Research By-Product

CRITICAL COMBAT PERFORMANCES, KNOWLEDGES, AND SKILLS REQUIRED OF THE INFANTRY RIFLE SQUAD LEADER

Offensive Operations

by

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FOREWORD

In response to a request from the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS), HumRRO Division No. 4 (Infantry) initiated a Technical Advisory Service research project to identify and record the critical combat performances, knowledges, and skills required of the Infantry Rifle Squad Leader (IRSL) and the infantry Fire Team Leader (IFTL).

The requirements imposed upon the IRSL and IFTL are essentially the same, except that the former is responsible for the control of the men and fires of both fire teams in a rifle squad, rather than only one. The senior IFTL within each squad must be prepared to assume effective leadership of the squad immediately if the IRSL becomes a casualty, completes a prescribed combat tour, or is absent for any reason. Since it is common practice to provide the same training for candidates for both positions of leadership and to employ the outstanding candidates in the higher position, each paper in this series will set forth the critical requirements imposed upon the IRSL and, therein, those imposed upon the IFTL as well.

Under Work Unit LEAD, Work Sub-Unit I, the critical combat performances, knowledges, and skills of the Infantry Rifle Platoon Leader were published in a series of 41 papers covering a like number of subject areas. Each paper was published with prior review and concurrence by the USAIS instructional Departments concerned. These papers are being used as the primary source of data in completing a parallel series of papers for the Infantry Rifle Squad Leader and the Infantry Fire Team Leader. This document details the requirements pertaining to offensive operations.

This Technical Advisory Service research is being performed at HumRRO Division No. 4 (Infantry), Fort Benning, Georgia. The present Director of Research is Dr. T. O. Jacobs.

Military support for the study is being provided by the U.S. Army Infantry Human Research Unit, Fort Benning, Georgia. LTC Chester I. Christie, Jr., is the present Unit Chief.

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OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

General Considerations

Introduction

The Infantry rifle squad normally attacks as part of its parent platoon, i.e., as a participant in a larger offensive operation. (The common exception to this general tactical rule is the squad's attacks in the conduct of semi-independent patrols in which the IRSL is the senior leader present.) The squad participates in attacks conducted by the platoon, both semi-independently and as part of company operations; as part of an attacking platoon in company attacks; and as part of a reserve platoon in company attacks. These attacks are made in daylight and during limited visibility, including night. They are made mounted and dismounted, with and without tank support. Movement to the attack position may be by infiltration. The attack may include or be preceded by a river-crossing operation.

Whatever the operation, whatever the circumstances, the IRSL is always there—planning and directing his squad's actions, and, more often than not, by simple force of circumstances, concurrently serving to some degree as a fighting member of the squad. He faces a great challenge, a challenge usually made even more formidable by the absence of ideal conditions. The information he receives is seldom desirably complete; the time he is allowed for planning, reconnaissance, and preparation rarely is adequate; a full-strength squad is the exception (squads of seven men or less are common in Vietnam); an even greater rarity is a squad with all members—especially IFTL's—fully qualified in their positions.

These continuing adverse circumstances require the IRSL to be extremely knowledgeable, highly imaginative, always flexible, and habitually optimistic. He must have mastered the knowledges and skills of his subordinates, else he cannot teach them and, when necessary, perform for those not present. In addition, he must have a thorough knowledge of platoon operations and an understanding of company offensive operations. This is because the squad operates, not in isolation, but as an integral part of the platoon and company. Every action of the squad affects the platoon and company and must be planned and executed with full contemplation of the interactions of the squad, platoon, and company. It is only then that the squad realizes its full potential and contributes its share to accomplishment of the company mission.

Scope

This paper is concerned with the performances, knowledges, and skills required of the IRSL in planning and directing his squad's actions as part of the platoon in company offensive operations. Specific discussion of the squad's actions in patrolling operations is omitted (except as required for clarity or continuity), to avoid duplication of the material in the paper.
Patrolling. As written, however, the material in this paper applies without significant modification to patrolling operations.

Few of the knowledges and skills contained here are specifically peculiar to offensive operations. Most are equally essential, in some form, to all combat operations. For example, troop-leading procedure is necessary in every situation; proper use of camouflage, cover, and concealment is required whether attacking, defending, or patrolling; and the assembly area is organized for defense just as is any other position occupied. Similarly, the knowledges and skills necessary for these performances are acquired, applied, and perfected in all combat areas. Because of this close relationship to other combat areas, the performances, knowledges, and skills required of the IRSL in offensive operations cannot be isolated from those required in the other areas. Therefore, all papers in this series relate to offensive operations, the most directly involved being Mission, Organization, and General Operation of the Rifle Squad and Platoon; Defensive Operations; Tactical Movement; Squad Formations; Battle Drill, and Elementary Fire and Maneuver; Technique of Fire of the Rifle Squad; Mounted and Dismounted Platoon Combat Formations;Patrolling; Radio Communication; Visual, Auditory, and Tactual Communication; Use of Indirect Supporting Fires; Observation, Combat Intelligence, and Reporting; and Cover, Concealment, and Camouflage.

Materiel

Weapons and equipment organic to the squad or usually available from the platoon or company, e.g., metascopes, starlight scopes, and other night-vision and night-firing devices.

Maps, map supplements, aerial photos, sketches, and improvised terrain models.

Camouflage face paint sticks and nets and garnish for helmets.

Luminous tape, luminous buttons, or other visual markings to aid in identification or maintenance of contact during limited visibility.

Fighting and existence loads tailored to the mission, including mines and trip flares.

Attached weapons and equipment, weapons and equipment of supporting units, and captured items that are suitable for use.

Locally available civilian material, such as woven mats for crossing barbed wire.

Available transportation, resupply, and evacuation means.
**Battlefield Cues**

Orders, information, and guidance from higher commanders.

Study of maps, map supplements, and aerial photos.

Reconnaissance.

Information from patrols, security forces, prisoners, civilians, and adjacent and supporting units, including the results of aerial reconnaissance.

Weather and visibility conditions.

Knowledge of enemy tactics and practices.

Knowledge of the tactics and practices of higher and adjacent commanders.

Terrain conditions favoring enemy defense.

Terrain conditions favoring enemy delaying action, such as existing or potential obstacles.

Terrain conditions, including routes, favoring offensive maneuver, movement, and establishment of positions for base-of-fire elements.

Indications of enemy presence, position, and strength, including fires and other activities.
Performances, Knowledges, and Skills


He must:  know that the two general offensive functions of the Infantry rifle squad are:

   a. To conduct, as a separate offensive force, semi-independent combat patrols in which the IRSL is the senior leader present.

   b. To participate, as part of its parent platoon, in:

       (1) Semi-independent combat patrols and platoon offensive operations in which the Infantry rifle platoon leader (IRPL) is the senior leader present.

       (2) Company offensive operations, including patrols related to ongoing company operations.

NOTE: This paper primarily encompasses the performances, knowledges, and skills specifically related to the squad's participation in company attacks in which movement, other than river crossings, is on foot or by land vehicle and, except as necessary for clarity or continuity, omits patrolling, actions as a security force during movement of a larger force, and airmobile operations. The performances, knowledges, and skills required in these operations are contained in the papers on Patrolling, Tactical Movement, and Airmobile Operations.

He will:  know that, in a company attack, his parent platoon may be employed as an attacking platoon or as a reserve platoon.

:  know that the company may be deployed for attack with:

   a. Two platoons attacking; one platoon in reserve.

   b. Three platoons attacking.

   c. One platoon attacking; two platoons in reserve.
He must: know that, when part of an attacking platoon, his squad is employed:

a. As an attacking squad, when possible, to gain maximum concentration of the platoon's combat power, particularly during the assault.

b. As part of the platoon base-of-fire element:

(1) To provide security, if required.

(2) Positioned, and, as necessary, displaced, to provide close supporting fire for the attacking squads when:

(a) The platoon zone is too narrow for lateral deployment of all three squads.

(b) Other terrain restrictions, such as width of the platoon objective, preclude simultaneous assault by all three squads, abreast or from two directions.

(3) To provide any desired combination of security for the base-of-fire element and close supporting fire for the attacking squads.

c. To maintain contact with adjacent units or to protect the platoon's flanks or rear when orders or circumstances require the IRPL to so employ a squad.

d. To provide (in a night attack) any portion of the patrol the IRPL dispatches to secure the platoon's portion of the probable line of deployment and to guide the platoon from its release point to the probable line of deployment.

He will: know that, as in all types of operations, when part of a reserve platoon, the squad is employed as required to assist the platoon in accomplishing its assigned mission(s).

He must: know that, whether attacking or in reserve, the platoon normally does not employ a reserve.

He will: know that the mission of an attacking squad (platoon) is to close with and destroy or capture the enemy, and:
a. In non-counterguerrilla operations usually is:

(1) Accomplished as a part of seizing and retaining terrain occupied and defended by the enemy.

(2) Expressed as a requirement to seize a clearly delineated portion of the enemy position, key terrain feature, or geographical area assigned as the platoon (company) objective (e.g., "Seize the left portion of Hill 413.").

b. In counterguerrilla operations, because guerrillas seldom defend the terrain they are occupying when located, usually is:

(1) Accomplished without specifically seizing and then holding the terrain in which the operation is conducted.

(2) Expressed as a requirement to find, fix, and destroy or capture the guerrilla forces in a specified portion of the platoon (company) area of operation (e.g., "Locate and destroy the guerrillas in the patch of jungle west of this road.").

He must know that, in either operational environment, the mission of a non-attacking squad of an attacking platoon is to perform the task(s) that precludes employment as an attacking squad, i.e., support by fire, protect, maintain contact.

a. The base-of-fire element comprises:

(1) The weapons squad, minus weapons attached to or employed with the maneuver element. (Platoon AT weapons, because of their relatively short effective range, usually are so attached or employed.)

(2) Weapons attached from company or higher and not further attached to or employed with the maneuver element.
(3) Non-organic, non-attached weapons whose fires are available through an FO or the company commander, e.g., company and battalion mortars and AT weapons, artillery, armed helicopters, and high-performance aircraft.

(4) A rifle squad positioned to provide close supporting fire, if applicable.

b. The maneuver element comprises:

(1) The rifle squads minus, if applicable, a squad employed with the base-of-fire element. (A squad employed for contact or protection is considered to be part of the maneuver element.)

(2) Crew-served weapons assigned to support the rifle squads composing the maneuver element or attached to individual squads of the maneuver element.

: know that the squad attacks in either of two ways—by fire and maneuver or by fire and movement. (For compositions and actions of firing and maneuvering/moving elements, see the paper Technique of Fire of the Rifle Squad.)

He will recognize that employment of the platoon's crew-served weapons (organic and attached) is one of the IRPL's earliest and most important concerns.

: know that the IRPL may:

a. Retain all of the weapons in the base-of-fire element.

b. Retain some of the weapons in the base-of-fire element and:

(1) Assign those remaining to support the maneuver element (thus retaining direct control).

(2) Attach those remaining to one or more of the squads of the maneuver element (thus relinquishing direct control).
(3) Combine (1) and (2), i.e., assign some of the remaining weapons to support the maneuver element and attach those still remaining to one or more of the squads of the maneuver element.

: make a comparably early decision whether to employ an attached crew-served weapon to reinforce:

a. The squad as a whole.

b. One of the fire teams (or both fire teams, when more than one weapon is attached).

c. A designated base-of-fire element.

: base his decision on employment on the same factors the IRPL considers in reaching his decision, i.e.:

a. Under known or expected terrain and visibility conditions, what is the availability of successive positions from which a base-of-fire element can provide effective close support during movement from the LD to the Final CL, during the assault, and during consolidation? Availability of suitable positions favors reinforcement of a designated base-of-fire element. Non-availability dictates reinforcement of the squad as a whole or of one of the fire teams.

b. Will supporting from successive positions cause the base-of-fire element to be sufficiently separated in distance from the maneuver element (i.e., the other fire team) that either element may be unduly exposed to sniper or ground action from the flanks or rear? In such a situation (not uncommon in counterguerrilla operations), security of the squad in general, and of the crew-served weapon in particular, precludes employment in this manner, and dictates reinforcement of the squad as a whole or of one of the fire teams.

c. Does the existing armor threat, and the effective range of an attached AT weapon, require that the weapon be employed as far forward as possible, i.e., with the squad as a whole or with one of the fire teams?
d. Can safety requirements be met when employment of an M60 machinegun from successive positions, though otherwise desirable and feasible, will require delivery of overhead fire? See the paper *Machinegun, 7.62-mm, M60* for requirements, e.g., minimum-maximum gun-target range of 350-850 meters, terrain that is neither level nor uniformly sloping, use of depression stops.

: when electing to employ a base-of-fire element for support from successive positions, also determine whether the element is to continue in this manner throughout or physically join with the maneuver element at some specified stage, e.g., at the Final CL, for the assault.

He must: list and explain the purposes and circumstances for use of the tactical control measures he or the IRPL may employ to facilitate coordinated preparation for and conduct of an attack and, in his explanation, identify the measures applicable:

a. Only to day attack.

b. Only to night/limited visibility attack.

c. Or generally applicable to both day attack and night/limited visibility attack.

: know that, despite the large number of control measures that may be employed, each commander, as a matter of principle, prescribes the minimum measures necessary to ensure proper preparation for and conduct of an attack and allows his subordinate leaders maximum freedom to act as their judgment dictates.

: in like manner, habitually prescribe the minimum necessary control measures and seek always to allow his IFTL's maximum freedom to apply past experience and opportunity to gain new, meaningful experience.

: depict control measures on maps or sketches diagraming company, platoon, or squad attack plans, using, where applicable, the standard symbols or abbreviations representing the control measures.
THE IRSL WILL PLAN AND DIRECT THE ACTIONS REQUIRED OF HIS SQUAD TO PREPARE FOR AND EXECUTE THE MISSION ASSIGNED TO THE SQUAD AS PART OF AN ATTACKING PLATOON IN A COMPANY DAYLIGHT ATTACK.

He will: on moving to an assembly area to prepare for an attack, and pending receipt of the actual warning order for the attack, make all possible preparations, basing his actions on unit SOP, available information, and his own knowledge and experience and that of his IFTL's and men.

- organize his squad's sector of the platoon assembly area and, as minimum defensive preparations:
  a. Post local security.
  b. Position personnel and assign sectors of observation and fire.
  c. Establish radio communication with the platoon CP-OP or, if radio silence is required, dispatch a messenger to the CP-OP.
  d. Require digging of hasty emplacements.
  e. Institute appropriate light and noise and camouflage measures.

- unless additional position preparation is ordered by the IRPL or required by SOP, limit defensive preparations to these minimums, recognizing that time normally is limited and that priority must be given to preparing the squad for the attack.

NOTE: Preparation of a defensive position is covered in the papers Defensive Operations and Emplacements, Shelters, Obstacles, and Fields of Fire and is not repeated here.

He must: pending receipt of the platoon warning order, and concurrent with defensive preparations, initiate:

- The individual and squad preparatory measures common to both day and night/limited visibility attacks, e.g.:
  (1) Cleaning and checking weapons, setting battlesights on rifles.
(2) Ammunition inventory (including grenades and pyrotechnics) for use, on receipt of the warning order, in determining amounts to be drawn for the attack.

(3) Cleaning, checking, and adjusting equipment.

(4) Padding, taping, or tying down equipment that may rattle or make noise.

(5) Camouflaging helmets, webbing, and any items that may reflect light (exposed skin normally is not camouflaged until just before moving out, because perspiration and normal movement quickly degrade skin camouflage).

(6) Checking the squad radio for proper operation and battery freshness.

(7) Carrier maintenance, checking, and resupply, when mechanized. (See par. 99, below.)

b. Such normal human maintenance measures as:

(1) Washing, shaving, and other personal hygiene.

(2) Exchanging worn or dirty clothing.

(3) Resting and sleeping.

(4) Eating.

(5) Filling canteens.

(6) Caring for blisters and minor injuries.

: permit test firing of weapons only if specifically authorized by the IRFL (the noise may attract enemy attention and compromise the secrecy of the attack).

He will: as soon as possible after receiving the platoon warning order, issue his squad warning order.

: issue the warning order to the entire squa`, if assembly is practicable; otherwise, to his IFTL's for prompt relay to all members.
continue preparations already begun and initiate those required or made possible by the platoon warning order, e.g.:

a. Drawing of rations, special equipment, or additional ammunition.

b. Turn-in or other disposition of equipment not to be carried, such as stacking bedrolls for pick-up and delivery on the objective after the attack.

to the extent permitted by time and the availability of maps or map substitutes, familiarize himself with, and brief his IFTL's on, the terrain over which the squad will operate in the attack.

He must: take his senior IFTL with him to receive the platoon attack order (as a matter of SOP, except when directed to come alone), placing his junior IFTL in charge of the squad, as a means to:

a. Ensure that the senior IFTL is informed and knowledgeable of all aspects of the situation and fully prepared to:

   (1) Assist materially in planning the squad's tactical actions.

   (2) Take over the squad should he become a casualty.

b. Provide for prompt, accurate, and authoritative transmittal of essential information to the squad—and for initiation of appropriate action—should his return to the squad be delayed. (E.g., he may choose, or be required, to make his reconnaissance immediately after the order is issued, particularly when time pressure is great. In this situation the senior IFTL returns to the squad, transmits necessary orders, and initiates appropriate action.)

c. Employ his IFTL's to the maximum degree possible and, concurrently, ensure that they gain meaningful experience beyond their specifically assigned positions.

He will: anticipate that the IRPL will issue his attack order:
a. When possible, at a covered position near a forward vantage point from which the objective and the terrain over which the platoon will move can be seen, and from which he points out and specifically identifies the features he will refer to in the order (e.g., attack position, LD, roads, trails, draws, ridges).

b. With maximum use of maps, map substitutes, and other visual aids (e.g., terrain models), particularly when direct observation of the terrain is not possible, as usually is the case in airmobile operations.

c. For an airmobile operation, after making an aerial reconnaissance of the objective area, if this was possible and would not compromise the mission.

31 during issue of the order:

a. Take notes on portions or items applying specifically or solely to his squad and those affecting his squad (e.g., the platoon plan of fire support as it affects his squad) and in as much detail as time and circumstances permit, particularly when the operation is complex and the plan complicated.

b. Commit essential details to memory when visibility or other conditions preclude taking notes.

32 study the order quickly but thoroughly, and ensure that he clearly understands all information and requirements.

33 He must: follow normal troop-leading procedure in planning and preparation--make estimate, effect coordination, make tentative plan, etc. (Troop-leading procedure is discussed in the paper Mission, Organization, and General Operation of the Rifle Squad and Platoon and is not repeated here.)

34 on receiving the platoon order, and as appropriate at all stages, promptly provide his IFTL's and squad members any information affecting their planning and preparation (e.g., a significant change in time of attack, a change in the announced time or place he will issue his order).
if the situation permits, orient his IFTL's (and, if possible, his entire squad) at a vantage point from which they can see the objective and the terrain over which the squad will pass, pointing out:

a. And identifying landmarks on which they can orient during movement.

b. The location of the LD, Final CL, and objective, emphasizing the features by which each can best be recognized, particularly if any part of movement will be during reduced visibility.

c. The locations and identifying features of any other prescribed control measures, such as phase lines or contact points.

include in his reconnaissance the observation and study of:

a. The route assigned to his squad, with particular attention to the portion from the LD to the tentative Final CL.

b. Approaches for his fire teams, within the assigned route.

c. Cover and concealment en route to and on the objective.

d. Known or suspected enemy positions along his route or on the objective.

e. Likely enemy approaches to his portion of the platoon zone and the objective.

f. Natural and artificial obstacles along his route.

g. If an exterior squad, location of contact points on the flanks of the objective for probable requirements for patrolling between these points and the objective (after seizure).

while developing his plan and preparing his attack order, issue fragmentary orders to keep his men informed and facilitate their planning and preparation.
keep his plan of attack as simple and specific as the information available to him permits, recognizing and emphasizing to his men that additions or changes must be anticipated as each situation arising during the attack is developed.

**He will** : issue his attack order:

a. At a vantage point, if possible; otherwise at a covered location (e.g., the assembly area).

b. To the entire squad, if assembly is practicable; otherwise to his IFTL's.

: when time permits—to ensure clarity and presentation of information in the most logical order—issue a complete five-paragraph operation order, even though this involves repetition of earlier fragmentary orders.

: when time is short, issue the balance of the attack order as fragmentary orders, repeating portions of earlier fragmentary orders only as necessary.

: ensure that IFTL's are allowed sufficient time for issuing necessary supplemental orders to their fire teams.

: seek always to provide or obtain time for rehearsal of planned actions, and on terrain similar to that over which the squad will operate.

**He must** : supervise final preparation of the squad, conduct inspections and rehearsals, and question IFTL's and men to ensure complete understanding of the plan of action.

: move from the assembly area with the platoon or at the time specified by the IRPL.

: during movement to and at the attack position, accomplish last-minute coordination and final preparations (e.g., fix bayonets).

: at the attack position, deploy the squad as required to assume his position in the platoon attack formation and ensure deployment of his fire teams.

: halt the squad at the attack position only if the platoon halts or if a halt is approved by the IRPL.
forward of the LD, change the squad's formation as appropriate.

on meeting resistance, develop the situation and initiate appropriate action to overcome or by-pass the resistance.

move quickly through or around mortar or artillery impact areas encountered en route.

if possible, move quickly around mined or booby-trapped areas; otherwise, breach these areas quickly and move through rapidly.

He will anticipate that any halt during approach of the Final CL (e.g., to permit all elements to cross simultaneously) will be made short of this line, to permit continuation of all supporting fires until the line is crossed.

begin deploying the squad as it approaches the Final CL, ensuring that the squad crosses the Final CL in squad line.

forward of the Final CL, advance to fix, close with, and kill or capture the enemy and clear the objective, using, as directed or as required by the situation:

a. Assault fire techniques, when fire superiority has been gained.

b. Fire and movement until fire superiority is gained, up to and even within the objective.

c. A combination of fire and movement and assault fire techniques, when appropriate, e.g., when the enemy has employed a strong defense.

He must at all times, supplement the IRPL's observation of his squad's advance with reports and signals to:

a. Obtain intensified supporting fires as he approaches the Final CL.

b. Ensure the lifting or shifting of artillery and battalion-controlled mortar fires when these fires, because of their dispersion characteristics, become dangerous to the squad and platoon (normally as the platoon crosses the Final CL).
c. Provide continuation of company mortar fires as long as possible (i.e., until they, too, must be lifted or shifted to avoid danger to the squad and platoon).

d. Facilitate continuation and intensification of fires of company direct fire weapons until masked by the platoon’s advance.

: move far enough over the objective to pursue withdrawing enemy by fire and to protect against counterattack.

: establish his squad’s portion of the platoon’s hasty defensive position and, according to the plan announced in the attack order:

a. Organize for defense, if the position is to be occupied including, as suitable for the armor or personnel threat, emplacement of available antitank and antipersonnel mines.

b. Effect minimum essential reorganization, if the attack is to continue.

3. THE IRSN WILL PLAN AND DIRECT THE ACTIONS REQUIRED OF HIS SQUAD TO PREPARE FOR AND EXECUTE THE MISSION ASSIGNED TO THE SQUAD AS PART OF AN ATTACKING PLATOON IN A COMPANY NIGHT/LIMITED VISIBILITY ATTACK.

NOTE: The knowledges and skills comprising this performance apply generally to all attacks conducted in conditions of significantly reduced visibility but, for conciseness, are presented primarily in the context of non-illuminated night attack, with differentiation between non-illuminated night attacks and other limited visibility attacks made only as required for clarity.

He will know that the term limited visibility attack is applied, not only to night attacks, but, also, to daylight attacks in which, because of significantly reduced visibility, the control measures employed are substantially the same as for night attacks. (E.g., night control measures usually are employed when such weather or atmospheric conditions as fog, rain, snow, smog, smoke, or dust so reduce visibility that personnel in relatively open terrain cannot be quickly identified as friendly or enemy at battlesight ranges—250 meters or less.)
recognize that jungle canopy, jungle undergrowth, and other dense vegetation (e.g., elephant grass) also may sharply reduce visibility in daylight and create control problems.

selectively employ night/limited visibility control measures when attacking in terrain of this nature.

indoctrinate his men to regard night attacks as a normal part of offensive operations, conducted to:

a. Gain surprise, usually through closer undetected approach.

b. Maintain pressure on the enemy.

c. Exploit a successful daylight operation.

d. Avoid heavy losses by capitalizing on the concealment afforded by darkness (or limited visibility).

emphasize that night attacks become increasingly necessary and more desirable as the enemy's battlefield firepower increases and makes daylight operations progressively more hazardous.

without minimizing difficulties, emphasize to his men that while some of the general characteristics of night attack are disadvantages to them as the attackers, these characteristics also adversely affect the defending enemy, often to an equal or even greater degree, e.g.:

a. The ability of the enemy to deliver aimed fire usually is decreased more than that of the attacker because of the difficulty in locating definite targets in darkness, particularly when the exact direction of the attack has not been discovered and when the attacker takes maximum advantage of terrain, camouflage, and reduced visibility.

b. The attacker can realize at least partial effectiveness from his direct fire supporting weapons by laying them on definite targets or target areas during daylight. The enemy, however, has no definite targets on which to lay until he locates the main body of the attack. Both are equally restricted in shifting the fires of these weapons during darkness.
c. Movement, and the maintenance of control, direction, and contact, though more difficult for the attacker, are problems for the enemy as well.

d. Night attack magnifies the enemy’s doubts, apprehensions, and fear of the unknown—normal and very human reactions—and gives the attacker a distinct psychological advantage. (E.g., the inability of the individual defender to see the results of his fire increases his tendency to crouch in his hole and fire upward, rather than rising and attempting aimed fire.)

He must: know and ensure that his men know how the control measures used in a night attack differ from those used in a daylight attack.

a. The company assembly area normally is smaller and closer to the LD than for a daylight attack (consequently, each platoon assembly area is smaller).

b. An attack position is always designated (but need not provide as much concealment).

c. Intermediate objectives are not usually assigned.

d. Terrain features identifying boundaries, routes, and other control measures may be marked by such means as infrared devices, luminous tape, or luminous buttons.

e. A probable line of deployment (PLD) is designated, rather than a Final CL.

f. Minimum or maximum intervals and distances to be maintained between platoons, squads, and individuals may be specified.

g. Guides and connecting files may be used.

h. A limit of advance is designated to restrict movement over the objective after the assault.

i. Designated individuals may be marked for ready identification by armbands or luminous tape or buttons (e.g., leaders, flank men of squads).

j. A company point of departure or platoon points of departure is designated.
k. A platoon release point is designated.

l. Squad release points are designated.

m. Movement is in column formation as far forward as practicable and the company normally crosses the LD in:

(1) A column of platoon columns, when visibility is poor, distance to the objective is great, or early contact is not expected.
   
   (a) A company point of departure is designated.
   
   (b) The platoon release point is forward of the LD.

(2) A line of platoon columns, when visibility permits a more open formation, distance to the objective is short, or early contact is expected.

   (a) Platoon points of departure are designated.

   (b) The platoon release point is short of the LD, usually at the attack position.

n. Authority to initiate the assault normally is delegated to the platoon sergeant, and may be delegated to the IRSL's.

He will know that:

a. A non-illuminated attack is planned when the commander anticipates that the attack can be conducted by stealth, secrecy maintained, and surprise achieved, by closing with the enemy before he discovers the attack.

b. An illuminated attack is conducted (in substantially the same manner as a daylight attack) when the commander anticipates that the probability of maintaining secrecy and attaining surprise is remote or that adequate control will not be possible without illumination.
c. Contingency plans for a non-illuminated attack will include provisions for illumination, and continuation as an illuminated attack, if the attack is prematurely discovered.

He must: organize and prepare his squad's sector of the platoon assembly area in the same general manner as when preparing for a daylight attack, but with special emphasis on noise discipline and, after dark, light discipline, recognizing the increased danger of compromising the secrecy of the attack when the assembly area is farther forward than in a daylight attack.

: initiate maintenance, resupply, and preparatory measures as in a daylight attack, but with special emphasis on padding or taping of equipment and other noise reduction or prevention measures.

: seek to accomplish preparations without obvious change in normal night procedures, recognizing that obvious changes are likely to alert the enemy and compromise the attack.

He will: issue a warning order, reconnoiter, plan, prepare, and issue an attack order, generally as for daylight attack.

: terrain-orient himself and his fire team leaders from a vantage point, as in a daylight attack, and in dusk—during changing light conditions—and at night, to ensure maximum familiarity with the terrain as it will appear during the attack.

He must: include in his plans and orders:

a. Provisions for protecting night vision prior to the attack.

b. Designation of a base fire team.

c. Formation from the platoon release point to the squad release point.

d. Actions if the attack is discovered prematurely, including provision for on-call illumination.

e. Emphasis that scattered fire by the enemy must not be assumed to be premature discovery requiring initiation of the assault.
f. Methods for breaching obstacles quietly, including barbed wire.

g. Whether authority to initiate the assault has been delegated (to the platoon sergeant or to himself).

He will: move from the assembly area with the platoon; ensure that the squad is positioned properly in the platoon column; and take all necessary steps to ensure quietest possible movement.

: begin deployment into squad line at the squad release point; complete deployment by the time the squad reaches the PLD; and notify the IRPL when the squad is fully deployed.

: on order of the IRPL, move the squad forward silently, maintaining the squad line formation, and guiding on the base squad.

He must: when the assault is initiated, move forward aggressively, with the greatest possible volume of aimed or well-directed fire—to help establish and maintain fire superiority—and clear his portion of the objective.

: ensure that movement of the squad over or beyond the objective does not proceed past the designated limit of advance.

: consolidate and organize for defense or prepare for continuation of the attack, as in a daylight attack.

4. THE IRSL WILL PLAN AND DIRECT THE ACTIONS REQUIRED OF HIS SQUAD TO PREPARE FOR AND EXECUTE THE MISSION(S) ASSIGNED TO THE SQUAD AS PART OF A RESERVE PLATOON IN A COMPANY ATTACK CONDUCTED UNDER ANY CONDITIONS OF VISIBILITY.

He will: know that, unlike an attacking platoon, a reserve platoon has no inherent specific mission, but has, instead, the inherent general mission to provide the company commander a means for decisively influencing the action and for maintaining the momentum of the attack.

: know that a reserve platoon accomplishes this general mission by execution, as directed, of one or more of these specific missions:
a. Protecting the company's flanks or rear.

b. Maintaining contact with adjacent units.

c. Clearing (i.e., mopping up) a position overrun or bypassed by the attacking platoons.

d. Providing supporting fires as part of the company base-of-fire element.

e. Assuming the mission of an attacking platoon.

f. Attacking from a new direction (i.e., becoming an attacking platoon).

g. Providing protection or assistance on the objective during consolidation and reorganization.

: know that the mission of the squad, when part of a reserve platoon, is to perform, or assist in performing, one or more of the tasks making up the platoon's specific mission(s).

He must : recognize the necessity for a general understanding, by himself and his squad, of the missions and plans of actions of the other platoons, to facilitate rapid and efficient assumption of their missions by his platoon, if required, even though such assumption is not specifically assigned as a mission.

: for the same reason, ensure complete understanding of the missions and plans of actions of the other squads of his platoon.

He will : keep himself and his squad as full abreast of the situation as possible, to maximize opportunities to anticipate and prepare for other missions likewise not specifically assigned, but which the squad may be required to execute.

: plan and prepare for the specifically assigned mission(s) in the same manner as when commanding an attacking squad.

: make tentative plans and preparations, as permitted by available time, for other missions which, though not specifically assigned, may be required of the squad, considering these potential missions in the order of their probable relative importance to accomplishment of the platoon's mission(s).
He must: execute his mission(s) in the attack according to plan, ensuring that the squad is at all times capable of quick and effective reaction to mission changes or additions.

5. THE IRSL WILL PLAN AND DIRECT THE ACTIONS REQUIRED OF HIS SQUAD TO PREPARE FOR AND PARTICIPATE IN A COMPANY ATTACK BY INFILTRATION.

He will: define an attack by infiltration as an attack in which the company enters the enemy area by infiltration, explaining that the company is broken down into platoon, squad, or fire team groups (infiltration groups), and:

a. Moves by stealth over assigned routes (infiltration lanes), around, between, or through enemy positions, with each group:
   (1) Avoiding contact, if possible.
   (2) Breaking chance contact as quickly as possible and avoiding decisive engagement.

b. Reassembles at a specified location (the company rendezvous point) at or by a specified time.

c. Moves, as a company, to an attack position.

d. Conducts a raid, a daylight attack, or a night/limited visibility attack.

: explain that the purpose of infiltration is to place the company secretly in the enemy area, while exposing to possible detection and fire during movement only small groups whose individual detection does not immediately or automatically compromise the mission or the entire company.

He must: emphasize that an attack by infiltration:

a. Differs significantly from any other attack only in the movement method used to reach the attack position.

b. To help preserve secrecy and achieve surprise, normally is planned and timed so that infiltration groups move only during darkness or other reduced visibility conditions, e.g., rain, snow, or fog.
He will know that, for ease of control and for maximal maintenance of unit integrity and retention of combat capability, the company infiltrates by the largest groups permitted by circumstances (i.e., by platoon or squad groups, avoiding infiltration by fire team groups, if possible).

: know that the company commander may specify the manner in which each platoon is to infiltrate (i.e., as a platoon, by squads, or by fire teams), or prescribe group minimums (e.g., no smaller than squads, no smaller than fire teams), leaving final determination to the platoon leader(s).

: explain that the factors the company commander and platoon leaders consider in determining infiltration groups are:

a. Enemy dispositions.

   (1) How many gaps are there between positions?

   (2) How large are these gaps?

   (3) What is the surveillance effort in or over these gaps, e.g., patrols, electronic devices?

b. Terrain and visibility.

   (1) What routes affording concealed movement are available for infiltration lanes, other than obvious routes of approach that can be expected to be under surveillance and covered by fire?

   (2) How will visibility affect concealment?

c. Control.

   (1) Considering proficiency of subordinate leaders, particularly in navigation, how closely do platoon and squad leaders need to control their squads and fire teams?

   (2) How much control is possible with available radios? For example:

   (a) Distance or the nature of the terrain may preclude communication between the IRPL and his squads.
(b) When infiltrating by fire teams, only one will have a radio.

He must: recognize that infiltration lanes are comparable to patrol routes and may be specifically prescribed, but normally are defined as generally as possible to provide each group maximum freedom of movement and, when applicable, to permit leaders to further prescribe:

- Squad lanes within platoon lanes.
- Fire team lanes within squad lanes.

NOTE: Infiltration by fire team groups, although avoided if possible, requires the IRSL to plan and prepare in greater detail and, generally, to be more knowledgeable than does infiltration as a squad or as part of the platoon. To ensure inclusion of critical knowledges and skills, the remainder of this performance assumes a situation in which the IRSL is required to infiltrate his squad by fire team groups.

He will: know that, in addition to the instructions and information as given for any attack, the platoon warning and attack orders will contain the details essential to plan, prepare for, and conduct the infiltration, including as a minimum:

- Location of the squad release point (which may be the same as the platoon release point but, preferably, is beyond this point and forward of the LC to permit the platoon to make passage of line as a unit).
- Fire team release time (i.e., time at which he can begin infiltrating his fire teams).
- The squad's infiltration lane to the platoon rendezvous point.
- Location of the platoon rendezvous point, disposition of the squads in the area, and time at or by which each squad is to arrive (squad arrival times usually are staggered to reduce likelihood of congestion and confusion).
- The platoon's infiltration lane to the company rendezvous point.
- Location of the company rendezvous point, disposition of the platoon in the area, and time at or by which each platoon is to arrive (as at the platoon rendezvous point, arrival times usually are staggered).
g. Recognition signals for approach and entry of the platoon and company rendezvous points, and actions to be taken at each, including security measures.

h. The company's infiltration lane to the attack position.

i. Location of the attack position, disposition of units, and actions to be taken, including reconnaissance and coordination.

j. Actions, after the attack, pertaining to withdrawal, continuation, or linkup with other forces.

k. Designation of alternate platoon and company rendezvous points and instructions or conditions governing their use.

He must: for purposes of planning, preparation, and conduct, divide the operation into these four general phases:

a. The infiltration phase, in which:

   (1) The platoon moves, as part of the company, to a platoon release point designated by the company commander.

   (2) The platoon moves, on its own, to a squad release point designated by the IRPL.

   (3) The squad moves, on its own, to a fire team release point designated by the IRSL.

   (4) Each fire team moves, on its own, to a squad rendezvous point designated by the IRSL.

   (5) The squad moves, on its own, to a platoon rendezvous point designated by the IRPL.

   (6) The platoon moves, on its own, to a company rendezvous point designated by the company commander.

b. The attack phase, in which:

   (1) The platoon moves, as part of the company, to the attack position. (In other attacks, this corresponds to movement from the assembly area to the attack position.)
(2) Final reconnaissance and coordination are made at or from the attack position.

(3) The attack is launched.

c. The consolidation and reorganization phase, in which the company secures the objective and reorganizes.

d. The withdrawal, continuation, or linkup phase, in which the company, according to plan:

(1) Withdraws on foot or by air, as a company or by smaller groups.

(2) Continues the attack.

(3) Effects linkup with other forces.

He will: in his plans, preparation, and orders:

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a. Include essential information and instructions from the platoon order.

b. Organize the squad into two fire team infiltration groups, assigning:

(1) Attached personnel as required to best balance the teams in size and capability for accomplishing the mission.

(2) Himself to accompany, but normally not to replace, his least-experienced fire team leader.

c. Direct each fire team leader to plan and prepare as for a separate patrol.

d. Announce the location of the fire team release point.

e. Assign each fire team group an infiltration lane, if terrain allows division of the squad lane, and establish a time for each group to begin infiltration (or direct both to begin at the same time).

f. Designate a single, specific route (e.g., defined by azimuths, checkpoints, and distances), if separate lanes are not practicable, with staggered departure times to assist in maintaining interval during movement.
g. Announce the location of the squad rendezvous point (and an alternate point), rendezvous time(s), recognition signals for approach and entry, and actions to be taken at this point (including securing by the first group to arrive).

h. Define the route from the squad rendezvous point to the platoon rendezvous point.

i. Explain the plan of fire support in minute detail, including:

   (1) Locations and times of both diversionary and suppressive fires in or near the squad lane during infiltration.

   (2) Fires during and after the attack.

j. Emphasize the importance of avoiding even visual contact and of breaking chance contact as quickly as possible without decisive engagement.

k. Provide instructions for actions if a group (or an individual who becomes separated) is not able to reach the squad rendezvous point before the squad departs for the platoon rendezvous point.

He must: plan, prepare for, and conduct the attack phase generally in the same manner as for a daylight or night/limited visibility attack, except:

a. Alternate plans must include the possibility that one of his fire teams will not reach the rendezvous point.

b. Return to friendly areas, by air or on foot, as a unit or in groups, must be planned, if the objective will not be held.

6. THE IRSL WILL PLAN AND DIRECT THE ACTIONS REQUIRED OF HIS SQUAD, AS PART OF AN ATTACKING PLATOON, TO PREPARE FOR AND PARTICIPATE IN A MOUNTED ATTACK (I.E., AN ATTACK IN WHICH THE PLATOON IS MOUNTED IN ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS FOR ANY PART OF ITS MOVEMENT FORWARD OF THE LD).

He will: explain to his men, and exploit fully, the additional advantages and capabilities carriers provide the platoon in an attack.
a. While in the carrier, the squad has good protec-
tion against small arms fire, shell fragments,
and hand grenades; and some protection against
the effects of nuclear weapons.

b. The carrier's mounted weapon provides the squad
a firing capability during movement and increases
the squad's dismounted firepower.

c. The squad's energy is conserved in proportion to
the lesser distance moved on foot.

d. The squad's load-carrying capability is increased
evermously, e.g.:

(1) More ammunition can be carried and is
readily available, especially that needed
for prompt resupply on the objective.

(2) Such items as bangalore torpedoes for gap-
ing wire obstacles and tools for preparing
defensive positions can be immediately at
hand.

(3) Bedrolls, packs, and personal items required
for human maintenance, as well as rations
and extra water, can be immediately available
without encumbering or overburdening the men.

e. The capability for more rapid movement forward of
the LD allows the enemy less time and opportunity
for coordinated and effective reaction.

f. The enemy is subject to the adverse psychological
effects often induced by armored attack.

He must: for a mounted attack, include in his plans these
additional considerations or actions:

a. Formations prescribed by the IRPI for movement
to and forward of the LD.

b. Prescribed control measures, e.g., the platoon's
axis of advance, if designated; the dismount area,
if prescribed.

c. Actions to be taken by the squad (platoon) if the
carrier(s) comes under effective antitank fire.

d. Actions during dismounting.
e. Most effective use of the carrier's mounted weapon.

f. Use of the carrier(s) during consolidation and reorganization.

He will: prepare for a mounted attack generally as for a dismounted attack, but with these additional considerations:

a. Carrier maintenance must be performed, including filling of fuel tanks.

b. The carrier's ammunition load must be brought up to prescribed level.

c. Squad equipment and individual gear must be loaded so that it does not interfere with rapid dismounting (usually specified in SOP loading plans).

d. The carrier's radio(s) must be checked.

e. All men must receive a detailed terrain briefing so that, since they usually will not see the terrain or the objective area until they dismount, they will not be disoriented at the time of dismounting.

f. Actions to be taken if the carrier is disabled short of the dismount point must be made and the squad appropriately instructed.

He must: during the attack, continue mounted movement as far forward as possible (when enemy defenses are weak, mounted movement all the way to the objective may be possible).

He will: after seizure of the objective, ensure that maintenance and refueling of the carrier is accomplished as rapidly as possible.


He must: know that, except for squad raids, ambushes, and other patrolling-type operations that are not directly related to a company offensive mission, the rifle squad's participation in offensive counter-guerrilla operations is as part of the platoon in a coordinated company action.
He will: diagram and explain in detail to his men the forms of tactical maneuver employed in offensive counter-guerrilla operations, i.e., encirclement, penetration, and envelopment. (These maneuvers are covered in detail in FM 7-15 and are not repeated here.)

He must: explain and emphasize to his men that the principal significant differences between a coordinated attack on a guerrilla force and on a regular force are:

a. The objective is the guerrilla force— not a position, terrain feature, or geographical area—and the mission is stated as a requirement to destroy or capture the guerrilla force and, normally, does not include a requirement to seize or retain terrain.

b. Reconnaissance of the objective (i.e., the guerrilla force) by the platoon leader before the attack normally is not possible because of the danger of alerting the force before it can be fixed and permitting its escape.

c. A guerrilla force seeks to avoid or to quickly break contact with a superior attacking force, and defends its position only as a measure which may permit eventual escape or when it occupies an important base camp, supply depot, or other extremely critical installation.

d. Closer and more detailed coordination between squads is essential, both to prevent gaps through which the enemy may escape and to ensure that squads do not interfere with nor endanger each other.

e. Use of supporting fires may be restricted or reduced in effectiveness by the intermingling of the guerrilla force with the local population.

He will: except for modifications necessitated by the differences noted above, plan and prepare as in any other attack situation.

8. THE IRSL WILL PLAN AND DIRECT THE ACTIONS REQUIRED OF HIS SQUAD TO PREPARE FOR AND PARTICIPATE IN AN ATTACK INCLUDING THE CROSSING OF A RIVER OBSTACLE.

NOTE: The knowledges and skills of this performance are based on the assumption that the squad has received boat team training sufficient to assure satisfactory performance, with or without Engineer support, as applicable.
He must regard the crossing of a river obstacle as an essential task to be accomplished to move the squad, as part of the platoon, rapidly and efficiently across the river to permit continuation or resumption of the attack by the unit of which the platoon and company are parts.

: describe a river crossing as hasty or deliberate to indicate manner and circumstances of conduct, recognizing and emphasizing to his men that both are planned operations, i.e.:

a. A hasty river crossing is one in which movement of the attacking force to and across the river is planned to be continuous, or as nearly so as possible (i.e., the attack is to continue to, across, and beyond the river with minimum delay and minimum loss of momentum).

b. A deliberate river crossing is one in which the attacking force intentionally delays on the near bank for detailed planning and preparation (e.g., obtain or prepare crossing means, or build up the forces required to overcome enemy defenses on the far bank), then crosses and resumes the attack.

He will know that, unless made in organic personnel carriers, on existing bridges, or at fords, a river crossing requires use of non-organic equipment and usually requires non-organic trained personnel to install, construct, operate, or drive this equipment, e.g.:

a. Plastic or pneumatic assault boats:
   (1) With Engineer operators if equipped with outboard motors.
   (2) With Engineer crewmen when non-motorized and required to make multiple trips.

b. Rafts, floating footbridges, and floating vehicular bridges, with Engineer operating crews.

c. Personnel carriers and drivers.

He must explain that an attack involving a river crossing differs generally from other ground attacks in that:
a. Areas suitable for a crossing usually are limited, and this limitation may canalize the attack and permit the enemy to concentrate his defense against a possible crossing at a relatively small number of points.

b. Choice of tactical courses of action is limited by restriction of maneuver space and by the extremely limited firepower capability of the troops while astride the river, especially when crossing in boats, on rafts, or in personnel carriers, e.g.:

(1) The squad has little offensive capability when paddling a boat or raft.

(2) Maneuver is not possible in personnel carriers.

c. Deviations from plans, especially those for actions after landing, are difficult once the crossing has begun, because of the difficulty of coordination with and between affected units.

d. Control is difficult, particularly at night or in fog, smoke, or other reduced visibility, and may be further complicated when non-organic personnel are participating (e.g., Engineer troops operating boats or floating bridges), and is even more difficult if the squad is required to use two boats or rafts.

He will know that, unless the platoon is to cross at a ford, or on an intact bridge, the IRPL will seek, with his assigned area, a crossing site with as many as possible of these desirable characteristics:

a. A far bank that is undefended or lightly held.

b. Terrain on the far bank which facilitates rapid continuation of the attack, e.g., early seizure of key terrain features.

c. A moderate river current [no faster than 9 KMPH and, preferably, no faster than 6 KMPH (particularly when crossing in carriers)].

d. No obstacles in the water.

e. Suitable banks for entry and exit (particularly when crossing in carriers).
f. Concealed approaches to the near bank.

g. Dominating terrain on the near bank that offers observation and fields of fire superior to that of the far bank.

h. A good road net to the near bank and from the far bank (particularly if mechanized or attacking with tanks).

i. Suitable sites for rafts or bridges to carry tanks (when attacking with tanks).

: seek these same characteristics within the proportionally smaller area assigned to his squad.

: anticipate that orders and information regarding the crossing, at a minimum, will include:

a. Type crossing to be made.

b. Platoon crossing site or area.

c. Squad crossing site or area.

d. Crossing means to be used, including (as applicable) instructions:

(1) For securing bridges, fords, boats, or rafts at the crossing site.

(2) For obtaining inflatable boats or rafts to be carried by the squad.

(3) Regarding attachment of or coordination with Engineer units and equipment (e.g., boats, rafts, floating bridges) to accompany the squad or, in a deliberate crossing, to precede the squad to the crossing site.

e. Speed of current at the platoon crossing site.

: anticipate that, when possible, the attack will be timed to take maximum advantage of natural limitations on visibility; for example:

a. In a hasty crossing, initiation of the attack and crossing of the river during fog, rain, haze, or snow.
b. In a deliberate crossing, movement to and preparation at the river, and crossing of the river during darkness.

: anticipate that orders for a hasty crossing, especially if conducted in the circumstances indicated above, normally will include authority for the platoon to cross immediately upon arrival at the river, if it arrives before the other platoons, and if such action will permit it to capitalize on enemy weaknesses, maintain the momentum of the attack, or achieve surprise, but that such authority normally is not delegated to a squad.

He must : know that a hasty crossing may be conducted in circumstances which preclude his making a reconnaissance prior to crossing (e.g., advance is more rapid than anticipated), but that, in such a case, the feasibility of a hasty crossing will have been determined before orders to make the crossing are issued.

He will : incorporate planning and preparation for the crossing into his attack plan, order, and preparation, bringing his plans and actions on the platoon attack order, orders and information from the platoon leader specifically regarding the crossing, and on information obtained through reconnaissance.

He must : when planning and preparing for a deliberate crossing (and to the extent permitted by the situation for a hasty crossing) include in his reconnaissance:

a. His IFTL's.

b. Carrier drivers.

c. Selection of routes forward.

d. Selection of the specific sites where his boat(s), raft(s), or carrier will enter the water and, if possible, the specific landing site on the far bank.
base loading plans, formation for crossing, and sequence for crossing by fire teams (if applicable), on the crossing means to be used (i.e., boats, rafts, carriers), ensuring that these plans and his plan for deployment on the far bank are compatible. (Loading, formations, and crossing are discussed in detail in FM 7-11, Rifle Company, Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized and are not repeated here.)

when fording a river on foot, require maximum practical dispersion and speed of movement, emphasizing to his men that:

a. Their vulnerability to grazing automatic weapons fire is comparable to that encountered when crossing flat open areas.

b. Underwater detonation of high explosives (e.g., grenades, artillery and mortar rounds) increases the effects of concussion.

when crossing in a personnel carrier (organic or attached), ensure that the vehicle is prepared as described in the paper Armored Personnel Carrier.

He will on reaching the far bank, deploy immediately and continue the attack, reorganizing as necessary during movement, and completing reorganization after seizing the first objective.