Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) stationed in the recipient country. MAAG groups work with their equivalent military levels in the host country to assist them in all phases of the development of their armed forces. The character of each MAAG group is quite different and is determined by the developmental stage of the host country. At present, the military has the following unclassified MAAG groups in existence: Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Korea, Vietnam, and the Republic of China. The MAAG group in Taiwan, the Republic of China, functions only as a planning and budgeting office. This is so because the Army of the Republic of China has progressed to the level of a self-sustaining, highly sophisticated military organization. On the other hand, the MAAG group stationed in Vietnam is quite large, with advisors functioning all the way down the military organization to company level. The Vietnam MAAG performs more tasks and provides more assistance because of the relative stage of development of the Vietnamese Army.

For military officers and men performing MAAG duties or those assigned to civil affairs jobs, as is currently the case in much of Vietnam, a knowledge of the process of cross-cultural change would be most beneficial.

Arthur H. Niehoff and his colleagues at the Human Resources Research Office (HuRRO), formerly of George Washington University (until forced by campus pressure groups to sever their ties with the University), operating under contract with the Department of the Army has been a leader in analyzing the process of and developing a body of knowledge on cross-cultural change.

In 1963, Niehoff published a paper, Lao Buddhism: A Vehicle for Technical Change. The paper was based on his experience in Southeast Asia as a Commodity Development Advisor for the Agency for International Development (AID). In this paper it was Niehoff's thesis that the change agents, technical AID advisors, never really understood the local patterns of leadership and therefore often failed to implement a technical change. The AID advisors tried to implement
changes working through the village secular leaders and ignored the potential leadership of the Buddhist monks. The western change agents had ignored the monks because they harbored an attitude that the monks were a "quaint vestige of the past" and that their religion was tradition-bound and naturally resisted change. But Niehoff goes on to illustrate that the true source of motivation to almost all villagers was their religious associations with the monks. Niehoff contrasted several projects, constructing buildings, digging wells, etc., that either succeeded or failed according to the degree of participation enlisted from the monks, when the monks had a meaningful degree of participation the project almost always succeeded. Niehoff points out that the motivation for the villagers to participate in a project backed or controlled by the monks is a positive value placed on the ritual acts of merit (assisting or helping the monks). In this society, the most laudable act an individual could perform was to assist the monks. By so doing, the lay Buddhist obtains the approbation of his fellow villagers in this life, and merit that will favorably influence his destiny in the after life. A change agent, to work effectively with any group, must be knowledgeable of the patterns of leadership, and the cultural traditions of that group.

In 1967, Niehoff published a theory on the use of intra-group communications in the induced change process. The essence of this theory can be seen in the following diagram:

![Diagram](image-url)

**Illustration V-1: Intra-Group Communications**

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**NOTE:** Solid straight lines indicate information flow. P.A. = Potential Adopter.
Three elements of communication occur in the process of change. They are: input by the change agent, open channel of feedback, and intra-group communications or gossip. The change agent is directly interested in and usually effectively controls the first two. However, he is usually not involved with nor does he take any action to directly influence the gossip communications of the recipient group.

In studying this communications process, Niehoff found that when the degree of feedback is low, the chances for negative rumors and gossip will be high. In most case histories examined in this study, where the existence of gossip of a positive nature was recorded, the project tended to be successful. Negative gossip, or rumormongering, was found to be a product of a lack of good information flows between the change agent and the potential adopters, and usually predicted an unsuccessful project. To effectively utilize this valuable intra-group communications, Niehoff recommends that operations people monitor the "grapevine" in gossip sessions, at village wells and other such sites, to measure the success of their communications input and feedback programs and to be able to take positive corrective action to keep a project on the right track.

After analyzing a selected bibliography of 165 cross-cultural change projects, Niehoff and Anderson in 1964 developed a model that identifies the primary variables in this process. The authors offer this model both as a framework for analysis and as guidelines for action by technical change agents.

**The Change Process**

![Diagram: The Cross-Cultural Change Process](Illustration V-2)
As indicated in the diagram, the change process is visualized as the introduction of an idea or a technique into another society, during which time there are two principal forces in operation. One force is the behavior of the change agent, which can also be viewed as the action, and which is defined as the technique used to obtain acceptance of the new idea. The other force is the behavior of the recipients, which can be viewed as the reaction brought about by the change agent's action. The new idea or technique is considered to have been introduced into the other society when it has been integrated into that society's cultural patterns. Lack of integration or rejection of the new idea can take place at any time from the beginning of the introduction, up to the final stages where the pattern of maintenance needs to be assured.

As a result of this study Niehoff has identified 19 major types of influences which he refers to as "sets," 10 of change agent behavior and 9 of recipient behavior. These sets of influence, as taken from his report, are reproduced in Illustration V-3. As a major part of his paper, Niehoff discusses the negative and positive aspects of each influence set and sub-category using concrete examples to illustrate how each variable could lead to success or failure.

One of the important collateral missions of the Army in Vietnam is that of Civil Affairs. Practically all military units down to company size have been assigned civil affairs missions. Basically this mission consists of promoting the welfare of the civilian population. In accomplishing this mission, units carry on such activities as medical assistance, sanitation projects, building of schools and pagodas, road construction and the general protection of villages and communities through various self-defense measures.

As Operations Officer for a battalion of the 4th Infantry Division located in the vicinity of Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam, during a period of 1967 and 1968, one of the authors accumulated valuable first hand experience in the implementation of innovations across cultural barriers. One duty of the Operations Officer is the management and coordination of the Civil
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Illustration V-3
Affairs mission. In this particular battalion, the assigned civil affairs mission was to look after the welfare of five Montagnard tribes located within the 4th Division's tactical area of responsibility.

During this period many innovations, such as sanitary facilities, sanitary practices, and the digging and maintenance of wells were accomplished and incorporated into the lives of these villagers. Accomplishment of these different projects, however, cannot in any way be attributed to the advance in the knowledge and understanding of cross-cultural change and social innovations as documented by academics such as Dr. Nicholoff. Most of the success of these projects can be attributed to the intuition of the American soldier and the warm feelings and relationships he expressed toward the Montagnard people while he was going about his job. In fact, it was not really a job to most of the soldiers involved in civil affairs—it was a deep personal involvement.

In looking at these events after the fact and studying the process of cross-cultural change, one can readily see where mistakes were made and how prior knowledge of the process of change would have helped. However, one is also struck by the uninhibited, intuitive processes that naturally surfaced in these situations and led to the success of the mission. In suggesting a change, the soldier always worked with the tribal leaders to gain their approval and participation. In doing this, he naturally developed a good two-way system of communications. Through experience, he knew the basic elements of the tribal culture. He recognized the central importance of the rice planting and harvesting season and the traditions of their religion, and almost unconsciously considered these elements in any suggestion he proposed. In working with these people, the soldiers, observed in this experience, even tried to learn the language of the Montagnards. What is most remarkable about this fact is that the Montagnard language has never been reduced to symbols and recorded in any fashion. But most important of all was the element of respect and trust that the Montagnards held for the
soldiers. The soldiers, through their actions, developed an excellent rapport with these people. Often they were invited to participate in ceremonial events of the tribe and to drink rice wine with the men of the tribe as a sign of their mutual friendship. In any academic analysis of cross-cultural change, one must conclude that the strong personal relationships developed here were the key variables to successful implementation of most of the recommended innovations.

One innovation recommended in late 1967 can serve as a good illustration of some of the variables required for success. It had long been felt that the best method for the common defense of these five Montagnard villages was for them to combine into one single, large village, using fortifications and a formal system of defense.

This project had been proposed to the leaders and all agreed that something must be done, but after repeated suggestion no further initiative was taken by these leaders. The tribes were of close ancestral background, their rice fields were all relatively close to a recommended location, and the need for a good defense had been occasionally demonstrated through acts of terrorism by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army.

In February 1968, the NVA and the VC initiated their large scale operation, now labeled as the "1968 Tet Offensive". During this operation the NVA rounded up and marched off at gun point the entire population of these five villages, excluding only the very old and the nursing infants. Two of the village chiefs were assassinated on the spot when they demonstrated opposition. It was learned later that the Montagnards were to be used as liberation forces after the successful capture of Pleiku by the NVA (which did not succeed) to demonstrate a popular support for the newly achieved communist liberation. After the NVA were defeated in the battle for Pleiku, they released the Montagnards and allowed them to return to their villages.
Within two weeks following their return to normal village life, the remaining chiefs and the new leaders approached the battalion civil affairs team and wanted to know if they were still willing to assist them in building a common village. The village was eventually constructed and did serve to provide the Montagnards with a much stronger self-defense capability.

An analysis of this case of cross-cultural innovation according to Miehoff's model indicates that practically all important variables were fulfilled except that of the felt need. The defense used by the tribes to date had been sufficient for their purpose and as they had no idea of the potential the enemy really had, they did not feel a need to make the sacrifice necessary to build a consolidated village. The "Tet Offensive" adequately demonstrated this need and the leaders were able to overcome the threshold of resistance within their respective villages.

Arms Control Role

There are certain environmental forces active today that could prescribe for the military a future role of arms control inspection and verification. The growth in the destructive capacity of both conventional and unconventional weapons has been paralleled by an extension in the limitation of the political effectiveness of force. Recognizing this fact, as early as 1961, President John F. Kennedy was instrumental in establishing within the government a separate agency for the purpose of studying and preparing for disarmament. This office, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has been highly successful in establishing several arms control agreements or treaties within the past nine years. A list of these agreements or treaties includes the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Antarctic Treaty. All the agreements to date, except the Antarctic Treaty, preclude the use of on-site inspection and verification. In fact, any agreement to exchange inspectors, has been the
principle block to any further arms control treaties with Russia. Presently, the U.S. is forced to rely on national or unilateral means (satellites, sensors, aerial reconnaissance) for the verification it demands.

With the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) now underway with the Russians, the Army could in the immediate future, be faced with a mission to act as arms control inspectors. To be sure, the SALT talks are not likely to produce any dramatic reductions of armaments, yet significant reductions could be agreed upon that would require the establishment of a rather sophisticated and well-organized system for the inspection and verification of the agreement.

How could this new role be added to the military mission? The first step would be the legitimate assignment of this mission to the Army through the proper executive channels. The change agent in this case would be the technicians of the Field Operations Division of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Since 1961, this division of ACDA has been preparing for this role by conducting research and study into all phases of the inspection and verification process. Their studies have covered the range from sophisticated nuclear weapons to conventional arms. When called upon, they will be ready to recommend the right inspection system for any given agreement. The client system in this scheme will be that branch of the Army so designated to perform the mission. The objectives and goals, mutually agreed upon by both the change agent and the client system, will be the development of an effective capability for an adequate inspection and verification system.
FOOTNOTES


3. Hovey, Harold A., United States Military Assistance, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, New York, 1965.


CHAPTER VI

THE FUTURE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

The All-Volunteer Army

Recently, Congress voted against a proposal to institute an all-volunteer Army. This idea is not a new one and in fact, the U. S. has always had a volunteer Army except during times of war and since 1948. There are many pros and cons to this idea which have been discussed and rehashed over and over again. The purpose of this section is not to reiterate the already well worn arguments, but to point out first, why such a proposal is popular, and second, the concepts of organizational change that will have to apply if such a step is taken.

Two major sources of dissatisfaction and unrest in the U. S. today are the Vietnam War and the military draft. They each present a particular sore in the side of a large sector of the U. S. population and as such are prime candidates for removal from the scene. An all-volunteer force, namely a professional Army, would seemingly quickly resolve both problems.

By establishing an Army of professionals of a given size, the country would in effect be placing a stringent control on the size of the Army since it would be infinitely more difficult to expand such a force. Expansion could only occur via congressional approval and therefore hinder the furtherance of any future "undeclared" wars. A further check on undesirable operations would be that funding could not be expanded without application to the legislature. Our society has great fear of a powerful military that can plunge the country into unwanted wars. It also fears that the large scale coordination now required between the military and industry will form a complex that will resist further control by the people. It is fairly well accepted that if our national defense is to be effective and if we are to maintain an adequate industrial base, then the military and industry must coordinate their efforts. With the country already
imbedded in an unpopular war, it is not hard to see how the U.S. society might fear a strong military industrial complex that could randomly involve it in further conflicts of that nature to further its own interests.

The draft is widely looked on as "involuntary servitude" and since it is being used to supply an unpopular war with people resources, it too has become quite unpopular. If you accept the premise that the country needs an armed force, then you must too conceive a way to man such a force. The easiest answer is to "hire somebody else to do it". In a way, this is how society eliminates its requirement to keep feeding that monster whose appetite for human resources is nearly endless. This road had the added advantage of promising greatly increased efficiency in the armed forces due to largely decreased turnovers.

Whatever the merit of this rationale, it does serve to give us a clue as to what forces are on the loose in our society and how the military must prepare for such changes.

If the volunteer Army does eventually come about, then the military will be faced with two major changes. First, it must devise some new external system by which it restricts itself in its conduct of political matters. Inception of a volunteer force will only increase the polarity of the civil-military relationship and therefore, if the military is to remain an instrument of the society it protects, then it must devise methods which will preclude a completely professional force from dominating that same society. If it cannot adjust its own structures to calm the fears of the society, then of course, the society will institute its own controls which are likely to hinder the effectiveness of the armed force in its operations of war, whether complete or constabulatory.

The second and most obvious change will be that with continuity of membership, and adequate compensation to members, the military will be in a position to realign itself in such a manner so as to eliminate many of the ills of its present system. However, the challenge will still remain to establish a system
acceptable to society while still insuring sufficient dedication and response from its members to achieve the only real goal of war—victory by force.

Leadership

With the advent of systems oriented organizational concepts in the U. S. Army, new challenges are going to arise for its leadership. The U. S. Army Combat Developments Command is presently studying a project in which the Army battalion is focused as a system. The study and consideration of internal and external environmental factors will shed new light on the most effective organization of the battalion structure. Colonel Arthur S. Hyman is presently involved with CDC in assessing the human element in the design of future military organizational structures. He states in a recent article, "Contemporary organizations must function with change, rather than solely as a result of change; and traditional organizational structures historically have had great difficulty in responding to change."1, p. 171. He further sites 3 major challenges for those leaders who will guide the future organizations.

First, the fact that any change from a bureaucratic to an integrated system will not occur overnight alone will be a problem in itself. During the period of transfiguration, "Leadership will be responsible for giving clarity of purpose to what otherwise may appear as vague organizational objectives to the uniformed organization member."2, p. 175. Secondly, many key members of the traditional structure will resist any change away from the pyramidal concept. "Leadership characterized by patience, a high degree of diplomacy, and an inexhaustible sense of humor can (and will) educate the change resistors."3, p. 174. The third problem facing leadership of the future will be the paradox that under the newly-emerging organization, members will enjoy new freedoms never before permitted. The fear is that the lateral lines of communications and lack of direct supervision will lead to role confusion and loss of identity. "The job of leadership in terms of organizational ambiguity will be to somehow create an
environment in which organization members come to understand that this uncertainty is an integral part of the new 'natural order of things',*4, p. 174.

I began this short discussion of leadership change with Col. Hyman's remarks for two reasons. The systems concept is the "hot item of the day" and also, I wanted to insure that it did not become the finale of the section and thereby take on the illusion of being presented as a solution. The rebuilding of the military organization into an adaptive, pluralistic integrated system responsive to its environment is not the subject of this section. We have already stated that changes in leadership patterns will not provide a panacea for all the problems of change facing the military of the future. Neither then is it to fall forward onto a theoretical model of a complex socio-technical organization and principles of cybernetics. Our military leaders today need answers today. These many problems arising from social change in our environment must be dealt with now in the purest, most practical sense possible. There has never been and will never be a field manual written that will cover all the situations for a leader. Perhaps the greatest assist our unit commanders of these days can receive are firm guidelines such as the recent Department of Defense rules on dissent and the subsequent court rulings upholding such limits. Perhaps this is a fallback to the rigid, structural, bureaucracy but at least it provides the decision maker some basis upon which to make a rational judgment. Chaos and uncertainty are our enemies, not rules and regulations fairly conceived.

Still, leadership must change. Perhaps the answer is simply an awareness of all these forces and why they exist to provide the "rational leader" with the information he needs to be an effective military leader. Professor Lyman W. Porter seems to say it pretty well in his article at the recent U. S. Army leadership conference. "If research results to date provide relatively little by way of directly relevant prescriptions for the leader, what can we say—at the present point in time—about what he can and should do with respect to influencing organizational commitment? Here we will make some
admittedly extended extrapolations from the general social science literature: For one thing, it would seem probable that the leader of the future, particularly in a military setting, will need to see the leadership task in a broader perspective than may have been the case in the past. That is, he will have to face and accept the complexity of the task and forego the notion that there are any nice, clean-cut and highly specific rules of effective leadership. Just internalizing this simple idea may be a major step toward obtaining a breadth of perspective. Secondly, he will need to realize the impact of his actions and behavior on the expectations and beliefs that his subordinates will develop concerning what the organization is really like and what is to be really gained by committing oneself to the organization. Much more than in the past, given the nature of the types of values becoming more prevalent in our society, his actions will indeed shout much louder than his words. He will be leading by example whether he wishes to or not. ... 

p. 232.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER VII

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This research paper has been a cursory review of the rapid change occurring in American Society today and the impact of this change on the military establishment. No attempt has been made to propose any solution to those myriad of problems facing the military, and society as a whole, in that these solutions would be either nothing more than the opinions of the authors or repetition of much more eminent students in the field of behavioral science.

We feel, however, that it would be appropriate to conclude the paper with a quote of two military officers eminently more qualified than we in this field. It most appropriately restates that the social problems facing the military are nothing more than an extension of the problems facing our society as a whole.

The military does not feel inadequate in coping with the problems we have presented. Indeed the trends of social change appear to support solutions in many areas. On the other hand, the burden of resolution has been placed principally upon the military when in fact the problems are those of the community at large. Society must in the long run seek to break away from simplistic stereotypes, ideological viewpoints and rationalizations and see the military as a social institution of its own creation which can only operate effectively if it is permitted to retain its place as an integral part of the American community.

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

In this paper, the authors describe a survey of much of the current literature on the behavioral aspects of organizational change and how it pertains to the military. The survey is broad in nature and extends to processes for affecting change presently in use in the armed services. The study further describes some of the various opinions expressed in current articles on the affect of societal changes on the military.
**Key Words**

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- Military Organization
- Organizational Change and Behavior
- Change Processes
- Change Forces
- Cross-Cultural Change
- Minority Groups