THE POLITICAL VIABILITY OF
THE US BASE SYSTEM IN ASIA
AFTER A VIETNAM SETTLEMENT

Angus M. Fraser

April 1970

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
INTERNATIONAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES DIVISION

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400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202

IDA Independent Research Program
## CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 1

II. MAJOR FACTORS ............................................ 3
   A. US POLICY .............................................. 3
   B. ASIAN VIEWS OF SECURITY ............................ 5
   C. POLITICAL CHANGES IN ASIA ......................... 6

III. COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS .................................... 9
   A. JAPAN .................................................... 9
   B. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ............................. 12
   C. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ............................ 13
   D. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ................. 14
   E. THAILAND .............................................. 15
   F. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND ......................... 16

IV. CONCLUSIONS ............................................... 19

APPENDIX - DETAILED COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS .................. 21

I. JAPAN ...................................................... 23
   A. IMPACT OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS ON JAPAN'S
      INTERNAL AFFAIRS .................................... 23
   B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN JAPAN'S
      EXTERNAL AFFAIRS .................................. 26

II. KOREA ...................................................... 30
   A. IMPACT OF US-KOREAN RELATIONS ON KOREA'S
      INTERNAL AFFAIRS .................................. 30
   B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN KOREA'S
      EXTERNAL AFFAIRS .................................. 31
III. REPUBLIC OF CHINA--TAIWAN
   A. IMPACT OF US-TAIWAN RELATIONS ON TAIWAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS
   B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

IV. THE PHILIPPINES
   A. IMPACT OF US-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS ON PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS
   B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN PHILIPPINE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

V. THAILAND
   A. IMPACT OF US-THAI RELATIONS ON THAILAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS
   B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN THAILAND'S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

VI. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
   A. IMPACT OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND INTERNAL AFFAIRS
   B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INTRODUCTION

Whatever the outcome in Vietnam, the United States will presumably continue to need a wide variety of military bases and facilities in East Asia and the Western Pacific. This paper does not, however, attempt to estimate future US base requirements in that part of the world. The focus here is on the political viability and usability of the present US base system in order to gain a better understanding of the political environment in which the United States must try to satisfy its future base requirements, whatever they may be.

No attempt has been made to arrive at precise predictions concerning the future of US bases in specific countries or in the area as a whole. Too many intangibles are involved, and too many important factors are essentially unknowable, including the actions which the United States itself might take in possible future contingencies. The scope of the paper has been limited to an analysis of how political conditions and trends in East Asia might affect the ability of the United States to maintain and use its present base system. The countries covered are Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. In all of these countries, the United States has bases or the use of facilities, or both. South Vietnam is not covered because the future of US bases there depends upon the outcome of the current hostilities. Should the conflict end in an international arrangement for maintaining peace, continued American use of bases in South Vietnam would probably be foreclosed. On the other hand, should a

1. As used here, "base requirements" includes requirements for both bases and other facilities. Similarly, "base system" refers to both bases and other facilities.
Korea-type truce eventuate, a thorough review of US base requirements and of the military-technical problem of infrastructure maintenance would be necessary.

The table below shows the primary functions of US bases and facilities in the countries covered by this paper. (Intelligence functions and a few other minor functions have been omitted.) As the table indicates, the present US base system supports a wide range of strategic postures and military operations and provides substantial intrasystem flexibility.

### PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF US BASES AND FACILITIES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GENERAL WAR</th>
<th>LOGISTICS-GROUND</th>
<th>NAVAL OPERATIONS &amp; MAINT.</th>
<th>LOGISTICS-AIR (TROOP &amp; CARGO)</th>
<th>AIR OPERATIONS</th>
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a. Functions based in the Republic of Korea are a special case since they are largely directed toward operations in Korea rather than in other Asian areas.
II

MAJOR FACTORS

Before undertaking an analysis of relevant political conditions and trends in individual countries, it is useful to examine several factors which exert a more generalized influence on the US strategic posture in East Asia and the Western Pacific. The factors fall under three general headings: US policy, current Asian views of their security situation, and political trends in Asia.

A. US POLICY

The general statement of US goals and policies now known as the Nixon doctrine derives from a press conference held on Guam by President Nixon on July 25, 1969. President Nixon in his State of the Union speech on January 22, 1970, referred to this doctrine in this way: "Its central thesis ... is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot--and will not--conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest."

On February 18 in his report to the Congress on foreign policy, the President cited an earlier summary of this approach:

- The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
- We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.
- In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.
The President went on to emphasize that the United States wanted to strike a careful balance between too much and too little in helping our partners to develop their own strength. The doctrine means a more effective use of common resources and a sustainable long-run American policy.

Plainly, the doctrine is intended to indicate a shift in the nature of American support while reaffirming continued American concern in Asian affairs. It is a reassurance of the American nuclear guarantee (without precisely defining it) and an encouragement toward greater self-reliance within and among Asian nations. Its chief characteristic, in Asian eyes, is its ambiguity with respect to specific contingencies or situations. Here is the focus of Asian concern. While welcoming assurances and amplifying explanations by the United States, the Asian allies await actual performance. Since the US reaction will depend on the terms of an actual contingency, the uncertainty must persist and, with it, an increased need to maintain dialogues with our Asian allies.

Precisely how the Nixon doctrine is put into effect will clearly depend as much on political, social, and economic changes in the United States as on developments overseas. There is, of course, a connection and a dynamic interaction between foreign and domestic events. Thus, in the present context, the real importance of the eventual outcome in Vietnam is that it will serve as a possible signal of perceptible changes in the US presence and posture—i.e., the application of the Nixon doctrine. The effect of any settlement on America's view of its future role is, in the eyes of many Asians, the most important aspect of that settlement.

Big power competition will also affect the way in which the Nixon doctrine is implemented. Attempts by China or the Soviet Union to increase or gain influence—aid, support for insurgents, security proposals—could force the United States to maintain a higher level of activity (including a military presence) than otherwise might be necessary in the national interest. Activity by the two great Communist powers might equally serve to stiffen the US domestic will and win support for active programs in Asia.
B. ASIAN VIEWS OF SECURITY

There is a curious inconsistency in some of the US Asian allies' views of their own security situation. Except for the divided countries, our Asian allies generally take the position that they are not in immediate physical danger, either from neighbors with whom they may have differences or from the Chinese People's Republic. Thus, the Japanese seem to feel only remotely menaced by the Soviet Union, although they do recognize their reliance on the United States for the protection that makes their security possible.

While professing that the US presence serves US interests more than their own, there is also some concern (notably in the Philippines and Japan) over the prospect of an American withdrawal which, by its rapidity or degree, created a vacuum which others might be tempted to fill. The political problem is actually that of balancing these somewhat contradictory views so as to maintain the American guarantee while extracting from the United States maximum political and financial benefits. However seriously they may regard their vulnerability in private, Asian politicians often take public positions which minimize the threats to their nation's security, assert their will and ability to be independent of the United States, and convince their own people that the Americans pay appropriately for the concessions they enjoy.

Another aspect of the behavior of many currently active Asian politicians is their apparent willingness to support the search for new international arrangements and accommodations, or at least to keep their options open. Even Nationalist China and South Korea are not completely immune from the sort of activity, although their ventures to date have been extremely modest. It cannot be suggested that these attitudes are anything less than sincere, particularly since the United States is clearly engaged in operations which have the same goal.

To the degree that it threatens open war, the conflict between the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union is, of course, of concern to Asian nations, particularly to Japan. It does not
follow, however, that they see the United States as their protector against any side effects of physical violence between the two Communist states. The Japanese feel that the United States tends too much toward the use of force. They prefer a role as the architect of more peaceful solutions, working to change the conditions which, they concede, now make American bases in Asia necessary. They would be seriously concerned if they saw their arrangements with the United States causing them to lose control of their policies toward either China or the Soviet Union.

The non-Communist parts of the divided countries (Republic of Korea and Republic of China) are in a special category. They naturally feel in continuous jeopardy and press for strong US support to maintain themselves. Implicit in this attitude is the hope for an extension of US support to a point that would permit them to reunify their countries on their terms.

Australia and New Zealand also cannot easily be fitted into any generalizations concerning Asian security attitudes. Their forward defense policies depend critically on American policies in the area. In these two countries, there is some fear that what begins as a military disengagement in Asia may become a general retreat from power and responsibility all over the world.

C. POLITICAL CHANGES IN ASIA

New political combinations are emerging in several Asian countries, involving largely a new generation whose goals, standards, and general view of the world differ in important ways from those of the major political parties. The new groups draw on a complex base for support. Students and intellectuals (including sizable numbers of teachers) watch and emulate their counterparts in Western nations. The size, cohesiveness, and prospects for these new groups vary widely from country to country. They might be thought of as possible vehicles for future change in political style rather than as real political parties, although this possibility is by no means negligible. They could, over time, work significant change in politics and policies.
At this time it would be inaccurate to suggest that this new political phenomenon has cohered into a defined party in any country among America's Asian allies. It may never so appear. It is quite possible that existing parties may absorb many of the new generation. It must be remembered, however, that a potential exists and that anti-Americanism could become (for a variety of reasons) an increasingly significant element in the internal politics of several nations. Although most of the ferment is on the Left, there are conservative elements, particularly in Japan and the Philippines, whose search for economic ascendancy and extremely nationalist attitudes make them hostile to the United States.

A surge of nationalism has occurred in many Asian countries as a result of changing conditions since the end of World War II. Whether resurgent or new, the phenomenon must be considered when assessing the political climate in Asia. Nationalism usually involves ethnic feelings and political ideology. Asian politicians who exploit national feelings as the basis for their appeals find convenient targets in the old bogies of colonialism and imperialism. It is not too difficult for the younger people further to equate opposition to these concepts with opposition to America. The only white or Western presence that most of them have seen or felt is American. Lacking any personal experience or knowledge of World War II and its antecedents, they are more willing to accept the teachings of the new Left (or the extreme Right) and to be indifferent to the values of an older generation.

In general, the United States is identified with the more stable and conservative elements in the political spectrum. Since these are the sources of leadership and control, this is entirely natural. It is clear, however, that these leading groups are vulnerable to criticism from their internal opposition if they let themselves appear to be in any way manipulatable by the United States. It must be expected, therefore, that they will take issue with, and create problems for the United States whenever their national interests and goals seem to be infringed upon or when it is
necessary, in their minds, to demonstrate for home consumption that they are the best promoters of the country's well-being and integrity.
III

COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS

This section, necessarily speculative, discusses the political conditions in the several Asian allies as they might affect US plans for the base support of various strategic postures now and after Vietnam. The material on which this section is based appears in greater detail in the Appendix.

A. JAPAN

The bases and facilities in Japan (including Okinawa)\(^1\) are by far the most important component of the US base system in East Asia and the Western Pacific, just as Japan is by a wide margin the United States' most important ally in that part of the world. The US-Japan security relationship is in process of change, and US bases in Japan will inevitably be affected. In the late 1960s, the Okinawa reversion problem was the primary focus of attention. With the reversion of Okinawa in 1972 now assured, broader questions concerning US bases in both Okinawa and Japan proper may be expected to come to the fore.

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1. The Japan-Okinawa complex has had a major role in supporting the US defense posture in Asia, providing a full range of bases and facilities, including command, control, and communications. Air bases in both locations are capable of supporting general war functions, air transport of troops and cargo, reconnaissance, and air defense. Modern naval facilities provide a full range of support for fleet operations. The Japanese industrial base has been a useful primary producer of parts and general supply and equipment items. Several divisions of ground troops can be quartered and trained in Okinawa and at the Fuji-McNair site in Japan. Japanese facilities have been extensively used in the Vietnam Rest and Recreation Program.
For many reasons, further reductions in the US military presence in Japan are likely. The winding down of the Vietnam war will reduce US requirements for logistic use of bases in Japan. Budgetary pressures will probably cause US forces in Japan to curtail operations and reduce personnel in Japan, as elsewhere. Also, the application of the Nixon doctrine will presumably result in the further reduction of the US military presence.

All of these essentially American reasons to expect some reduction in the US military presence are reinforced by public attitudes in Japan: growing nationalism, the desire to use US-held land for other purposes, and the belief that some US bases endanger public safety, or at least create public nuisances.

In recent years, public discussion of Japan's defense policy has grown. The outcome is not yet clear. On the one hand, the Japanese Government has moved cautiously toward explicit public endorsement of at least some US security objectives in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Thus, in the Sato-Nixon communiqué of November 1969, the Japanese Prime Minister declared that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security," and that "the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan."

On the other hand, military "hardliners," some major industrialists, and some members of the Left, for a variety of reasons take the position that Japan cannot rely on anyone else for its security. While the holders of this view are in no sense a majority, they may, at a minimum, be expected to provide serious opposition to continued dependence on the United States.

Advocates of an independent defense policy are assisted by two currents in Japanese public opinion. The first is the growing feeling of national pride and self-confidence resulting largely from Japan's outstanding economic successes. The second is the phenomenon which the Japanese call "my homeism": an indifference to affairs which do not appear to affect directly the life and welfare of the individual and his family. As the nation prospers and the lot of the worker
improves, an increase in the effect of personal concerns on political attitudes can be expected. The Japanese leadership may find it more difficult to rouse the people to enthusiasm for abstract causes and foreign problems.

Japan's economic successes may affect its defense policy in yet another way. As Japan's economic power increases, other nations may react to protect their markets or to prevent Japanese control of important sectors of their domestic economies. The resultant controversies will undoubtedly reinforce to some extent nationalist sentiment in Japan. Most importantly, economic disputes between Japan and the United States could erode the sense of mutual interest which is essential to the present US-Japan alliance.

On balance, the United States faces the prospect of a continuing reduction of its freedom to operate in Japan. The rate and nature of change cannot be predicted, but in general, restrictions on access and use will degrade the strategic advantages which the United States now enjoys. Major air facilities are most vulnerable—they represent a general war attack capability, they disturb the countryside, and Japanese urban growth has brought them dangerously close to population and industrial concentrations. The naval presence, less conspicuous and more compatible with Japanese tradition, will probably be more durable, but it, too, will be subject to increasing restrictions. Major ground and combined arms training facilities have no long-term future. Some carefully controlled reentry rights may endure, but only under conditions carefully specified by the Japanese and when it is clearly to their advantage to cooperate.

The general trend toward a smaller, more constricted US military presence in Japan is clear. What is uncertain is whether this trend will be marked by public controversy and a growing divergence in security policies, or whether it will be accompanied by increasing cooperation and a deepening sense of common security interests. From the perspective of 1970, both appear to be possible.
B. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

It is extremely unlikely that the incumbent South Korean government, or any probable successor, would want to see the American presence and commitment reduced. The overwhelming majority of the South Korean people appear to share this view.

Any lowering of tension in the Korean Peninsula, however achieved, will probably take place gradually and in the face of some American (or UN) guarantee. The recent increase in cordiality between Peking and Pyongyang may in part be a product of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but it is bound to be viewed with concern in the South. Certainly, it does not improve the prospects for any long-term solution of Korea's problems in terms of bilateral arrangements between North and South. There is little prospect that South Korea will come to view the military balance achieved by the US presence as any less important to its future security.

Military support of the United States in Vietnam has led the South Koreans to believe that they are our partners there and should have a voice in the final settlement. Further, they consider themselves to be staunch fighters against communism in Asia and hence entitled to special consideration from the United States. Given these conditions, and reinforced by an awareness that reasonable alternatives are not now visible, the ROK Government welcomes and encourages American activity. Any reasonable request for new facilities or expanded use of existing ones would probably be welcomed. Seoul would no doubt prefer that the US military presence continue to be directly related to the security problems of the

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2. The United States maintains sizable forces in the Republic of Korea. The base system and facilities there are designed primarily to support current and contingency operations in Korea and are, therefore, somewhat limited as compared to those in Japan. If necessary, however, some operations beyond the immediate Korean area could be supported. Subject to this stipulation, South Korea provides support for general war operations, air operations (offensive, defensive, and supporting) and air/ground logistics. Naval facilities are minor and require the backing of Japanese or Philippine installations. There is adequate real estate for troop quartering and training.
Republic of Korea, but a presence serving broader objectives would not disturb the Korean Government too much. Rather, its concerns in the past have been over what they view as American passivity, as in the Pueblo and RC-121 incidents.

C. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The United States does not now have any formal base rights on Taiwan, but, by agreement with the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), the United States does enjoy the use of some facilities. Before the Vietnam war, such use was extremely limited. Even now, US facilities on Taiwan are of minor importance compared with the more extensive bases and facilities in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

The GRC would clearly welcome a US request for formal base rights or for permission to make greater use of facilities on Taiwan. An increased US military presence would, from the GRC's point of view, serve both to reinforce the US security commitment and to reduce the likelihood of a detente between Washington and Peking. Certainly, Peking would regard such an action as further evidence of US hostility.

Public opinion on Taiwan today would probably take the same view as the government toward an increased US military presence. What the political climate will be several years from now is far from clear. A period of instability after Chiang Kai-shek's death is entirely possible. Internal conflict, either among various groups in the present leadership or between Taiwanese and mainlanders, could create delicate problems of choice and action for the United States.

3. The Republic of China provides facilities for the operations of four squadrons of US logistics and tanker aircraft and a detachment of air defense fighters. Normal harbor services are available and tender repairs have been made on fleet units. Command, control, and communications facilities have been established and are in operation. US troops have used ground training facilities alone and with Chinese forces, but no US ground combat units are based in Taiwan, and space is limited. Taiwan has been used extensively in the Vietnam R and R Program.
Conceivably, the US military presence could become a domestic political issue. Even if the present internal stability on Taiwan continues, a greatly expanded US presence could create the frictions customarily associated with foreign military installations in densely populated areas.

The best estimate is probably that the United States could maintain its present use of Chinese facilities for at least the next few years and might, if it wished, expand its use moderately on a case-by-case basis.

D. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

It is difficult to predict the future course of political events in the Philippines and thus equally difficult to speak of the future of US bases there with any degree of certainty. This, of itself, suggests strongly that the approach to this problem must be cautious and conservative.

To this point in time, the United States has been able to maintain acceptable conditions of tenure and use of its major bases in the Philippines. There are, however, a number of forces working against long-term maintenance of this desirable position. President Marcos, entering his second term, finds himself facing a political opposition that is critical of his government's close ties with the United States. The President himself has found it expedient to criticize the terms of present arrangements with the United States.

Clark Field, with its vast expanse of unused real estate, is a continuing annoyance. Sangley Point, less offensive in this sense, is unfortunately in full view of Manila. Subic Bay, relatively inconspicuous, is probably least vulnerable, but is not immune from criticism.

4. The Philippines affords a full range of support for fleet units and naval air forces. A major air base accommodates all types of combat and support operations. The use of Philippine real estate for troop training has been increasingly delimited. Air defense and administrative command, control, and communications serve local commands and area requirements.
Even though President Marcos recently cautioned his countrymen that they must not blame all their ills and problems on the Americans, it is still true that the United States provides a handy scapegoat and will continue to come under attack. Native emotionalism and very real social and economic problems will serve for some time to maintain an inhospitable atmosphere. The economic importance of the US bases to the Philippine economy may serve to make the government somewhat more cautious, but of itself might not serve to overcome factors which the government cannot control.

The Philippines must be seen as essentially unstable over the near future. In assessing the viability of US bases in Asia, the bases in the Philippines should be regarded as high-priority candidates for reduction or elimination and relatively poor prospects for expansion in either use or size. Tradition and utility would predict a longer life for naval facilities, but this, too, ultimately would depend on Philippine agreement with the United States over the nature and imminence of an external threat.

E. THAILAND

There is little possibility that current defense arrangements with the United States will provide a major internal political issue in Thailand. The principal concern of Thai leaders is the nature of the US involvement in Asia after Vietnam and the implementation of the Nixon doctrine. The Thais would favor an outcome in Vietnam which comprehended their position and concern, particularly with respect to the influence of Laos and Cambodia on their future.

The US commitment to Thailand under the terms of SEATO is realistically viewed as the mainstay of the country's security system. Should that arrangement be weakened, some equivalent bilateral commitment from the United States would be necessary if the current relationship is to be maintained. Should the United

5. Thailand air bases support Vietnam air operations and related logistics. Bangkok is a popular R and R center. There are limited naval facilities.
States manifest any major weakening in its Asian commitments, a Thai reexamination of its relations with Asian neighbors and of its attitudes toward China and the Soviet Union would become a strong possibility. At present, the leadership in Bangkok shows only mild interest in overtures from the Communist powers. The political climate in Thailand as it might affect US base rights and use of facilities will depend on the Thai interpretation of American intentions, the depth of the US commitment to them, and the perceived ability of the United States to act effectively in Asian affairs. At present, the United States should have no major problem in maintaining access and use of existing facilities or even ad hoc expansion of them to meet agreed threats to the security of Thailand.

F. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Australia and, to a perhaps lesser degree, New Zealand feel some need for the sort of external reinforcement that only the United States can provide. They are quite willing to make reasonable concessions in return. This means, however, that any significant reduction of the US position in Asia would force these countries to reexamine their present forward defense postures and general national strategies. Some divergence in perceived interests is likely, if only because the center of US Asian concerns lies in Northeast Asia, and Australia (and to a lesser extent, New Zealand) must give greater importance to developments in South and Southeast Asia. The location of these countries also influences the requirements that the United States might put forward, e.g., installations and forces that are not highly visible and hence less irritating, but the general posture of the United States in Asia would nevertheless override any other consideration.

The incumbent government in Australia has been seriously challenged by an opposition that wants, among other things, to

6. Australia/New Zealand at present provide sites for extended range command, control, and communications facilities.
reexamine both the country's relationship with the United States and its total defense posture. The closeness of the last elections induces American caution, but there is the strong possibility that the personal qualities and appeal of the two party leaders involved influenced the returns strongly. Until the situation is clarified and the next elections are held, some caution is in order concerning the acceptability of the US presence. In general, however, there seems to be little reason for concern over present arrangements or over future requirements that relate to treaty-defined defense activities.
Two general conclusions emerge from the foregoing analysis:

First, the political viability and usability of US bases in East Asia and the Western Pacific depend in part on the general thrust of the US security policy in that part of the world. Our ability to maintain, and to use, existing bases and facilities will vary according to Asian perceptions of the wisdom and realism of our overall security policy.

Second, at the same time, achieving and maintaining a reasonable degree of consistency in our security perceptions and those of our Asian allies will not be easy. Differences concerning the nature of the threat are as likely to increase as to decrease. Moreover, strong political currents in several countries work against continued cooperation with the United States.

Prospects within the different countries in which the United States has bases or facilities, however, vary greatly. Continued, relatively unrestricted, use of bases or facilities in South Korea and Taiwan seems most nearly certain. This comforting conclusion must, however, be qualified somewhat in the case of Taiwan because of the possibility of political instability after Chiang Kai-shek's long period of leadership comes to an end.

A favorable prognosis for the US bases in Thailand also appears to be warranted, but on one condition: continued Thai confidence in the firmness of the US security commitment. Should that confidence be seriously shaken, a reorientation of Thai policy, with adverse consequences for US bases, would become possible.

The US bases in the Philippines appear most vulnerable to unfavorable local political developments. Prospects for avoiding a loss of land area, freedom of use, or both, for more than a few years must be rated as poor.
The country in which the future of US bases is least predictable is Japan (including Okinawa). For both Japanese and American reasons, some continued reduction in the US military presence in Japan is predictable. What is not known is whether the reduction will proceed on the basis of agreed policies or in a context of deteriorating relations. In the latter event, the United States might find itself without either the bases or the freedom of use needed to maintain its overall security posture in East Asia and the Western Pacific.
Appendix

DETAILED COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS
A. IMPACT OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS ON JAPAN’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Long-term necessities, both economic and defense-related, suggest that Japanese-American cooperation will endure for some time to come. Nevertheless, the terms and conditions of the relationship will continue to provide material for the internal political debate in Japan. Experience with the issues of Okinawa’s reversion and US bases in Japan has established that aspects of the American relationship provide means for developing differences in both intraparty and interparty debates.

The extreme Left and some pacifist groups are seriously dedicated to weakening or destroying links with the United States, but their prospects are poor. Of greater importance is the manner in which moderate and conservative elements react to accusations that they are subservient to Washington or that they are endangering Japan’s security by too-close ties with US military operations. In defending themselves against such charges, friends of the United States may feel compelled to move further away from close cooperation with the United States than they otherwise would.

There are in Japan elements of more conservative military and political groups who favor rearmament to a much greater degree than is permitted under current interpretations of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Some major industrialists, e.g., those interested in arms production, hold the same view. In a few instances, these industrialists have given financial support to extremely conservative political groups who are not necessarily wholly friendly toward the United States. While there is not now a real “military-industrial” complex in Japan, there are signs that one might be developing. The arguments for rearmament include

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the expansion of the country's defense perimeter as a result of Okinawa's reversion, concern over the vulnerability of large Japanese tankers transiting the Strait of Malacca, and the development of a general military posture (including perhaps even nuclear weapons) appropriate to a major world power. Some industrialists even contemplate the sale of Japanese arms to other Asian nations. While this group is not yet an active political force, it has gained some strength and can exercise pressure at specific points in the system.

If Japan was to embark on a major military program, it would require new interpretations of the constitution to deal with the present constitutional limitations on the scope and uses of military power. The political system of Japan tends to seek consensus and to deal with one major issue at a time. Both of these conditions would make serious rearmament efforts somewhat difficult. In addition, the research and development effort and advanced technology input which are required for weapons systems production have not, it appears, been examined completely as costs of production.

The combination of growing nationalism and a desire for self-sufficiency can, if far enough developed, operate to reduce the perceived need for a US presence in the Japanese security system. The degree of consensus on the need for US support is far from overwhelming. A number of recent polls indicate continuous movement away from this feeling of necessity and a growing feeling that US presence is in the interest of US rather than Japanese security and strategic policies. When this feeling is coupled with the basic idea that the US presence might draw down punitive actions against Japan in a war which was not its primary concern, there emerges some desire for reduction or elimination of the American military presence. In addition, uncertainty over the future role and posture of the United States in Asia can be exploited to increase support for ideas of neutrality, armed or unarmed.

The economic contribution of the US military bases is of very little significance since Japan's growth rate and the general prosperity of the economy eliminate any real need for this sort
of support. In addition, several large American air bases which, when built, were far from any populated area, are now surrounded by Japanese residential and industrial areas. The occasional accident and misbehavior of US forces encourage Japanese residents to press for the removal of these bases. It has been suggested that the US presence might be more tolerable if the bases were clearly under Japanese control and if significant numbers of Japanese defense forces used the facilities. In the absence of an acceptable solution, continuing pressure against specific installations is inevitable.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has a vested interest in US post-Vietnam actions. A too-precipitate military withdrawal from Asia, for example, could undercut its position. The orderly implementation of the Nixon doctrine holds the key to the future, and many believe that the Seventh Fleet will be the instrument that gives real substance to the American commitment. In general, a lower keyed US approach to Asian security would be welcomed in Japan. The Japanese horror of war is real and influential and, in the best of all possible Asia's, Japan's function would be expressed in efforts to reduce tensions and contribute substantially to the solution of long-term social and economic problems. Japan's goal is to avert situations in which the use of force might be necessary; stability in Asia is recognized as an enduring necessity if Japan is to continue to prosper and grow.

The internal political balance in Japan is slowly changing. Prior to the December 1969 elections, the LDP was losing strength at the polls at the rate of about one percent per year. Some US observers foresaw a political change in the mid-1970s which would probably bring about a coalition between the LDP and the Democratic Socialist Party, with Komeito in effective opposition. Such an arrangement could produce strong pressures toward self-sufficiency and encourage greater independence from the United States. Despite the trend just described, the LDP won a victory in the December election, increasing its total number of seats by 16; 12 additional seats were gained by independents who then allied themselves with
the LDP. However, the LDP actually received a lower percentage of
the total vote than in the previous election. Komeito increased its
strength from 25 to 47 seats, while the Japanese Socialist Party lost
44 seats. The Democratic Socialist strength remained at 31, and the
Communist Party increased from 4 to 14 seats. It is believed that
the favorable election returns were in good part the result of the
LDP's (and Mr. Sato's) demonstration of strength in securing
American agreement to the return of Okinawa. Political victory
certainly came to the Party most congenial to the United States.
It does not follow, however, that this result presages an era of
smooth relations with the United States. It might very well
indicate an endorsement of leaders who showed that they could serve
Japan's national interests and deal effectively with the United
States. The pursuit of narrowly conceived national interests (or
perhaps the joy of flexing new muscles) might make future negotiations
over bases, security arrangements, export problems, or investment
controls just that much more difficult.

There is a small, noisy, and sometimes violent New Left in Japan.
Its base rests on students, intellectuals, and some labor unions,
who seem to be capable of inducing disorder and exercising some
conditioning influence on specific matters. The transport and
communications unions could, in cooperation with students, create a
serious internal problem. At this time it appears that the govern-
ment and the police are willing and able to meet violence with
violence. One Japanese scholar suggested that the authorities have
permitted some of the extreme action of the New Left to develop into
violence in order to let the activists discredit their cause in
the eyes of the general public.

B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN JAPAN'S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

South Korea and Nationalist China are seriously disquieted by
the pressures for the reduction of American forces and bases in
Japan and Okinawa. They believe that these base locations are
essential to effective US support of its current security arrangements.
Extensive American force reductions in Japan and Okinawa, accompanied by a rapid and extensive application of the withdrawal aspect of the Nixon doctrine, implies to them not only a reduction in capability but also a decreased American willingness to stand behind them in all foreseeable contingencies. Attitudes expressed in the US Congress, particularly in the Senate, and by a segment of the American public do little to assuage these fears. South Korea must have been heartened by the special handling it received in the recent foreign aid bill, but the Chinese Nationalists are probably less than cheered by the fate of the attempt to provide them F4D aircraft. Nevertheless, it is not likely that the concerns of others will exert very much influence on Japan, and the Japanese are not likely to accept base arrangements in the interests of Korean and Taiwanese security purely for their own sake. It is significant that the November 21, 1969, Nixon-Sato communiqué included assurances of Japan's interest in the security of South Korea and Taiwan.

Japan's relations with all of Asia are at stake in the rearmament issue. The political leaders of Japan are sensitive to how they are viewed by other nations in Asia. The "low posture" and insistence on trade, investment, and economic aid as the vehicle for Japanese participation in promoting Asian security are examples of the leadership's foreign policy style. Some Japanese business interests are insensitive to the political impact of their actions and might, therefore, pursue goals which could be harmful to Japan's political status in Asia and, as a byproduct, to American security interests. Such actions could take the form of attempts to make political concessions to Peking in the interest of substantially increased trade with Communist China, or, on the other hand, to force Japanese initiatives in armament and security arrangements on other Asian nations.

Antipathy toward Japan as a military power and concern over its economic dominance continue to have surprisingly great weight in the calculations of other Asian countries. Japan itself is sensitive to these feelings and greatly concerned with the maintenance of a role that will avoid arousing fears and alarms in other countries of Asia.
It is generally true that security arrangements which do not involve the United States directly are not highly regarded by Asian countries. Japan as leader and supplier is not a solution; indeed, any such arrangement probably could not be developed into a viable association within the reasonable future.

The Japanese display mixed reactions to their own security. There are those who doubt the United States would be active in the protection of Japan once the Chinese People's Republic has acquired the capability to strike the continental United States with nuclear weapons. There are others who hold the view that there is not now and will not very soon be a threat to Japanese security from the Chinese People's Republic. Indeed, recent polls have shown that the Japanese people fear attacks from the Soviet Union more than from China but are not strongly inclined toward nervousness over their situation in any case.

While they would not wish to see the United States humiliated, the Japanese do not seem to be deeply concerned over the Vietnam outcome, except as it might produce a confrontation between the United States and the Chinese People's Republic. In such an event, it would be difficult indeed to permit the United States to use Japanese or Okinawan bases for combat operations. This concern has lessened somewhat because of recent US actions and attitudes. The Japanese leadership appreciates the importance of the US bases in Okinawa to the Vietnam war effort and will not act to inhibit the American ability to operate from Japanese and Okinawan bases so long as the Vietnam conflict persists.

Japan increasingly, and with good reason, thinks of itself as a world, rather than as an Asian, power. There is strong feeling that the Sino-Soviet-US triangle soon will be a quadrilateral, with Japan as the fourth corner. This prospect might, in its physical manifestations, condition the Japanese to thinking ahead to a major role and to think of its assistance to developing nations as comparable to or more than that of the Soviet Union, respectable when compared with the United States, and beyond
anything possible from China in this century. The national policy of Japan has so far been quite successful in these areas and the continuing growth of its economy makes expanded aid programs and trading arrangements reasonable expectations.

How seriously Japan will entertain proposals for closer relations with the Soviet Union or China, particularly at the expense of relations with the United States, may not at the moment be a serious question. Nevertheless, both Communist powers have attractive negotiating material, the use of which would be quite logical. The Chinese can hold out tantalizing trade prospects, as well as the general desirability of peace and stability in Asia; while the Soviet Union can offer attractive economic and investment prospects in Siberia, as well as the possibility that some bargain might be struck over the northern islands. As have several other countries, Japan could find it attractive to use the situation to secure concessions from the United States.
II

KOREA

A. IMPACT OF US-KOREAN RELATIONS ON KOREA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Agreement on the desirability of the US presence in the Republic of Korea is overriding in internal politics. There is no inherent political taint from identification with the United States. Opposition to the government has not yet found an issue in this subject. In fact, the incumbent government is careful to demonstrate its closeness to the United States, and it encourages optimistic speculation about further US aid. At the same time, it is eager to convince the people of Korea that the government is, in a very real sense, independent of the United States. While the opposition might want to make an issue of US dominance over the government at some future date, this question has largely been raised so far by outside observers, although it does have some support among students, professors, and a segment of the press. The government has shown that it can manipulate anti-Americanism for a specific purpose, as it did during the negotiation of the status-of-forces agreement, but there is no general desire to discredit the United States. The anti-Communist laws of Korea can be used to inhibit any agitation against the United States which the government might find distasteful.

North Korea represents itself as relatively free from foreign influences in comparison with South Korea and asserts its role as the protector of Korean culture. The government in the South, however, cannot let this issue become a major internal problem because of the real need for the US presence and support. Fortunately North Korea has, by the savagery of some of its actions in the South, tarnished its own image as a defender of Korean virtues.

President Park has observed that the United States cannot support the Republic of Korea forever. In September 1969 he raised the
question of the ultimate withdrawal of US forces. Senior Korean officials have talked about such action in 1973, but this date seems to have some connection with the prospective return of Korean troops from Vietnam, which in turn is tied to a hoped-for program of extensive force improvement, to be financed by the United States. Discussions have been opened (July 1970) over the whole question of the US presence in the Republic of Korea. A substantial reduction in numbers, offset by extensive modernization of ROK forces, appears to be a logical outcome.

To the degree that the Nixon doctrine might imply a large reduction in the American presence and support, South Korea considers itself largely exempt. This feeling seems to have been strengthened by President Park's San Francisco meeting with President Nixon. The South Koreans are extremely sensitive to US policy shifts and would not wish to see the US presence changed, except upward. There is genuine need to maintain the reality of the UN commitment and the US presence is seen as essential for this purpose. A significant reduction of the US element would, it is felt, encourage other nations to review their commitments.

B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN KOREA'S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Vietnamese situation and outcome are pivotal points for the Republic of Korea. There is more concern over the effect of Vietnam on future American policies and posture than over the outcome itself. The South Koreans see themselves as faithful allies and expect to be consulted on any Vietnam settlement. While there is, of course, a self-serving element in their Vietnam commitment, they truly feel they have made both a moral and a material contribution to the fight against communism.

The South Koreans see the United States repeating what they considered errors made in the Korean war by entering into negotiations with the Communists. Although they publicly endorse the Paris talks, many officials believe that present American policy can only encourage the Communists (particularly the Soviet Union) to probe and
press elsewhere. The South Koreans' best hope is that any Vietnam settlement be clearly separated in principle and future policy from anything in Korea. Even so, they now view the best possible solution in Vietnam as a Korea-type stalemate.

The Koreans consider SEATO a failure and consider Northeast Asia to be a more stable and important area. A Pacific Area Treaty Organization ("PATO") would, in their eyes, be very useful. There is no Korean enthusiasm for a security arrangement with Japan. Any regional security arrangement must, in the South Korean view, involve a direct and heavy commitment from the United States. The major consideration to the Koreans is the level of US effort and the type of activity foreseen: air; air and sea; or air, sea, and ground.

Regardless of the problems involved, ROK officials hope to maintain the closest possible US ties. In pursuit of this, American observers feel that the Republic of Korea would accept any base proposals the United States might make. There has been some discussion of the use of an island site, Cheju-do, should an alternative location for Okinawan facilities become necessary. There are substantial political and technical military arguments against this site, in addition to the very great costs involved. The people of Cheju-do have not always been enthusiastic supporters of the ROK Government and are not considered to be too reliable. There is no good harbor and development of one would be difficult and expensive. Finally, the island is completely covered by the Communist Chinese air defense radar net.

There is some speculation over a long-term "Koreanization" of the total situation in the peninsula. This is seen as a post mid-1970 phenomenon coming after a Vietnam settlement and a substantial reduction in the threat from North Korea, accompanied by clarification and stabilization of US Asian policy. Ethnic pride and self-sufficiency would support movement in this direction, particularly if there was a decreasing belief in the immediacy of the Communist threat. The new political generation would be more willing to accept some accommodation, since it has no memory of World War II and its aftermath. It is not likely that there would be a dramatic shift in the
posture of either side; rather, there would likely be a series of ad hoc arrangements, each carefully related to some perceived mutual advantage. On June 5, 1970, Kim Il Sung made public (via a third party) a long proposal for reunification. The polemic and ideological content guaranteed that it would repel the South Koreans, but the proposal did dwell at great length on highly specific and discrete actions.

The South Koreans are publicly making the best of what they regard as the most likely future. At the same time they regard their own situation as dangerous and important. They have put forward the idea that while a US phasing-out in Korea is inevitable, it must be keyed to the return of Korean forces from Vietnam and preceded by major US financial contributions toward the improvement of ROK defenses.

The Koreans feel much more apprehension in the long term over the Chinese People's Republic than they do over the Soviet Union. They feel that neither of the Communist nations is likely openly to encourage major offensive operations by North Korea for fear of becoming involved with the United States. They also believe that the Republic of Korea can deal with North Korea at any likely level of North Korean effort as long as the South is backed by US military power.

On the world scene, the South Koreans are anxious to maintain the concept of the force supporting them as a UN arrangement. They are concerned that a too-large or too-rapid reduction in the US contribution would weaken the basic concept of UN participation and perhaps reopen debate on the question.
III

REPUBLIC OF CHINA--TAIWAN

A. IMPACT OF US-TAIWAN RELATIONS ON TAIWAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

It is most unlikely in the near term that the composition and size of the US presence in Taiwan will become a straightforward internal political issue. The internal political condition in Taiwan does, nevertheless, suggest uncertainties about the future which might affect the interests of the United States. Relations between the Taiwanese (particularly those who might be described as the Taiwan elite) and the mainlanders are colored by resentments and antipathies reaching back to the 1947 Taiwanese revolt and its harsh suppression. From time to time, the continuing differences between the two communities are brought forward by slights or differential treatment, real or imagined. For example, there were claims that the clean-up effort in Taipei after the typhoon of October 1969 concentrated on the property and living areas of the mainlanders to the neglect of the Taiwanese areas. There are also ongoing problems over political participation and the continued existence of martial law. No matter how deep their feelings might run, it is difficult to think of the Taiwanese effectively generating a political force of immediate consequence, although elections might bring forward individual candidates who would provide effective political competition for the Kuomintang (KMT), as well as for mainlanders within the KMT. Taiwanese political figures have made significant gains in provincial and local affairs. Agitation against the government is a risky business, however. Tactics such as the arrest and harassment of opposition candidates for office, as happened in the recent elections in Taiwan, bear little resemblance to the rules of democratic procedure as understood in the United States.
It is difficult to see how any physical action against the KMT and its control mechanisms could be effective, although the growing size of the Taiwan-born majority in the lower commissioned and enlisted ranks of the armed services provides some potential for action. As in the case of any future Taiwan-oriented political movements, the problems of leadership, planning, and coordination in any military coup attempt would be formidable.

Quite apart from the Taiwanese-mainlander complex of relations, there are other political phenomena that should be watched closely. Students are beginning to show some signs of political involvement and there is a growing urban proletariat which is less amenable to the traditional appeals of the KMT. There are some minor manifestations of ethnocentricity and anti-American feelings, but these are not now significant.

Doubts about long-term stability also stem from problems of succession when Chiang Kai-shek, who is now in his 80s, dies. Detailed arrangements for the assumption of power by Chiang's elder son, Chiang Ching-kuo, are essentially complete, but this plan is marred in several important ways. Chiang Ching-kuo is himself 60 years old and has health problems of such seriousness that informed observers have suggested that his father could very well outlive him. This would create a difficult period in which a new successor, not now visible on the scene, would have to be prepared for the assumption of power.

Should Chiang Ching-kuo succeed, there would still be latent problems of considerable importance. The elder son quite obviously lacks his father's charisma and international reputation as a leader and politician. His personal style, while quite effective in the functional sense, does not present an emotional rallying point for the people of the nation. It is possible that the native Taiwanese might feel less constrained in political competition with him. The prospect of such competition and perhaps of public disorder, while not necessarily likely, could still become a real problem, given the necessary local conditions. Any early displacement of
Chiang Ching-kuo would probably have serious results, since the military might then prove to be the only group capable of exercising control. In the absence of a strong civilian central control, the environment for a military coup, or even a series of such coups, would be created.

It cannot be said that the situation in Taiwan is seriously unstable at the moment. In terms of its foreign relations and UN position, the situation appears reasonably sound for the short run. The problems of leadership and the relations between mainlanders and Taiwanese imply some possibility of change. The role of the United States in any internal conflict would be a delicate one, and decisions about Taiwan as part of an expanded or alternative base system should be taken in the light of these uncertainties.

B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Any significant increase in the American military presence in Taiwan, or any expanded agreement over the use of facilities or the establishment of bases there, would do serious damage to any US prospects for real accommodation with the mainland regime. There might be low-keyed actions which would not be considered provocative, such as supplying food, non-primary military articles, and general services. Visibility, volume, and mix would be important aspects of such activities. In any event, there is some doubt about whether any consideration should be given such problems as long as Mao Tse-tung and his group prevail in Peking, since little progress can be made with that leadership. Any decisions (taken for whatever reason) to minimize the American involvement in Taiwan should be exploited actively as a gesture toward easing tensions in East Asia.

Subject to absolute inhibitions against a country's maintaining relations with both the Communist regime and itself, the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) is very active in establishing and maintaining good political relations in Asia wherever it can. The Japanese relationship is particularly important. Hence, the GRC feels great displeasure at any dealings between Japan and
Communist China. There is great concern when there is any suggestion of Japanese political accommodation with the mainland government. There is also real concern among the Nationalists over the reversion of Okinawa and the prospect of the reduction of the function of the Japan-Okinawa base system. The Nationalists, like the South Koreans, feel strongly that Okinawa has been a most significant base for their protection and support. There is also some resentment over the United States giving way to a defeated enemy in an area of traditional Chinese interest.

The Japanese Prime Minister in his communique with President Nixon (November 21, 1969) said that the "maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was [also] a most important factor for the security of Japan." This question will become more complicated with the reversion of Okinawa, since the Japanese national defense perimeter will then include the Sakishima Islands, 200 miles from Taipei. Any American action in Taiwan will therefore have to be gauged in light of its influence on Japanese-American security arrangements, present and future.

The Chinese on Taiwan, like the South Koreans, feel themselves in a state of physical jeopardy. The specific power equation at any particular moment may give them some feeling of security, but their larger ambition for reunifying their country is by no means satisfied. There is, however, little public concern over a Communist nuclear strike against them. Further, the Nationalists recognize the Communist lack of weapons and equipment to support a major invasion. Nevertheless, they recognize that any major lessening of the overt US commitment to their security could start a series of events which eventually might force their capitulation.

The Nationalist Government would probably be willing to join in almost any viable regional security arrangement. Preferably, but not necessarily, the United States should also be involved. Like most other Asian nationals, they feel concern over the side effects of Japanese leadership in any Asian security arrangements. It is true also that the situation of the divided countries--Korea and
China--make other Asian nations more reluctant to enter into real security arrangements involving them. There is a very real fear that the latter could involve reunification undertakings, of which they want no part.

Korea, Thailand, and South Vietnam have joined the Republic of China in arrangements for the exchange of information and for comparing views of the strategic situation. The Vietnamese play their part in a very low key. The concern in other nations over the divided countries and their goals makes any further expansion in size or scope of this arrangement unlikely. The Chinese and the South Koreans do maintain contacts and activity at fairly high levels; in the past they have discussed combined exercises and at one point several years ago made low-key approaches toward the conduct of tripartite exercises with US forces.

The PATO concept, involving a NATO-like arrangement among nations in the Western Pacific area, is not seen as viable by the Republic of China. In an interview for Japanese television, Chiang Kai-shek said that the idea was good but that the Asian nations were not in a position to proceed with it.

The Nixon doctrine has created serious concern in Taiwan because there is general agreement there over the need for a visible US commitment and it is not clear that the actual application of this doctrine would adequately fulfill this need. As mentioned earlier, there is a general feeling that the United States could, by actions that were overly precipitate, tempt Peking into serious attempts to regain Taiwan.

Both the Taiwanese and the mainlanders are concerned over the actual application of the Nixon doctrine. The Taiwanese feel that a significant reduction in the US commitment would leave them to the mercy of the mainlanders. Since they already feel that the United States has failed to use the leverage it possesses in their interest, this prospect only reinforces their concern. Nationalist leaders and the Taiwanese feel that they would be much more vulnerable to Communist pressures and actions.
A visit by the Soviet journalist Victor Louis and low-keyed discussions between the Republic of China and Soviet diplomats have led to some speculation about a new relationship between these two countries. Experienced observers contend that the events and activities seen up to this point are of little significance. Both sides might want to give some indication of a better relationship in the interest of maintaining the concern of the Chinese Communists, but any concrete demonstration of cooperation is considered most unlikely.
IV
THE PHILIPPINES

A. IMPACT OF US-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS ON PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS

On balance, the Philippines have an essentially friendly attitude toward the United States. Proceeding beyond this generalization, however, there are significant elements in the Philippine political situation which should concern US planners.

A number of American observers with extensive Philippine experience take a rather pessimistic view of the capability of Philippine politicians to recognize and deal with problems objectively. They are considered to be capable of acts against their own interest when emotional issues are involved. Except for a very small number of senior people, Philippine officials seem to lack the ability to see ahead and plan for the future. It was observed in their defense, however, that while they seem to have a talent for making major issues of petty problems, on the other hand, they are remarkably easy to deal with on more important questions.

As in several other countries, Philippine politicians are very sensitive to accusations that they are puppets or lackeys of the Americans. The opposition in the recent political campaign described President Marcos and Foreign Secretary Romulo as "American Boys." This was one of the reasons that both men felt compelled to demonstrate their independence from the United States and their ability to manipulate the relationship to the advantage of national interests. This sort of feeling is reinforced by the growth of nationalism within a new generation which has no long-term US ties and no memories of war. Among the consequences of internal political maneuvers was the Philippine demand that the Military Assistance Agreement, the Mutual Defense Treaty, Bases Agreement, and the Laurel-Langley Agreement, all be renegotiated beginning in
February 1970. There was serious doubt at the time about the ability of the Filipinos to prepare properly for discussions as wide-ranging as these or, within the time available, to organize and prepare a capable negotiating team. As of June 1970 negotiations had not begun.

While asserting their independence and equality, Philippine leaders are tremendously sensitive to American influences. The positions taken by US legislators such as Senators Fulbright and Symington create strong reactions of concern and resentment. There is considerable resentment over US Congressional and editorial statements about the "price" the United States has paid for the Philippine Civic Action Group in Vietnam. When considering the special relationships between themselves and the United States, the Filipinos tend to direct their attention to getting rid of conditions that favor Americans, such as investment and trade concessions. They do not show a corresponding interest in the reciprocal reduction of their privileged status in such matters as trade and sugar price and sugar quotas.

The continuing instability of the Philippine economic position is a significant factor in the US future there. The so-called oligarchy, consisting of some 50-odd wealthy families operating on a sort of Spanish patron system, has been able to maintain tight control over the investment market and to ensure its own dominance in the industrialization of the country. This is not to suggest any sort of conspiracy or deliberate collusion. It is simply that convergent interests tend to make for effective union for action.

While Americans enjoy a formally established, special economic status in the Philippines, there nevertheless remains the problem of inducements and conditions for long-term investment. The special status of Americans will expire in 1974. This will probably serve to complicate further investment and industrial procedures. The Government of the Philippines recognizes the economic importance of American bases, which contribute some 7 to 8 percent of the GNP and employ 6 to 7 percent of the labor force. This amounts to something over 150 million dollars per year of direct US payments into the Philippine economy, to which must be added other
indirect inputs. The American sugar subsidy is the foundation for the economic security of many members of the upper class and for an agricultural elite. The logic and durability of this arrangement, in the face of Philippine insistence on reducing the formal economic status of Americans, must be open to question when future arrangements are discussed.

The gravity of the current Philippine situation has been illustrated by a report of a recent proposal that the United States buy $100 million of pesos in advance of need in order to tide the Philippine Government over a near-term financial crisis. The source of this story was identified only as a "high-ranking government" person. In connection with US base financing, the Philippine press has recently given prominence to the idea that the United States is paying "rent" to Spain for bases, and it has been strongly suggested that the Philippines deserves treatment of this sort also.

Another sensitive political issue which will condition relationships over time is the matter of criminal jurisdiction over US troops. The Filipinos believe that other nations have better arrangements in their status-of-force agreements than they, and they are trying to adjust this situation. This area of relations is reexamined from time to time when cases of misbehavior on the part of US military people arise. The Mooney case involved an American serviceman who killed a Filipino while hunting, was tried by an American military court, acquitted and gotten out of the country very quickly. Resentment has been great and pervasive. Mr. Romulo has even gone so far as to make speeches about this in Paris and Mexico City.

An internal problem which at the moment does not look serious, but which could become so, is the disaffection of Muslims in the southern islands. There are several localities which are completely Muslim and antipathetic to the central government. They are so located that some sort of minor secession movement could be troublesome for the center. It is believed that Malaysia and Indonesia have both dabbled in agitation in these areas.
The indigenous Communists—the Hukbalahaps, or HUKS—at the moment are mainly operating almost as extortion gangs in central Luzon. They are relatively few in number and, with the exception of one small group, are not politically or ideologically oriented. It has recently appeared that the dissident elements in the Philippines may have established some working political contact with the HUKS. It is the consensus that the government can deal with them at their present level of strength and effort. Should useful political arrangements be made between the Soviet Union and the Philippines there is some concern over the results that Soviet assistance to the HUK movement might produce. The Chinese government involvement at the moment is minimal. Military observers claim that the recent appearance of a number of AK 47 weapons (individual small arms) is attributable to a flow from Vietnam via Philippines means rather than from direct Chinese support.

A host of other problems beset the Philippines. Land tenure, for example, is complicated by the old Spanish system which still prevails. The migration to towns and cities from the rural areas creates the usual associated problems. In many cases, however, the road back to the country is open and assures survival. The island nature of the republic and the vast differences between Luzon and Manila on one hand and all other regions inhibit cohesion, but they also inhibit political mobilization in opposition. It is conceivable that a convergence of events and conditions—secession, revolution, student and urban unrest, growth in Communist strength, economic setbacks—might produce a major crisis. So long as issues and problems can be kept isolated, the existing government can probably cope and survive over the near term.

There is a particular group of some potential in the Philippines. It is made up of the under-thirty generation of technical and managerial experts who operate industry and major businesses. These young people have largely been trained in US universities and have absorbed many Western ideas and attitudes. At present their interests focus on professional prestige, jobs, and pay, but there
have been some indications of interest in political affairs, particularly as these matters affect their own well-being and status.

President Marcos has recently won reelection—the first Philippine president in history to do so. He may now be more free to operate without some of the traditional political constraints, but clearly he also faces serious internal social and political problems and a critical economic situation. The conduct of the election has also been questioned, as has the alleged US part in it. Recent student riots against President Marcos portend more active (and violent) participation of another segment of youth. Dr. John Badgely of The Johns Hopkins University has suggested that there are interesting parallels between Philippine conditions and those that have influenced student groups in Mexico. The idea is worth further exploration.

B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN PHILIPPINE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Filipinos are, like most others, antipathetic toward Japanese leadership in any regional military arrangements. Here, too, concern is felt about the nature and degree of the successful Japanese economic penetration and its effect on progress and independence.

The Philippines has recently shown an inclination to take a less demanding and immediate stance in its dispute with Malaysia over Sabah. It is increasingly active in general political and economic affairs in Asia.

Several factors make negotiations over base rights difficult for the United States. The Philippine leaders do not see a particular military threat to their territory. They have great confidence in the water barrier and are unwilling to accept the idea of a Chinese nuclear threat. Further, the Philippine military high command seems not to accept as urgent the need for US protection for their territory; they hold that the US presence is primarily in the interest of a US security system.
There is some concern over the Vietnam outcome as it will affect the application of the Nixon doctrine. If the general defense line of the United States seems to be drawn east of the Philippines, there will be serious reappraisal of the arrangements with the United States. If the Seventh Fleet is programmed to operate west and south of the Philippines, then its security value will be recognized and the usefulness of bases clearly perceived. Meantime, reductions in force, dollar cuts, and the Vietnam troop reduction are seen by some as indications of a general US withdrawal from Asia. Actions in the near future will be very carefully examined for evidence of what US future plans really are. Subic Bay and Clark Field will be the focus of attention for real indications of the type and volume of military activity that the United States might seek to maintain in Asia.

The Philippines, while seeking a real role and identity as an Asian nation, also seeks a place on the world stage rather larger than its size and position might support. Some part of this derives from the person and accomplishments of the present Foreign Secretary, Carlos Romulo. It may be that some of his anti-American utterances in other countries have the same purpose they had had at home—to nullify the accusations that he is a creature of the Americans. It is quite clear that some of his other utterances have been aimed at the global audience. For example, Romulo recently told an American journalist that what the Philippines would like to see eventually would be a nonintervention agreement with the United States, Russia, and China. He noted the significant loss in revenue from US bases that would follow a shift in his country's alignment, but considered this a necessary condition to a new posture. President Marcos, in his inaugural speech, touched upon the desire for broader accommodation with other nations, including Communist China. This search for a broader role, and a skepticism about the real need for an American military shield, will make the Filipinos more difficult to deal with regarding base matters. Realistically, however, there has not yet been an actual demonstration of intransigence that truly affects the American position.
V
THAILAND

A. IMPACT OF US-THAI RELATIONS ON THAILAND'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Partisan politics in Thailand has not developed to the point that issues such as national security policy or relations with the United States constitute significant constraints on the government. The history of political development in Thailand suggests that the Thais will not necessarily follow the pattern of other Asian nations. Thailand's demonstrated ability to rationalize or solve its problems in unique style supports the idea that, whatever group might hold power, the government's position with respect to its rivals will dampen serious debate over internal issues.

B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN THAILAND'S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Thai leadership is out of sympathy with any "soft" solution to the Vietnam war. While clearly aware of the limits on the range of possible outcomes, they would favor a "hawkish" type of solution. The critical problem for the Thais is that posed by conditions and prospects in Laos and, more recently, in Cambodia.

In the main, the current US presence in Thailand is correctly seen as directly connected to Vietnam. A US withdrawal from Thailand is seen as a perfectly logical accompaniment to a reduction of forces in Vietnam. The Thai leaders emphasize that they do not want American troops to be involved in Thai counterinsurgency operations, although they welcome advisers and materiel support. This position, in their view, is completely compatible with the Nixon doctrine, and thus the doctrine does not imply to them any major shift in US strategy.

The Thais feel strongly that their own security and the security of the region cannot be safeguarded without the United States.
Thai efforts to foster more regionalism are described pointedly as "political collective security." The Thais look upon these efforts as a useful antidote to excessive dependence upon the United States, but they at no time delude themselves that they thereby will be able to do without the United States. For the moment, they have taken at face value statements that the US will honor its treaty commitments; as the Nixon doctrine unfolds, however, there may come to the fore more of the chronic uncertainty from which other US allies suffer.

Despite Thailand's good record of participation in regional matters, it is not an exception to the generally parochial attitude with which Asian countries approach this subject. Regional organizations are viewed by the Thais as serving specific Thai interests; there is little appreciation of any regional interests transcending those of individual countries. This parochialism extends to the Thai view of the "threat," which is seen as one of infiltration from Laos and Cambodia or, at most, a North Vietnamese incursion. China at this time is seen as a much more remote threat and this perception is unlikely to change very much in the next few years. For this reason, the Thais probably consider the American "nuclear umbrella" as less vital in the short run than a continuing US readiness to play a conventional role in the defense of Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.

The Thais have at times attempted to obtain a bilateral security arrangement with the United States, and they may do so again should they see SEATO collapsing. As of this moment, however, they probably look upon SEATO and related arrangements as a useful means for keeping the United States engaged militarily and otherwise in the security of Thailand. In a communique issued with the Thai Foreign Minister on March 6, 1962, the US Secretary of State expressed US intentions to resist Communist aggression and subversion and reaffirmed that the US obligation was not dependent on the prior agreement of all other parties to SEATO.
The Thais were willing participants in Vietnam and also provided facilities willingly. It is believed that the United States could retain the use of whatever facilities it might require after Vietnam so long as it continued to demonstrate a reasonably firm posture toward Communist aggression and Communist violations of whatever settlement might eventuate in Vietnam. The Thais would like the United States to retain some facilities for monitoring the Vietnam settlement and, incidentally, as an earnest of US intentions to continue support of Thai security. The terms under which American forces utilize Thai military facilities are now politically viable, although the United States may, in the longer run, have to negotiate a status-of-forces agreement.

As part of the effort to get in line with current US trends, Foreign Minister Thanat has made statements that seem to reflect a more relaxed attitude about relations with Communist countries, including China. Thai officials stress strongly that they feel that such a public position is sound for Thailand. However, these officials concede that they expect no reciprocity from Peking and hence no immediate practical results from their public posture. The Thais equally point out that they do not consider Soviet overtures, including the rather vague Brezhnev proposal for a regional security arrangement, to have much substance, but in this regard there is in Thailand as in other countries of the region some curiosity about Soviet intentions.

The readjustments the Thais are making in their public posture on some of the above points and also on various status-of-forces problems that arise in the normal course of events reflect a strong sense of Thai nationalism and pride in never having been a colonial country. Thailand seems less pathological about these matters than some countries with more recent experiences of extraterritoriality and colonialism. The Thais remember that it was largely through the legal and diplomatic support of the United States that extraterritoriality was eliminated in their country.
The Thai leadership has reacted rather strongly to the suggestion that they have been moved in directions desired by the United States by financial concessions of considerable size. This situation may be expected to color public statements and perhaps to inhibit Thai decisionmakers, but it should not have substantial impact on the way the Thais serve their own interests.
VI

AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

A. IMPACT OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Conservative parties congenial to the United States have dominated Australian and New Zealand politics for the last twenty years. Recent election campaigns, however, produced serious challenges from opposition Labor parties. Among the vital issues raised were the security concepts and policies which have obtained in the past. Severe criticism was also directed against SEATO and involvement in the Vietnam war, with the implication that policies would be changed if the opposition should win. Incumbents have in reply described their opponents as anti-American and raised doubts as to their ability to deal successfully with the United States. The incumbents have not presented themselves as antipathetic to existing relations with the United States.

As in many other countries allied with the United States, the ruling governments of Australia and New Zealand must face accusations that they are puppets or satellites of the United States. Thus, it is necessary that arrangements with the United States be portrayed as serving the interest and advantage of their countries. In Australia, there is a reinforcing trend toward taking a more independent stand in the world, and in New Zealand, there is some sentiment for adopting a more neutral position. Success for either movement would necessarily dilute the US relationship.

The recent election in Australia produced a narrow victory for the coalition that favors close relations with the United States. The key element was the support of the relatively small Democratic Labor Party (DLP) for the Liberal/Country Party coalition. The DLP is sensitive to Communist threats, believes in containment, and
opposes reductions in Australia's defense efforts. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) holds generally opposing views and has sought to prevent the establishment of US military facilities that are not under joint control. The small spread in the vote between government supporters and the opposition may be attributed, in part, to a number of domestic causes, but it does appear that there is some uncertainty and concern over foreign policy and defense matters. SEATO is the subject of significant debate. The reliance on a forward defense policy, the usefulness of SEATO in implementing that policy, and the tasks to be assumed by the participants are all questioned. When these attitudes are joined with a skeptical view of the threat to themselves, there emerges attitudes which bring at least the specifics of the relationship with the United States into question.

The Vietnam outcome will have an important effect on Australian attitudes toward SEATO and the United States. There is now apparent some concern over the change in US thinking about Vietnam, some resentment over being caught in a more forward posture than the United States, and some uneasiness over the future tenability of the forward defense strategy. The alleged vagueness of the Nixon doctrine has come in for considerable criticism in circles concerned with foreign policy questions. Once again, the post-Vietnam conduct of the United States is nervously awaited. Incentives to reexamine relations with the Soviet-Union may increase as a result of the US posture in Asia.

The political future in Australia is uncertain. The ALP conceivably could come to power. Only if this should happen could there emerge some real manifestation of the ALP's relatively isolationist position. The ALP's biases would tend to incline toward compromise in Vietnam, unilateral withdrawal of forces without consultation, détente with China, and general disarmament. Only in office, however, can the ALP demonstrate its real views and, most importantly, the relative impact of foreign policy and defense issues in comparison with the bread and butter domestic elements in its program.
In New Zealand political groups less clearly oriented toward the United States and toward current defense policy might come to power, but the prospects and consequences are less extreme since, because of its size and remoteness, New Zealand has less impact on the Asian situation.

B. US RELATIONS AS AN ELEMENT IN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Only in recent years have Australia and New Zealand come to grips with Asia. Poverty-stricken millions, alien in their way of life, present sharp contrasts with the culture, society, and politics of Western nations. Prior to World War II, the antipodean countries saw themselves as outposts of Western ways and values in a basically oriental area. Their Asian neighbors were kept at arm's length. The Japanese of the 1930s are remembered as a rapacious and violent nation. Even though Japan may now have earned a greater respectability, China can easily replace it as an object of concern.

World War II forced a shift in the focus of their attention. Australia and New Zealand began then to learn the lessons which more and more emphatically are being reinforced now. They are in and of Asia, the Empire and Commonwealth are increasingly irrelevant, and the United States is the best hope for protection and support as they feel their way into a growing role in the Asian Community. The most important element in the defense arrangements is ANZUS. This treaty gives Australia and New Zealand a claim on the defense resources of the most powerful nation in the world. Both Australia and New Zealand regard ANZUS as crucial to their security, and the treaty has bipartisan support in both countries.

The Chinese threat seems relatively remote for the present. It may be real enough in the long term, but there is not yet anything like the concerns felt in Taiwan, Thailand, or India. ANZUS (and SEATO) make Chinese ventures against Australia and New Zealand very risky, even should the Chinese possess the physical capabilities required for a real attempt. When, and if, the Chinese gain the necessary forces to present a real physical menace, the problem will
become more significant—but at the same time an American commitment will be that much more important.

Indonesia is a much more comfortable neighbor than it was several years ago. Even so, there is potential for conflicts of interest. Australians are acutely conscious of the fact that their only land border (in New Guinea) is with Indonesia. Given the raw power and size of Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand need the assurance of American support and would find it very useful in any negotiations over differences with the Indonesian Government. A menacing Indonesia might have the effect of focusing concerns close to home, with the consequent abandonment of the forward defense policy.

The Australians and New Zealanders accept Japan as a trading partner and as a major force in the area. Nevertheless, like many others with vivid memories of World War II, they are extremely reluctant to accept the idea of Japanese dominance in regional security arrangements and are uneasy over Japan’s expanding economic influence. They would want to see strong controls over Japan and to feel that the American interest was not being displaced or eroded. Japan is Australia’s largest market, and the United States the largest supplier and trading partner. Australian entrepreneurs have begun to think about the relative desirability of the functions of raw material supply and complete manufacture. Some knotty problems could arise as the several economies press against current limits and functions and as Australia seeks an expanded economic role. At present China buys sizable quantities of wheat from Australia, but this relationship could change and grow into other types of trade also.

Australia must live with its past. The "white Australia" immigration policy may not interfere in the day-to-day relations with Asian countries, but the matter has been irritating in the past and it could exacerbate relations in the future. It must also be said that Australia and New Zealand have paid a price in Asia for the benefits they have gained from their association with the United States. They have incurred the animosity of America’s enemies and
have been accused, at home and abroad, of being American lackeys. Of particular concern in Asian affairs is the representation of the two nations as members of a "White Man's Club" which seeks to exploit Asians. Despite such strictures, the two countries have consistently been active supporters of the United States in world affairs and of the Colombo Plan and related aid activity.

Australia and New Zealand will very likely continue to expand their interests and involvements in Southeast Asia. Barring political upsets or other adverse developments, a forward defense policy seems likely to continue at least into the first half of the 1970s. Economic and political activities in Asia, including aid and technical support, will continue to grow. The Australian economy will make it possible to support growing defense budgets. The growing trade relationship with Japan will develop new opportunities as well as problems for regional cooperation as third countries become meeting places for activity by both nations. The total structure depends on a reasonably stable Southeast Asia and some confidence in the United States as an ultimate guarantor.

Australia and New Zealand are economically developed Western nations that by their very nature find it difficult to understand and deal with their Asian neighbors. Founded and developed within the framework of the British system and participating enthusiastically in Empire and Commonwealth affairs, they have faced the need for major readjustments since the end of World War II. To their credit, they have met problems and obligations in a most realistic manner. They have shouldered a large share of the burden produced by the British withdrawal from Asia and, in general, shared a real sense of international responsibility. Their heritage as parts of a global system persists, but it does not blind them to the real and immediate world of Asia.

Australia has faced a real problem in trying to harmonize its relations and roots in the Western world with its position and goals in Asia. The balancing of sometimes opposing conditions between the two, taken along with the need to maintain its own posture of
independence and freedom promise a cluster of policy and operational problems that will endure for a long time.

Australia and New Zealand have taken a realistic view of their defense problems. They have recognized that there was no sensible alternative to heavy reliance on an outside great power. They have been confident that the needed protection could indeed be guaranteed if the right measures were adopted, and they have felt that acts of cooperation and support on their part could "earn" great power protection. The close association between the two nations has developed in part because of this recognized mutuality of interest and in part because of their awareness that the modest forces they could build alone were not adequate to prospective tasks.

SEATO has been something of a disappointment to Australia and New Zealand. Its effectiveness has been hampered by discord and the essential withdrawal of several powers. Britain cannot be counted on for significant physical support, and France and Pakistan have long since defaulted as active members. The alliance projects a "cold war" aspect which is distasteful to many. In the view of some, it "has not been totally effective in warding off communism in Southeast Asia. The "US" in ANZUS symbolizes the real connection with the new-Asian world and, in a way, portrays the geographical dilemma with which Australia and New Zealand must live. It may be long-term insurance, but it is no less important for that.
This paper focuses on the political viability and usability of the present US system of military bases and facilities in East Asia and the Western Pacific in order to gain a better understanding of the political environment in which the United States must try to satisfy its future base requirements.

The scope of the paper has been limited to an analysis of how political conditions and trends in East Asia might affect the ability of the United States to maintain and use its present base system. In all of the countries covered, the United States has bases or the use of facilities, or both. South Vietnam is not covered because the future of US bases there depends upon the outcome of the current hostilities. Should the conflict end in an international arrangement for maintaining peace, continued American use of bases in South Vietnam would probably be foreclosed. On the other hand, should a Korea-type truce eventuate, a thorough review of US base requirements and of the military-technical problem of infrastructure maintenance would be necessary.