POSTATTACK RESEARCH

VOLUME VII

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF RESEARCH ON SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

FINAL REPORT

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Reviews and Abstracts of
Research on
Socio-Psychological Problems
FINAL REPORT

POSTATTACK RESEARCH

by

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The MITRE Corporation, in a previous study ("A Context Study of Postattack Research"), developed a preliminary model for relating the various areas of research to the problems of postattack survival and recovery. This model sought to apply systems analysis techniques to the management of a postattack research program. It proposed an approach for reviewing and assessing previous research related to the problems of survival and recovery.

The study contained herein is an attempt to apply this approach to a specific topic area. The first part of this report, the formatted reviews, was prepared by June Karlson and Ellen Langer, while the second part, the comparative review, was authored by Ellen Langer.

The studies cited in Part I do not necessarily correspond on a one-for-one basis with those referred to in Part II, because the intent in the second part was to comment on relevant sections of all studies regardless of the primary area of research.

While this was the aim of our review, from a program standpoint, it serves other needs as well. In terms of the procedures and products of the review process, these needs are as follows:

1. **PLAN EVALUATION** - A review of postattack research is needed to assess the reality of program plans as they currently exist or the need to modify them.

2. **PROGRAM PROCESS** - An up-to-date review is needed to provide narrow, finite measures of progress through translation of broad postattack research programs.

3. **COMPENDIUM OF FINDINGS** - The many scientific disciplines of the researchers, the large amount of research information acquired over time, and the variety of organization of this information in research
documents leads to communication problems and a need for the abstraction of these documents to pertinent, recognizable form.

4. COMPARATIVE FINDINGS - The uncertainties of post-attack research information are substantial. By comparing research in the same topic area, confidence in the findings can be gained where there is general agreement among researchers. Where there is disagreement, further study is often indicated to attempt to resolve the differences.

Every effort was made to keep these reviews of previous research objective; however, it was found that where some of the studies were related to certain of our postulated postattack objectives (goals), the subjective value judgements that had to be made might appear hypercritical. Possibly, in a different context or with someone else's set of postulated objectives, the value judgements could be quite different.

In no case is any criticism of the scholarship of other researchers intended.

The MITRE Corporation
Bedford, Massachusetts
February 1969

Donald Turrentine
Project Leader
Systems Analysis Department
SUMMARY

Conclusions about the relative uselessness of disaster research in predicting behavior in a nuclear war seem to understate its value. For instance, research has drawn on this research to estimate postattack worker productivity:

It is true that World War II conditions and natural disaster conditions are hardly comparable to a postnuclear attack situation; nevertheless, they do provide possible insight into behavior among survivors of nuclear attack that might affect the speed of recovery by the economy as a whole. It is also true that Americans may not react as the British, Germans, and Japanese did; however, there does appear to be remarkably consistent behavior on the part of British, German, and Japanese civilians and similar behavior has been observed in Americans in disaster situations. In any case, some generalizations have been made that seem to be relevant and should be weighed in planning for postattack recovery. These generalizations have been applied to estimating the productive potential of the postattack labor force.¹

Many additional areas where behavioral research has been of direct value can be cited. Many insights have been provided by this research on the problems of large scale population evacuation,² design of adequate and credible warning systems,³ panic behavior

¹George Hopkins et al. A Survey of the Long-Term Postattack Recovery Capabilities of CONUS (Memo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, December 1963), p. 246


in disasters, shelter confinement, appropriate re-housing policies, and postattack population control and work motivation. Only a small sampling of relevant studies are cited in the footnotes. There has been many good suggestions offered in these and other areas. While the impact of nuclear war on the U. S. social structure cannot be precisely predicted, behavioral research, and disaster research in particular, certainly seem to have provided an excellent foundation for certain areas of civil defense planning.

Specifically, disaster research has indicated that certain types of postattack behavior are less likely than others, viz., totally irrational or panic behavior is less likely than emotional shock or depression. This type of information would appear to be of direct value in attempting to set up plans to cope with the surviving postattack population. Communications, coordination and control, authority, and transportation are identified as problems in organizing an adequate emergency social system.


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PART I

ABSTRACTS OF RESEARCH ON SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS
INTRODUCTION AND ABSTRACTS

Seven studies of the social and psychological effects of nuclear war were reviewed and abstracted. While the product of this review may not be complete in terms of the coverage of work in the area, criteria for the selection of review documents had to be restrictive due to the large number of studies in this category.

The task of selecting documents was simplified by the availability of one document which appeared to summarize the last six years of study (Review SP-1). Another document (Review SP-2) was selected because it appeared to be the most recent, comprehensive treatment of the area. Other earlier studies were added to indicate the changes in this research over the last twenty years. Listed in roughly chronological order the documents are:


7. Review SP-7; Horace D. Beach; Management of Human Behavior in Disaster; Department of National Health and Welfare, Emergency Health Services Division, Canada; (1967).
Logan, Killan, and Marrs; A Study of the Effect of Catastrophe on Social Disorganization (1950) SP-6

The authors reviewed human behavior in several civilian disaster situations for the purpose of determining the effects of catastrophic situations on the behavior of military personnel, recommending effective training and organizational measures that tend to minimize disorganization both in extent and time, and establishing criteria for the military control of the civilian population in combat zones.

While many of the authors' assumptions are noteworthy, two stand out among the others.

(1) The motives of soldiers and civilians may be the same.

(2) The behavior of soldiers may be affected by their training.

As a result of their analysis, the authors conclude that social reorganization following a disaster appears to follow the following pattern:

(1) The individual at first tends to act in terms of those social values which seem to him most threatened.

(2) Small groups begin to emerge on the basis of concern with a common problem. Leader-follower relationships develop spontaneously.

(3) As communications are reestablished, leadership controlling several small groups, emerges. This is most successful if the relationship is that of coordination.

In analogy, one of the greatest problems would be the dilemma of management that is responsible for the assignment of units of workers for the reorganization of utilities and industries.
Janis; Air War and Emotional Stress (1951) SP-5

The book, Air War and Emotional Stress, (Review SP-5), was written as one of a series of monographs under the auspices of The RAND Corporation in 1951.

Several comments by the author will be quoted from his book to summarize its contents.

In general. . .psychiatric reports on civilian reactions to bombing indicate that heavy air attacks produce a sizable incidence of "emotional shock" cases with acute anxiety symptoms. Most of these cases appear to be capable of fully recovering, either spontaneously or in response to simple forms of psychiatric treatment, within a period of a few days up to several weeks.

. . .severe personal losses (i.e., being injured, losing a member of the family), even in a lightly raided town, depresses morale so greatly that added effects of moderate raids were relatively slight.

. . .air raids are a contributing factor in the wartime increase in petty criminal activity.

. . .The less adequate the physical protection of the population, the higher the incidence of emotional shock and disorganized behavior.

. . .There is a strong likelihood that with appropriate psychological preparation [overt panic in areas not directly affected by the explosion] can be prevented.

. . .From what is generally known about the spread of fear rumors, the best antidote is confidence "that you have been told the worst, and that you will always be told the worst."

Janis recommends systematic research to assess the effectiveness of alternative techniques for minimizing the effects of psychological trauma, to gauge the impact of alternative communication policies, and to increase the general psychological understanding of personal adjustment to impending danger.
Iklé, The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction (1958) SP-3

Iklé's approach, as reviewed in SP-3, is a demographic one. He has tackled the problem of the social effects of a nuclear attack in statistical terms of the associated problems of housing, evacuation, food distribution, and productivity of available manpower in terms of requirements. "The emphasis is the relation between physical cause and social effect."

Excerpts from pages 151, 154, and 157 of the book:

It has been emphasized that limited alternatives restrict the voluntary behavior of air-raid survivors. The daily need for food is the paramount limitation to such alternatives. This fact can be utilized by the government to influence the public, if it still controls the nation's food supply after bombing attacks.

...bomining has a three-fold effect upon durable consumer goods and clothing. First, it destroys existing stocks and reduces current production of civilian goods...Second, bombing disrupts the distribution system for consumer goods. And third, it suddenly creates an enormous increase in demand, far in excess of the highest demand ever occurring in peacetime...

[The] man-power loss from fatalities, injuries, and irradiation sickness constitutes one of the most important effects of nuclear bombing upon a nation's war recuperation effort. [Also] there is a widespread disorganization, which leads to a waste of man-hours and lowered efficiency, especially immediately after attack.

Iklé comments on other critical areas including continuity of government, disruption of communications, and genetic effects. On the issue of law and order, he has this to say.

There is absolutely no evidence from past disasters of a precipitate increase in crime...
Fritz and Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disaster (1957) SP-4

Fritz and Mathewson of the National Academy of Sciences, (SP-4), have identified some of the most immediate problems that will have to be faced after a nuclear attack; namely, the care of people— their shelter, medical attention, feeding, and transportation. Operational planning for meeting such requirements should consider the problem of convergence. "A virtually universal phenomenon following disasters is the mass movement of people, messages, and supplies toward or away from the disaster-struck area." The authors review the data available on the following disasters in the course of drawing their conclusions:

- The White County, Arkansas, tornado, March 21, 1952
- The Waco Texas, tornado, May 11, 1953
- The West Frankfort, Illinois, mine explosion, December 21 1951
- The Warner Robins, Georgia, tornado, April 30, 1953
- Kanawha Valley, Charleston, West Virginia, chemical explosions, summer 1951
- The Texas City, Texas, munitions ship explosions, April 16, 1947
- The Holland Flood, February, 1953
- The Brighton, New York, house explosions, September 21, 1951
- The Worcester, Mass., tornado, June 9, 1953
- The atomic bombing, Hiroshima, Japan, August 6, 1945
- World War II air attacks on British cities

This study is another of the many that suggest "...the development of a systematic policy for handling information and communications in disasters...either the technical facilities of communication or a planned network of human communicators is a prerequisite..."

Other needed systems or procedures identified by this study are:

- Triage procedures for handling casualties (even before being transported to a hospital or other treatment center, to eliminate those that can be taken care of by on-the-spot first aid and thus reduce the congestion at the hospital.)
- Roadblocks and other traffic control procedures.
- Rigorous pre-disaster work in the following areas to meet post-disaster requirements:
  - Assessment of potential needs for supplies.
Establishment of emergency supply sources. Planning and organizing for post-disaster canvassing to determine needs not met by emergency sources. Public education.

Concerning control and maintenance of law and order, the following excerpt from page 77 is quoted:

The security authorities [police, national guard, etc.] responsible for control or maintenance of orderly social processes quite generally have instituted methods that are oriented almost exclusively towards constrictions or restraint. ... [because of] their... day-to-day... contacts with criminals, offenders, and suspects... the human needs entering into convergence behavior cannot be disposed of by indiscriminate use of restraint, constrictions, or suppression. ... their satisfaction will be achieved by resort to unofficial, "subterranean" channels.

Nordlie and Vestermark, Civil Defense in Postattack Society (1967) SP-1

The report, Civil Defense in Postattack Society by Nordlie and Vestermark, (SP-1), appears to be a summary of the six years of study on the part of Human Sciences Research, Inc. researchers. This document and the Vulnerabilities of Social Structure: Studies of the Social Dimensions of Nuclear Attack, (SP-2) are a comprehensive treatment of the topic area. The following points from the latter, (SP-2), are cited in summary.

The results tend to dismiss panic as a particularly likely psychological effect of nuclear attack. Smelser, however, makes the following observation in Chapter II, p. 229, of the report:

If, however, we examine the anticipated relations between warning, shelter, and the location of people at the time of attack, we may discover situations where these "exceptional conditions" exist in almost classic form and make the probability of panic behavior fairly high...
Smelser on pages 211 and 256 respectively, comments on the enormity of the analytical problem:

No matter how awful, the potential effects of nuclear attack are very complex and not subject to simple diagnosis by quick formulae. In fact, this complexity is so great that the study of modern war demands the same scientific detachment—difficult as it may be in this case—that we use in approaching any other natural phenomenon.

***

...even if no nuclear attack materializes, it is inherently difficult to generate specific predictions about American society twenty or thirty years from now; we simply cannot assume as given all the intervening social forces and unanticipated events. This difficulty is increased if a social tragedy of only partially known proportions afflicts the society in the meantime.

Nordlie and Vestermark on page 40 of their report, (SP-1), suggest an approach to postattack research:

...the attack-oriented approach begins with a description of the attack and projects forward in time the succession of likely consequences... resulting in a multiple branching tree of post-attack possibilities in which the number of possibilities increases rapidly the further in time from the attack one moves. ...the recovery-oriented approach begins with a definition of the desired end-state and... moves backwards, to identify what succession of conditions must exist between the desired end-state and the immediate postattack state for the desired end-state to be reached.

On page 55 of their report, Nordlie and Vestermark recommend that criteria for societal recovery be identified.

As to law and order, Smelser states on page 244, (SP-2),

...the greatest need for martial law would presumably arise when it became apparent that local governments were hopelessly inadequate to handle a chaotic situation. Were the situation handled from the beginning by a carefully formulated plan for federal action short of military government, this need would diminish correspondingly.
On page 231, Smelser makes a case for education of the public and effective pre-, trans-, and postattack communications:

[Since] ...the present warning and shelter-taking arrangements may result in more casualties than no warning at all. ...it is essential not only that members of the household understand the meaning of warning signals, but also that they be carefully "programmed" with alternative plans for movement to shelters, depending on the time of day of attack and the availability of shelter space. ...knowledge, instruction, planning, and rehearsal will reduce tendencies to random, confused, disorganized and panicky behavior.

* * * *

...after the attack...officials must continue a steady stream of authoritative information to control...rumors and fears, and must be prepared to enforce the regulations limiting the movement of population.

Beach; Management of Human Behavior in Disaster (1967) SP-7

The purpose of the author's work was to provide reliable information about what happens in a disaster, how people behave, the kinds of problems that arise, how problems can be managed, and how planning and preparation can reduce casualties and suffering on one hand and facilitate recovery on the other.

To accomplish his objective, Beach assumed that the behavior of individuals is sufficiently consistent in civilian disasters so that, broadly speaking, the reactions of people in extreme situations can be predicted. The following list is a sample of the author's findings.

(1) Contrary to common belief, mass panic...is a very rare occurrence in disasters.

(2) Looting is a relatively minor problem in most disasters.
(3) Disaster victims are seldom reduced to the level of thinking only of their personal survival.

(4) Populations which have been struck by a disaster are not a dazed helpless mass.... they help themselves and indeed perform much of the rescue work.

(5) Emotional and physical reactions are fairly widespread following a disaster, but they tend to be temporary.

(6) ...in times of stress people can endure much more hardship, deprivation, under-nourishment, and shock than they had ever thought possible.

(7) ...the best means of minimizing suffering and losses will still be those of adequate preparation and training, in terms of both the individual and the social system.
Format for Reviewing Research Reports

1. Title, author(s), contractor (which would become publisher in the case of books, publication in the case of journal or magazine articles, and society or conference in the case of presented papers), contract number, report date and number.
2. Type of Study
3. Key Descriptors
4. Objective(s) of the Study
5. Assumptions, Analytical Techniques, and Models
6. Scenario(s) Used
7. Measures of Effectiveness
8. Problem Areas
9. Countermeasures or Findings
10. Recommendations
11. Contribution of This Study to Operational Planning
12. Key References
13. Costs

Review Procedure

Each report was read carefully. Where concise statements by the authors were found to match specific categories of the format, the information was excerpted directly. Quotation marks are not used since any statement not quoted directly from a document by the reviewer is enclosed in brackets. Every effort was made to use the author's statements and to avoid incorporating personal prejudices and subjectivities into the review. Each emphasis (underlining) in a review is taken from the research document except where indicated otherwise.
1. **Title:** Civil Defense in Postattack Society
   
   **Authors:** Peter G. Nordlie and S. D. Vestermark, Jr.
   
   **Contractor:** Human Sciences Research, Inc.
   
   **Contract No.:** SRI Subcontract B-81866(4949A-38)-US (Task 6)
   OCD Task 4321B
   
   **Report:** HRS-RR-67/2-Me, February 1967 (64 pages, including appendixes)

2. **Type of Study**
   
   p. 1
   
   A clarification of the results of six years of study effort on the likely social and psychological effects of...the social vulnerabilities of American society to...and the problems of societal recovery from nuclear attack.

3. **Key Descriptors**
   
   Psychological, social, societal.

4. **Objectives**
   
   p. 2
   
   The objective of this report is to communicate tersely those findings from the entire series of studies which appear to have the greatest potential action implications for civil defense.

5. **Assumptions, Analytical Techniques, and Models Used**
   
   None identified.

6. **Scenarios Used**
   
   Not applicable.

7. **Measures of Effectiveness**
8. **Problems Addressed**

p. 8  ...the lack of any specification of the real, total objective of civil defense.

p. 10  [The complexity of] the societal perspective.

p. 13  The problem of planning socially valid defense systems is to show the social dimensions on which many different attack effects might occur, and then to show how systems can be defined to manage efforts so expressed.

p. 14  [The need for] a model of society...for describing the systematic effects of an attack on society and the process of societal recovery and for evaluating [alternative recovery measures].

p. 16  [The need for] organizational capacities for managing recovery.

p. 18  [The] assessment of damage to both bases of recovery [technological and organizational].

p. 20  ...preservation and reconstitution of pre-attack technology.

p. 22  [The lack of adequate concepts, methods, and techniques for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of civil defense systems.]

p. 26  [The need for] a comprehensive system for gathering and inventorying data on social damage and social resources after an attack.

p. 29  [Orphans in the postattack society.]

p. 34  [Recovering birth and death rates (defined as "vital movements").]

p. 36  The postattack strengths of pluralistic, industrial society.

p. 40  [A recovery-oriented versus attack-oriented approach to civil defense planning and research]

p. 44  Centralized versus local management of recovery efforts.

p. 49  [The conceptual implications of the "systemic disaster."]

9. **Findings**

p. 9  Our work has led us to conclude that...
The primary objective of civil defense is the creation of the conditions and capabilities for the recovery of society in the event of a nuclear attack.

Acceptance of this statement implies ways of thinking about almost all aspects of civil defense in ways different from what has been characteristic of civil defense to date. The two terms in this conclusion that require further specification are "society" and "recovery"...

[Society] is a complex, functioning system in which a population organized in patterned ways accomplishes the basic functions of production, distribution, and consumption... [something] more than a collection of individuals, their geophysical environment, and the man-made structures and facilities existing within geographical boundaries.

...If one considers the objective of civil defense to be only the saving of lives or anything short of preserving the ability of the total system to function...One fails to understand that...the protection and preservation of the ability of the total system to function is the only meaningful objective of civil defense planning.

Civil defense planning has tended to be preoccupied with the dramatic immediate nature of the expected attacks. This tendency is especially ironic because it is precisely the capacities of modern weapon systems to affect social parameters which create the civil defense task. The central task of describing and dealing with nuclear attack as a civil defense job is to show how attacks change the characteristics of society.

...making general or specific predictions about what social phenomena are likely to result from attack is less useful than establishing the social dimensions on which social effects can be measured.

***

...It is futile exercise to debate whether society would recover. What would be useful is the specification of the conditions which must occur in order for society to recover. The civil defense task would then be to create those conditions.

...a model...based on the concept of equilibrium system...is needed...for the systematic study and the management of the progression of systemic effects an attack on society would have.
...the attack event itself is only the beginning point in a sequence of events. It is the progression of system effects from stable equilibrium (pre-attack) to unstable equilibrium (trans-attack, immediate and intermediate postattack) and back toward stable equilibrium (longer-term recovery).

...Implicit in discussion of equilibrium movements...is the requirement for a new and radically broadened framework for defining and managing postattack conditions and events.

...It seems clear that the kinds of specific organizational capabilities required to manage a stepped progression of postattack events, from one equilibrium phase to another, toward societal recovery, imply a concept of civil defense organization many times removed from any presently existing or planned conceptions.

Civil defense planning must encompass the means for identifying and employing organizational resources in the utilization of technological resources for recovery ends. It is the organizational base which identifies, allocates, and mobilizes the technological resources in processes of social action directed toward recovery goals...societal recovery cannot occur...even assuming technological resources in excess of minimum levels, without adequate performance on the part of the organizational base.

...prior to any effort which is coherently a societal recovery effort, the organizational problem of defining an effective technological and organization inventory must be solved.

Our conclusion is that for a modern, industrialized society, plans which did not assume re-institution of pre-attack technology in communications, transportation, agriculture and manufacturing would decrease the likelihood of achieving a viable society...The planning goal should be reconstitution of an urban-based, pluralistic, highly interdependent and productive social system.

...since ultimate system performance criteria do not exist, no analysis can relate performance to total system objectives. For that reason, no analysis can show that a particular civil defense measure contributes or does not contribute in any way at all to achievement of the ultimate civil defense objective.
The description of social damage on relevant social dimensions; the management of the postattack phases of social equilibrium; and the pre-attack cost-effective analysis of civil defense systems for reducing societal vulnerability cannot be meaningfully undertaken without a comprehensive system for gathering and inventorying data on social damage and social resources after attack. Such a system is needed now. A beginning in constructing it could be made by extending presently existing systems for assessing physical damage and technological resources, through adding counts on a number of different kinds of social variables.

On the basis of existing data and analytic inquiries, one of the damage sensitive systems which appears to be of highest priority for further study is some system for managing the shift in the dependency burden which would occur when large numbers of orphans survived nuclear attack.

...Students of nuclear attack remain uncertain of what attack may do to postattack birth rates, although it seems certain that, at least, in the short term, there will be a marked increase in death rates...some investment is now warranted in considering measures for recovering vital movements [defined as "rates of birth and death"] following nuclear attack.

While it is possible to argue that command societies might respond with greater short-term resiliency to massive upheaval, such short-term advantages appear to be offset in longer-term recovery by the capacities of a highly developed though pluralistic, industrial society...[The]highly developed general skill level in the population is associated with a large variety of institutional and organizational alternative forms, which offer multiple modes for reorganizing complex social action following attack.

...The attack-oriented approach begins with a description of the attack and projects forward in time the succession of likely consequences. The recovery-oriented approach begins with a definition of the desired end-state and...[works] backwards, to identify what succession of conditions must exist between the desired end-state and the immediate postattack state for the desired end-state to be reached. The former is an open-ended approach which results in the identification of a multiple branching tree of postattack possibilities, in which the number of possibilities increases rapidly the further in time from the attack one moves. This approach makes it possible to answer the question of what might happen after
an attack, but in itself it provides inefficient tools to answer the question of what might happen after an attack relevant to civil defense planning. The employment of a recovery-oriented approach should increase the efficiency of civil defense planning and research.

p. 44 The total society perspective does not imply a requirement for highly centralized recovery management systems. But it does imply a needed determination of what elements of a recovery management system are best centralized and what elements are best managed at local levels.

p. 51 High on the agenda of future social research... is study of the dimensions, systems, and capabilities required to meet non-nuclear, systemic disasters [The Alaskan earthquake of 1964 is discussed as an illustration.]... the lessons learned are not irrelevant to practical civil defense planning [and even if nuclear war missions should decline in importance should not be lost.]

10. Recommendations

p. 55 [Paraphrased from the original:]

1) Identify and describe the dimensions and criteria of societal recovery.

2) Develop methods of assessing cost/effectiveness of proposed civil defense measures.

3) Extend existing damage assessment capabilities to include counts on social variables.

4) Design a National Orphan Assignment Plan and study its feasibility. Such a plan could provide a prototype for a range of social welfare systems.

5) Design a program to recover vital movements (birth and death rates).

6) Create an inventory of redundant social system capabilities, against which alternative forms of civil defense systems could be projected.

7) Define a set of recovery requisites which would form the basis of a recovery-oriented approach.
8) Determine what civil defense management activities are best suited to centralization and which are better performed at local levels.

9) Consider the results of analytic study of societal recovery from nuclear attack as they may affect the potentially evolving future role of civil defense in American society.

11. Contribution of this Study

[This report clarifies the results of some six years of study applied to the social impact of nuclear war by members of the Human Sciences Research, Inc. It encompasses the information contained in 26 volumes totaling over 3000 pages of documentation.]

12. Key References


13. Costs

Not applicable.

21
1. **Title:** Vulnerabilities of Social Structure
   Studies of the Social Dimensions of Nuclear Attack

**Author:** S. D. Vestermark, Jr., Editor with Chapters* as follows:

- I Analytic Aspects, by S. D. Vestermark, Jr. (203 pages)
- II Social Dimensions, by Neil J. Smelser (52 pages)
- III Demographic Aspects, by David M. Heer (52 pages)
- IV Economic Dimensions, by Sidney G. Winter (125 pages)
- V Local Government, by Howard W. Swearer (72 pages)
- VI Methodology, by Neil J. Smelser (111 pages)
- VII Dimensions and Domains, by S. D. Vestermark, Jr. (65 pages)

**Contractor:** Human Sciences Research, Incorporated

**Contract No.:** OCD-OS-63-114, Task 4321B

**Report:** HSR-RR-66/21 Cr, December 1966 (726 pages)

2. **Type of Study**

[A review of philosophical, historical, psychological, and methodological literature relevant to the effects on social systems of major disasters, military and natural.]

3. **Key Descriptors**

Panic; individual, societal, and cultural systems; institutions (religion, education, politics); demography; economics; ecology; law enforcement and government.

*Chapter titles paraphrased by reviewer; page count of each chapter does not include introductions to each by the editor.
Nuclear War Phases: warning and attack, shelter, emergence, adjustment, recovery (Ch. II); survival, reorganization, and recuperation (Ch. I); shock, shield, first emergence, initial recovery, final emergence, reconstruction, and final recovery (App. to Ch. I., pages 196-197.)

4. Objectives of the Study

The reader of these studies of "societal vulnerability" will note a paradoxically dual basic purpose. To develop ways of making more reputable projections of the possible ranges of events in society following nuclear attack, so that planners can know the likely dimensions of human response and the likely orders of demand which will be placed on systems of recovery, fundamental questions of describing and modeling complex society must be pursued. It will be seen later that planning and administrative questions of immediate, applied importance depend on the conduct of inquiries which stretch toward the domains of the speculative and the unknown. Thus the philosophers once more assist the guardians of the common-wealth, for, as Plato wrote,

The name of philosopher, then, will be reserved for those whose affections are set, in every case, on the reality.

[Footnote: Plato, The Republic...]

[The following objectives were identified for each succeeding chapter of the report:]

Chapter II:...to move a step away from the prevailing simplistic models of behavior...and a step toward an understanding of the social dimensions of nuclear attack and recovery...

Chapter III:...to specify the possible social and economic consequences of demographic changes following nuclear attack and thereby clarify what further changes would be necessary to achieve demographic recuperation...to indicate the length of time which might be required for such recuperation...as to population (1) size, (2) composition, (3) rate of growth.
Chapter IV: Investigation of the implications of nuclear war is an intellectual activity that has as its primary object the avoidance of situations in which the most relevant data would become available. The secondary object of the activity is to guide the development of measures that promise to mitigate, in some degree, the disastrous consequences of a failure to achieve the primary objective.

p. 329 ...developing appropriate conceptual apparatus rather than reaching substantive conclusions, ...but available factual knowledge is brought to bear on the problem of developing a useful conceptual structure for assessing the effect of nuclear war on economic systems.

Chapter V: ...an initial exploration...of the vulnerability to nuclear attack and recovery capability of local political authority in the United States and the Soviet Union.

Chapter VI: ...to analyze the methodology ...of social-scientific investigation, and its application to nuclear attack and recovery.

Chapter VII: ... a review of the analytic techniques and empirical findings of the preceding chapters...

...a listing of general principals for the analysis of postattack social domains...a more specific inventory of propositions about the domains of behavioral and institutional process...

5. Assumptions

Foreword p. viii ...Panic turns out to be highly unlikely, except under conditions which appear to be tractable to advance planning.
Chapter I...

p. 6

...Responsible officials as well as the lay public have frequently believed that a sudden disaster affecting a large group will typically trigger a wild stampede of hysterical individuals who will seek any escape at any expense to others. Analyses of cases of mass panic and related forms of collective outburst show, however, that panic is not an automatic reaction to a sudden real or imagined danger but that particular conditions, arranged in particular sequence, are associated with the panic outburst...

p. 22

...The knowledge that panic is associated with specifiable conditions will suggest to the planner and administrator that if they take steps to control these conditions, they can control and redirect potential panic behavior.

p. 150

...the massive attack assumption establishes a relatively fixed point in time for all situations of action in social responses and social changes throughout the whole system originate... [Limitations of this assumption are subsequently gone into.]

Appendix to Chapter I...

p. 185

...one of the key procedural rules has been that studies of the social dimensions of thermonuclear attack could not result from the mere application of social models, neat experimental designs, and orthodox research methods to the problems of extrapolating from present to postattack society...

[The Appendix to Chapter I has a section, pages 192-195 entitled "Assumptions Guiding the Essays."]
...In the absence of systematic bodies of findings about possible effects of nuclear weapons upon the institutional complexes with which they were most familiar, they [the authors of Chapters II through VI] were asked to propose their own best conceptual integration.

Chapter II
p. 219

...Any massive nuclear attack will leave in its wake new values, norms, and social cleavages that will permanently affect the organization of society. Nevertheless, many pre-attack social and cultural characteristics of American society [e.g., our democratic tradition] will strongly condition the pattern of recovery.

p. 228

...One of the most striking findings of the research by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, as well as recent disaster research, is that panic is a relatively rare occurrence in bombing and other disaster situations. Again, to cite Chapman's summary of current thinking among social scientists:

The folklore of cataclysm frequently asserts that panic--in the sense of wild, terror-stricken behavior--is natural and commonplace. Quite to the contrary, panic has seldom been found in the study of actual disaster ... [Re-cited here to give one definition of "panic" identified. Another definition is found on page 213: "...persons rushing frantically and aimlessly about, unable to engage in adaptive behavior of any sort"]

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p. 229

Panic, then, is an "exceptional phenomenon arising under exceptional conditions," and probably should not be expected to be widespread, even after massive nuclear attack. If, however, we examine the anticipated relations between warning, shelter, and the location of people at the time of attack, we may discover situations where these "exceptional conditions" exist in almost classic form and make the probability of panic behavior fairly high...
[Since] the "exceptional conditions" (regarding nuclear attack)...are: (1) the presence of an immediate, extreme danger that is...(2) ambiguous in its consequences and uncontrollable by any adaptive human action, and (3) most important...belief that there is only a limited route or time to escape... If the escape route is perceived to be completely open, or...completely sealed off, collective panic will not occur.

...we can appreciate the truth behind Fritz' observation...that..."the best choice may be no warning at all."

p. 253

[Prof. Smelser identifies a conflict between the heroes of the early phases following an attack and the administrative and political leaders of later phases. The conflict appears to rest at least in part on an assumption that heroes may not qualify for the jobs of leadership needed for the long pull of recovery.]

Chapter III

The only identifiable assumptions pertain to scenario. See 6, below.

Chapter IV

p. 397

...only a little over 30 percent of the 1964 gross national product would be required to provide a per capita consumption standards of 1933 to the entire 1964 population. Less than a quarter of current output would be required to provide the consumption standards characteristic of the turn of the century. It is clear, therefore, that large losses of productive capacity relative to population losses could be sustained without threatening the economy with nonviability for technological reasons provided that the destruction did not fall disproportionately on precisely those sectors that produce essential consumption goods, and that the surviving capacity in transportation and the other utilities permits the other types of capacity to be utilized. ...surviving food stocks would be adequate with high probability to support the surviving population for two years...
Chapter V
p. 462
...society will recover [and]...postattack society will have some continuity with pre-attack society, i.e., the legacy of the past will have some relevance for the future...

Chapter VI
See Chapter II assumptions above.

Chapter VII
Not applicable.

6. Scenarios Used

| Chapter I | Weight: 1500 MT to 10,000 MT | Attack Interval: Less than 6 hours | Follow-on: None |
| Chapter I | Weapons: Nuclear only (no CW or BW) | Attack Pattern: Half against metropolitan centers, in descending order of size and importance, and half against U.S. retaliatory force. |
| Chapter I | Strategy: An enemy first strike intended to bring the major metropolitan centers under greatest possible risk of blast, radiation, thermal, and fallout effects. |

| Chapter II | Weight: 3,000 MT to 10,000 MT | Attack Interval: Less than one day |
| Chapter II | Follow-on: None |
| Chapter II | Weapons: Nuclear only |
| Chapter II | Attack Pattern: At least 1,000 MT, mostly surface blast, on metropolitan centers, including several 10-20 MT bombs; remainder on retaliatory or other U.S. strategic forces. |
| Chapter II | Strategy: Maximum damage to retaliatory capability; death to 60-90 million people, injury to 20-40 million more, maximum damage to housing facilities; immobilization of transportation capability. |
| Chapter II | Shelters: Not markedly more adequate than now, but stocked with food and water. |
| Chapter II | Warning: (p. 226) 15-30 minutes. |

Chapter III
p. 289
The Holifield attack: 1,466 MT directed at cities and military targets, resulting in a 30 percent fatality rate for the nation.

The Spadefork attack: 1,779 MT directed primarily at military targets, resulting in a fatality rate of 18 percent.
Chapter IV
None specifically identified, but attack variables are discussed in a general way on pages 364-371.

Chapter V
For a general discussion, see pages 466-469 of the study report.

Chapter VI
See Chapter II scenario above.

Chapter VII
Not applicable.

7. Measures of Effectiveness
None identified.

8. Problems Addressed and Findings

Chapter I

1) Problem
The events attending a large thermonuclear bombardment form one domain of uncertainties; the unresolved problems in describing and predicting events in complex social systems form another domain of uncertainties. When combined, these domains form an even larger domain of uncertainties, and the meaning of this domain becomes an important preoccupation for the analyst of thermonuclear attack.

Finding
...the basic lesson of this excursion [a 15-page review of panic as an illustrative case] is that so many important analytic questions remain....Answers about panic [for example] may depend, in the end, on answers to questions about the potential behavior of many other sectors of the society.
2) Problem  

The task, then, is to establish an intellectual basis for projecting possible social effects of nuclear attack... How can the analyst transcend the particularities of evidence about individual behavior, and show it in its proper relation to the characteristics of social life over which any one individual [person] has only partial relevance, partial affect, partial control?... Repeatedly, it will be seen that solutions to practical problems of predicting response to thermonuclear attack can go no further than the capabilities allowed by presently available conceptual techniques for analytically defining and manipulating the crucial traits of pre-attack society.

Finding  

...these questions depend for their answers, in part, on the examination of a range of behavioral determinants intermediate to the individual at one extreme and the whole structure, ecological system, or culture at the other extreme. It will be argued that this intermediate range is peculiarly the domain of the analysis of institutional structure... Ultimately, the problem is nothing less than describing the interactions among the many levels and across the many institutional forms through which an ongoing society is organized and through which individual behavior patterns exhibit coherence and direction ...and then introducing a sudden, massive change agent in the form of a thermonuclear attack.

Simulation Models:  

For the present, however, the clarity and completeness purchased with a simulation model or a total model of society are purchased at the price of introducing several orders of uncertainty about the validity of these models.

Propositional Inventories-Hierarchical Ordering and Closure: Thus, any ordering of propositions which is both hierarchically structured and, in principle, completely exhaustive of an actual sector of behavior will be limited in generality in the determination of events and, to an uncertain degree, narrowed in its specific reference.
A Compromise:
Setting Ranges and Limits, and the Problems of Hierarchical Ordering, Closure, and Specification. ...to combine the virtues of both approaches [simulation and hierarchical ordering.]

3) Problem pp. 65-81

Finding p. 80
As has been suggested, metaphor and insight from metaphor often must be a central tool in undertaking complex problems. On the other hand, science declines and poetry begins when metaphor becomes an end in itself, or when it becomes a device for deliberately creating and trafficking in ambiguity.

4) Problem Institutional Dimensions of the Social System p. 82

Findings p. 89
The actual analysis of social systems begins in the analysis of social structure. If a social system is an organized, continuing, bounded pattern of social interactions, social structure is the organized pattern of positions and relationships which results from interaction.

...In considering the effects of thermonuclear attack upon society in general and upon behavioral determinants in particular, the initial address to attack effects beyond the individual level of behavior will be to attack effects expressed through damage to the social structure.

p. 102
...a dual concept of hierarchical specification of behavior and hierarchical ordering of behavioral determinants is useful for pointing analysis from visible individual behavior toward those institutional complexes in society which set fundamental limits to behavior and, in doing so, create the elements of social structure. In this context, the hierarchical concept is a way of defining the workings of institutional process.
...As a practical matter, the effects of a concrete event on the systems of society will begin at the level of visible behavior, even though it should be possible from an analytic point of view to trace changes in the four systems [biological, individual, social, cultural] by beginning at any one of the seven levels [ranging from relative situational dependence to relative situational independence as follows:

1) Acts - Roles and Role Behaviors.  
2) Action Possibilities - Collectivities and Groups.  
3) Individual Personality Structure - INSTITUTIONS  
4) Individual Life History - Social Values  
5) Individual Life Functions - Normative or Technological Prescriptions for Action.  
7) Population Characteristics, in Relation to Environmental Constraints - Systems of Symbol, Value Patterning. (Paraphrased from Figure I-7, p. 111)

...A great remaining task of social theory--both as a theory of social structure and of social change--must be to develop an even more precise scheme for stating and analytically manipulating the ways in which the reciprocal relations between visible behavior and institutional events create changes at social levels beyond the individual [person] which constrain and limit his behavioral possibilities.

***

...Because institutional patterns appear to permit some short-run and longer-run variations in their social structural manipulations, they do not appear to determine strictly precise structural and organizational forms. Nevertheless, institutions do appear to create pressures toward the creation of general types of social structural arrangements, according to the basic type of society in which the institutions function.
5) Problem
p. 138

The immediately preceding discussion of social institutions emphasizes the need for more basic knowledge of institutional functioning in society. A dominant theme of the entire chapter has been the ambiguities inherent in present attempts to develop the basic tools for achieving knowledge of possible postattack social conditions...

Finding
p. 147

...Once objections to the scientific and methodological feasibility of postattack social inquiry have been temporarily put to one side, the quest for manageability in the general direction of inquiry and the particular format of the findings will press the analyst to pay close attention to the strategic assumptions, countermeasure system design problems, and general needs of the users of his findings. This need not prostitute the objectivity of his inquiry. Nor should the analyst feel that by being partial, his findings are necessarily invalid... Indeed, the pursuit of postattack knowledge in the contemporary strategic and organizational environment offers an unusual opportunity to explore the ways in which constraints interact to produce a body of knowledge with particular, distinguishing characteristics.

p. 152

...the massive attack scenario...[is] simultaneously too simple and too complex [for social system analysis]...too simple because it establishes at one discrete, limited temporary interval the beginning of social changes, responses, and institutional interactions which ultimately affect all levels of society...[and] depends on an adequate, pre-existing model of societal functioning...too complex...for it may bring too many institutional and structural features of society into play at once. It may be more feasible to study social damage and social responses in more limited areas, and to trace from them the effects which extend to other areas and levels of social structure and institution in the larger society.

...such a scenario [then] points up the basic institutional and social structural criteria and domains of responses to attack [but is not] the most efficient way of programming a study of precise attack effects on all social levels.
6) Problem p. 147

Finding p. 153

7) Problem p. 154

Finding p. 177

Chapter II 1) Problem p. 211

p. 213

Most contemporary thinking about the effects of nuclear war is shrouded in emotion...

When we turn to questions of individual and social behavior... (above and beyond the quantitative estimates of death, injury, and destruction), we find that contemporary thinking offers a much less stable foundation for making scientific estimates [because of inadequate knowledge about behavior in crisis and difficulty of measuring complex behavioral responses, and the extreme discomfort experienced in envisioning individual personal tragedy (paraphrased from original)]... "models" and "predictions" [therefore] are likely to drift toward magical thinking and hysteria... tend to become oversimplified.
...negative utopian visions...are likely to foreclose the possibility of further serious thought about the realistic complexities of postattack society.

Finding

No matter how awful, the potential effects of nuclear attack are very complex and not subject to simple diagnosis by quick formulae. In fact, this complexity is so great that the study of modern war demands the same scientific detachment--difficult as it may be in this case--that we use in approaching any other natural phenomenon.

[Prof. Smelser defines a "set of variables, which form an inter-related system" that could be applied to "hypothetical phases of attack and recovery," and he defines five of these phases under a described, assumed attack. The set of variables are included in his Chapter VI, where he compares the relevancy of various analytic methods. (See 6., Scenarios above, and 11., Contribution, below.) The problems cited below are related to the five phases Prof. Smelser defines and are given in that order, i.e., Warning and Attack, Shelter, Emergency, Adjustment, and Recovery.]

2) Problem

Warning and Attack Phase - Survival (minutes to hours)


Findings

Since...the present warning and shelter-taking arrangements may result in more casualties than no warning at all...It is essential not only that the members of the household understand the meaning of warning signals, but also that they be carefully "programmed" with alternative plans for movement to shelters, depending on the time of day of attack and the availability of shelter space...knowledge, instruction, planning, and rehearsal will reduce tendencies to random, confused, disorganized and panicky behavior.
...After the attack...officials must continue a steady stream of authoritative information to control such rumors and fears [of future attacks], and must be prepared to enforce the regulations limiting the movement of population.

3) Problem

Shelter Phase - Resignation (weeks)

Allocation of food, water, and medical supplies; Care of injured, ill, and dying; Containment of serious emotional reactions, anxiety, fear, depression, and grief, brought on by "near-miss" experiences, sight of dead, and dying, loss of or separation from loved ones; Premature emergence; Apathy and uncooperativeness; [Spread of] wild rumors; Scapegoating and conflict; Convergency; Hoarding and black-marketeering; Coordination of rescue, repair, and control.

Finding

...Ideally, defense authorities should assign certain key personnel--religious, medical, as well as a general "shelter manager"...to move to certain shelters in the event of warning... Ideally, shelters should be equipped with radio communications...[Short of the ideal] it is essential that spontaneous, informal leadership arising in shelters be instructed as to the distinctive needs and problems of shelter life...[beginning with] an inventory of religious, medical, and welfare personnel within the shelter population...[as many] as possible of the healthy shelter occupants should be enlisted to assist in caring for [those] injured, ill, and dying...even if it "makes work"...Insofar as possible provide official, authoritative, and accurate information regarding the extent of the disaster, nationally and locally, to the shelter occupants...in estimating future events, authorities should err on the pessimistic side.
p. 238  ...Authorities [outside but] near damaged and contaminated areas should take early measures to keep persons in undamaged areas from moving into and roaming through damaged or contaminated areas.

p. 238  ...Authorities should be prepared--in advance if possible--to appropriate and ration these [fuel, medical supplies, and possibly food and water] commodities.

p. 241  Present defense arrangements concerning federal intervention...are replete with paradoxes... states and municipalities are at present woefully unprepared and in great need of area-wide and national coordination.

p. 243  ...it is necessary to specify in advance various alternative sources of authority...

p. 244  ...The greatest need for martial law would presumably arise when it became apparent that local governments were hopelessly inadequate to handle a chaotic situation. Were the situation handled from the beginning by a carefully formulated plan for federal action short of military government, this need would diminish correspondingly.

4) Problem Emergence Phase - Repair (months)

- Mobilization of personnel
- Maintenance of law and order
- Mass bereavement

Findings

...The problems of mobilizing individuals [people] for the task of re-establishing crucial lines of agricultural and industrial production cannot be managed through free market mechanisms or by local authorities. The central government looms large on many counts...the longer its parts remain debilitated from the effects of nuclear attack, the longer may we expect demoralization, disorder, and sluggishness in mobilizing the society into the later stages of adjustment.

Yet the central government [even if intact]...cannot manage everything.

***
Public authorities should be prepared to encourage and capitalize on the postattack burst of potentially productive energy of the "therapeutic community," a psychological spirit that has been shown to arise typically in the wake of disasters. Such a spirit, though known to last for many months, eventually subsides, at which time kinship ties that have been established, together with group ties other than kinship (ethnic and religious, most probably) will have to be relied on, and the government should be prepared to work, perhaps informally, through the leadership of such emergent groups as a basis of solidarity to re-orient and mobilize a shocked population. (Paraphrased from the original.)

The danger of challenges to law and order will probably be widespread during the emergence phase... One of the most pressing needs of the surviving government, then, is to keep military and police well stocked with necessary supplies—even at some cost to other groups—and to keep them under the firmest discipline.

What little discussion of the dead exists in the literature on postattack society concerns mainly the technical problems of identification and mass disposal. The problem of handling the survivors' grief is not mentioned. It is evident, however, that the strain on religious leaders, medical personnel, social workers, as well as relatives and friends, will be enormous... It is necessary to recognize that the handling of mass bereavement will probably be one of the major social problems confronting religious leaders and others in the months after attack.
5) Problem

Adjustment Phase - Rebuilding (years)

p. 253

Rebuilding of a capital base for future development:
- Re-establishment of agricultural production
- Rebuilding of harbors and rail centers
- Re-establishment of key industries, e.g., petroleum and steel
- Training and retraining of people

Findings

p. 254

Conflict between public figures of the emergence phase [heroes] and public leaders of the adjustment phase [presumably hard-working executives]. Maintenance of law and order.

p. 255

The government will probably have to withhold an unprecedented portion of the dollar in taxes...and assign low priority to the manufacture of many consumers' goods.

The government should institute some form of compensation for the heroes and sufferers of the earlier phases...to give due recognition to bravery and self-sacrifice in a time of national crisis; [and]...lessen the tendency for the heroes and martyrs to seek their recognition by engaging in political conflict.

The government should be firm and unyielding in the face of any overt expression--especially conspiracy and incitement to violence--which threatens law and order. At the same time it should encourage alternative channels of expression--free press, free speech, etc.--[because] they are...American traditions; and they encourage the expression of conflict in forms that do not threaten the legitimacy of the government.

The government should act to re-establish both centrally and locally, the legislative and judicial branches of government,[which during early phases may have become less active and less significant in face of the tremendous job shouldered by the executive.]
6) Problem Recovery Phase (decades)

p. 256 ...even if no nuclear attack materializes, it is inherently difficult to generate specific predictions about American society twenty or thirty years from now; we simply cannot assume as given all the intervening social forces and unanticipated events. This difficulty is increased if a social tragedy of only partially known proportions afflicts the society in the meantime.

Findings In many respects long-term recovery from nuclear attack poses the same analytic issues as long-term economic and social development.

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p. 259 Many of the major institutional problems of long-term recovery will probably arise from the degree of governmental involvement in the various institutional spheres...one characteristic of the American tradition is that this involvement has been relatively low...the "normal" state has been one of institutional autonomy...contrary to tradition--the government will very likely have to assume much more intimate guidance, regulation, and control of the non-political institutional spheres..., education, business, medical, etc.

Chapter III 1) Problem

p. 269 Population versus economic resources.
p. 271 Population versus scientific output.
p. 282 Population composition:
   Age/sex balance,
   Marital and Family Characteristics,
   Levels of education, training, and skill,
   Incidence of sick and disabled,
p. 311 Rate of population Growth:
   Birth rate, death rate.
...in the absence of civil defense preparations in all-out nuclear attack occurring around 1970 might kill approximately 69 percent of the total population... [such] a drastic decline in the nation's population might... take around 56 years to restore half its former level... and might...

have important social and economic consequences... [depending] heavily on the amount of capital and natural resources also destroyed... A fallout shelter program preserving additional lives but not additional resources would complicate the problem of making a living in the postattack environment. A sharp reduction in population would also affect the economies and diseconomies inherent in alterations of the scale of production. A smaller scale of production might present both economic disadvantages and advantages...

... adversely affect scientific output...

hence, its ability to make technological advances.

... reduce the power of the United States in international affairs... [depending on] the population loss sustained by other world powers.

... remain essentially unchanged [as to age]... a reduction in the number of persons... born near the time of attack would have the immediate effect of reducing the ratio of dependents to wage earners and hence enable the nation in the immediate postattack period to have a higher standard of living than would otherwise be possible... [but] it would tend to create a labor shortage seven years later... another possibility [is] that a reduction in the proportion of aged persons [in the early postattack period] would also tend to reduce the nation's burden of dependency... [and] would probably change the sex composition... much less than conventional wars.
Nuclear attack would create large changes in the marital and family status of the surviving population... up to 17 percent of all married persons would be widowed and up to 26 percent of all children might lose one or both parents... It is doubtful that nuclear attack could reduce median education attainment or occupational level below the not insubstantial level now obtaining among inhabitants of non-metropolitan areas... [but] the ratio of outstanding professionals and business leaders might be greatly decreased.

...increase the proportion of the permanently disabled [that would] last up to 80 years.

...the growth rate... might be nil for some time and lower than before the attack for a longer time.

Chapter IV
1) Problem
p. 452

...whether production will recover to a level adequate to support the survivors before the grace period afforded by surviving inventories comes to an end.

Findings
p. 452

...It will not be technologically feasible to achieve viability with a drastically more primitive division of labor, involving a large factor increase in the percentage of the population living on farms, unless perhaps this policy is deliberately adopted and prepared for. If the alternative of a major relocation of the surviving population is foreclosed, the levels of real gross national product per capita for viability are certainly not below those characteristic of the early years of this century, and are probably more like those of 1934--i.e., a fourth to a third of present levels... [Attack] levels on the order of [1000 to 3000 MT] might well make the attainment of the required levels of GNP per capita infeasible within the first year or two after the attack--roughly the time that might be made available by preparedness programs of the indicated type. The most obvious potential cause of such a collapse would be an all out attack on petroleum refineries, coupled with enough damage to transportation and to durable goods manufacturing to severely delay reconstruction...
Chapter V
1) Problem

[Potentials of "market" (U.S.) versus "organization" (USSR) societies for growth after nuclear attack]

Findings

Broadly, the impact of a generalized nuclear disaster in the United States would appear likely to promote further growth of organizational characteristics (although not necessarily to the degree of pushing it from the market to the organizational category). In the Soviet Union a nuclear disaster would likely retard or reverse the growth of market elements and result in the re-affirmation of the organization society.

Chapter VI
1) Problem

What scientific canons should be observed in combining these four orders of knowledge...
(potential of nuclear weapons for physical and biological destruction; empirical data about the targets of nuclear attack—the size and shape of what is being attacked; considerable empirical knowledge, however, imperfect about the social and psychological effects of other phenomena—famines, disaster, conventional bombings, [Hiroshima and Nagasaki], for example; a store of theory and empirical research on the general relations among social and psychological phenomena) if we are to generate the most nearly adequate predictions about the social and psychological consequences of nuclear attack?

Findings

The appropriate research strategy at the moment, then, is not to encourage the development of more and more refined statements as to the condition of postattack society, but to encourage general research on a wide range of comparable and historical situations so that our account of the effects of such a catastrophe can be built on a more solid empirical and theoretical foundation.

Chapter VII

Not applicable.
9. **Countermeasures or Findings**

Countermeasures - not applicable; see 8., above for findings, chapter by chapter and problem by problem. See also 11., Contributions, below.

10. **Recommendations**

See 8., Problems Addressed and Findings, above.

11. **Contribution**

[In Chapter II, Prof. Smelser defines a "set of variables, which form an interrelated system." The variables and his organization of them are given below, since they appear as a first step toward defining the social implications in a way that with further study could lend to meaningful inputs to models.]

**Variables**

**Independent:** The dimensions of the attack itself:
- Single or multiple strike;
- With or without follow-on invasion;
- Size (megatonnage);
- Proportion of surface to altitude bursts;
- Warning;

**First-Order Dependent:** Short-run behavioral responses (during and immediately after):
- Random, dazed, or immobile behavior;
- Uncontrolled looting;
- Collective panic;
- Heroic rescue and relief activities;
- Bereavement and its complications (depression, anxiety, hostility, psychosomatic disorders, etc.)
- Criminal and other deviant behavior (black marketing, looting, murder);
- Hostile outbursts and scapegoating
- Conflict among social groups (religious, ethnic, refugees vs. hosts);
- Religious behavior (rise of cults);
- Rebellion and revolution against the surviving government.
**First-Order Intervening:** Between the attack itself and the various short-run behavioral responses; the posture of American Society at the time of attack, for example:
- Family membership and its influence on individual behavior between warning and blast;
- Religious and ethnic identifications and their influences on behavior at and shortly after emergence from shelters,
- Distinctive American values and features of "national character" and their influences;
- Information and instruction people have received as to how to behave and their influences.

**Second-Order Intervening:** After the short-term behavioral responses have begun to appear (First-Order Dependent variables above):
- Attempts by social control agencies to contain and manage behavioral response and to channel behavior into lines of recovery and reconstitution.

**Second-Order Dependent:** Concerning the pattern of recovery of the society:
- Combinations of the four variables described above.
- The society's holding operations in the face of immediate crisis;

12. **Key References**

The 726 pages of this report contain over 600 footnotes containing almost 700 citations, ranging from Plato's Republic and the Bible to very recent clippings from the New York Times, including many reports of many other studies performed by such as Stanford Research Institute, and many books by such as Herman Kahn, Charles J. Hitch and Roland McKean, Arata Osada, Michihiko Hachiya, Irving L. Janis, and Archibald MacLeish.

13. **Costs**

Not applicable.
1. Title: The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction

Author: Fred Charles Ikle
Under grant from The Ford Foundation

Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press
Copyright 1958, Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 58-11611

2. Type of Study

p. vii [An inquiry into] the social consequences of actual [nuclear] bombing upon national populations and whole countries.

3. Key Descriptors

Social, demographic, economics, psychological.

4. Objectives of Study

p. viii ...the main purpose of this study is to encompass the total effect of bombing on cities or on a country as a whole. Accordingly, the approach will be demographic rather than psychological, without neglecting, however, psychological data on individuals in disaster situations. Thus, the problem will be studied largely in statistical terms, abstracted from its value content and devoid of references to personal or national interests. Such an approach is more likely to provide unbiased conclusions.

p. ...The emphasis is the relation between physical cause and social effect.

5. Assumptions

None identified.

Analytical Techniques and Models Used

p. 55 [A set of formula were developed] to clarify the relationship between the actual post-destruction population...and the housing remaining after attack...in terms of the following symbols:

47
p. 54

\[ P_1 = \text{Population of a city before destruction} \]
\[ P_2 = \text{Population of a city after destruction} \]
\[ H_1 = \text{Number of housing units before destruction} \]
\[ H_2 = \text{Number of housing units after destruction} \]
\[ F = \text{Number of fatalities} \]

p. 55

Thus, a city's potential housing density after destruction becomes:

\[ \frac{P_1 - F}{H_2} \]  

\( (1) \)

...Since the pre-destruction housing density is \( \frac{P_1}{H_1} \), the fully compensating increase in housing density \( \frac{P_1}{H_1} \) becomes

\[ \frac{P_1 - F}{H_2} - \frac{P_1}{H_1} \]  

\( (2) \)

Whereas the actual housing density is

\[ \frac{P_2}{H_2} - \frac{P_1}{H_1} \]  

\( (3) \)

6. Scenarios

Not applicable.

7. Measures of Effectiveness

p. 156

In order to draw the balance between losses and compensations we must find a common unit of measure. Since most of the social effects of bombing can be related to urban man power, the balance of losses and gains can be conveniently summarized in terms of the effects of bombings on the number of man-hours devoted to industries and activities essential for survival.
8. Problem Areas

p. 231 ...there remains the ultimate and ghastly question of whether an extreme use of nuclear weapons could actually extinguish all human life on earth. Some writers have called this possibility a real threat and stressed it with a macabre fascination...The misery and horrors of a nuclear war are beyond the power of human imagination and are not clarified by presaging the end of all human life. On the contrary, such prophecies deprive the threat of its realism. [Emphasis added.]

p. 226 ...The prerequisite for a living civilization is a society of living persons;...But there are many historical examples of civilizations disappearing even though the populations on which they were based continued to survive...but the causes remain obscure...One of the major problems of sociological theory concerns the way in which social institutions and customs, art, science, technology, law, government, religion, and ideologies are woven together to constitute a civilization.

p. 3 ...The only empirical evidence of the effect of nuclear weapons on society must come from mankind's only actual experience with nuclear bombing of cities--at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

First-hand knowledge of man's reaction to nuclear bombs is therefore--and most fortunately--very limited.

p. 179 ...the social effects of bombing, such as the losses in population, man-power, and other urban resources, together with the subsequent readjustments, can occur only in the political context of aggression and defense. The disaster forms an integral part of an international war, and its social effects are inseparably connected with the termination or continuation of hostilities.

Strangely enough, the relation between nuclear bombing and the termination of war has received little public attention, possibly because of two obstacles: first, most people encounter an emotional block when they try to imagine the aftermath of horror and misery in the context of continued hostilities and the prospect of further devastation and terror; and second, there is an intellectual difficulty of comprehending a world in which war continues amid widespread
nuclear destruction. It is difficult enough to picture a nuclear disaster's occurring in a society whose only effort is to mitigate its effects--as in the case of natural calamities--and the additional task of relating bombing effects to a continued war effort seems almost insurmountable. As a result, public discussions of nuclear bombing have generally left the impression that a war would end as soon as nuclear attacks have been launched. The heritage of death and destruction is then pictured as a part of the postwar period, and the way in which a thermonuclear war would be terminated remains unexplained.

Although the idea that there could be "broken-backed warfare" rather unlikely at first glance, it appears more likely after we have considered the alternatives. The fact is that none of the alternatives--surrender, truce, or a technical cessation of hostilities--may materialize quickly enough to prevent "broken-backed warfare."

... surrender and truce are two-sided decisions, depending on some agreement and cooperation between the...belligerents... The history of Japan's surrender from late 1944 until its consummation in August 1945, illustrates how difficult it is for a government to surrender...due partly to die-hard militarists [on both sides], partly to inadequate communications, and partly to tragic misunderstandings about Japan's minimum conditions for surrender in contrast to the political objectives of the United States.

[Technical cessation would require the destruction] of nearly all of the men and material...[unlikely] if the existing military forces have been properly protective [in which] case the hostilities would not cease without a true agreement.

Our imagination is appalled when we try to visualize the state of society which is exposed to additional nuclear attacks during a period of "broken-backed warfare."

[Details of the large problem addressed in this book are as follows:]

In the event of nuclear attacks, the normal mechanisms provided for the replacement of important government functionaries will break down in many instances.
We cannot adequately treat the possible social effects of chemical...bacteriological or virological forms of attack.

Of all the urban services affected by bombing, housing is most susceptible to quantitative statistical study.

...how the aftermath of bombing destruction affects the productivity of the workers who remain in the city.

Food Supply and Other Essentials

Factors Reducing Man Power

The Economy of the Remainder

National Organization and Decision-Making

"Broken-Backed Warfare" [described as] the conduct of hostilities after intense atomic attacks.

...genetic effects...

[ from footnote 5: ] ...the question of the lethal effect of a United States Strategic Air Force attack against Russia...

9. Findings

The world-wide spread of radioactive fall-out material is sometimes suggested as a possible lethal agent for all persons on earth. While it is impossible to state how much damage it might do to human lives, even if the forms of attack were given, it is nonetheless clear that the world-wide spread of the contaminant would be very uneven. Hence one can expect large population groups to remain free of serious irradiation, even if the amount of radioactive material produced were far in excess of the amount which could -- if uniformly spread -- cause lethal contamination in all populated areas. Fall-out has to be distributed by high-altitude winds in order to effect large areas. Nearly all the likely targets in a possible all out war are located on the northern hemisphere. Thus, it follows that the populations which would be least affected are those on the southern hemisphere, most of which have a huge actual or potential rate of growth.

Those speculatively inclined, then, ought to picture the world after an all out nuclear attack with extreme fall-out contamination not as a planet inhabited only by lower forms of plant life, immune to radioactivity, but as a world with expanding
populations and perhaps thriving economies in South America, South Africa, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. From this picture one might try to look still further ahead and perhaps reach the conclusion that the surviving generations would be further away from a peaceful millennium than ever because of the deep racial, religious, and ideological differences that divide the peoples of the southern hemisphere. Indeed -- thus speculation could continue -- both Capitalism and Communism might survive, since both might be represented among the survivor nations. But the powerful states which fought for these issues would have disappeared from history -- much as the Inca Empire and the realm of Carthage have ended forever.

The most seriously threatened elements of civilization are the political and governmental organization and the economic structure. In the aftermath of the bombing disaster the traditional forms of government would be inoperative, and this would lead to military control and emergency measures. After the end of the war, it might be a slow and difficult process to revert to the prewar situation, and many governmental innovations -- for good or evil -- might remain in force.

The economic structure that would evolve in the postwar era is of particular interest since it is so closely linked with political and ideological developments. Apart from the enormous loss in total national wealth, there are two especially serious problems for any postwar economic system. One is the unequal and largely fortuitous distribution of property losses among the survivors; the other is the destruction of many financial records that are necessary to determine property relationships.

"Panic" is defined as individual or collective behavior that is contrary to the interests and safety of the individuals or society. It is characterized by fear and a lack of rational thinking and is prompted by sudden danger or disaster -- real or imaginary. Within this definition of panic, a mass flight from the site of an explosion is not in itself a panic. A hurried exit from the scene of a nuclear holocaust is perhaps the most rational action a person could take. One could argue, on the contrary, that only those paralyzed by panic would passively await death or certain injury in their dwellings in the face of a nuclear attack.

In the event of nuclear attacks, the normal mechanisms provided for the replacement of important government functionaries will break down in many instances. A replacement procedure based on popular elections will be out of the question...
... the legal replacement mechanism for the office of President of the United States, for example, would be entirely inadequate.

The use of biological or chemical weapons against livestock or crops seems remote, since the only purpose would be to reduce the food resources of a nation. It is scarcely conceivable that a belligerent would choose such a circuitous and -- compared with nuclear weapons -- such an ineffective method of attacking a population.

In principle, the social effects of chemical and biological warfare, in contrast to those of nuclear and conventional bombing attacks consist of all the effects of casualties without the effects of destruction, such as homelessness, disrupted transportation and communication facilities, and shortages of consumer goods. Consequently, the ratio between consumers and physical resources would decrease, not increase as in nuclear and conventional bombing (with the exception of medical supplies). The impact of these types of warfare upon morale would basically correspond to the general impact of casualties upon morale.

...five months [after Hamburg had lost almost half its housing]... less than 2 percent of Hamburg's homeless [had been accommodated in emergency housing]... Hamburg's recuperation was the most remarkable of all the heavily bombed cities in World War II and... the resources of the whole German Reich could still be rallied at that time to aid in the recovery. How much less can then be expected from emergency construction after nuclear attacks upon several cities of a nation!

To be effective in a nuclear attack, evacuation must take place before the first bomb has exploded. People would have to react toward a danger they have not yet perceived or experienced. Since strong motivation is lacking in this instance, this plan of evacuation is likely to be abandoned in face of obstacles or deprivations.

...Undoubtedly, survivors of a nuclear explosion who are endangered by the ensuing fire storms will flee as fast as they can. Mass flight may save many from death by asphyxiation or heat. However, if the fleeing masses fear that they may be entrapped or that escape routes may become blocked, panic is likely to follow. Therefore, it is most important to facilitate immediate post-attack evacuation if adequate shelters are not available.
Compulsory powers [of billeting officers]...were not used very vigorously during World War II. They are obviously of little value if children alone must be billeted, for children should not be left with foster parents who lack willingness and sympathy. Thus the burden of caring for evacuated children was distributed quite unequally in some reception areas. The poor and congested parts of reception towns according to British reports, were convinced that they should accept children while the wealthier and roomier parts were left undisturbed. In the case of homeless adults compulsory billeting can be more widely used, since adults can be accommodated in households even though they are not willingly accepted by the hosts...the development and revisions of British evacuation plans since the beginning of World War II have led to increasingly greater support for private arrangements. Evidently experience has proved the great value of encouraging people to select their own billets.

The tribulations of evacuation, which seemed so serious in World War II, will be accepted more readily in an era of nuclear warfare. Personal hardships will be dwarfed by the appalling fatalities, the widespread incidence of radiation sickness, and the sheer terror of the enormous destruction.

...nearly total destruction—such as would result from nuclear bombings—would probably break up the central network of utility systems, and surrounding regions would then have to reorganize their utility services on an independent basis. But complete failure of any of these services: transportation, communication, and housekeeping (gas, electricity, water, sewerage, etc.) would certainly delay rehabilitation and might even jeopardize the lives of those who survive the bombing. Ingenuity and co-ordination in the effort to restore these utilities would be of great importance in the post-disaster period, even more so than the repair of housing, which can be done on a more gradual and individual basis. For the repair of utilities, skilled workers and highly specialized tools and parts are essential; hence this is an area where civil defense preparations can make significant contributions.

...for about a week [after the raids on Hamburg] rationing was virtually abolished and foodstuffs which before the raids were unavailable even for coupons were distributed free to those who had stayed in the city. This naturally bolstered morale and encouraged the working population to carry on...
It has been emphasized that limited alternatives restrict the voluntary behavior of air-raid survivors. The daily need for food is the paramount limitation to such alternatives. This fact can be utilized by the government to influence the public, if it still controls the nation's food supply after bombing attacks. An evacuation policy or rehabilitation program after heavy attacks can be enforced most effectively by withholding ration cards from unauthorized evacuees and by increasing rations and special allowances of hard-to-get foods for workers engaged in the recuperation effort.

In summary, bombing has a three-fold effect upon durable consumer goods and clothing. First, it destroys existing stocks and reduces current production of civilian goods (in wartime, civilian production of civilian goods is further curtailed because of shortages). Second, bombing disrupts the distribution system for consumer goods. And third, it suddenly creates an enormous increase in demand, far in excess of the highest demand ever occurring in peacetime, because housing destruction necessitates replacements in the entire range of household goods and personal effects.

There is a distinction between direct and indirect man-power losses from casualties... The former is the numerical reduction in the number of workers who survive and are able to work, and the latter is the diversion of labor from productive activities to the care of casualties. Both types of losses were negligible under the conventional bombing of World War II. But nuclear bombing results in a much greater number of fatalities, more injured people, and many serious illnesses from initial and residual (fall-out) radiation. This triple man-power loss from fatalities, mechanical and heat injuries, and irradiation sickness constitutes one of the most important effects of nuclear bombing upon a nation's war or recuperation effort.

The assumption is frequently made that nuclear attacks upon the large cities of a country would somehow automatically result in a nationwide "breakdown," a paralysis of the whole country which would end the war immediately. No proof is given for this assumption, and nothing is said about what would happen to the war if this instantaneous "paralysis" occurred on both sides. It should be pointed out here that there is a very simple causal relationship between nuclear attacks and a nation's capacity to continue a war. This is the sheer reduction in urban man-power which results from casualties (i.e., death, injuries, and sickness). Until this clear-cut effect has been more carefully explored, there is no reason to accept such vague concepts as "breakdown of society" or "national collapse," which have an all-embracing, almost mystic connotation, and hence are not useful for an objective study.
The indirect man-power effect of causalties will be serious in the event of widespread irradiation sickness. Many healthy persons from the fringe areas will have to make a choice between nursing their sick and injured family members and working for the war or rehabilitation effort.

Fatalities also impose an indirect man-power drain [in disposing of the dead], but this is much less than that caused by the sick and injured. Normal peacetime forms of burial will have to be dispensed with and the effect of burials on man-power will be very important. In Hamburg, [for example,] some 30,000 bodies -- about three-fourths of all the fatalities -- were buried in a mass grave prepared in the municipal cemetery with construction machines.

The most significant facts about urban man-power can now be recapitualted. First, after nuclear attacks, casualties constitute by far the most important loss in labor force. Second, long-term evacuation removes workers from the urban industrial sites (but many of these would be physically destroyed anyway), leaving, however, the possibility of some re-employment in the reception areas if industrial towns and smaller cities remain free of serious damage. Third, a further loss in productive man-power is caused by repair and decontamination activities. And lastly, there is widespread disorganization, which leads to a waste of man-hours and lowered efficiency, especially immediately after attack.

The measure which can compensate some of this man-power loss most rapidly is the lengthening of the working week and increase in labor force participation (i.e., adding young people, women and retired workers) will further augment the man-power resources. However, transfer from nonessential to essential activities is administratively cumbersome and takes considerable time to become effective.

It is significant that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not cause the survivors to lose interest in the outcome of the war. Indeed, to many citizens the fate of the nation and the hoped-for victory seemed more important than their own individual survival. Whether such a reaction was peculiar to the Japanese is hard to say, but all accounts confirm their continued concern about defeat or victory.
Hydrogen bombs can cause destruction in such a large area that a single bomb could demolish nearly all the resources of a large city or even of a metropolitan region. Only the resources located underground could escape obliteration. Protective measures, such as evacuation and deep shelters, could save a substantial part of the population, but there would not be sufficient physical resources left to revitalize the city while the war continued. Furthermore, residual radioactivity near the site of the explosion might necessitate long-term evacuation of all survivors. Hence the compensation and recuperation processes...would have to take place on a nationwide scale. The elasticity of housing, for example, would quickly be exhausted within the metropolitan region, and urban survivors would have to be billeted in other areas of the country.

A disaster of this magnitude cannot be comprehended in terms of its local effects on single cities, but must be assessed within a larger framework. Basically, the post-attack situation is determined by the resources which remain in the country as a whole. Foremost in importance are the total national population that survives the urban attacks and escapes the possible fallout effects. Next in importance are the total food and housing left in the nation and the ability of the transportation system to bring survivors to the remaining billets and food to all the people. These are the prerequisites for the survival of the nation and of any economic or military potential.

Throughout the areas affected by bombing, the economy will at first be totally disrupted because of the casualties, the physical damage, and the tremendous fallout hazard. Before anything else, the people will have to satisfy their most urgent needs for food and housing. In the long run, food will be more critical than housing because all evacuees can eventually find billets by doubling up in the undestroyed houses in small towns and villages. However, enough food will be left in the country because the destroyed cities are consumers rather than producers of food. In a country like the United States, which has large stock-piles of food the effects of radioactive contamination of livestock and crops could be cushioned until new crops were available -- provided, however, there would not be renewed or lingering contamination affecting the new crop. The threat of starvation among the survivors will arise not from a basic lack of foodstuffs within the nation as a whole, but from the difficulties of transporting and distributing food to all the people. If food has been stock-piled in widely separated places throughout the nation, no area will be entirely without food after an attack in spite of disrupted transportation.
[As to commodities other than food] many...will be scarce and some will be missing entirely...there will be a shortage of man-power for building factories where none existed before; component products and raw materials will be lacking or scarce; and the high casualty rate may leave practically no survivors with the necessary specialized skills in fields in which the training of new specialists may require several years.

The continuity of the national government depends on the survival of the principal government officials (or the effective designation of successors) and on a communication system, which permits these officials to maintain contact with each other and to retain control over the military and local authorities.

It may be useful to approach the problem from the bottom of the governmental hierarchy...it is readily conceivable that important local offices could be rendered perfectly safe against fallout radiation...The extent to which protective preparations have been made will determine the continuity of local government in the fall-out areas. However, failures in electric power may extend into areas which are otherwise intact and disrupt telephone and radio communications.

The most urgent task of the local authorities in undestroyed areas which are not subject to fall-out will be to accommodate evacuees and to send relief in the form of food and medical help to the stricken areas. In areas where there is a fall-out hazard, however, decontamination and other safety procedures must take precedence over outside relief work.

Law and order will be maintained by the inertia of cultural traits and the persistence of people's habits. The great devastations may offer opportunities for looting, but law-abiding citizens will not suddenly turn into criminals. There is absolutely no evidence from past disasters of a precipitate increase in crime, although a gradual rise in the delinquency rate usually occurs during prolonged wars...Such an inordinate amount of attention has been given to the possibility of looting and other crimes after nuclear bombings that this bias deserves to be corrected.

Disruption of communications between the local and national authorities will arise not only from the destruction of the capital but also from misunderstanding and confusion at the local level. Local officials are not normally prepared to take orders from unfamiliar officials in high government positions.
The delegation of decision-making to regional and local agencies will greatly facilitate the continuity of administrative functions at a time when the traditional hierarchy of the government has been disrupted, but independent action of local government officials cannot lead to a co-ordinated national policy without directives from a central authority.

p. 190 As to "broken-backed warfare", footnote II is quoted as follows in its entirety:

Statement on Defense, 1954, Cmd. 207 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1954). The key passage reads: "If by some miscalculation in Communist policy or by deliberate design, a global war were to be forced upon us, it must be assumed that atomic weapons would be employed by both sides. In this event, it seems likely that such a war would begin with a period of intense atomic attacks lasting a relatively short time but inflicting great destruction and damage. If no decisive result were reached in this opening phase, hostilities would decline in intensity, though perhaps less so at sea than elsewhere and a period of "broken-backed" warfare would follow during which the opposing sides would seek to recover their strength, carrying on the struggle in the meantime as best they might." The most recent British White Papers on defense are more concerned with deterrence than with "broken-backed warfare," thus reflecting the true objectives of the defense effort. But the term remains a useful name for hostilities that continue after deterrence has failed.

p. 201 There are many examples from World War II where the stronger force wanted to speed up the enemy's surrender by delivering the last knock-out blows. It is now quite clear that this additional destruction contributed very little to hastening the surrender, but it brought a heavy legacy for the future that has proved to be invariably detrimental to the winner. One of the most tragic examples is the German attack on...Rotterdam...Another is the British attack on...Dresden...which was packed with refugees from the east. So huge were the casualties that about thirty thousand bodies were found during the next two months. Even now the more than a decade later, the Communist authorities in Dresden are still exploiting the memory of this formidable event to stir up hatred against the West. Finally, with regard to the atomic bombings in Japan, strong arguments have been advanced that these attacks, too, did not produce the enemy's surrender; it is said that simple political arrangements could have accomplished the same end much sooner and at an immensely lower cost to both sides.
The final conclusion is somewhat paradoxical. After widespread nuclear attacks, war production and mobilization would be practically halted, and, with further attacks or the threat of them, there would be no recuperation. But this alone would probably not end the war because residual military capabilities -- especially nuclear weapons -- could prolong "broken-backed warfare." Therefore a political settlement would be imperative to save the remainder of the belligerent nations from ultimate destruction. Additional bombing alone might not accomplish the termination of the war because the residual military capabilities could be made almost invulnerable to bombing attack and the social effects of bombing would accrue much too slowly to lead to political action. The means to end the destructive agony would thus belong almost exclusively to the political sphere.

Indeed, there is no scientific justification for attributing greater importance to genetic [long-range] effects of nuclear bombing than to other effects that appear to be more serious and can be expected with much greater certainty.

...No other question on about thermonuclear bombing is more important than how many people in the nation or the world at large could survive such a war.

In the hearings of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force in 1956, the question of the lethal effect of United States Strategic Air Force attack against Russia in the event of nuclear war was answered by Lieutenant General James M. Gavin as follows: "Current planning estimates run on the order of several hundred million deaths that would be either way depending upon which way the wind blew. If the wind blew to the southeast they would be mostly in the U.S.S.R., although they would extend into the Japanese and perhaps down to the Philippine area. If the wind blew the other way they would extend well back up into Western Europe." (New York Times, June 29, 1956.)

10. Recommendations

[None specifically identified other than what might be inferred from 9. Findings, above.]

11. Contribution of this Study

[Since this described the possible effects of nuclear war on people including their survival, their food and shelter, their employment and productivity, and their government, it provided a background for postattack research.]
12. **Key References**

[The selected Bibliography to this book is extensive. No detailed analysis of it has been made, but at the risk of offending authors overlooked, the following appear to be particularly pertinent on cursory examination:]


13. **Costs**

Not applicable.
This page intentionally left blank.
1. **Title:** Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social Control

2. **Authors:** Charles E. Fritz and J. W. Mathewson

3. **Contractor:** National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Washington, D.C., Committee on Disaster Studies

4. **Report:** Publication 476, 102 pp., 1957

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 57-60019

5. **Type of Study**

   p. 1  
   [An analysis] of current disaster research bearing on convergence behavior.

6. **Key Descriptors**

   Social, behavior, convergence.

7. **Objectives**

   p. 1  
   [To assess the convergence problem in terms of its magnitude, the major forms it takes (personal, informational, and material), the kinds of people who converge on disaster areas, and techniques that have been used, successfully or otherwise, to cope with it.]

8. **Assumptions**

   None identified.

9. **Scenarios**

   Not applicable.

10. **Measures of Effectiveness**

    Not applicable.

11. **Problem Areas**

    p. 7  
    ...current data are sufficient to indicate that the actual physical movement of persons in and toward the disaster area and toward specific points in contiguous and proximate zones has provided the most direct, immediate, and persistent problem of control in nearly every recent disaster.
..."jamming," "swamping," or "overloading" of existing communication facilities and informational centers. Communication convergence, like personal convergence, is a persistent problem of disaster control.

...the "deluge" of supplies which "flood" into the disaster area and into hospitals and relief centers...(1) normally arrive in volumes far in excess of the actual needs; (2) in large proportion, are comprised of unneeded and unusable materials; (3) require the services of large numbers of personnel and facilities which could be used for more essential tasks and functions; (4) often cause conflict relations among relief agencies or among various segments of the population; (5) materially add to the problem of congestion in and near the disaster area; and (6) in some cases, may be disruptive to the local economy.

[There is a] general tendency to characterize all "unauthorized external convergers" as "sightseers." ...the term...has neither research nor operational utility; it simply obscures a number of important distinctions in the nature and needs of the converging population.

...Most of the evacuees will become returnees at some time period following a disaster's impact.

This "pull of the familiar" can be documented in many disaster studies, both wartime and peacetime.

Footnote 21...So far as the writers were able to determine, there have been no systematic studies of the spatial distribution of kinship groups on a national scale.

9. Findings

It is possible to distinguish three major forms of convergence:

1) Personal Convergence: The actual physical movement of persons on foot, by auto or other vehicle.

2) Informational Convergence: The movement or transportation of messages.

3) Materiel Convergence: The physical movement of supplies and equipment.

[With regard to personal convergence:]
p. 12 "...From what happened at Hiroshima, it is apparent that special problems of disaster control are likely to arise in connection with keeping unauthorized persons out of stricken or contaminated areas (unless avoidance tendencies have been built up by public information about the dangers of radioactivity). Apparently there were strong "approach" motives among the survivors: to search for the missing, to salvage possessions, or to satisfy curiosity." [This citation from I. L. Janis, *Air War and Emotional Stress*, The RAND Series, McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc. (1951) is repeated here as illustrative of the many given to support the conclusion.]

p. 29 ...we delineate five major types of informal or unofficial convergers [that are not] mutually exclusive categories of persons, but [which represent] dominant motivations at a given point in time...
...roughly in the order of legitimacy...ranging from those which are normally conceived to have inalienable rights of access to the disaster area to those whose movement into the area should be curtailed or prevented:

p. 30 The Returnees - ...disaster survivors who have left or...been evacuated...but who...wish to return to the homesite. [Including] residents of the disaster area who were absent...when the disaster struck and non-resident property owners...and relatives or friends of disaster victims who enter the disaster area to assess the victim's losses, and to retrieve, guard, and salvage their property.

p. 36 The Anxious - ...In a fundamental sense, the disaster-affected population consists not only of the people directly affected by the disaster but also of people who are indirectly affected by virtue of their identification with disaster victims or the stricken community. [See Problem, 9., cited from p. 36.]

p. 37 [The] spatially transcendent quality of kinship and friendship groups in American society is a fact of paramount importance for disaster management and control...the effective unit of disaster management is not confined to the disaster population, but extends to persons and groups throughout the nation and various parts of the world...
Anxiety over the whereabouts and condition of loved ones is clearly one of the major determinants of personal convergence, internal and external...within moments after the impact of an instantaneous disaster, survivors in the impact area begin their anxious search for missing family members...[followed shortly] by impact-area residents temporarily outside the impact zone and relatives and friends who reside in contiguous and proximate zones.

...anxiety-motivated [personal] convergence has provided immediate problems of congestion and "confusion" in the disaster area, and at medical, communication, and relief centers located in the contiguous and proximate zones...

...present data suggest that the volume of external convergence is very large, [mostly] comprised of...anxious and help-motivated persons.

The Helpers - ...a significant portion of the emergency relief and restorative activity...is handled on an informal, unofficial basis...

...A large share of the volunteer aid in peacetime disasters can be attributed to the fact that organized disaster forces have not arrived in sufficient strength...to render the needed assistance during the early stages of disaster...although...many of the tasks [will be turned over] to formal, organized forces [as soon as such forces] can better supply the need.

...disaster-struck populations have demonstrated a consistent preference for private and informal solutions over public and formal solutions, even when the latter objectively may be more adequate than the former..."the need is to be not just cared for but cared about."

The Curious - ...during the early post-impact phase of a disaster, we would normally expect curiosity-motivated...behavior [by] persons...not preoccupied with pressing personal concerns.
Later, however, the initial curiosity seekers are likely to be augmented by survivors who were formerly anxious about their own or other's safety and welfare, and by persons who enter the disaster area from outside.

... most curiosity convergence... does not arise from neurotic impulses or "ghoulish glee"... but rather... from the need to assimilate happenings which lie outside the viewer's frame of reference or realm of experience, and which may affect his future safety.

The volume of personal curiosity convergence... [may] be reduced considerably by finding "substitute" means of satisfying curiosity needs.

The Exploiters - the extent of exploitation that occurs in disasters is usually grossly exaggerated in popular thinking...

Although disasters increase the opportunities for exploitation, they often reduce the motivation...

[from Footnote 61]... disasters produce basic changes in social norms and individual behavior. Failure to appreciate these changes often leads to concentration of attention on imaginary or minor problems.

Looters, Pilferers or Souvenir Hunters, Relief Stealers, and Profiteers are discussed. The following excerpt regarding looting is cited:

In none of the peacetime disasters studied has there been [significant] looting or major theft... when compared with the formal, government-sanctioned confiscation of patent rights, productive facilities, or other movable or transferable resources belonging to the conquered nation.

The security forces guarding a disaster area, of course, usually have maximal opportunity to engage in looting and minimal emotional involvement in the situation—a fact which logically suggests that their potentiality for looting is much greater than that of the general population.
The security authorities [police, national guard, etc.] responsible for control or maintenance of orderly social processes quite generally have instituted methods that are oriented almost exclusively towards constriction or restraint...understandable in view of the quasi-military nature of their organization and the fact that their normal day-to-day experience is limited mainly to contacts with criminals, offenders, and suspects...this orientation is distinctly nonfunctional in meeting the needs posed by disaster. The human needs entering into convergence behavior cannot be disposed of by indiscriminant use of restraint, constriction, or suppression. To "dam" these needs means simply that their satisfaction will be achieved by resort to unofficial, "subterranean" channels.

The projection of normal, day-to-day law enforcement experience into the disaster situation probably accounts for many of the fallacious conceptions which guide control measures in disasters...for example, that crowds will engage in "unruly" and "unlawful" behavior, and that there will be widespread looting. The empirical evidence from numerous studies discredits these beliefs. It is difficult to find a single, clear-cut instance of an unruly or unlawful crowd either in recent domestic disasters or in World War II bombing disasters.

...Much of the movement in disasters is of the "silent" type which goes unnoticed by authorities. Voluntary and unofficial movement probably has always exceeded the amount of officially controlled movement...

...It is axiomatic that the pressures that result in such breakthroughs...control in one area may cause continuous leaks or serious breakdowns in other parts of the control structure...stem directly from unsatisfied human needs and that until such needs are met in substantial measure, the problem is not solved...the situation is not truly under control...these findings suggest the dubious validity of general reconstructions of disaster behavior based solely on the testimony of "official" or "expert" information.

[With regard to informational converge:]

68
In disasters where only a few hundred people are killed, injured, and rendered homeless, the total number of personal welfare inquiries may number in the tens and hundreds of thousands. How then can we account for this great volume of "unnecessary" convergence? It might be noted here that the volume...is largely a function of (1) the accuracy and specificity of information concerning the geographic scope of the disaster and the population directly affected, and (2) the degree to which this information is rapidly gathered, evaluated, and disseminated. Disaster reports leave little doubt that the dissemination of erroneous, ambiguous, and sensational information concerning the disaster and the failure to coordinate quickly the information-gathering and dissemination services are largely responsible for the immediacy and persistency of this problem.

[With regard to materiel convergence:]

Many disaster accounts refer to the "deluge" of supplies which "flood" into the disaster area and into hospitals and relief centers.

The needs in disaster are strategic and selective needs. Equipment, supplies, and services are needed in particular quantities, types, times, and places. The mass media are not well adapted to serve this strategic supply purpose, since there is little control that can be exercised over the potential donors once the appeal is made. The central difficulty in the use of these media, in other words, is that they require institution of a screening function after the supplies begin arriving rather than prior to their solicitation.

[To illustrate the consequences of the indiscriminant use of mass media, the following examples are paraphrased:

Over 500 persons drove automobiles to Flint-Beecher, Michigan, in answer to a public appeal for flashlights during the tornado. In the same disaster, just as one of the hospitals was beginning to achieve order, 2000 unwanted blood donors showed up as the result of local radio appeals. Likewise, in Waco, Texas, the Red Cross blood center had to open and work for 48 straight hours, although it had been closed because all hospitals and military establishments had a three months supply on hand.]
10. **Recommendations**

Regarding the needs for information:

- the development of a systematic policy and program for handling information and communications in disasters... 
  
- either the technical facilities of communication or a planned network of human communicators is a prerequisite for maintaining communication over a broad social field...

NORC recommends that a corps of persons be pre-designated as informational specialists and given special training in speedy and accurate information gathering in the area for which they are responsible...this corps should be available immediately to set up headquarters and collect information from various sources, direct casualties to appropriate locations, compile data on the persons dead, injured and safe, provide information to the organized rescue, medical, mortuary, law enforcement, and relief forces, coordinate this information in their own area, and check and clear information for dissemination to other areas. Provisions for alternate headquarters...and...personnel are also recommended.

Owners of emergency communication equipment ("Ham" radio operators, owners of loud speaker equipment, etc.) and operators of communications facilities at fixed installations (radio stations, telephone switchboards, newspapers, and other printing establishments) would be integrated into this corps and provided with the complementary personnel (e.g., couriers and clerks) needed...

The corps suggested here would recognize the need for a total inventory of the affected population. The corps would be organized to cover every section of the disaster-affected area, each point of ingress and egress from the area, and all major communication, control, medical, and relief centers in the contiguous and proximate zones. It would also recognize that convergence arises too quickly and in too great volume to be handled effectively by outside control or law enforcement agencies; and that most immediate problems of convergence can be solved by providing accurate information and positive guidance rather than by using physical constraint or other forms of negative sanction.
...it may be necessary to develop public sanction by a program of education which would emphasize the crucial role of informational needs in disaster.

...pre-disaster canvassing of the population and up-to-date registers of emergency addresses...Similarly, in the post-disaster period, the active canvassing of the population to determine informational needs...

...many of the informal information and communication needs are more imperative than those which currently originates from organizational sources and...a sound information policy must recognize these needs and take them into account in preparing operational plans.

...Failures of recognition and acceptance of the role [of representatives of the press, radio, television, and other mass media] ...have sometimes isolated newsmen from the accurate or authoritative sources of information...[from ISONEVD] "In a time of crisis, it appears that a coordinated news service is a condition sine qua non..."a special section of any disaster planning ought to be devoted to the care of the press"...representatives of [the press media should be] brought together to develop a code of disaster reporting and news dissemination which will protect freedom of the press and the right of a wider audience to know the facts and, at the same time, prevent or minimize the problems discussed in this report.

[Regarding control of population movement]

...Beyond a doubt there is merit in the basic premise of the operation of roadblocks in or around disaster-struck areas...

...The speed and volume of movement normally is so great that it cannot be handled effectively by the ordinary security forces available—a fact which emphasizes the need to train large numbers of local volunteers for traffic direction and control tasks...

...next in importance...is keeping routes clear for the flow of emergency traffic...the patrolling of routes by cruising police vehicles, guided and controlled, wherever feasible, by observer aircraft.

...The transportation of all casualties to hospitals, with no regard for the severity or type of injury, is one of the major contributions to the congestion which occurs around medical centers. This...suggests a threefold function for roadblocks established around the perimeter of a disaster area: (1) the security force operation to control all forms
of traffic in and out of the area; (2) a medical triage operation, and (3) an information-communication operation... locations for the operations should be adequate and strategic... each station should be connected to a master... station which... would be immediately identifiable to every regular member of the disaster organization.

...further study of traffic passes made by "Project East River:"

Traffic Passes - It is evident that a system of passes for civil defense traffic on streets and highways must be instituted...

[Regarding materiel convergence:]

...centralize and coordinate supply functions...
...incorporate the major voluntary associations as well as the formal disaster agencies.

11. Contribution of This Study

[This study defines one of the main control problems to which civil defense operational plans should be addressed:]

The care of people--their shelter, medical attention, transportation. The dissemination of accurate, needed information. The distribution of supplies and services.

[The findings that resulted from this study suggest the establishment of systems and procedures, including the following:]

Triage procedures for handling casualties,
Roadblock and other traffic control measures to ensure as nearly as possible the flow of necessary traffic by reducing congestion and bottlenecks,
Pre-disaster assessment of potential post-disaster needs for supplies and establishment of emergency supply sources,
Pre-disaster plans and organization for post-disaster canvassing to determine needs not met by emergency sources.
Pre-disaster organization of post-disaster communications capability from the highest level of commercial and mass media facilities down through person-to-person, face-to-face vocal relay.

Public education]

12. Key References

Too many to identify a short list.

13. Costs

None given.
1. **Title:** Air War and Emotional Stress - Psychological Studies of Bombing

   **Author:** I. L. Janis

   **Contractor:** The RAND Corporation

   **Contract No.:** None identified


2. **Type of Study**

   p. v 

   ...one of a series of monographs... [under the auspices of the RAND Corporation.]

3. **Key Descriptors**

   Psychological, emotion, stress, behavior.

4. **Objectives of Study**

   p. v 

   ...to evaluate the psychological effects of [atomic] air warfare and to indicate the nature of problems in this field which may arise in planning the defense of the United States against air attack.

5. **Assumptions**

   p. 101 

   It is generally recognized that if at some future time large-scale A-bomb attacks are launched against the United States, the psychological impact upon the American people might prove to be as shattering as the physical devastation. Moreover, long before any wartime disaster occurs, there may be a high degree of psychological vulnerability to the A-bomb threat.

   p. 182 

   1. That a potential enemy of the United States will possess a large stockpile of A-bombs and effective carriers for delivering them against targets within the United States so that, in the event of war, our cities and industries will be threatened.
2. That there will be a "cold-war" period of at least two or three years during which this country will have an opportunity to carry out defensive measures in order to minimize our vulnerability to A-bomb attacks.

3. That the A-bomb threat will not be eliminated by the development of any special counter-A-bomb weapon or by an effective international agreement for the control of atomic energy.

6. Scenarios

None specifically identified.

7. Measures of Effectiveness

Not applicable.

8. Problem Areas

Although a considerable amount of information is available on "conventional" air warfare, there is a dearth of relevant material on atomic warfare. Very little psychological research has been carried out among the tens of thousands of Japanese survivors who lived through the disasters at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

[See also entry from p. 194 in 9., Findings, below.]

The tremendous devastation in the disaster area will be a disturbing factor. Even more upsetting will be the sight of people who have been killed and injured. Especially among medical aid personnel, the problem of preventing emotional shock reactions is an acute one because of the extreme disfigurement and mutilation of human bodies produced by an atomic explosion. John Hersey, author of Hiroshima, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1946 gives a graphic account of the unnerving experiences that beset survivors who set about the task of aiding the injured in Hiroshima.
[Father Kleinsorge, a German priest]...heard a voice ask from the underbrush, "Have you anything to drink?"...When he had penetrated the bushes, he saw there were about twenty men, and they were all in exactly the same nightmarish state," their faces were wholly burned, their eyesockets were hollow, the fluid from their melted eyes had run down their cheeks...Their mouths were mere swollen, pus-covered wounds, which they could not bear to stretch enough to admit the spout of the teapot.

Mr. Tanimoto [a Japanese clergyman] found about twenty men and women on the sandspit...He reached down and took a woman by the hands, but her skin slipped off in huge, glove-like pieces. He was so sickened by this that he had to sit down for a moment. Then he got out into the water and, though a small man, lifted several of the men and women, who were naked, into his boat. Their backs and breasts were clammy, and he remembered uneasily what the great burns he had seen during the day had been like: yellow at first, then red and swollen, with the skin sloughed off, and finally, in the evening, suppurated and smelly...On the other side, at a higher spot, he lifted the slimy living bodies out and carried them up the slope away from the tide. He had to keep consciously repeating to himself, "These are human beings."

...bewildered by the numbers [inside the hospital], staggered by so much raw flesh, Dr. Sasaki lost all sense of profession and stopped working as a skillful surgeon and a sympathetic man; he became an automaton, mechanically wiping, daubing, winding, wiping, daubing, winding.

1 Brackets in source document.
Near the entrance to the park, an Army doctor was working but the only medicine he had was iodine, which he painted over cuts, bruises, slimy burns, everything—and by now everything that he painted had pus on it.

p. 222 There is a twofold problem here. First the disaster victims will require calm, reassuring, patient handling during the days and weeks following the attack. Secondly, the relief personnel who come in close contact with disaster victims must be able to withstand the emotional strain and demoralizing influence of working with persons who are in an extremely anxious or depressed state of mind.

p. 233 ...motivational problems that might interfere with the success of a public educational program...

p. 244 The necessity for overt practice is only one of many reasons for expecting that adequate training of the general population, if it is seriously attempted, will necessitate an intensive educational program that goes far beyond the usual publicity campaign. The anxiety aroused by the subject matter will interfere with the motivation to learn and will often keep the size of self-selected audiences to a minimum. Even if the content of the educational program is limited to the most essential material, there is still so much to be learned—and it must be learned well to be effective—that special training courses may be necessary.

p. 252 ...Boomerang effects may arise in connection with various security measures, such as antisabotage precautions. Government officials have already issued public warnings concerning espionage, sabotage, and underground activity; they have urged that everyone be alert to report suspicious circumstances to proper authorities. At some future time, when atomic warfare is felt to be much less remote than at present, people may become extremely apprehensive about the possibility that A-bombs can be launched by submarines, planted in innocent-looking merchant craft or even smuggled into the country piece by piece and reassembled inside any factory, office building, or apartment house. At such a time, the public might become all too cooperative, especially if anxiety
is strongly aroused by playing up dramatic incidents which demonstrate that underground agents are actively at work trying to plant A-bombs in American cities. The national security apparatus might then become overloaded with a multitude of false leads, coupled with urgent requests for prompt investigations of questionable activities in every local community. Concurrently, in a national atmosphere of apprehensiveness and suspicion, critical issues might arise with respect to the political dangers of "scapegoat" reactions toward minority groups and popular demands for extreme security measures of an antidemocratic character.

9. Findings

The only published case studies of atomic disaster experiences are those in John Hersey's popular book, *Hiroshima*. There has been only one systematic study of a cross section of A-bombed survivors: a small sample survey by the Morale Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, [USSBS] conducted about three months after the A-bombs were dropped... [and which] was focused mainly on questions of morale... Nevertheless, many of the interviews contain spontaneous comments that tell us something about the emotional impact resulting from the A-bombing.

...It was by no means rare to find interview comments suggesting emotional shock...
...In other words, to produce a given amount of physical destruction in a metropolitan area, the use of an A-bomb (under the Hiroshima-Nagasaki type of conditions) results in an excessive number of killed and injured people, as compared with the use of "conventional" bombs. This antipersonnel feature of the atomic weapon seems to have definite psychological implications.

...despite the shortcomings of the available evidence, the numerous reports for many different samples of bombed communities show such a high degree of consistency that it appears to be safe to accept the following general conclusion: air attacks of the type employed against civilian communities during World War II produced only a very slight increase in chronic psychopathological disorders.

In general, then, psychiatric reports on civilian reactions to bombing indicate that heavy air attacks produce a sizeable incidence of "emotional-shock" cases with acute anxiety...
symptoms. Most of these cases appear to be capable of fully recovering, either spontaneously or in response to simple forms of psychiatric treatment, within a period of a few days up to several weeks.

p. 135 ...except in the mentally ill, the content of hostile thoughts depends to a considerable degree on the situational factors that are present at the time that aggression is aroused.

p. 141 Apparently there are diminishing returns so far as the morale effects of increased magnitude of air attacks are concerned... The USSBS report points out that a considerable number of people in heavily hit cities were evacuated...Such persons were likely to have lower morale than those who remained.

p. 145 ...severe personal losses (i.e., being injured, losing a member of the family), even in a lightly raided town, depressed morale so greatly that the added effects of moderate raids were relatively slight.

p. 147 Although there was a marked deterioration in morale attitudes among the Germans and Japanese, there appears to have been relatively little descriptive behavior, even during periods of very heavy bombing.

p. 148 Although the quantitative results just described are ambiguous, they do lend some weight to the following hypothesis, which is also supported by other evidence: air raids are a contributing factor in the wartime increase of petty criminal activity (looting, black-market activity, and juvenile delinquency).

p. 149 ...Schmideberg offers the hypothesis that the tendency to indulge in petty criminal acts is due to a particular unconscious attitude toward bombing, namely, the feeling that the authorities have failed to prevent the unlawful behavior of the bombs and therefore one need not be so concerned about his personal conformity to law.

p. 153 ...Bombing had little effect on the incidence of chronic mental disorder; outbreaks of mass panic were rare; behavioral morale was maintained at a relatively high level. Although emotional shock did occur on a sizeable scale, most cases recovered fairly rapidly.
Although sightseeing may have provided vicarious gratifications of aggressive impulses, it is likely that other motives were also involved [regarding curiosity--see also SP-4, Convergence Behavior in Disasters]. Matte claims that the facial expressions of people as they stood in front of damaged buildings, seemed to reflect an emotional "working-through" of air-raid experiences, perhaps resulting in increased understanding and acceptance of the realities of the threat....the heightened awareness of the danger may have enhanced self-respect ("I am able to take it").

It is probable that feelings of security are most effectively maintained if the group has a leader who is able to organize collective activities skillfully and who possesses the personal characteristics which make it easy for people to accept him as a protective authority figure.

hedonistic abandonment of social restraints rarely occurred among people faced with the threat of air attacks. Certainly there are no indications that common moral standards were swept away in any mass outbreaks of greed, lust, or violence. On the contrary, what little evidence we have consistently points to fairly rigid conformity to social norms and increased efforts to adhere to conventional morality.

There are two main ways that emotional control can be fostered: preparatory education preceding the outbreak of atomic attacks and on-the-spot communication from an authoritative source immediately following an atomic explosion.

The less adequate the physical protection of the population, the higher the incidence of emotional shock and disorganized behavior. In an atomic war, such reactions on a mass scale might become a crucial deterrent to national recovery.

Many groups of survivors who received no help from people in outlying communities might become extremely hostile and attempt to obtain shelter or supplies by force and violence. Obviously, if this type of social disorganization occurs following an atomic disaster, a prolonged period of demoralization is to be expected. On the other hand, if the essential needs of the survivors are well provided for and if there is community leadership, there is every reason to expect that within a short period of time the vast majority will willingly participate in reconstruction work and make a fairly adequate adjustment to the deprivalional situation.
Although "panic" is an extremely ambiguous term, the image it usually brings to mind is that of a wildly excited crowd behaving in an impulsive, completely disorganized fashion, each person abandoning all social values in a desperate effort to save himself. From the available literature on extreme fear reactions, it appears that this sort of behavior rarely occurs unless (1) there is an obvious physical danger which is immediately present (e.g., a raging fire only a few feet away) and (2) there are no apparent routes of escape. Hence, panic, in the limited sense of the term, is likely to be evoked by an A-bomb attack primarily in the area where the disaster actually occurs, e.g., among those who are trapped by the general conflagration within the city. In places which are not affected by the explosion, including cities which are potential targets for the next attack, there is far less danger of a serious outbreak of overt panic. That is to say, there is a strong likelihood that with appropriate psychological preparation such reactions can be prevented.

For purposes of analyzing and predicting social behavior, it is preferable to avoid using a term which connotes the sort of behavior that occurred in the Cocoanut Grove fire [Boston, Mass., 28 November 1942] when referring to other less extreme, types of action motivated by fear...it is necessary to reformulate the ambiguous question with which this discussion began. Instead of asking, "Will there be widespread panic?" the inquiry should be centered upon (1) what forms of fear reaction are likely to occur under various conditions of an A-bomb threat? and (2) by what means can the more extreme forms of personal disorganization and inappropriate behavior be prevented in threatened areas?

...From what is generally known about the spread of fear rumors, the best antidote is confidence "that you have been told the worst, and that you will always be told the worst." Once the authoritative channels of communication are taken to be unreliable, people begin to feel isolated from their government and can no longer be reassured by official demands.

[Refer to 9., Problem Areas, above, entry from p. 233]. Most of the respondents [to a survey carried out in the Los Angeles area during the summer of 1950] expressed lukewarm approval of civil defense preparations. The favorable sentiment seemed to be of a rather superficial character, reflecting primarily the conventional appraisal of rescue and relief activities as a

1 [See SP-2, Vulnerabilities of Social Structure, 5., Assumptions, excerpt from p. 229, Chapter II by Neil J. Smelser.]
humanitarian and patriotic enterprise. In most of the interviews, one finds manifest approval accompanied by the attitude that there is no real need for us to do very much about the A-bomb threat at the present time...

p. 235 [The following quotation of a statement from one of the Los Angeles respondents in 1950:]

"Russia might be able to bomb the U. S. but I don't worry about that at all. The United States has always won every war it fought and has always managed to keep its home territories protected and that is what will happen in any war that we ever get into."

10. Recommendations

p. 191 Clinical psychiatrists have suggested and tried out many different techniques for minimizing the effects of psychological trauma, some of which may prove to be extremely valuable. But, so far, practically no systematic research has been carried out to assess the effectiveness of alternative techniques. An integrated research program should be organized in order to explore the most promising techniques in a thoroughly objective way.

p. 206 It is at [the initial stage of organizing civil defense units] that social scientists may be able to make an important contribution as advisors on policy decisions. Well in advance of this stage, social research should be alerted to the need for information relevant for soliciting mass participation in a civil defense organization.

p. 222 [Refer to 3., Problem Areas, p. 222 above.] Such problems require careful consideration in planning the organization of medical and social services. For example, in setting up a system of sorting medical casualties so as to give priority to those who have the best chance of recovering [triage], it may be desirable to arrange for segregating those radiation
victims who are expected to die, so that they will not have a demoralizing effect on a large number of medical-aid personnel and on other patients. For the patients who will be worried about epilation, ugly scar tissue, and other disfigurements, a special series of pamphlets and posters might be prepared in advance, containing information about treatment and the chances of recovery. These printed materials could be included in emergency supply kits for distribution at the appropriate time in disaster-aid centers.

The training of civil defense personnel might also take account of the problem. In the preceding chapter, the suggestion was made that all those who are likely to be in extensive contact with emotionally upset survivors be given some instruction and practice in elementary psychiatric principles and techniques. To the extent that defense workers are able to give appropriate supportive help to disaster victims, the unfavorable effects of widespread emotional upset will be reduced within their own ranks as well as among the people they are trying to help.

In an Army Medical Bulletin devoted to the problems of atomic warfare, it is estimated that of the 50,000 or more deaths which would ordinarily result from a single attack on a modern city about 10,000 could be avoided if every person in the city were adequately informed beforehand as to what he could do for himself in case of an A-bomb disaster. The Hopley Report on civil defense recommends a public educational program as a major undertaking of vital importance to national security, referring not only to the tremendous number of lives that may be saved, but also to the psychological dangers that may be averted:

As war of the future will directly affect our total civilian as well as our military resources, the entire civilian population must be made aware of the problems and hazards, as well as the limitations, of an enemy attack which might employ unconventional as well as conventional weapons.

Individual citizens and families must be prepared to exercise maximum self-protection before expecting help from others. They must be so informed and instructed that they will be able to act with assurance and self-confidence. Such knowledge and ability to take the proper action in an emergency will dispel fear, prevent panic and confusion, minimize loss, and maintain some semblance of morale.
In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that emotional factors should be taken into account at an early stage in the preparation of the material for the public education program. Before that stage is reached, research should be encouraged on the general problem of minimizing the anxiety aroused by mass communications dealing with potential dangers.

...Intensive research is needed, not only to gauge the impact of alternative communication [education] policies, but also to increase our general psychological understanding of personal adjustment to impending danger...

...In order to obtain an initial estimate of the validity of current speculative hypotheses and to arrive at some new insights, intensive interviews and behavioral studies could be carried out with persons who are exposed to an extreme threat of personal danger, such as:

1. Persons who have cancer or some other serious disease, particularly those who suffer little discomfort but know that they might have only a short time to live.

2. Persons who are scheduled to undergo an extremely serious operation.

3. Men in hazardous occupations for which there is a relative high casualty rate (e.g., test pilots).

4. People in communities threatened by epidemics or by other periodic disasters.

...from on-the-spot studies of peacetime disasters, valuable data may be obtained on the conditions under which official communications issued during a crisis are successful or unsuccessful. By contacting the relevant authorities, field investigators would obtain fairly complete information about the media and the content of practically every official communication issued to the public before, during, and after each disaster, including such items as (1) warnings of impending danger; (2) recommendations concerning preventive and protective measures; (3) reassurances about anticipated dangers; (4) evacuation orders and other emergency demands; (5) information releases about the progress of disaster control, the damage sustained, or the damage anticipated; (6) notices about the information of emergency laws and regulations; (7) warnings and recommendations about public health and safety measures during the postdisaster period; (8) announcements about postdisaster relief and rehabilitation.
activities. Such studies would answer the following:

1. Communication Exposure (Was it perceived by those for whom it was intended?)

2. Comprehension (Was it correctly understood?)

3. Acceptance (Was it believed?)

4. Transmission (Was the information passed on to others?)

5. Arousal of affect (What emotional feelings did it produce?)

6. Instigation of action (Did it elicit appropriate or inappropriate action?)

7. Morale (What effect did it have on attitudes toward authorities, expectations about the future, etc.?)

It would require painstaking work on the part of many highly skilled investigators before even the most tentative findings could be derived from intensive case studies; field investigations and controlled experiments are even more costly. Even if effective manipulative devices are developed for handling localized peacetime threat situations, they may not be applicable on a mass scale to a collective wartime threat.

Despite these objections, the proposals which have just been outlined represent what seems to be a promising line of attack for making basic scientific advances relevant to the practical problem of minimizing anxiety, pessimism, and disruptive behavior in times of anticipated danger. One has only to contemplate the potential magnitude of the problem to feel that in the absence of any safe bet, it is worth while to take the best possible research gambles.

11. Contribution of This Study

This book provides a discussion of nuclear war in the context: What is nuclear war?, and What is its effect on people?
12. **Key References**

   [From the many references, it was difficult to identify the more important ones.]

13. **Costs**

   [None given.]
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1. **Title:** A Study of the Effect of Catastrophe on Social Disorganization
   - **Authors:** L. Logan, L. M. Killen and W. Marrs
   - **Contractor:** The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office
   - **Contract No.:** Department of The Army (number not given)

2. **Type of Study**
   - p. 3 [An analysis of] civilian disasters...for common indicators concerning behavior training, organization, and control which could be extrapolated to military atomic situations.

3. **Key Descriptors**
   - Disasterous situations (Texas City: Explosion Port, Tornado Towns, University of Oklahoma Dormitory Fire), civilian behavior.

4. **Objectives of the Study**
   - p. 7
     1. To determine the effect of catastrophic situations on the behavior of military personnel.
     2. To make recommendations concerning effective training and organizational measures that will tend to minimize disorganization, both in extent and in time.
     3. To establish criteria for military control of civilian populations in combat zones.

5. **Assumptions**
   - p. 14 Many of the motives of civilians and soldiers may...be expected to be the same...
   - p. 115 ...that atomic attack against combat zone troops would have as its purpose preparation for ground offensive action, exploiting disorganization created by the bomb.
Bombing of areas in the Communications Zone would have as its purpose interruption of the flow of supplies, services, and replacements to combat troops.

...a "Zone of Destruction" with a radius of 3,000 feet from ground zero, with a diameter of a mile or more [would be created]...all buildings and equipment would be destroyed...small minority of survivors...surrounded by the dead and dying...all combustible material would be in flames. The area and the few living people in it would be defenseless against ground attack by properly trained and equipped enemy troops.

Surrounding...this area would be a "Zone of Extensive Damage," between 3,000 feet and 10,000 feet from ground zero. Damage...would range from severe to moderate...many deaths and serious injuries...majority of the people in the zone would still be alive...fires [exist].

A "Zone of Light Damage" would begin about two miles from ground zero...damage to material and injury to personnel [would] be of such a minor nature that the psychological effects of being subjected to atomic attack would be the major determinant of the troops' reactions.

...that human life, per se, is of less importance as a motivating value in wartime military groups than in peacetime civilian groups.

The preservation of human life, no matter whose, will still remain a strong cultural value for United States troops, but its sacrifice in the furtherance of a tactical or logistical mission is expected in a military situation.

...a well-trained soldier will, even in a disaster situation, place accomplishment of his mission ahead of the saving of his own life or the lives of others.

...the motive of carrying out the military mission will be in conflict with two other motives [the individual's desire to save his own life and the concern for the lives of primary group associates].

...in a military situation property will be of little significance as a motivating factor [with the exception of equipment essential to accomplish the mission].
Differences in the past experience of the soldier and the civilian must be assumed. [These differences include: definition of what is normal in wartime, and more training in recognition of, and protective action against, disaster].

p. 122 ...in the event of actual atomic attack, the patterns of reaction of persons in the various disaster zones would be similar to those of civilians in corresponding zones, modified only by the objective and subjective factors assumed to be peculiar to the military situation.

6. Scenario

p. 115 ...explosion of bombs releasing energy equivalent to about 20,000 tons of TNT...a nominal bomb [causing maximum destruction] exploded in an air-burst at 2,000 feet, over one of two targets: (a) Troops in the Combat Zone organized laterally and in depth for a mission of attack or defense; or (b) troops and installations in the Communications Zone, with a logistical mission of supporting combat units with supplies, services, and personnel replacements.

7. Measures of Effectiveness

[None identified.]

8. Problem Areas

[None identified.]

9. Findings

p. 4 (1) Social reorganization after a disaster follows this pattern:

(a) The individual at first tends to act in terms of those social values which seem to him most threatened.

(b) Small groups begin to emerge on the basis of concern with a common problem. Leader-follower relationships develop spontaneously.

(c) As communications are reestablished, leadership, controlling several small groups, emerges. This is most successful if the relationship is that of coordination.
(2) The first 15 to 30 minutes after a disaster is the critical period during which fateful decisions must be made in the face of a totally new unstructured situation.

(3) In the case of troops under atomic attack, previous organization and training may counteract to some degree the initial complete disorganization, at least in the areas of moderate and slight damage.

(4) Panic can best be prevented by rapid transmission to individuals of accurate information as to the sources of danger and as to appropriate action to escape actually existing danger.

(5) Plans for meeting disasters should be flexible, inclusive as to personnel and broad as to area, and should include arrangements for prompt provision of essential supplies, the locations of which are known to all.

But the behavior of people subsequent to experiencing the disasters described here [explosion of the ship "Grandcamp," Texas City, and tornado towns] indicates that this very realistic sort of training does not insure accurate identification of actual, as distinguished from imaginary, threat.

People at first consistently tended to underestimate the extent of the destruction.

In the Zone of Destruction...structuring elements would be the desire to save one's own life and the lives of others in the immediate vicinity...

In the Zone of Extensive Damage...panic flight [would be] likely...the imaginary danger of radioactivity [might be added]...panic would not be universal...small group formation and reorganization would take place, first for the purpose of saving lives, later for the resumption of the mission of defense.

Only in the Zone of Light Damage, beginning two miles from ground zero, would reorganization of units for the purpose of the accomplishment of the tactical or logistical mission be the predominant reaction. The greatest problem in this zone would be the dilemma of commanders responsible for the assignment of subordinate units.
10. **Recommendations**

   An important question for further research is: To what extent can training--vicarious experience--be substituted for actual experience in preparing the individual to cope with disaster problems?

11. **Contribution of this Study**

    [This study represents a detailed analysis of civilian social responses to disasters and, from this observed civilian behavior, extrapolation of the reactions of troops to atomic attacks.]

12. **Key References**

    From the bibliography of 21 references, it was difficult to identify key references.

13. **Costs**

    None given.
1. **Title:** Management of Human Behavior in Disaster
   
   **Author:** Horace D. Beach
   
   **Contractor:** Department of National Health and Welfare, Canada
   
   **Report:** Emergency Health Services Division, 1967, p. 133

2. **Type of Study**

   ...[a description of] people's reactions and [a discussion of] the different principles and conditions which underlie particular kinds of behavior...

3. **Key Descriptors**

   Disasters (Halifax explosion, Flint-Beecher tornado, World War II bombing incidences, Hurricane Carla, Springhill mine disaster, Worchester tornado,...), civilian behavior.

4. **Objectives of the Study**

   ...to provide readers with reliable information about what happens in a disaster, how people behave, the kinds of problems that arise, how problems can be managed, and how planning and preparation can reduce casualties and suffering on the one hand and facilitate recovery on the other.

5. **Assumptions**

   Human behavior is sufficiently consistent in such different emergencies that we can predict, broadly speaking, how people will react in extreme situations.

6. **Scenario Used**

   [Not applicable.]

7. **Measures of Effectiveness**

   [Not applicable.]

8. **Problem Areas**

   p. 67 The problem of precisely what structure and characteristics of an organization or social system make it functional and efficient in disaster...
the difficulty of providing adequate numbers of the appropriate service personnel.

9. A More Complete List of the Author's Findings

[The following are the main findings of some 150 systematic studies of disasters in the last 15 years, together with intensive studies of civilians under air attack in World War II.]

p. 6
1. Contrary to common belief, mass panic, that is, headlong and terror-stricken flight, is a very rare occurrence in disasters.

2. Looting is a relatively minor problem in most disasters.

p. 7
3. There are very few instances of a breakdown of moral codes.

4. Populations which have been struck by a disaster are not a dazed helpless mass... they help themselves and indeed perform much of the rescue work.

5. Disaster victims are seldom reduced to the level of thinking only of their personal survival.

6. Disaster-stricken people generally do not exhibit outbursts of hysteria, screaming and weeping.

7. While social organization tends to break down because of the disruption of communications, transport, lines of authority, and because of the urgent concern of survivors for their families, friends and neighbors, an emergency social system is established fairly rapidly.

8. Emotional and physical reactions are fairly widespread following a disaster, but they tend to be temporary.

9. There is no clear evidence that disasters produce an increase in neurosis, psychosis, and such mental illness.

10. Children generally do not cause special problems in disasters, especially if they are not separated from their parents and those about them react to the situation.

11. ... in times of stress people can endure much more hardship.
deprivation, undernourishment and shock than they had ever thought possible.

p. 18 12. The reactions of people in the different zones of disaster space is also a function of the particular time phase in which they happen to be observed. [See p. 20 of the report.]

p. 24 13. ...nuclear disaster is likely to alter the behavioral reactions and problems associated with natural disasters, in the following ways:

(a) The response to warning may be exaggerated and difficult to control.

(b) Early symptoms of radiation sickness may appear in survivors...it will be more difficult to reassure and calm victims, and to evoke constructive coordinated behavior.

(c) Knowledge of radiation hazards will reduce the convergence behavior...potential helpers from the fringe and filter areas will...avoid the impact area.

p. 25 14. (d) The homing tendency will be reduced...

(e) The dangers from radioactive fallout may necessitate retreat to shelters for some time...shelter living will pose special problems. [See finding 20.]

(f) Mood and morale changes...are likely to be altered...shock will be more widespread, fears of radiation effects will persist for some time...availability of adequate supplies and facilities for survival [will determine existence of the whole community]...

p. 25 15. ...the best means of minimizing suffering and losses will still be those of adequate preparation and training, in terms of both the individual and the social system.

p. 33 15. Six kinds of emotional reactions and psychological disorders produced by an extreme emergency have been observed: (i) "normal" reactions, (ii) individual panic reactions, (iii) depressed reactions, (iv) overactive reactions, (v) grief reactions, (vi) and physical reactions.
16. There are four main principles in the management of emotional reactions in disasters: (i) decentralization of treatment and management efforts, (ii) the application of brief and simple methods of treatment, (iii) maintaining an attitude and treatment environment that emphasizes positive expectations of recovery, and (iv) appropriate registration and sorting of psychological casualties.

17. The three main problems in the development and functioning of an adequate emergency social system are: communication, coordination and control, and authority.

18. ...people who are highly aroused [by early warning signs] will be more subject to the influence of rumors and other misinformation, and that those who are not aroused by early warning signs will require powerful fear messages to produce the appropriate arousal and vigilance.

19. ...people seldom react with protective behavior to a single warning message.

20. ...that apprehension, anxiety, and fear would be a major problem in shelter living...

21. ...to be prepared with an operational management structure is to enter the situation with a preestablished social system, and this is the best means for controlling and directing human behavior.

22. ...[preparation] is not practical on a voluntary basis.

23. Any program of preparation for natural or nuclear disasters must include adequate attention to the collection and appropriate dissemination of three kinds of information: information on operational plans and procedures, on available resources of personnel material and facilities, and on recommended protective behaviors.

24. ...everyone [need not] be trained...persons with the appropriate skills, with clearly defined responsibilities, supported by adequate organizations,...will contribute most to survival.

Recommendations

...contributing conditions to disruption of behavior and
social system warrants analysis...

...to work out organizational systems that will best accomplish their particular tasks under the conditions and with the given population.

11. Contribution of This Study

This study represents a detailed description of people's reactions in disaster situations. It points out the problems that would be encountered in a certain situation, the management of these problems, and the importance of preparation.

12. Key References

From the 67 references, it was difficult to identify key references.

13. Costs

[None identified]
PART II

A REVIEW OF POSTATTACK SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
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RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

The task of predicting human behavior after a nuclear attack is well understood to be an enormous one. This task is magnified by the complexity and variability of social fact affecting human behavior, by the limitations of direct observations, and by the difficulty of theoretical development.

As summarized by SRI researchers: neither behavioral science research in general nor disaster research in particular provide a concrete basis for predicting the effects of nuclear attack on socio-psychological systems; nevertheless, they do provide possible insight into behavior among survivors of nuclear attack that might affect the speed of recovery by the economy as a whole.¹

DISASTER RESEARCH

The majority of these studies consist of the analysis of civilian behavior in peacetime disasters. They assume that, in the event of nuclear war, the patterns of reaction of persons in the various disaster zones would be similar to those of survivors in corresponding zones, modified only by the objective and subjective factors assumed to be peculiar to the military situation.

¹G. Hopkins et al., A Survey of the Long-Term Postattack Recovery Capabilities of CONUS, (Memo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, December 1963), p. 16
Logan, Killan and Marrs\(^2\) find that human behavior is a function of the distance from the center of destruction. In examining the events following the Texas City port explosion, the tornado towns of Woodward, Antlers, Holdenville, and Sasakwa, and the University of Oklahoma fire, they recognize three distinct zones of behavior.

In the "Zone of Destruction," where only a small minority of persons would still be alive and conscious, structuring elements would be the desire to save one's life and the lives of others in the immediate vicinity and to escape from a hopeless and dangerous situation. In the "Zone of Extensive Damage," panic flight might be likely, coupled with the imaginary danger of radioactivity. Panic, however, would not be universal, and small group formation and reorganization would occur, first for the purpose of saving lives, and later for the resumption of the mission of defense. Only in the "Zone of Light Damage," beginning two miles from ground zero, would reorganization of units for the purpose of accomplishing tactical or logistical mission be the predominant reaction.

Beach, analyzing tornado, hurricane, and explosion disasters, and bombing incidents, recognizes the different reactions of people in the various zones of disaster space, but he, like Vestermark, interprets this behavior as a function of the particular time phase in which survivors happen to be observed. Beach defines five phases: (1) pre-disaster phase in which emergency resource distribution and training for influencing the effect of, and response to, impact occurs, (2) warning-alert, where precautionary activity and seeking further information occur; and warning-threat, where protective and survival action takes place; (3) impact, in which people "hold on"; (4) emergency-isolation, in which shock, social system disruption, survivors extricate and rescue occur; and emergency-assistance, where organized and professional assistance occur; and (5) recovery, in which individual rehabilitation and readjustment, restoration of property and community organization and preventive measures against recurrence take place.

Vestermark's five phases, which he adopted from Smelser, are defined as warning and attack, shelter, emergency, adjustment and recovery. He does not analyze aspects of human behavior in these different phases, but rather describes counter measures. In his analysis, he describes a somewhat chaotic situation which could be

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3 D. Beach; Management of Human Behavior in Disaster; Department of National Health and Welfare, Emergency Health Services Division; Canada: 1967.

4 S. D. Vestermark, ed.; Vulnerabilities of Social Structure; Studies of the Social Dimension of Nuclear Attack; Human Sciences Research, Inc.; HSR-RR-66121 Cr; McLean, Virginia; December 1966.

5 Ibid., Chapter 2, "Social Dimension," Neil J. Smelser;
handled from the beginning by a carefully formulated plan for federal action short of military government. Vestermark, in contrast to Beach, states that widespread challenges to law and order would probably occur. Beach and Fritz and Mathewson conclude that looting is a relatively minor problem.

Fritz and Mathewson address behavioral patterns in respect to convergent actions which happened at Hiroshima. They delineate five major types: (1) the returness, (2) the anxious, (3) the helpers, (4) the curious, and (5) the exploiters. Thus, they raise the problem, as do many authors, of controlling the movements of persons, and, like many authors, offer, as a solution, security forces guarding disaster areas.

A spontaneous reaction to unwarned danger is stated by Logan, Killan and Marrs as being the momentary stun of all survivors within several miles of the point of the attack. Contrary to common belief, Beach found that mass panic, that is, headlong and terror-stricken flight, is a very rare occurrence in disasters. He further states that emotional physical reactions are fairly widespread, but they tend to be temporary so that outbursts of hysteria, screaming and weeping generally do not exist. In accordance with this analysis, Janis, in examining case studies experienced at Hiroshima, concludes that a sizeable incidence of "emotional shock" cases with acute anxiety symptoms occurred and that these cases were capable of full recovery within a period of a few days to several weeks. Like Beach, Janis concludes that a very slight increase of chronic psychopathological disorders will occur in the advent of a nuclear attack.


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Beach does not describe population which have been struck by a disaster as a dazed, helpless mass in the midst of a permanently disrupted social system, but rather as a group which establishes an emergency social system in an attempt to perform rescue work. He points out communications, coordination, control, and authority as problems, to which Ikle adds transportation, in organizing an adequate emergency social system.

Although Beach describes in detail behavioral reactions and problems associated with natural disasters, he states that nuclear disaster is likely to alter these reactions. He urges a program of plans and procedures on available resources of personnel, material and facilities, and on recommended protective behaviors. Beach states that not everyone need be trained; only persons with the appropriate skills and with clearly defined responsibilities will contribute most to survival.

Logan, Killan, and Marrs describe a pattern which social reorganization will follow after a disaster. They state that the critical period during which fateful decisions must be made in the face of a totally new unstructured situation is the first 15 to 30 minutes after a disaster. In the case of troops under atomic attack, previous training and organization may counteract, to some degree, the initial complete disorganization. In concluding, they specify flexibility and planned arrangements.

RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS

Although it is granted that research leading to the prediction of behavior has been useful in the design of population control policies, the immediately relevant question concerns the types of research to be encouraged at this point in postattack research. Suggestion of focusing on influencing behavior rather than on predicting behavior seems to be a valuable one since the existing data appear to be sufficient for most other purposes.
This study provides formatted abstracts and a narrative review of seven research tasks on post-attack socio-psychological problems. Most of the tasks are analyses of civilian behavior in peacetime disasters and conventional wars. Research into methods for influencing behavior after a nuclear attack is recommended.
1. Civil Defense  
2. Postattack Research  
3. Research Review  
4. Socio-Psychological Problems