SOVIET JOURNALISTS IN CHINA

Barton Whaley

Research Program on Problems of International Communication and Security

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

March 1970

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INTRODUCTION

It is remarkable that the literature on Soviet foreign relations consists largely of description at the level of formal governmental interaction. And this despite the fact that most authors of such studies are quite aware that Communist theory and Soviet practice intimately interrelate conventional diplomatic relations with propaganda and agitation, economic warfare, open intelligence collection, and—when and where appropriate—clandestine subversion. Furthermore such authors commonly neglect to integrate the findings of the considerable body of acceptable and cross-verified accounts of the operations of Soviet espionage, cultural offensives, information programs, etc. The obvious fact that much of this material derives from political refugees (as well as from emigres with less savory motives for defection) whose accounts are often ghostwritten in styles reminiscent of yellow journalism, does not relieve the student of international relations from making extensive—if closely critical—use of such often unique data.

The present paper reconstructs the fragments of data bearing on Sino-Soviet press relations from the widely scattered and often unreliable documentary sources, to supply one of the neglected pieces in the jigsaw puzzle of Sino-Soviet relations. Also, it attempts to demonstrate that such collated and analyzed data—though perhaps only when available in a more complete form than the author can now provide—can serve the student of relations among Communist states as both one more index of the saliency of particular countries to the USSR and as relevant evidence for the nature and degree of rift in inter-state and inter-party relations.

This paper is a by-product of my more general study, Soviet Foreign Correspondents (1970) which is, in turn, the outgrowth of my card-indexed Who's Who of Soviet Journalists' Specializing in Foreign
Affairs (draft, 1961-1965). Another paper, Guerrilla Communications (1970), collates the data on internal and external intelligence collection by several selected Communist guerrilla movements: China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, etc.

The research for an initial draft of this paper was completed in August 1964. The present final form represents only an edited version of that early draft. Because of other commitments, it was not possible to incorporate the following originally planned material: 1) a general up-dating of the data, 2) a biographical directory of Soviet journalists dealing with China, 3) a chronology, 4) critical annotation of the bibliography and 5) maps. Although such supplements would have greatly increased the reference value of this paper, it has been decided to issue the existing textual material to make it publicly available to interested scholars.
I. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

CLOSED Soviet attention to political events in China dates from the early months of Bolshevik power in Russia.

In the belief that it would prove mutually advantageous, Dr. Sun Yat-sen brought his political party, the Kuominjang (KMT), into close liaison with both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet Government. Dr. Sun accepted Soviet political and military advisers in large numbers after 1923, notably Mikhail Borodin in the former category and General Vasili Blyukher ("Galen") in the latter. An intense effort was made by the Soviet Government to present their advisers under labels as either private citizens or representatives of the international Communist movement rather than as operating under the discipline of the CPSU much less that of the Soviet Government. This camouflage was however a legal fiction to avoid a charge of export of revolution and to preserve the proprieties of inter-governmental relations. The true nature of the KMT-Soviet collaboration was however well understood by both contracting parties.
II. SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS IN NATIONALIST CHINA, 1920–1937

In June 1920 a Mr. "Zarkhin" arrived in Peking with his wife, having entered China under credentials issued by the official Russian press-wire agency, ROSTA. From there he went to Shanghai where we know he was in August and September at which time he visited Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Subsequently he went to Canton and then in 1921 returned to the USSR.

In June 1920 Gregory Voitinsky, special agent of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern, arrived in Peking where he visited Li Ta-chao to found the first Communist cell. From there he went to Shanghai where he assisted Ch' en Tu-hsiu in organizing the first local Communist cell. Subsequently Voitinsky went to Canton where he repeated his earlier organizational triumphs. He returned to Moscow in 1921, after turning over his operation to the Dutch Comintern agent, Hendricus Sneevliet (alias "Marling") who had just assisted in founding (1920) the Indonesian Communist Party. In an obsequy written for Pravda three days after Dr. Sun's death, Voitinsky recalls a second visit to Sun—then in Canton—in June 1924. ... "Zarkhin" and Voitinsky are the same person.¹

¹For Voitinsky's Comintern activities in China, see North (53), Wilbur and How (56), and Eudin and North (57). Eugene Pick, China in the Grip of the Reds (Shanghai: 1927), pp. 9-14, 18, 21, 45-46, is our only source for the statement that Voitinsky travelled in China under a ROSTA cloak. Pick claimed—on what seems very good internal evidence—to have been a Captain in Red Army Intelligence who served as General Galen's adjutant in China from 1924 until his defection in Hankow on 18 May 1927. Subsequently Pick (the actual pseudonym by which he was known in Soviet Intelligence) had some dealings—in 1930 and 1933—with U.S. Marine Lieutenant Evans F. Carlson, then Navy Intelligence Officer in Peking. To Carlson he claimed to have worked for Japanese Intelligence until 1933 when he hinted he had returned to the Soviet payroll. Michael Blankfort, The Big Yankee: The Life of Carlson of the Raiders (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947), pp. 153-153, where Eugene Pick is identified only as "Mr. Dick".
On 6 October 1923 Mikhail Borodin arrived in Canton from Moscow, also ostensibly as a representative of ROSTA. However, as in Voitinsky's case, this was merely a cover. Borodin had, in fact, been sent in response to Sun Yat-sen's request to Karakhan, Soviet Ambassador to the Peking regime, that a Comintern representative be sent as adviser to his own revolutionary regime in Canton.

On 13 December 1923 Borodin was officially appointed by Dr. Sun as Adviser to the KMT and launched on his spectacular career in the early history of the CCP-KMT movements in China. Although the Soviet Government, the CCP and the KMT initially insisted publicly on Borodin's status as a private citizen, they soon acknowledged his official Comintern role. However, it was many years after Borodin left Hankow on 27 July 1927 following the collapse of the CCP-KMT entente that his secret Soviet Government affiliation was disclosed.

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3 On Borodin's invitation, arrival and activities prior to formal attachment to Dr. Sun's staff see North (53), pp. 72-75; Brand, Schwartz and Fairbank (52), p. 31; Fischer (30), pp. 634, 636-640; Mitarevsky (27), pp. 130-1; Wilbur and Iow (57), pp. 144, 148.

4 North (53), p. 73; Isaacs (38); Fischer (30); Sheean (36).

During the period of active KMT-CCP collaboration (1924-1927), numerous Comintern and Soviet intelligence agents of several nationalities were sent to China as advisers to the KMT and the CCP. They normally entered with the usual conspirator's "legend," supplying false background, a *nom de guerre*, and a cover occupation. According to Captain Pick, those who entered on TASS (or until July 1925, ROSTA) credentials were—in addition to Zarkhin-Voitinsky—the German Jew Zilber, who operated in Hankow, Canton and Swatow in 1925, the Bulgarian (or Moldavian) Proussianin (alias "Arnold," alias "Arthur") in 1927, and the Russian Jew Musin in Hankow in 1927. In addition, Pick mentions an Englishwoman married to a Russian, a Mrs. Lotov (alias "Lotoss"), who entered as a Soviet journalist (organizational affiliation unspecified) and operated in Hankow or Shanghai in 1927.

In 1921 the Comintern decided to intensify its political activity in the Far East. According to Peking journalist Sokolsky the subsequent intense propaganda operations in China were conducted by ROSTA and DALTA (presumably the official Far Eastern Telegraph Agency of the short-lived Far Eastern Republic.)

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6 Wilbur and How (56) is the standard reference on this general topic.

7 Pick (27), pp. 11-14, 16, 18, 21, 44-46. Pick is not only my only source for this mention of a TASS "cover", but the lone source that mentions these names (other than Voitinsky, Zilbert, and Musin). Furthermore, Pick is not too specific in his dates or other details. Both the Hoover and Columbia libraries contain several lists of Soviet agents in China at this time published by Chinese, British and U.S. police, intelligence and foreign ministries which should be checked for confirmation. Pick (an admitted pseudonym) is almost certainly the mysterious "Mr. Dick" who in 1930 and 1933 attempted to get recruited by U.S. Navy Intelligence Officer in China, Lt. (USMC) Evans F. Carlson. If so, it is quite clear from his statements to Evans that he was a most untrustworthy person. Blankfort (47), pp. 153-155.

8 Eudin and North (57), p. 84.

The earliest reference to a "legitimate" Soviet journalist in China is to an unnamed ROSTA "Jew" who had lived many years in the United States and who was familiar with American methods of thought and American newspaper terminology and practice whom UP's Far East Manager, Miles Vaughn, met in Peking in May 1925. 10

One measure of the importance of Soviet Intelligence coverage of China is the fact that the Shanghai office was one of the first six TASS foreign bureaus to have been established. 11

The earliest TASS dispatch from China of which I know, was filed from Shanghai on 17 July 1929. TASS was also represented in China by a Shanghai bureau in 193412 and 193613. This office did send dispatches to Moscow which were published by the central press. 14

On the occasion of the pioneer flight of a Soviet airplane from Moscow to Peking sometime in the early 1920's, Miss Zinaida Richter—at

10Miles W. Vaughn, Covering the Far East (New York: Covici, Friede, 1936), p. 102. Mr. Vaughn—then only newly arrived in the Far East—described this ROSTA correspondent as: "one of the best of my Soviet contacts. . . . I liked to talk to him because he could talk Bolshevik ideas without resorting to all the Marxian phraseology." Vaughn was based in Tokyo for UP from 1925 to 1934.


12See previous footnote.


14McLane (58), p. 75, notes a TASS dispatch filed from Shanghai and published in Pravda, 24 June 1936, p. 5.
Leading Soviet journalist—arrived in the craft as a special correspondent covering the event.  

In early 1937, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, TASS had only two Russians registered with the Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nanking, presumably comprising the entire TASS China bureau at that time.

Pravda maintained a correspondent in Shanghai at least as early as March 1927. And an Izvestiya correspondent in China is known from a wired dispatch published in the 28 July 1927 issue of International Press Correspondence, the official bulletin of the Comintern.

This was, of course, a period of intense revolutionary—and counter-revolutionary—activity in China, one closely watched in Moscow.

From Edgar Snow we have an intriguing account of the Chief of the TASS Peking Bureau in 1936 functioning as a self-admitted channel of reporting to what he could only mean (unless one presumes some sort of self-delusion) were the top Soviet policy makers on Chinese affairs.

Snow recounts how:

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17 Isaacs (1951), p. 154. The nationality of the anonymous correspondent is not specified. The reference is to his interview with Kuomintang General Pai Chung-chi quoted from Pravda by the New York Times, 1 April 1927.

18 Isaacs (1951), p. 266. Again nationality is not specified.

19 Edgar Snow, Random Notes on Red China (1936–1945) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 3. This interview is based on Snow's diary notes of the time. Snow does not mention the name of the TASSman, only that he was recalled to Moscow in 1937 and that Snow had never heard of him again. He may have been V. Abolnik who was in Peking around that time. Snow notes that the Peking TASS bureau had at that time purchased all of his articles on the Chinese Communists—the first such on-the-scene public reporting to come out of Red China—and that he was "reasonably sure" they had been forwarded to Moscow, but none had been published in the Soviet press.
Following my return from Yenan in [October] 1936 
I ... told the head of Tass agency in Peking, off 
the record, exactly how the Reds were being helped by 
Chang HaUeh-liang. Our conversation indicated he was 
not entirely informed about that. But he himself 
had no doubt that Chang HaUeh-liang was sincerely anti- 
Japanese and that his seizure of Chiang Kai-shek [on 
12 December 1936] had the full support of the Chinese 
Communists. He was as astounded by the [unfavorable] 
Moscow press reaction as I was. He kept repeating, 
"I don't understand. They have read all my reports. 
How could they make this mistake?"
III. SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS IN NATIONALIST CHINA, 1937-1949

This chapter covers Soviet press activities in the non-Communist areas of China during the unsettled years of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1941), the Pacific War (1941-1945), and the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949).

The Sino-Japanese War began on 7 July 1937 with the Marco-Polo Bridge incident in Peking, which fell to Japanese troops on July 28th. A month later Russia and China signed a non-aggression treaty and this was soon followed by sale to China of Soviet warplanes and, later, by other military supplies.

Shanghai fell on 12 November 1937 to the Japanese, who then pressed on toward the Nationalist capital of Nanking. Although, in anticipation of further retreat to the interior, the Nationalists formally transferred their capital to Chungking on November 20th, the Executive in the person of Generalissimo Chiang moved only to Hankow. The bulk of the foreign press corps followed Chiang's pattern of keeping one city ahead of the Japanese. 20

During the brief period of the battle for Nanking which ended with its fall on 13 December 1937, the TASS office—then in Hankow—filed 2,000 to 3,000 words daily to Moscow. This was considered by the Reuters Hankow correspondent to be an unusually large volume. 21

By 1938 TASS had greatly increased its China bureau staff. The bureau chief, Vladimir Rogov, imported ten "crack" Soviet reporters and sent them

20 Tong (50) gives a detailed chronological account of the movements of the Nationalist Ministry of Information and the foreign press corps.

directly to the various fronts. According to Miss Sues:22

They reported to him by wire as often as they came near a field station. Thus Rogov's cables to Tass, which I had to censor and to translate, contained the only accurate, detailed and reliable information from the various battle zones which gave a comprehensive picture of the war situation. They were highly appreciated by the Government, though this was, of course, never admitted—but the fact that officials would go to the trouble of telephoning or dropping in to get them was proof enough. There were American and British war correspondents like Jack Belden and James Bertram, traveling with one or another army unit and doing good work, but no other country had arranged for as complete a coverage as the U.S.S.R.

Later, by August 1938, the number of TASS staff at the front had been increased to 12 war correspondents, all reporting to Rogov in Hankow.23

Roman Kamen, Izvestiya's former war correspondent-cinematographer in Civil War Spain, was sent from Moscow soon after April 1938 to film the war in China and may have been there as late as 1941.24


23 Chao (39), p. 704. Also Utley (39), p. 174, who enables us to pinpoint the date.

24 Ilya Ehrenburg, Eve of War, 1933-1941 (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1963), p. 277. In any case, Ehrenburg speaks of him in April 1938 as "planning to go to China" and on 17 June 1941 as being in Moscow exhibiting a film (his own?) on China. For personal reminiscenses of Kamen in Spain see Ehrenburg, op. cit., pp. 117, 130, 133, 148-9, 152 and Louis Fischer (41), pp. 396-398. Kamen was one of the few Izvestiya staffmen to survive the 1937-1953 purges, writing on the Venice Film Festival for Pravda in August 1959 and serving as an Izvestiya Special Correspondent in Havana in November 1960.
In December 1938, AP's Haldore Hanson met two "Soviet news photographers" who were staying with other foreigners at the Officer's Club in Kweilin, which was then both South China Headquarters of the Nationalist Army as well as capital of Kwangsi Province. 25 And on 8 January 1942 Robert Payne met a "Russian correspondent" who was also covering the major battle of Changsha. 26

An interesting fact emerges when we compare this striking growth in TASS investment of personnel in China and consequent increase in information output to Moscow with the news output on China appearing in the Soviet press of the time. Charles McLane has done a valuable content analysis of the China coverage in the Moscow daily press from 1938 until 1949. Whereas in September 1939 battle dispatches from China alone averaged one-third column per day each in Pravda and Izvestiya, by the eve of the German invasion of Russia in June 1941 this coverage had dropped by one-half. 27

During the period from the German attack on Russia until the dissolution of the Comintern—July 1941 to July 1943—"battle dispatches from Chungking carried in Pravda dwindled from an average of about three a week to three a month or less." Furthermore, neither Pravda nor Izvestiya carried any editorial comment on China. Similarly both

26 Robert Payne, Chunking Diary (London: William Heinemann, 1945), p. 62. Payne was covering this battle as special correspondent for the Times when he met this unnamed correspondent among other foreign journalists.
27 McLane (58), p. 146. This decline in dispatches from China was even exceeded by the fall in Moscow-originated feature story coverage: the number of such articles during the first six months of 1941 being one-fourth of those during similar periods in 1938 and 1939. Indeed from 3 May 1940 until 1945 not a single political commentary about China appeared in the Moscow daily press.
Bolshevik and Communist International dropped all mention of China.  

However in August 1943, Soviet press coverage—particularly in the form of Soviet political commentary—was renewed after four years of virtual blackout apparently as a result of the rapidly mounting tension between the KMT and the CCP.  

Hankow fell to the Japanese on 25 October 1938 and Chiang soon moved executive headquarters to Chungking. The TASS China bureau headquarters presumably accompanied this move. In any case, we know it was there at least by 11 June 1940, because on that day the TASS offices were bombed and burnt out in a spectacular 112-plane Japanese raid that also destroyed the premises of the French and German news agencies and the Soviet Embassy. While Havas and DNB immediately transferred their offices into the government-operated Press Hostel, TASS moved in only later that winter due to the shortage of accommodations elsewhere. Meanwhile the then two Russian TASSmen lived in a house of their own located near the Soviet Embassy. Also located in the Press Hostel were the offices of Transocean, AP, Reuters and even Guenther Steim's China Air Mail together with the living quarters of 40 foreign correspondents, virtually the entire foreign press corps.  

By January 1943, the total permanent foreign press corps in Chungking had declined to 25 of whom three were Russians, all with TASS.  

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28 McLane (58), pp. 156-157.  
29 McLane (58), pp. 166-167.  
30 Journalism Quarterly, v. 17 (1940), p. 278.  
Certainly one contributing factor to this general reduction in the press corps was the expansion of belligerency, which excluded the Germans and their allies from Free China. By fall of the following year, the total number had expanded to 32 of whom the same number was with TASS.33

The TASS Chungking Bureau chose to send and receive news reports directly to and from Moscow over the powerful Chinese Government Radio Administration transmitter at Chungking. Most other foreign correspondents preferred to send their dispatches first to Shanghai or Hong Kong via wireless.34 This bureau did send dispatches to Moscow which were published in the Central Press.35

During 1942 the TASS Chungking Bureau, continuing to use the direct Chungking-Moscow radio telegraphy link, transmitted 623 messages totaling 122,998 words and received 6,401 messages of 1,454,548 words.36

The month after the June 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Embassy in Chungking opened a Press Bureau. This bureau published a daily bulletin in English, News and Views from the USSR, consisting of news dispatches from TASS and special wires from the SOVINFORMDURO. The Embassy Press Bureau also issued a weekly bulletin

34 Journalism Quarterly, v. 17 (1940), p. 175.
35 Thus McLane (58), p. 208, notes a TASS dispatch filed from Chungking and published in Pravda, 30 November 1945, p. 4.
36 The Chinese Yearbook: 1943, p. 684. One presumes that with the Japanese in control of both Shanghai and Hongkong and at war with the Americans and British, that these latter had now joined the Russians in using the CGRA Chungking transmitter. The comparable traffic that year between Chungking and the U.S.A. was 7,959 outgoing messages totaling 881,132 words and 5,657 incoming messages totaling 1,095,588 words.
in Chinese, the Hsin-wen lei-pien. 37

In July 1945 we know that the TASS Chungking bureau was issuing—like Reuters—its news service in English. 38

Until its dissolution on 23 May 1943, the Comintern operated its own international news agency which called itself SUPress, a Freudian abbreviation of "Soviet Union Press." Headquarters were in Moscow, except presumably for the brief wartime evacuation in 1941 of the Comintern to Ufa. 39 In June 1942, Chang Han-fu registered in Chungking as the correspondent for SUPress. 40 Mr. Chang was concurrently—and throughout the Sino-Japanese War—editor of the Hsin-hua jih-pao (新華日報, New China Daily), the official Communist Party newspaper in Chungking. 41

Soviet correspondents—either at home or abroad—have seldom been particularly noted for their mixing—either professionally or socially—with the foreign press corps. This was generally true in China. 42


41 Whaley, Who's Who of Soviet Journalists (draft, 1964). Five years later, Chang Han-fu became a Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a position which he still (1963) shares with four others in Peking. He is also an Alternate Member of the CC of the CCP. He represented his government at the Geneva Conference in 1961 and 1962.

42 This is implicit from the rare references, all noted in this paper, by Western and Chinese journalists to their Soviet as contracted with their other colleagues. For explicit references to the non-mixing of the Soviet community in Chungking and elsewhere in China, see Peck (50), p. 118.
However, their early contacts in China offer some of the notable exceptions. For instance, when on 18 May 1943 the members of the foreign press corps in Chungking founded the Foreign Correspondents Club, TASS was represented. Indeed, TASSman M. Yakshamin was a charter member and officer, being elected a Vice-Chairman (together with Theodore White of Time-Life-Fortune and Chao "Tommy" Ming-heng of Reuters) while Brooks Atkinson of The New York Times was Chairman and Spencer Moosa of AP was Secretary. This organization registered itself with the Chinese Nationalist Government and soon began to represent the foreign press corps in various official matters concerning its membership. However, the three TASS members both reverted to form and, incidentally, showed good discipline when they unanimously proved the only exceptions when in April 1944 all other members of the Foreign Correspondents Club joined in signing a petition to Generalissimo Chiang requesting the liberalization of press censorship.

The camaraderie which sustained the western journalists covering the Japanese advance from the de facto Nationalist capital in Hankow in 1938, partially encompassed the TASS contingent. The chief of the TASS China bureau there, Vladimir Rogov, was called "friend" by the distinctly anti-Communist Hollington Tong, Vice-Minister of Information, who had responsibility through his Central Publicity Board for all correspondents and international propaganda. Rogov and his staff frequented "Rosie's,"

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44 Tong (50), p. 248.

45 Tong (50), p. 208.
Hankow's only "respectable" Western-style nightclub along with the other foreign press, military and diplomatic corps. Rogov had his apartment-cum-offices on the third floor of the China Press Building which also housed Reuters on the ground floor and "Colonel" J. L. Huang's War Area Service Corps on the second. The roof of this building was the only one where correspondents were allowed to stand during Japanese air raids; and Rogov would join his professional colleagues, Colonel Chennault, and the diplomatic corps during these social occasions.

TASS correspondents evidently accompanied the Soviet Army which entered Manchuria on 9 August 1945 and remained in occupation until its withdrawal the following April. Whether or not TASS departed with the Soviet forces is not known to me. However, it seems likely on two grounds that they would have done so: Firstly, the unsettled state of civil war which followed close upon the withdrawing Soviet troops and the hostility which the entering Nationalist forces felt toward the Russians at that moment would probably have made a Soviet journalist's life too risky. Secondly, and only inferentially, the TASSmen in Manchuria were probably accredited only to the Soviet Army and it is unlikely that the Nationalists would have sanctioned transfer of accreditation to the regular TASS China bureau.

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46 Utley (39), p. 194.

47 Sues (44), pp. 181, 296. Miss Sues notes however that Rogov was avoided by the Christian and anti-Communist "Colonel" (actually General Huang).

48 McLane (58), pp. 227, 234, notes the following two TASS dispatches published in Pravda:
24 February 46, p. 4 (filed from Manchuria)
2 March 46, p. 4 (filed from Changchun)

49 The only subsequent TASS dispatches on Manchuria of which I am aware are datelined Shanghai. A search of Pravda for that period should, however, be made to find any Manchurian datelines.
Following the Japanese surrender in China in August 1945, the emigre foreign press corps returned to Shanghai, Peking, and Hong Kong. In any case, we know that TASS was back in Shanghai by April 1946 if not earlier. 50

By September 1948, there were 88 foreign correspondents and Chinese representatives of foreign press agencies in the Nationalist cities of Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, Tientsin and Tsingtao. The only Soviet correspondents represented in that group were the TASS staff. 51

50 Thus, McLane (58), p. 259, notes from his conversation in 1953 with American journalist, Marjorie Ravenholt, that she had interviewed a TASS official in Shanghai in April 1946.

As described below, Soviet official relations with the Nationalist Government of China were consistently "correct" from earliest contact until 1949 when Soviet Diplomatic recognition was transferred to the Chinese Peoples Republic after its \textit{de facto} seizure of power on the mainland on the eve of the flight of the Nationalist Government to Taiwan.

All military supplies were channeled directly to the Nationalist Government during the Sino-Japanese War. And even after World War II, with the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, the Soviet Government managed desperately to preserve a legally correct position while facilitating the Chinese Communist takeover there. Theodore White learned that:\textsuperscript{52}

From 1937 to 1945 no more than five Russian planes made trips to \{the Communist capital of\} Yenan; each of these planes was approved by the Central Government and brought a Central Government inspector with it as it flew in, and all materials carried were thoroughly checked.

It appears that the Soviet Union preserved the official proprieties even in terms of its accreditation of foreign correspondents to those regions under the control of the Chinese Communists.

From the time of the KMT-CCP split in 1927 and expulsion of the Soviet advisers until the arrival in the Communist town of Paoan of Edgar Snow in June 1936, no foreign observers or journalists entered the Chinese

\textsuperscript{52}White and Jacoby (46), pp. 239-240.
Communist enclaves. 53

The first known Soviet journalist to visit the Communist regions was TASS correspondent Skvortsov who had been recently assigned to the Hankow bureau and came up from there by train to the Communists' Eighth Route Army headquarters in Southern Shansi province for a few days in February 1938 with a goodwill delegation of five other Hankow Europeans, bringing money, clothing, and medical supplies. 54

53 McLane (58), p. 2. This does not, of course, include Comintern officials who continued—although seemingly on a much reduced scale—to visit the Communist-held areas. For example, Mif in 1931, "Albert" in 1931-1933, possibly Lominadze in 1932 or 1933, and the German "Li Teh" (Otto Braun) stayed on as a military adviser from 1933 to 1939. See McLane (58), pp. 9-10; North (53), p. 164. For explicit denials of the presence of Russians or Soviet newsmen see:

a) Snow (38), p. 66, who notes that when he reached Pao An in June 1936, the only other foreigner there was Li Teh.

b) Wales (39), p. 264, who mentions only Li Teh in her time: April-October 1937.

c) Bertram (39), p. 284, who notes that TASSman Skvortsov's visit in February 1938 was first Russian in Red Areas for at least the five months since September 1937.

d) Hanson (39), p. 295, who states "there were only two white residents" in Yenan at time of his 3 week visit in September 1938: "Ha Hai-teh" (George Hatem) and "Li Teh" (Otto Braun).

e) Payne (47), p. 68, who notes in June 1946 only 2 Russians in Yenan, both doctors.

f) Strong (49), pp. 17, 25, who mentions in August 1946 only 2 Russians in Yenan, both doctors flown in from Manchuria.

For mere non-mention see:

a) Wan Yah-kang, Rise of Communism in China (Hong Kong: 1952). Wan, who claims to have spent 3 years with the Chinese Communists during the war, makes no mention of either Soviet correspondents or any other Russians in Yenan. Cited by McLane (58), p. 175.

54 James Bertram, Unconquered (New York: John Day, 1939), pp. 284-5, 289. Bertram, a New Zealand journalist and consistent sympathizer of the Chinese Communists, met Skvortsov there while on his return from seven months in the Red areas. Skvortsov is probably T. F. Skvortsov who, later in the early 40's, was Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Chungking. Alternately, he could be I. M. Skvortsov, Professor of Newspaper Editing and Publishing at Moscow State University in 1963.
Anna Louise Strong, while covering the operations of General Chu Teh's Eighth Route Army when she visited his field headquarters in 1938 (probably in January or February) reports that two of the twelve TASS correspondents then covering the Nationalist's war effort briefly appeared at Chu's headquarters. "It was plain that these were the first Russians most of Chu Teh's men had seen."  

McLane, commenting on Dr. Strong's evidence, remarks that this may have been possible only because of the relaxation of Nationalist resistance to travel by foreigners to the Red areas during the first two years of effective Nationalist-Communist "united front" during 1937-1939. As Chu's field headquarters was then located in Northern Shansi province, I would suggest that the two TASS men referred to may have come through Yenan, although as remarked above, it is unlikely they were based there.

When American correspondent Joy Homer visited Yenan in late April and early May 1939, the only Russian she found was "a very homesick Russian photographer who had been sent out to bring back propaganda pictures of Yenan." This is the first known reference to a Soviet journalist in Yenan itself.

55 Anna Louise Strong, The Chinese Conquer China (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1944), p. 60. She does not give their names. Dr. Strong, a consistently pro-Chinese Communist American freelance journalist, is now (1968) in Peking serving as a propagandist for their cause. See Mark Gayn, "Anna Strong, Mao's friend, in Big Trouble," Boston Globe, 18 August 1968.


57 Anna Louise Strong, One-Fifth of Mankind (New York: Modern Age, 1938), pp. 127-138, describes in detail this 1938 visit to Chu's headquarters "some-where in Northern Shansi" but mentions no Russians, journalists or otherwise.

58 From Miss Sues' account (44), pp. 187-190, we know two additional facts about Dr. Strong's trip. First we can pinpoint the date more closely in 1938 to January or February. Secondly, we can perhaps trace an eyewitness: Dr. Strong's translator was CNA journalist, Francis Yao, who subsequently became CNA's "daredevil battlefield reporter" and, later still, joined the new Delhi Broadcasting Station.

59 Joy Homer, Dawn Watch in China (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941), p. 226. Mrs. Helen Joy Doerflinger, nee Homer, was then China correspondent for the Interdenominational Church Committee for China Relief.
The only Soviet journalists regularly assigned to the Communist-controlled areas of which I know were those in the one- or two-man TASS sub-bureau in Yanan during World War II. Only three (or, perhaps, four) eye-witness accounts of this TASS operation are known to me. These are found in the reports on their visits to Yanan by the Bands, 60 Harrison Forman, 61 and Gunther Stein. 62 In addition, Theodore White appears to provide an additional first-hand reference. 63

William Band was an English physicist at Yenching University in Japanese-occupied Peking at the time of Pearl Harbor. He and his wife eluded internment and spent the next two years in the Communist-controlled areas. 64 Their published account of their stay in Yanan is one of the valuable sources for a period in which even fewer than usual Westerners passed through. On 28 October 1943—after only three weeks in Yanan—they became aware of the presence of a Russian TASSman there only when his replacement arrived with KMT permission on a Soviet plan—thus creating a small sensation because of its rarity. The Band's report the speculation of a local Chinese friend that the TASSman got his news out "by the Post

60 Claire and William Band, Two Years with the Chinese Communists (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 262-3. This work was published earlier in England under the title Dragon Fangs.


64 The Bands should be contacted for any further information they might yield. In 1948 Mr. Band was connected with the Institute for the Study of Metals, University of Chicago.
Office telegraph system to Chungking, most probably.65

The reports by Forman and Stein are for the same period. Both men visited Yenan together in the summer of 1944 as part of the first group of Western journalists to visit the Communist regions in five years.66 Although a number of other Westerners were in the areas at the time, none except White seem to have made any mention of the TASS correspondents.67

65Band, op. cit., pp. 262-3. The Bands are quite vague about the plane's route, commenting that it came either (directly from the USSR) via Lanchow or (indirectly) via Chungking. As these were the only normal routes, this comment is quite uninformative. The fact that he arrived accompanied by several Nationalist Army officers plus the normal protocol which would have him first report to—if not actually having been assigned from—the main bureau then in Chungking, indicates that the flight originated in Chungking.

66This group, the so-called "Chinese and Foreign Correspondents Press Party to the Northwest," left Chungking on 17 May 1944 and toured the Communist region for three months. In addition to nine Chinese correspondents and two Nationalist officials, the group consisted of:

- Gunther Stein (British journalist covering for the Christian Science Monitor and the AP. Stein remained a total of five months in the area.)
- Harrison Forman (New York Herald Tribune, UP, and The Times of London)
- Maurice Votow (Reuters, Toronto Star, Baltimore Sun, and Tong's Staff.)
- Father Cormac Shanahan (American Roman Catholic priest and editor of Catholic Monthly and China Correspondent and correspondent of The Sign. He remained in the region.)
- N. Protsenko (China Manager of TASS)

For accounts of this group, see Tong (50), pp. 243-244; Stein (45), pp. 26-28, 75, 79; Forman (45), pp. 2-3; McLane (58), pp. 175-176.

67One should carefully screen their writings and also open correspondence with those still surviving. Both Forman and Stein describe meeting, in Yenan, Michael Lindsay (now Lord Lindsay of Birker, at the School of International Service, The American University, Washington, D.C.). Stein (p. 347) mentions that on 22 July 1944 the U.S. Army Observer Section was established in Yenan with Col. David D. Barrett directing the group which consisted of John Stuart Service (since dead), Major Roy Cromley and Dr. Melvin A. Casberg, a major in the U.S. Army Medical Corps.
Of this TASS sub-bureau, Stein (pp. 437-8) says only:

The Russians have two TASS correspondents and an army surgeon in Yenan who went there years ago with Chungking via Kuomintang-controlled China, and those three men seem to be the only Soviet citizens in the Yenan region. All I was able to find out about radio contacts is that, Soviet broadcasts are received in Yenan and distributed to newspapers and government offices by the TASS representatives, very much in the same way our foreign branches of the Office of War Information and the British Ministry of Information distribute their home broadcasts in China and elsewhere.

Mr. Stein's reporting on this matter may well be less than the whole truth, if we accept Maj. Gen. Willoughby's detailed accusation that Stein was at that time a key member of the remarkable Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) ring operated by Richard Sorge. 68

Forman's account generally confirms Stein's statement, as far as it goes. 69

We have what appears to be an eye-witness reference from Theodore White who visited Yenan sometime later the same year than Stein and Forman. White states that: 70

68 Charles A. Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952), particularly pp. 76 ff, 249-250, and 276-7. One might check the New York Times Book Review and New York Times columns to see if Stein were publishing only what was already known, a good mark of a sharp operative.

69 Forman (45), p. 176, which says:

The sole Russians in the Border Region were a surgeon who seemed to stay at the operating table about sixteen hours a day, and two representatives of Taos News Agency who had come in under passports duly vissed by the Chinese Government. These two Tass men were not, as far as I could see, sending news dispatches to Moscow—they were merely receiving and issuing a regular news service like that put out by the American OWI in strategic political centers all over the world today.

70 White and Jacoby (46), p. 201. Time China Bureau Chief White flew into Yenan "late" in 1944 for a "few brief weeks."
By 1944 two Tass newspapermen and a Russian doctor constituted the only instruments of Soviet influence in Yanan, and these men had come with Central Government permission.

The only known second-hand account of this TASS office, which throws fresh light on the problem is that by Charles B. McLane. His direct evidence is based only on the above quoted passages by Stein and the Bands, missing the supporting references by Forman and White. However McLane did some interesting research on his own. During the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact, August 1939-June 1941, Soviet press coverage of Chinese Communist activities drastically declined: none of the feature articles on the Chinese Communists which had appeared occasionally in the previous two years were published, the formerly frequent battle dispatches disappeared by the end of 1940, official statements from Yanan were only infrequently reported, only two of Mao's 27 statements during that period were reported and then only in the Comintern press in early 1940, and no reports appeared of the several major CCP meetings. "Chinese Communism had never been so little in the news in Moscow--apart, perhaps, from the nine months preceding the announcement of the [KMT-CCP] United Front in September, 1937--since the beginning of the movement two decades earlier."72

Indeed, the Soviet press carried not one single substantive reference to the Chinese Communists from June 1941 until January 1945 when a brief


72 McLane (58), pp. 144-146. Even what little that was reported was handled gingerly and often with delay. See, for example, pp. 148-152, on Soviet reporting of the New Fourth Army Incident of 1941.
dispatch from Chungking reported Chou En-lai's views on recent Nationalist-Communist negotiations. McLane found "no articles in Soviet publications until after the war which were directly concerned with developments in the Border (i.e., Communist) areas, despite the fact that one or more Soviet correspondents ... were accredited to Yenan from at least 1942 [sic] on. ..." McLane comments that:

The presence in Yenan of Soviet correspondents who were apparently in continuous residence there throughout most of the war raises several questions: Why were their dispatches, if filed, kept out of the Soviet press? Were they, in fact, bona fide war correspondents, or were they perhaps sent to Yenan to maintain liaison between Moscow and the Chinese Communists? The present writer has seen no materials which would shed light on their activities, nor is he familiar with any speculation on this subject by other students of Chinese Communism.

We do not know who the TASSmen in Yenan were. However we can ask what, in fact, they were doing in Yenan. As we know that probably from at least as early in March 1938 and certainly from October 1943 on that the Chinese were regularly monitoring the TASS radio transmissions, it seems somewhat implausible that with only two or three Russians sent

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73 McLane (58), pp. 175-176. His date of 1942 for the earliest known presence of TASS correspondents in Yenan is incorrect even in terms of his own sources. The earliest date available to either McLane or myself is 28 October 1943, given by the Bands. Also had McLane closely examined his own cited sources he would know—as noted above—both the Bands' rumor that the TASS correspondents were sending dispatches to Moscow via Chungking and Forman and Stein's statements that they constituted a sort of Soviet PR in Yenan. These are dubious "materials," but materials nonetheless.

to Yenan, the TASS contingent would be merely occupied with providing a service that the Chinese appeared to be handling well enough themselves. At the very least, I presume that the Chinese welcomed them as advisers in interpreting the transmissions from Moscow. In addition, I suspect that they also provided a channel for transmission of secret communications from the Soviet Government or Party. Furthermore, I would suggest they were also reporting on Chinese Communist activities to Soviet intelligence.\footnote{That Soviet journalists under Stalin were not above espionage on fraternal Communist parties is seen in the activities of Pavel F. Yudin in 1947 and 1948 in Belgrade where he simultaneously edited the official Cominform journal \textit{(For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy)}, affiliated as the Soviet Union's permanent Cominform representative, and spied for the NKVD. See Fitzroy MacLean, \textit{The Heretic} (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 315.}

In any event these TASS correspondents had left Yenan by the time Robert Payne briefly visited in June 1946 during a truce period. "There were only two Russians in Yenan, both doctors."\footnote{Furthermore, the only foreign official there—an American major with the U.S. Yenan Observer Group—had assured himself that the two Russians were not moonlighting. Payne (47), p. 68. This was confirmed two months later by Anna Louise Strong who arrived in August 1946 when "the only Russians around were two doctors who had flown in with the Red Cross supplies and Chiang Kai-shek's permission sometime earlier from Manchuria when the Russians were still there." Strong (49), pp. 17, 25.}
On 2 October 1949—two months before the Nationalists fled to Taiwan—the USSR extended diplomatic recognition to the newly triumphant People's Republic of China, which had been established the previous day. This act was accompanied or soon followed by a flood of Soviet diplomatic, commercial, technical, and cultural personnel. TASS received permission to open an office in Peking in the month following recognition.77

Presumably the Soviet correspondents already in Nationalist China were involved in the initial transfer of accreditation, as were the Soviet officials there.78 However, this should not be assumed out of hand, because the type of Soviet personnel accredited to Nationalist China might well have been thought by either the Russians or the Chinese as unsuited for dealing with Communist China. One could even imagine an immediate transfer of certain key staff, particularly those serving state security, or military espionage officers under diplomatic or journalistic covers.

In view of the rather conclusive evidence that the majority of all Soviet foreign correspondents during the period from the 1937 purge to the death of Stalin in 1953 were Soviet espionage agents,79 it would be

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77 Lynn and Amos Landman, Profile of Red China (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 147. The Landmans were in Communist China at that time, as American journalists.

78 For example, the Soviet Ambassador, N. V. Roshchin, continued to serve in the new regime for three years until replaced by A. S. Panyushkin who had himself been a former Soviet Ambassador to the Nationalists. Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1963), pp. 289-291. See also K. M. Panikkar, Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955).

79 Whaley, Soviet Foreign Correspondents (1970), Chapter V. See also Kruglak (62) for similar conclusions based on analysis of documentary materials. The author's conclusions confirm Kruglak's, using additional documentary sources as well as by noting sharp and indicative discontinuities in personal backgrounds of Soviet journalists for the periods 1919-1937, 1937-1953, 1953-present, based on an examination of over a thousand Soviet journalistic biographies.
surprising to find the same personnel continuing to serve for any extended period in the new fraternal regime. Unfortunately I lack data for the crucial year 1949, but of all Soviet journalists known to be in Nationalist China in previous years, none appear in China after 1949. 80

This point should be stressed because the preoccupation of some authorities with the covert activities of Soviet journalists, in particular places and periods, desensitized them to data which indicates both local differences and changes in the general system. A splendid example of the errors that this static, unhistorical view can create is given by American journalist Paul F. Healy who wrote in 1951 that: 81

A splendid example of the Tass-spy breed is one Vladimir Rogov, who directed the main Tass bureau in Nationalist China from Shanghai, while simultaneously heading up the Far Eastern Soviet spy ring. When the Chinese Reds took over, Rogov moved his two-faced operation to the new government's seat at Peiping, presumably to spy on Russia's ally.

In (or about) April 1960 there were 40 members of the foreign press corps in Peking. Of these, eight were Soviet, about an equal number each from East Europe, the Asian Communist countries and the Western Communist press (British, French, Italian, Austrian, Canadian, and Israeli Epstein from the U.S. National Guardian), two from Yugoslavia, and three from the 'Capitalist' press (one each from Reuters, Agence France Presse, and the Toronto Globe and Mail), and seemingly only one from a non-Communist Asian country (Indonesia). Of the eight Soviet journalists, three were from Pravda, three from TASS, end one each from Izvestiya and Komsomolskaya Pravda. The protocol order for the foreign press corps placed the

80 Unpublished graph of biographies.
Soviet journalists—in the above order—over those from all other fraternal Communist states; next came the representatives of the Western Communist press; and last, the three "Capitalists."\(^{82}\)

In addition to the permanently assigned Soviet correspondents in China, a rather large number of contacts occurred through temporary visits. These were either in the form of delegations of Soviet journalists\(^ {83}\) or of special correspondents coming to China to cover only one event such as the inauguration of a new airline service, celebration of a national anniversary, or arrival of a Soviet Party delegation. The significance of special correspondents is the quite straightforward one of indicating the propaganda and/or official importance as perceived by the Soviet leadership. In the case of delegations, however, the officially announced circumstances of sightseeing, dinners, handshakes, etc., often prove later to have masked substantive negotiations between delegation and host. Unfortunately, we can only idly speculate as to hidden significations, if any, of these journalistic delegations.

A. TASS

The TASS China bureau was transmitting dispatches from its new headquarters in Peking from at least as early as 4 July 1951. Despite the recent vicissitudes of Sino-Soviet relations, this bureau has continued (at least through 1963) to operate although—as we shall see below—not without some harassment.\(^{84}\)

\(^{82}\) Frederick Nossal, Dateline—Peking (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1963), p. 165. Nossal, Peking correspondent for the Toronto Globe and Mail, cites a booklet issued to foreign correspondents by the Information Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These booklets list the names, news media, countries, and protocol order of all members of the Peking press corps.

\(^{83}\) A virtually complete listing of such delegations can be compiled and analyzed from the indexes to the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP) and the Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP).

\(^{84}\) Latest noted TASS China Bureau dispatch was filed in Peking on 27 August 1963.
Judging from the frequency of TASS dispatches datelined Shanghai, it appears that TASS also maintained a permanent sub-bureau there, at least during the period 5 July 1951 to 10 December 1954.

It has proved quite difficult to establish either the number or names of TASS correspondents in China. Even when in late 1958 TASS first began to publish some of its dispatches under the by-lines of its foreign correspondents, this personalization was not extended to TASS correspondents reporting from Communist countries. 85

B. Pravda

Pravda has maintained a major foreign bureau in the Chinese Peoples Republic (CPR) since at least late 1950. Indeed, one measure of the salience to the Soviets of China news coverage is that fact that from mid-1953 to mid-1959, the four-man bureau was the largest one maintained abroad by Pravda. 86 Thence the bureau gradually contracted to its present (1963) size of two, probably in consequence of the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations.

C. Izvestiia

Izvestiia, the official newspaper of the Soviet government, has consistently maintained a smaller staff of correspondents in China than Pravda. 87

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85 Whaley, *Soviet Foreign Correspondents* (1970), Chapter VII. The only exceptions (why?) are Cuba and East Germany. Even TASS Yugoslavian bureau dispatches continued to be published anonymously.

86 Most Pravda bureaus are one-man operations. The only known cases where as many as three Pravda men were assigned to one country were in North Korea in 1950-51 (covering the war) and in the U.S. since 1962 when a one-man Washington, D.C., office was opened to supplement the normal two-man office in New York City.

VI. THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT AND DETERIORATING PRESS RELATIONS

The relations between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union have never been entirely smooth, either at the Party or state levels. Even those periods of relative smoothness in the 1930's and 1940's were perhaps merely the result of little contact. The successive Soviet leaderships have never wholeheartedly approved the various Maoist programs and Soviet material assistance invariably flowed from less than ungrudging fraternal negotiations. Despite the mutuality of ideological background and ultimate goals, the divisive elements ever present in the operation of their day-to-day policies now (1964) clearly dominate both the state and Party relations of China and Russia. The revelations from both Peking and Moscow in 1963 and 1964 are sufficiently frank and detailed and documented to end any lingering doubts about the validity of the above judgment.

Before 1963, both Sinologists and Sovietologists were divided in the relative weighing they assigned the binding forces of ideology and the dividing forces of existent international policy making. Observers obsessed with ideology failed to recognize the historical, psychological, economic, and political factors that tended to disturb the relationship. Conversely, many persons of the Old China Hand persuasion had perhaps underrated the binding forces, both ideological and, in some cases, political.

In any event, the implications of the present (1964) stage of the Sino-Soviet rift now extend far beyond the Chinese and Russian borders as a result of the choice between the CPR and the USSR which is now being
forced on the various Communist states and the opportunities for maneuver opened to several non-Communist nations. We can expect that the operating conditions of both Soviet and Chinese journalists will be affected by these relationships.

From the very moment of Communist takeover in Peking in February 1949, the official Communist news agency, NCNA, followed the international pattern of Communist news agencies of depending on the TASS wire and Pravda for most of its foreign news, at least that portion which was passed to the public. This pattern was spread throughout the Mainland as the advancing Peoples' Liberation Army swept up city after city. In the summer of 1949, Michael Lindsay (now Lord Lindsay of Birker) revisited North China as New Statesman and Nation correspondent and was displeased to note that "the general standards of foreign news reporting were those of the less reputable British or American press (with bias reversed)." Finally, by a Government order effective

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88 For example, when in 1963 all states were invited to sign the partial nuclear test ban treaty ("Treaty of Moscow"), North Vietnam could no longer equivocate and publicly refused to sign, thereby committing herself at that time, clearly if uneasily, to the Chinese camp. P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 195-196. See also P. J. Honey, "North Vietnam: Divided Councils in the Party," China News Analysis, No. 503 (Hong Kong: 13 March 1964).


90 Op. cit., p. 125. Lindsay had been Radio Adviser to the Eighth Route Army during his stay in Yenan from 1942 to 1945, having fled there from his university position in Peking when Britain entered the Pacific War.
1 September 1949, all foreign news agencies were expressly prohibited from distributing their news services inside China. 91

Soviet political domination of the satellites was accompanied by adoption of the Soviet style of organization and operation of the press, news agencies, and radio. This was soon followed by direct control over supply of non-bloc news by TASS. 92 This situation was legitimized in 1950 by the Conference of News Agencies of the Peoples' Democracies. This conference produced an agreement for coordination of news handling policies that established TASS as the principal source for foreign news dispatches for China as well as Albania, Bulgaria, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. These states continued their former news exchange agreements with such Western wire agencies as Reuters and AFP, but as these now disappeared from the public press, we can only presume that such news was used for reference only, that is, in the so-called Red TASS monitoring reports circulated daily to selected officials.

But TASS' monopoly in the bloc news agencies was short-lived. Theodore Kruglak states that it did not last beyond the end of the Korean War but gives no examples prior to 1958. 93 However, Kruglak's theory that the successive stages and varying degrees of TASS monopoly are the direct reflection of political strains with Moscow and not merely a function of TASS's technical proficiency in news diffusion seems to be supported both by his own data as well as other data now available to me in addition to the other general indices that have become so visible since 1963 as a result of the Sino-Soviet split.

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91 Landman (55), p. 94.

92 Kruglak (62), pp. 51-61, provides an excellent summary of the relationship between "TASS and its Satellites."

93 Kruglak (62), p. 58.
In 1956 William Stevenson was in Peking when NCNA suddenly "took precedence" over TASS and all other news distribution channels in China, "something no Soviet satellite succeeded in achieving for its native-born agencies." Up to that time the TASS and Radio Moscow bureaus in Peking had received priority over all other Peking foreign press bureaus in receiving official news announcements.94

By 1958—I have not yet established which year—NCNA had moved aggressively to expand its services in Asia. It had largely replaced TASS as the principal source of foreign news for the North Korean news agency (Chung Yang Tongshin). It had become a major supplier for the Communist or fellow-travelling press in both Burma and Thailand. Radio Peking transmitted extensive NCNA news broadcasts at dictation speed to the entire Southeast Asia region and the Mongolian Peoples Republic.95

Soviet journalists were apparently also included among the specialists supplied to the Chinese under their aid agreements. Mikhail Klochko describes one young man whom he was told by an outspoken Soviet Embassy official had been sent by TASS at the request of the Chinese to teach journalism and had been doing considerable touring through the country. For this he was paid 650 yuan by the Chinese in addition to his regular ruble salary, an amount considerably in excess of current Chinese salaries for comparable officials.96

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95Kruglak (62), p. 58, based on his interviews with North Korean, Mongolian, and Burmese delegates at the spring 1958 Congress of the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) in Bucharest. Of course, at that time, these informants denied any Sino-Soviet ideological differences, merely expressing a "preference" for the Chinese presentation.

In any case, such technical assistance in journalism as may have been extended ended abruptly in August 1960 when all Soviet advisers were withdrawn in accord with the Soviet note of mid-July recalling all Soviet nationals working in Chinese organizations. However, constraints on dealings of Soviet advisers and specialists had begun earlier from the Chinese side. During an earlier trip in 1958 Klochko had noticed little difficulty in interpersonal and official contacts with Chinese fellow-scientists or bureaucrats; however it was subsequently reported to him that in late 1959 the Chinese authorities had begun to closely restrict the movement of Soviet nationals, requiring them to be accompanied at all times by their assigned guide-interpreter. Finally, following his return in 1960, Klochko noted that within a week of the publication on 22 April 1960 of the "Long Live Leninism" article in Hung Ch'i [Red Flag] it had become evident to Klochko that a directive had reached most Chinese in regular touch with Russians that forced them to sever all personal relations with their Soviet colleagues.97

Frederic C. Nossal, an Australian journalist, was Peking correspondent for the Toronto Globe and Mail for eight months in 1959-60. He describes the socially and professionally isolated, travel-restricted life of Peking's foreign community and makes it quite clear that these constraints applied equally to the Soviet diplomats and correspondents in that period.98

97 Klochko (64), pp. 147-193, describes in great detail both his personal observations of these changes and the official reasons given privately at the time by both the Chinese and Soviet authorities to all Soviet advisers.

98 Nossal (63), pp. 13, 25-27, 69, 163-5, 182. Nossal arrived in Peking in early October 1959 and left in June or July 1960. He was forced to leave when the Chinese Foreign Ministry refused to renew his visa on the grounds that his reports had not been entirely "accurate," although he had just been condemned by Time for his "uncritical reporting" and "approving copy."
The eight-man Soviet press corps in Peking—three each for Pravda and TASS, and one each for Izvestiya and Komsomolskaya Pravda—were as dependent on the official press handouts and briefings as the representatives of East European, Western Communist, and Capitalist press for news coverage of China. These were handled by the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry, the sole official contact with all foreign journalists. Independent searching out of news was almost impossible. In addition to tight limitations on travel, interviews with officials, even admission to certain "public" places was restricted. Nossal notes that:

The Peking citizen was always on the lookout for party spies, and was therefore of little use to the foreign reporter. ... Political conversation anywhere was out of the question. Several Communist and Western reporters who spoke Chinese told me that when addressed in the street people would either smile politely and say nothing or would simply walk away.

Judging from Nossal's account, the social life of the eight Soviet correspondents in Peking—at least in 1959 and 1960—was virtually confined to themselves, their 30 or so fellow foreign correspondents, the diplomatic corps, and formal social banquets conducted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Information Department. "Many of the Russian reporters were as unhappy about Peking" and the "arrogance" of the Chinese toward all foreigners as were their non-Communist colleagues. Even at diplomatic functions the foreign Communist journalists tended to mix more with the West Europeans and even Yugoslavs than with the Chinese. A particularly sore point with newsmen was the "refusal of the Chinese to issue invitations to their wives" with the consequence that "some of the women had themselves accredited to a variety of little-known Communist journals so they wouldn't be left out of things." In housing, even the foreign

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99 Nossal (63), p. 27.
100 Nossal (63), pp. 163-165.
Communist newsmen often had to live in hotel rooms with their families for months before receiving an apartment.

In 1960, Fritz Steck, correspondent of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, visited China only briefly but observed—as did Nossal—friction between the Chinese press officials and both the Soviet and East European journalists. For example, TASS was excluded from a junket of journalists of "friendly" nations to "newly liberated" Tibet. Steck reported:

"It was a beautiful moment when the TASS correspondents were shaking hands with Agence France-Presse and Reuters in the information office and explaining the solidarity they felt with their Western colleagues.

Steck also was witness to the fact that the (Soviet?) and East European correspondents did not rush to file dispatches on the official announcement of the impending visit of Chou En-lai to India. In response to his query, they told Steck: "Oh, Hsin Hua [NCNA] has put this on the wires from Poland down to Albania [i.e., throughout Eastern Europe] about six hours ago, so we will be, anyhow, too late." Kruglak notes that this behavior was surely in contravention of NCNA's exchange obligations permitting the East European agencies free access to its wire file."

Peking undertook its first reported direct harassment of Soviet journalists in August 1963. The unlikely occasion was the 1963 basketball championships of the armies of the socialist countries hosted in Peking by the National Defense Ministry of China. In a rare display of fraternal unity, ten of the old bloc chums turned out: Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Korea (DPRK), Mongolia, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam (DRV). The event, together with the Soviet participation, was given appropriate coverage by the Chinese press media, at

least by NCNA in its English language transmissions to Asia and Europe on August 23rd and 24th. Apparentiy all went smoothly from the arrival of the Soviet team on the 23rd, through the opening ceremony on the 24th and through the first two days of play (25th and 26th). Then, according to TASS, on the 27th the officials of the Peking Sports Palace refused admittance to the correspondents of TASS, Pravda, PAP (Polish press agency), ADN (East German news agency), and the Polish newspaper Trybuna Ludu. These officials stopped the correspondents at the door, explaining only that "the system has been changed," although the Press Department of the CPR Foreign Ministry which had issued the original press cards that previously served to get the correspondents in had not notified the correspondents of any change.

On August 30th, NCNA in both foreign and domestic transmissions reported a press conference on that day by the Information Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry admitting the incident but stated that it was caused by the Soviet correspondents making a "big fuss" about a misunderstanding with an attendant at the stadium who was unfamiliar with the

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104 TASS Moscow Bureau in English language transmission to Europe, 1830 GMT 27 August 1963 (Complete text in USA Monitor No. 168-1963 p. BBB4). The 120-word story was filed from the TASS Peking Bureau.

special arrangements applying to all foreign correspondents. The TASS correspondent's report was said to have been "distorted" and constituted "an unfriendly action ... detrimental to the solidarity and friendship among socialist countries." 106

In any case, the Soviet team defeated the Chinese 74 to 69 in the playoffs on 2 September 1963 for the title of Basketball Champions of Friendly Armies of the Socialist Countries. 107 But none of this is too surprising, it is only the latest—and almost certainly not the last—overflow into fraternal bloc journalism of the Sino-Soviet dispute. 108

This sort of communication tit-for-tat has also affected the previously smooth exchange arrangements between Radio Moscow and Radio Peking, whereby each undertook to broadcast in its domestic service and in the local language every Monday, Wednesday, and Saturday a half-hour program prepared by the other. Radio Moscow discontinued carrying the Chinese programs with its broadcast of 3 July 1963, and Radio Peking responded by terminating the Soviet program with its 8 July transmission. 109

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108 Since writing this in 1964, many similar incidents did occur. For example, at an IOJ conference in Jakarta and the Czech expulsion of NCNA.
The All-China Journalists' Association "once again" appealed to the Communist controlled International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) to "take effective and immediate steps to uphold its aims and protect the rights of the news office of a socialist country in its normal functions."

It has been recently (1963) suggested that the Soviet Union may soon open—for the first time—overseas news bureaus in Hong Kong co-located with a permanent trade mission and even, conceivably but not likely, a consulate. The general purpose of these possible moves would be to employ the Crown Colony as a listening-post in the same effective way that such other Governments as the United States and Britain who are not entirely persona grata in Peking do. This is taken to be a direct result of the closing of the Soviet consulates in the Chinese hinterland in September 1962.

Although this suggestion is highly speculative, it merits attention because it went to press only days, if not hours, before Peking initiated its first harassment of Soviet journalists during the 1963 basketball championships of the fraternal socialist states described above. That true prescience may have been involved is revealed in the following developments:

Apparently for the first time Soviet journalists have taken to visiting Hong Kong since late in 1963 and have also begun publicly reporting on their trips following their return. All that remains would

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111 The 29 August 1963 issue of a "confidential" newsletter of that otherwise very proper British weekly political-economic journal, The Economist. The motive for the trade mission suggested by this "source" would be to apply economic pressure on the Mainland. Refugee interviewing for intelligence purposes was also suggested. It further says there have already been "feelers" in the form of requests for temporary trade delegations.

112 The author's draft, Who's Who of Soviet Journalists, gives special attention to any Soviet journalists who have served abroad, even those who were only on brief "special" assignment to cover a single event or who had visited abroad.
be to report directly from there and, ultimately, to assign a regular Hong Kong correspondent.

Sometime soon after September 1963, when his account was published in Nedelya, Yury Popov had visited Hong Kong. His article emphasized Chinese inactivity toward that remnant of "colonialism on their own soil." Popov was there on a short visit from New Delhi where he has been stationed as Izvestiya correspondent from 1962 to the present (June 1964). It seems likely that this trip dates from May-June 1963 when he was on special assignment in West Iran.

On 30 April 1964 Izvestiya published another, rather lengthy, article by Popov describing Hong Kong as an imperial remnant. The story was credited to "Special Correspondent" Yu. Popov and datelined "Hong Kong, March and April 1964" and contains some eyewitness observations buried among a number of generalizations which could have easily been acquired without making the trip. Despite the Hong Kong dateline the report was published only after Popov's return to India following a brief trip to Hong Kong, New Zealand, and perhaps other places.

Then on 27 May, Pravda published an article on Hong Kong:


114 Popov's Hong Kong visit could have been even earlier, in March, when he was in Manila covering an ESCAPE meeting. Whaley, Who's Who of Soviet Correspondents (draft, 1964).


written by two of their journalists who had returned to Moscow having "visited" the Crown Colony "during a recent journey through Southeast Asia." The authors charge that the Chinese Communist leaders are "doing all they can to prevent the spread of the truth about Hong Kong" because it is a "city in which British colonialism and Peking's foreign policy—the same policy that attempts to pass itself off as a model of revolutionism—get along so well." They state they are constantly shadowed during their stay and one received an anonymous telephone call warning that: "The sooner you leave Hong Kong the better it will be for you." They openly speculate that "somebody was uneasy about our stay" and clearly imply by irony that both their shadows and their caller were Chinese Communist agents.

In their 1964 article, Domogatskikh and Pochivalov mention that this recent trip had been foreshadowed by an experience two years previously when they had inquired at the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi for information about air and rail travel facilities from Hong Kong through China to their intended destination of Vietnam and were most strongly—but unsuccessfully—urged to avoid Hong Kong, a transit point at that time.

At the time of their more recent trip to Hong Kong both co-authors were assigned to the Pravda staff in Moscow. Earlier, Domogatskikh had been Pravda correspondent in China (?-1954-1960-?) and Pochivalov with Komsomolskaya Pravda. Actually, I suspect the "we" covering the 1962 transit of Hong Kong applies only to Domogatskikh.

The fact that the content of all these articles on Hong Kong are part of the current (1964) propaganda barrage in the Sino-Soviet dispute would seem a weak argument for any claim that the visit of Soviet journalists to Hong Kong was prompted merely to collect editorial data. All the significant content of this material was already available in Moscow. Furthermore, the delayed publication of the material suggests that the correspondents were not there primarily to get a "hot" story.
A more plausible explanation is that given by Domogatskikh and Pochivalov: Hong Kong is a convenient transit point for trips through Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, I suspect that these recent Soviet journalists were also exploring the ground for possible future establishment of news bureaus in Hong Kong. This would seem a likely development should the Sino-Soviet dispute continue even without a formal break. Even now the Soviet government must feel the need of more listening posts for China and a Soviet "presence" in Hong Kong might well be judged by the British authorities to offer greater deterrent value to Chinese pressure than the obvious provocation it would represent.

Whether or not the Soviet Government plans to open a listening post in Hong Kong, it is true that there has been a steady contraction of their news collection in China since 1959. First, the number of dispatches filed in China and published in the Soviet central press has dropped off markedly since the Sino-Soviet split erupted openly in 1962 and 1963, despite the fact that overall coverage of China increased in this period as a direct result of the published polemics. Of course, the number of dispatches published is not a necessarily reliable index of the number transmitted by Soviet news bureaus in China. However, we do have a better index supporting this tentative conclusion: namely the number of Soviet journalists in China. Here a marked decline may be noted in the following table:

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<td>3?</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>2</td>
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13. ABSTRACT
   This study is a brief account of one of the minor but still significant aspects of the troubled history of Sino-Soviet relations namely the role of Soviet journalists in China. It covers the period from 1910 to 1964. It is the first monographic treatment of this previously neglected topic, reconstructing the story from the very thinly scattered fragments of relevant documentary data. The study shows that the press relations between the Soviet Union and China are a sensitive indicator of the nature and degree of rift in their general political relations. Moreover, the study suggests inferentially that similar studies of press relations among Communist states can serve researchers as valuable indicators both of the saliency to the USSR of particular countries and of the direction an extent of rift in inter-state and inter-party relations.
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